

FOREIGN RELATIONS
OF THE
UNITED STATES

1981–1988
VOLUME IV

SOVIET UNION,
JANUARY
1983–MARCH 1985



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988

Volume IV

Soviet Union, January 1983-1985

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**Office of the Historian
Foreign Service Institute
U.S. Department of State
February 2021**

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About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or

deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume were located at the Department of State in Washington and the National Archives and Records Administration.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by

the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department's central files for 1981-1989, which were stored in electronic and microfilm formats, will eventually be transferred to the National Archives. Once these files are declassified and processed, they will be accessible. All of the Department's decentralized office files from this period that the National Archives deems worthy of permanent preservation will also eventually be transferred to the National Archives where they will be available for use after declassification and processing.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes in this subseries is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Reagan Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Reagan Library include some of the most significant foreign affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Reagan Library record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records Administration's Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate the declassification of still-classified

records held in various Presidential libraries. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of the *Foreign Relations* series were not always able to determine whether attachments to a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the document in the Reagan Library file. In such cases, some editors of the *Foreign Relations* volumes have indicated this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were “Not found attached.”

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to time in Washington, DC. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chiefs of the Declassification and Publishing Divisions. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of

abbreviations and terms is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after declassification review have been accounted for and are listed in their chronological place with headings, source notes, and the number of pages not declassified.

All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified in the footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document and its original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation of the series and declassification of records. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2015

and was completed in 2019, resulted in the decision to withhold 1 document in full, excise a paragraph or more in 13 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 20 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of the Reagan administration's policy toward the Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985.

Kathleen B. Rasmussen, Ph.D. General Editor **Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.** The Historian
Foreign Service Institute
February 2021

Preface

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administration of Ronald Reagan. This volume documents U.S. bilateral relations with the Soviet Union from January 1983 to March 1985. Due to the importance of U.S.-Soviet relations during the Reagan administration, the Reagan subseries includes an extensive examination of U.S. bilateral relations with the Soviet Union in four volumes: [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, Volume III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983](#); [Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983-March 1985](#); [Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985-October 1986](#); and [Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986-January 1989](#). In conjunction with these volumes, several other volumes in the subseries will provide the reader with a fuller understanding of how U.S.-Soviet relations impacted the global character of the Cold War and U.S. strategy during the Reagan era. For documentation on U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations, see [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, Volume XI, START I](#), and [Volume XII, INF, 1984-1988](#). [Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, Volume V, European Security, 1977-1983](#), documents the NATO dual-track decision and TNF/INF negotiations through 1983. Documentation dealing with nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear testing, chemical and biological weapons, and space arms control, including anti-satellite systems, will be published in [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, Volume XL, Global Issues I](#). The development of the Strategic Defense Initiative and ABM-related issues and other strategic considerations are addressed in [Foreign Relations, 1981-](#)

[1988, Volume XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981-1984](#), and [Volume XLIV, Parts 1](#) and [2, National Security Policy, 1985-1988](#). For selected documentation on the human rights situation in the Soviet Union, see [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II](#).

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, Volume IV

This volume documents the development of the Reagan administration's policies toward the Soviet Union from January 1983 to March 1985. With Reagan's signature of National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 75 on January 17, 1983, the administration's approaches and policies toward the Soviet Union were codified in a specific four-part agenda: arms control, human rights, regional issues, and bilateral relations. This volume examines the efforts of administration officials, namely Secretary of State George Shultz, President's Assistants for National Security Affairs William Clark and later Robert McFarlane, and NSC Staff member Jack Matlock, to implement the four-part agenda in dealing with the Soviet Union. The documentation demonstrates how administration officials developed policies related to the four-part agenda, mainly in the National Security Council (NSC) and Department of State, and then promoted these various tracks during meetings between Shultz, and on occasion Reagan, and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in various fora. Although no high-level meeting took place between Reagan and either Soviet General Secretaries Yuri Andropov or Konstantin Chernenko during their short tenures, the documents provide a window into how the Reagan administration viewed the Soviet leadership and formulated policies to deal with whomever was in charge.

The volume also documents the bureaucratic struggle Shultz faced against the NSC in implementing the four-part agenda laid out by NSDD 75 and in gaining access to President Reagan. After some wrangling, by June 1983 an understanding emerged between Shultz and Clark, which allowed Shultz regular weekly meetings with Reagan. When Jack Matlock joined the NSC Staff as primary adviser on the Soviet Union, Shultz gained a like-minded ally in approaches to dealing with the USSR. While some administration officials, such as Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, consistently argued that negotiating with the Soviet Union seemed futile, Shultz, Matlock, and others pushed President Reagan to see the value in keeping lines of communication open with the Soviets. Even during tragic events, such as the Soviet downing of the KAL 007 airliner in September 1983, Shultz kept his meeting with Gromyko a few days later in Madrid and used this as an opportunity to admonish the Foreign Minister for this inexplicable act and the inability of the Soviet Union to admit fault on the international stage.

The volume documents several Cold War flashpoints during the contentious months of 1983. The announcement in March 1983 of Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) caused concern for the Soviet Union because it shifted the strategic balance from the theory of mutually assured destruction toward a defensive nuclear posture. Aside from the downing of the KAL airliner, the Euromissiles crisis came to a head with U.S. deployments of INF missiles to several NATO allies in late November 1983. While the bulk of the documentation dealing with these negotiations is covered in two other volumes, the scheduled deployments permeated all other aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations in 1983. The volume also presents selective documentation related to the 1983 Soviet "War Scare" and the November 1983 NATO nuclear exercise, Able Archer (see [Appendix A](#)).

The volume attempts to demonstrate that even with these challenges, Shultz and others pressed to keep moving ahead with the four-part agenda and promote greater dialogue in U.S.-Soviet relations.

After the Soviet walkout of the INF negotiations in Geneva in late 1983, the administration focused throughout 1984 on developing a framework to restart arms control negotiations; the documents in this volume demonstrate the difficulties involved in opening new talks with the Soviet Union. Reagan's SDI program continued to cause problems. The Soviets believed SDI would "militarize space," and therefore the debates over how SDI would be dealt with during negotiations were a major point of contention during this period. When Shultz and Gromyko met in January 1985, they finally reached an agreement on a new round of umbrella negotiations. The Nuclear and Space Talks (NST), scheduled to begin in Geneva in March 1985, would have three tracks, START, INF, and Defense and Space. The documents in the volume trace how various positions from the Department of State, NSC, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency impacted the decision to move forward with the three arms control tracks. While the other parts of the four-part agenda remained in play during this period and were discussed in bilateral meetings, restarting arms control talks seemed to trump the other areas of concern. Little did the U.S. or Soviet negotiators know that on the eve of these new NST negotiations, Chernenko would die, and a younger, more ambitious Soviet leader would emerge and dramatically change the course of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Acknowledgments

The editor wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of officials at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California, especially Lisa Jones and Cate Sewell. A special thanks to the Central Intelligence Agency staff for providing access and assistance with Reagan Library materials scanned for the Remote Archive Capture project, and to the History Staff of the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence for arranging full access to CIA records. The editor wishes to acknowledge the staff at Information Programs and Services at the Department of State for facilitating access to Department of State records and coordinating the review of this volume within the Department. Sandy Meagher was helpful in providing access to Department of Defense materials. The editor extends thanks to the family and executor of the Estate of former Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger for granting Department of State historians access to the personal papers of Secretary Weinberger deposited at the Library of Congress. Additional thanks are due to officials of the Library of Congress Manuscript Division for facilitating that access.

Elizabeth C. Charles collected, selected, and annotated the documentation for this volume under the supervision of David Geyer, Chief of the Europe Division, and Adam Howard, then General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series. The volume was reviewed by David Geyer and then Historian Stephen Randolph. Kerry Hite and Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Carl Ashley, Chief of the Declassification Coordination Division. Kerry Hite also performed the copy and technical editing under the supervision of Mandy Chalou, Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division.

Elizabeth C. Charles, Ph.D. Historian

Sources

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union January 1983-March 1985

The White House Staff and Office Files at the Reagan Library provide a key source of documentation on high-level decision-making toward the Soviet Union from January 1983 to March 1985. The Executive Secretariat files, a subset of this collection, include the National Security Council (NSC) and National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Meeting Files; National Security Decision Directives (NSDD); the Head of State File; and the USSR Country File. Other relevant Staff and Office File collections include the European and Soviet Affairs Directorate: USSR Files; Director of Soviet Affairs Jack Matlock Files; and files of President's Assistants for National Security Affairs William Clark and Robert "Bud" McFarlane. Key collections of other members of the NSC Staff are the files of John Lenczowski, Robert Linhard, Ronald Lehman, and Sven Kraemer, which focus on various aspects of policy development, arms control, and negotiations with the Soviet Union. In some instances, NSC records related to NSDDs and NSC and NSPG meetings have remained in the institutional files of the NSC in Washington. The text of the declassified NSDDs are available on the Reagan Presidential Library website.

The Department of State records most vital for this volume are in the following Executive Secretariat S/S Lot Files: Lot 91D257: Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum; Lot 92D52: Executive Secretariat Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984-1989; Lot 92D630: Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989; Lot 93D188:

Memorandum of Conversations, 1981-1990; Lot 94D92: NODIS and EXDIS Secretariat Memorandums, 1985; and Lot 96D262: Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983. The files of Lawrence Eagleburger in Lot 84D204 and Kenneth Dam in Lot 85D308, as well as the Policy Planning Staff Memoranda in Lot 89D149 and files of the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Office of Soviet Affairs, in Lot 91D231 provide an excellent insight into high-level decision-making in the Department. The Central Foreign Policy File of the Department includes cable traffic between the Embassy in Moscow and Washington, as well as other related cables.

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Central Foreign Policy File

Lot Files. These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland

Lot 03D256: EUR Records, Records of Ambassador Thomas J. Simons, Jr.

Lot 03D314: EUR Records, Arthur Hartman Files

Lot 84D204: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Lawrence Eagleburger Files, 1967-1984

Lot 85D308: Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files

Lot 89D149: S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff

Lot 89D250: A Records, Miscellaneous Papers of
Secretary Shultz and Charles Hill
Lot 90D137: Paul Nitze Files, 1953, 1972-1989
Lot 91D231: Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs,
Office of Soviet Affairs, 1978-1989
Lot 91D257: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top
Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum
Lot 92D52: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive
Secretariat Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents,
1984-1989
Lot 92D630: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive
Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989
Lot 93D188: Executive Secretariat, S/S Records,
Memorandum of Conversations, 1981-1990
Lot 94D92: Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, NODIS
and EXDIS Secretariat Memorandums, 1985
Lot 96D262: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special
Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983

**Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley,
California**

Intelligence Directorate
NSC Records

White House Staff and Office Files

Frank Carlucci Files

William Clark Files

Kenneth deGraffenreid Files

Files of the Executive Secretariat, National Security
Council

Agency File

Cable File

Country File: Europe and Soviet Union

Head of State File

Meeting File

National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) File

National Security Planning Group (NSPG) File

National Security Study Directives (NSSD) File

System Files, System II Intelligence File
System Files, System IV Intelligence File
Subject File
Files of the European and Soviet Affairs Directorate,
National Security Council
Files of the Political Affairs Directorate, National
Security Council
Files of the Situation Room, White House
Donald Fortier Files
Fred Ikle Files
Intelligence Directorate, NSC Records, 1981-1989
Sven Kraemer Files
Robert Lehman Files
John Lenczowski Files
Robert Lilac Files
Robert Linhard Files
Jack Matlock Files
Robert McFarlane Files
Edwin Meese Files
John Poindexter Files
Roger Robinson Files
Papers of Charles Hill
Papers of George Shultz
President's Daily Diary

Central Intelligence Agency

Office of the Director of Central Intelligence
Job 88B00443R: Policy Files (1980-1986)
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(1988-1989)

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National Security Council

Carter Intelligence Files

Institutional Files

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Maryland**

RG 330, Records of the Department of Defense

FRC 330-85-0023: 1983 Official Files of the Office of
the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of
Defense

FRC 330-86-0048: 1984 Official Files (Top Secret) of
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Secretary of Defense

FRC 330-87-0023: 1984 Official Files (Secret and
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Deputy Secretary of Defense

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Abbreviations and Terms

ABM, anti-ballistic missile
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ALCM, air-launched cruise missile
ASAP, as soon as possible
ASAT, anti-satellite
ASBM, air-to-surface ballistic missile
ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASW, anti-submarine warfare
AWAC, Airborne Warning and Control
BMD, Ballistic Missile Defense
BW, biological weapon
C, Office of the Counselor of the Department of State
CA, covert action
CAB, Civil Aviation Board
CBI, Caribbean Basin Initiative
CBM, Confidence-Building Measures
CC, Central Committee
CD, Conference on Disarmament
CDE, Conference on Disarmament in Europe
CEMA, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CI, Counterintelligence
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CINCSAC, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command
CJCS, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CM, cruise missile
CODEL, Congressional Delegation
COM, Chief of Mission
CP, Communist Party
CPPG, Crisis Pre-Planning Group
CPSU, Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

CTB, Comprehensive Test Ban
CW, chemical weapon
D, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State; Democrat
DAO, Defense Attaché Office
DATT, Defense Attaché
DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission
DDI, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
DDO, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
DIRNSA, Director of the National Security Agency
DOD, Department of Defense
DST, Defense and Space Talks
EC, European Community
EconOff, Economics Officer
EE, Eastern Europe
EEC, European Economic Community
EmbOff, Embassy Officer
EOB, Executive Office Building (houses the Vice President's Office)
ERW, enhanced radiation weapon
EST, Eastern Standard Time
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State; after September 15, 1983, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
EUR/SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State
Exdis, Exclusive Distribution
FAA, Federal Aviation Administration
FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FBS, forward-based systems
FCO, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (United Kingdom)
FM, Foreign Minister

ForMin, Foreign Ministry; Foreign Minister
FRG, Federal Republic of Germany
G-7, Group of 7, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States
GDR, German Democratic Republic
GLCM, ground-launched cruise missile
GOJ, Government of Japan
GPS, George P. Shultz
GRU, Soviet military intelligence agency
HA, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs,
Department of State
HPSCI, House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence
HUMINT, human intelligence
I&W, Indications and Warning
IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization
ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile
IG, Interagency Group
IMEMO, Institute of World Economy and International
Relations
IMF, International Monetary Fund
INF, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of
State
IOC, International Olympic Committee
JCC, Joint Commercial Commission
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JMC, Joint Military Commission
KAL, Korean Airlines
KGB, Committee for State Security in the Soviet Union
L, Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State
LANDSAT, Land-Use Satellite
Limdis, Limited Distribution
LRINF, Long-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces
LTA, Long-Term Agreement on grain

MAD, mutual assured destruction
MBFR, Mutual Balanced Force Reductions
memcon, memorandum of conversation
MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MFN, most favored nation
MIRV, multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle
MOU, Memorandum of Understanding
MX or M-X, missile experimental (intercontinental ballistic missile)
NAC, North Atlantic Council
NAM, Non-Aligned Movement
NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Niact, Night Action
NID, National Intelligence Daily
Nocontract, Not Releasable to Contractors
Nodis, No Distribution
NoforN, No Foreign Dissemination
NORAD, North American Aerospace Defense Command
NPT, Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSA, National Security Agency
NSPG, National Security Planning Group
NSC, National Security Council
NSDD, National Security Decision Directive
NSSD, National Security Study Directive
NST, Nuclear and Space Talks
NTM, National Technical Means
NUF, non-use of force
OAS, Organization of American States
OBE, overtaken by events
OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Orcon, Originator Controlled
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
OVP, Office of the Vice President

P, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
P-II, Pershing II missile
PDB, President's Daily Brief
PFIAB, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
PNE or PNET, Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
POLAD, Political Adviser
PolCouns, Political Counselor
Poloff, Political Officer
PRC, Policy Review Committee
PROFs notes, internal White House and NSC electronic messages
R, Republican
R&D, research and development
reftel, Reference Telegram
RFE, Radio Free Europe
RL, Radio Liberty
RR, Ronald Reagan
RW, radiological weapons
S, Office of the Secretary of State
S/P, Policy Planning Council, Department of State
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/S-O, Operations Center, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/S-S, Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S&T, Science and Technology
SACG, Senior Arms Control Group
SACPG, Senior Arms Control Policy Group
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SCC, Special Coordinating Committee; Standing Consultative Commission
SCG, Special Consultative Group (NATO)
SDI, Strategic Defense Initiative

Secto, series indicator for telegrams sent from the Secretary of State while away from Washington
septel, separate telegram
SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe
SIG, Senior Interagency Group
SIG/I, Senior Interagency Group on Intelligence
SIG-IEP, Senior Interagency Group-International Economic Policy
SLCM, surface-launched cruise missile; submarine-launched cruise missile; sea-launched cruise missile
SNDV, strategic nuclear delivery vehicle
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
Specat, Special Category
SRINF, Short-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces
START, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks; Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TASS, official Soviet news agency
TNF, Theater Nuclear Forces
Tosec, series indicator for telegrams sent to the Secretary of State while away from Washington
TTBT, Threshold Test Ban Treaty
UK, United Kingdom
UN, United Nations
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
US, United States
USA, United States of America; United States Army
USAF, United States Air Force
USAFSB, United States Army Field Station Berlin
USCINCEUR, United States Commander in Chief, European Command
USDel, United States Delegation
USDOC, Department of Commerce
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USN, United States Navy

USNMR SHAPE, United States National Military
Representative, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers,
Europe

USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

USTR, United States Trade Representative

VOA, Voice of America

VP, Vice President

WH, White House

WHSR, White House Situation Room

WP, Warsaw Pact

Z, Zulu Time Zone (Greenwich Mean Time)

Persons

- Abrahamson, James A.**, Lieutenant General, USAF; Director, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
- Abramowitz, Morton I. (Mort)**, U.S. Representative to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Negotiations from March 1983; Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from February 1, 1985
- Abrams, Elliott**, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs until July 1985
- Adelman, Kenneth L. (Ken)**, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from April 1983
- Akhromeyev, Sergei F.**, Marshal of the Soviet Union and Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces from September 1984
- Allen, Richard V.**, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs until January 1982
- Andreas, Dwayne**, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Trade Policy; U.S. Co-Chairman of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council (USTEC)
- Andropov, Yuri**, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from November 12, 1982, until February 9, 1984
- Arbatov, Georgii**, Director, Institute for U.S. and Canada Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow
- Armacost, Michael**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from May 1984
- Azrael, Jeremy**, member, Policy Planning Council, Department of State, from 1984 until 1985
- Babrak Karmal**, President of Afghanistan from December 1979
- Bailey, Norman**, Director, Planning and Evaluation, National Security Council, from April 1981 until 1983; Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director,

International Economic Affairs Directorate, from June 1983 until October 1983; thereafter, consultant to the National Security Council Staff

Baker, James A., III (Jim), White House Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President until February 1, 1985; thereafter Secretary of the Treasury

Baldrige, H. Malcolm, Jr., (Mac), Secretary of Commerce

Baraz, Robert, Director, Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Barker, Robert, Deputy Assistant Director, Bureau of Verification and Intelligence, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from 1983 until 1986; Head of the U.S. Delegation to the U.S.-USSR Nuclear Testing Experts Meetings

Bessmertnykh, Aleksandr A., Minister-Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in the United States, to March 1983; thereafter Chief of the U.S.A. Department, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs from March 1983

Bishop, Maurice, Prime Minister of Grenada until October 19, 1983

Block, John R. (Jack), Secretary of Agriculture

Bosworth, Stephen W., Chairman, Policy Planning Council, Department of State, from January 3, 1983, until April 7, 1984

Bova, Michele, Director, Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, from 1984

Boverie, Richard, Major General, USAF; National Security Council Staff

Bremer, L. Paul, III (Jerry), Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department of State until March 27, 1983

Brezhnev, Leonid, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union until his death on November 10, 1982

Brock, William E., III, U.S. Trade Representative from 1981 to 1985

Burt, Richard (Rick), Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs-designate from May 10, 1982, until February 17, 1983; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (European and Canadian Affairs from September 15, 1983), from February 18, 1983, until July 18, 1985

Bush, George H.W., Vice President of the United States
Byrd, Robert, W., Senator, (D-West Virginia), Senate Minority Leader

Carter, James Earl (Jimmy), President of the United States from January 20, 1977, to January 20, 1981

Casey, William J. (Bill), Director of Central Intelligence from January 28, 1981

Chain, John T., Jr., General, USAF; Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from July 1, 1984, until June 14, 1985

Chernenko, Konstantin, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from February 1984 until March 1985

Clark, William P. (Judge), President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from February 1982 until November 1983; Secretary of the Interior from November 1983 until February 1985

Cobb, Tyrus (Ty), Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff

Cooper, Henry F. (Hank), Deputy Negotiator for Defense and Space Talks in Geneva, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from March 1985

Courtney, William H., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Department of State

Craxi, Bettino, Prime Minister of Italy from August 1983

Crocker, Chester, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Dam, Kenneth W. (Ken), Deputy Secretary of State from September 23, 1982, until June 15, 1985

Deaver, Michael K., Deputy White House Chief of Staff and Special Assistant to the President until 1985

deGraffenreid, Kenneth E., Senior Director, Intelligence Directorate, National Security Council Staff

Dobriansky, Paula J., Deputy Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1983 until 1984; thereafter Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate

Dobrynin, Anatoly, Soviet Ambassador to the United States

Dolan, Anthony R. (Tony), Speechwriter, White House Office of Speechwriting until 1985

Dunkerley, Craig, Office of Security and Political Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State

Eagleburger, Lawrence (Larry), Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 1982 until May 1984; Career Ambassador from April 1984

Ermarth, Fritz W., National Intelligence Officer for USSR, Central Intelligence Agency, and member, National Intelligence Council Staff, from 1984

Foley, Thomas, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Washington); House Democratic Whip

Fortier, Donald R. (Don), Director, Western Europe and NATO, National Security Council Staff, from September 1982 until June 1983; Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Political-Military Affairs, National Security Council Staff, until December 1983; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Policy Development from December 1983

Gandhi, Rajiv, Indian Prime Minister

Garthoff, Douglas F., Policy Assistant for Soviet Affairs, Department of Defense

Gates, Robert (Bob), Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, from January 1982 until April 1986; also, Chairman, National Intelligence Council, from September 1983

Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany

George, Clair E., Director of the Office of Legislative Liaison, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, from July 1983 until July 1984; Deputy Director of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency, from July 1984

George, Douglas (Doug), Chief of the Arms Control Intelligence Staff, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, from June 1982

Glitman, Maynard W. (Mike), Negotiator for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Talks in Geneva, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Talks with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from March 1985

Goodby, James E., Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) from 1983 until 1985

Gorbachev, Mikhail S., General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from March 1985

Gordievskiy, Oleg, Colonel, Committee on State Security (KGB), USSR; secret agent for British Security Service from 1974 until his defection to the United Kingdom in 1985

Grechko, Andrey A., Marshal, Soviet Minister of Defense from 1967 until 1976

Gregg, Donald P., Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

Grinevsky, Oleg A., Head of the Soviet Delegation to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe from 1983 until 1986

Grobel, Olaf, Director, Office of Theater Military Policy, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

Gromyko, Andrei, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs

Hartman, Arthur A., U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union

Hill, M. Charles, Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary of the Department of State from March 28, 1983, until January 1, 1985; thereafter Executive Assistant to the Secretary

Horowitz, Larry, Executive Assistant to Senator Edward M. Kennedy

Howe, Sir Geoffrey, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from June 1983

Howe, Jonathan T., Rear Admiral, USN; Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, until July 1, 1984

Iklé, Fred C., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Isakov, Viktor, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy in Washington

Kamman, Curtis, W., Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Moscow, until August 1985

Kampelman, Max, U.S. Ambassador to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe until 1983; head of U.S. human rights mission to Europe in 1984; head of the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva; Negotiator for Defense and Space Talks, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from March 1985

Keel, Alton B. (Al), Associate Director, Office of Management and Budget

Kelly, John H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs

Kennedy, Edward M. (Ted), Senator (D-Massachusetts)

Kennedy, Richard T., Special Adviser to the Secretary of State on Nonproliferation Policy and Nuclear Energy Affairs from 1983

Keyes, Alan, staff member, National Security Council in 1983

Keyworth, George A., II, Science Advisor to the President; Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President

Kimmit, Robert M., Executive Secretary and General Counsel, National Security Council Staff, from 1983

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J., U.S. Representative to the United Nations until April 1985

Kohl, Helmut, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

Korniyenko, Georgii, Soviet First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Kraemer, Sven, Director, Arms Control, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff

Kvitsinskiy, Yuliy A., Head of the Soviet delegation to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations in Geneva until December 1983; Head of the Soviet Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva from March 1985

Lehman, Ronald F., II (Ron), Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1983 until January 1986; Deputy Negotiator for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from March 1985

Lenczowski, John, Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff

Levine, Richard, Deputy Director, Defense Programs, Defense Policy Directorate, National Security Council

Staff

- Lilac, Robert**, Director, Political-Military Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1983 until 1984
- Linhard, Robert E. (Bob)**, Colonel, USAF; Director, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff
- Marshall, Andrew**, Director, Office of Net Assessment, Department of Defense
- Matlock, Jack F.**, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff
- McFarlane, Robert C. (Bud)**, Colonel, USMC (Ret.); Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1982 until October 1983; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from October 1983 until December 1985
- McKinley, Brunson**, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State until 1985
- McMahon, John N.**, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from 1982
- Meese, Edwin, III (Ed)**, Counselor to the President until February 1985; U.S. Attorney General from February 1985
- Mitterrand, Francois**, President of France
- Montgomery, Hugh**, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- Moreau, Arthur S.**, Admiral, USN; Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1983 until 1985
- Mulroney, Martin Brian**, Prime Minister of Canada from September 17, 1984
- Murphy, Richard**, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs
- Nakasone Yasuhiro**, Prime Minister of Japan from November 27, 1982

