

SALT II and the Growth of Mistrust

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nuclear weapons and disarmament issues. Later—maybe even next year—we'll get to the questions of linkage, U.S. views about whether the Soviet Union wanted to take over the world, the interactions between these things, and so forth. But on the strategic weapons issue and the disarmament issue, it is clear from what has been said on both sides that the lack of transparency with respect to the Soviet strategic doctrine was a real problem for the United States.

Now, it is true that if the Soviet side had said, "We are interested only in deterrence," there would have been Americans who said, "They are lying." But, at least, there would have been the beginning of a discussion. The separation between Foreign Ministry and General Staff knowledge of—and participation in the formulation of—that doctrine probably contributed to the lack of transparency. On the U.S. side, there was also a problem: there was too much concern among the U.S. political class, and among many journalists and academics—not all of them were in favor of disarmament, as Les Gelb pointed out—about Soviet first-strike capabilities, which were never that great. But, in fact, as the strategic arms negotiations evolved, Soviet concerns about the American qualitative superiority, and American concerns about Soviet quantitative superiority—specifically having to do with heavy missiles and their ability to destroy the U.S. retaliatory capability—resulted in quite different goals on both sides. And it was the tension between the respective goals on the two sides that drove the negotiations, beginning all the way back in 1968 and '69, recurring periodically, including in 1977. When we get to the point of discussing the specific proposals, I think we should keep this background in mind.

LEGVOLD: Thank you. Anatoly.

DOBRYNIN: I want to add something on this issue. Really, it relates more to what Sergei mentioned. Of course, our military people, as I understood it, had various plans and options for using nuclear weapons—when to use them, how to use them, at what level, and so forth. Very occasionally I would discuss these matters with the military—unofficially—because we had a friendly relationship with some people from our General Staff. But I can tell you this: Foreign Ministry people did not discuss this on a regular basis, and we did not spend even five

minutes on it in discussions with your State Department. Gelb and others talked about first strike capability, first use, no-first-use, nuclear options, and so on. We did not discuss them in the Foreign Ministry. *In the Foreign Ministry*, I emphasize. In the General Staff, they discussed these things. But we never really tried to be involved.

This was very bad, because we didn't know what they were talking about. All we knew about nuclear war we knew from American sources, you see. [Laughter.] I am speaking for myself, and all my friends, including Komienko. We knew nothing about it. So, it made things much more difficult. Actually, it made things too simple, too: we did not have very elaborate theories underlying our negotiating positions. We did not really discuss the balance of interests, we discussed the balance of weaponry: "How many missiles do we have? Okay, you have more, and we have less, so let's insist until we reach the same level. We will stand without moving." It was too simplified. Simplified, but at the same time it was really very difficult to negotiate with you. You put things in a much broader context than this. This was both a plus for you and a minus. The plus was that you were much more educated in strategic doctrine than we were; the minus was that you were always drawn into details. So when we began to discuss with you, we didn't know whether you were just talking, or trying to impress us. [Laughter.] It was very difficult even to report to Moscow what you were talking about. [Laughter.] When I wrote a telegram, I would always try to communicate enough information to let the Politburo decide whether the Americans were serious or not. But in the discussion it was sometimes really very difficult to know.

It is an open secret—I think somebody mentioned it somewhere; Carter, perhaps—that in the whole history of the Soviet-American discussion, not a single time did the Russians mention a figure with respect to their nuclear arms. They always waited until the Americans offered the figures, and they would say "yes" or "no." Sometimes we would add or subtract, but all the numbers were American. So were the names. I myself did not even know until the very last moment what "SS-18" meant. [Laughter.]

So all of this made our diplomacy very difficult. Maybe that's why our diplomacy was really rather simple. We had very simple diplomacy. We just went forward without paying attention to what you were saying to us. We just repeated the same answers to the same questions. Of course, I am exaggerating. But this did make it very difficult for us to negotiate

constructively—I am speaking about the Soviet diplomats.

I think that you overplayed the importance of hypothetical scenarios. I recall speaking to [Thomas] Watson, who before being appointed ambassador was Chairman of the Advisory Committee. I said, "What is the main lesson that you draw from your experience as Chairman of the Commission?" He said, "One thing I draw, Anatoly, after two years being Chairman of the Commission, is that we couldn't allow the military to handle nuclear war. Because they couldn't handle it as well as a civilian could do it. Because they—the military—know very clearly how many weapons one side could strike with, and how many the other could return, but they avoid answering the question of what would be the result after such a war, and how we deal with the world after the war."

So, let's discuss these things in concrete terms. To summarize—yes, this was situation where none of the Russian diplomats, including top ambassadors, knew what our military doctrine was, except that we were always on the defensive, defending our country. But I never heard what the military doctrine of the Soviet Union was. I don't know, maybe you didn't even know your own doctrine. But I didn't know ours. This made things very complicated and very simple. I didn't know much about the actual military situation—how powerful the missiles were, what the real balance was, whether we could annihilate your capacity with a first strike or not—we just took it all for granted. That's all. I think this might clarify your question a little bit.

LEGVOLD: Marshall?

SHULMAN: Well, I think it's useful that we have identified that at this early stage one of the fundamental problems of the asymmetry on the two sides was the extent to which those responsible for the negotiations were involved in the discussions of strategic doctrine. I go back to what Sergei said about what Kosygin reported. And I think one further elucidation might be useful from the Soviet side, particularly from those with military experience.

From my point of view, in observing the period from Glasboro, in 1967, when the president sought to argue with Kosygin first about the importance of deterrence, there was a gap between U.S. and Soviet understandings of the role of nuclear weapons. The U.S. always spoke about them as retaliatory. But what the discussion at Glasboro reflected was the

DOBRYNIN: So, as I understand it, it is rather ironic that during all those years of rivalry between our two countries, the main premise was that neither you nor we intended to have a first strike. If it had been clear from the very beginning, I think many issues could have been solved on the spot.

BROWN: I think neither side—well, I cannot speak for the Soviet side; but we were not, within the government, so much concerned about Soviet intentions for a first strike in a peaceful situation—a “bolt-out-of-the-blue” situation. What we were concerned about—what I was concerned about, certainly—was that in a situation of great tension—in Europe, for example, where there might even have been conventional military conflict—the Soviet leadership might misconstrue either American intentions or the balance of strategic forces in such a way as to decide either that there was going to be a nuclear exchange, and that they’d be better off striking first. I was concerned that the Soviet political leadership might hear a convincing briefing from a Soviet military planner saying, “If we, the Soviet Union strike first, we can destroy all the land-based American systems and bombers, and the subsequent imbalance would be so great either that we can limit the damage that the American submarine-launched missiles might do, or else we will be in a better negotiating position.” Now, I must say, I always found this scenario difficult to believe or to imagine; but it was something that had to be considered. There may well have been similar considerations on the Soviet side with respect to us. To repeat, I never felt that we would let the imbalance become such that it would become plausible, but it was the kind of calculation of weapons balance that the U.S. military had to make. That was part of their professional responsibility.

DOBRYNIN: Let me add—

LEGVOLD: Anatoly, I’m going to hold you now.

DOBRYNIN: Very quickly.

BRZEZINSKI: I think you have to understand the political situation that prevailed in the United States in 1976. The new administration came to office quite explicitly rejecting the idea of backchannels, secret negotiations, and so forth. It was made very clear from the very beginning that the negotiations would be conducted by the secretary of state either directly with his counterpart in the Soviet Union, or with Toly [Anatoly Dobrynin]. And I remember that, in fact, when Toly and I talked about the possibility of maintaining the kind of relationship that Toly had with Kissinger, I told Toly that this is not the way that the president wants to operate now; that Cy would be the principal channel, and that that would be the way we would conduct our business.

But beyond that there is this question of the seriousness of the relationship. The issues between us were centrally important, and they were being posed very directly through the official channels. I don't think it's an adequate answer to say that somehow or other the absence of a backchannel explains the difficulty of dealing seriously with the proposals that were being advanced by the U.S. side. And, I repeat, these proposals had two dimensions to them: one was a more ambitious effort to go forward in keeping with the president's faith as well as conviction that we ought to move eventually towards a non-nuclear world; and the second set of proposals was based on Vladivostok—quite deliberately, and if you look at our documents, we prepared them on the basis of Vladivostok, but left aside two issues on which we could not have immediate agreement because we viewed them as unresolved.

