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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

PROSPECTS FOR THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
27 November 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Prospects for the Nonproliferation TreatySummary

The Nonproliferation Treaty is still far short of receiving the number of signatures and ratifications required to bring it into force. For a variety of reasons the momentum required to bring about the treaty's speedy acceptance has failed to develop. Some of the holdouts retain their earlier reservations that the treaty will impede their access to peaceful nuclear technology. Others are dissatisfied with the security assurances provided. Many countries believe that, so long as progress is not made toward actual reduction of nuclear arsenals, the treaty aggravates the imbalance between the have and have-not countries. Moreover, the world situation generally--particularly the continuing uncertainties in Eastern Europe and the Middle East--is not a propitious one for disarmament. Early US ratification of the NPT would give a boost to its prospects, but inertia and delay have already taken their toll of support and will be hard to overcome.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by the Central Intelligence Agency. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Strategic Research and the Office of National Estimates.

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~~SECRET~~Current Status

1. On 1 July 1968, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was simultaneously opened for signatures in London, Washington, and Moscow. By 27 November 1968, some 83 countries had signed the treaty and four (the UK, Ireland, Nigeria, and Mexico) had ratified it (see Annex). By its terms the treaty will enter into effect when 43 nations, including its three nuclear-weapon-possessing sponsors (US, UK, and USSR), have signed and ratified it. A substantial list of countries have signed the treaty, but have since adopted a wait-and-see attitude before ratifying. Of the three nuclear sponsors, only Britain has ratified. So far no momentum has developed to speed the ratification process, and the treaty is a long way from entering into force.

Obstacles to the NPT

2. The nonsigners have raised a number of specific objections to the treaty's provisions. These fall mainly into three groups: security guarantees against nuclear attack or threat, guarantees that national programs for peaceful uses of atomic energy will not be impeded, and imbalances in favor of the nuclear countries in the machinery to administer the treaty. Underlying these stated objections are deeper political concerns. Some holdouts are unwilling to renounce a nuclear option because they regard it as a bargaining weapon against a hostile neighbor. Others are disturbed because the treaty, by formalizing and freezing the distinction between haves and have-nots, seems to discriminate against them. Some, particularly West Germany, fear that the NPT seems to point toward a developing Soviet-American partnership to which their national interests will be sacrificed.

Security Assurances

3. Naturally, the sine qua non of the non-nuclears for yielding the nuclear option has been freedom from nuclear blackmail and a credible security arrangement in case of nuclear attack. The security assurance scheme of the NPT contemplates that the UN Security Council will act upon threat or use of nuclear weapons, calling upon the US, UK, and USSR to counter the danger to world peace, with

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force if necessary. In addition, each of the three sponsoring nuclear powers has declared its willingness to act through the Security Council to counter such aggression.

4. The have-nots have pointed out bitterly that these arrangements are not credible since any proposed future Council action could be thwarted by a permanent member's veto. Among the demands for additional guarantees, India has sought explicit undertakings that the US or Britain would use its nuclear capabilities to defend India. Several nations have demanded international agreements, or promises from the Great Powers that they will not use their veto. Brazil and others have tried to convene an international conference on security assurances, apparently on the theory that one more attempt to embarrass the nuclear powers publicly cannot hurt.

5. Most proposals to "harden" security arrangements have sought to eliminate the UN as the implementing mechanism. The nuclear powers, however, continue to see the Security Council's peacekeeping machinery as a protection against commitments and circumstances that might prove catalytic to nuclear war. As a substitute for the security assurances they have requested, the non-nuclears have also sought from the Great Powers either progress toward nuclear disarmament or commitments not to use nuclear weapons.

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

6. Another major concern to the non-nuclears has been the possibility that safeguards might deprive them of access to the equipment, material, and technology essential to the development of their peaceful nuclear industries. Germany has interpreted the treaty as obliging nuclear countries to disclose all technology not strictly weapon-oriented, including the technology involved in isotopic separation and enrichment. Several countries have requested express commitments between haves and have-nots covering the non-nuclears' requirements. The idea of a "fuel bank" funded by the US, UK, and USSR has been pressed. Many countries have complained that the safeguards requirements are unduly burdensome.