Nitze, Paul, Chief U.S. Arms Negotiator, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, until 1984; Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters from 1985

Ogarkov, Nikolai V., Marshal, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, until September 1984

O'Neill, Thomas P., Jr. (Tip), member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Massachusetts); Speaker of the House

Palme, Olof, Prime Minister of Sweden from October 1982

Palmer, Robie M.H. (Mark), Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs

Parris, Mark R., Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State

Pascoe, Boris L. (Lynn), Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State

Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier, Secretary-General of the United Nations from January 1, 1982

Perle, Richard, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy

Pipes, Richard, Senior Director, East European and Soviet Affairs, National Security Council Staff, until December 1982

Platt, Nicholas, Executive Secretary of the Department of State and Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from January 7, 1985

Poindexter, John M., Rear Admiral, USN; Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs until October 1983; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from October 1983 until December 1985

Powell, Colin L., Major General, USA; Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Qadhafi, Muammar, President of Libya

Raymond, Walter, Jr., Senior Director, Intelligence Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1982 until 1983; Senior Director, International Communications and Information Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1983

Reagan, Ronald, President of the United States

Regan, Donald T. (Don), Secretary of the Treasury until February 1985; White House Chief of Staff from February 1985

Robinson, Roger, Director, International Economic Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1983 until 1984; Senior Director, International Economic Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1984 until 1985

Robison, Olin C., President of Middlebury College

Rodman, Peter, member, Policy Planning Council, Department of State until 1984; Chairman, Policy Planning Council, from April 9, 1984

Rostow, Eugene V. (Gene), Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency until January 1983

Rowny, Edward L., General, USA; Chief U.S. Arms Negotiator to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks until 1984; Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters from 1985

Sagdeyev, Roald Z., Director, USSR Institute of Space Research

Sakharov, Andrei, Soviet nuclear physicist and dissident

Scowcroft, Brent, Chairman of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces; member of the Dartmouth Group

Seitz, Raymond G.H., Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State until July 1984

Sestanovich, Stephen, Director, Political-Military Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1984

Sharansky, Natan (also Shcharansky, Anatoly),
Soviet dissident and refusenik

Shultz, George P., Secretary of State from July 1982

Shultz, Helena (Obie), wife of George Shultz

Simons, Thomas W., Jr., Director, Office of Soviet Union
Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs,
Department of State, from 1982 until 1985

Sofaer, Abraham, Legal Adviser, Department of State

Sokolov, Oleg, Minister-Counselor at the Soviet
Embassy in Washington

Sokolov, Sergei F., Marshal, Soviet Minister of Defense,
from December 1984

Sommer, Peter R., member, European and Soviet Affairs
Directorate, National Security Council Staff

Speakes, Larry M., Assistant to the President and
Principal Deputy Press Secretary from June 17, 1981

Spiers, Ronald I., Under Secretary of State for
Management from November 23, 1983

Stearman, William L., member, National Security
Council Staff

Taft, William H., IV., Deputy Secretary of Defense from
February 1984

Thatcher, Margaret H., Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom

Thayer, Paul, Deputy Secretary of Defense until January
1984

Timbie, James P., Advisor for Strategic Policy to the
Deputy Secretary of State

Tower, John G., Senator (R-Texas) until January 3, 1985;
Negotiator for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in
Geneva, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space
Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from
March 1985

Ustinov, Dmitri F., Soviet Minister of Defense until
December 1984

Velikhov, Yevgeny P., Vice President, Soviet Academy of Sciences

Vershow, Alexander, Multilateral Relations Officer, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State

Vessey, John W., Jr., General, USA; Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff from June 1982

Wallis, W. Allen, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Department of State

Weinberger, Caspar W. (Cap), Secretary of Defense

Wick, Charles Z., Director, United States Information Agency

Wolfowitz, Paul, D., Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Zagladin, Vadim, Deputy Chief, International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union

Zimmerman, Warren, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Moscow, until July 1984

Note on U.S. Covert Actions

In compliance with the *Foreign Relations of the United States* statute that requires inclusion in the *Foreign Relations* series of comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions, the editors have identified key documents regarding major covert actions and intelligence activities. The following note will provide readers with some organizational context on how covert actions and special intelligence operations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and approved within the U.S. Government. It describes, on the basis of declassified documents, the changing and developing procedures during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter Presidencies.

Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency

The Truman administration's concern over Soviet "psychological warfare" prompted the new National Security Council (NSC) to authorize, in NSC 4-A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4-A made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively executive branch function. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certainly was a natural choice, but it was assigned this function at least in part because the Agency controlled unvouchered funds, by which operations could be funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington.¹

The CIA's early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and

Defense. The Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4-A.

NSC 10/2 directed the CIA to conduct “covert” rather than merely “psychological” operations, defining them as all activities “which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any U.S. Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.”

The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive included: “propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition, and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas, and refugee liberations [*sic*] groups; and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.”²

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with NSC 10/2, assumed responsibility for organizing and managing covert actions. The OPC, which was to take its guidance from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the

Department of State and to the military without having to proceed through the CIA's administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and decisions.³ In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to the OPC through the DCI.

During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically prominent of the CIA's activities. Concerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper "scope and magnitude" of CIA operations. The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded the CIA's authority over guerrilla warfare.⁴ The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of the CIA's covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.

As the Truman administration ended, the CIA was near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although the CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific projects from the NSC, the PSB, and the Departmental representatives originally delegated to advise the OPC, no group or officer outside of the DCI and the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations.

*NSC 5412 Special Group; 5412/2 Special Group; 303
Committee*

The Eisenhower administration began narrowing the CIA's latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of NSC directives, the responsibility of the DCI for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the CIA's responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth; the DCI was made responsible for coordinating with designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and the Operations Coordinating Board was designated the normal channel for coordinating support for covert operations among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA. Representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President were to be advised in advance of major covert action programs initiated by the CIA under this policy and were to give policy approval for such programs and secure coordination of support among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.⁵

A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was issued, identical to NSC 5412 except for designating the Planning Coordination Group as the body responsible for coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2 of December 28, 1955, assigned to representatives (of the rank of assistant secretary) of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President responsibility for coordinating covert actions. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as the "NSC 5412/2 Special Group" or simply "Special Group," emerged as the executive body to review and approve

covert action programs initiated by the CIA.⁶ The membership of the Special Group varied depending upon the situation faced. Meetings were infrequent until 1959 when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Special Group adopted fixed criteria for bringing projects before the group; initiative remained with the CIA, as members representing other agencies frequently were unable to judge the feasibility of particular projects.⁷

After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy's request and submitted a report in June that recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and including Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater responsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the DCI determined whether a CIA-originated project was submitted to the Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but informal criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of \$25,000 was adopted by the CIA), for determining whether covert action projects were submitted to the Special Group.⁸

From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Augmented), whose membership was the same as the Special Group plus Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General Taylor (as Chairman), exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a major covert action program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. When President Kennedy authorized the program in November,

he designated Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense, to act as chief of operations, and Lansdale coordinated the Mongoose activities among the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. The CIA units in Washington and Miami had primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose operations, which included military, sabotage, and political propaganda programs.⁹

President Kennedy also established a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) on January 18, 1962, when he signed NSAM No. 124. The Special Group (CI), set up to coordinate counter-insurgency activities separate from the mechanism for implementing NSC 5412/2, was to confine itself to establishing broad policies aimed at preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and other forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries. In early 1966, in NSAM No. 341, President Johnson assigned responsibility for the direction and coordination of counterinsurgency activities overseas to the Secretary of State, who established a Senior Interdepartmental Group to assist in discharging this responsibility.¹⁰

NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI, changed the name of "Special Group 5412" to "303 Committee" but did not alter its composition, functions, or responsibility. Bundy was the chairman of the 303 Committee.¹¹

The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert actions during the Kennedy administration and 142 during the Johnson administration through February 1967. The 1976 Final Report of the Church Committee, however, estimated that of the several thousand projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only 14 percent were considered on a case-by-case basis by the 303 Committee and its

predecessors (and successors). Those not reviewed by the 303 Committee were low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final Report also cited a February 1967 CIA memorandum that included a description of the mode of policy arbitration of decisions on covert actions within the 303 Committee system. The CIA presentations were questioned, amended, and even on occasion denied, despite protests from the DCI. Department of State objections modified or nullified proposed operations, and the 303 Committee sometimes decided that some agency other than the CIA should undertake an operation or that CIA actions requested by Ambassadors on the scene should be rejected.¹²

The effectiveness of covert action has always been difficult for any administration to gauge, given concerns about security and the difficulty of judging the impact of U.S. initiatives on events. In October 1969 the new Nixon administration required annual 303 Committee reviews for all covert actions that the Committee had approved and automatic termination of any operation that had not been reviewed after 12 months. On February 17, 1970, President Nixon signed National Security Decision Memorandum 40,¹³ which superseded NSC 5412/2 and changed the name of the covert action approval group to the 40 Committee, in part because the 303 Committee had been named in the media. The Attorney General was also added to the membership of the Committee. NSDM 40 reaffirmed the DCI's responsibility for the coordination, control, and conduct of covert operations and directed him to obtain policy approval from the 40 Committee for all major and politically sensitive covert operations. He was also made responsible for ensuring an annual review by the 40 Committee of all approved covert operations.

The 40 Committee met regularly early in the Nixon administration, but over time the number of formal

meetings declined and business came to be conducted via couriers and telephone votes. The Committee actually met only for major new proposals. As required, the DCI submitted annual status reports to the 40 Committee for each approved operation. According to the 1976 Church Committee Final Report, the 40 Committee considered only about 25 percent of the CIA's individual covert action projects, concentrating on major projects that provided broad policy guidelines for all covert actions. Congress received briefings on only a few proposed projects. Not all major operations, moreover, were brought before the 40 Committee: President Nixon in 1970 instructed the DCI to promote a coup d' etat against Chilean President Salvador Allende without Committee coordination or approval.¹⁴

Presidential Findings Since 1974 and the Operations Advisory Group

The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 brought about a major change in the way the U.S. Government approved covert actions, requiring explicit approval by the President for each action and expanding congressional oversight and control of the CIA. The CIA was authorized to spend appropriated funds on covert actions only after the President had signed a finding and informed Congress that the proposed operation was important to national security.¹⁵

Executive Order (EO) 11905, issued by President Ford on February 18, 1976, in the wake of major congressional investigations of CIA activities by the Church and Pike Committees, replaced the 40 Committee with the Operations Advisory Group (OAG), composed of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI, who retained responsibility for the planning and implementation of covert operations. The OAG was required to hold formal meetings to develop recommendations for the President regarding a covert action and to conduct periodic reviews of previously approved operations. EO 11905 also banned all U.S. Government employees from involvement in political assassinations, a prohibition that was retained in succeeding executive orders, and prohibited involvement in domestic intelligence activities.¹⁶

Approval and oversight requirements for covert action continued to be governed by the Hughes-Ryan amendment well into the Carter administration, even as the new administration made alterations to the executive branch's organizational structure for covert action. President Carter retained the NSC as the highest executive branch organization to review and guide U.S. foreign intelligence activities. As part of a broader NSC reorganization at the outset of his administration, President Carter replaced the OAG with the NSC's Special Coordination Committee (SCC), which explicitly continued the same operating procedures as the former OAG.¹⁷ Membership of the SCC, when meeting for the purpose of reviewing and making recommendations on covert actions (as well as sensitive surveillance activities), replicated that of the former OAG—namely—the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the DCI, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Attorney General and Director of the Office of Management and Budget (the latter two as observers).

The designated chairman of all SCC meetings was the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Carter formalized the SCC's replacement of the OAG in EO 11985 of May 13, 1977, which amended President Ford's

EO 11905 on United States Foreign Intelligence activities.¹⁸ In practice, the SCC for covert action and sensitive surveillance activities came to be known as the SCC-Intelligence (SCC-I) to distinguish it from other versions of the SCC.

The SCC's replacement of the OAG was reaffirmed in EO 12036 of January 24, 1978, which replaced EO 11905 and its amendments. EO 12036 also reaffirmed the same membership for the SCC-I, but identified the Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget as full members of the Committee, rather than merely observers.¹⁹

Also in the first days of the Carter administration, the SCC-I established a lower-level working group to study and review proposals for covert action and other sensitive intelligence matters and report to the SCC-I. This interagency working group was chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (David Aaron), or in his absence, the NSC Director for Intelligence Coordination. The working group was named the Special Activities Working Group (SAWG). The SAWG was active in early Carter administration reviews of ongoing covert action and remained active through at least 1978. NSC officials in mid-1978 sought to downgrade or abolish the SAWG and replace it as needed with ad hoc working groups. Internal NSC reviews at the end of the Carter administration state that the SAWG gradually fell out of use. By late 1979, the means for debating, developing, and guiding certain covert actions was an interagency working group chaired by Aaron at the NSC. This group was referred to by several names during the late Carter administration, including the Deputy's (or Deputies) group, the Aaron group, the interagency group, the Black Chamber, and the Black Room.

The Carter administration made use of a new category of presidential findings for “world-wide” or “general” (or “generic”) covert operations. This continued a practice initiated late in the Ford administration in response to the Hughes-Ryan requirement for presidential findings. The worldwide category covered lower-risk operations that were directed at broad policy goals implemented on a worldwide basis as assets allowed. These operations utilized existing assets as well as existing liaison contacts with foreign intelligence or security services, and in some cases also consisted of routine training or procurement undertaken to assist foreign intelligence partners or other agencies of the U.S. Government. A new type of document—known as “Perspectives”—provided more specific tasking guidance for these general, worldwide covert activities. Perspectives detailed the themes to be stressed in furtherance of a particular policy goal. Riskier operations required their own presidential findings or Memorandum of Notification (MON). Perspectives were drafted by the CIA and cleared by the Department of State, so the CIA could vet the operational feasibility and risks of the program while the Department of State could assess the diplomatic risks and verify that the program was consistent with overall foreign policy goals. At least initially, Perspectives did not require further coordination with OAG, SCC, or the President. Once an agreed-upon Perspectives document was finalized by CIA and the Department of State, it was transmitted to the field, and posts were required to make periodic reports on any achievements under the Perspectives guidelines. Beginning in 1978, actions in this worldwide category were authorized by the President as specific line-item additions to a previously existing “world-wide” finding, though Perspectives were still used to provide additional details.

The Carter administration initially used MONs to introduce higher-risk, significantly higher-cost, or more geographically specific operations under a previously approved worldwide or general objective outlined in a Perspectives document. Like Perspectives, MONs had to be coordinated between the CIA and the Department of State, but they also required broader interagency coordination within the SAWG or SCC. MONs subsequently came to be used for significant changes to any type of finding, not just worldwide ones. Entirely new covert actions continued to require new presidential findings. The Hughes-Ryan amendment stipulated that Congress be notified of new findings “in a timely fashion,” but did not specify how much time that meant. During the Carter administration, the CIA typically notified Congress of new covert initiatives within 48 hours, including those outlined in Perspectives or MONs.

In October 1980, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981—also known as the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980—scaled back the Hughes-Ryan amendment’s provisions for congressional oversight of covert action. While the requirement to notify Congress about presidential findings remained in place, the new Act limited the Committees of Congress that had to be briefed to the two intelligence Committees, and also explicitly clarified that this requirement to keep the Committees “fully and currently informed” did not constitute a requirement for congressional approval of covert action or other intelligence activities. Moreover, the new Act stipulated that if the President determined it was “essential to limit prior notice to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States,” the President could limit prior notice to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two intelligence Committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and the majority and

minority leaders of the Senate—a group that came to be known as the “Gang of Eight.” If prior notice of a covert action was withheld, the President was required to inform the two intelligence Committees “in a timely fashion” and provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice.²⁰

¹ NSC 4-A, December 17, 1947, is printed in [Foreign Relations, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 257](#).

² NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, is printed *ibid.*, [Document 292](#).

³ Memorandum of conversation by Frank G. Wisner, “Implementation of NSC-10/2,” August 12, 1948, is printed *ibid.*, [Document 298](#).

⁴ NSC 10/5, “Scope and Pace of Covert Operations,” October 23, 1951, is printed in [Foreign Relations, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, Document 90](#).

⁵ William M. Leary, editor, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents* (The University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 63; for text of NSC 5412, see [Foreign Relations, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, Document 171](#).

⁶ Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, pp. 63, 147-148; *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence* (1976), pp. 50-51. For texts of NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2, see [Foreign Relations, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, Documents 212](#) and [250](#).

⁷ Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, p. 63.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁹ See [Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. X, Cuba, 1961-1962, Documents 270](#) and [278](#).

¹⁰ For text of NSAM No. 124, see [Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VIII, National Security Policy, Document 68](#).

NSAM No. 341, March 2, 1966, is printed in [Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIII, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 56](#).

¹¹ For text of NSAM No. 303, see [Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIII, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 204](#).

¹² *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence*, pp. 56-57.

¹³ For text of NSDM 40, see [Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, vol. II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969-1972, Document 203](#).

¹⁴ *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence*, pp. 54-55, 57.

¹⁵ P.L. 93-559.

¹⁶ EO 11905, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 12, No. 8, February 23, 1976.

¹⁷ The broader NSC reorganization sought to reduce the number of NSC committees to two: the Policy Review Committee (PRC) and the SCC. The SCC's jurisdiction included all intelligence policy issues other than annual budget and priorities reviews; the PRC also had jurisdiction over other, non-intelligence matters. Presidential Directive 2, "The National Security Council System", January 20, 1977, Carter Library, Vertical File, Presidential Directives. See also Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1983), pp. 59-62.

[18](#) EO 11985, “United States Foreign Intelligence Activities”, May 13, 1977, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 13, No. 20 (May 16, 1977), pp. 719-720.

[19](#) EO 12036, “United States Foreign Intelligence Activities”, January 24, 1978, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (January 30, 1978), pp. 194-214. Since EO 12036 governed foreign intelligence activities, all references in the EO to the “SCC” were effectively references to what was known in practice as SCC-I.

[20](#) P.L. 96-450, Sec. 407 (October 14, 1980). See also the description of the Hughes-Ryan amendment and its replacement by P.L. 96-450 in: Richard A. Best, Jr., “Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions,” Congressional Research Service, RL33715, December 27, 2011, pp.1-2; and L. Britt Snider, *The Agency and the Hill: CIA’S Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004*, Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2008, pp. 280-281.

Soviet Union, January 1983-March 1985

Contents

January 1983-April 1983 “Dobrynin seemed like he wanted to run. But the Secretary is a jogger”: Shultz and the Four-Part Agenda

[1. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan](#)

Washington, January 19, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/19/83-01/21/83); NLR-748-23-40-10-7. Secret; Sensitive.

Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Burt wrote Shultz on January 18: “Per our conversation earlier today, I have recast the US-Soviet paper as a memo from you to the President.” (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1982-83 U.S.-Soviets Background Info) In his memoir, Shultz recalled that in this memorandum to Reagan: “I set out to him for the first time what was to become our four-part agenda: human rights, arms control, regional issues, and bilateral relations.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 162)

2. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, January 25, 1983, 1348Z

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/28/1983-02/02/1983). Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Clark forwarded and summarized the telegram in a memorandum to the President on January 29. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. (Ibid.)

3. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, January 28, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/28/83-02/02/83); NLR-748-23-40-9-9. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Drafted by Dobriansky. Printed from an uninitialed copy; however, next to his name in the "From" line, Clark wrote: "Could we discuss this with George before he leaves for China? WPC." Reagan responded: "Yes. There is merit in much of what he proposes. RR." In a memorandum to Clark on January 22, Dobriansky forwarded a draft of Clark's memorandum and noted that Blair, Kraemer, Robinson, and Stearman not only strongly concurred in her assessment, but also "made significant contributions to the critique of Shultz's memorandum." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/19/83-01/21/83))

4. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, January 28, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/28/83-02/02/83); NLR-748-23-40-7-1. Secret; Sensitive.

5. Memorandum From Paula Dobriansky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, January 28, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/24/83-01/27/83). Secret, Sensitive; Nodis. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Boverie and Blair. Clark's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

6. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 28, 1983, 12:30 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/11/83-02/20/83). Secret. Drafted by Burt on January 29; cleared by Eagleburger. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. Clark's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it. In a covering note attached to another copy, Eagleburger wrote: "Bill Clark—The Secretary asked

that I make a specific effort to brief you on his talk with Dob. Here is the memcon; I'll be glad to go into more detail if you wish. LSE." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Lawrence Eagleburger Files, 1967-1984, Lot 84D204, Chron, January, 1983)

7. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, February 4, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (2). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The memorandum is unsigned. There is no drafting information on the memorandum. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

8. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, February 7, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (2). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. In a cover note to Reagan, Clark wrote: "Mr. President: While I do not concur in all points of this staff memo, it provides a basis for discussion—hopefully during some of your unscheduled time today—to discuss 'next steps.' Do you wish to meet on this? Bill." A typewritten note from the unidentified "JH" reads: "I am not certain the above note was the WC note

attached to the JL paper when taken to the President via the usher.”

9. Editorial Note

10. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 15, 1983, 5:10–6:50 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, February 1983. Top Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information on the memorandum. The meeting took place in the Residence at the White House. Reagan wrote in his diary that evening: “Almost forgot—Geo. Shultz sneaked Ambassador Dobrynin (Soviet) into the W.H. We talked for 2 hours. Sometimes we got pretty nose to nose. I told him I wanted George to be a channel for direct contact with Andropov—no bureaucracy involved. Geo. tells me that after they left the ambas. said, ‘this could be an historic moment.’” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 198) In a covering note to Shultz on February 17, Eagleburger reported: “As your schedule is such that your only chance for reading is this morning, I am forwarding the memo to you without having read it myself. I would appreciate a chance to give you my comments on it later today. LSE.” Shultz wrote in the margin: “I gather this is being redone in light of our discussion. G.” In a February 19 covering note

to Reagan, Clark wrote: "Mr. President: I attach the memorandum of conversation between Sec. Shultz and Amb. Dobrynin." (Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers, Working File: Contains Originals (2))

11. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 15, 1983, 7-8:15 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union-Sensitive File-1983 (02/15/1983-07/14/1983). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons on February 17; cleared by Eagleburger. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office after Shultz and Dobrynin returned from meeting with Reagan in the White House. See Document 10.

12. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, February 28, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/21/83-03/02/83). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. In an undated, unsigned covering memorandum to Reagan, Clark summarized Shultz's message and commented: "I am skeptical that the Soviets have any intention of permitting the Pentecostals to leave."

13. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

San Francisco, March 3, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (03/03/83-03/07/83). Secret; Sensitive. A draft of this memorandum, dated March 2, was prepared by Napper on March 1; cleared by Simons and Palmer. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive File, March 1-15, 1983) On March 4, telegram Secto 2003 from Shultz in California reported that the memorandum was "hand-carried to the White House office in San Francisco." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830002-0359)

14. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 8, 1983, 11 a.m.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-85-0023, USSR 091.112 (Jan-) 1983. Secret. Drafted by Garthoff on March 11. The meeting took place in Room 3E880 at the Pentagon.

15. Editorial Note

16. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, March 9, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (3). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Prepared by Lenczowski.

17. Editorial Note

18. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz and the Director of the United States Information Agency (Wick) to President Reagan

Washington, March 16, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/04/83). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by B.B. Morton on March 4 and cleared by Simons and Palmer according to a March 10 covering memorandum. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive March 1-15 1983)

19. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, March 16, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1983 Soviet Union March. Secret; Sensitive. In a March 14 memorandum to Shultz, forwarded through Eagleburger, Burt summarized the purpose of sending this memorandum forward to Reagan. Eagleburger wrote in the margin: "G.S.: This is a good memo. LSE." (Ibid.) Lenczowski forwarded the memorandum to Reagan on March 25 (see Document 25).

20. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 16, 1983, 5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, March 16-23 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Palmer on March 18; cleared by Seitz and McManaway. Palmer initialed for both clearing officials. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. A typed notation indicates that McManaway "cleared cable with ident. text." The text of the memorandum of conversation was sent to Moscow in telegram 80054, March 24. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])

21. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, March 21, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, March 16-23 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Drafted by Simons and Napper on March 8; cleared by Palmer. Napper initialed for Simons. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on March 21.

22. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 23, 1983, 4:30 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, March 16-23 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Palmer; cleared by Eagleburger, Seitz, and Hill. Eagleburger initialed for Seitz and Palmer initialed for Hill. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office.

23. Editorial Note

24. Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Palmer) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, undated

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1983 August 10, Secretary's Meetings with the President. Secret; Sensitive. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Although the memorandum is undated, Hill initialed it on March 25. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.

25. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to President Reagan

Washington, March 25, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (5). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. The memorandum is unsigned. Prepared by Lenczowski. Clark wrote in a covering memorandum: "Mr. President: Preparatory to your 2:30 meeting with George Shultz, it might be well you review the attached two papers. Bill." A stamped notation indicates the President saw both memoranda.

26. Editorial Note

27. Note of a Meeting Between President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Hill)

Washington, March 25, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, Entry for March 25, 1983. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the text from an entry in Hill's handwritten notebooks. An image of the note is Appendix B. After his meeting with Reagan on March 25, Shultz returned to the Department and briefed Hill.

28. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, March 25, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (4). Secret. Sent for information. A notation in an unknown hand at the end of the memorandum reads: "Sven Kraemer and Ken DeGraffenreid concur."

29. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, March 25, 1983, 1527Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830166-0101. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Secretary of Defense, USNATO, and the Mission in Geneva; sent for information to Ankara, Athens, Beijing, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Reykjavik, Rome, The Hague, Tokyo, US MBFR Delegation Vienna, USNMR SHAPE Belgium,

CINCSAC Offutt AFB in Nebraska, USCINCEUR Germany, and the Consulate in Leningrad.

30. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, March 28, 1983, 1528Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830170-1044. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to the Consulate in Leningrad, USUN, USNATO, London, Paris, Bonn, the Mission in Geneva, Secretary of Defense, USNMR SHAPE Belgium, USCINCEUR Germany, US Delegation MBFR Vienna, and Mission in Geneva for the INF and START delegations.

31. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, March 28, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (03/24/83-03/25/83). Secret; Sensitive. According to another copy, the memorandum was drafted by Palmer and cleared by Blackwill. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D 188, Sec/Dobrynin 2/15/83) Clark forwarded the memorandum and summarized its main points in an undated memorandum to the President. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, US-Soviet

Diplomatic Contacts (3/5)) Reagan initialed the memorandum from Shultz, indicating he saw it.

32. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, April 1, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/01/83). Secret; Sensitive. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Burt forwarded a draft to Shultz on March 31. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, March 17-31) Clark forwarded the memorandum to the President on April 5. See Document 35 and footnote 5 thereto.

33. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, April 2, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/13/83-04/15/83); NLR-748-24-10-2-8. Secret. Reagan initialed the attached FBIS press report, which summarized U.K. Foreign Minister Pym's rebuttal to Gromyko's press conference. (FBIS 58, April 2, 1983; "Pym Attacks Gromyko's Rejection of Reagan's Proposals")

34. Editorial Note

35. Memorandum From Norman Bailey, John Lenczowski, and Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, April 4, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/01/83) (3). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for Urgent Action. In a cover note to Poindexter, McFarlane wrote: "The attached memo, which Shultz sent over by courier, is being staffed (closehold) by Norman Bailey in coordination with John Lenczowski, Doug McMinn and Don Fortier. The Secretary's proposal that no one else be involved until the day of the announcement (Brock, Block, Regan etc) won't work. Still we can find a way to do it discreetly."

36. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, April 6, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (5). Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Lenczowski. A note in an unknown hand at the top of the page reads: "For discussion with Geo. Shultz at 4 pm."

1. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 19, 1983

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations in 1983

The recent NSPG discussion of US-Soviet relations underscored the fact that increased Soviet activism since Andropov's rise to power confronts us with a situation requiring strength, imagination and energy.² This memo sets forth a strategy for countering this new Soviet activism by using an intensified dialogue with Moscow to test whether an improvement in the US-Soviet relationship is possible. Even if no improvement ultimately takes place, the dialogue itself would strengthen our ability to manage the relationship and keep the diplomatic initiative in our hands.

As we proceed, we must keep in mind that our challenge is not to launch a bold, new initiative, but to build on the good beginning we have made in the patient, steady, yet creative management of a long-term adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union. I look forward to an early opportunity to discuss this topic with you in greater detail.

Enduring Features of US-Soviet Competition: The US-Soviet competition has deep roots in the fundamentally different nature of the two societies and in Moscow's readiness to use its growing military power in ways that threaten our security. Thus there is no realistic scenario for a breakthrough to amicable relations with the Soviet Union.

To be sure, the Soviet system is beset by serious weaknesses. But it would be a mistake to assume that the Soviet capacity for competition with us will diminish at any time during your Presidency. While recognizing the adversarial nature of our relationship with Moscow, we must not rule out the possibility that firm U.S. policies could help induce the kind of changes in Soviet behavior that would make an improvement in relations possible.

We have made considerable progress toward a more effective Soviet policy through our long-term rearmament program, actions to revitalize our Alliances, a new ideological offensive on behalf of our fundamental values, and arms control proposals that have made clear our seriousness in the search for peace.

The Challenge of US-Soviet Relations in 1983: There is already evidence of greater foreign policy energy and sophistication under Andropov, and the Soviets will clearly be on the offensive in 1983. In Europe, we can expect that the Soviets will make the fullest possible use of Western hopes raised by the succession to redouble their appeals to Western publics on issues such as INF. In Asia, Moscow will use renewed talks with the Chinese to press its diplomatic offensive, while hinting at new flexibility on Afghanistan. I believe that we can best preempt this increased Soviet maneuvering with increased diplomatic and public activism of our own, including through an intensified dialogue with Moscow. If this dialogue does not result in improved US-Soviet relations, the onus will rest clearly on Moscow; if it leads to actual improvement, all the better.

Preconditions for Effective Dialogue: To proceed with an intensified dialogue while protecting our security interests, we need to fulfill the following preconditions: (1) continued rebuilding of American economic and military strength; (2)

continued revitalization of our Alliances; (3) stabilization of relations with China; (4) continued regional peacekeeping efforts (Middle East and CBI); and (5) continued competition in ideas.

The Purposes of Intensified US-Soviet Dialogue: Such a dialogue could serve our interests by: (1) probing for new Soviet flexibility (get Andropov to put his money where his mouth is); (2) controlling events (reaffirming our determination to play a central role on all issues while preventing opening of gaps between us and our Allies); (3) maintaining Allied and domestic support for our policy in the face of a redoubled Soviet “peace offensive”.

Substance of the Dialogue: As we intensify dialogue, it is neither necessary nor advisable to abandon the policy framework we have established. We must continue to insist that US-Soviet dialogue address the full range of our concerns about Soviet behavior: the military buildup, international expansionism, and human rights violations. We must be prepared for evolution of our substantive positions in the give and take of negotiations, but we must not lower our basic requirements for improved US-Soviet relations.

A. Arms Control: We must not abandon the high standards we have set for potential agreements—real reductions, equality in the important measures of military capability, verifiability, and enhanced stability. We must at the same time win the battle for public opinion by making clear that it is the USSR, not the U.S., that is impeding progress toward agreements.

Our most formidable arms control challenge will be in *INF*: at stake is whether or not we can sustain the integrity and vitality of the Western Alliance. In *START*, we should hold

firm on the conceptual framework of our approach, including substantial reductions and warheads as the principal unit of account. We must negotiate seriously, taking as the point of departure the apparent Soviet willingness to accept the principle of reductions.

B. Regional Issues: The fact that we have engaged Moscow on regional issues—Afghanistan and southern Africa—positions us to sustain diplomatic pressure and exploit whatever opportunities may emerge in the context of the Soviet political process this year. Given the many signals we have heard on Afghanistan, we should test Soviet intentions by another round of our bilateral talks, and possibly by tabling a bold framework for a comprehensive settlement.

We must also deal effectively with the Soviet “Asian offensive” by adding substance to the US-PRC dialogue and holding firm on our requirements for a Kampuchean settlement. This will be one of the objectives of my China trip.³

On other issues, we may wish to renew bilateral discussions with Moscow on Namibia/Angola to press for Cuban troop withdrawal. In some cases, we may need to reinforce warnings about possible unacceptable Soviet behavior in the Third World, such as delivery of MiGs to Nicaragua. In the Middle East, we want to continue to avoid dialogue that could help Moscow regain a role in the peace process.

C. Human Rights and Western Values: We must continue to seek improvement in Soviet behavior: relief of prisoners of conscience, resolution of divided-family cases and the Pentecostalist situation, and a significant increase in Jewish emigration. Our focus should be on private diplomacy

leading to results, not counterproductive public embarrassment of Moscow. We must also press our democracy offensive and ensure that human rights remains a major component of our policy toward Poland and in the CSCE context.

D. Economic Relations: Any steps we take must not contribute to Soviet military power, subsidize the Soviet economy, or undercut our efforts to develop a new framework for East-West economic relations. We must also manage domestic pressures for increased trade so that the timing of any steps we take is geared to our overall US-Soviet strategy. A possible mechanism for managing these pressures would be to restore government-to-government economic contacts through a session of the Joint Commercial Commission (JCC).

E. Bilateral Relations: Small steps have a modest but real role to play in the relationship, and we should seek opportunities to use them. We should be careful to ensure that benefit is mutual and reciprocal and that our actions advance our objective of broadening access to Soviet society. We could implement Charlie Wick's suggestion to negotiate a new umbrella cultural agreement; this would prevent Soviet cultural groups from making their own arrangements with U.S. sponsors, while denying us reciprocal access to the USSR.

The Process of Dialogue: We should begin to put in place the building blocks for a productive summit, but without committing ourselves prematurely. Four levels of dialogue should be considered:

—*Summitry:* The dialogue process should be constructed to lead to a summit if relations warrant, but without initially defining a summit as the only possible outcome. Should we

later decide on a US-Soviet summit, you should probably meet with the Chinese first.

—*Ministerial-Level Contacts*: We could consider another meeting between Gromyko and me, possibly in Moscow if a meeting with Andropov could be guaranteed. Another option would be a neutral site. We might also consider a possible Weinberger-Ustinov meeting.

—*Dialogue through Ambassadors*: We should make maximum use of both Dobrynin and Art Hartman, and possibly try to regularize their access to Gromyko and me. We might also recall Art for consultations this spring and send him back with a message from you to Andropov.

—*Dialogue between “Departments and Desks”*: We could accept Dobrynin’s proposal of intensified dialogue between specialists on US-Soviet relations from the State Department and the Soviet MFA.⁴

Conclusion: In sum, 1983 will be a year of new challenges and opportunities in our relations with the Soviet Union. We have in place a sound policy, which gives us the foundation for an intensified dialogue with Moscow along the lines I have described. Such a dialogue would protect our security interests while giving the Soviets incentives to address our concerns—as long as we do not waver on the essentials of the policy approach we have established over the past two years. The Soviets may ultimately prove unwilling to satisfy our criteria for an improvement in the relationship. If so, we will nonetheless have done our part, and the responsibility for continued tensions will rest squarely with Moscow.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/19/83-01/21/83); NLR-748-23-40-10-7. Secret; Sensitive. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Burt wrote Shultz on January 18: "Per our conversation earlier today, I have recast the US-Soviet paper as a memo from you to the President." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1982-83 U.S.-Soviets Background Info) In his memoir, Shultz recalled that in this memorandum to Reagan: "I set out to him for the first time what was to become our four-part agenda: human rights, arms control, regional issues, and bilateral relations." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 162)

² See [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 258](#).

³ Shultz visited China February 2-6. In his memoir, Shultz recalled working in early 1983 with Reagan "to develop further our approach to the Chinese. Our aims with China needed more definition: to resolve the most troublesome problems, stabilize relations, and make use of our common interests against Soviet actions in Cambodia and Afghanistan and against deployment of Soviet missiles aimed at Asian countries. We would do what we could to edge the Chinese regime toward a more open and just society. We would also work to develop an important intelligence exchange with the Chinese." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 385-386)

⁴ See [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 250](#).

2. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, January 25, 1983, 1348Z

973. For the Secretary From Hartman. S/S Check With Deputy Secretary Dam About Any Wider Distribution. Subject: US/Soviet Relations.

1. (Confidential—Entire text.)

2. We have now seen enough of the Andropov regime's foreign policy to detect implications for our own policy and for our relations with the Soviets. This message draws some conclusions about where we should be trying to go in our overall relations with the Soviets and how we can get there.

3. It is becoming increasingly clear that the Andropov approach is not marked by significant experimentation or initiative. Internally, Andropov is making major efforts to make the economy run better, but he is using traditional and conservative methods—an emphasis on discipline and an anti-corruption drive. In foreign policy, he has departed in no way from the Brezhnev policy. He seems to be going out of his way to knock down speculation that he will be more flexible on Afghanistan or Poland; and even on issues of less importance to the Soviet Union, like Southern Africa, there appears to be no relaxation of the hard line. If anything, the best candidate for change, at least in the near term, would seem to be an acceleration of Soviet overtures to China—a development that is not in our interests. I remain nevertheless convinced that a priority item in Soviet policy under Andropov is their relationship with us. In

short, we are confronting a regime which will be every bit as hard to deal with as the Brezhnev regime, which is more vigorous and probably more intelligent, but which has a certain dependency on its relations with the U.S.

4. Against such a background, it seems to me we should go back to first principles. The first principle of our relationship with the Soviet Union is our own security. Whatever the condition of other elements of our relationship our basic approach must be designed to lessen the danger of nuclear war. The two mistakes of the 1970's were (1) to emphasize arms control without a parallel emphasis on defense and (2) to count on arms control to carry too much of the weight of the entire relationship. Fortunately, we are not prone to those mistakes today. If we are not careful, however, trends in public opinion on nuclear issues, particularly in Europe, could undermine our ability to correct these mistakes.

5. It is with this context in mind that I say we must now give a heightened emphasis to arms control, and I think this issue deserves high priority on your own global agenda. I say this because arms control is the only currently available catalyst toward starting a process of improvement in the overall relationship. I say it because arms control is an essential element of that first principle of security. And I say it because arms control is now perceived by publics to be the weakest aspect of our policy toward the Soviet Union—a weakness which the Soviets are exploiting in Western Europe with growing effect. Since the deployment timetable makes INF a more urgent matter than START, it is INF that I want to address here. In my view, our INF negotiating position of zero-zero is reaching the end of its usefulness.² The time has come to change it.

6. I was in Western Europe during the period before and after the NATO double decision;³ I have been in Moscow during the Soviet efforts to tear that decision apart. The Soviet strategy is quite plain; it has not changed from Brezhnev to Andropov. The Soviets do not want an arms control solution to INF (in contrast to their policy toward START). They want to prevent our deployment without affecting theirs. They are trying to achieve this by manipulating both their negotiating position in Geneva and their overall propaganda; their aim is to sweet-talk (and threaten) Western European, and particularly German, public opinion. Their negotiating position is like an onion. It began as absurdly extreme; but as they have peeled extraneous layers off one by one, it is beginning to look attractive to the Europeans even though it remains a sham. So far the Soviets have accomplished this at very little cost; European public pressure is now focussing on U.S., not Soviet, "rigidity" even though the Soviets have not proposed the destruction of a single SS-20. I expect that, after the German election,⁴ we shall see some more extraneous layers peeled off. If we don't move now to anticipate this, I'm afraid our deployment schedule will be in real trouble.

7. I remember vividly how the INF debate and ultimate decision developed between 1977 and 1979. The origin was Western Europe's fear that, without U.S. weapons in Europe to respond to the SS-20, the U.S. might hesitate to defend a Europe threatened by the SS-20. The decision to deploy GLCM's and Pershing-II's was not primarily a military decision (after all, we had the military means to respond to an SS-20 attack; we had our whole strategic arsenal). The decision to deploy was primarily a political decision: to give the Europeans confidence that we would treat a nuclear attack on them as if it were an attack on ourselves. As I remember it, there was no great sanctity

about the numbers in INF. The number 572 was chosen because (1) 572 was less than the projected SS-20 warhead arsenal (to equalize the SS-20's was considered "de-coupling" since the nuclear exchange could then take place solely in Europe) but (2) 572 was enough to establish U.S. credibility in defending Europe.

8. I recall all this history to make the point that the double decision was perceived on both sides of the Atlantic primarily as a means of strengthening U.S. credibility in Europe and, therefore, strengthening the Atlantic alliance. However we come out on INF, we should keep that objective firmly in mind: we want a solution that strengthens—or at least doesn't weaken—the alliance. The security of the U.S. is less dependent on the number of intermediate-range missiles we can deploy on European soil than on the cohesion of the alliance and the credibility of our commitment to defend our allies against an attack.

9. The greatest danger in the current INF debate is the threat to alliance unity. One thing is becoming clear: our holding to zero-zero much longer will imperil that unity. Zero-zero (like the 1979 decision itself) was an alliance, not just a U.S., decision; if our allies begin to come off it—as I believe to be happening—then alliance unity itself is called into question. For their part, the Soviets will not accept zero-zero; they are not about to dismantle their entire SS-20 force, even at the price of NATO's carrying out some or all of its INF deployments. That would not be all bad if we could be sure our deployment would go ahead on the basis of Soviet rejection of zero-zero. But will the Germans, or even the British, permit deployment without our seeking to narrow the negotiating gap? While I'm not dealing with those countries anymore, I strongly doubt it. George Bush should get a feel for this during his trip.⁵ If they don't agree to the deployment, we are then faced either with a

crisis with our two major allies or with a face-saving “delay” in deployment while negotiations continue (which will guarantee that the missiles are never deployed). Either way the Soviets win.

10. I therefore believe we must put flexibility into our negotiating position while there is still some credibility in our deployment option. We should come forward with a formula which provides more flexibility than zero-zero. In fact, we might produce different formulas at different stages—doing some onion-peeling ourselves for European public opinion. Our aim should be to present alternatives which are so reasonable that our allies can have no plausible excuse for non-deployment if the Soviets reject them. Whatever our formulas, zero-zero can and should remain our stated ideal solution and ultimate objective. If we get an agreement on the basis of our new approach, we will have reinforced alliance unity, reduced the SS-20 program, and created a catalyst for movement in other areas of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

11. On the question of when to offer a new U.S. approach, I leave it to the experts. The Soviets might not remove another layer of the onion until after the German election. Thus, we can probably wait till then. There may be German reasons for waiting, too, since a U.S. move before March 6 might strengthen those in the FRG who are least committed to the double decision. In any case, I think we should not delay much beyond March 6, since at that point will begin the period of maximum Soviet propaganda activity.

12. Movement along the lines I have proposed can provide a good basis for the accelerated bilateral dialogue that we discussed several weeks ago. If we move on INF, your next talk with Gromyko—whether here or elsewhere—could be

the occasion for introduction of the idea or—if already tabled in Geneva—for emphasis to Soviet leaders of the significance for the whole relationship of an early INF agreement. The question of whether to come to Moscow would depend on the weight we attach to getting directly at Andropov. After such a round we could better determine where to take the process next.⁶

Hartman

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/28/1983–02/02/1983). Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Clark forwarded and summarized the telegram in a memorandum to the President on January 29. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. (Ibid.)

² In a speech on November 18, 1981, Reagan first proposed the zero option on intermediate-range nuclear forces: “The United States is prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground-launch cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles.” (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1981*, p. 1065) In his January 25, 1983, State of the Union address, Reagan said: “For our part, we’re vigorously pursuing arms reduction negotiations with the Soviet Union. Supported by our allies, we’ve put forward draft agreements proposing significant weapon reductions to equal and verifiable lower levels. We insist on an equal balance of forces.” He continued: “In the case of intermediate-range nuclear forces, we have proposed the complete elimination of the entire class of land-based missiles. We’re also prepared to carefully explore serious Soviet proposals. At the same time, let me emphasize that allied steadfastness remains a key to achieving arms reductions. With firmness and dedication,

we'll continue to negotiate. Deep down, the Soviets must know it's in their interest as well as ours to prevent a wasteful arms race. And once they recognize our unshakable resolve to maintain adequate deterrence, they will have every reason to join us in the search for greater security and major arms reductions." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book I, p. 109) The 1981 and 1983 speeches are in [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Documents 69](#) and [139](#), respectively.

³ For information on the December 12, 1979, dual-track decision, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, January 1980, pp. 16-17. Documentation is scheduled for publication in [Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. V, European Security, 1977-1983](#).

⁴ The West German election was scheduled for March 6.

⁵ Vice President Bush visited various European capitals from January 30 to February 10 to discuss INF issues with NATO allies. (Telegram 3038 to Berlin, January 6; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830007-0977)

⁶ For Dobriansky's critique of Hartman's position, see [Document 5](#).

3. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 28, 1983

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations in 1983

George Shultz forwarded you a memorandum (Tab A) outlining how to handle U.S.-Soviet relations in 1983.² His memorandum sets forth a strategy for “countering new Soviet activism by using an intensified dialogue with Moscow to test whether an improvement in the U.S.-Soviet relationship is possible.” George posits that a “process of dialogue” (Depts./Desks, Ambassadors, Ministries, Summitry) would help us gauge the seriousness of Andropov’s proclaimed intentions to improve U.S.-Soviet relations, and could permit us to seize the high ground domestically and internationally, and foster Allied unity.

Specifically, he argues that the Administration should continue its present arms control policy, resume a dialogue with the Soviets on regional issues (Afghanistan, Africa, Middle East), and continue to seek improved Soviet human rights behavior. On economic and bilateral issues, the Administration should pursue careful and controlled forward steps—no dramatic expansion, only carefully paced positive change. Lastly, he suggests that the whole dialogue process would lead to a summit if relations warrant.

While there may be some initial public relations benefit to explore the possibility of “across the board” improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations, I believe that we should have no illusions about the nature of the Andropov regime. Thus, I

have serious reservations about the proposed timing and method of implementation in State's memo.³ I am specifically concerned that the U.S. would soon be forced to dissipate its leverage by making piecemeal concessions in bilateral negotiations which would not result in any meaningful Soviet response, but which would further intensify rather than mollify domestic and Allied pressures to do more. In sum, this course of action would be sure to arouse even more public expectations and would make it difficult for us to maintain a firm policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union; moreover, Soviet activism is largely in the field of public propaganda. This is difficult to counter through dialogues which normally remain private.

Instead, I suggest that we use existing channels to smoke out real Soviet intentions and their willingness to be flexible on critical issues *before* embarking on a campaign to improve our bilateral relations. The private Shultz-Gromyko exchanges should continue to concentrate on eliciting concrete Soviet views on how military, political and economic aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations can be specifically improved. Right now, I do not see any important areas for give in our basic positions: in arms control, any signal of readiness for compromise on INF would be interpreted by the Soviets as a sign of weakness—a sign that we fear we will be unable to deploy our missiles in Europe; on regional issues, we might be willing to reach some small compromises on individual issues, but we would not make major changes in our positions on Afghanistan, Central America or the Middle East. Since there is no basis for major reciprocal deals, I, therefore, do not see the justification for undertaking a major effort to intensify the dialogue.

If it appears that there is real possibility for progress, then we can respond accordingly. However, if, as is probable, the

Soviet positions still offer no room for genuine breakthroughs, it is essential that we be able to maintain firm policy positions and intensify our efforts to portray the USSR as an obstacle to peace. Creating false expectations of progress in U.S.-Soviet relations might buy us some time and temper domestic and Allied pressure in the short term, but in the long term, public expectations would pressure us for more and more concessions making it exceedingly difficult to sustain a firm and resolute course.

I have grave reservations not only about the overall thrust of the proposed strategy for “improving U.S.-Soviet relations”, but I also disagree with some of the specific policy initiatives set forth.

1. On *regional issues*, State sees the possibility of new Soviet flexibility on *Afghanistan* and proposes tabling a bold framework for a comprehensive settlement. There actually seems to be little willingness to compromise in the Soviet position and a proposed settlement by us could lead to negotiations which would take the heat off the Soviets and erode U.S. credibility with Pakistan.

2. Bringing Moscow into renewed bilateral discussions on *Namibia/Angola* as State proposes has pitfalls which we should avoid. I suggest that we continue to deal with the problems of Cuban presence in Angola through the frontline African states.

3. State recommends the restoration of government to government *economic contacts* through the Joint Commercial Commission (JCC). This proposal would send a dramatic signal of changed trade policies and procedures to the business community and would seriously hinder our efforts to forge Allied consensus on East-West economic relations. Any unilateral actions at this time would be

counterproductive as the East-West Economic Study is not completed. Instead, trade should continue to be conducted through private channels. Restoration of the JCC can only be seriously contemplated if meaningful improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations appear imminent.

4. In accordance with the terms set forth in NSDD 75 (U.S. Policy Toward the USSR), a U.S. dialogue with the Soviets should address the full range of U.S. concerns about Soviet internal behavior and human rights violations and not just *arms control*.⁴ However, in addition to what State mentions, arms control—without becoming the centerpiece—should be addressed in these discussions with the expressed purpose of gauging Soviet seriousness of purpose on reductions, equality, verification and compliance. That is, Soviet behavior in INF and their willingness to fundamentally alter their present negotiating stance offers an excellent litmus test of true Soviet intentions vis-a-vis the U.S. If the Soviets are not prepared to relinquish the current clearcut nuclear superiority they enjoy in the European theater, no modicum of dialogue or even of piecemeal agreements in the political/economic sphere would decrease the Soviet threat to Western security.

5. A “*process of dialogue*” at all levels (Departments/Desks, Ambassadors, Ministries, Summitry) would not be fruitful but counterproductive, as it would serve primarily Soviet interests. We should seek a better balance between contacts through Dobrynin and our Ambassador in Moscow.

6. Finally, a *summit meeting* is envisioned by State as the ultimate objective of the dialogue proposal. I see little point in summitry until the Soviets have made a major move which clearly demonstrates a willingness to reduce threats to us and the rest of the free world.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/28/83–02/02/83); NLR-748-23-40-9-9. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Drafted by Dobriansky. Printed from an uninitialed copy; however, next to his name in the “From” line, Clark wrote: “Could we discuss this with George before he leaves for China? WPC.” Reagan responded: “Yes. There is merit in much of what he proposes. RR.” In a memorandum to Clark on January 22, Dobriansky forwarded a draft of Clark’s memorandum and noted that Blair, Kraemer, Robinson, and Stearman not only strongly concurred in her assessment, but also “made significant contributions to the critique of Shultz’s memorandum.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/19/83–01/21/83))

² Tab A is attached; printed as [Document 1](#).

³ On an attached routing slip, McFarlane commented: “Judge—The staff’s memo would have you take a position almost 180 degrees against that of the Secretary of State. If you are going to do that, it is not unreasonable that you have a program of your own. The paper doesn’t really give you that. I think we have to bear in mind that Shultz is saying—like the President—now we have built the leverage, now let’s see if we can use it. It’s just that our staff (with good cause) believes that State will mess it up.” He concluded: “On the whole, I would think this is the kind of paper which is better discussed in person than acted upon after reading. Recommend that you send both memos to the president with yours unsigned but with a note on the top to the effect ‘Could we discuss this with George before long?’ Bud.” According to Shultz: “Shortly after my paper reached the White House, Bud McFarlane let me know that the NSC staff over there was ‘fly specking’ it. ‘There are so

many ideologues around here that they are picking it to pieces,' he said." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 162)

⁴ Dated January 17; see [*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 260*](#).

4. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 28, 1983

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations in 1983

The President has asked me to respond to your thoughtful and suggestive memorandum of January 19 on the means of improving U.S.-Soviet relations in the coming year.² (S)

I believe you are correct in assuming that the recent changes in Soviet leadership portend a more intense and more sophisticated Soviet challenge to U.S. interests. I have no problem at all with your excellent suggestions concerning such topics as our stand in arms reduction talks, regional issues, and human rights issues. Some questions, however, arise in connection with your proposal for significantly increased U.S.-Soviet dialogues. (S)

The Soviet leadership has always favored continuing multi-level dialogues with the United States because they offer Moscow opportunities for identifying and exploiting differences of opinion that exist in every democratic society and government. (Such differences probably also exist on the Soviet side but, given the closed nature of Communist society and government, we are unable to exploit them.) It is with this in mind that during the past two years we have sought to confine U.S.-Soviet political contacts largely to the ministerial and ambassadorial levels. We have staunchly rejected all Soviet efforts to establish an independent link to the White House which would enable it, as in the past, to play NSC against State, and State against

NSC. Our assumption has been that if and when Moscow is prepared to make meaningful concessions on outstanding differences between us, these will be communicated to you through Gromyko or Dobrynin. It is then and then only that a dialogue on lower levels (departmental desks and "experts") should get underway. If and when a variety of outstanding issues can be brought near a point of resolution through such meetings then a summit between heads of state may be profitably arranged. (S)

In the light of these considerations your proposal for a possible summit and for more intense dialogues between specialists of the State Department and the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs strikes me as somewhat premature. The record of meetings which Al Haig and you have had with Gromyko indicates no readiness on the Soviet part whatever to contemplate concessions on outstanding political and regional differences between us. The same holds true of such "expert" level meetings as were held on Afghanistan and Namibia last year. Would it, therefore, not make more sense for you to schedule another meeting with Gromyko (and Andropov, if possible) to determine whether Moscow's position on any outstanding issue has altered to the point where meaningful expert level talks could be usefully contemplated? (S)

If it appears that there is genuine possibility for progress, then we can respond accordingly. However, if, as is probable, the Soviet positions will continue to offer no room for genuine breakthroughs, it is essential that we be able to maintain firm policy positions and intensify our effort to portray the USSR as an obstacle to peace. Creating false expectations of progress in U.S.-Soviet relations through intensified dialogues might buy us some time and temper domestic and Allied pressure in the short term, but in the long term, public expectations would pressure us for more

and more concessions making it exceedingly difficult to sustain a firm and resolute course. (S)

William P. Clark³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/28/83-02/02/83); NLR-748-23-40-7-1. Secret; Sensitive.

² See [Document 1](#).

³ Printed from a copy that indicates Clark signed the original.

5. Memorandum From Paula Dobriansky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, January 28, 1983

SUBJECT

Cable from Ambassador Hartman

Attached (Tab I) is Ambassador Hartman's cable on the ongoing arms control negotiations and the projected tenor of U.S.-Soviet relations.² I take strong exception to the overall thrust of the Ambassador's argument, namely that the zero-zero option has "outlived" its usefulness and should be abandoned.

Ambassador Hartman's cable begins by citing the most fundamental objective of U.S.-Soviet relations as the lessening of the danger of a nuclear war. This assertion is self-evident; yet, the Ambassador's idea on how to accomplish this objective is faulty. The implication of his argument is that moving away from the zero option would buttress deterrence through the establishment of some, albeit imperfect, arms control regime, and prospective improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations, which he alleges hinge upon the successful conclusion of the talks in Geneva. Despite Ambassador Hartman's disclaimers notwithstanding, his argument is a straightforward rehash of the failed approach to arms control pursued during the 1970s.

Deterrence is more likely to fail if the existing strategic-nuclear asymmetries favoring the Soviet Union are not

redressed. Meaningless agreements which do not restore at least parity at both the intercontinental and theater levels would not restrain Soviet international behavior but would make Moscow more prone to gamble in a crisis period. Our fundamental policy objective, which simultaneously would provide us with high-quality deterrence, is the restoration of parity at both the intercontinental and theater levels through the combination of arms control and new deployments. Because the Soviets presently enjoy an overwhelming superiority in long-range, Euro-based nuclear systems, a non-zero solution would effectively perpetuate this asymmetry.

Ambassador Hartman sought to strengthen his assertion with background on INF history, Soviet propaganda efforts and the likely impact on Alliance unity of U.S. adherence to a zero-zero option. He envisions that the Soviets would continue to peel their “propaganda onion,” unraveling more and more suggestions. The Ambassador further anticipates growing European intransigence with U.S. “rigidity”, which would place INF deployment in jeopardy.

He correctly notes that the original impetus for INF deployment came from the Europeans, namely Chancellor Schmidt,³ who among others, was convinced that regional imbalances were impermissible in an age of strategic parity and had to be rectified. The original purpose of INF deployment was to reassure the Europeans and eliminate the growing fear of “decoupling”. According to Hartman, what was intended to reinforce Atlantic unity, now has turned into a divisive issue. Moreover, he contends that even if we persist deployment is unlikely given the current European mood. His prescription is to trade-in our increasingly shaky deployment option, while it is partially credible, get an arms control agreement with the Soviets which is supposed to improve U.S.-Soviet relations and

buttress deterrence, and remove an irritant from badly strained trans-Atlantic relations. He proposes that we move soon, lest Soviet propaganda would lead the Europeans to reject the projected deployment with all the attendant damaging consequences to U.S. prestige, NATO's unity, etc.

I find two fundamental errors in Ambassador Hartman's argument. First, it is basically irrelevant how the INF decision came about. At this point in time, whether we like it or not, the issue has been made a litmus test of NATO's viability. Non-deployment without the establishment of a genuinely balanced and stable theater arms control regime would cast major doubt on the Alliance's ability to implement any controversial decisions. It would also further embolden the already strong pacifist and anti-American forces in Europe, effectively insuring the eventual demise of NATO as a viable security organization. Moreover, I disagree fundamentally with Ambassador Hartman's reading of the European mood. The recent statements by Mitterrand are very supportive of INF; the Italians are still holding firm; and despite recent statements by the British and Germans, it remains more than likely that they would honor their deployment commitments.

I recommend that we hold firm on the zero-zero option and further intensify efforts to demonstrate our sincerity and good faith to the Europeans—an approach the Administration is already taking with Ambassador Dailey's efforts and Vice President Bush's trip.⁴ If, as I expect, the Soviets do not seriously alter their untenable position, we should deploy the first INF units as scheduled. It is *then and only then* that fundamental change in the Soviet position might take place. If such a change does not materialize we should complete the full deployment. However, if at this juncture, the Soviets seriously

restructure their INF position in a more balanced fashion, we might consider moving away from the zero-zero option toward an arms control regime which would establish theater-nuclear parity through asymmetrical reductions (the Soviets retire most of their systems and we deploy some INF units).

Presently, any indication that we are unilaterally ready or even seriously considering the abandonment of the zero-zero option would be extremely deleterious as it would embolden the anti-deployment forces in Europe, embarrass some of the European governments in a manner reminiscent of Carter's neutron bomb fiasco, and remove any incentives for the Soviets to compromise.⁵

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/24/83-01/27/83). Secret, Sensitive; Nodis. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Boverie and Blair. Clark's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² See [Document 2](#).

³ Helmut Schmidt was Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1974 to 1982.

⁴ Reagan had appointed Peter H. Dailey, who was serving as the U.S. Ambassador to Ireland, to chair an interagency committee on arms control, INF, and public diplomacy, in coordination with European governments. (Telegram 27340 to Bonn, January 30; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830053-0142) For information on Bush's trip, see [footnote 5](#), [Document 2](#).

⁵ At the end of the memorandum, Dobriansky added a typewritten message: "Please note: While I recognize that the Vice President's trip may have significant bearing on

the outcome of this issue, I still felt compelled to express my views at this time. PD.”

6. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 28, 1983, 12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin

DCM Alexander Bessmertnykh

The Secretary

Under Secretary Eagleburger

Assistant Secretary Burt, Designate

Dobrynin joined the Secretary for lunch and an informal, wide-ranging discussion of US-Soviet relations. After a private meeting with Dobrynin the Secretary and Dobrynin joined others for lunch. Present on the American side were Lawrence Eagleburger and Richard Burt and on the Soviet side, Alexander Bessmertnykh. The Secretary briefly summarized the private meeting by saying that the two had agreed to meet regularly on US and Soviet questions, including arms control, regional issues and bilateral questions. They had surveyed the various exchanges now under way in Geneva, Madrid and Vienna, as well as the discussions that had been held earlier on non-proliferation and southern Africa.² They had agreed that a Foreign Ministers' meeting should probably be held sometime before the next UNGA, but that it was too early to suggest a specific date. They had also agreed on the general desirability of a U.S.-Soviet summit, but that it was the U.S. view that such a meeting achieve concrete results. The Secretary asked Dobrynin whether this was a fair summation of their private dialogue and Dobrynin agreed.

Dobrynin then went on at length about his conception of the best way to do business on arms control. He felt little

progress in arms control negotiations had been made thus far. It was important to have a channel in which to resolve difficult problems; this could be the Shultz-Gromyko channel. The negotiators in Geneva did not have sufficient flexibility to resolve major problems. Nitze tried but did not succeed.³ The experience of the past ten years showed that when major problems arose, the Foreign Ministers were required to meet and resolve them. It was then left to the negotiators to put the results into treaty language.

The Secretary did not rule out the possibility of discussing INF and START in the Shultz-Gromyko channel, but noted the US preference for conducting the negotiations in Geneva and added that with new rounds beginning in both negotiations, that it made sense now to see what developed in the talks before deciding how to treat arms control in any future Shultz-Gromyko meeting.

Turning to the issue of bilateral relations, Dobrynin proposed that progress between the two sides might be made by expanding areas of bilateral cooperation. During recent consultations in Moscow, Dobrynin said, Andropov asked him what the Reagan Administration had done in a positive sense in US-Soviet relations. Had the Americans agreed to even one thing? Dobrynin said he had to answer no. Dobrynin pointed out that over the course of the past year a number of bilateral agreements had lapsed. He suggested that perhaps we should now consider making an inventory of bilateral agreements, with each side listing bilateral agreements and less formal undertakings under such categories as "cancelled," "lapsed," "ongoing," and "close to agreement." The Secretary agreed and suggested that such lists might be discussed at his next meeting with Dobrynin—perhaps in late February. Dobrynin agreed and said that he would be in touch with Eagleburger next week on this project.

Dobrynin said there were a number of other bilateral talks in the national security area that were also worth exploring, such as discussion of radiological weapons, chemical weapons, conventional arms transfers, and Indian Ocean naval deployments. The Secretary was noncommittal.

Dobrynin then listed a number of broader issues that in his opinion were topical, including the CSCE meeting in Madrid, South Africa, the Middle East, nonproliferation, and the Warsaw Pact's recent Prague Declaration. Concerning Madrid, Dobrynin said only that he had recently met with US delegation chief Max Kampelman. Dobrynin characterized the several bilateral exchanges on South Africa as "not bad." The Secretary noted that these exchanges so far had resulted in little, but agreed that they probably should be continued as circumstances warranted.

On the Middle East, which Dobrynin characterized as a "sacred area" for the United States, the two sides should consider bilateral talks that would be given little or no publicity. The Secretary said that he and Gromyko had already discussed the Middle East at length, as had Secretary Haig and Gromyko, and indicated that the United States was not prepared to go beyond those discussions.⁴

The Secretary agreed with Dobrynin that the Washington bilaterals on nonproliferation had been useful and should be continued. Dobrynin said he would like to talk about the Prague Declaration, which contained many good ideas.⁵ He complained that so far, Washington had ignored the proposals contained in the communique. The Secretary said he would be willing to listen if Dobrynin wished to discuss that matter at their next meeting.

The Secretary stressed there were other regional issues of importance to the United States that must remain on the agenda. These included Poland, Kampuchea, Afghanistan, and Central America. Dobrynin said that he would be willing to address these in future meetings.

In addition, the Secretary continued, human rights issues were in our view also central to the relationship. They were an “historic issue” for the United States. During the Vice President’s meeting with Andropov in Moscow last November,⁶ Andropov had underscored the importance of noninterference in internal affairs. We understood that concern. But for the United States, human rights was a question of major importance, and would remain so. These issues, such as the situation of Soviet Jewry, should be handled in a practical way, without publicity. Dobrynin commented that issues of this sort were most easily resolved in a climate of overall improvement in the relationship and noted the negative impact that the Jackson Amendment had had on Soviet emigration.⁷

Summing up, Dobrynin characterized arms control negotiations as by far the most important area for progress, and indicated that in addition to surveying bilateral agreements, START and INF should be on the list of discussion topics for the next meeting.

The Secretary said that although the primary negotiations should remain in Geneva, he would not object if Dobrynin wished to discuss START and INF. While not as important, confidence-building measures comprised an area where relatively early accomplishments were possible. At the same time, human rights and regional issues must also remain on the agenda.

At the conclusion, Eagleburger reminded everyone that Bessmertnykh would soon be leaving for Moscow to head the U.S. department in the Soviet MFA. All Americans present wished him luck.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/11/83–02/20/83). Secret. Drafted by Burt on January 29; cleared by Eagleburger. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. Clark's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it. In a covering note attached to another copy, Eagleburger wrote: "Bill Clark—The Secretary asked that I make a specific effort to brief you on his talk with Dob. Here is the memcon; I'll be glad to go into more detail if you wish. LSE." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Lawrence Eagleburger Files, 1967–1984, Lot 84D204, Chron, January, 1983)

² In Geneva, U.S.-Soviet INF negotiations began on November 30, 1981. From November 11, 1980, to September 9, 1983, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was holding a Second Review Conference in Madrid. In Vienna, Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks (MBFR) had been ongoing since 1973.


³ Reference is to the Nitze-Kvitsinskiy Geneva "Walk in the Woods" proposal in June/July 1982. Documentation on the proposal is scheduled for publication in [*Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. V, European Security, 1977–1983*](#).

⁴ See [*Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Document 138*](#).

⁵ The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact met in Prague from January 4 to 5.

⁶ See [*Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Documents 234–235*](#) and

[237](#) .

⁷ The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act denied Most-Favored-Nation status to countries with non-market economies (particularly those of the Soviet bloc) that restricted their citizens' right to emigrate. President Ford signed the Trade Act with the amendment on January 3, 1975. Documentation is in [Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974-December 1976](#) .

7. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, February 4, 1983

SUBJECT

The Prospects for Progress in US-Soviet Relations

Is there a possibility of achieving a constructive change in US-Soviet relations or not? The short answer is that we don't know; in part because of the change in Soviet leadership, but also because we haven't tried.² There is a good reason for that. It was your view—correctly in my judgement—of the state of our relations at the end of the decade of the seventies that the Soviets may well have considered us a nation in decline and that before we could have any realistic hope of getting them to bargain seriously with us toward the resolution of the many problems before us, we had to make clear that we had reversed that trend. In short, we had to demonstrate that we still possessed the will and the capability to defend our interests and once more, to lead the free world. Toward that end you set out to restore our defenses, to reassure our allies, to solve our economic problems at home and in sum, to show by action that we were coming back and had to be taken seriously. At the end of two years it seems to me that you have succeeded and that there is a very solid basis for concluding that the Soviets may be reconciled to the fact that by the end of the decade we will have passed them again. The corollary is that now, at a position of maximum relative strength, they ought to cut the best deal that they can. In this respect, they are not unlike the Japanese in 1941. They—like the Japanese—have two choices. Either

they can attempt to inflict a devastating military defeat upon us, or they can seek to restrain our military buildup through negotiation. Which of the two is the most appealing course can be argued. This memo proceeds from a fundamental judgement, borne of a reading of Soviet history and reinforced by recent military setbacks they have suffered (e.g., the woeful performance of their hardware in Lebanon) that the Soviets will not risk a military conflict with us.

There are also internal incentives at play which could lead the new Soviet leader to conclude that an arms control agreement—not just endless negotiation—is in his personal interest. For example, Andropov came to power relying, like all of his predecessors, on the support of the military. Historically it has been necessary in the Soviet Union to give the military its due—more spending—in order to keep that support. But at times, the military has been willing to accept arms control as a reasonable alternative because it has constrained US defense programs in the process. Now, at a time when you have launched a solid rebuilding program, such an incentive is at hand. And as you have pointed out, the other pressing demands on the Soviet economy give him a separate set of reasons for cutting back the rate of increase in military spending. (Note: I do not intend to say that a significant real cut is likely—at best we might achieve a reduction in the rate of increase.)

Separate from these military/economic incentives in Andropov's mind are the personal political realities. He is not yet President and it is reasonable to ask why. Is it not because he faces competition? Before his accession there was speculation that Chernenko was a strong contender for the top position. He is still a prominent player with his own following. Chernenko is a Brezhnev protege and generally labeled as a detentenik. There is still a certain attractiveness

among Soviet intellectuals for this approach and Andropov cannot dismiss their power and influence. For this reason there is considerable incentive for him to outflank them with an agreement of some kind.

Against this view one can paint the well-known image of Soviet single-minded militarism which requires eternal confrontation without even the suggestion of compromise. My point is that it is irrelevant to debate which view is correct for as long as we keep our guard up. More importantly what do we have to lose by trying to open some doors? Two years ago I wouldn't have said that for indeed at that point, we had a lot to lose; we would have appeared to be supplicants, rushing into a very tough card game with no winners. But that's no longer true. We're on the march, and Andropov knows it.

So what should we do? The first question is where should we concentrate our effort—on what subject do we and they have an overlapping interest in an agreement? The answer seems to me clearly arms control and more specifically the INF talks. There is also some promise in START but that can wait. On INF, we have a schedule—the clock is running—and it gives us substantial leverage and imputes a sense of urgency in Moscow.

The next question is how to open the dialogue. Should we use traditional diplomatic channels either in Moscow or in Geneva or try a private channel. The latter seems to me preferable and perhaps unavoidable. The reason it is preferable is because Andropov likes secrecy—indeed he has made a career out of it. It also makes it easier for him to manage his internal bureaucraties. The same factors apply in our government for different reasons. It has become virtually impossible for us to keep the substance of our negotiations private once they are circulated within the

government. And we have a separate but related problem. This concerns the very deeply-felt ideological bias which exists within your Administration against arms control. This small group of professionals—centered in the Defense Department—believes that arms control generically is bad. To be fair we have a legacy of 12 years experience which supports their claim. In gross terms, the military balance has worsened during the SALT era. But I think that we must have the maturity to understand that much of the reason for our failure in the past has to do with our inability to keep the “stick” as powerful as the “carrot” owing to post-Vietnam and Watergate vulnerabilities. In short, just because we came out badly in the past doesn’t mean that we will suffer the same fate again. We have to be tough negotiators and sustain our defense buildup. But back to the point, these individuals will resist any serious negotiation and if given the opportunity, will undermine it with leaks. Consequently a private channel may offer the only means to proceed.

Concerning what is to be said, there is a good reason not to be so anxious as to lay out an entire proposal in the first overture. Rather it would be better to make the first contact with a short letter expressing in serious tones your recognition that our relations appear to be evolving toward renewed confrontation. It would express your acknowledgement that we will no doubt continue to disagree on fundamentals, but that this should not be allowed to abort our common interest in maintaining peace and, where possible, resolving problems. You might then note that you view Andropov’s accession as an occasion on which perhaps a new page can be turned in US-Soviet relations and that if he is so inclined you want him to know that you are seriously interested in making real progress toward reducing the level of nuclear arms. If he is

interested, you would welcome his reply in the same channel.

With regard to how that message would be sent, there are several choices. We could use the hotline. While the circle of awareness within the Soviet Union is small for such messages, we cannot be sure that it would not include some who Andropov would rather not include. If our objective is to allow Andropov the maximum latitude as to whom he chooses to involve, we should seek the personal delivery to him of your letter by a trusted individual. There are various options on this score; suffice to say that it can be done without great risk of compromise.

Once that contact is made with Andropov it is possible that he will reply and ask that talks be opened. At that time he will indicate his interlocutor. If it is Dobrynin, then it would be my recommendation that we have him open talks with George Shultz but here in the White House (in the Map Room with total privacy as has been done in the past). From there we would see what develops.

Launching such an undertaking holds some risks. If made public it would engender criticism from the right on general principles and from a disaffected bureaucracy as well. Still on the whole I believe it would be worthwhile because it would make clear that you are not ideologically against solving problems with the Soviet Union; it would show that you are at least willing to try. To assure the substantive quality of the talks and assure their ultimate supportability, you would include as the backstopping group for this effort, the statutory members of the NSC (the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense), the Chairman of the JCS, Bill Casey and your National Security Advisor.

Mr. President, it seems to me that we have reached a point where you must decide where you will invest your time and political capital in the next two years. You may be able to accomplish two or three truly lasting things in foreign affairs. In my judgment, forging peace in the Middle East and securing an arms control agreement with the Soviets represent the best and most exigent opportunities. You may have other thoughts. The purpose of this memo is to raise one possibility and, thereby, stimulate a discussion at your convenience, during which we can begin to lay out a strategy. I have discussed this with no one.³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (2). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The memorandum is unsigned. There is no drafting information on the memorandum. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² Reagan wrote in the right-hand margin: "we have tried."

³ It is unclear if Clark wrote this on his own, as he suggests. Lenczowski wrote extensive comments in the margins of another copy of this memorandum. (Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, NSC Files, Chron File February 1983) It is unclear, however, whether Lenczowski saw the memorandum before it went to the President or whether he was looking at a copy. See [Document 8](#).

8. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, February 7, 1983

SUBJECT

The Memorandum to the President on U.S.-Soviet Relations

If I may be blunt about it, this memo is seriously flawed and contains recommendations that are not in the interests of U.S. security.² The assumptions underlying its analysis are at best questionable and at worst (which is most of the time) faulty. Among these are:

—The assumption that the U.S. is as responsible as, if not more responsible than, the USSR for U.S.-Soviet tensions and differences. This is implicit in the assertion that “we haven’t tried” to see if better U.S.-Soviet relations are possible. It is also implicit in the author’s statement that it would be politically useful to prove to the world that the President is not “ideologically against solving problems with the Soviet Union” (as if he has not done so already in his INF and START proposals).

—The assumption that the Soviets believe that “we are on the march again”—i.e., that our military buildup is on track, will inevitably overtake them in a few years, and is forcing them to come to arms control accords with us. Apparently the Soviets cannot see the efforts in our Republican Senate to cut

back that buildup (which, in any event, will not match the concurrent Soviet buildup).

—The assumption that since the Soviets are at a position of maximum relative strength vis-a-vis the U.S., they are in the best position possible to negotiate an arms control agreement and therefore have a real incentive to do so. This is half-true. The Soviets will always negotiate an agreement that restrains U.S. defense programs. But they will never cut a deal that serves U.S. interests in any meaningful way unless they are forced to do so. We have not forced them whatsoever. In fact, in the only arena where we could plausibly make a case that we are forcing them—the INF deployments in Europe—the *Soviets* are the ones who have us up against the wall, and they know it.

—The assumption that the Soviets have something to fear from the U.S. defense buildup, and that our impending INF deployment imposes on them a “sense of urgency.” This assumption is based on a mirror-image perception of the Soviet Union—a perception that is totally false. The Soviets know that there is no military threat coming from the U.S. They know that when the U.S. was really anti-communist in the 1950s, we would not even help the Hungarian freedom fighters. They know that there is even less of a political constituency today to do anything similar, much less threaten the USSR itself.

—The assumption that the Soviets have “suffered recent military setbacks” (the “woeful performance of their hardware in Lebanon”). Need it be said that the *Soviets* have not suffered any setbacks?

—The assumption that these “setbacks” reinforce their policy of not risking military conflict with us. The only reason why they don’t want to risk military conflict with us is that they do not need to take such risks. Their political strategy is doing quite a good job of eroding the strength of the West, while pursuing their policy of attrition in the Third World.

—The assumption that there are “interest groups” in the USSR and that the military is one of these. This is expressed in relation to the military’s support of Andropov (as if such support were analogous to constituent group support in the U.S.) and its alleged willingness to engage in arms control talks at this stage (as if there are other times when it is against such talks). This whole theory assumes that the military wants something different than what the Party wants, i.e., more military spending, and that the military is usually a force opposed to detente. This theory has serious flaws (such as a lack of evidence to support it). It is, once again, a mirror-image-based theory that ignores mountains of evidence to the contrary (not the least of which is the total infiltration of the military by Party political commissars who maintain strict political controls). This theory further ignores all the evidence that the military has a major interest in pursuing the policy of detente—both to restrain U.S. defense programs and to acquire Western technology which permits them to maintain, without reform, their command economy, which in turn allows them to keep the highest priority on military spending. (The other flaws of this theory require more lengthy explanation.)

—The assumption that the Soviets have domestic economic reasons (like ours) to cut back their

military spending. This is another mirror-image fallacy that has little or no evidence to support it. The Soviets are perfectly willing to starve their own people (witness the current pervasive rationing system and malnutrition) to retain military superiority.

—The assumption that there is a conflict between proponents and opponents of detente, and that the “detenteniks” (a label the author ascribes to Chernenko) are falling all over each other in a competition to see who can be more detentist vis-a-vis the U.S. There is utterly no evidence to show this. Nor is there any evidence to show that we can help Andropov in his domestic political position by reaching an agreement with him (except, perhaps, if we make so many concessions that he can boast of his unique negotiating skills to his comrades). (I can explain elsewhere at greater length why the proponents-opponents of detente theory is false.)

