

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

1968

To: The Secretary
Through: S/S
From: FE Mr. Robertson
Subject: Introduction of Atomic Weapons into Korea.

3/26/57 RMA

Central Files

I understand that Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford have invited you to visit the Pentagon on March 28, 1957, to discuss further this problem in the light of evidence assembled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of communist violations of the reinforcing provisions of the Armistice Agreement. You will recall that in the discussion of this issue on January 18, 1957, with Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford, it was agreed that Defense would prepare evidence that could be submitted to the Sixteen and the United Nations in support of our charge that the communists had grossly violated Article 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement, thus upsetting the military balance obtaining at the time of the signing of the Armistice. Thus far, the Department of State has not been provided with such evidence.

The introduction of nuclear weapons into Korea is the crucial question raised in a new Statement of Policy on Korea (NSC 5702/1), which is to be considered by the National Security Council on April 4, 1957. In view of the clear provisions of Article 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement and of our assurances to the Sixteen and to the United Nations as recently as last summer that we would continue to abide by its terms, I feel that it would be disastrous to our position with our Allies and in the United Nations if we were to proceed and equip our forces in Korea with nuclear weapons in the absence of demonstrable and relatively comparable communist actions. We have, therefore, during Planning Board discussion of the new Korean policy paper endeavored to assure the inclusion of what we consider essential safeguards by giving due consideration to the timing of any introduction of nuclear weapons and the bearing such action will have on other aspects of United States policy, not only in Korea but toward our Allies and in the United Nations. Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken exception to these timing safeguards.

Recommendations

1. That you again explain to Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford the dangerous consequences to our position with our Allies, in the United Nations and before the world, were we to lay ourselves open to the charge of having violated the Korean Armistice and having greatly increased tensions in the Far East through introducing nuclear weapons without being able fully to justify this action on the basis of comparable communist action.

2. That you suggest that a State-Defense working group be formed to study the evidence, prepare our case for use with our Allies and in the United Nations and recommend a schedule for proceeding with our consultations with the Sixteen report to the Military Armistice Commission, report to the United Nations, public statements, etc.

FE:NA:DC:MSR:Robertson:semb

FE - Mr. Sebald

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