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TS # 141564
IAC-D-57/59
21 March 1957

Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-57:

Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs

in the Guided Missile Field,

dated 12 March 1957

1. This estimate supersedes NIE 11-6-54, 5 October 1954, and its supplement, NIE 11-12-55, 20 December 1955. Much time and effort was expended over the past year in estimating the USSR's military requirements for guided missiles, its capabilities to develop missile systems and its intentions regarding missile production and operational employment during the next ten years. We were unable to make an estimate of production and operational programs in terms other than feasibility and reasonability. This portion of the estimate was handicapped by: lack of agreed estimates on how the USSR is likely to balance its future military programs; lack of agreed estimates on how the USSR is likely to apportion its nuclear materials stockpile among various weapons systems, and our inability to form a valid judgment thereon; our inability to predict Soviet judgments over a ten-year period regarding missiles versus other weapons systems. These weaknesses stem in part from deficiencies in intelligence on Soviet missile development and testing programs, an almost complete absence of evidence on Soviet production and operational deployment of guided missiles and their warheads, and deficiencies in intelligence on Soviet programs for other competing weapons systems.

Findings

2. Major Gaps in Scientific and Technical Intelligence. Intelligence is still insufficient to determine accurately the detailed characteristics of missile systems already known to exist, i. e., the currently-deployed Moscow surface-to-air system, short-range ballistic missiles, and air-to-surface missiles. Even greater gaps exist in the air-to-air and submarine-launched categories, and in the

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development of more advanced systems in all categories. Of particular significance is our almost total lack of firm evidence relating to Soviet development of an IRBM and an ICBM. There continues to be a need for more detailed up-to-date intelligence on Soviet guided missile research and development organizations, facilities, and personalities. An urgent requirement exists for further information on Soviet guided missile testing activities.

3. Major Gaps in Economic Intelligence. Specific evidence on Soviet missile production capabilities and facilities is extremely limited. Quantity production of missile systems will require extensive production capacities in such fields as electronic components, precision mechanisms, and rocket fuels, all of which offer potential intelligence collection targets. Better data are needed on Soviet prices and costs as well as production and consumption patterns, particularly in the electronics field.

4. Major Gaps in Intelligence on Operational Status and Deployment. Specific evidence is lacking on Soviet military doctrine pertaining to the current and future relationship of guided missiles to a balanced military program. We have no direct evidence of Soviet judgments as to the advantages of missiles versus other weapons systems. In the absence of such evidence, improved techniques for evaluating the comparative performance of the various Soviet weapons systems are needed. Although we have estimated that nine Soviet missile systems could already be operational, we have firm evidence of the deployment of only one system in one area, i. e., the surface-to-air system at Moscow. A very urgent requirement exists for collection of intelligence on the operational status and deployment of Soviet guided missile systems.

Action

5. The appropriate IAC agencies and subcommittees are requested to take the following action and report on progress to the IAC by 1 September 1957:

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a. Continue intensive efforts to fill the gaps noted above, by exploiting to the fullest all existing intelligence collection methods;

b. Seek to develop and apply additional collection methods;

c. Study and recommend methods for improving the exploitation of available intelligence in the guided missile field, including methods for improving the community-wide coordination of effort.

6. The IAC agreed to designate an ad hoc committee to study and recommend by 1 June 1957 methods for evaluating the comparative performance of competing Soviet weapons systems, in order to assist in the formulation of national estimates on Soviet military programs.

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