—The assumption that we can easily sustain our defense buildup while engaging in the kind of negotiations with the Soviets that the author recommends. The author ignores the fact that a respectable case can be made to demonstrate that the entire arms control process makes it very difficult to convince the people that a defense buildup is necessary or that we even face any kind of threat from our negotiating “partners”.

—The assumption that negotiating through a private channel serves U.S. security interests. It is the Soviets, in fact, who are the greatest proponents of private channels. The author’s comments on this subject almost suggest that he trusts Andropov more

than he trusts our most security-minded people at DOD. In fact Andropov himself could not have written a better recommendation to the President.

—The assumption that we and the Soviets have a “common interest in maintaining peace.” This assumption, as formulated here, which is a truism when it refers to avoiding nuclear war, nevertheless tends to equate the U.S. and the USSR politically. It tends to ascribe blame for tensions if not equally, then largely on the U.S. It fails to explain how murdering a million Afghans represents a “common interest in peace.”

—The assumption that we are dealing with an individual, Mr. Andropov, who has individual discretion to make major policy changes. (This assumption is reflected in the author’s view that Andropov’s accession to power represents a new opportunity for better relations.) The fact is that we are dealing with a *system* where individuals have little impact or discretion. If Andropov were to deviate measurably from the Party line as defined by the system, he would represent a threat to his colleagues, who would oust him as they did Khrushchev. To operate from this assumption is to entertain the illusion that Andropov has it within his power to pursue a genuine policy of accommodation with the U.S. It is to believe that the possibility exists that Andropov might really turn out to be something other than a Communist. To believe that individuals (as opposed to the system) can really make a significant political difference is the first step in the process of wishful thinking about the nature of Soviet communism.

With so many questionable or false assumptions, this memo proceeds from a most shaky base. What aggravates its soundness even more is that many of these assumptions are deliberate disinformation themes that the Soviets use to confuse Western policymakers. The original question posed by the memorandum—“Is there a possibility of achieving a constructive change in U.S.-Soviet relations?” remains not only unanswered but not seriously examined. The key question here is not even addressed, namely, “constructive change in U.S.-Soviet relations” according to whose definition of “constructive”? What is “constructive” for the Soviets is not necessarily constructive for U.S. national security.

What this memorandum recommends, in effect, is that the U.S. act to improve relations with the USSR on Soviet terms. It asks us to accept as true the charge that the U.S. is substantially if not largely responsible for the arms race and that the Soviets have as much to fear from us as we from them. It denies that the President’s zero-option proposal is a good faith arms control proposal, in spite of the fact that by itself it represents a concession to the Soviets in strictly military terms. It is overly sanguine about our defense buildup and our political will to defend ourselves and lead the Free World. Indeed the President has demonstrated his own will to do so—but can we say as much for Congress, most of the probable Democratic presidential candidates or various important East-West trade constituencies? Or speaking of the electorate as a whole, what conclusions have the Soviets reached when they viewed the victory of the nuclear freeze initiative (a Brezhnev proposal, after all) in every state referendum where it appeared?³ It would appear that any attempt to make the kinds of negotiating concessions recommended by this memo would only solidify in Soviet minds their view that the political-moral-spiritual strength of America as a

whole is not as great as the election of President Reagan would have had them believe.

The author concludes with the notion that a U.S.-Soviet arms agreement would be a lasting accomplishment for the President in foreign affairs. However, he fails to warn the President that previous agreements have not been such jewels in crowns of his predecessors. A Middle East peace would indeed be a feat. But nowhere is the President's Democracy Initiative mentioned—or his related efforts to upgrade U.S. public diplomacy and make America strong and respected again. Indeed these are the real feats this President is accomplishing—and they stand on the solid ground of strengthening U.S. interests and values and not the shaky ground of problematic compromises with an adversary that has shown no evidence of changing its avowed purpose of destroying our civilization.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (2). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. In a cover note to Reagan, Clark wrote: "Mr. President: While I do not concur in all points of this staff memo, it provides a basis for discussion—hopefully during some of your unscheduled time today—to discuss 'next steps.' Do you wish to meet on this? Bill." A typewritten note from the unidentified "JH" reads: "I am not certain the above note was the WC note attached to the JL paper when taken to the President via the usher."

² The memorandum from Lenczowski is in response to [Document 7](#). See also [footnote 3 thereto](#).

³ In a message to the UNGA Second Special Session on Disarmament read by Gromyko on June 12, 1982, Brezhnev

proposed a freeze on nuclear arsenals and pledged that the Soviet Union would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. See *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 349–352.

9. Editorial Note

According to the President's Daily Diary, on February 12, 1983, President Ronald Reagan and First Lady Nancy Reagan hosted Secretary of State George Shultz and his wife, Helena ("O'Bie"), at the White House for dinner and a movie from 6:50 p.m. to 10:35 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) During the evening, the two men discussed the state of Soviet-American relations, including the Secretary's channel with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. No formal record of this meeting has been found. However, Shultz described the evening in his memoir as follows: "I returned to Washington on February 10, after a long trip to Japan, China, and South Korea. Snow was falling when my plane touched down at Andrews Air Force Base. The blizzard continued for days. By Saturday afternoon, February 12, Washington was covered by one of the heaviest snowfalls of the century. Traffic had virtually come to a halt. People were skiing in the streets. My telephone rang. It was Nancy Reagan inviting O'Bie and me to the White House for dinner. The snow had prevented the Reagans from going to Camp David. When we arrived that evening, the president and first lady were relaxed and talkative. The family dining room on the second floor of the White House imparts a sense of history, especially when the group is small and the atmosphere informal. The Reagans were gracious hosts. They like good conversation, a good story. If the president heard a story he liked, he never forgot it. And I would hear it again and again, further embellished and perfected with each telling.

"President Reagan was fascinated by China and expressed openly his ideas about the Soviet Union. He recognized how difficult it was for him to move forward in dealing with either of these countries. He realized, I thought, that he

was in a sense blocked by his own White House staff, by the Defense Department, by Bill Casey in the CIA, and by his own past rhetoric. Now that we were talking in this family setting, I could see that Ronald Reagan was much more willing to move forward in relations with these two Communist nations—even travel to them—than I had earlier believed. Reagan saw himself as an experienced negotiator going back to his days as president of the Screen Actors Guild. He was self-confident about his views and positions. He had never had a lengthy session with an important leader of a Communist country, and I could sense he would relish such an opportunity.

“‘I will be meeting with Dobrynin again late Tuesday afternoon [February 15],’ I told him. ‘What would you think about my bringing Dobrynin over to the White House for a private chat?’

“‘Great,’ he responded. ‘We have to keep this secret,’ he said. ‘I don’t intend to engage in a detailed exchange with Dobrynin, but I do intend to tell him that if Andropov is willing to do business, so am I.’

“Monday morning at 7:40, a call came to me from Bill Clark. His nose was out of joint. He was very negative about a meeting between Reagan and Dobrynin. ‘I argued against the meeting to the president,’ he told me. President Reagan, however, had his own ideas and wanted to get more involved. The efforts of the staff at the NSC to keep him out, I thought, were beginning to break down. Mike Deaver made arrangements to send a White House car over to the State Department’s basement garage to bring Dobrynin and me over to the relatively unwatched East Gate of the White House without the press’s knowledge.

“When Ambassador Dobrynin walked into my office at 5:00 P.M. on Tuesday, I greeted him with the question ‘Anatoly, how would you like to go see the president? Why don’t we just go back down in my elevator, get in the car, and go over there?’ Dobrynin immediately agreed, surprised but elated. Off we went.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pages 163-164)

10. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 15, 1983, 5:10-6:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ronald Reagan
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin of the USSR

The meeting between the President and Ambassador Dobrynin went on for about an hour and three-quarters. It was spirited throughout and the entire time was spent on content as distinct from pleasantries of one sort and another. The time can be divided into segments.

1. The President expressed his readiness to see important problems we have with the Soviet Union addressed and resolved if reasonable solutions can be arrived at. He made it plain that he was talking about genuine content and not simply words of good feeling. It seemed to me that he was very convincing in the way he expressed himself. Dobrynin responded that while he didn't realize that he would have this opportunity to see the President, he had been instructed by Andropov to say through the scheduled meeting with GPS that Andropov's view was similar.

The President said that personal channels often needed to be established in order to have things happen and that as far as he was concerned, the Soviets could look upon me, Shultz, as the personal channel.

2. Dobrynin reviewed the scope of issues that confront us, running from arms control to regional issues (the only one he mentioned was the Middle East) to bilateral issues. Then the discussion moved into the INF and START Talks. For one-half to three-quarters of an hour, the President and

Dobrynin engaged each other on these subjects and, without reviewing the arguments used, it must have been apparent to Dobrynin that the President was quite well informed and, while reasonable, very tough-minded. The President has a very pleasant way of stating his point of view, but he came across as clear and strong. He also made it apparent through the content of the discussion that he was ready to work for constructive solutions.

3. The President developed at considerable length the reasons why human rights issues are important to him: on the basis of the human beings involved on the one hand; on the other, the political impact in the United States of treatment that would not be tolerated here. He pointed up the difficulty of managing a relationship with the Soviet Union when practices we would not tolerate are so visible and untended. There was considerable discussion of the Pentecostals in the Embassy. Dobrynin's only argument was that if people who came to an Embassy found that was the way out of a country, then the Embassy would be overwhelmed. The President asked Dobrynin why it was that they were so anxious to keep people in the country who wanted to leave. The President also developed the human rights and political impact points in terms of the situation in Poland. The President expressed his view that this was a subject that he was perfectly ready to work at quietly and that results would be greeted with appreciation but not with any sense of victory. He expressed his opposition to the Jackson-Vanik approach to this subject.

4. At the end, considerable time was spent in reviewing the scope of issues before us and in saying to each other that it was important to find operational ways to implement the desire of both the President and the General Secretary to solve problems reasonably.

5. It seemed to me that Dobrynin was clearly impressed with the fact of the meeting and, even more, with the strength and reasonableness of the President. He was surprised that the meeting happened. He said that he was honored, and it was a privilege to be received by the President. He commented that it just might possibly have been an historic occasion—that whether we were talking about two years or six years, in either case it was quite possible to get things accomplished and that he would give Andropov a full and detailed report of the entire conversation.²

In my discussion with Dobrynin after we left the President,³ Dobrynin picked up on the personal channel and suggested that a meeting of Shultz and Gromyko between the UN sessions would be a necessity if this relationship were to develop and that I ought to consider a trip to Moscow at some point so that I could have a lengthy session with Andropov. He also mentioned that when Gromyko comes for the UN session, we should consider returning to what he regarded as the traditional Gromyko call on the President. I reminded Dobrynin of the importance of Art Hartman's access to Soviet officials.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, February 1983. Top Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information on the memorandum. The meeting took place in the Residence at the White House. Reagan wrote in his diary that evening: "Almost forgot—Geo. Shultz sneaked Ambassador Dobrynin (Soviet) into the W.H. We talked for 2 hours. Sometimes we got pretty nose to nose. I told him I wanted George to be a channel for direct contact with Andropov—no bureaucracy

involved. Geo. tells me that after they left the ambas. said, 'this could be an historic moment.'" (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 198) In a covering note to Shultz on February 17, Eagleburger reported: "As your schedule is such that your only chance for reading is this morning, I am forwarding the memo to you without having read it myself. I would appreciate a chance to give you my comments on it later today. LSE." Shultz wrote in the margin: "I gather this is being redone in light of our discussion. G." In a February 19 covering note to Reagan, Clark wrote: "Mr. President: I attach the memorandum of conversation between Sec. Shultz and Amb. Dobrynin." (Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers, Working File: Contains Originals (2))

² Dobrynin's memoir provides a more detailed account of this meeting than this short memorandum of conversation. He wrote: "This was not only my first private meeting with Reagan, but it was his first substantive conversation as president with any senior Soviet representative and—as far as I know—at any time in his long career as an aggressive opponent of communism and the Soviet Union. The very decision to hold our meeting was remarkable, as Reagan made it only in the third year of his presidency, which showed his personal desire finally to examine Soviet-American affairs more closely." (Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, pp. 517–521)

³ See [Document 11](#).

11. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 15, 1983, 7-8:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

UNITED STATES

George P. Shultz, Secretary of State

Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs

Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Director, EUR/SOV, Department of State

U.S.S.R.

Anatoliy F. DOBRYNIN, Soviet Ambassador

Oleg M. SOKOLOV, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy,
Washington

Viktor F. ISAKOV, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy, Washington

The Secretary said he would briefly summarize the meeting with the President and invited Ambassador Dobrynin to comment if he differed with what the Secretary said.

The President knew of the series of meetings between the Secretary and Dobrynin, and had decided it would be useful were he to meet directly with the Ambassador to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations. The President has very definite views, as Dobrynin had discovered; they were not always the views ascribed to him. He had spent longer than the Secretary thought he would; of course Dobrynin had spoken too. The net result was that Dobrynin, for Andropov, and the President for himself had agreed that both countries should make a genuine effort to solve problems so that the bilateral relationship could progress. We could not say how far this would go, but we want to improve it. The discussion with the President had covered a four-point agenda.

(1) *Arms control* has many aspects: START, INF, MBFR, and related CBMs. It is an area of great importance, and we should try to identify aspects where progress may be possible. We should be ambitious where we can, for instance on START and INF.

(2) There are a number of *regional issues*. Dobrynin had mentioned the Middle East, and the President had mentioned Poland, Afghanistan, and Central America. Southern Africa, while perhaps somewhat different in character, is also important. We are unlikely to be able to resolve our differences; but on some we might do something. We should try to make progress. We had tried on Afghanistan, but without results. Our talks on southern Africa had not been wholly unproductive, but not much had been accomplished. They were more in the nature of informational meetings.

(3) *Economic topics* perhaps fit best in the framework of bilateral relations, but they also could be looked at on the basis of individual issues.

(4) The President had put great emphasis on *human rights*. Dobrynin had seen how important these questions were to the President and how important they were to the relationship between the two countries. The President had made very clear that his approach was a quiet one; he wishes to talk, not to have newspaper stories or claims of "victory."

This represents a sweep of the issues discussed; we should try for progress in all areas, recognizing that we cannot do everything at once, but seeing if we can get something done on the agenda across the board. The closing note of both the President and the Ambassador had been that both parties are interested in a genuine effort to improve

conditions; Dobrynin, in fact, had expressed optimism that this could happen.

Dobrynin said that, with the addition of working more closely in this channel, the Secretary had given a fair summary.

The meeting was the President's idea, *the Secretary* added, and was not on his calendar. We have no intention of making a statement on it, but knowing how Washington works a question is conceivable. We plan to answer that the meeting took place; that Dobrynin had called on the President with the Secretary, in connection with his series of talks with the Secretary; that the President had suggested the meeting; and that we would have no further comment. *Dobrynin* said that it is not the Soviet practice to comment on such matters, but what the Secretary had said about the U.S. approach was acceptable.

The Secretary said that with the President, and then together in the car on the return to the Department, he and Dobrynin had talked about a meeting of the Secretary with Gromyko, and then of a meeting of Gromyko with the President at the time of the UNGA. *Dobrynin* noted that the latter would restore normal practice. Moreover, *the Secretary* continued, they had talked about the Secretary's meeting Andropov if the Secretary were to travel to Moscow. They had also discussed Ambassador Hartman's access to people in Moscow, a topic they had talked about before.

The Secretary then turned to matters at hand, saying time was too short for him to discuss with Ambassador Dobrynin his Far East trip at length. But, to summarize, he had found Afghanistan and Kampuchea much on people's minds; further, arms control is not just a U.S. and European issue,

but is much on minds in Asia as well. *Dobrynin* asked if this meant the Asians were prepared to take part in arms control, not now perhaps, but in some other forum at some time in the future. He realized the Secretary could not speak for them—for the Japanese and Chinese—but wondered whether they would be willing to negotiate in the future. The *Secretary* replied that he did not get to that point with them. However, he had been impressed in Korea, China and Japan with the interest in what the Soviets are doing. In side meetings his people had with subordinate officials, they were impressed with how much the hosts knew about arms control negotiations underway, and how well informed they were.

The Secretary suggested that they go through the work of their staffs on the bilateral lists (attached).²

He began with a brief review of the four pages of agreements still in force, saying that he was glad to note the 1973 taxation convention, since it had been his responsibility in the Nixon Administration.

Dobrynin turned to page 5, which lists agreements up for renewal in 1983/1984 (transportation, atomic energy, fisheries, grains, housing, world ocean, economic-industrial-technical cooperation). The Soviets favor continuing these agreements. We could look at them later, or, if the Secretary had comments on all or any of them, he was prepared to discuss them. In any event the Soviets are in favor of renewing them. The U.S. side had added grains to this list; the Soviets had reminded us of the others. On grains, he asked if the U.S. was proposing renewal. The Soviets did not want to force themselves on us; if the U.S. dropped it, they would let it go. The rest they thought worthwhile to renew. If the U.S. thought one or another

should be dropped, we should say so. The rest can be sent to the working level for further work.

The Secretary commented that we find the seven agreements generally constructive. Given Dobrynin's statement, we would begin to review them through our interagency process. We would develop positions—presumably positive—on each and as this work proceeds we will get back to the Soviets. *Dobrynin* asked if this meant the basic U.S. intention was positive. *The Secretary* replied that it did.

Dobrynin said that the third category listed (agreements in force, but where more active implementation would be useful) really had no substance now (agriculture, environment, health, artificial heart). The Soviets would like to invite us to give more life to these agreements. We should consider renewal of working groups, for example. If the Secretary agreed in principle, and after the U.S. had completed its internal process, then we could proceed to meetings between small delegations or work with the Soviet Embassy to put life back into the agreements. There were four of these agreements. If the U.S. was not negative, we could go ahead.

The Secretary said this was a worthwhile field on which to exchange ideas, but there is the question of how far and how fast to proceed, and the question of whether to engage higher level officials in these exchanges. *Dobrynin* said level is not really a question. It is not a matter for Gromyko and the Secretary. It is a question of letting people who know each other, who are old friends, get together to find out what can be achieved. Agriculture is an example; let our working people find out what can be done—draw on their experience—and then report to their superiors.

Dobrynin continued that the Soviets are proposing working groups from Moscow or from here, for an active exchange. This is not a new avenue; it is a matter of restoring substance to agreements now in disuse. No publicity is necessary. Delegations can be sent by the Secretary of Agriculture, for instance, or there can be experts on the environment that sit down together. This is only renewal of what went on before.

The Secretary said it is not a question of who goes where, but there is an issue of level of representation. We will consider the matter and get back to the Soviets at the working level. *Dobrynin* suggested that the embassies might be the appropriate channel.

Dobrynin turned to the fourth category (agreements expired or in suspense). *The Secretary* commented that we need to examine further what might be worked on in this category. *Dobrynin* noted that civil air, maritime, science and technology, and energy agreements had been proposed by the Soviets; the rest (space, trade, culture, Kama and consulates) by the U.S. The Soviets are prepared to look at all of them. He asked how the Secretary proposed to proceed. *The Secretary* commented that all were worth reviewing, but without commitment at this point.

Dobrynin said commercial flights under the civil air agreement had been stopped; with regard to the maritime agreement, it is a question of implementation; the U.S. had added the references to the trade, culture, Kama and consulate agreements. What did the Secretary have in mind?

Eagleburger commented that where we added items to the list of agreements from which we are working, it was solely for the purpose of making the list complete. *Dobrynin* said

the intention was to add items to make things more active; what did adding the Trade Agreement mean? *Eagleburger* said our only purpose was to assure that we had before us a complete list of all agreements—nothing more than that.

The Secretary commented that all these items have merit; we need to pick and choose among them, and assign priorities. Once this has been done, *Dobrynin* said, you can instruct the Soviet desk on next steps and we can then talk further.

Dobrynin then turned to the fifth category (regular consultations), which includes Foreign Ministers at the UNGA, pre-UNGA working level, delegations at IAEA meetings, incidents at sea, grains, Nazi war crimes. He suggested that meetings of Foreign Ministers between UNGA sessions should be added. *The Secretary* commented meetings only once a year is insufficient, and agreed to *Dobrynin's* suggestion.

On pre-UNGA consultations, *Dobrynin* noted that these take place between the MFA and State, and asked if we had anything else in mind. *Simons* noted that our intention was to record what exists; *Dobrynin* responded that we should also try to move forward.

We are discussing non-proliferation, *Dobrynin* pointed out. *The Secretary* said this was a useful step, and we are looking toward another meeting. *Simons* noted we seem close to agreement on another separate bilateral session in June.

Dobrynin said that the incidents at sea consultations are useful. On the grains consultations, the Soviets agree to them if the LTA is agreed, but they would drop it if not.

Dobrynin then turned to the sixth category (recent consultations) which lists Afghanistan, southern Africa, CSCE, and nuclear non-proliferation. He said the Soviet side agreed to continue all of them.

The Secretary noted we had had consultations on Afghanistan that went nowhere. The UN process is now going on. If it works, fine; we do not need to be involved in everything.

Dobrynin replied that there is no need for a meeting each month, but if we need a meeting we should agree to have one. The matter is now going through the UN. There is no big movement, but things are positive. Still, there is a possibility to continue bilaterally as well. He understood that this was Ambassador Hartman's field. When and how is up to the U.S. to decide.

The Secretary said that on so-called regional issues, we should work to see where emphasis might prove productive. Leaving Afghanistan aside, southern Africa is somewhat different. Afghanistan is snuggled close to the Soviet Union. Southern Africa is a long way from both of us: we both have an interest, we are both involved, and the world is interested. It could be an example of effective collaboration, and would be to everyone's benefit. This may also be true of other issues nearer or farther away. On southern Africa, though, he had to say he was disappointed that our talks have not produced more. They have been informational, but not operational.

Dobrynin said he would pass the Secretary's comments to Moscow.

The Secretary continued that on CSCE we understand each other. When he and the Vice President had been in Moscow,

Andropov had lectured them that this was none of our g.d. business. The President had just told Dobrynin our views. The Soviets might not agree with them, but they are our views.

Dobrynin said our CSCE delegations are in touch, and that is not the problem; *the Secretary* agreed. These contacts could be improved, however, *Dobrynin* said. The big question is that in previous administrations, as Eagleburger well knew, the Secretary and Gromyko might decide that an additional push could be useful at some point, and would then act to break deadlocks.

The Secretary noted that on issues where we had recently consulted, the last three (southern Africa, CSCE and non-proliferation) had resulted from his New York meetings with Gromyko,³ whereas the first (Afghanistan) had been agreed to before his time.

Dobrynin said he had mentioned the Middle East to the President, and previously discussed it with the Secretary. He asked why we should not add it to the list. He was not speaking here on behalf of Gromyko, but there had been a meeting between Hartman and Korniyenko, and even though it was inconclusive, why not add it to the list?

The Secretary said he and Gromyko had discussed the issue in New York, and agreed to be back in touch if there were anything further worth reporting. *Dobrynin* suggested again that it be added. *The Secretary* agreed.

Dobrynin then turned to the seventh category of consultations under discussion (deep seabed mining aspects of LOS, nuclear non-proliferation, Pacific maritime boundary, bilateral consular matters).

Deep seabed mining talks had taken place, Dobrynin said, and were good, though outside the Law of the Sea Treaty context. Non-proliferation talks were okay too. We need to find a solution on the Pacific maritime boundary. *The Secretary* said this would be a tough one, but needs to be resolved. *Dobrynin* agreed.

Dobrynin said that on consular talks we have gone back and forth on the issue of an agenda, thus far without results. *The Secretary* said he had a possible solution, and proposed that we schedule a preliminary informal session in Moscow and a formal opening in Washington one month later. We need to confront the officials involved with two scheduled meetings, thus forcing them to use the first to get ready for the second. *Dobrynin* said this sounded good if the first meeting was for discussion of substance and not just the agenda, and was to be continued in Washington. *The Secretary* noted that it is hard to begin discussions without an agenda. *Dobrynin* said he would support the Secretary's proposal with Moscow. *Eagleburger* said that when we had a response, we could schedule the meetings.

Dobrynin then turned to the Soviet-proposed category on arms control talks (conventional arms transfers, CTB, CW, Indian Ocean, ASAT, RW, non-proliferation). All except No. 7 (non-proliferation) had been stopped, and the Soviets would like to resume. He asked if the Secretary had any comment on the first six.

The Secretary said he had two comments:

—On TTBT, which is not included, the U.S. owes the Soviet side a proposal, and is about to make one. Rick Burt has been designated to be in touch.

—On the others, returning to what had been discussed with the President, we had identified arms control, regional issues and human rights (as a kind of special category) as areas for discussion. We ought to list these categories separately, and see where things can progress. We should look at what is most promising, but also most worthwhile. We should not confine ourselves just to the easiest issues, but include also the most important questions, even where we know they will be difficult. We need to develop a sense of priorities, of places where we need a political impulse to make something happen. We need to get back to each other on things we have identified, to construct an agenda. Dobrynin had told the President, and Gromyko told the Secretary that arms control is at the top of the Soviet priority list. There is no question that it is an important category, but there are other important categories as well.

Dobrynin said there is no question of the importance of the three negotiations (INF, START, MBFR) now underway, but he invited comment as to whether the U.S. was ready to talk on any of the others. The Soviet side was prepared to talk on all seven listed in this category. His government was prepared to talk, but he did not know if the U.S. government was. If not it was all right, but the Soviets want answers. Perhaps not today, but the matter is important. Non-proliferation was being discussed, but some of the other issues were also ready to be discussed. He was not pressing, but wished to report to his government which issues we should continue on. He and the President had agreed that the three negotiations must be included, but success on the others is also important.

The Secretary replied “maybe.” We would get to the Soviets on TTBT. On the seven others, we would get back to them.

