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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2904

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 TEHRAN 07930

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CHEROKEE - FOR THE SECRETARY  
CORRECTED COPY TEXT

E.O. 12065: NDS-3 7/28/79 (LAINGEN, L. BRUCE) UR-M

TAGS: PEPR

SUBJECT: SHAH'S DESIRE TO RESIDE IN THE U.S.

REF: STATE 194782

1. YOUR MESSAGE ASKS FOR MY PERSONAL AND PRIVATE EVALUATION OF THE EFFECT, ON THE SAFETY OF AMERICANS IN IRAN AND ON OUR RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN, OF THE SHAH BEING ALLOWED TO ESTABLISH RESIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES.

2. A JUDGMENT ON THAT ISSUE MUST INEVITABLY BE (AND REMAIN) SPECULATIVE, CLOUDED BY THE ENORMOUS UNCERTAINTIES OF THE CURRENT IRANIAN SCENE--WHERE THERE HAS BEEN ALMOST NO PROGRESS TO DATE TOWARD RESOLUTION OF THE ULTIMATE POWER STRUCTURE. SUBJECT TO THAT RESERVATION, I CONCLUDE THAT FOR THE SHAH TO TAKE UP RESIDENCE IN THE U.S. IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, BY WHICH I MEAN THE NEXT 2-3 MONTHS, WOULD CONTINUE AS BEFORE TO BE SERIOUSLY PREJUDICIAL TO OUR INTERESTS AND TO THE SECURITY OF AMERICANS IN IRAN. ON THE OTHER HAND, I BELIEVE THAT THIS SITUATION COULD BEGIN TO CHANGE WITHIN THAT TIME

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Mr. P	...
Mr. E	...
Mr. G	...

*Stephen Kelly*  
April 18, 85

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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PERIOD TO MAKE THE RISKS MANAGEABLE BY LATE FALL THAT JUDGMENT, I MUST CONFESS, IS INEVITABLY SPECULATIVE AND PRESUPPOSES A GOOD DEAL OF GOOD FORTUNE FOR THE UNITED STATES CONCERNED. MY RATIONALE FOLLOWS.


3. I BELIEVE THE NEXT 2-3 MONTHS REPRESENT THE TIME PERIOD FOR TWO BASIC REASONS: FIRST, THE HIGH DEGREE OF FRUSTRATION (AND THUS THE POTENTIAL FOR SEARCH FOR SCAPEGOATS) IN THE CURRENT IRANIAN POLITICAL SCENE AND, SECOND, THE STILL SENSITIVE NATURE OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.

4. IRAN TODAY REMAINS POLITICALLY ADRIFT, ITS "GOVERNMENT" UNDER BAZARGAN STILL SUBJECT TO THE WHIMS AND THE ULTIMATE CONTROL OF THE AYATOLLAH AND HIS ENTourage. DAY-TO-DAY DECISION MAKING IS DIFFUSED, EITHER MORE OFTEN THAN NOT BY REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS AND LEADERS SCATTERED IN AND OUT OF THE FORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS OF GOVERNMENT. THERE IS GROWING POPULAR FRUSTRATION OVER THE FACT THAT THE REVOLUTION HAS CHANGED THINGS VERY MUCH IN IRAN; INDEED FOR MANY OF THE POPULATION, CONDITIONS ARE WORSE THAN THEY WERE BEFORE.