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7. Several key "threshold" countries, for example Italy and Japan, have expressed fears that international politics could influence implementation of the treaty, with the nuclear countries occupying an unduly strong position. These countries have exerted great influence to create new international bodies, balanced in favor of the non-nuclear countries, to administer the treaty, instead of depending upon existing machinery which is more or less controlled by the nuclear countries. Italy, for example, fears that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), overbalanced with nuclear powers, might be prejudiced in their favor in administering safeguards. Italy has therefore fought to expand membership of the IAEA's governing body to include more non-nuclears (and particularly Italy). The Italians also seek a permanent committee to carry on the work and to implement the recommendations of the non-nuclear conference, an idea unpleasant to the nuclear powers.

Positions of Principal Non-Signatories

8. The following paragraphs discuss the prospects for signature in the major countries now holding out. Each of these countries will probably defer a decision until the US ratifies. In most of them, US ratification would generally encourage the proponents of signature, but in important instances early US action would not decisively tip the scales. The failure of a US ratification effort, of course, would finish off the treaty.

West Germany

9. The key country in Europe obviously remains West Germany. The decision for Bonn has been an agonizing one, with strong feeling running both pro and con. Under present circumstances there is no prospect for early action. The Czechoslovak invasion has aggravated German suspicions of the Soviets, and the continuing Soviet verbal broadsides against West Germany have further thinned the ranks of NPT supporters. Upper echelons of the Christian Democratic Union, which seem to be close to the public mood on the matter, contend that the Federal Republic

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should not risk entering into such an important undertaking with a nation whose readiness to break its word and to intervene in other countries was amply demonstrated in Czechoslovakia on 21 August. Officials of the Social Democratic Party, while still sympathetic to the treaty, say that the Soviet intervention rendered any West German action on the NPT politically impossible for the time being. A number of frequently heard arguments have been trotted out again. Three are of particular interest in West Germany: 1) there is no guarantee of unimpaired access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; 2) there is no clear substantive linkage between the treaty and vertical disarmament; and 3) German security is not adequately assured.

10. Of special importance to Bonn has been the Soviet contention, following Czechoslovakia, that, under Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter, the USSR has the right to intervene in West German affairs if the Federal Republic engages in acts of provocation. Some Germans have linked this obviously strained construction of the Charter with ratifying the NPT. Naturally, any such intervention would be of overwhelming international import, which leads to the conclusion that the Soviet claim was probably an effort to regain the propaganda initiative after the Czechoslovak invasion. This, however, does not eliminate concern over the issue among the Germans.

11. West German action on the NPT is thus unlikely for the time being. Disarmament specialists in Bonn have said that there certainly will be no action until next year at least, very possibly not until after elections in late 1969, and maybe not even then. But the NPT still has friends in Bonn, chief among them Foreign Minister Brandt and the Social Democrats. They see the treaty as an important adjunct to their policies of detente, and as they revive talk of the latter they are likely to resume supporting the NPT. Signatures by other key holdouts will be influential in West Germany. Many in Bonn will be following the treaty's progress in the US Senate. Ratification by the US, particularly if it creates momentum toward ratification by other countries, will in the end probably lead to West

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German accession, but Bonn will be in no hurry and will probably require further urging by the major powers.

Japan

12. Japanese leaders basically support the NPT, but have reservations on certain points. The Japanese wish to see further progress toward nuclear disarmament, security guarantees of a higher order than those proffered, and equal treatment under the safeguards provisions for all countries. The latter point is of special importance to business leaders, who seek protection from "commercial espionage" and fear that the relative freedom the US and the USSR have from safeguards gives them a commercial advantage.

13. The government would like to have a specific bilateral guarantee of protection against nuclear attack from one or more of the NPT's nuclear sponsors--a guarantee of more assured duration than the US-Japan Security Treaty--and Japan may not sign unless it obtains such a guarantee. Chinese progress in weaponry is a matter of concern to the Japanese, which, together with apprehensions stirred up by Czechoslovakia, has germinated some support for holding open the nuclear weapon option.

14. Policymakers will continue to follow closely the decisions of other major powers, particularly West Germany and India, before making any decision. Ratification of the NPT by the US would not, by itself, have an overriding impact on Japan. In fact, the Sato government would be loath for domestic political reasons to appear subservient to Washington by acting on the heels of US Senate ratification. It will probably take favorable action by the US and major non-nuclear holdouts like West Germany and India to build up enough internal pressure for Japanese signature and ratification.

