

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 959001

By MB NARA Date 2/17/85

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

POLICY PLANNING STAFF

TOP SECRET

February 5, 1959

MEMORANDUM

Subject: IRBM's in Turkey

1. We were not committed to deployment in Turkey by either the Secretary's statement or the communique at the 1957 NATO Heads of Government Meeting. Both these were in general terms. The communique said that deployment of these missiles would be decided "in agreement with the states directly concerned".

2. Nothing was added to, or detracted from, this general commitment at the 1958 Paris Meeting. Our position on Turkish IRBM deployment was stated in a position paper prepared prior to the meeting and cleared by State and DOD: "Turkey and Greece". The question of deployment of IRBM's in Turkey or Greece rests, in accordance with NAC decision, entirely with SACEUR. The US would, of course, consider carefully whatever recommendation SACEUR might make in this regard."

3. General Norstad then spoke to the Greek and Turkish representatives without US authorization. Despite this, it was still Embassy Ankara's judgment (Ankara 1998 of January 13) that if the Department's decision were not to deploy this generation of IRBM's to Turkey, there would be "great disappointment in official Turkish circles but no overriding political reaction in Turkey". In Ankara 2104 of January 23, this was amplified to mean that Menderes would not be overthrown or would a "similar political repercussion" occur, but that "relations between our military and the Turk military" would be severely strained.

4. Then followed a casual reference in Secretary McElroy's press conference to the possibility of IRBM deployment in Greece and Turkey, which was reported in three Turkish opposition newspapers. In Ankara 2125 of January 26, the Embassy reversed its former judgment and stated that the "consequences could be very grave" if the IRBM's were not forthcoming, since the opposition could charge that we were no longer backing Menderes. (This contrasts oddly with the NEA judgment that the opposition would criticize IRBM deployment, if it occurred.)

In

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Authority NND 959001

By MB NARA Date 2/17/95

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

In Ankara 2196, the Embassy reported that on February 1 Zorlu had voiced worry about the delay in IREB negotiations, pointing out that it could be done now, but that "we might have trouble later on because the Cabinet is becoming more restive, opposition more vocal, and even President upset by bad news from Iran and other similar developments." This uncertain national attitude toward IREB deployment somehow moved the Embassy to the same conclusions as had its earlier judgment that the Turks wanted the missiles very badly: we should go ahead.

5. In short, the only commitments to Turkey specifically are (i) an unauthorized approach by Norstad, (ii) a press conference remark by Secretary McElroy.

II. Is It Militarily Necessary?

6. In a letter to the Secretary of December 4, 1958, Secretary McElroy stated that the JCS deployment plan was as follows: 4-UK, 1-Turkey, 1-Okinawa, 1-Alaska, 1-NATO area.

7. Since then we have become hooked to deployment of two squadrons in Italy, so that the JCS recommendations re Turkey, Okinawa, and Alaska must compete for the remaining two squadrons. (Only eight are to be produced.)

8. On January 15, General Twining said to the President in the NSC that Okinawa would be a good place to put some IREB's.

9. The latest JCS deployment plan, as reported informally by ISA to Bob Magill: UK-4, Greece-1, Italy-2, Turkey-1.

10. All of which suggests a sufficient variety of opinion to indicate that there may not be a decisive military advantage to be gained by deploying IREB's in Turkey, rather than Okinawa and/or Alaska.

P.S. FE signed off a while back on having no major political objection to Okinawan deployment. Re the argument that this would move the CHICOMS to want Soviet IREB's: these missiles would not, given their accuracy, be a good means of knocking out the US missiles on Okinawa. They could do this better with aircraft.

III.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 959001

By MB NARA Date 2/17/85

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

III. Could Effective US Control be Maintained?

11. The warheads will be standing in the missile at all times (Magill); certainly whenever the missile is on alert.

12. A key necessary to fire the missile could not be withheld from the Turks once indigenous manning had been achieved. This would be politically infeasible, given the Italian precedent.

13. The State Department has no information concerning a key which must be used to render the warhead operational. If such a key is developed:

(a) If it is a physical facility, it could be taken from the American custodian. If the Turks had decided to fire the missile without US approval, they would hardly stop at this.

