



meeting w/USSR FM  
Shevardnadze, Windhoek,  
Namibia.

4/3/90

United Sta

Washington,

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hilburn,  
Senior Reviewer

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## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: March 20, 1990

Time: 6:00pm - 9:30pm

Place: Windhoek, Namibia

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary Baker  
Eduard Shevardnadze

Attached is the March 20  
JAB-Shevy memcon in its  
entirety. S and S/P  
are the only recipients  
of this version.

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**Baker:** I am glad to have an opportunity to talk and see you. There have been a lot of things happening around the world since we last met. And I think we will have a good deal to talk about. You are the guest here so I would like to allow you to set the agenda, but before you do could I first go over two housekeeping items?

First, I am going to give you a letter which you do not need to read now, which is on open skies. What I have outlined in the letter is a proposal for removing some of the obstacles on open skies. Please study it at your leisure and then respond to me when you can.

**Shevardnadze:** I feel there is a need for us to sort out what is happening in those talks.

**Baker:** Well I propose some things that move us in your direction and also have you moving in ours.

**Shevardnadze:** That's good. I am sure that this is a question on which we can agree.

**Baker:** Second item -- the timing of the Summit. I gave you some dates through Ambassador Matlock and those dates of June 18-22 I understand could be a bit of a problem for you because they are too close to the Party Congress date. And if those dates are not convenient for you, then we would be prepared to move up the timing of the Summit by one week. So, in other words, instead of meeting from June 18-22 we could meet from June 11-15. Regardless of which week you would come, we would hope that President Gorbachev would arrive on either Tuesday, June 12th or Tuesday, June 19th. Then we could have meetings that day and then the next day, perhaps in the evening a State dinner and that would be on either June 13th or June 20th. President Bush would then like it if President Gorbachev could come up to his home in Maine at Kennebunkport, that would be on either June 15th or June 22nd. That would leave time for

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responsibility for peace will continue for thirty to forty years -- that's our destiny. I am not just rejecting categorically the issue of Germany being in NATO. I am saying that we have a kind of logical position but I am also saying that I don't know what else to suggest at this point. We are prepared to consider other possibilities. Let me say that we are prepared to consider all possible scenarios.

**Baker:** I don't disagree with that. I don't disagree with the importance of thinking through all possible scenarios. We have spent a lot of time thinking about those scenarios ourselves. But I can just tell you that Germany anchored in the West in terms of its security is a Germany that is not going to be prompted to provide for its own security. Coupled with the kinds of guarantees I've talked about -- e.g., not using the territory of the GDR -- I think one can produce a stability that is better than others. We can't think of any other way. In any event, we can consult on these kinds of issues in the two plus four mechanism. Whatever mechanisms are developed or shaped that will in the end envelop Germany -- those mechanisms must in fact be developed and take shape with the consent of the Germanies, otherwise we can easily repeat the lessons of history which need to be absorbed and not in fact experienced again.

**Shevardnadze:** Unification is a fact. Therefore, what we do has to have some influence on its pace -- it is important that it not be speeded up. In the time that remains, I think we need to seek some guarantees for security.

**Baker:** That's what the two plus four mechanism is designed to at least get at. In any case, thanks for that discussion, thanks for staying late. I do have one more thing I would like to bring up. You talked of Namibia as being a good example of a success story of U.S.-Soviet cooperation and you said we ought to try to achieve the same kind of result on Angola. My feeling is that we ought to try to do the same thing in Afghanistan. We ought to look for a practical way to resolve Afghanistan. We both have some problems with our Afghan partners. What we need is a honorable way for both of us and for them to resolve this. I laid out some ideas in Moscow, you didn't like all of them; you laid out some ideas in your Izvestia interview. It occurs to me that there may be some common ground on the issue of elections -- though the circumstances in Afghanistan are not the same as they were in Namibia or in Nicaragua. I would be interested at some point in hearing your ideas on how you see elections working in Afghanistan. I know that in constructing a process that at some point we would get to the issue of whether Najib would take part as a candidate in the elections. We've never said someone ought not to run for office -- we would never exclude anyone from running for office. But we don't think we can

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produce the Mujahaddin in a process where Najib could still be in power. That is not a political position -- that is really just a statement of reality. It is really the same thing with regard to negative symmetry. If Najib left tomorrow, if he said he was tired of fighting off coup attempts, I could agree with you tomorrow on negative symmetry, on a ceasefire, and on elections. So I just wanted to put the thought in your head that we are open to elections, open to ceasefire, and open to negative symmetry working with others if Najib is not there. Or as I mentioned in Moscow, if we could tell the Paks, the Saudis, and the Mujahaddin that at some point he is not going to be there.