India and Pakistan

15. When the Security Council passed the security assurances resolution as part of the NPT package, India--a member of the Security Council at the

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time--abstained. India has refused to sign the treaty, and there is no indication that it will change its policy in the foreseeable future. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reaffirmed this decision in early November, citing popular opposition as a major factor. Additionally the government still takes a dim view of the security assurances arrangement in view of India's proximity to China, and Indian policymakers remain dubious that the treaty will in fact retard proliferation. The safeguards provisions are unpopular with the nuclear establishment in the country. Also, the government is quite possibly taking a second look at the weapons option. There seem to be few arguments that could enhance the chances of Indian adherence to the treaty at this time. And, as a prime example of the regional balance required to secure NPT ratification, unless and until India becomes a party to the NPT, Pakistan will not sign or ratify.

Italy

16. Italy is expected to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty during the first few months of 1969 if the United States has ratified by then. At present, government preoccupation with domestic political uncertainties is a factor against immediate signature of the treaty. However, the most important element influencing Italian leaders to go along with popular feeling and sign will probably be the attitude of the United States as shown by its own actions on ratification. Popular sentiment as reflected by most parliamentary delegates strongly favors the treaty. Once the treaty is signed and presented to the Parliament, ratification should follow quickly.

Israel and the Arabs

17. The Israelis continue to resist signing the treaty, and so long as conditions in the Middle East do not improve, there is little likelihood of a change in their position. Prime Minister Eshkol said recently that he saw no reason for Israel to rush into the pact. He raised the issue of possible Soviet-Arab supervision, under the safeguards provisions, of Israel's nuclear program, a spurious issue

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since the IAEA's nuclear procedures will permit a state in effect to choose the nationality of the inspectors assigned it. He also argued that Israel could ill afford to relinquish the nuclear option without ironclad security assurances, since the Soviets might give nuclear weapons to the Arabs in violation of the treaty at any time. In the meantime, the Israelis' nuclear program proceeds apace.

18. All of the Arab countries have signed the treaty. Among them only the UAR has a peacetime nuclear program of any significance. They have leveled verbal barrages at the Israelis, and are clearly concerned that Israel's inaction on the NPT is indicative of a nascent Israeli nuclear weapons development program. It is doubtful whether US ratification would have much bearing on Arab willingness to ratify.

Other Countries

19. Among other nonsigners are France, Communist China, Indonesia, and Australia. France has never participated in the ENDC, it has said it will not sign the treaty, and there is no indication that this attitude is changing. It no doubt wants Germany to adhere to the treaty, however, and probably will not prevent EURATOM's negotiating a safeguards arrangement with the IAEA.

20. Peking has regarded the NPT from the outset as an effort to perpetuate the "US-Soviet nuclear monopoly" and will not become a party to the treaty. Indonesia and Australia are both bothered by their proximity to Communist China and have not yet made up their minds. If a substantial landslide of support should develop for the treaty, however, it is quite possible that both would ultimately decide to affirm the pact.

21. South Africa, a producer of fissionable material, is dissatisfied with the extent to which safeguards under the treaty would encroach on its industrial operations, even though South Africa as a member of IAEA has always cooperated with safeguards requirements. The South Africans, never strongly in favor of the NPT, have seized upon the

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Czechoslovak occupation as a reason for not agreeing to the treaty. They have used this as an excuse to keep available the privilege of beginning a nuclear weapons program, should it appear necessary. They would probably hold fast to this position despite a timely US ratification.

22. In Latin America, three key nations--Brazil, Argentina, and Chile--are closely linked as indefinite holdouts against signing the treaty. Rio, which has assumed a role of leadership among the three, has consistently opposed the NPT on grounds that the potential restrictions impinge on Brazil's "sovereign right" to develop its own national nuclear programs. It also points to the allegedly inadequate security guarantees and the absence of a binding commitment among the nuclear powers to limit their arsenals of nuclear weapons. These attitudes reflect the traditional national sentiment that Brazil is destined for "Great Power" status, and the government will probably not alter its view that the NPT is an obstacle to this national goal. Foreign Minister Magalhaes Pinto, who has formulated the Brazilian opposition, is probably reflecting accurately widespread Brazilian nationalist sentiment.

23. Argentina has taken an almost identical position and in fact is following the Brazilian lead. With traditional ambitions for leadership in South America, it apparently will not modify its policy until Brazil has done so. Chile, a traditional rival of Argentina, in turn will probably not sign the NPT until both Argentina and Brazil have become signatories. Cuba is adamantly opposed to the treaty and will not sign.

