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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : EUR - Mr. Merchant *es-15-01* *DATE* *NOV 25 1958* *NOV 25 1958*

FROM : EUR/RA - Mr. Timmons *BTW* *RECORDED* *INDEXED* *NOV 25 1958* *NOV 25 1958* *R-file*

SUBJECT: Atomic Armament of Germany *no records described on this*

In view of recent Soviet and Polish moves directed against the arming of Germany with nuclear weapons, it may be of interest to set forth the present status of this question.

The basic NATO position on the question of equipping the forces of other NATO countries with an atomic capability was contained in the communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Bonn Ministerial meeting in May 1957. The relevant excerpts from this communiqué are attached at TAB A. The position stated at Bonn was reiterated in the communiqué of the NATO Heads of Government meeting in December 1957. Relevant excerpts from that communiqué are attached at TAB B.

You will recall that Chancellor Adenauer last March obtained a majority vote in Parliament for the proposition that German armed forces "must be equipped with the most modern weapons", and that the Chancellor stated publicly in May that the equipping of German forces with atomic-capable weapons was envisaged.

MC 70 requirements for Germany include a number of weapons with dual or atomic capability, notably Honest John, Lacrosse, Redstone, Matador and Nike. However, the Germans, having to pay for weapons which are furnished as grant aid to other NATO nations have been shopping most carefully. There is indication of a German desire to "leapfrog" current weapons systems and delay any sizable acquisition of new weapons until they are fully satisfied that the equipment they can obtain will be best suited to Germany's requirements.

According to the latest information from Defense, the Germans have so far ordered only the following atomic-capable weapons: 3 Nike battalions, (60 Ajax and 40 Hercules per battalion - only Hercules is atomic-capable), 2 Honest John Battalions, and 1 Matador battalion. These are in the process of delivery, except for the Matadors, which are scheduled for delivery some time between August 1959 and July 1960. The atomic warheads for any new weapons would of course remain under US control, and the Germans have indicated to us that they prefer it that way. Occasion will be taken during the German Annual Review examination on November 27 to needle the Germans on their slow arms buildup, including new weapons, and they will be asked to declare their intentions in this regard.

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In addition to the foregoing, the Germans have acquired some 225 F-84F fighter bombers, a portion of which are equipped with "conversion kits" which give them an atomic capability. Further, a German group is presently in the United States to complete negotiations for acquiring the F-104, including license for manufacture in Germany. This plane, of course, has an atomic capability.

As part of the NATO stockpile system, the United States maintains atomic warheads and bombs in the German Federal Republic. With German permission, SACEUR has embarked upon a program of stocking in Germany atomic bombs and warheads in United States custody for BRITISH CORPORAL regiments and BRITISH CANBERRA bomber squadrons. However, as yet, there are no atomic warheads and bombs being stocked in Germany for the use of German forces, although SACEUR would like to move forward on this aspect of the matter at a very early date.

Clearance:

GER - Mr. Behr *JHB*

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18. The Soviet leader., while preventing a general disarmament agreement, have made it clear that the most modern and destructive weapons, including missiles of all kinds, are being introduced in the Soviet armed forces. In the Soviet view, all European nations except the USSR should, without waiting for general disarmament, renounce nuclear weapons and missiles and rely on arms of the pre-atomic age.

19. As long as the Soviet Union persists in this attitude, we have no alternative but to remain vigilant and to look to our defences. We are therefore resolved to achieve the most effective pattern of NATO military defensive strength, taking into account the most recent developments in weapons and techniques.

20. To this end, NATO has decided to establish stocks of nuclear warheads, which will be readily available for the defence of the Alliance in case of need. In view of the present Soviet policies in the field of new weapons, the Council has also decided that intermediate range ballistic missiles will have to be put at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

The Council noted that since its last meeting the Soviet leaders have launched a campaign which, while throwing the cloak of oblivion over Soviet repression in Hungary, is designed to induce public opinion in various member countries to oppose the modernisation of defence forces, and to weaken the principle of collective security in NATO.

The Council agreed that one of the objects of this campaign was to ensure for Soviet forces a monopoly of nuclear weapons on the European continent. Such a situation clearly could not be accepted. It was with satisfaction that the Council noted the firm replies given to these Soviet manoeuvres.

The Atlantic Alliance must be in a position to use all available means to meet any attack which might be launched against it. It is the availability of the most modern weapons of defence which will discourage attempts to launch any such attack on the Alliance. Pending an acceptable agreement on disarmament, no power can claim the right to deny to the Alliance the possession of the modern arms needed for its defence. If, however, the fears professed by the Soviet Union are sincere, they could be readily dissipated. All that is needed is for the Soviet Union to accept a general disarmament agreement embodying effective measures of control and inspection within the framework of the proposals made on numerous occasions by the Western powers, which remain an essential basis of their policy.

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