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IAC-D-81/13
25 November 1955

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Report of the IAC Ad Hoc Guided Missile

Intelligence Survey Committee

References: IAC-D-81/12 (Final), 19 July 1955
IAC-M-204, 19 July 1955, Item 3

1. Attached is the report of the IAC Ad Hoc Guided Missile Intelligence Survey Committee.
2. This report has been placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting scheduled for 6 December 1955.

Acting Secretary

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FINAL REPORT

AD HOC GUIDED MISSILE INTELLIGENCE SURVEY COMMITTEE

4 November 1955

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(Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Staff, NSA)

(Agreed)

(State, AEC, CIA)

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Ad Hoc Guided Missile Intelligence Survey Committee was organized in accordance with IAC-D-81/12, dated 19 July 1955. Committee members were nominated by each member agency of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, (IAC) with exception of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which stated it desired no regular representation. The National Security Agency (NSA) also nominated a member upon invitation extended by the IAC.

The mission of the Ad Hoc Committee, as stated in IAC-D-81/12.

"will be to survey and evaluate the efforts of the U. S. intelligence community in the field of guided missile intelligence, to include the coverage, emphasis, guidance and status of coordination now existent in this field, and submit a comprehensive report on the state of guided missile intelligence in the U. S., and in friendly foreign powers, together with recommendations as to IAC action."

In carrying out this mission general inquiry was made into the present status of guided missile intelligence, into the operations of guided missile intelligence-producing agencies, into functioning of information-collecting agencies, into the functioning of coordinating groups and committees, and into the necessity for increased emphasis on operations in these areas. Each area was reviewed with regard to coverage, emphasis, guidance and status of coordination.

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

To acquaint the Committee with the community effort in the guided missile field, briefings were given by representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Staff, CIA, NSA, FBI, State Department, and IAC Committees concerned. In addition, CIA representatives presented [redacted] Each department, agency and IAC Committee was asked to brief the Survey Committee regarding its activities in the field of guided missiles with specific consideration of the following seven areas, as appropriate:

- a. Requirements
- b. Guidance to collectors [redacted]
- d. Utilization of community assets
- e. Lateral flow of intelligence information
- f. Intelligence research and analysis
- g. Intelligence production

In conducting the survey, the Committee was guided by the following Intelligence Directives as they relate to the duties and responsibilities of the various departments and agencies concerned:

- National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1
- National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3
- National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5
- National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9
- National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 15
- National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 17
- Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 3/4
- Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/5
- Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 15/1


Based on the findings, conclusions were drawn by the Committee and are herein presented. Recommendations based upon these conclusions are also submitted.



II. CONCLUSIONS

1. The critical requirements of the community for guided missile intelligence are not at present being satisfied, primarily because of the inadequacy of information available.
2. The present collection efforts are inadequate to fulfill stated requirements for intelligence information.
3.
4. Certain new technical methods for collection have produced a significant amount of the currently available direct information. This new information is of considerable value and further exploitation of these technical methods holds great promise.
5. *A lack of understanding and/or of effective working relationships continues to exist between collectors and consumers, with consequent impairment of both collection and production activities.

*NSA and Joint Staff abstain.



(Agreed)


(Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Staff, NSA)

(State, AEC, CIA)

6. *A duplication of effort between the Department of Defense and the CIA exists in the field of operational characteristics of guided missiles, which is contrary to the provisions of NSCID No. 1, NSCID No. 3, and DCID No. 3/4.

7. The present organizational structure is adequate to coordinate the community guided missile intelligence effort.

8. There are deficiencies in the coordination of intelligence activities which can be rectified by increasing the competence and breadth of participation in the existing coordination mechanisms.




6. Guided missile intelligence is critically important to national security, and in accordance with NSCID No. 3, responsibility for this intelligence, in its entirety, must be shared by the entire intelligence community.

7. The present organizational structure is not adequate for efficient and effective coordination and guidance of the community guided missile intelligence effort; this deficiency can most simply be rectified by establishment of a joint mechanism with essentially the missions and functions delineated in Tab A.



