

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC  
FLEET POST OFFICE  
SAN FRANCISCO 96601

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October 23, 1965

Dear Marshall:

Now that Colonel Untung is undone, I have been interested in following the developing confrontation between the Army and the PKI. Chuck Flowerree and I were particularly interested in your telegram no. 1098 to the Department, which reviewed the resources which the PKI might be able to mobilize in a major insurgency effort against the Army. As you say, there is no real evidence that the PKI has decided or will decide to go into insurgency but they do have contingency plans. The question that arises in our minds is whether we should accordingly be doing some contingency thinking about the possibility that if the PKI should go into insurgency, the Indonesian Army might at some point request U.S. assistance.

I have read your message 1160 in which you replied to the Department's 491 by saying that "if the military authorities ever really need our help in this matter, they would let us know." I certainly agree with your advice against taking soundings at this time. However, I wonder how we could respond if the Indonesian military really would ask us for help.

I suppose it would depend to a large extent on the way in which the insurgency developed, i. e. whether it followed the pattern of guerrilla warfare and terrorism and whether it produced some rough front line with the PKI in control of certain large identifiable areas. It would also depend on the role of Sukarno as well as many other factors. Nevertheless, it is interesting to speculate on the possibility that either with or without Sukarno as their front man, the Indonesian Army, being hard pressed in a war with the PKI might request our help. I

The Honorable  
Marshall Green,  
American Ambassador,  
Djakarta.

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suppose a request for help might include anything from covert operations and assistance on up through the spectrum, including transport, money, communications equipment, or arms.

Perhaps it is premature to raise this question and perhaps the situation is so fluid that it is almost impossible to estimate the future course. Nevertheless, if there is a reasonable possibility that the Indonesian Army might request our help against a PKI insurgency, then I suppose it would not hurt to consider how we would respond. I am sure all of these things are in your mind but if there is anything you or someone on your staff could tell me on this score, then I would certainly be appreciative.

Sincerely,



Norman B. Hannah  
Political Adviser to CINCPAC

P.S. I've just seen your 1169 to the Dept. which both underlines the possibility and casts doubt on the reliability of the Army's gloom. But maybe the Army is softening us up for ~~the~~ an early request for aid.



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