5. IN THIS ATMOSPHERE, WE REMAIN THE CONVENIENT GOAT, TO THE POINT WHERE KHOMEINI THIS PAST WEEK TARGETED US AS SOMEHOW BEHIND THE BURNING OF HARVESTING THE FIELDS IN CERTAIN PARTS OF IRAN. FOR US NOW REFUGING TO THE SHAH WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY TRIGGER DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST OUR EMBASSY, WITH LUCK, STOP AT THAT, WITHOUT A PHYSICAL ASSAULT OF THE KIND WE EXPERIENCED LAST FEBRUARY. BUT THERE COULD BE NO ASSURANCE OF THAT, SINCE IRAN'S REGULAR MILITARY

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POLICE FORCES REMAIN LARGELY DEMORALIZED AND CANNOT YET BE RELIED ON TO APPLY THE FORCE THAT MIGHT BE NEEDED TO PREVENT VIOLENCE AGAINST US. INDEED THE GOVERNMENT HERE HAS YET TO FIND THE STRENGTH OR MEANS TO REPLACE WITH A UNIFORMED FORCE THE IRREGULAR GUERRILLA FORCE ASSIGNED BY KHOMEINI TO "GUARD" OUR COMPOUND SINCE LAST FEBRUARY. THE POSSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP TERRORIST ACTION AGAINST OUR CHANCERY AND PERSONNEL WOULD OF COURSE ALSO BE GREATER WERE THE SHAH TO COME TO THE U.S. NOW, THOUGH THAT IS A POSSIBILITY THAT ALREADY EXISTS.

6. NOR IS OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP YET OF THE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND SUBSTANCE EASILY TO WEATHER A GESTURE OF THIS KIND TOWARD THE SHAH. I THINK WE ARE MAKING PROGRESS IN REMOVING AT LEAST SOME OF WHAT HAS BEEN A DEEPLY FELT SUSPICION AMONG REVOLUTIONARY IRANIANS THAT WE HAVE NOT YET ACCEPTED THE NEW REALITIES IN IRAN AND THAT WE ARE CONNIVING WITH THE SHAH, ZIONISM, OR WITH SAVAKIS TO UNDERMINE THE REVOLUTION. BUT IT IS SLOW GOING, AND WE DOUBT VERY MUCH THAT OUR CREDENTIALS HAVE BEEN ENHANCED MUCH AT ALL AS YET WITH KHOMEINI. GRANTING ASYLUM TO THE SHAH NOW WOULD NEGATE MUCH THAT WE HAVE ACHIEVED TO DATE, AND I WOULD NOT EXCLUDE A REPEAT IN SOME FASHION, DICTATED BY KHOMEINI, OF A KNEE-JERK TYPE OF POLICY ACTION AGAINST US AS DEMONSTRATED AT THE TIME OF THE JAVITS RESOLUTION.

7. WHAT I AM SAYING IS THAT WE NEED SOME ADDED CUSHION ON BOTH FRONTS--ON THE INTERNAL IRANIAN SCENE AND IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS--BEFORE WE ACCEPT WHATEVER RISKS

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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 07930

NODIS CHEROKEE - FOR THE SECRETARY

THERE MAY BE FOR OUR INTERESTS IN DOING WHAT I BELIEVE WE EVENTUALLY SHOULD DO-- ALLOW THE SHAH REFUGE IN THE U.S.

8. THE NEXT 2-3 MONTHS ARE CRUCIAL AND POSSIBLY HOPEFUL IN BOTH RESPECTS. INTERNALLY, BAZARGAN IS MAKING A NEW AND STRONGER EFFORT TO GET KHUMEINI TO TRANSFER TO HIS PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT SOME OF THE AUTHORITY NOW EXERCISED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY AND COURTS AND BY THE LOOSE HIERARCHY OF REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES THAT STRETCH TO THE STREET LEVEL. GROWING PROBLEMS WITH THE KURDS AND THE ARAB MINORITY IN KUZISTAN SEEM TO BE REMINDING AT LEAST SOME OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ELEMENTS THAT STEPS MUST BE TAKEN TO RESTORE THE STATUS OF THE MILITARY IN TERMS OF BOTH AUTHORITY AND MATERIAL. BUT THE REAL KEY TO STRENGTHENED GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY AND CONTROL LIES IN THE SUCCESSFUL CARRYING OUT OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS (A KIND OF CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY IS TO BE ELECTED AUGUST 3) WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO RESULT IN A CONSTITUTIONALLY ENDOWED GOVERNMENT IN POWER BY AUTUMN.