LEGVOLD: Anatoly.

DOBRYNIN: Zbig, I really think your comment about use or non-use was interesting. I think it clarified several points. About the most recent items discussed, let me say this.

First of all, about Harriman. We knew, of course, that he was the not representative of the president. But at the same time he was an eager beaver who went back and forth between Georgia and Washington, and then said things to us on behalf of the president. Our people took that very seriously. After his reports, our Politburo sat and discussed them. Then I received a telegram saying, "You have to go to Harriman and tell Harriman to go to the

president.” So Harriman was like an official channel. Arbatov was different. Arbatov said he was on his own. That is the difference.

On the second question you raised, about whether were we surprised or not about your proposal. No, we were not surprised; because from the very beginning you were talking about deep cuts. From the very beginning. Comprehensive cuts. Harriman had said that President Carter did not feel specifically obliged to follow everything that was in Vladivostok. This was the first time when people in Moscow said, how come? Why is he not obliged? But he was very clear. He indicated that the president was going to seek deep cuts. When we asked him, “How many?” he said, “Two or maybe three hundred missiles.” It was a big revelation to Moscow.

I spoke with Cy, before he went there, and although you had not at that time fully defined your positions, he made it clear what we could expect. So, in Moscow they knew. I simply want to dispel the impression that you get from some of our colleagues. Maybe some of our colleagues have the impression that there was great surprise, that this proposal came suddenly. But for us it was around for four months. There were many indications from many sources that you wanted to make very big drastic comprehensive reductions. So this was no really revelation for us.

About the second proposal: the second proposal was taken in the context of the overall relationship with you. We did not see these as a first proposal and a second proposal. What actually happened before Cy went to Moscow was that we had a big discussion in our government about what kind of relationship we were going to have with the new administration. Would it be like it was with Nixon, or before Nixon? And we were under the impression that the new administration was coming with the intention—maybe we were wrong—of taking a new course toward us on a whole set of issues. I don’t say that it was a good course or a bad course, but a change of course. It was a change in arms negotiations, the proposal for drastic reductions; it was the new position on human rights. It looked as though at the very beginning of the new administration you were setting a new agenda, an agenda proposed by you—a completely new one, which we didn’t have before. How were we to deal with this?

A decision was taken to begin not with the specifics of Vladivostok—because, after all, while they were important, it was more important to know what kind of course our relationship would

take with the new administration. We had to decide whether we were going to fight these two issues, drastic reductions and human rights, and if so, how.

[UNIDENTIFIED]: Do you mean linkage?

DOBRYNIN: In a way, yes. In a way. Not directly, but in a way. It always happens; sometimes you make it a public linkage, and sometimes you do not say it. So this was the decision. And when Vance came, from the very beginning, when we first saw you [indicating Vance], we felt the proposal for drastic reductions was not a serious approach. I don't say that we were right or wrong, but that was the overall impression. So, the question was really: were we going to do something, prepare something, to find a compromise?

Zubok asked here about the backchannel. I was one of the participants for many years. I don't say that it is something of overriding importance, but it has some importance. Specifically in one sense: it gives you a chance to explain things. It helps provide a preliminary explanation of the position of the other country. It's simple. It doesn't always matter who the channel is; things are decided by the president. But the backchannel helps elaborate on your thinking a little bit. Not always. There was one situation when the secretary of state brought one proposal—drastic reductions—and someone else brought another one. And someone would raise human rights. It was difficult to know how to deal with this administration at all.

I should say, after an elaborate discussion they had in the government, Brezhnev was a little bit angry. He was not in the mood for this. In the first meeting with Nixon, he said, "Let's sit down and discuss what we are you going to do, because I am for peace, and you are for peace too." There was no such opportunity with the Carter administration. Maybe it sounds funny, but psychologically it's important, because during the previous fifteen years, that had been the pattern with any administration. And suddenly this administration came and did not send anything except a self-appointed ambassador who says one thing, but at the same time they couldn't take him for word because he was not speaking for a president, but a president-elect.

So, that was the situation. I think that in this sense, the channel—the backchannel—was

useful at least for explaining things. It is important not just to have people come with very big proposals, accompanied by some other things which were not acceptable. You need contacts to explain things.

What we were really concerned about was having the agenda prepared by your administration from the very beginning. You prepared it, and then brought it to us. Why did we have to accept it? If we want to understand the fight we had for years with your administration, we have to look at your agenda. Wrongly or rightly, that is how we saw things. That's why we were so angry, and didn't even want to discuss your proposals.

I think back channels are sometimes useful, useful mostly first for advance explanation, and also sometimes useful for working things out without much publicity. As a matter of fact, at one point there was work between Cy, me, and you too [indicating Brzezinski]. You were involved in this negotiation. Very few people know it, but before 1979 I had many meetings with you, too. They were useful. There was no publicity. So back channels were useful. I don't say it's really the most important thing, but still this is what happened.

LEGVOLD: Thank you very much, Anatoly. I think that's a rich introduction.

BRZEZINSKI: Could I respond to Anatoly?

LEGVOLD: Yes. I've got Cy next, and then I have Viktor. Before you respond, Zbig, when you noted the objective linkage that was implicit in the way Anatoly spoke, I would remind you of something that Sergei said earlier on the issue of human rights and arms control. According to his report, Andropov said that if there was a prospect of progress in arms control, then they might have been willing to be more forthcoming on the human rights issue. So, there was also a kind of linkage as Andropov saw the matter. Cy, you're next.

VANCE: I simply want to clarify some things that Anatoly stated. He was absolutely correct in saying that we laid out our proposals in really considerable detail. In the briefing book, there is a report of the March 21 meeting between Anatoly and myself in which we laid out immediately prior to going exactly what it was that we were going to put forward in terms of the basic deep

nin, you are a long-time expert in Washington. You observed the 1976 presidential campaign over an extended period of time, in which the winner had criticized severely and successfully the style and the approach of the previous administration, particularly Secretary Kissinger. Did you tell Moscow that this would be an administration that would need to modify the Kissinger proposal? Therefore, even if your government rejected Carter's comprehensive proposal, wouldn't it have been advisable to make a counter offer? And secondly, did you factor into your own analysis the timetable of ratification? I mean, assume for the moment that the United States accepted Vladivostok, or some variation on that. Did Moscow have any awareness that that would be a tough debate extending over a significant period of time, and would have to be completed in practice before Congressional elections in 1978, or the presidential elections in 1980?

DOBRYNIN: Have you ever been an ambassador? [Laughter.]

PASTOR: It was an ulterior purpose of my question. [Laughter.]

DOBRYNIN: I am sorry, your question comes exactly from the fact that you are not. So, coming back to your question. Of course I made my observations; but what kind of observation could I make in, say, December of 1976? What kind of observation? The election? I knew that an election campaign is an election campaign. So, we had to wait a little bit. What did I know before? Very little about Carter. Just what I read in his statements. I didn't know much about Vance or Zbig; just what I read about them. But first of all, it was not clear who would occupy what office. So, at that particular time it was very difficult to predict the situation.

What is interesting is that, historically, for ten years—maybe even twelve years—there had not been a single case when a new administration came to power, and we—the Soviet government—took a harsh position from the very beginning. In March, when we rejected the proposal, it was the first time we had taken such a harsh position with a new administration. Usually there was a lengthy period of give and take, so to speak, where we felt each other out, carefully negotiating, forming our opinion.

The question that we faced, when Cy Vance arrived in Moscow, was whether we were going to continue détente by pursuing Vladivostok, or whether we were facing a situation of having to accept an agenda that we thought at the time represented a major departure: a revision of the Vladivostok agreement, human rights, and many other issues which were until now unacceptable. That was really the problem as we saw it at that time. And we wanted from the very beginning to know where the new administration stood on our relationship.

