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By SPR NARA Date 2-10-95

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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1959 JAN 29 10 11 AM '59

See Outgoing telegram!

MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR S/P

January 26, 1959

*2/5 to Bonn #1715
2/5 " " 1716
2/10 to Paris #2887
2/10 " " 2888*

To: S/P - Mr. Smith
From: EUR - Mr. Merchant *LSM*
Subject: NATO Atomic Stockpile in Germany.

Thank you for your memorandum of January 9 on the timing of our moves with respect to the NATO atomic stockpile in Germany.

My own feeling is, however, that in conjecturing about the possible public reaction in Germany when the subject becomes known, we should rely on the Chancellor's estimate of the problem. This was also the Secretary's view when he authorized the Ambassador's approach to the Chancellor (DEPTEL to Bonn 1314). According to Ambassador Bruce's report (Bonn's 1464), the Ambassador stressed the very point you are concerned about: that there would probably be widespread publicity in Germany. The Chancellor said he realized this and was prepared for the consequences. The Chancellor also agreed that negotiations should proceed at once.

As for dissension in Western Europe when the subject eventually becomes known, the NATO Foreign Ministers heard General Norstad report on December 17 that a stockpile storage site [WAGON TRAIN] had been developed for a German fighter-bomber squadron and, as far as I know, there was no expression of concern or recommendation that this operation be suspended. Similarly, in September a SHAPE document (128/58) was circulated to all NATO countries (except Iceland) which listed 13 stockpile sites in Germany planned through mid-1960, including German-user sites for 5 different types of atomic weapons. I have not heard that there was any adverse reaction to this plan on the part of European politicians.

The timing of the submission of the 144 (b) agreement to Congress will, of course, be most carefully weighed in the light of the situation prevailing at that time, with a constant review of the important factors to be considered with respect to this agreement. Our present plans are to answer Bonn telegram 1464 in separate messages setting

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forth our views on aspects of the stockpile for the comments of General
Norstad and Ambassador Bruce; these telegrams are to cover: (a) next
steps with respect to WAGON TRAIN; (b) the "use" formula aspects of
the general stockpile agreement; the security survey prerequisite to
the inception of 144 (b) agreement discussions; the question of further
notification of the stockpile to NATO.

Concurrences:

RA - Mr. Timmons *BT*

GER - Mr. Hillenbrand *HM*

Attachments:

1. S/P-596-1A: Memo to the Secretary from
S/P - Gerard Smith, dated January 9, 1959;
2. ~~S/P-5910-1A: Memo to Mr. Merchant from
S/P - Gerard Smith, dated January 16, 1959;~~
3. ~~Telegram to Bonn/Paris by G:DJPorter 1/13/59;~~
4. ~~Telegram to Bonn/Paris by G:DJPorter 1/12/59;~~
5. ~~BCNN T 1464-18.~~

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January 16, 1959

TO : EUR - Mr. Merchant
 FROM : S/P - Gerard C. Smith
 SUBJECT: NATO Atomic Stockpile in Germany

Attached is a memorandum which I sent the Secretary on January 9 and which, as you will see did not reach him in view of Bonn's 1464 reporting the Bruce-Adenauer stockpile talk.

S/S tells me that, following receipt of this memorandum Governor Herter discussed it with Mr. Murphy who drafted a proposed telegram to Bonn. Governor Herter sent that telegram together with this memorandum (which he had initialled) on to the Secretary's office. By the time the package arrived there, Bonn 1464 was at hand. (Mr. Murphy's proposed telegram is in the attached package.)

As indicated in para 5 of my memorandum, I did not expect this memorandum to prevent Ambassador Bruce from reaching a decision in principle with the Chancellor. I wished rather to influence the timing of our subsequent moves. This still seems feasible.

I believe that the best way to go about it at the present stage would be to grind this viewpoint into the answer to Bonn's 1464, and I am therefore sending the memorandum to you.

I think it would be desirable, for the reasons indicated in this memorandum, for our military people proceed very slowly and in a low key on this matter, busying themselves with low level technical details and delaying the conclusion of an agreement and the consequent submission of a 144B to Congress while the Berlin crisis is at its peak.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

SS 188

January 14, 1959

S/P - Mr. Savage
EUR - Mr. Long

NATO Atomic Stockpile in Germany

The attached staff study prepared in S/P, dated January 9, 1959, was initialed by the Under Secretary but was not sent on to the Secretary in view of recent events in Bonn (see Bonn's 1464). The Under Secretary and Mr. Murphy discussed this matter thoroughly on January 12 and 13.

In any event, there should now be a prompt follow-up by EUR on Bonn's 1464. The outgoing telegram should be prepared for signature by the Under Secretary, or if it is felt necessary and/or appropriate, by the Secretary.


C. A. Borg
S/S-RO
Ext. 4108

Att: Staff study 188.

cc: G - Mr. Donhauser

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POLICY PLANNING STAFF
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TO : The Secretary

THROUGH: U - The Under Secretary C.A.H.
S/S

FROM : S/P - Gerard C. Smith

SUBJECT: NATO Atomic Stockpile in Germany

DEC 9 1959

Mr. [unclear]
See [unclear]
1/16/59

1. I understand that Ambassador Bruce is, upon his return from Paris, to discuss with Chancellor Adenauer the possible establishment of a NATO atomic stockpile in the Federal Republic.

2. If we should then proceed to negotiate a stockpile agreement there would be the possibility of a leak. In any event, publicity would be unavoidable as and when a related agreement for the exchange of technical data was laid before the Congress.

3. Publicity concerning this proposed move against the background of the Berlin crisis could have two harmful effects:

(a) Free world support for our position in the Berlin crisis might be somewhat weakened by distracting and conflicting concerns over imminent West German nuclear rearmament. The Soviets would be able to stir up fears in Western Europe - including the Federal Republic - over this proposed move, thus creating disunity at the very moment when unity is most needed.

Tab B (b) This might make the Soviets more intransigent, - not only because they would perceive Western disunity but also because they would feel that only by bringing the crisis to a head could they prevent early German nuclear rearmament. SNIE 100-13-58 indicates that preventing this is a part of one of their major objectives in creating the crisis.

Tab C 4. In a recent telegram for Ambassador Bruce (Paris 2363 of December 27)/General Norstad states that, although it would be desirable to move forward promptly, timing is not critical from a purely NATO military standpoint. Nor

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would prompt initiation of stockpile negotiations be likely to get this issue out of the way before any East-West discussions over Berlin. In view of the duration of these negotiations and the requirement for Congressional action, our move would seem more likely to focus attention on the issue while such discussions were taking place.

5. I would hope therefore that, whatever decision might be reached in principle with the Chancellor, consideration could be given to deferring action involving substantial danger of publicity while the Berlin crisis is at its peak.

cc: G - Mr. Murphy
EUR - Mr. Merchant
S/AE - Mr. Farley

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