He noted that the Soviets never mention MBFR. Dobrynin said the Soviets agreed it is important.

The Secretary said that on INF we feel the Soviets believe we will not deploy the missiles. But we will, in the absence of a negotiated agreement. *Dobrynin* replied that the Soviets also think we will. *The Secretary* said that our position is that we are prepared to make a reasonable agreement, but equality does not mean the Soviet Union being equal to everyone combined. We think the U.S. and the USSR are the relevant standard, with SS-20's, Pershing II's, and GLCMs the main items. We do not think the proposal Dobrynin described to the President is responsive or acceptable.

The Secretary said he did not want to repeat the argument, but wondered whether it was worthwhile to push on INF given the Soviet analysis. Nitze is ready to listen to any suggestions, or to discuss principles. *Dobrynin* said principles had been discussed more than enough. *The Secretary* said perhaps they should be discussed some more. But we also need to look at whether START is more significant, or whether it is time to turn to MBFR. Certainly there is a relationship between nuclear weapons under discussion in INF and the conventional weapons we are talking about in MBFR, and perhaps this relationship cannot really be handled by the individual negotiators. Perhaps in trying to respond to the President, Dobrynin, with his experience, and without our going around the negotiators, could suggest ways to move forward. The Secretary concluded that he was looking for a way of sorting out issues on a broad agenda to see how to get someplace, to see what political impulse is needed.

Dobrynin said not just the Soviets, but also the U.S., needed to suggest, through our channels. If the Secretary had

some ideas, he should not hesitate to put them forward. On INF the Soviets have made three proposals, and the U.S. has stuck to the zero option. He did not know what to think when the U.S. said it was open to serious suggestions. The Soviets thought the U.S. would deploy the missiles, because it is sticking to a zero option that is totally unacceptable to the Soviets. If the U.S. stood on it, it will put the missiles in, he said, and the Soviets and the U.S. and your generals and at least some U.S. Allies know it. But if the U.S. wants some way out of the impasse, compromise will be required.

The Secretary noted that our position was not take-it-or-leave-it, as the Vice President had made clear. *Dobrynin* said we should use back channels. *The Secretary* replied that the Soviets and the U.S. should evaluate what would be the most fruitful arena for a political impulse, whether in INF or somewhere else.

Dobrynin said that in the three negotiations, including INF where we are working under an artificial deadline imposed by the U.S., we should try for a breakthrough, but this did not mean the others are hopeless. *The Secretary* reminded him that we are negotiating in good faith, as we are sure the Soviets are.

But, *Dobrynin* replied, the U.S. Ambassador had made clear that the U.S. did not like the three Soviet proposals, and the Secretary had said they were not acceptable. The Vice President and the Secretary could say the U.S. position was not take-it-or-leave-it, but the Soviets had made proposals to reopen the talks, in an attempt to find a way out. They proposed going from what they have to 162, almost half.

The Secretary said it was not clear to him whether systems reduced were to be destroyed or removed. *Dobrynin* said this could be discussed if the cards were on the table. *The*

Secretary specified he had not meant to say the offer was acceptable, but our friends in China and Japan had made clear they are worried that an agreement would only move the missiles which would then be pointed at them.

Dobrynin said the Asians could discuss this with the Soviets.

The Secretary suggested that further staff contacts take place on the lists. *Dobrynin* responded that this would not solve the basic issues. The Secretary continued that they had had a broad, penetrating discussion between 5:00 and 8:15 p.m., which covered a lot of ground. We agreed on some things; on others we compared notes; on others we need further work. We should let our staffs work with some urgency, and hope to meet again, perhaps next week, if not early in March after the Queen's visit.⁴ He would give *Dobrynin* feedback, and would expect feedback from *Dobrynin* on what the President had said.



Dobrynin said the President had raised one question (i.e., Pentecostals) which he would try to clarify to Andropov. The President had raised it as a good will step; he took this to mean the President did not mean the whole field of emigration, though he had mentioned that too. *The Secretary* said he would try to interpret the President's remarks. We have many human rights concerns, including Jewish emigration; the President's specific reference is an example of those concerns. The President had also mentioned Jackson-Vanik, making clear he did not like that approach.

Dobrynin concluded that it was, however, for each separate side to determine according to its own law how to deal with its citizens.

Dobrynin said our colleagues should work hard, looking toward a meeting next week. *The Secretary* said he would try to get back in touch next week; he was to leave again March 2.⁵

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union–Sensitive File–1983 (02/15/1983–07/14/1983). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons on February 17; cleared by Eagleburger. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office after Shultz and Dobrynin returned from meeting with Reagan in the White House. See [Document 10](#).

² Attached but not printed.

³ See [Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Documents 221](#)  and [222](#) .

⁴ Queen Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom visited the west coast of the United States from February 26 to March 7.

⁵ Shultz traveled to California from March 2 to 7 in conjunction with the Queen’s visit.

12. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, February 28, 1983

SUBJECT

Soviet Message on Embassy Pentecostals

Dobrynin is ill, and called to ask that I receive his Minister-Counselor, Sokolov, briefly this afternoon. Sokolov brought with him the text of a message from Moscow on the Pentecostals in our Embassy there. The text is attached.²

The message begins with the standard Soviet line that we are responsible for both the problem—keeping Soviet citizens in the Embassy—and the solution—making them leave. It also reiterates previous statements that the Soviets will not “persecute” them if they leave. Then, in what Sokolov described as “the constructive part” of the message, it says that if they return to their home town in Siberia, “the question of their leaving the USSR will be considered,” with “account taken of all the circumstances involved.”

Formally, this does not go beyond what the Soviets have said before. Nevertheless, the Soviets are obviously trying to be responsive to your deep interest in the Pentecostals’ plight. Thus, although the written message keeps their formal line intact, they may in fact be offering a kind of assurance that emigration will be permitted if the families return home first.

There are two problems with this. First, the families have had several lifetimes of broken promises, and it may take a great deal more than this sort of vague and masked

assurance (if that is what it is) to convince them to leave their refuge in the Embassy and apply for emigration from home. Second, given the vagueness of the message, we should be skeptical too.

I will be reviewing the issue of how we should respond, and will want to get the views of Ambassador Art Hartman, who will be here for consultations next week. I will then be giving you my recommendations.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/21/83-03/02/83). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. In an undated, unsigned covering memorandum to Reagan, Clark summarized Shultz's message and commented: "I am skeptical that the Soviets have any intention of permitting the Pentecostals to leave."

² The text of the Soviet message is attached but not printed.

13. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

San Francisco, March 3, 1983

SUBJECT

USG-Soviet Relations—Where Do We Want To Be and How Do We Get There?

I have now had the discussions with Dobrynin which you authorized me to undertake.² Dobrynin has come into these talks with a series of proposals for introducing new movement into the bilateral relationship. They are along familiar Soviet lines, with the focus on arms control and reviving bilateral agreements or processes that died largely as a result of Soviet misbehavior. In the background has been a series of statements by you and by Andropov on US-Soviet relations, with both of you saying you are willing to move forward, but that it is up to the other to take the first step. Meanwhile the Soviet “peace offensive” to derail INF deployments in Europe has continued.

From my talks with Dobrynin there have emerged a few tentative signs of Soviet willingness to move forward on specific issues—the Pentecostals and technical-level exchanges on consular matters. But the Soviets have not yet been seriously tested, and my feeling is that the time has come to use my channel through Dobrynin for that purpose. Before I proceed, however, we should take a look at our broader, longer-term strategy for dealing with them. The purpose of this memorandum is to discuss both that strategy and the immediate steps we might take to implement it.

Minimum and Maximum U.S. Objectives

Our minimum objective for US-Soviet relations over the next few years is to make clear that we are determined to resist Soviet efforts to use their growing military power in ways which threaten our security. The Soviets must recognize that, while we are serious in our arms control proposals, we also have the will and capacity to correct the imbalances which their military buildup has created. There must be no doubt in Moscow or elsewhere that we will not permit a resumption of the Soviet geopolitical expansionism in the Third World which we saw in the 1970s. Finally, the Soviets must understand that we are not prepared to insulate the bilateral relationship from these issues or our concerns about Soviet human rights behavior. In sum, it must be clear that we see the US-Soviet relationship as fundamentally adversarial and that we are fully prepared to compete effectively and vigorously.

There may also be a chance to go beyond this minimum objective and make some progress toward a more stable and constructive US-Soviet relationship over the next two years or so. This can occur only if the Soviet leadership concludes that it has no choice but to deal with this Administration on the basis of the comprehensive agenda we have established over the last two years. Some of the factors that will shape this critical decision of the Soviet leadership are beyond our effective control. These include the outcome of the succession process, the overall performance of the Soviet economy, and the ability of the new leadership to deal with the long-term malaise of Soviet society.

There are, however, a number of areas in which our actions, and particularly the degree of progress we make in achieving priority objectives beyond the US-Soviet bilateral

relationship, will be critical to the decisions of the Soviet leadership. Thus, sustaining the momentum of the efforts we have begun in the following areas represents an essential pre-condition for inducing the Soviets to deal seriously with the agenda we have established:

(1) Rebuilding American economic and military strength: With economic recovery now under way, we must redouble our efforts to rebuild American military strength. In particular, we need to solve the MX basing problem and obtain congressional approval for our strategic forces modernization program.

(2) Maintaining the vitality of our alliances: In this category, our two priority objectives should be a successful outcome in INF and the development of a new framework for East-West economic relations.

(3) Stabilizing our relations with China: Building on the basis established during my trip to Beijing,³ a summit later this year would solidify our own relations with Beijing, despite continuing differences on Taiwan, and inhibit improvement in the Sino-Soviet relationship.

(4) Continuing regional peacekeeping efforts: We have no illusions about the prospects for rapid success in the Middle East or a regional settlement in southern Africa. However, U.S. diplomatic activism in key third world areas reduces Soviet maneuver room and can help control destabilizing activities by the Soviets and their allies. To the extent that we are able to make real progress in resolution of regional problems, the Soviets are progressively frozen out of areas of key importance to us.

(5) Continuing vigorous competition in ideas: We want to have obtained congressional funding for the democracy initiative and a supplemental for the radios, establish our new party political foundations(s) and generally put our offensive in support of Western values into high gear.

If we are able to achieve real progress in these areas, we will have demonstrated to the Soviet leadership that it cannot expect a radical departure in U.S. policy of the kind that has occurred too often in the past decade. Thus, 1983 will represent a critical test of whether a U.S. Administration can not only put in place the kind of US-Soviet policy we have established—but see it through.

While the Soviet response to a successful demonstration of our resolve is not entirely predictable, I believe that the Soviet leadership might conclude that it had no alternative but to come to terms with us. In that event, opportunities for a lasting and significant improvement in US-Soviet relations would be better than they have been for decades. If the Soviets remained intransigent, we would have nonetheless taken the essential steps needed to ensure our security.

The US-Soviet Agenda—What Can We Realistically Aim to Achieve?

If the above analysis is correct we can realistically expect to confront the following opportunities and risks in specific areas of the US-Soviet agenda:

A. Arms Control

Here we have taken the approach that it is meaningful agreements that count, and you have established high

standards: real reductions; equality in the important measures of military capability; verifiability; and enhanced stability of the East-West military balance. These criteria form the basis of our proposals in INF and START, and must continue to do so as we consider our negotiating positions over the coming year or so. We should be patient; we should be deliberate; and we should be alert to openings from the Soviet side. Given the strength of the Soviet "peace offensive," our positions should also enable us to assume the strongest possible public posture. It must always be evident that it is the Soviet Union, not the United States, that is impeding progress toward agreements.

In INF, we should: (1) adhere to the arms control criteria we have established; (2) demonstrate to the Soviets and western publics that we are seriously searching for an agreement; and (3) undertake the necessary preparations for initial INF deployments at the end of the year.

In START, we should hold firm to the new conceptual framework that underlies our proposal, with its emphasis on substantial reductions and warheads as the principal unit of account. We should continue to negotiate seriously, taking as our point of departure the fact that the Soviets appear to have accepted the principle of reductions.

Prospects for agreements in START and INF before the end of 1984 are highly problematical; nevertheless, we should continue to press the Soviets for early progress on the basis of our proposals. We should also urge new Soviet movement in other arms control areas—in MBFR, in CSCE, in CBMs and in our proposals for verification improvements to the TTBT and the PNET. In MBFR we are now studying ways to break the deadlock over data. In CSCE, the Soviets could conceivably be willing to meet our requirement for

concrete movement in human rights as part of an overall agreement that would include a CDE.

We should keep the pressure on Moscow for serious responses to our proposals in these areas, to keep the onus for lack of progress on the Soviet Union. We will be negotiating in good faith. But if it is not possible to achieve agreements, it will be important to have maintained the high standards of your approach to arms control and to have won the battle for public opinion by making clear that it is the USSR, not the U.S., that was to blame.

B. Regional Issues

Our minimum objective over the next few years is to ensure that there is no new successful aggression by the Soviet Union or its allies in the Third World. This will require that we follow through on the security commitments we have made to Third World friends and allies and that we remain ready to use American military strength to keep the peace. It may also require that we reinforce warnings to the Soviet Union concerning the consequences of unacceptable behavior in the Third World, such as delivery of MIGs to Nicaragua.

The fact that we have engaged Moscow on key regional issues—particularly Afghanistan and Southern Africa—positions us to sustain diplomatic pressure and exploit whatever opportunities may emerge in the context of the Soviet political process in the intermediate term. In this connection, we should consider ways of using our bilateral dialogue to move the Soviet Union towards constructive involvement in negotiations that might lead to acceptable settlements of these issues. A litmus test of Soviet seriousness in response to our concerns would be whether

they are moving seriously toward real pullback from one of the inroads gained in the 1970s.

C. Human Rights and Western Values

We should continue to seek improvement in Soviet behavior: release of prisoners of conscience including Anatoliy Shcharanskiy; resolution of divided-family cases and the Pentecostalist situation; and a significant increase in Jewish emigration. Our objective should be to have achieved significant progress on one or more of these fronts by the end of 1984. Where it would enhance the chances of success, our focus should be on private diplomacy leading to results, not counterproductive public embarrassment of Moscow. We also want to increase our ideological impact inside the Soviet Union through expanded exchange programs and access of Americans to Soviet society.

In this area we must recognize that there is a natural tension between open discussion of and attacks on Soviet misdeeds and quiet discussion that will produce results on specifics. The Soviets never tire of suggesting that things are better accomplished in the shadows when it comes to human rights. On the other hand, they also know that we neither can nor want simply to turn off our public expressions of indignation and support for freedom. As we proceed, there will thus be a constant interplay between the public approach for which our values call and quiet diplomacy focussed on results. This interplay means that human rights issues must be handled in a somewhat special way.

In connection with human rights, the dilemmas of our Poland policy are likely to become more acute. On the one hand, we cannot relax our insistence that real improvement

in our relations with Poland can take place only if there is improvement in the human rights situation in that country. On the other hand, it is becoming increasingly evident that prospects for a revival of the Solidarity period are dim for the foreseeable future. There is no certain prescription for resolving this dilemma, given the limitations of our influence over events in Poland. Nevertheless, our Poland policy must continue to be based on determination to support the Polish people in their desire to exercise fundamental human rights—with the kind of rewards for specific human rights progress which you set forth in your December speech.⁴

D. Economic Relations

Our primary objective over the next year should be to develop and begin to implement a new framework for East-West economic relations; this would ensure that Western economic strength does not contribute to Soviet military power or subsidize the Soviet economy. It would also manage domestic pressures for increased trade so that the timing of any steps we take in the area of bilateral economic relations is geared to our overall strategy for US-Soviet relations.

US-Soviet Bilateral Dialogue

Bilateral dialogue with the Soviets has an important place in this overall strategy. Our exchanges with the Soviets are a constant testing process, in which we probe for possible new Soviet flexibility on the issues, while insisting that real progress must involve concrete Soviet actions to address our concerns. These exchanges put us in control of that process—in a position to bring it to a halt at every step if the Soviets are unwilling to proceed with real give-and-

take. In particular, they allow us to ensure that our dialogue with Moscow does not generate momentum toward a summit that would be difficult to rein in, should we find it in our interest do so. Further, these exchanges permit us to make sure that anything we are prepared to do is reciprocated. Finally, they give us a greater capacity to control international events, by reaffirming to the Soviets and others that we intend to play a role commensurate with our renewed strength and self-confidence. An active US-Soviet dialogue will be critical to our efforts to maintain allied and domestic support for our policy in the face of a redoubled Soviet "peace offensive." And if the Soviet leadership does conclude that it must seriously address our concerns, there should be an active bilateral dialogue underway to enable us to exploit fully this opportunity to advance U.S. interests.

We now need to decide whether to intensify this dialogue, and if so how. If we proceed in this direction, we will inevitably arouse concerns that we are returning to business-as-usual, and generate charges that our Soviet policy is more bark than bite. I believe that these problems are manageable, because we will not relax our insistence on balance and Soviet performance as we proceed. Continuing to work from the US rather than the Soviet agenda, and to require deeds rather than just words, is the way to manage the problem, but we should recognize it will remain with us.

If that makes sense to you, I have some ideas about next steps. My thought would be to see Dobrynin again and present him with a four-part work program of specifics covering each of the areas on the US agenda: arms control, regional issues, human rights and bilateral topics. This would serve to drive home to him that old bilateral agreements and arms control are not and cannot be the

only central issues in US-Soviet relations if we are to achieve serious progress. Furthermore, the specifics would challenge the Soviets to concrete responses, as part of the testing process we envisage:

—Arms Control: I could offer to discuss START/INF issues with Gromyko at a meeting soon after the current round of Geneva negotiations ends, making clear that I would of course address our overall agenda and not just arms control; I would say we want to work more intensively on MBFR, without further elaboration; I would point to TTBT verification improvements and nuclear CBM's where we have introduced specific proposals; and I would be downbeat on prospects for reviving the defunct arms control negotiations for which the Soviets are pushing.

—Regional Issues: I could note we are still looking at Southern Africa for positive Soviet action; reiterate our basic positions on Afghanistan (total Soviet withdrawal, Afghan independence and self-determination, return of refugees); and offer to send Ambassador Art Hartman to see Gromyko's Deputy again for another routine exchange of information and views of the Middle East. Such discussions provide a useful and low-cost means of keeping the Soviets at bay on this issue in our bilateral relationship.

—Human Rights: After reiterating your strong interest in human rights and your preference for "quiet diplomacy," I would welcome the message on the Embassy Pentecostals, but indicate that we still face the practical problem of how to convince the families to take up the offer; refer to indications that

movement on Shcharanskiy now seems possible; and suggest serious and confidential talks about what might be possible on human rights in connection with CSCE at Madrid, where the Soviets could conceivably be willing to meet our requirement for concrete movement in human rights as part of an overall agreement that would include a CDE.

—Bilateral Issues: Here several alternatives are possible. I could say we propose beginning with a single step both sides can agree is useful and which you approved in NSDD-75⁵—negotiation of a new cultural exchanges agreement—and have the rest of the bilateral issues we talked about earlier under review. I could also suggest that we would be prepared to renew discussions on opening a US Consulate in Kiev and a Soviet Consulate in New York. This could give us an invaluable listening post and do little for the Soviets (because of their UN Mission). The disadvantage of both the cultural agreement and the Kiev/New York consulates is that we would be undoing Afghanistan sanctions. The advantage is that in both cases we would be improving our access to Soviet society. I will, of course, adjust what I say to Dobrynin on these bilateral issues to your view of how significant a signal we wish to send Moscow.

Conclusion

The next few years will be a period of new challenges and opportunities in our relations with the Soviets. We have in place a sound policy, which gives us the foundation for further progress toward a more stable, if competitive, US-Soviet relationship. Bilateral exchanges are an important

part of it, but only a part. The approach outlined above would protect our security interests while establishing realistic benchmarks by which to measure progress. But it can succeed only if we do not waver on the essentials of the policy approach you have established these past two years. The Soviets may ultimately prove unwilling to see an improvement in the relationship on those terms. If so, we will nonetheless have done our part in good faith, and the responsibility for a continuation of the present tensions will rest squarely with them.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (03/03/83–03/07/83). Secret; Sensitive. A draft of this memorandum, dated March 2, was prepared by Napper on March 1; cleared by Simons and Palmer. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive File, March 1–15, 1983) On March 4, telegram Secto 2003 from Shultz in California reported that the memorandum was “hand-carried to the White House office in San Francisco.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830002–0359)

² Reference is presumably to meetings with Dobrynin on February 12 and February 15. See [Documents 9, 10, and 11](#).

³ See [footnote 3, Document 1](#).

⁴ On December 10, 1982, Reagan signed two proclamations for Poland on human rights and for a Day of Prayer. In his remarks, he offered: “If the Polish government introduces meaningful liberalizing measures, we will take equally significant and concrete actions of our own. However, it will require the end of martial law, the release of political prisoners, and the beginning of dialog with truly

representative forces of the Polish nation, such as the church and the freely formed trade unions, to make it possible for us to lift all the sanctions.” For the full text of his remarks, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1982*, Book II, pp. 1589-1591.

⁵ See [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 260](#).⁵

14. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 8, 1983, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

SecDef Meeting with Ambassador Hartman (U)

PARTICIPANTS

DoD

Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European & NATO Policy, Ronald
Lauder
Major General Smith
Mr. Douglas Garthoff

VISITOR

Arthur A. Hartman, US Ambassador to the USSR
Alexander Vershbow, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of
State

FRG Elections.

(C) SecDef Weinberger expressed satisfaction with the results of the recent elections in West Germany.² Ambassador Hartman agreed but pointed out that problems would persist with respect to implementation of NATO's LRINF modernization program.

Andropov.

(C) SecDef asked the Ambassador for his views on how the new General Secretary was doing. Was he not in a kind of probationary period? The Ambassador noted that Andropov's image-makers had done quite well in projecting the General Secretary as an urbane and sophisticated man. He pointed out that Andropov has not been shown on

Soviet TV recently, however, apparently as a result of health problems. Ambassador Hartman said that he had not met Andropov personally since the Brezhnev funeral. He felt that Andropov was the most intellectual Soviet leader since Lenin. In response to Ambassador Hartman's statement that he thought Andropov would want to concentrate on internal problems first, SecDef asked how he thought such efforts would impact on the Soviet military and the Soviet defense program. Ambassador Hartman replied that it was clear to him Andropov depended on the military to maintain his political position. If, for example, he undertook broad economic reforms that impacted adversely on military programs, the military would certainly object, and probably would do so effectively. The Ambassador said it is not clear yet how strong Andropov will become. While he may act strongly with respect to issues like discipline and corruption, we will be able to assess the depth of his strength only when he undertakes more important decisions.

Summitry.

(C) SecDef inquired whether there had been any recent talk of summitry in Moscow. The Ambassador replied that he thought the Soviet position was similar to ours. They do not want a summit unless it has been well prepared. Several members of the Central Committee have recently said that it is necessary to get issues treated at the top level if any progress is to be made. The Ambassador also said he had heard some grumbling about Foreign Minister Gromyko's attitudes on this subject. In response to SecDef's question about the status of Ambassador Dobrynin, the Ambassador stated that he had no firm information but felt the rumors Dobrynin might return to Moscow originated with Dobrynin himself.

US-Soviet Relations.

(C) In response to SecDef's question about how the bilateral relationship looked from Moscow, the Ambassador replied that it was not good on the propaganda level. But on the personal level, he felt the Soviets still wanted a dialogue. He mentioned the periodic meetings on incidents at sea as an example of a form of dialogue that they wish to see continued. He did not feel, however, that there would be any gesture of accommodation from the Soviet side with the possible exception of a symbolic act in the human rights arena, regarding Sharansky for example.

(C) The Ambassador recommended that now was a good time to test the new Soviet leadership to see where progress might be made in bilateral relations. This could be done, he argued, while of course continuing to strengthen our defense to adequate levels. SecDef asked if the Ambassador felt that emphasis on confidence-building measures—an area of interest to both the President and SecDef personally—would be a good place to undertake actions. The Ambassador replied that this was a good idea, but cautioned that the Soviets are suspicious that we would view such measures as a substitute for START and INF agreements.

START-INF.

(C) Ambassador Hartman stated that he felt the Soviets wanted a START agreement but would not be willing to reduce as drastically as we have proposed. He felt that the Soviets regard the US START position as one-sided in favor of the US. He believed the greatest US leverage derived from our cruise missile programs, and he also felt that we should be concerned about potential Soviet cruise missiles

as well. In response to SecDef's question about how he viewed the possibility for an INF agreement, the Ambassador replied that the Soviets had little incentive to sign any agreement that allowed new US LRINF deployments in Europe unless it was part of a larger pattern of progress on strategic arms limitations. He said he did not feel they would ever accept the true zero option, even if we were the first to make an accommodating move in the negotiations.

(S) The Ambassador said he was gratified by the staunchness of support from the Allies in the Catholic southern part of Western Europe (France and Italy), but felt that the problems we had in the northern European countries already reflected accommodations made to the LRINF imbalance the Soviets have created with new SS-20 deployments. Ambassador Hartman asked how many SS-20s were currently operational. SecDef replied that there were now 351 SS-20s in service. Ambassador Hartman offered the opinion that Andropov's December 1982 LRINF proposal was a mistake when measured against Soviet interests.³ He felt that by equating the Soviet SS-20s to the strategic deterrent forces of the UK and France, the Soviets are opening the door for the West to focus attention on how best to deter attack on the non-nuclear Allies in Western Europe.

Middle East.

(C) SecDef asked whether the Ambassador felt that the deployment of SA-5s to Syria was an effort by the Soviets to force their way back into the negotiating arena. The Ambassador replied that the war last year had put them on the spot, and they now felt they had to run new risks in order to regain their position in the region. Their only way

to do so was to intensify relationships with their few remaining friends there.