Gromyko did later on accept that we made a mistake by not answering Cy Vance. That's another story; and I agree with him. But we are speaking about history as it was. We wondered why Cy arrived with this proposal. It was not the particular proposal that made people mad there, but the fact that during the whole previous month, the administration had been pushing its Sakharov, Bukovsky, Ginzburg, Sharansky. Now it sounds ridiculous, but at that time, the telegram from the White House to Sakharov was very offensive. We considered this a departure from the normal diplomatic relations between two countries. Those people Brezhnev very sincerely considered enemies of the regime. How should one react to this? It's a psychological point. At that time, it stirred very strong emotions. I am explaining to you the psychological state of mind of our government.

LEGVOLD: Very quickly, Harold, and then Zbig is next on my list.

BROWN: From what you've just said, Anatoly, it becomes clear that the linkage with human rights was not solely a positive linkage in Soviet view. You have just described a very negative linkage.

The other point I'd like to make is that Vladivostok had been more than two years before, and no movement had occurred toward completing it or toward ratifying it. In retrospect, wasn't it a little naïve on the part of the Soviet side to think that the new administration would come in and just accept and move on an agreement which the previous administration had not been able to do anything with for two years?

DOBRYNIN: It was in '74, and in '76—

was very wisely put together.

I'm going to turn it over now to Les, who was one of the architects of that piece of construction that got us back on track.

LEGVOLD: Les?

GELB: After we came back from the Moscow trip, Bill Hyland and I went out to lunch. We made a lot of fun of our friends, a lot of fun of our adversaries, and then we said there must be some way to reconstruct what was done and what could be done. And we came up with the three-part proposal that you see before you. The first part embodied the essence of Vladivostok. The second part took the harder questions that couldn't be resolved there and put them in a protocol where we felt both sides could live with solutions of a very limited duration and go back at the issues. The third part was intended to get us where President Carter wanted to go in the first place: namely, toward the principles looking forward to creating a more stable strategic balance.

We looked at this inside the administration, and we were happy to find that it provided a way out. When Cy presented this to you informally shortly thereafter, we had it as a way out of the box we had both found ourselves in.

LEGVOLD: How shortly thereafter, Les?

GELB: Quickly. April.

LEGVOLD: What was going on in Moscow it those days immediately after March?

DOBRYNIN: I was involved immediately with the negotiations with Cy and Gelb—and with Marshall, too—on this issue—exactly on this issue. We were just preparing this “tripartite” or three-level plan, whatever you call it.

Well, in Moscow immediately after, of course, there was a recognition that we went to far, from both of our points of view. We knew that he had to find a way out; not immediately,

necessarily, but little by little. So, there was movement. I don't recall who was the first to reestablish communication, but somebody spoke rather quickly. And we established contact with the State Department—with Vance—and we began the exchange.

At first, we had no specific concrete plan. But we did intend to get something to move us forward. There was a mutual desire on both sides. So I was acting under this instruction from my government, and they were acting on theirs. And then things began to develop more elaborately. But in the beginning we were just saying, "Let's find a way," and ultimately that wasn't very simple, really. We had an unacceptable proposal on one side—unacceptable for the other—so what were we to do? We had to construct some kind of alternative. This three-level proposal ultimately ended in the agreement of 1979, if you look at it. It was the basis for '79.

VANCE: Basically, it was a very good—

DOBRYNIN: Basically, it was a very good ground, and there was not really much difficulty when we negotiated these issues with the State Department, and then with Gromyko they finalized all the details. It was done very quickly because both sides recognized that it was a good proposal.

I think that if we had begun with this kind of proposal when you first came to Moscow, everything would have been fine. But I am saying "if;" history was different.

LEGVOLD: Nikolai, could I ask you, from your perspective, sitting in Moscow, what was the reaction to all of this?

DETINOV: As far as I can recall that time, we in Moscow were also trying to come up with a way to restore a normal negotiating process. Our side prepared some proposals that included an agreement to some reductions in overall levels of the strategic arms. A decision had been made to reduce them by 150 launchers—from 2400 to 2250—in the overall level of strategic weapons.

DOBRYNIN: That was at the level of the delegations.

DETINOV: And that had opened the possibility of introducing sublevels in ballistic missiles with MIRVs. To some extent those proposals that Vance brought to Moscow in March had been included.

LEGVOLD: Before I turn to Marshall, let me come back to the question of the atmosphere that you were describing on the Moscow side in the weeks leading up to, and including the March meeting. I think the most comprehensive statement of that was made by Anatoly: there was enormous frustration that the American administration was trying to dictate a new agenda in a number of spheres, including strategic arms control and human rights. What happened to that sentiment? Was the leadership satisfied that they had adequately rebuffed the American side? Did they decide that they were mistaken in the way in which they had defined the problem?

DOBRYNIN: Well, I think you do understand that there was no major confession in the Politburo: "Thank you, we are sinners, etc." There is no question about it. The question was very simple.

DETINOV: They were pragmatic.

DOBRYNIN: Yes, they were very pragmatic. So there was great tension, and we were sitting and thinking about what to do next. Should we go further? If so, where do we go further? Do we break off negotiations on SALT? Do we break diplomatic relations? It was logical to consider the alternatives. But we decided to look once again at the proposal which was brought by Vance, to see if we could find some basis for resuming negotiations. Then came the three-level proposal. We decided to negotiate on the basis of that. Gromyko was originally against this, but then he really encouraged it. Brezhnev recognized that we could not stand still forever; it was a new administration, and we had to deal with it. The question was how. We could not have complete deadlock for four more years.

So, we searched for a way out. There was no change of mind; no one felt sorry about how

things had happened. They felt that there was a need for a pragmatic approach. We had to do something to find a way, so to speak, to keep contact, to explore our common ground, to work little by little to rebuild this kind of process and deal with the arms race, even though we could not do it the way we had hoped. This was the feeling, and nobody objected to it.

LEGVOLD: I've got three responses to this point now on this specific issue: Marshall, Les, and then Harold. Marshall?

SHULMAN: First I'd like to underline what Les said about the credit that the record should show for Bill Hyland's contribution at this point, breaking out the three stage approach. That, I think, helped really to move toward the ultimate solution.

Secondly, it's important at this point, I think, to take account of the fact that there were several extraneous issues that interfered with the process. And from the time of the May negotiations with Gromyko through the following year, two issues arose that interfered with the negotiations. One of these was Ethiopia, and the issue of the Cuban troops there—

DOBRYNIN: That was in '77, wasn't it? It was later; one year later.

SHULMAN: But the meetings, as I recall, between Gromyko and the president on the issue of Soviet military involvement in Ethiopia came, as I recall, in—what?—1978?

DOBRYNIN: '78; even later.

SHULMAN: No, but bear in mind that negotiations started in Geneva in May, and went through a year and a half cycle before they were approved.

DOBRYNIN: Yes, but we discussed with Cy the three-tier, three-level—

SHULMAN: All right; but look what happened. In the course of 1978 we went through series of negotiations, and by the end of the year we had almost reached an agreement when there came the second extraneous issue, which was China.

And, indeed, we had the example of many of the previous negotiations and agreements that Kissinger had signed off on proving this to be the case. The issue of the volume of missile silos, for example—when 5% in dimension turned out to be 15% in volume. The failure to identify what an “air-to-surface missile” meant—whether it meant ballistic missiles, or whether it meant cruise missiles as well—was another problem. With those examples before us, we felt it was very important to nail things down. And that takes longer. It may have appeared to the Soviet side to be an attempt to delay things on the U.S. side, but it reflected very serious concerns on our part.

LEGVOLD: A question to the Soviet side on this score: If, as Viktor Starodubov has said, the Soviet negotiators and Soviet policy makers believed that many of these issues were raised because the administration wanted to protect itself against potential criticism from the opponents of the treaty; and if you believed that the political environment in the United States was growing more difficult for the administration on these issues; then why didn't you feel pressured to speed up the conclusion of this agreement before more time passed?