*Air Force abstains.
**Endorsed by Army, Joint Staff, NSA, AEC, and CIA.
***Endorsed by the State Department, Navy, and Air Force representatives, with this explanatory note: Although the term "correlating" is interpreted to include identification, it is the opinion of the State Department, Navy, and Air Force representatives that, in order to avoid any possibility of misinterpretation, the word "identifying" should also be used to clearly define the area encompassed in the basic problem of how best to identify [redacted] pertinent to guided missile intelligence.



(Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Staff, NSA)


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III. RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

- 1. *The CIA direct its guided missile intelligence analysis efforts to the field of basic science as provided by NSCID No. 1, NSCID No. 3, and DCID No. 3/4.




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- 3. Each agency of the intelligence community examine its guided missile intelligence program to determine that it, within the allocation of resources available, reflects the priority accorded this field by:
 - a. Assignment of adequate numbers of competent personnel to collection, analysis, and coordination activities.

*Air Force abstains.

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


- 1. Intelligence on guided missiles, being of critical importance to national security, be allocated as the production responsibility of all interested agencies, and that those portions of DCID 3/4 in conflict therewith be rescinded.

- 2. The IAC form a Guided Missile Intelligence Committee (GMIC), with responsibility to the IAC for essentially the missions and functions delineated in Tab A.


- 3. The GMIC be directed to devote a major part of its initial effort to actions designed to improve guidance to the collection effort and to the flow of collected information.

- 4. Each agency of the intelligence community, under guidance of GMIC, examine its guided missile intelligence program in the light of its responsibilities and, within the allocation of resources available, to determine that it reflects the priority accorded this field by:
 - a. Assignment of adequate numbers of competent personnel to collection, analysis, and coordination activities.



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- b. Provision of adequate logistic support to guided missile field collection activities.
- c. Increased emphasis on the development and implementation of more effective techniques for the collection of guided missile intelligence.



(Agreed)


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- c. Increased emphasis on the development and implementation of more effective techniques for collection of guided missile intelligence.



*Joint Staff abstains.
 **Endorsed by Army, Joint Staff, NSA, AEC, and CIA.
 ***Endorsed by State Department, Navy, and Air Force representatives.



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(Agreed)


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IV. DISCUSSION

A discussion on this subject not considered appropriate.

A. STATE OF KNOWLEDGE


NIE 11-12-55, a Supplement to NIE 11-6-54, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missiles Field", is currently under preparation and will contain the details concerning our state of knowledge relative to the status of the Soviet Guided missile program.



It was brought out before the Committee that each intelligence consumer formulates requirements for intelligence on foreign guided missile activities

B. REQUIREMENTS

Each consumer reported that general and specific requirements on this subject had been prepared which, if fulfilled, would meet his needs. Time did not allow





(Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Staff, NSA)

(Agreed)

(State, AEC, CIA)

which are responsive to his specific need. Each consumer reported that he had a formal list of general and specific requirements on this subject which gave sufficiently wide coverage to meet his needs. Due to the divergent missions of the respective consumers, their needs for intelligence differ widely. For example, while the CIA requires intelligence on basic science related to guided missiles, the military consumers require detailed intelligence on weapons design, performance characteristics and operational employment.

Each agency has developed within the limitations of its resources, assets to fulfill its guided missile intelligence requirements. The stated guided missile intelligence requirements of the agencies of the intelligence community are not being fully satisfied at this time.


examination of these requirements in detail to ascertain the completeness of coverage. Questioning of the representatives of the activities under survey by the Committee, however, elicited the fact that only in the most general sense was each activity knowledgeable of the requirements of the others. This was considered significant in that the needs of the individual activities varied widely, due to their primary missions and responsibilities, and considerable overlap of needs was indicated. Within the limitations of its resources and guided by individual interpretation as to its role in the overall scheme of activities, each activity is developing unilaterally assets to fulfill its guided missile intelligence requirements. Even so, requirements for guided missile intelligence are not being satisfied at this time.

C. GUIDANCE TO COLLECTORS

1. General

Each intelligence production organization determines its own requirements for intelligence information as needed to support its individual intelligence requirements and serves them on its own collectors as well as on the other intelligence community collection agencies.