Afghanistan.

(C) SecDef expressed the opinion that the Soviets probably would like to get out of the current Afghanistan stalemate, but he did not see how they could do so. The Ambassador agreed that they seemed basically to be stuck. They probably could not obtain sizable Afghan support for a political solution acceptable to Moscow.

Support of the Moscow Embassy.


(U) Replying to SecDef's offer to help the Ambassador in any way DoD could do so, the Ambassador asked if he could have some copies of the new booklet, "Soviet Military Power, 1983", before he departed for Moscow on 12 March. The Secretary replied affirmatively. (Note: a dozen copies were delivered to the Soviet desk at State for the Ambassador on 10 March.)

Douglas F. Garthoff⁴ Policy Assistant for Soviet Affairs

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-85-0023, USSR 091.112 (Jan-) 1983. Secret. Drafted by Garthoff on March 11. The meeting took place in Room 3E880 at the Pentagon.

² West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's "conservative coalition won a decisive mandate" in the March 6 election. An important issue in the election campaign was whether to accept deployment of U.S. missiles in West Germany in December. Kohl's Christian Democrats won 244 seats and

their coalition partner, the Free Democratic Party, took 34 seats, “guaranteeing the coalition a solid majority.” (James M. Markham, “A Bigger Majority: Socialists Suffer Worst Defeat Since 1961—Missiles Were Issue,” *New York Times*, March 7, 1983, p. A1)

³ See [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 254](#) .

⁴ Garthoff signed “DF Garthoff” above his typed signature.

15. Editorial Note

On March 8, 1983, President Ronald Reagan delivered an address to the National Association of Evangelicals at their national convention in Orlando, Florida, in which he referred to the Soviet Union as an “evil empire.” While most of the speech dealt with domestic and spiritual issues, the section on the Soviet Union and the nuclear freeze movement has received the most historical attention. In his diary on March 8, Reagan wrote: “My speech was well received—3 standing ovations during the speech. I talked of parents rights (squeal rule) abortion, school prayer and our need for a strong defense.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 203)

White House Speechwriter Anthony Dolan drafted the speech. On March 4, Sven Kraemer of the NSC Staff received a draft of the speech for his review. In a memorandum to Richard Boverie, Kraemer noted: “The great bulk of the speech deals with domestic issues involving church, state and spiritual values. I have made no comments on those aspects.

“Beginning on page 12, there is a strongly worded characterization of the Soviet ideology and of Soviet practices. All the statements made are true and need to be said, but I believe senior NSC levels will need to review their tone.

“I have proposed a number of revisions for pages 13 through 15 in order to make clear the high ground of the Administration’s arms reductions proposals and to soften the direct attack on the entire freeze movement.

“At the end of the afternoon I passed my revisions on informally to Tony Dolan with a note indicating the revisions have no official NSC status at this time.” (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, March 1983, Chron File: [No. 12-13]) Kraemer’s focus was on arms control and national security, not on ideology or the “evil empire” remark. In fact, he made other edits to the sentence containing the “evil empire” phrase, but did not note anything about this language. Most of Kraemer’s revisions were incorporated into the speech.

In the defense section toward the end of the speech, Reagan stated: “And this brings me to my final point today. During my first press conference as President, in answer to a direct question, I pointed out that, as good Marxist-Leninists, the Soviet leaders have openly and publicly declared that the only morality they recognize is that which will further their cause, which is world revolution. I think I should point out I was only quoting Lenin, their guiding spirit, who said in 1920 that they repudiate all morality that proceeds from supernatural ideas—that’s their name for religion—or ideas that are outside class conceptions. Morality is entirely subordinate to the interests of class war. And everything is moral that is necessary for the annihilation of the old, exploiting social order and for uniting the proletariat.

“Well, I think the refusal of many influential people to accept this elementary fact of Soviet doctrine illustrates an historical reluctance to see totalitarian powers for what they are. We saw this phenomenon in the 1930’s. We see it too often today.

“This doesn’t mean we should isolate ourselves and refuse to seek an understanding with them. I intend to do everything I can to persuade them of our peaceful intent, to

remind them that it was the West that refused to use its nuclear monopoly in the forties and fifties for territorial gain and which now proposes 50-percent cut in strategic ballistic missiles and the elimination of an entire class of land-based, intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

“At the same time, however, they must be made to understand we will never compromise our principles and standards. We will never give away our freedom. We will never abandon our belief in God. And we will never stop searching for a genuine peace. But we can assure none of these things America stands for through the so called nuclear freeze solutions proposed by some.

“The truth is that a freeze now would be a very dangerous fraud, for that is merely the illusion of peace. The reality is that we must find peace through strength.

“I would agree to a freeze if only we could freeze the Soviets’ global desires. A freeze at current levels of weapons would remove any incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously in Geneva and virtually end our chances to achieve the major arms reductions which we have proposed. Instead, they would achieve their objectives through the freeze.

“A freeze would reward the Soviet Union for its enormous and unparalleled military buildup. It would prevent the essential and long overdue modernization of United States and allied defenses and would leave our aging forces increasingly vulnerable. And an honest freeze would require extensive prior negotiations on the systems and numbers to be limited and on the measures to ensure effective verification and compliance. And the kind of a freeze that has been suggested would be virtually impossible to verify. Such a major effort would divert us

completely from our current negotiations on achieving substantial reductions.”

After recounting the story of a speech he had heard years ago about communism, Reagan continued: “So, I urge you to speak out against those who would place the United States in a position of military and moral inferiority. You know, I’ve always believed that old Screwtape reserved his best efforts for those of you in the church. So, in your discussions of the nuclear freeze proposals, I urge you to beware the temptation of pride—the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil.

“I ask you to resist the attempts of those who would have you withhold your support for our efforts, this administration’s efforts, to keep America strong and free, while we negotiate real and verifiable reductions in the world’s nuclear arsenals and one day, with God’s help, their total elimination.” (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book I, pages 362–364)

In his memoir, Shultz commented on the reaction to this speech: “The ‘evil empire’ phrase would take on a life of its own. Calling the Soviet Union an ‘evil empire’ transformed this into a major speech, even though it had not been planned or developed through any careful or systematic process. No doubt Soviet leaders were offended, and many of our friends were alarmed. How conscious of the implications of their words the president and his speechwriters were, I do not know. Whether or not he was wise to use this phrase to describe the Soviet Union, it was

in fact an empire and evil abounded.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 267)

Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin wrote in his memoir: “What seemed most difficult for us to fathom were Reagan’s vehement public attacks on the Soviet Union while he was secretly sending—orally or through his private letters—quite different signals seeking more normal relations. On March 8, less than a month after our first White House conversation [see [Documents 10](#) and [11](#)] when he seemed to be trying to open a working relationship with the Soviet leadership, he publicly described the Soviet Union, in a phrase both memorable and notorious, as the evil empire.” He continued: “The speech was not designed to be a history-making event in foreign policy, and according to Shultz no one outside the White House, including him, had a chance to review the text in advance, but the phrase quickly spread throughout the world.” (Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, pages 526–527)

Sergei Tarasenko, who was an adviser in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, noted: “At the Foreign Ministry, we were quite indifferent to this remark because we understood that it was normal. If you look at the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, it was normal for our leaders to exchange rather unflattering remarks about each other. We called you names; you called us names. It was part of the game. If you look at our propaganda, we used awful names—imperialist, capitalist, and the rest of all this evil—so for us, it was nothing. I barely noticed it.” (Strober and Strober, *Reagan: The Man and His Presidency*, page 228)

Jack Matlock, who in March 1983 was Chargé d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Prague, but in July 1983 returned to Washington as Special Assistant to the President and

Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs in the NSC Staff said of the speech: “It amazed me that people got so upset. You could say, ‘This isn’t tactful or diplomatic, but it’s true. They did lie and cheat, and if you don’t recognize that to start with, people are much more apt to think you don’t understand them.’

“Actually, as it turned out, it was a brilliant stroke, because later, when he was asked about it, when they were changing, he could say, ‘Yes, they were, but that was another time, another place.’ It in effect legitimized the changes in the Soviet Union, so when Reagan finally turned up in Red Square [in May 1988], kissing babies and saying, ‘You’re on the right track,’ it had an enormous impact.” (Strober and Strober, *Reagan: The Man and His Presidency*, page 229)

For more on Reagan’s address to the National Association of Evangelicals, see [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 143](#).

16. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 9, 1983

SUBJECT

Secretary Shultz's New Memorandum on U.S.-Soviet Relations

The memorandum to you from George Shultz at Tab A² is an almost identical repetition of his January 19 memo to you.³ It is so similar that the outlines of both memoranda are the same, many sentences are repeated verbatim, and the recommendations are almost the same only with minor modifications. The only difference is that the words "intensified dialogue" are given less prominence in the text, which has been lengthened.

Like the old version, the new one calls for a strategy of intensified dialogue on bilateral issues and in specific areas: arms control, regional issues (Afghanistan, Southern Africa), human rights, and economic relations. George's reason for persisting with this recommendation is that he has detected in his recent meetings with Dobrynin "a few tentative signs of Soviet willingness to move forward on specific issues—the Pentecostalists and technical level exchanges on consular matters." Thus, he feels that dialogue, initially through his channel with Dobrynin, could serve to see that the Soviets are "seriously tested" and "challenged."

While State's final recommendations downplay the importance of summitry, all the logic that was used to justify a summit in the previous memo remains. The *new*

recommendations include: discussing new subjects such as MBFR; quiet diplomacy to encourage progress in the Shcharansky case; confidential talks to trade improvement in human rights for a CDE; and negotiations to open a U.S. Consulate in Kiev and a Soviet Consulate in New York.

There are several problems with this memorandum. Principally it fails to reflect a full understanding of the nature of the Soviet threat and the way the Soviets operate. What is systematically ignored here is the fact that the Soviets are engaging in low-intensity, political conflict with the West—an attack whose thrusts we have failed to deter. What is also ignored is that our existing policy of deterrence, which posits that the enemy should lose more by an attack than he could hope to gain, applies solely to the military sphere and not to the proxy-military and non-military forms of attack.

As a result the memo reflects a misunderstanding of what it takes to get the Soviets to come to terms with us. State believes that all it is likely to take is a “successful demonstration of our resolve” as manifested by renewed economic and military strength, revitalized alliances, a new relationship with China, regional peacekeeping efforts and an ideological offensive. There is some truth to this—but only partly so. With the exception of possible political losses inflicted on the Soviets by our young and fragile ideological offensive, none of this will cause the Soviets to lose more than they gain by attacking the Free World in their low-intensity fashion. Thus, the references to warning the Soviets about the “consequences of unacceptable behavior” ring hollow—no meaningful consequences are proposed.

State’s memo also contains several questionable assumptions. One is that the U.S. is as responsible as the

USSR for U.S.-Soviet tensions. This is implicit in the memo's last sentence which suggests that we should do our part to demonstrate our peaceful intentions—as if we have not done so for years. Another questionable assumption is that we can easily sustain public support for our defense buildup and demonstrate our resolve by engaging in precisely the dialogue which the Soviets want us to do—the kind that generates false public expectations of progress in U.S.-Soviet relations, which in turn induce public pressures on us to make concessions. Yet another questionable assumption is that there has been any kind of indication of Soviet willingness to make concessions on any of the issues that separate us. The reference to flexibility on the Pentecostals, for one, has no basis in fact.

Altogether, this memo is another State Department attempt to explain how increased dialogue can help pressure the Soviets into more acceptable behavior. The many reasons given as to how dialogue can pressure the Soviets to do anything are weak, and unconvincing, as they reflect a wishful-thinking perception about the nature of the Soviet system and its willingness to compromise. If we follow its recommendation for intensified dialogue, especially at a time of possible defense cuts, and unilateral disarmament and freeze movements, we will be sending all the wrong signals to the Soviets. We will be “improving” U.S.-Soviet relations on Soviet terms, and not on our terms and thus portraying an image of political weakness that is the exact opposite of the image of revived spiritual strength that your election symbolized.

In spite of your earlier decision and rejection of the same recommendation to intensify dialogue, State asserts that: “We now need to decide whether to intensify this dialogue.” This persistence merits an appropriate response: I believe that you and I should meet with George, so that he can

discuss his recommendations and address the problems we have with them.⁴ However, before the meeting takes place I would like to present you with an alternative set of recommendations which we could simultaneously address.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (3). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Prepared by Lenczowski.

² Printed as [Document 13](#). Under a March 8 memorandum sent for action to Clark, Lenczowski forwarded a copy of the March 3 memorandum from Shultz to the President writing: "In response to this latest version, I am tempted to attach the cover memo you sent the President with the old version and recommend that you send the Secretary a Xerox of the previous response you made to him on behalf of the President. However, since he has made some refinements in his old version, the President deserves a refined critique." Lenczowski also indicated that Dobriansky concurred with the March 3 assessment; Dobriansky initialed her concurrence on Lenczowski's memorandum.

³ See [Document 1](#).

⁴ See [Documents 17](#) and [26](#).

17. Editorial Note

On March 10, 1983, President Ronald Reagan chaired a meeting in the Cabinet Room from 2:09 to 3:11 p.m. “to discuss the State Department’s recommendations for U.S.-Soviet relations.” Vice President George Bush, Secretary of State George Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Director of Central Intelligence William Casey, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard Burt, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Arthur Hartman, National Security Council Staff member John Lenczowski, Chief of Staff James Baker, Counselor Edwin Meese, Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs William Clark, and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane attended. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) Richard Pipes, who had served on the NSC Staff as Soviet adviser but returned to teach at Harvard in December 1982, also attended the meeting. No official record of this meeting has been found.

A March 10 agenda from Clark to participants, prepared by Lenczowski, noted that the meeting would review the Department of State’s recommendations as laid out in Shultz’s January 19 and March 3 memoranda to Reagan. (See [Documents 1](#) and [13](#).) The background portion of the agenda, drafted by Lenczowski, stated: “Both memoranda are seriously flawed. Their recommendations are based on false and questionable premises, and a misunderstanding of the nature of the Soviet system and its goals. This meeting has been called so that State can further air its views.” Reagan initialed the agenda, indicating he saw it. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (03/10/83-03/21/83))

In a March 10 memorandum to Clark, Lenczowski wrote: "One point that you might raise in today's discussion is the pressure the U.S. is facing not only from the Soviets, the freeze movement and the unilateral disarmament movement, but from our *allies* to make concessions in our arms control talks. Yesterday, Italian Foreign Minister Colombo asked the President 'to get those [INF] negotiations going again.'

"The critical premise underlying this recommendation is the same premise behind State's call for increased dialogue: This is that the U.S. is as responsible for U.S.-Soviet tensions and the lack of progress in the negotiations as the USSR. *This premise is false.*"

"To follow Colombo's recommendation, or to start intensified dialogue would be to accept that this premise is true and that it is *our* responsibility to do more to reduce tensions that we allegedly helped create. It would also be a clear signal to the Soviets of the American political weakness and our vulnerability to their manipulation of Western public opinion.

"If you would like me to verify this at the meeting from a Sovietologist's point of view, you might want to ask me to do so in this way:

"'John has recently published a major book on Soviet perceptions of U.S. foreign policy. John, how would the Soviets view a move by us to enter an intensified dialogue?'

"I would briefly respond by saying that they see it as a sign of political weakness." (Ibid.; brackets are in the original)

In his memoir, Shultz described the meeting as follows: "When I walked into the Oval Office, President Reagan took me aside. 'I don't want these people to know about

Dobrynin,' the president said to me, referring to his private meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin and our subsequent effort to allow the Pentecostals, who had taken refuge in our Moscow embassy, to gain the freedom to emigrate. His remark reinforced my growing sense that the president was a prisoner of his own staff. The Oval Office was filled with people—Jim Baker, Ed Meese, Bill Clark, Bud McFarlane, as well as faces I didn't recognize. I started off by saying that I wanted to speak candidly, 'But I don't even know who all these people are.' I looked at one man I did not know.

"Bill Clark jumped in, 'This is Richard Pipes. He's an NSC member. He's on the payroll.'

"I could see the president didn't like the large cast of characters. The mood was intense and acrimonious. I could also see that he wanted to do what I wanted to do, but Bill Clark was standing in the way. I addressed my remarks to President Reagan, saying that he had already established the basics. The United States had improved its military strength, and our economy was moving forward. Our alliances were in good shape. Our work in China had caught the Soviets' attention, and democracy was gaining in Central America. 'It is time to probe and test,' I said.

"We should push for Afghanistan and Southern Africa as regional problems where progress might emerge. 'On bilateral issues, we can discuss the umbrella cultural-exchanges agreement, proposed consulates in Kiev and New York City, and an appraisal of the eight existing agreements with the Soviets and where they stand. If this goes well, we can start looking at a Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Moscow, and then Gromyko would come here to meet you at the time of the UN meetings in October,' I said.

“When I had finished talking to the president, Bill Clark called on Richard Pipes. I knew his name and recognized his scholarly distinction—and his hard-line reputation regarding the Soviets. Clark then called on Leslie Lenkowski [*John Lenczowski*], as another ‘Soviet expert.’ After they had their say, I remarked, ‘Perhaps we should also ask our ambassador in Moscow for his opinion.’ The attitude of Clark’s cadre was that *after* the Soviets have changed, *then* maybe we can do something with them. I was irritated. Toward the end of the meeting, I said that I understood the view of all these staff people was that I should ‘stop seeing Dobrynin and leave things as they are.’ Everyone in the room protested that this was not the correct interpretation. The meeting broke up. I was annoyed by the fiasco, and it showed.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pages 267-268)

Richard Pipes provided a contrasting account in his memoir: “In early March 1983 Shultz had State produce a paper on ‘U.S.-Soviet Relations: Where Do We Want to Be and How Do We Get There?’ [See [Document 13](#).] Ignoring NSDD 75, which was less than three months old, Shultz, hoping by means of this new paper to persuade the president that the time had come to change course in our dealings with Moscow, requested to see him. The meeting was set for March 10. Departing from customary procedure, either at the president’s request or his own initiative, Clark made it into a State-NSC confrontation. He invited me to attend.

“Shultz left in his memoirs a distorted picture of this encounter to make it appear as if the president had agreed with his recommendation but was thwarted by Clark and the NSC staff, whose ‘prisoner’ he allegedly was. This interpretation is widely off the mark, as I can attest from my detailed notes of the meeting.

“Present were fourteen persons. Shultz opened with a warning that what he was about to say was extremely sensitive and would cause much harm if leaked. At this point Reagan, with a mischievous smile, pulled up the corner of the tablecloth and addressing an imaginary microphone planted by Andropov, said: ‘This goes for you, too, Iurii!’ The secretary was not amused.

“Before making his case, Shultz shot a look at me, saying, ‘I know everyone in this room but you.’ Clark informed him who I was, whereupon he proceeded to outline a series of initiatives we could take with Moscow, such as raising the issues of Afghanistan and Poland as well as proceeding with renegotiating various agreements that were due for renewal (transportation, atomic energy, fisheries, etc.). At a certain point he stopped and glaring at me, said, ‘Your taking notes makes me very nervous.’ Clark assured him I had been a trustworthy member of the NSC staff for two years.

“Reagan listened to Shultz’s proposals with growing impatience, yawning, and at one point almost dozing off. When Shultz finished, he spoke his mind. ‘It seems to me,’ Reagan said, ‘that in previous years of détente we always took steps and got kicked in the teeth.’ Our attempts to get the Russians to cooperate led nowhere. We should exercise caution in dealing with them and make no overt appeals. When they remove irritants in our relations, we will respond in kind. In other words, Reagan was saying, no initiatives of our own, only responses to Soviet positive initiatives.

“Clark then turned to me, requesting my opinion. Addressing Shultz, who sat directly across from me, I asked whether he proposed to take these steps one by one or all at once. Shultz stared me straight in the eye but made no

response. I repeated the question and again received no answer. I suppose he was offended that having addressed the president of the United States, he was subjected to questioning by an academic.

“Reagan then stepped in once more. If the Russians allowed the Pentecostals holed up in our Moscow embassy to leave the country, we could agree to fishery negotiations. We would respond similarly if they released Anatoly Shcharansky from prison. Should such goodwill gestures be made, we would not ‘crow’ but quietly reciprocate. At this point, he articulated what for him was a rather novel idea and which, I must assume, I had planted in his mind: ‘I no longer believe they are doctrinaire Communists—they are an autocracy interested in preserving their privileges.’

“When the meeting, which lasted an hour, was about to break up, a defeated and visibly irritated Shultz muttered to himself but so that others could hear: ‘What I get is: eschew bilateral talks, be careful with Dobrynin, and ‘bang away’ at Cuba, Afghanistan, and the Pentecostals. Personally, I don’t think this is good.’” (Richard Pipes, *VIXI*, pages 206–207)

After the meeting, Shultz returned to the Department of State and met with Eagleburger. As Shultz later recalled: “Eagleburger told me that Bud McFarlane had been outraged by the meeting. Bud had not known that Clark had loaded the dice with his naysayers. ‘Bud gave me a memo before the meeting to read and destroy that was right down our alley,’ I said. ‘It was his idea of how the president should respond, positively, to my suggestions. Clark wouldn’t send it forward. The president was posturing in front of those guys. That’s why he told me he didn’t want to talk about Dobrynin.’ That was part of the problem: the president could not simply talk to me alone in

the Oval Office. Key people in his administration *would have to know* that the president wanted a change; he would have to say it openly and publicly. 'If the president doesn't express himself, the bureaucracy won't react. All I can do now is just pick up the ball and say go or no go.'

"At 7:25 that evening, Bill Clark telephoned. He talked as if nothing unusual had happened that afternoon. He told me that the president would 'let me know tomorrow,' whatever that meant. After the conversation, I said to Ray Seitz [Executive Assistant to Shultz], 'How can the president understand what I was trying to present this afternoon? Yet there's going to be some kind of communication from the president tomorrow about all this. Clark wants to keep State on a tight rein. It's like a sergeant I had in the Marine Corps who said, 'Don't fall out till I say fall out! Fall out!'" (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 268)

After his frustration at the March 10 meeting, Shultz had a private discussion with Reagan on March 11: "I told President Reagan privately that I needed to have direction from him on Soviet relations. I went through with him again what I was trying to achieve. 'Go ahead,' he told me. Despite this I could see that the president was concerned, and Clark even more so, that if he gave a green light to the State Department, I would run off and initiate actions that would change the atmosphere with the Soviets when they perceived no change was warranted. So I would need to be careful. There was no road map. I would need to make my own. I would have to keep going over my proposed route with the president privately, receiving his agreement and then seeking ways to have him make his own administration *follow through* on his decisions." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pages 268-269)

18. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz and the Director of the United States Information Agency (Wick) to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 16, 1983

SUBJECT

Promoting Political Change in the USSR

NSDD-75 set as a basic task of U.S. policy the promotion of political change within the USSR. It noted that, along with radio broadcasting, our most important means for ideological penetration and promotion of democratization in the USSR are exchanges activities and the exhibits program. The NSDD stated that we should reverse a pattern of dismantling those programs, instead expanding those which can serve our objective of promoting change in the Soviet Union. It called for an official framework for handling exchanges and obtaining reciprocity to prevent the Soviets from gaining unilateral advantage from their activities in the U.S. and their control of our access to the Soviet people.

This paper recommends an approach to negotiating an official framework which would achieve a significantly higher level of reciprocity and ideological penetration of the Soviet Union by the United States.

Problem and Opportunity

Vladimir Bukovsky has written that he became a dissident when he visited the US National Exhibition in Moscow in 1959—the one at which Khrushchev and Nixon debated in a model US kitchen. But, we have had no US exhibits in the

Soviet Union since 1979. We have allowed other ideologically effective aspects of the exchanges agreements to lapse as well. Thus, in the past three years we have dismantled much of what we had created.

One of the main advantages of those agreements was that they opened great fields of operation to us, such as exhibits, where we had a clear advantage over the Soviets. They also provided the means to obtain reciprocity. We now face a growing Soviet effort to work around us with private U.S. institutions and individuals.

Armand Hammer in partnership with Jerry Weintraub recently established an organization to bring Soviet cultural and other attractions to the U.S., with no known guarantee of reciprocity. We are also aware the Soviets are working with some other impresarios or individuals on possible performing arts tours, including a visit by the Moscow Circus this fall. The ready access that Soviet propagandists have to U.S. media without reciprocity is well known. The Soviets arranged a series of Soviet film weeks at the prestigious Smithsonian Institution last fall.

Under current circumstances we have no ready means of enforcing reciprocity in such endeavors. The present visa law does not permit us to refuse visas for that purpose. The result is that, according to the FBI, there is an increasing percentage of KGB agents in the groups the Soviets are unilaterally sending to the U.S. We can better control this problem with a better handle on visa issuance. We are seeking changes to visa procedures that would permit us greater latitude in refusing visas for policy reasons. That could facilitate control over visits by obvious propagandists, but it would still be a clumsy weapon, poorly suited to dealing with highly visible cultural visits. We should, nevertheless, use our anticipated new ability to

refuse visas as leverage to get a more satisfactory overall official exchanges framework permitting us to compete more effectively in the ideological conflict in which we are engaged.

Our previous exchanges agreements with the Soviet Union basically repeated the form and content of the first, concluded in 1958, and were never altogether satisfactory. In approaching a new official agreement we would review the old agreements and our current interests to determine what our negotiating targets should be without regard for what we may perceive as Soviet negotiating requirements. (We would, of course, prepare an estimate of Soviet positions as part of the preparations for negotiations.)