9. IT IS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE, IN MY VIEW, THAT WE NOT INJECT OURSELVES IN THAT PROCESS BY ANY PREMATURE GESTURE TOWARD THE SHAH, WITH ALL THE SUSPICIONS ABOUT OUR ATTITUDES AND ABOUT USG INTERFERANCE THAT THIS

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
COULD AROUSE AND THE THE OPPORTUNITY IT COULD PROVIDE FOR THOSE REVOLUTIONARY MOTHEADS WHO WOULD PROBABLY LIKE NOTHING BETTER THAN A CHANCE TO FRUSTRATE THE POLITICAL TIMETABLE AND TAKE A CRACK AT US AT THE SAME TIME.

10. SIMILARLY, I BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT THAT WE NOT BURDEN OUR STILL THIN BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP HERE UNTIL IT HAS GAINED ADDED SUBSTANCE AND DEPTH. AGAIN THERE IS PROMISE, DESPITE CONTINUED PROBLEMS ON MANY ISSUES BETWEEN US, WE HAVE SENSED IN RECENT WEEKS A GROWING APPRECIATION, AT LEAST WITHIN THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT, OF THE IMPORTANCE OF A BETTER U.S. RELATIONSHIP. LAST WEEK'S CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL (IN THE DOD SUPPLEMENTAL) OF FUNDS TO PURCHASE THE FOUR SPRUANCE DESTROYERS ORIGINALLY DESTINED FOR IRAN HAS GIVEN US AND THE IRANIANS THE FLEXIBILITY TO BEGIN ALLOWING THE IRANIANS ACCESS TO MORE URGENTLY NEEDED SPARES FOR THEIR AIR FORCE AND OTHER MILITARY FORCES. THIS WILL HELP REMOVE LINGERING SUSPICIONS IN THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT THAT WE HAVE HAD ULTERIOR POLITICAL MOTIVES IN HOLDING BACK ON SUCH SHIPMENTS.

11. ASSUMING THAT THIS MORE HOPEFUL TREND IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP CONTINUES AND DEEPENS, AND ASSUMING ALSO THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL TIMETABLE HERE RESULTS IN A SOMEWHAT STRONGER GOVERNMENT IN PLACE BY AUTUMN, WITH ENHANCED AUTHORITY OVER IRAN'S SECURITY FORCES, THE RISKS IN A GESTURE ON OUR PART TOWARD THE SHAH COULD BE MUCH MORE MANAGEABLE. I WOULD THEREFORE HOPE THAT WE COULD DELAY ANY FINAL DECISION UNTIL WE SEE HOW THINGS DEVELOP OVER THE NEXT 60-90 DAYS. IT WOULD HELP MEASURABLY, IN MY VIEW, IF DURING THAT SAME TIME PERIOD WE WERE ABLE TO NAME AN AMBASSADOR, AN ACT THAT IN ITSELF WILL BE SEEN AS A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IN

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THE NEW REALITIES IN IRAN.

12. THE JUDGMENT DESCRIBED ABOVE WOULD OF COURSE DIFFER IF THE SHAH WERE PUBLICLY TO RENOUNCE HIS CLAIM AND THAT OF HIS HEIRS TO THE THRONE BEFORE COMING TO THE U.S. SUCH ACTION ON HIS PART WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY LESSEN THE RISKS TO OUR INTERESTS. (I CONFESS, HOWEVER, TO FINDING IT HARD TO IMAGINE HIS TAKING SUCH ACTION IN THE SHORT TERM FUTURE). ON THE OTHER HAND, I DO NOT SEE THAT A PUBLIC STATEMENT BY THE SHAH SIMPLY FORESWEARING POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF ANY SORT WOULD HAVE MUCH IMPACT. IT WOULD SCARCELY BE CREDIBLE HERE. LAINGEN

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