The collection effort, to be strong, virile and effective, must be guided to a significant degree by statements of requirements by the consumers. The complexity and scope of the U. S. intelligence effort complicates the establishment of effective guidance in the guided missile field as it was brought out to the Committee that there were at least seventeen (17) activities, with fairly well defined functions, now collecting, evaluating, collating or producing guided missile intelligence. Inasmuch as each intelligence



(Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Staff, NSA)

(Agreed)

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production organization, having determined its own needs, serves its requirements on its own collectors as well as on other intelligence collection agencies, a better defined coordinative process is required to keep from confusing the collectors.

It was brought out that the formulator of requirements is not always fully able to express requirements to collectors since he does not have an adequate understanding of the collectors' capabilities and limitations. Communications between the analyst and the collector have often been less than required to produce an effective understanding of mutual problems, intelligence objectives, detailed requirements for information, priorities, etc.

Where it is possible to formulate joint requirements, such formulation has been performed and coordinated by several existing organizations, such as:

The Guided Missile Working Group (GMWG) of the Joint Technical Intelligence Subcommittee (JTIS);
the Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC);
the Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC);
the Interagency Priorities Committee (IPC); and
ad hoc IAC NIE post mortem committees.

It was brought out that there have been a few cases where joint requirements have been formulated. Increased activity in this area would measurably increase the effectiveness of guidance to the collector. Practically all of the joint guidance is contained in the following examples. In 1953, JIC 603/15, entitled "Technical and Scientific Intelligence Collection" with an enclosure on "High Priority Guided Missile Intelligence Objectives", was issued. A first draft of this paper was formulated by joint efforts of CIA and the USAF, and under direction and guidance of the Guided Missile Working Group (GMWG) of JTIS/JCS. Copies of the finished paper were forwarded to CIA and State Department. There was no follow-up made by JTIS as to whether or not action was taken on this paper by the

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(Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Staff, NSA)

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The coverage of the individual and joint requirements, although not complete, has improved as the emphasis on the collection of Guided missile intelligence relating to [redacted] has increased.

With but few exceptions, the coordination of joint requirements is satisfactory.

[redacted]

As the situation now exists, it is considered that the formulation of joint requirements is unsatisfactory.

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2. Overt Collection


It was brought out before the Committee that each collection organization provides general and specific guidance to its own collectors. In addition, each specific request for information contains guidance to the collectors. The Armed Forces provide joint guidance to their own and outside agency collectors through the mechanism of the GSWG of JNIS. An example of the coordinated guidance so provided is contained in JIC 603/15, a paper on "Technical and Scientific Intelligence Collection" with an enclosure on "High Priority Guided Missile Intelligence Objectives." A copy of this paper was forwarded to CIA and the State Department. Coordinated community guidance for collectors is effected through several mechanisms which include the SEC, EIC, USCIB, and the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC).

It was stated to the Committee that each organization possessing assets in the collection field provides general and specific guidance to its own collectors. Furthermore, it was stated that individual agencies exercise the prerogative of placing some of their requirements on the collection activities of other agencies. Also, as illustrated above, there have been a few cases where joint requirements have been placed on collectors.

The fact as to whether the sum total of individual plus joint requirements, as currently served on the collectors, completely cover all needs of the community for intelligence information, in a clear and unmistakable manner, was not proved to the satisfaction of the Minority. An examination into the specifics of the community's needs and guidance based thereon to collectors is indicated as one of the first orders of business of a Guided Missile Intelligence Committee.

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


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
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There was criticism, expressed by the CIA to the effect that no single overall body is providing the control and direction from which might be obtained better utilization of collection resources. The organizational structure and authority delegated by law to the governmental agencies of the U. S. intelligence community precludes the subordination of individual agency intelligence responsibilities to the control and direction of a supervisory committee. Further, the responsibilities assigned to the U. S. Armed Forces prohibits the military commander from the dissipation of his Service intelligence assets through action of a committee which cannot share those responsibilities. Therefore, overall coordination is effected on an informal and advisory basis.



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