**Shevardnadze:** Well, I think this is not the place to begin because if we do we will immediately run into a dead end. The fact is that he is not going to leave. You've seen the coup attempt, you saw someone who was the defense minister who had all the generals with him fighting against Najib representing the Khalq wing of the party and we always had good relations with that wing of the party. What they counted on is that the army and the people would rise up in support of them. Look at what the defense minister had at his disposal, and yet he didn't succeed. So he is now in Pakistan and Najibullah is still in Kabul. This is so even though he is a professional army officer and Najib is not. So you see that Najib is not so easy to move out. He is proposing free elections. He is saying they can be held under UN auspices, he said there could be strict monitoring; he said there would be an opportunity given for the refugees to participate, he said that the territorial aspects need to be respected where the opposition controls the territories. I think maybe we should give some thought to using the process of a direct general election as a way out of this. We can't just tell him to go. He won't.

**Baker:** You can get him to go by stop paying his salary.

**Shevardnadze:** Well, we don't just pay his salary, it is more broad than that. But yes, we do provide him weapons. But bear in mind this is something we have to do. When we left Afghanistan, some complained in a very big way. Some of our past friends said you are abandoning us, you are abandoning your friends. You are simply jettisoning your friends. It was wrong to send troops in the first place, and we have to look for a solution. Look at Nicaragua where there were elections. Look at Namibia where there were elections. We are even trying the same thing in Cambodia. We can find a pragmatic solution, I am sure. But I have to say to you frankly that Najib has been able to strengthen his position and his prestige. He is an able figure. He has the power to persuade people.

**Baker.** Well, maybe we should, as someone once said, let them boil in their own juices.

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Shevardnadze: It could be that we will arrive at that point.

Baker: We just can't sell Najib to the Mujahaddin.

Shevardnadze: Well, why can't we think about this idea of free elections?

Baker: What would you think of the idea of asking him to abide by the results of elections, go along with it, but have him agree that he would not run in the first election, but he would be eligible for any election after that. There could even be a PDPA candidate in that first election.

Shevardnadze: I think we've got to consider the fact that this is Afghanistan. It is a country with its own laws, and its own way of doing things. We did not know Afghanistan before; look at how long the British were there, and the British never really understood it. I think that we could talk to Najib but it wouldn't get us very far if we were to talk to him in a fashion that you suggested.

Baker: But look at what we have seen countries do in the last twelve to fourteen months. Look at how they have passed election laws; they held elections in the GDR, Bulgaria, Namibia, Nicaragua, Romania. Why couldn't Afghanistan pass such election laws?

Shevardnadze: This is what Najib is proposing. In Namibia you had an election and Nojouma won. Why can't Najib stand? One year ago I visited Kabul and the city was being shelled all the time and it really was quite dangerous and there wasn't protection from the shelling. At one time during the shelling I spent some time with Najib and his family and I spoke to his wife and she has young children. I said that maybe she and the young children should go to Moscow. She said no; either they would win or die together. That's the kind of people they are.

Baker: Well we see the exact same kind of stubbornness in the Mujahaddin.

Shevardnadze: I know that and I agree with that.

Baker: The Mujahaddin says: What's this election? how can we have an election if Najib is not going to go? They are only going to take part in elections if they think there is going to be a new leadership.

Shevardnadze: Not one leader of the Mujahaddin is going to accept free elections. They all have a dictatorial persuasion -- Hekmatiyar, Khalis -- you name it; they are not interested in elections.

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**Baker:** Well we are not going to solve this one tonight.

**Shevardnadze:** Yes, but we have had a good discussion. I think it was good that we did discuss it, and I think we ought to give more thought to it.

Let me ask you one last question? Do you believe that the process of reform in South Africa is irreversible?

**Baker:** I want to. I probably will have a better sense in a couple of days when I go down there. But, I will say this. A year ago I met Pik Botha in Rome and he told me they were going to run on a platform of ending white domination. He said they were going to run on a platform of dismantling apartheid. I didn't believe him at that time but everything he said they would do, they have done. So maybe we are seeing a time of real change. Maybe this process of reform can be made irreversible. I hope so.

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