(b) If it is a state of knowledge, it could not indefinitely be concealed from the Turks after repeated practice drills.

14. The need for US range data is irrelevant: The missile could be fired without the data and still set off a war.

15. The difference between the control issue posed by Italian and Turkish deployment is very great: Both countries are volatile, but they are volatile in different directions: The Italians are as likely to err on the side of caution as the Turks are to err on the side of eagerness. Italy does not have a common frontier with the USSR, and so there would be less likelihood of the incidents that might trigger off a mistaken decision to fire IRBM's: (i) violations of airspace or mistaken readings of radar blips leading to a supposition of imminent attack, (ii) local hostilities which we might want to prevent from expanding.

16. The difference between IRBM's and other weapons deployed in Turkey is also great:

(a) The take-off of an aircraft is not an irrevocable act, as is the firing of a missile.

(b)

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Authority NND 959001

By MB NARA Date 2/17/95

TOP SECRET

- 4 -

(b) The Redstone is a tactical weapon, whose mistaken use would be less likely to trigger off a general nuclear war.

(c) The liquid-fueled IRBM is, furthermore, peculiarly vulnerable because of its characteristics; hence the Turks will know that it must be fired on a "strike first" basis if it is not to be destroyed on the ground by a Soviet attack.

17. The IRBM's, once deployed, would represent a standing commitment which could not easily be recalled if an irresponsible Turkish government came to power. We would have given Turkey more or less indefinitely continuing power to start general war by firing IRBM's in haste or error.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 959001

By MB NARA Date 2/17/85

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET

IV. How Could the Blow to NATO be Softened?

18. A six-squadron NATO deployment would still represent a sizeable fulfillment of the program laid on at the 1957 Heads of Government meeting. It would, however, obviously fall short of the ten-squadron program that SACEUR originally envisaged.

19. We might point out to the few officials who are sufficiently concerned with this subject to feel any disappointment that--

a. There is a limit to how much MAP funds we can secure from the Congress.

b. If we do not use funds for IRBMs, we can spend more on NATO modernization than would otherwise be the case.

20. A more substantial blow softener:

a. A promise of a more forthcoming attitude on second generation missiles? Holladay says (according to Magill) that it would cost about \$200 million to make about 200 Polaris missiles for Europe. Would there be any chance of cancelling production of the 7th and 8th IRBM squadrons (the NSC decision to the contrary notwithstanding), thus saving the funds for the second generation program? Solid-fueled missiles--being less vulnerable than Thor and Jupiter--would generate less risk of accidental war.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 959001

By MB NARA Date 2/17/95

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET

V. Does the Funding Problem Have Political Implications?

21. It sure does. To push aside the technicalities--

a. The weapons cost money, and it seems unlikely that DOD will agree to charge all or most of this cost to its own budget rather than MSP.

b. The sizeable local costs will have to be borne largely by MSP, to judge from the Italian precedent.

c. There is a limit to how much money the Budget Bureau will allow us to ask for MAP or that the Congress will provide, and this limit is probably not going to rise in the years ahead.

22. So that even if the Turkish deployment costs to MAP are shared with DOD and spread over several future years they will be substantial ~~be substantial~~ and will compete with other high priority MAP commitments (NATO modernization, Iran, etc.). Is the IRBM deployment high enough priority to win out in this competition? The State Department has a strong political interest in other commitments and we should recognize the danger that an affirmative IRBM decision may pose to them. We cannot do everything. Our choice should represent a conscious weighing of alternatives, not going ahead with one costly program without reckoning its effect on other programs.

TOP SECRET

SECRET
AUTHORITY: NND 959001
By: JTB NAMA 1000 2/17/95

TOP SECRET

VI. Why Are IRBMs Good in Turkey, While They Were Bad in Germany?

23. They are both countries close to the bloc, and having tense relations with the bloc. Deployment in either country would thus increase the risk of accidental war, of the missiles being fired in reaction to a mistaken judgment that Soviet attack impends or to a local action whose scope we wished to confine.

TOP SECRET

**NATIONAL
SECURITY
ARCHIVE**

This document is from the holdings of:

The National Security Archive

Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University

2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037

Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu