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17 AUG 1976

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Raymond A. Warren
Chief, Latin America Division
VIA : Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : Potential Political and Security
Ramifications of "Operation Condor"

*Review
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249-ly*

1. "Operation Condor" has been the subject of previous correspondence to you and other senior officials of the Agency; it has also generated considerable correspondence [redacted] in recent months and has prompted discussions with senior officials of the Department of State as to what action the U.S.G. could take in an attempt to assure that human rights were not violated by the countries involved in "Condor". The most significant of the foregoing documents are attached for your review. In addition, the following is a precis of "Condor" and an assessment [redacted] of the possible adverse political ramifications for the Agency should "Condor" engage in assassinations and other flagrant violations of human rights. [redacted]

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2. Initial reports on "Condor", the code name given to the program of cooperation among the intelligence services of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay, beginning in April 1976, indicated that the thrust of the program was to be intelligence exchange and that the target of this effort was to be the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR). The JCR is an international revolutionary coordinating body which was formed by the Argentine Peoples Revolutionary Army (ERP) and which includes, in addition to Argentina, terrorist organizations in Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia and Paraguay.

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The JCR has received financial, logistical and training support from Cuba; in addition, it has been the recipients of millions of dollars obtained by the ERP through the ransom of executives of U.S. firms in Argentina. The JCR operates principally in the southern part of South America, but it is known to have strong representation in Europe and is suspected of having been involved in the assassinations in Paris of General Joaquin Z e n t e n o Anaya, Bolivian Ambassador to France, on 11 May 1976 and Colonel Ramon A. T r a b a l, Military Attache of the Uruguay Embassy in Paris on 19 December 1974. Zenteno was the military region commander in the area where Ernesto "Che" G u e v a r a was captured and killed in 1967. Trabal had previously been active in the successful efforts by the Uruguayan security forces to suppress the Tupamaros, a member organization of the JCR, in Uruguay.

3. [redacted] 3.3(b)(1)

[redacted] indicating that the efforts by the security services of the southern cone countries to undertake a regional approach to meet a regional terrorist threat, i.e., "Condor", would go well beyond the exchange of information -- to include plans to assassinate selected JCR leaders in [redacted]

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[redacted]

4. In an attempt to preempt potential political ramifications for the Agency, should the "Condor" countries proceed with the European aspect of their plans, we have taken the following action. As soon as we learned of the possible

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[redacted]

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[redacted] In addition, discussions were held with senior officials

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of the Department of State relating to the steps which could be taken to dissuade the South America countries from their planned course of action. Accordingly, agreement has been reached on the text of an EXDIS message from the Department of State to the U.S. Ambassadors in Buenos Aires, Santiago and Montevideo instructing them to approach the highest levels of their host governments and express the serious concern of the U.S. Government to the alleged assassination plans envisioned within "Operation Condor." The host governments would be informed, however, that the U.S. takes no issue with "Condor" plans to collect and coordinate information to counter regional terrorism in the southern cone area.

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[Redacted]

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5. The State Department approach described above could well have some adverse impact on the security of the

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] In any case, it is our judgement that the potential repercussions must be accepted in order to counteract the negative aspects of "Condor."

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signed

Raymond A. Warren

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Attachments, a/s

CONCUR:

William W. Wells

17 AUG 1976

Deputy Director for Operations

Date

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