DOBRYNIN: I may put it this way. While I agree with what my colleague General Starodubov said—because he knows these things better than I—I should say that not all of the people on the political side really believed in this stuff about ratification being more difficult or less difficult, because—particularly in this period—there were so many official approaches from your side on small things. “We ask you to give in on this, because otherwise we will have difficulty in ratification,” or, “We would like you to take into consideration such-and-such because of the difficulty of ratification.” This matter, by the way, was a special subject for discussion in the government in the autumn of '78. We got a little bit suspicious, really. You were trying to get a lot of concessions by arguing that otherwise the treaty will not be ratified—not just on arms control, but on other issues as well. We were told, “Look here, the fellows on the Right—Mr. Jackson or some others—will be against it. So, let's do this.” It was unbelievable.

Once before the summit, for example, you asked us about reconnaissance flights along the Soviet-Turkish border. You asked permission—I don't know why you needed it, but nevertheless, you asked it, so we were definitely against it. This is just one example; I could

give you others, rather trivial ones—because there were so many. These appeals to the importance of verification for domestic political reasons were so many that they became, as I said, a subject for special discussion in our government.

LEGVOLD: Could you recall the specific date?

DOBRYNIN: In the autumn; I don't recall.

LEGVOLD: What year?

DOBRYNIN: '78.

LEGVOLD: Cy Vance.

VANCE: I just want to make a point—and it's an important point, I think. Verification was a very important issue politically. That's something that everybody understands: whether the other side will be honest, or whether they're going to cheat, is very important. And it's a very technical business. But it was very important because this was the kind of thing where somebody, when you were trying to get the treaty ratified, could say, "Yes, but you haven't proved that we can verify it, and then how can we be sure that they aren't going to cheat?" So that was not a simple issue to deal with, as all of the issues we are now talking about were not simple. They are very complex because of the kinds of very technical and complicated machinery used in military matters. So I don't think it's strange that it took more time than most of us thought or hoped that it would. These were issues that had to be resolved, and as painful as it might be to do it, they had to be done because they were not things you could just toss away.

LEGVOLD: Before I turn to—

VANCE: There is one other thing that just came to my mind: the Iranian radar. That was a very important thing. We lost that at that time, as you will recall, and that made it even more

DOBRYNIN: General Secretary Brezhnev was not bothered very much with the ratification. So, it was not really an issue for him. [Laughter.] Verification, too, was not a very important issue for him personally. I am not speaking about—

LEGVOLD: No, I'm asking how he felt about this long, drawn-out process of completing the agreement, and in turn, how he saw Carter?

DOBRYNIN: Let me put it this way. First, I think he became used to it. It was a long process, and nobody knew whether we would reach the end of it. Second, of course, he was a little bit impatient, but what he could do? When you come to the highly technical questions, he was in no position to judge—as Gromyko, by the way, could not judge, either. When we were diplomats sat and listened to the Generals say, "Look here, it's very important to have this encryption," we knew nothing about its real importance. Then an American would say, "It's very important, this issue." I couldn't even pass my judgment as a politician. I guess Gromyko didn't know either. Usually he would not speak from notes, but when these highly technical matters came up, he would read from his papers. Cy remembers.

VANCE: I remember.

DOBRYNIN: It's useful to know the details about what Mr. Turner just mentioned. I understand the problem he had before the Congress. I am sure that our people in the military, too, in their own way, worried about verification. They, too, wanted more or less perfection in the agreement. But at the same time I could tell, too, that our military men sometimes became impatient, and would say, "Look here, they are again asking another question." They sometimes felt that it was completely unnecessary. We would accept their judgment. We would say that these things were unnecessary. Ultimately we would ask them: what really do you need? It became so highly complicated technically.

That's why we became involved in such protracted discussions without, on the political side, knowing very much what we were talking about. This was the difficulty. There were many

other issues which preoccupied us in 1978, too—Ogaden, Somalia, the Middle East “Arc of Crisis,” as my dear friend referred to it [indicating Brzezinski], sending us running to the map asking, “Where this Arc of Crisis going on?” [Laughter.] Even Brezhnev looked at the map, because he was interested in knowing where this Arc of Crisis was that he had created. [Laughter.] So, it was an educational process, too. [Laughter.] There were other issues, as you know, too: a new adventure in South-East Asia—our beloved friend China organized something there; then our friend Vietnam, too. So we were trying to say, “Let’s do something;” but how were we to do it? Sometimes our minds were very much preoccupied. It wasn’t a situation where there was a cloudless sky and SALT was our only concern. No. We were preoccupied with many other things.

The Cuban brigade, which came up later, was another example. We spent a whole month on it. A whole month! There was a lapse of memory from your intelligence community, and the result was a Cuban brigade crisis. A whole month we were arguing. But this was typical. There were other difficulties as well. China, of course, was very much involved. We will probably discuss this issue tomorrow; I just mention it now in answering your question. SALT was not the only issue in our relations during this period of time. We were very much preoccupied with these other negative developments. They made it rather difficult to push a little bit quicker on SALT.

LEGVOLD: Anatoly is whetting our appetite, because a lot of what he has raised in his comment is something that we are going to come to tomorrow; but not at this hour, this afternoon. Harold, early on in Anatoly’s comment, you wanted to say something; and then I am going to turn to Phil Brenner. But let’s wait on the broader set of issues that he raised in his comment.

BROWN: Well, two points. One that he raised earlier has to do with the use by the U.S. side of its political Right—the U.S. political Right—as a reason for the Soviet side to make concessions. I think that was so used; but it worked the other way as well. Americans within the government—and I don’t know how much they heard this from the Soviet side—would say, “Well, Brezhnev has his hawks and his doves, and the more we stonewall the Soviet Union on

to sit down across the table from his counterpart and see whether or not he could communicate his own sincerity. Was it a lost opportunity that the two leaders did not meet until Vienna, in June of '79? Did the Soviets consider an earlier summit? Why did you not seize the opportunity?

LEGVOLD: Anatoly.

DOBRYNIN: To answer this specific question: my personal opinion is, yes, it was a mistake on our side not to have a summit. That was my opinion then, and it is still my opinion now. It was a mistake that we were linking SALT II and a summit. It was really Gromyko's idea; he sold it to Brezhnev. Gromyko firmly believed that we should have a SALT II agreement ready for signing at a summit, and that we should not have a summit beforehand. And Brezhnev went along because he was at such an age that he was not prepared to sit down with Carter, who knew the subject quite well, and negotiate SALT II during a summit conference. He simply couldn't do it. That's why he was deferring.

Brezhnev also remembered the situation when Khrushchev met with Kennedy in Vienna, and what happened there. He didn't want a repetition of that. He was already an old, distinguished gentleman; he just wanted to have a nice quiet signing, with everybody looking at him and kissing each other. This was his kind of paradise. [Laughter.] He was definitely too stubborn, really.

Many times, I remember—five times; six times, maybe, beginning in 1977 and all through '78—I spoke with Cy many times, and even the president himself twice mentioned to me directly when I met with him that he wanted a summit. He said directly, "Please pick any time." He mentioned this place, specifically, to fish and to hunt, etc. He offered all kinds of seductions. But he failed, because Gromyko and Brezhnev wanted to come and sign this nice agreement.

I believe that if Brezhnev had been of a little bit different state of mind—if he had had greater capacity—it would have been important from the very beginning to sit down and to discuss what we were against, what you were against, or what we were for, and what you were for. If that had been a possibility, there would have been no need for Vance to bring this

kind of proposal in March. You could have had an April summit meeting just for discussion, to clarify where you stand. But I said that the leadership—at least these two men—simply did not want to meet before there was an agreement. Gromyko believed very strongly that only through the diplomatic process we could make a good agreement.

