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will again be raised at the NATO Ministerial meeting this December, and I consider it most important that at that meeting the United States Government be prepared to take a positive, forthcoming approach, outlining a concrete plan that we are prepared to implement. Failure to do so could have seriously adverse effects on NATO unity.

I should therefore greatly appreciate word from you as to when the current study by the JCS will be completed, in order that you and I may discuss the matter, and, if necessary, obtain the President's decision in advance of the December NATO meeting.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles

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Clearances: G - Mr. Murphy
S/AE - Mr. Farley

EUR:RA:BEL:Immons:mlr

10/14/59

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

October 17, 1957

EUR - Mr. Elbrick

Thru: S/S.

The Secretary considers that in view of the discussion and action at the NSC this morning, the approach to Defense should be along the line that now that the matter is decided it is for State and Defense promptly to get together and work out the details. This in preference to the draft here submitted.

J. N. Greene, Jr.

Attachment:

Staff Study re NATO Atomic
Stockpile dated October 14.

S:JNG, Jr. :jm

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To: The Secretary
Through: S/S
From: EUR - C. Burke Elbrick
Subject: NATO Atomic Stockpile.

October 14, 1957

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EO 11652-2, 11652-1, 2, 4
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Background

1. You will recall that you discussed this question with Deputy Defense Secretary Quarles on September 5. You felt that there were few substantive differences between State and Defense on the question. It was then agreed that Defense would obtain General Norstad's views, and the two Departments would continue to work on the matter, in order to develop a concrete plan which could be announced to our NATO allies.

2. On September 10, General Norstad sent his views to the Chairman of the JCS. (Although Defense has never sent us a copy of Norstad's cable, we received one privately from General Norstad's political adviser. Defense is not aware of this fact.)

BIA?

3. Pursuant to the Political Directive adopted at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in December 1956, General Norstad has just completed a SHAPE "Minimum-Force Study, 1958-1963". One of the basic requirements stated by General Norstad to be essential to an effective defense of Western Europe over the next five years is greatly increased strength in nuclear-capable delivery systems (missiles), ground-to-ground and ground-to-air, together with the atomic warheads for such missiles. Specifically, he states:

✓

"A. Nuclear Stockpile for NATO

Two basic building blocks in the structure of the minimum-force are: development of a nuclear delivery capability in our forces where necessary without regard to national or command affiliations, and dispersal of the delivery units. The two blocks will continue useful only if nuclear weapons for the delivery systems, also dispersed, are available in emergency. These conditions are therefore integral in Strike and Shield force requirements. Whether any NATO nation has possession of nuclear weapons is not within the province of this Command. It is, however, for us to ensure at our disposal a store of weapons of appropriate numbers and types so located that the Allied delivery systems can use them effectively. Such a system

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has been developed to service United States forces. Extended, it will meet the military requirements of the Alliance without entailing complicated and perhaps difficult changes in systems of control and custody as established by law.

"We will continue to advocate the creation of this capability as an essential part of our collective strength."

This summarizes the basic elements of a NATO Stockpile (atomic warheads in U.S. custody and control but deployed in accordance with SACEUR's plans) as General Norstad sees them.

4. The subject of the NATO stockpile will be a topic of the greatest interest to NATO at the Ministerial meeting this December, particularly in light of General Norstad's study. It seems to us imperative that the U.S. Government be in a position to announce its intention of proceeding with a stockpile along the lines General Norstad has in mind. We understand the JCS are restudying the matter in the light of Norstad's comments. We have less than two months in which to prepare for the December meeting, and we should urge Defense to have the JCS complete their study, so that a high-level political decision on the matter can be made.

Recommendation

That you sign the attached letter (Tab A) to Defense Secretary McElroy.

Attachment

Letter to Secretary McElroy,
Tab A.

Concurrences

G - Mr. Murphy

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S/AE - Mr. Farley

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Dear Neil:

As you know, our two Departments have been discussing for some time the question of a NATO Atomic Stockpile. The basic concept is that the United States would maintain full custody and control, as required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, but the atomic bombs and warheads destined for use in the event of emergency by the nuclear-capable forces of our NATO allies, would be stocked and deployed in accordance with SACEUR's plans.

I went into this matter in more detail in my letter to Charlie Wilson of July 2, and in his letter of August 23, Charlie Wilson suggested that we discuss the matter, which I did with Don Quarles on September 5. At that time the sense of the meeting was that the study made by the JCS was along the same general lines as the thinking of this Department, and that we should proceed to work out a concrete plan that could be announced in the NATO Council. At the September 5 meeting I was informed that General Norstad's comments were being sought and my staff has been informed by officers of your Department that these comments have been received and are now under study by the JCS.

I have been particularly interested to see SACEUR's requirements for atomic-capable delivery systems in his "Minimum-Force Study, 1958-1963", and his remarks on the need for the establishment of the NATO stockpile, to ensure that atomic warheads will be available to our allies in time of hostilities.

The question of the NATO stockpile first arose at the NATO Ministerial Meeting at Bonn in May of this year, and I said that the United States would study the proposal. I feel certain the question

will again

The Honorable,
Neil McElroy,
Secretary of Defense.

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will again be raised at the NATO Ministerial meeting this December, and I consider it most important that at that meeting the United States Government be prepared to take a positive, forthcoming approach, outlining a concrete plan that we are prepared to implement. Failure to do so could have seriously adverse effects on NATO unity.

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Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles

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