24. Mexico is the one major country of the hemisphere which has taken an active role in support of the NPT and the only one in the area to ratify it thus far. Its stance is a logical projection of its leading role in the formulation and promotion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967, which designates the southern half of the hemisphere a nuclear-free zone.

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25. The Soviet Union is clearly disturbed by the NPT's loss of momentum. Moscow fears that any additional delay invites further efforts by the non-nuclear countries to create obstacles. Like the US, the Soviets have pushed hard, in public and in private, for signatures, although the invasion of Czechoslovakia has impeded success.

26. The Soviets themselves have not yet ratified the NPT. Early US ratification would reduce uncertainty and would probably give prospects for early Soviet ratification a boost.

Expectations

27. The NPT has become so integrally tied to other international issues that to bring it into effect at an early date will be difficult under the best of circumstances. With the passage of time, attrition of support could be fatal to it. It is probably safe to say that the treaty's prospects depend upon accession by West Germany and at least one or two of the other prominent holdouts. Unless a trend of ratification can be started by these countries, the effects of the inertia of delay which have already rendered the treaty moribund could finish it off entirely.

28. There appear to be several contingencies which could produce substantial new interest in ratifying the treaty. If the French could be persuaded to assume some of the obligations of the treaty--such as voluntary acceptance of safeguards, West German receptivity would probably be enhanced. If the Soviets toned down their anti-Bonn diatribes, it would assist those Germans who favor the treaty. Support from a number of countries would grow if Moscow should make a token acceptance of safeguards. And naturally, easing of major international tensions over Vietnam and the Middle East would be helpful.

29. Many countries have tied their willingness to agree to the NPT to US-USSR progress in disarmament; yet, ironically, many of the same countries are experiencing unprecedented apprehensions that the Great

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Powers may "get together" too readily. Although it is quite possible that US ratification of the treaty would give a boost to its prospects, inertia and delay have already taken their toll of support and will be hard to overcome.

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ANNEX

STATES WHICH HAVE SIGNED THE NPT
(On 1 July 1968 unless otherwise indicated)

- | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. U.S. | 43. Lebanon |
| 2. Afghanistan | 44. Lesotho - July 9 |
| 3. Austria | 45. Liberia |
| 4. Barbados | 46. Libya - July 19 |
| 5. Belgium - Aug. 20 | 47. Luxembourg - Aug. 14 |
| 6. Bolivia | 48. Malagasy Republic - Aug. 22 |
| 7. Botswana | 49. Malaysia |
| 8. Bulgaria | 50. Maldive Islands - Sept. 11 |
| 9. Cameroon - July 17 | 51. Mauritius |
| 10. Canada - July 23 | 52. Mexico - July 26 (ratified) |
| 11. Ceylon | 53. Mongolia |
| 12. Chad | 54. Morocco |
| 13. Republic of China | 55. Nepal |
| 14. Colombia | 56. Netherlands - Aug. 20 |
| 15. Congo (Kinshasa) - July 22 | 57. New Zealand |
| 16. Costa Rica | 58. Nicaragua |
| 17. Cyprus | 59. Nigeria (ratified) |
| 18. Czechoslovakia | 60. Norway |
| 19. Dahomey | 61. Panama |
| 20. Denmark | 62. Paraguay |
| 21. Dominican Republic | 63. Peru |
| 22. Ecuador - July 9 | 64. Philippines |
| 23. El Salvador | 65. Poland |
| 24. Ethiopia - Sept. 5 | 66. Romania |
| 25. Finland | 67. San Marino |
| 26. Gambia - Sept. 20 | 68. Senegal |
| 27. Ghana | 69. Somali Republic |
| 28. Greece | 70. Sweden - Aug. 19 |
| 29. Guatemala - July 26 | 71. Syria |
| 30. Haiti | 72. Togo |
| 31. Honduras | 73. Trinidad & Tobago - Aug. 20 |
| 32. Hungary | 74. Tunisia |
| 33. Iceland | 75. USSR |
| 34. Iran | 76. UAR |
| 35. Iraq | 77. UK (ratified) |
| 36. Ireland (ratified) | 78. Upper Volta - Nov. 25 |
| 37. Ivory Coast | 79. Uruguay |
| 38. Jordan - July 10 | 80. Venezuela |
| 39. Kenya | 81. Vietnam |
| 40. Republic of Korea | 82. Yemen Arab Rep. - Sept. 23 |
| 41. Kuwait - Aug. 15 | 83. Yugoslavia - July 10 |
| 42. Laos | |

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