As for the military, I could tell—and my friends from military could tell you—that Ustinov was definitely against a meeting with the military people from your side. He had quite an experience in '79, I can tell you; I was there. Carter pressed Brezhnev for a meeting between our ministers of defense. Ustinov balked. Then one evening, Brezhnev said to him, "Look, Carter and I want you to sit down with the Secretary of Defense, and you are refusing." Ustinov said, "That is not my job. It is the job of Gromyko and Dobrynin to discuss things with Americans, it's not my job." Brezhnev pressed him, but then Ustinov said, "What am I supposed to do there, discussing things with Brown? I have no specific position." Then Gromyko said, "Look, in Vienna you have the MBFR negotiations going on. We have a fallback position which our delegation didn't use; so I will give it to you, this fallback position, which I have been withholding for six months, and not using, waiting for the proper moment. I will present it to you." So then Ustinov said, "Okay, I will go." And he went, and he met with Brown with no diplomats involved—because Ustinov didn't want to have any diplomats present from our side or from your side. Ogarkov, I guess, was there on our side—Ustinov and Ogarkov. Nobody else from our side, except maybe an interpreter—a military interpreter, I think. So they had a discussion, and when he came back, you should have seen Ustinov's reaction. [To Brown:] He was so angry with you. He said, "I am talking one way then another, trying to negotiate, making some concessions by additional unilateral reductions in the number of troops in Europe, and he just sat there saying, 'Yes, yes,' without elaborating anything, or making a single concession in return. He just stuck with the same position. I don't know how Gromyko negotiates with Americans in general. I am not going to negotiate with them any more. Period." That was the Vienna discussion. It shows you the mood of the military. They were very much involved in the negotiations, and they were sometimes decisive in working out our positions; but not in a direct negotiation, really.

I think that was a mistake. Many of them were really very able people who knew much better than we diplomats knew. And they couldn't discuss things. But that was the mood of

their top man. He did not want to be in the front-line of the negotiations.

LEGVOLD: Mark Garrison is next.

GARRISON: I want to go back to Anatoly's previous comments about the usefulness of the telemetry discussion, because it helped get at the question of how difficult it was on the Soviet side to understand the political dynamics on the American side. I guess the lesson I would draw from that is the necessity and importance of having the best possible understanding of the dynamics—including the internal political dynamics—on the other side, in order to separate out those things which are real from those which are not. In that particular period the Soviet side had a problem understanding our internal dynamics, just as in the early Carter period we had a problem understanding the internal dynamics of the Soviet side.

One other kind of dynamic that was at play here. I put it to you with some trepidation; perhaps we don't want to get into this at this late hour. But Les mentioned, among many of the issues that came up in this period, issues affecting American allies, which is another case where the American side was under certain real pressures, and I assume that on the Soviet side there was a problem of understanding the extent to which these were real and the extent to which they were a lever used by the American side to get some additional concessions. If at some point there is time and interest in getting into that, it might be an interesting brief discussion.

LEGVOLD: Mark, I think that's an issue that we want to come back to tomorrow. It deserves some discussion. David Welch, you have been patient, and you get the last word this afternoon.

DAVID WELCH: I don't have a last word, but a question; so maybe I should put it off until tomorrow also?

LEGVOLD: If it's a question that's can be answered fairly briefly, go ahead and ask it.

weapons systems. And we knew approximately when certain weapons systems were supposed to reach the testing stage, and we took those developments into account in the negotiations. At the negotiations we did not have a position of simply not taking the prospective developments of the new weapons systems into consideration. It was all included in our negotiating positions.

I would also like to add something more related to the topic of our negotiations. Take, for example, the period when Eurostrategic weapons had emerged—when the United States imposed their nuclear weapons, or deployed their nuclear weapons in Europe. During the negotiations, we were taking into account the balance of forces both in Europe and in general. We understood that the United States were trying to take their own territory out of the theater of possible nuclear war, to limit nuclear exchanges to Europe. All these factors were clearly taken into account during our negotiations on SALT. Thank you.

LEGVOLD: Anatoly.

DOBRYNIN: I think I will clarify the situation, because I see the right wing and left wing views beginning to argue. I think the situation was simple to understand from the American point of view. We on the political side—by the “political side,” I mean the Foreign Ministry—really knew very little. We knew very little about what was going on in our military thinking. Did they have long-range planning in the military or not? What kind of weaponry we were preparing? [Indicating Kondrashov:] Well, he knows, because he was working in the KGB, and the KGB knew everything. But there was no way for ordinary—I say ordinary—channels, working in the Foreign Ministry, to know what was going on? So, the situation was really a little bit like what Tarasenko said it was. He speaks for the Foreign Ministry. Georgy Komienko knew a little bit more, because he was in this famous “Five.” But even he didn’t know everything, because he didn’t have any secrets from me, and when we discussed things, I felt that he was on a rather shaky ground: he knew a little bit more; but still, in the grand scheme of things, he did not know much.

When I came back from Washington and saw friends in the KGB and General Staff, I began to learn some things. But this was just piece by piece; things were not well-connected in my

mind. So I would return to Washington a little bit enlightened, but not on a great scale. I was enlightened on this particular sphere, or on that particular sphere—so that when I discussed things with you, I would try to learn from you. This was the situation. There was no system. It was as our Generals said. It was a closed society. Five, six men—who knows? And the whole Ministry—the Foreign Ministry, I mean—knew nothing—except when we participated directly in formulating negotiation strategy. We had a very good team in Geneva, and in other places. We worked very closely together—military, diplomats, and KGB people. It was a very good team. But they weren't working together within their own society, so to speak. The military did not always tell us all the whole all the story. Maybe they didn't know themselves—I mean, our participants in the negotiations. Or maybe there was some military discipline preventing it. Perhaps they didn't want to go too far, because, after all, it was only planning.

Military planning in Russia was top secret. It's unbelievable: in your country, it's a loose cannon. You discuss all these military things, rightly or wrongly. And ultimately you yourself don't know what you are talking about. [Laughter.] But it made an impression on us, I should say, because we tried to understand what you were talking about. We still believed in you. We had a much higher opinion of you at that time, by the way, than you did of yourselves. [Laughter.]

So, what Generals Detinov and Starodubov said was quite right. At the later stages, I had a chance to be a little bit more involved on the military side. I had several chance to speak with the Minister. But this was just because I happened to know the fellow. For most of the period, the military did not know me, the ambassador, personally. They did not know how to talk with me. This was the situation. There is always an eagerness among the diplomats to know what we were up to; but it was very difficult for us to know.

It was also difficult for you. When I would go to the negotiations with you, Cy, or with Zbig, I would have an instruction from Moscow: "Do not compromise on this issue; merely inform the Americans of our position on this issue," and so forth. There was no indication of what we were really interested in. They even asked me sometimes to find things out from you. When I asked you questions, they were my questions; they were not Gromyko's questions. I was trying to find out what was going on. It was very difficult for us diplomats. I repeat what Tarasenko said: his is the voice of despair of the time. We were not dumb diplomats, but it is

a difficult profession if you try very hard.

We were trying very hard. But the military people developed our positions. One day they tried to explain to Mr. Gromyko—in the very beginning, of course—how missiles fly without a propeller. [Laughter.] I was present when one of our fellows explained it to him. Then, of course, he knew. I graduated from Moscow Aviation Institute, and I had very good connections with the Yakovlev Design Bureau when I was still ambassador; so it was easy for me to understand it. But most of our foreign policy people knew nothing.

We did not even know the names of our own weapons. We used your names. We have been speaking of *Backfire*. By the way, why is it *Backfire* and not *Forwardfire*? [Laughter.] We did not know. But we used the Western name. I never saw a *Backfire*, actually. Or rather, I saw one photo later in an American magazine. [Laughter.] But I once tried to ask Gromyko why they couldn't take our diplomats who really involved in the negotiations to some factory, or to some airfield, just to see what kind of bombers existed, in what form, so that we would know what we were talking about? It was impossible. It was a top secret. Why? Viktor recalled how many years later on we called it the Tu-22 instead of the *Backfire*. Tu-22M—this is what we called the modernized version. But at the time, we never knew what it was. Everyone just called it "*Backfire*." We didn't know how to say that in Russian, so always in my telegrams I only used the word *Backfire*. I didn't use a single Russian name for bombs or missiles or planes. They were secret. So this was the mentality. And little by little began, subconsciously, to think that you really knew more than we, because we used your terminology, we use your designations for our missiles. All of this was because there was a great gap between the military and the diplomats—a gap in communications, not a disagreement. What could I or others tell Detinov? "Look here, this particular missile should be prohibited"? Or, "This missile should be accepted as equivalent to that one, in a ratio of one to five"? What kind of argument could I have against what he said?

The military had good intentions. General Grechko also had very good intentions. But he was against giving up anything, because he learned his lessons from the Second World War. That's why it was difficult.

The Commission of Five did a great service to us. When I became a Secretary of the Party, I participated in these kinds of discussions. It was [first name?] Sokolov at that time;

myself from the Party; a fellow named [first name?] Kryuchkov; and somebody else. An interesting discussion was going on, too. But the military just impressed on us that they had all the knowledge. Our job was to talk about what kind of relations we wanted to have with the Carter administration. I know you have a system that is much better than ours; but at that time we didn't have any education in military things. None at all. No one attempted to educate the Foreign Ministry on military matters—except, perhaps, on a friendly basis, one-on-one. I would go to someone, and he would tell me what I needed to know, but he would say, "Please don't tell anyone that I told you." This was the situation. It made things very difficult.

That's why we now have this disagreement. They are trying to convince you that they had a nice plan, and Sergei said there was no planning at all. Actually, if you accept my explanation, the truth was in between.

LEGVOLD: Thank you Anatoly. Harold, and then David.

BROWN: It seems to me there are two separate but related issues here. On the military: in the first place, it's clear that very tight compartmentalization—the separation of the Foreign Ministry and most of the other parts of the government from strategic issues, and especially from military's development and deployment programs—hampered the development of overall policy in the Soviet Union. But separately, I think that a distinction needs to be made between the ability to plan weapon systems and to understand the narrow balance between one weapon system on one side and one weapon system on the other side—which clearly was done in the Soviet Union—and longer range strategic planning in an attempt to understand where the competition was going, and what it signified—which apparently was not very much done in the Soviet Union, whereas in the United States there was a good deal of it; perhaps not as much or as effective a kind of planing as the Soviet Union thought was going on in the United States, but some planning nonetheless. What McNamara did, what Schlesinger did, and what I later tried to do was to look at things from that point of view. That capability—which, again, was probably not nearly as effective as it may have looked from the Soviet Union—was helped a lot in the United States by the relative lack of compartmentalization on these issues, and by the existence of large numbers of academic people and people in think tanks who were

enhanced.

In that context, the Soviet involvement in Ethiopia struck me as a departure from what I thought was a positive evolution in the relationship. A very hard-nosed stand taken on that subject by the Soviet leadership further aggravated my perception of the problem. I have to say that the president, *à propos* the evolution of his assessment of American-Soviet relationship, was shaken very much by the meeting with Gromyko, and by the fact that Gromyko lied to him directly.

DOBRYNIN: About what?

BRZEZINSKI: About the Soviet command structure and the presence of senior Soviet military people in Ethiopia, which he categorically denied were there. At that time we had very accurate information—very accurate information—as to who was there, what they were reporting to Moscow, the names of their officers, and so forth. And this had the kind of an impact on Carter which reminded him of Kennedy's conversation with Gromyko about the Cuban missiles. It made him feel, "Well, here we go again."

So, I think, you are right in saying that that did have a significant impact on our position, and more so on my thinking personally than on the president's. But it also had an impact on the president's thinking.

LEGVOLD: Ilya Gaiduk.

DOBRYNIN: Zbig, just as a matter for your own information. About Kennedy and Gromyko and Cuban missiles. It's just historical footnote, really; but during this conversation Kennedy didn't ask a single question about missiles in Cuba. Nothing. So it wasn't a question of deception or no deception. He wasn't shown any photo, or any signal; he was not told, "We have information on missiles in Cuba," or any such thing. There was complete silence. And then two days later the secretary of state spoke with me, and I said, "Why you didn't you speak with Gromyko when he was here?"

PASTOR: Well, actually, I wanted to ask a very specific question at this time, rather than raise the broader question of lessons. The specific question focuses on the issue of the Horn of Africa. This is the one issue that really has not been addressed by the Russian participants: the extent to which the intervention of Cuban troops under a Soviet General in Ethiopia was considered in terms of its potential effect on U.S. calculations, on U.S. decision making—how it would affect SALT, U.S.-Soviet relations in general, or whatever.

DOBRYNIN: Can I answer in one sentence?

LEGVOLD: Yes.

DOBRYNIN: In one sentence, I hope; because otherwise we will get into a long, long story.

I know—and my colleagues know—that you Americans attached the greatest importance to our adventures in the Horn, in Somalia, and so forth. Why is it that nobody Russian speaks about the Horn? I can explain why. Because nobody gives a damn for this Horn, really. [Laughter.] At that time, and today, I should say. That's why they were sitting quietly; they didn't know what to say about the Horn, exactly. If you want to press us, what can I tell you? It is a matter of minor importance. We will be glad to hear the importance you attach to this issue; but from our perspective, it was of very small importance. [To his colleagues:] Do you agree with me?

KONDRASHOV: Absolutely; absolutely. This is a general statement. [Laughter.]

BRZEZINSKI: Can I ask a question?

LEGVOLD: Zbig.

BRZEZINSKI: If it was so unimportant—

DOBRYNIN: You'll be late for your plane. [Laughter.]

you, or somebody else—in Oslo, and look at the Afghan situation, then more documents will be disclosed—more documents of the secret services will be disclosed—and the picture will be more complete. That's all I wanted to say.

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Sergei. Before I turn to Nikolai, who also wants to speak on this—then Marshall is on the list—let me reconstruct an impression that I'm now getting from what I hear in earlier comments, and then in these most recent comments on the Ogaden, on the Somali-Ethiopian conflict. This morning, Sergei Tarasenko said that there was a basic division in Russian foreign policy between the Foreign Ministry, which had control of the large foreign policy issues—that is, the West, Japan, and India—and the International Department, which had authority over a lot of these Third world activities. Now, Anatoly and Sergei suggest that as far as this other activity was concerned, it was to some degree random, and inconsistent. What does that say then about Soviet foreign policy in general? Was this essentially an incoherent foreign policy as a result of these different factors that you've introduced? Or is there something more to it? Even though your interpretation of what was actually involved in the Ogaden may be quite right, in terms of a broader pattern of things that were happening, was it essentially incoherent? Or was there something more? And I don't mean to suggest a devil's interpretation of what the something more might be.

DOBRYNIN: If we get into this discussion, we will need another two or three days—just to explain what is involved in your question. We cannot just say “yes” or “no,” “I accept” or “you are wrong.” Because if I said you are wrong, you will only disagree with me. That's clear.

SHULMAN: Not if you agree. [Laughter.]

DOBRYNIN: Maybe someone will agree. But your question really is too big. What do you mean, consistent or inconsistent? It's a matter of interpreting policy. Was the foreign policy of the United States consistent? In some respect yes, in others no; if you look from one president to another president, it will look very much inconsistent, but it may not necessarily be. Do we blame you for this? Were we inconsistent in our foreign policy, because we were

involved in the Ogaden and Somalia? It is a complicated question.

LEGVOLD: It's not a question of placing blame; I am trying to understand what the essential nature of the problem was.

DOBRYNIN: What Tarasenko said about the structure of foreign-policy making in our government was basically right: the Foreign Ministry dealt more with some areas, and the Party with others. What I think he really meant to say, besides what he said, was that there were some issues which we really considered of utmost importance to the government, or to the country, which was handled as a Big policy—for example, relations with the United States. And then there were some things which were not so important. Nobody, of course, said that Ethiopia, Ogaden, and the Third World were unimportant to us; but we knew that these were not issues about which we argued much, which we regarded as basic to our policy. Yes, it happened; we played a role in the Horn, in a rather opportunistic way. We were involved in certain things. In many cases opportunity would arise. Someone in the Third World would say, "We are Socialist; we are for Socialism," and someone from the Central Committee would say, "I have known this guy for 15 years; I met him in seminars," and so on. But nobody in the foreign policy apparatus would know him. So, they would begin to support this fellow. It has happened. The same thing happened with Ethiopia.

Cy mentioned about the General. I really don't know what the name of the General was; maybe my friends will tell me. As far as I knew from the information from the Foreign Ministry, we had several advisers there. But I didn't know any of their names, so I am not so sure whether Gromyko knew the name of our commander there, either.

