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19 September 1964



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
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19 September 1964


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2. Communist China: Soviets believe Chinese Communists could detonate nuclear device at any time.
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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2003Communist China: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Moscow believes the Chinese Communists could detonate a nuclear device at any time.

The present US estimate-- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is that the weight of available evidence indicates the Chinese will not have enough fissionable material for a test device until after 1964. Because another undiscovered reactor may exist, however, the possibility of an earlier detonation cannot be completely discounted.

Moscow had detailed information about the Chinese nuclear program until 1960. The Soviets themselves have stated, however, that they have not been able to keep well informed since then.

Khrushchev's references this week to "monstrous" and "terrible" weapons may have been motivated at least in part by concern over the impact a Chinese nuclear detonation could have at this time. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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DAILY BRIEF

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