BRZEZINSKI: We did.

DOBRYNIN: But it doesn't mean that when he said, "I don't know," he was lying.

BRZEZINSKI: What? He is a public policy maker.

DOBRYNIN: But it was not necessary for him to know all of these military operations. This is important for you to understand. Maybe this sounds very strange to you. This has really happened in the Foreign Ministry. I'm sure that Kornienko didn't know all the details—who our commander was, how many advisers we had there, and so forth. We knew we sent equipment and advisers; but there were many things we did not know in the Foreign Ministry. Because in minds of the Foreign Ministry people, it was a second-rate operation—I mean, in a global sense. In the United States, yes, it became a really big issue. And I should say that the Foreign Ministry became more attuned to this African situation because of you—I mean, not you personally, but Americans, always needling us and asking, “What you are doing?” The people in the Foreign Ministry began to check with our people from the Defense Ministry, asking them, “What's going on there?” And then little by little, everybody was involved, including the Politburo. This is how it happened historically.

So, one remark I would like to make is that you shouldn't look at this adventures as a special plan which was really specifically thought out like a move in a big chess game. Yes, we were involved; we didn't deny it. But the importance we attached to it was secondary. For you it was not secondary, because you thought it was a part of the overall plan to disrupt everything and promote the dominance of the Soviet Union. And we accept that you really believed that.

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Anatoly. Nikolai is next, and then Sergei Tarasenko, and then Marshall, and then Phil. One second, before you begin, Nikolai; let me underscore something that comes out of this most recent exchange, because historically it's quite important, although it's a very specific point. Anatoly believes that it's quite possible that Gromyko simply didn't know, when he met with you people. Zbig told us earlier that this had a very important impact, because the president thought he was being lied to by the Foreign Minister. And, in some ways, he compared it—perhaps out of his own misinformation—with Gromyko in the Cuban missile crisis. So, it had a very great impact, and if you think about what's involved here, it's important.

DOBRYNIN: Of course Gromyko knew that we had our advisers there. But I doubt that he

knew the names, who our commander was. This Zbig knew, but I am not sure that Gromyko knew. I doubt that he knew, because I know about his knowledge of military things, especially in remote areas. He knew a great deal about the United States, but he did not know much about remote Africa. He may have participated in the decision, if it was proposed during a Politburo meeting. Somebody from the military or Central Committee probably said, "Look here; we need to send some soldiers and some equipment there." So it could be that he said, "Yes, all right." But when the president told him, "We have information that this General is in Ethiopia," I doubt if he knew the name.

BRZEZINSKI: No, no, no.

DOBRYNIN: No, he didn't name him, your president, he just asked him. So, Gromyko said: "I don't know." And then the president was thinking: "O-ho. The same conversation took place between Kennedy and Gromyko." But there not a word was mentioned about missiles at that meeting. Later on someone asked [Dean] Rusk, "Why you didn't ask Gromyko about the missiles in Cuba?" and he said, "I don't know." So when I was in Moscow after this crisis I asked Gromyko—it was at a conference in Moscow, and one of the American participants ask me, "Ambassador, did you know about the missiles in Cuba," and I said, "No, I didn't." So they asked Gromyko why he didn't tell me, and Gromyko looked at me and said, "You didn't know? I am surprised!" And I asked, "Why are you surprised?" "You didn't ask me," he said.

So, this matter of "not asking" sounds anecdotal, but it was the case. Gromyko didn't know the specifics.

BRZEZINSKI: He called the presence of a Soviet General in Ethiopia "a myth."

DOBRYNIN: If he is speaking in general, then, of course, he was not saying the truth.

BRZEZINSKI: That's what he said.

lessons of the history as we understand it at this point. I will open that session with ten minutes of comments of my own, and then we'll go on, and wind up moving toward the second meeting of this group.

Okay, the floor is open.

DOBRYNIN: For questions, as you invited us; so I will not make a speech like yesterday, but just ask a question—two, rather.

One is simply for clarification. During the meeting in Vienna, President Carter gave to the Brezhnev a proposal which was written on a yellow pad—a proposal which was not really discussed there, but it was given there. We in the delegation looked at it, but really, it just kind of faded away. Do you know, exactly, what kinds of cuts you were proposing? I know what other issues were involved in this paper, but, I don't recall the cuts exactly. I couldn't find it in my own archives. What were the cut you were proposing there, in Vienna? They went beyond SALT II, which we had already prepared and signed.

And one observation—not to take too much time. Yesterday we discussed very actively—specifically, from your side—about our adventures in the Third World. You were rather aggressive, in a good sense; but I noticed that nobody mentioned there were at least two initiatives from our side on this—for example, when in January of 1978 we officially proposed to you that we mediate the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia together. We proposed to sit down—Soviets and Americans—with our clients. This was really a major effort. But it went practically unnoticed everywhere. You just pushed us aside. Politely—but nevertheless, you pushed us aside. I forgot yesterday to ask Zbig about this. In his memoirs he wrote that he remembered this, but that he thought that it was a bad idea for the Americans to take up this proposal. As he put it there [paraphrasing:], “If we had accepted the Russian proposal, it would have legitimized the presence of the Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa.” And you don't want to do that.

By the way, the same happened with the Middle East. When we came with a proposal to do something, Cy signed this beautiful declaration on October the 1st, but then you put this all aside. And in the memoirs of the American participants, they very frankly said that they could not allow Russians to be active in Middle Eastern diplomacy, or this would legitimate them.

You said that, with SALT, you did not merely want to continue the policy of Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger; but in the Middle East you did exactly the same thing, because Kissinger wrote in his own memoir exactly what Zbig wrote: [Paraphrasing:] "My aim was not to allow Russians to participate in all this kind of mediation, because it is not their area, it is our area—an Americans area." If you compare these two memoirs, it was almost exactly the same, word for word. The Carter administration took up where previous administrations left off on the Middle East, for instance, or on Africa. You chose not to cooperate. But at the same time, on arms control, you preferred to present new ideas.

So, my first question is about this summit meeting: could you clarify in a few words what this proposal was? And second, could you illuminate a little bit actually what the position of the American administration was on Soviet participation in Africa and the Middle East?

LEGVOLD: That's something we could begin this morning; that's a question that could be answered, if there are any Americans who might like to respond to it. Phil wants to come in on this point; am I right, Phil?

BRENNER: Let me read from Brzezinski's memoir: "As hostilities increased, and as more Cuban troops went to Ethiopia, Gromyko suggested the classic Soviet solution to regional disputes: a joint U.S.-Soviet mediation effort pointing to a condominium. I believed that it would only legitimize the Soviets presence in the Horn, and suggested instead that we put more effort into urging the regional leaders and other African nations to call for a withdrawal of all foreign troops, and mediation by the African states alone." It's exactly what you just said.

DOBRYNIN: This is just what I said. By the way, we never used the word "condominium." Condominium with the United States? It would be unbelievable, in our world view, to have a condominium with the U.S. over Africa or the Middle East. But Kissinger and Zbig were always were afraid of condominium, condominium, condominium—What condominium? When were we proposing condominium?

LEGVOLD: Would Marshall, or Stan, or Mark, or Bob want to respond to that? Bob?

the approval of, say, seven or nine Politburo members. It takes time to write a telegram and to send someone around to gather signatures. It takes at least a full day.

Finally, the telegram was sent. In that telegram we told Castro that we did not support the action. We asked him not to do it. We asked him to abstain. But at that time the planes were already in the air. The planes were flying while the telegram was going to Havana. The action had been completed.

After that, Kornienko tried to find out how it had happened. Our military were in Cuba; our planes were in Cuba; as Ilya said, it simply could not have happened without our participation. And this was when the simple explanation came up: our military in Cuba said, "We had no doubt that that issue was agreed upon somewhere at the highest levels—that a political decision had been made. We just did some technical work, some technical planning." This is an example of the senselessness—of the incoherence—of policy-making.

DOBRYNIN: With whom was Castro consulting in Moscow?

TARASENKO: As far as Kornienko told me, there were no conversations of that sort. Not with anybody. Of course, the Cuban military had contacts with our military, as usual; they probably said, "We need so many planes, and a flight plan"—and the two militaries worked together on that.

DOBRYNIN: [To Detinov:] That's an explanation which must be interesting for you to hear! [To Tarasenko:] But what you just mentioned may be a lesson for today's situation. There is a new development—and, I should say, a very welcome development: leaders, at the very top level, speaking with each other by telephone. It's a very good development. The President of United States and the President of the Soviet Union can just pick up the telephone and conduct business.

Back then, the Foreign Ministry knew nothing of what going on. There was a lot of improvisation. What Sergei Tarasenko mentioned is probably correct. I recall this actually happening. I'm sure this worked out among the military, there in Havana. Probably the Cubans said to our military, "Look here, we need planes now; we need to get our people to

Angola.” And our people would say to themselves, “That sounds all right.” So they little by little they would help out the Cubans, and word would eventually reach Moscow through a telegram.

I can give you another example; I don’t recall the month, exactly, but there was to be a certain important meeting with the United States government. I was in Moscow. Our military had a plan every year for maneuvers; I think you have the same kinds of plans—what and when to conduct military exercises, and so forth. We met to prepare for our meeting, and the subject of the maneuvers came up. And in the middle of this, we discovered that in two or three days, a squadron of atomic submarines was to arrive in Cuba. It was completely out of the blue. It had been approved in December; this meeting was in the middle of the year. Nobody in the Foreign Ministry knew about it. And our Defense Ministry was sure that Gromyko had been told in December. If he knew, he forgot about it. This would have been a top secret at that time, so only Gromyko knew about it. Kornienko found out about it by accident—just in time to cancel it. Otherwise, we would have had another Cuban crisis—not a Cuban brigade crisis, but a Cuban missiles-on-submarines crisis.

So the point which is important for us to understand for the future is that sometimes things happen really by accident, without careful thought, as Sergei has said. As a practical matter, in diplomatic relations, you have to try to find out a little bit better what our top people know—little by little, of course. They are not obliged to tell us what they are talking about; but at least on the working level it’s useful to know what they are talking about. It is better not just to be confronted with a situation.

LEGVOLD: Jim wants to comment on this right away, and then I have Marshall, then Sergei. Before doing that though, I would observe, Anatoly, that yesterday Harold Brown used this word—the one Russian word that people in Washington came to know: “*ne sluchaino*.” Maybe the word they should have known was, “*sluchaino*.” [Laughter.]

BLIGHT: Just an anecdote from the Cuban side just to complete the circle on what Sergei was telling us, as far as Kornienko’s view of what happened in regard to Angola are concerned. A couple of years ago Castro told us that he got an urgent message from Moscow part way

DOBRYNIN: Well, it's a little bit late, maybe. I think that the discussion was very important. Specifically, for me it was very interesting to know more about the military side of the story. The diplomatic side I know rather well; but there were some nuances which will be useful for our colleagues to know. It was an important and useful discussion, and I welcome this opportunity to share our views, our knowledge, our experience.

Unfortunately, we had no chance to discuss how we would implement the changes we identified as useful. This is a very practical question, and it would have been useful for both sides to discuss it further. But we had no time; we were stuck on the Horn. [Laughter.]

I think the military people here are right—Admiral Turner and our friends, the two Generals. Many things were the result of misunderstanding, or different perceptions about military matters. And we, in diplomacy, knew very little about that. We were overwhelmed with the feeling, as the Admiral rightly said, that this was all “nuclear theology.” I feel that the American side is still overwhelmed by this theology. It is hard for us, on the diplomatic side, to understand. We didn't discuss it at the time, those of us who were responsible for foreign policy. We didn't discuss at all. You kept pressing on us things like crisis stability; but it is important for you to understand how it was for us at that time, and how it is now. This was all theology.

I think our military was up to the level of yours—their prognoses, their evaluations, their recommendations to the government. We were behind, yes; we were trying to catch up. And this influenced our positions on SALT. On the diplomatic side, we were trying to help our country not get too far behind. But the main problems of SALT II were political, not military. The discussion of military aspects reminded me of that movie in America, “Gray Area”—you know, this night movie show—

PASTOR: Twilight Zone.

DOBRYNIN: Yes, twilight zone. After SALT II we passed this twilight zone: the discussion of who was going to attack, whether we had enough to strike first, or maybe second, or a third time. We managed to get beyond this. We realized that our safety really lay in our own hands, and in the hands of our colleagues from other side. We don't have this fear of war between us now; this nuclear theology helped create this fear. Of course, we are still con-

cerned about the security of our countries—your and ours. It's one of our main concerns still. But now our security depends more on discussion, on dialogue.

I don't know how many hours I spent on this Horn, or human rights, or Scharansky; it was unbelievable. Instead of using our conversations constructively to find out what was going on between us, we spent so much time on these irritants. If we had come to the conclusions then that we have come to now, many things would have been completely unnecessary for us—then and now—to discuss. Sometimes I feel sorry that we spent so much effort in our competition, in our rivalry, on issues which were really of no importance to us. Look around the Third World; I don't want to sound cynical, but who in the Soviet Union or United States cares now what's going on in Somalia? You were there; you tried to do something about it; and now you don't want even to be reminded about it, because Somalia became a symbol of failure. Or take Ethiopia. It is the same thing. I could give you many examples. But these were certain issues which we had to deal with.

Sergei, I think, was complaining about human rights. Well, he was a representative of the organization which was very much involved with human rights. We were less involved—the diplomats, I mean. But I should say, at that time it was our impression that, quite frankly, you couldn't find a compromise with the Carter administration on human rights. I was 100% convinced that it didn't matter whether you solved the case, for example, of Scharansky, or Sakharov; they would continue with more. As Zbig very clearly mentioned, for some it was a way of putting the Soviet Union on the defensive. That was very convenient policy, putting the Soviet Union always on the defensive. We kept saying, "Don't interfere, don't interfere." When you say, "don't interfere," you are accepting that something is happening—you merely don't want to discuss it. So it was a convenient issue for the American side to attack us with vehemently. It was a very convenient way to try to undermine the regime. They didn't say that publicly, of course; you didn't say it in a diplomatic conversation. In friendly talks, Marshall Shulman or Cyrus Vance never mentioned to me that they were trying to undermine our regime. [Laughter.] But we understood each other quite well.

So, coming back to what I was saying earlier, we should look at the real issues—not the unimportant ones. Not the distractions. Not the tactical issues. We have to look back with perspective and discuss the lessons of this. Unfortunately, we do not have time to look at it

now. But there are lessons we could draw, because I am a little concerned that relations between Russia and America are starting to look a little old-fashioned and familiar—not because of any specific issue or situation, of course, but because the euphoria of *détente* has passed. We don't use the word "*détente*" now—but it used to be a magic word, almost. Now we have more and more questions; more issues are arising between the two countries. Viktor spoke about Far East; this is one example. And he is right. The new administration is losing a great deal by taking such a strong position on the side of Japan over the so-called "Northern Territories." I was in Washington for many years; your position on this issue used to be different. There has been an evolution from administration to administration. I could quote you what the Presidents of United States said about it, beginning from, let's say, the 1950s. They had different positions than you have now. If you think it is worthwhile to take such a strong position on behalf of Japan—well, that's your business. That is between you and Japan. But why do you agree to support them so strongly? You are losing so much in our opinion; Viktor is right. Why? Just to support Japan? I don't think Japan really needs your support. Maybe we are a little bit oversensitive; but you should take our sensitivity into account, because it's your future, too.

That is all I would like to say. I think this was very useful, really—to discover the mistakes we were making; we made a lot of mistakes. The main lesson should be not to repeat them in the future.

LEGVOLD: Anatoly, thank you very much. [Applause.] What you do is underscore how much work this enterprise still has to do. This is a first step. And as you leave, I want to tell you again how much you have enriched the discussion. Thank you for being here.

We will come back at 11:30.

MAY 9: MORNING SESSION 2

LEGVOLD: Okay, are we ready to begin? We'll go on now for approximately an hour, and

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