In developing our negotiating targets, our aim will be to improve our penetration of Soviet society. During the negotiations on a new overall framework for exchanges, we would concentrate on the following specific areas in which the U.S. has the clear advantage or in which, through enforcement of strict reciprocity, we need to offset a current advantage held by the Soviets:

USIA Thematic Exhibits—Our exhibits, when in the USSR, provide the U.S. Government its best opportunity to acquaint millions of people in all walks of life throughout the Soviet Union with the many aspects of American life: our democratic system, our foreign and domestic policies and our hopes and aspirations for peace and prosperity for all peoples of the world. As a communication medium, in contrast to radio broadcasting, our exhibits bring the Soviet people into a two-way face-to-face dialogue with our American Russian-speaking guides who staff the exhibits. The Agency's exhibits had such overwhelming ideological impact that the exchange of thematic exhibits under the previous official exchanges agreements became anathema

to the Soviet authorities. Thus, it is clear that if the U.S. Government once again is to take advantage of this most effective ideological weapon against the Soviet Union, it will be able to do so only by adopting the same negotiating position we used during previous negotiations—no USIA thematic exhibits, no official exchanges agreement.

Radio and TV—Currently, Soviet propagandists have easy access to U.S. media without reciprocity. We will insist on greatly improved access to Soviet nation-wide electronic media to reach the largest possible audience with our message. For example, we have in mind setting an annual minimum for US and Soviet appearances on political discussion programs on each other's television.

Publications—The U.S. has always enjoyed a clear advantage in the popularity and appeal of our Russian-language *America Illustrated* magazine in the Soviet Union compared with its Soviet counterpart in the U.S., *Soviet Life*. In fact, the note you sent Charlie with the “special introductory offer” for *Soviet Life* (mailer attached at tab A)² illustrates how they have to push their product. Our magazine goes like hot cakes in the Soviet Union. Under a new agreement we would seek to negotiate a higher level of distribution of our magazine inside the USSR.

Educational and Academic Exchanges—With these exchanges we reach elite audiences, build long-term contacts inside institutions producing future Soviet leaders and help build and maintain the base of US expertise on the Soviet Union.

Performing Arts—Performing groups presenting the finest of American theater, dance and music in modern, classical and popular genre can provide large numbers of Soviet

citizens with a view of the exciting possibilities of free cultural development, a process denied by their system.

American and Soviet Films—The Soviets have been able to put on film weeks in a number of major American cities, but we have received no reciprocity for this. Under a new exchanges agreement we would insist on reciprocal film weeks in the Soviet Union.

Access to Soviet Elites—Soviet officials, propagandists and academics have almost unlimited access to our institutions, for which we will insist on reciprocity under the framework of a new agreement.

Should you decide to seek to negotiate a new framework for exchanges along the above lines, we will find the Soviets receptive in certain respects, although there will be a long fight on specifics. Soviet authorities believe that they derive political benefits from agreements with us. Ironically, they also know that official agreements serve a very practical purpose—in their rigidly planned bureaucratic society official agreements make it easier to obtain the necessary budgets to finance the concrete expenditures encountered by the Soviet ministries and organizations engaged in exchanges-type activities in the U.S. and the USSR.

A decision to move toward a new bilateral exchanges agreement with the Soviet Union will encounter some opposition as well as considerable support domestically. We will want to make the point to our public and the Congress that a new agreement enforcing reciprocity is to our great advantage (there is a strong constituency on the Hill for the exchanges.) In general, we believe that our Allies will welcome such a decision as further evidence of our willingness to deal seriously with the Soviet leadership. We

will, of course, want to consult with the Allies before announcing any decision, to ensure that they fully understand our reasons and that they understand it is not a move to initiate a rapprochement with the USSR.

If you agree with our view of the importance of building a new framework for conducting exchanges and enforcing reciprocity, USIA will develop, in cooperation with the Department of State and other interested agencies, a draft agreement and negotiating strategy. When that process is completed, we would then propose to you appropriate timing for an approach to the Soviets on opening negotiations.

Recommendation:

That you authorize us to develop a draft exchanges agreement and negotiating strategy.³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/04/83). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by B.B. Morton on March 4 and cleared by Simons and Palmer according to a March 10 covering memorandum. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive March 1-15 1983)

² Not attached.

³ The President did not indicate his approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

19. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 16, 1983

SUBJECT

Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations

In accordance with your instructions,² here is how I propose to proceed in our bilateral relations with the Soviets in the coming months. I will continue to report to you and seek your further guidance at each stage of the process.³

Human Rights: We will continue to keep this issue at the top of our agenda with the Soviets, focusing on:

— *The Pentecostals:* I will meet with Dobrynin this week to begin implementing the approach you have approved.⁴ Emphasizing that the recent Soviet response does not go far enough, I will press Dobrynin to permit the immediate emigration of the one member of the family (Lydia) who was evacuated from the Embassy in connection with her hunger strike last year. I will also give him our understanding of the Soviet statement concerning the Pentecostals still in the Embassy, i.e. that they will be given permission to emigrate if they return to their home and submit applications.⁵ At this initial meeting, I will inform Dobrynin that I have discussed areas for possible progress in our bilateral relations with you, but will reserve further discussion of these for a later meeting.

—*Shcharanskiy*: I will continue in subsequent meetings to reiterate our strong interest in an early release of Shcharanskiy and indicate that we remain interested in the possibility of an exchange for him (as you know, there has recently been some movement on this score).

—*Madrid*: Underscoring our interest in a balanced outcome at Madrid, I will continue to reinforce Max Kampleman's suggestion that Soviet release of a number of prisoners of conscience would remove a major obstacle to a successful conclusion of the conference.⁶

Arms Control: In my meetings with Dobrynin and in our other diplomatic contacts, we will stress our intention to continue serious negotiations at Geneva. Our arms control approach will continue to be based on the criteria you have established—real reductions, equality, verifiability, and enhanced stability of the East-West military balance.

Regional Issues: In accordance with our overall policy of probing Andropov for new flexibility on regional issues, we will continue to raise these issues with the Soviets. Because we do not wish to fall into the old pattern of conducting most of our exchanges through Dobrynin, our principal interlocutor with the Soviets on these issues will continue to be Art Hartman. I believe that in coming months Art should test the Soviets on the following regional issues:

—*Middle East*: Art should meet with senior MFA Officials for a discussion of the Middle East, as he has done on two recent occasions. These exchanges represent a low-cost means of keeping the Soviets at bay on this issue and, of course, would not touch upon more sensitive aspects of our diplomacy. They

also give us a means of reiterating our concerns about unhelpful Soviet behavior, such as the export of SA-5s to Syria.

—*Afghanistan*: Art should also be instructed to keep the pressure on Moscow by reiterating our basic position on Afghanistan—something we have not done in detail since Andropov became General Secretary. Following the visit of UN SYG Perez de Cuellar to Moscow this month and the next round of UN-sponsored talks in Geneva next month, we will again assess whether there is more we can do, together with the Pakistanis and Chinese, to press Moscow on Afghanistan.

—*Southern Africa*: We are carefully considering whether further US-Soviet dialogue would advance our Namibia/Angola initiative and our broader objectives in the region. If this review suggests that more exchanges would be in our interest, I would anticipate that Art would be our principal channel of communication on this issue as well.

Bilateral Relations: In this area, we will move deliberately and cautiously, looking at each step in terms of our interests and the requirements of our overall policy approach. In accordance with your guidance, I will in subsequent meetings with Dobrynin indicate our willingness to take two steps that are in our interest:

—Negotiation of a new cultural agreement to enforce reciprocity and enhance U.S. ideological penetration of the Soviet Union itself;

—Opening of a U.S. consulate in Kiev to establish a new U.S. presence in the Ukraine.

As for the existing bilateral agreements which come up for review/renewal over the next year, we will examine carefully each agreement on its merits to ensure that any action we take is clearly in the U.S. interest. The first of these is the Fisheries Agreement where we are already under pressure from Congress and U.S. fishing interests to negotiate a new agreement with expanded joint venture fishing activities—steps which would rescind elements of our Afghanistan and Poland sanctions regime. I will be sending you a recommendation on this issue shortly.

As I suggested in our recent discussions, the long-term grains agreement is a special case requiring careful handling. I will shortly be sending you a recommendation on this matter.

High-level Dialogue: As noted above, I will be implementing your instructions in meetings with Dobrynin, focusing first on the Pentecostalists, and then addressing other issues in subsequent meetings. I will instruct Art Hartman to pursue his contacts with the Soviet MFA on regional issues. If these discussions indicate that a meeting before the next UNGA between Gromyko and me would be in our interest, I will have further recommendations on timing and venue.

Public Handling: As we proceed, it will be essential that our public statements on US-Soviet relations continue to emphasize our concerns about Soviet behavior—their military buildup, geopolitical expansionism, and human rights violations. Against this background of Soviet behavior, we must continue to stress the necessity for a renewal of American economic and military strength. It must be equally clear that we have no intention of returning to “business-as-usual” in our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union—there must be significant concrete changes in Soviet behavior.

Our public statements should also emphasize that we intend to continue the dialogue with the Soviet Union which we began at the outset of this Administration on the full agenda we have established. We should continue to emphasize our intention to negotiate in good faith in the START and INF talks. But we should also underscore that we have engaged the Soviet Union in discussion of human rights, regional issues, and our bilateral relations. While continuing to stress the continuity of our policy of realism, strength, and dialogue, we can proceed with confidence to take limited steps in our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union where it is in our interest to do so.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1983 Soviet Union March. Secret; Sensitive. In a March 14 memorandum to Shultz, forwarded through Eagleburger, Burt summarized the purpose of sending this memorandum forward to Reagan. Eagleburger wrote in the margin: "G.S.: This is a *good* memo. LSE." (Ibid.) Lenczowski forwarded the memorandum to Reagan on March 25 (see [Document 25](#)).

² See [Document 17](#).

³ In his memoir, Shultz wrote: "On March 16, I sent the president an important memorandum entitled 'Next Steps in U.S.-Soviet Relations.' I outlined my proposed program and our four-part agenda. Instead of asking for the president's formal approval—and thereby allowing my memo to be funneled through the NSC staffing process—I gave the president my reading of our own private discussions, and I said, 'Here is how I propose to proceed in our bilateral relations with the Soviets in the coming months. I will continue to report to you and seek your further guidance at each stage of the process.'" (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 269)

⁴ Reference is presumably to Shultz's meeting with Dobrynin that evening. See [Document 20](#).

⁵ See [Document 12](#).

⁶ Kampelman headed the U.S. Delegation to the CSCE Second Review Conference being held in Madrid.

20. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 16, 1983, 5 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Secretary of State Shultz
Mark Palmer, EUR

USSR

Ambassador Dobrynin
Minister-Counselor Sokolov

The Secretary opened by stating that he had discussed with the President the matters which are on our agenda. The President found his meeting with Dobrynin useful.² The Secretary expected shortly to be able to review with Dobrynin a number of issues. But he had insufficient time to do so properly now. The effort we are making is on track.

The Secretary then said that he did not want to let more time go by on the Pentecostals. The President was pleased with the promptness of the Soviet response. We would like to move ahead to resolve this problem. We interpret the Soviet response to mean that if the Pentecostals leave the Embassy, go home and apply for visas, their requests will be acted upon favorably. If we are not correct—and we are not asking for the Soviet Union to rewrite its communication—the Secretary said he would like to know about it.

The Secretary continued that we believe persuading the Pentecostals will not be easy. One of them has left the Embassy—Lidia Vashchenko. If her papers are processed and she is allowed to leave the Soviet Union, we could inform the Pentecostals still in the Embassy, and this

would be definitive, and persuasive evidence. We request the Soviet Union to act on this key element so that we can make this effort come about.

Dobrynin responded that he could not say more than is in their communication.³ Careful examination of it should be done. He was not in a position to give additional assurances. There were matters of principle, legality and extra-territoriality. The Soviet authorities would take into consideration all the circumstances, including the President's appeal. But he could not give any guarantee and doubted that Moscow could.

Dobrynin argued that they could not have a situation in which the Pentecostals go to OVIR (Soviet passport office) and say that they have assurances from the U.S. Ambassador and the Secretary of State. We should be eloquent and persuade the Pentecostals to proceed.

The Secretary then stressed that we need more than eloquence. We face a practical problem and are trying to resolve it. We made our points carefully. The Secretary then reiterated them again, stressing that we were not asking for additional assurances but that if our understanding was off base, we should be told. He also emphasized again that allowing Lidia to emigrate would constitute a convincing argument.

Dobrynin then stated that he would pass our message to Moscow. He went on to ask where we stood on other matters.

The Secretary stated that he would be in touch promptly to continue our effort and to become more specific. He had been busy with other matters.

Dobrynin said he would like to raise one question. There are still major issues at the Geneva talks. The Secretary had stated before this round in Geneva that he would look through these issues. This round is almost over. Maybe higher levels than the delegations should address these matters. He was speaking from experience. What did the Secretary think? Would it be worthwhile?

The Secretary stated that when he got back to Dobrynin he would have some comments to make on arms control. But we also wanted to discuss regional issues and we had a number of bilateral matters to address. We wanted to see what we could do, for example on what we have called "Madrid" issues. We accept approaching these matters in that spirit.

The Secretary reiterated that arms control is certainly one of the most important issues, but there are other issues too. The menu is important. His discussions with Dobrynin would continue. Art Hartman's discussions in Moscow also can make contributions. The Secretary does not have any doubt that as we proceed we should try to arrange a meeting with Gromyko. At the next meeting with Dobrynin he would have one or two concrete things. The Secretary concluded by noting that everybody has a different approach to exercise. Some like to walk. Dobrynin seemed like he wanted to run. But the Secretary is a jogger.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, March 16-23 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Palmer on March 18; cleared by Seitz and McManaway. Palmer initialed for both clearing officials. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. A typed notation indicates that McManaway "cleared cable

with ident. text.” The text of the memorandum of conversation was sent to Moscow in telegram 80054, March 24. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])

² See [Document 10](#).

³ See [Document 12](#).

21. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, March 21, 1983

SUBJECT

Increasing the Pressure on Moscow

This memorandum discusses a number of things we will or could be doing to step up pressure on the Soviets in the critical period ahead.

The Setting

US objectives over the period between now and 1984 are described in the memorandum which you recently sent to the President.² We see building pressure on the Soviets within that context—providing additional pressures/incentives for moderation and serious negotiations.

We will be pursuing a new and sounder basis for US-Soviet relations through domestic and international economic recovery, through rearmament, through sustaining and strengthening of our alliances and international friendships, and through direct diplomacy—recognizing that success in direct diplomatic dealings depends in large part on success in these first three fields (economic, rearmament, Allies and friends). In terms of timing, however, the next year or so breaks down prospectively into two phases.

Until late summer and early fall, we and the Soviets will be engaged in the battle over INF deployments in Western Europe. The shape of the second phase depends on who wins or loses that battle. If we have demonstrated that we cannot be isolated, if INF moves forward in the framework of the NATO dual decision, and if economic recovery and rearmament are proceeding apace, the Soviets can be expected to take rearguard actions to mask and compensate for their defeat. Indeed, the harder line they have adopted following the West German elections and toward Nakasone may be groundwork, intended to prepare for work on a losing wicket. Some of these Soviet actions may be quite nasty.

In addition, we should be aware that inadvertence, neglect, the dynamic of events—or all three together—could produce a further deterioration of relations which neither country desires as a matter of policy. Simple continuity in the Soviet approach to El Salvador, for instance, could have this result under certain circumstances. The Bulgarian connection to the Papal assassination attempt is another potential source of new strain in our relations with Moscow.³

Prospects, nevertheless, are not necessarily discouraging. At present, the Soviets have an interest in avoiding a major political crisis in Europe or the Third World which could distract European publics from the INF issue, or even make deployments easier by casting Moscow in the role of “aggressor.” New Soviet diplomatic activism in Asia—with Sino-Soviet “normalization” as its centerpiece—serves the same end. Any risk of confrontation with the U.S. would have to be commensurate in importance with the INF issue. There are only a few issues—Poland, the Middle East, and possibly Iran—on which Moscow would envisage such a tradeoff in 1983. Even in these areas, moreover, Moscow

will have an important incentive for restraint—at least until the fate of INF is clear.

And if we are successful as this year proceeds, there will be a growing prospect of the Soviets dealing with this Administration on the basis of the comprehensive agenda we have established these last two years. We could face a situation which potentially parallels the 1953-1956 transition period. During that “thaw,” there were significant changes in both domestic and international Soviet conduct.

—On the one hand, the parallel is sobering: the USSR made important moves on human rights and in Eastern Europe, Austria and Korea, but it continued its military buildup, eventually cracked down again in Eastern Europe and renewed its expansionism elsewhere.

—On the other hand, the parallel is encouraging: internally, millions of prisoners left the camps never to return, and the terror regime has never been the same; Eastern Europe has never reverted to the pure colonial status of the pre-1953 period; and the Korean armistice and the Austrian State Treaty were substantial accomplishments.

Our task, then, is to maintain our overall framework of realism, strength and negotiations for dealing with the Soviets whatever they do. We should test the Soviets, along the lines you have recommended to the President; we should step up the pressure, as I recommend below; and we must insist on deeds rather than merely words. In the period immediately ahead we should be alert to the possibility of genuine openings, but we should above all be firm in our direct dealings with the Soviets and imaginative

in our approach to our Allies and friends. That is the context for the program of pressures described below.

A U.S. Pressures Program

You are aware of efforts underway to put our political action programs into high gear, and the Counterintelligence SIG is actively considering more stringent controls on Soviet diplomats in the U.S. This memorandum does not address these issues or our START/INF positions, though they will be critical to our success in dealings with the Soviets. Rather, I begin with two ideas for further thought in the military programs area.

1. *Defense.* These ideas are put forward as possibilities only, and will require further elaboration.

—Rapid agreement with Congress on the MX study recommendations (put the MX into Minuteman silos and develop a small, genuine mobile) would give us additional leverage with Moscow. Announcing soon that we are moving ahead to put the MX into Minuteman silos quickly (possibly in 1985) would have the distinct advantage of confronting the Soviets in the near term with a deployed system they would have to reckon with in both arms control and defense planning. Announcing the small mobile would demonstrate that we have a longer-term challenge as well.

—We could submit a major security assistance supplemental if the Soviets themselves undertake a new, dramatic aggressive act. This would give us more practical leverage in key countries and areas across the spectrum than practically any other other step we could take.

2. *High-Level Diplomatic Activity*

We can offset Andropov's own greater activism (meetings with foreign leaders, etc.), and put pressure on the Soviets, by effective use of visible U.S. high-level activity. In particular we want President Reagan himself to outshine and outrun Andropov. We should task a thorough review for 1983–1984 to ensure that we are making the best use of this tool. The President should be identified with some drama and movement in foreign affairs to continue the momentum created by the Middle East initiative and his letter to the peoples of Europe.⁴ The Vice President and you can also play important roles—as demonstrated by your recent trips. In this connection, we suggest that you publicly announce a meeting with Gromyko following this round of INF and START talks if he has agreed.

Another idea which interweaves political action and Presidential drama would be a private and then public invitation to Andropov to appear on American television in return for a Presidential appearance on Soviet television. If the proposal were rejected (or simply not answered, as when the President made the offer to Brezhnev in his London speech last year),⁵ Andropov's "sophisticated," "liberal" image would suffer. If it were accepted, we would be the net winner, since Andropov is unlikely to overwhelm the American public, while the President's appearance on Soviet TV would be a major event in the USSR.

3. *Diplomatic Action.* We suggest a program to increase pressures (or at least maintain our present positions) in two areas directly adjacent to the USSR—the Far East and Eastern Europe.

—In the *Far East*, and throughout Asia, we should demonstrate our continuing involvement and relevance to

area problems. Specifically:

(a) With *China*, we should follow up on your trip with continuing efforts to maintain and advance our relationship, recognizing the limits to what we can accomplish in the short term and the need to sustain the realistic tone you have set. To this end, we could move forward with a summit later this year and concentrate on being responsive to some of China's needs in the technology area, as well as meeting our commitments under the August 17 communique.⁶

(b) We could seek to build up incrementally toward *trilateral US-PRC-Japan talks*. We could suggest to a private American institute (e.g. CSIS, AEI) that it approach a Japanese counterpart to take the lead in organizing "private" trilateral exchanges with PRC counterparts, who could include some officials. In a parallel effort, we could also move in the official track. We have responded to Chinese interest in bilateral talks on Soviet issues by inviting a small delegation of their Soviet experts to Washington this spring for consultations with our Soviet experts, along lines similar to those we use with the Japanese. We are also suggesting that we add a stop in Beijing to the itinerary of the experts going to Tokyo for talks later this year. The Chinese have responded informally but positively, and we are firming this up. Once these steps have been taken, and if the result warrants it, we could consider how to build up or enhance such consultations further.

(c) EUR and EA have been considering yet another run at trying to establish a diplomatic presence in Mongolia. Both Art Hartman and Art Hummel favor an approach. But neither we nor EA think the time is

ripe as there is a “Mongolian element” in the second round of Sino-Soviet normalization talks now underway in Moscow—it could appear that we are rather fecklessly trying to interfere. Once this round is over, however, we will want to take another look at the pros and cons of what would in any case be a small step, and will be sending you a paper on the topic.

(d) We should sustain our support for ASEAN’s approach to *Kampuchea* and take further steps, like your meeting with Sihanouk in Beijing, to strengthen the anti-Vietnamese coalition.

(e) Further west, we should supplement Pakistani efforts to use the UN process to keep diplomatic pressure on the Soviets over *Afghanistan* with pressure of our own in bilateral and other channels. We will be instructing Art Hartman to meet with Soviet MFA officials to reiterate our basic position on Afghanistan before UNSYG Perez de Cuellar visits Moscow March 27-28. Following the next round of UN-sponsored talks in Geneva in April, we will reassess whether there is more we can do, together with the Chinese and the Pakistanis, to keep diplomatic pressure on the Soviets.

—In *Eastern Europe*, greater U.S. activism would serve to counteract Soviet attempts to enforce greater unity and discipline, and to supplement the dwindling economic resources we can commit to East-West competition in the area. We want to heighten Andropov’s uncertainty about his own backyard, and undercut the widespread impression that we have written off Eastern Europe from Yalta onwards. Specifically:

(a) In *Poland*, this strategy argues for our going ahead with the Allies to develop a package indicating Western willingness to reciprocate concrete human rights progress. Specifically, we should make our willingness to consider rescheduling of Polish debt dependent on release of political prisoners and cessation of regime harassment of prisoners already released. We could make our approach to the Poles themselves in the wake of the Pope's visit in June—assuming it goes well.

(b) In *Hungary*, we should place a high priority on ensuring that the Vice President visits Budapest this year, and indicate the possibility of seeking Congressional approval for multi-year MFN for Hungary at an appropriate time. We should also move forward with the visit by their Foreign Minister this fall.

(c) In *Czechoslovakia*, we should consider expanding our ideological penetration and presence by negotiating an exchanges agreement—this would parallel the same step we will be taking with the Soviets.

(d) In *Romania*, while lifting MFN, we should manage our post-MFN relationship to encourage continued Romanian independence from Moscow.

(e) In *Yugoslavia*, we should keep moving on economic support and with the Vice President's visit.⁷ There could be no better signal of our vitality and relevance to the area than major movement toward sale of the F20 to Yugoslavia—and it may justify use of countertrade financing.

(f) In *Albania*, we should encourage the Italians, Greeks, West Germans and French to respond to Hoxha's opening to the West with modest reciprocal gestures and discreet appeals to Hoxha to get off his anti-Yugoslav campaign.⁸ The only bilateral step we might consider would involve a settlement of Albania's pending gold claims against the U.S. This careful building of a Western connection would take account of both Yugoslav sensitivities and Andropov's recent signals to the Albanians, and would be designed to keep the Soviets from moving into a vacuum either now or post-Hoxha.

(g) With *selected Soviet allies*, we should make occasional bilateral demarches explaining our current START and INF positions and criticizing those of the Soviets, and making clear our concern about their programs in areas of tension in the Third World. This would match what the Soviets do with our Allies and make the point that we consider these countries to be potentially autonomous in foreign policy.

4. *Covert Action*

A separate memo has been sent to you on this subject. It should be read in tandem with this memorandum.⁹

Under prudent management, steps in these four categories—plus movement to put our political action and counter-intelligence/reciprocity programs in place—would enhance the effectiveness of the diplomatic testing I have recommended, and serve to keep our overall framework of realism and strength in place as the Soviets test us. Together, this combined program of direct tests and indirect pressures would also lay the groundwork for more

productive direct dealings if and as the Soviets realize that their current diplomatic offensive has failed.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, March 16-23 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Drafted by Simons and Napper on March 8; cleared by Palmer. Napper initialed for Simons. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on March 21.

² See [Document 19](#).

³ Documentation on Bulgarian involvement in the 1981 Papal assassination attempt is scheduled for publication in [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. X, Eastern Europe](#).

⁴ In a letter read by Bush in West Berlin on January 31, Reagan offered to meet with Andropov to sign an agreement to ban intermediate-range land-based nuclear missiles. See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book I, p.155.

⁵ Reference is to Reagan's speech to Parliament at Westminster, June 8, 1982. See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1982*, Book I, pp. 742-748. See also [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 177](#) and [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 104](#).

⁶ Documentation on the Taiwan communiqué on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is scheduled for publication in [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. XXVIII, China, 1981-1983](#).

⁷ Vice President and Mrs. Bush visited Yugoslavia from September 16 to 18. In telegram 7776 from Belgrade, September 21, the Embassy reported: "The Vice President was, I believe, fully satisfied and indeed impressed by his talks with the Yugoslav leadership. He held over seven hours of substantive talks with the top-most officials." The Embassy continued that the Yugoslavs "expressed their

sincere appreciation for the Vice President's warmth, directness and measured approach to internal and bilateral affairs. They especially value his comments on continued U.S. support for Yugoslav independence and for its non-aligned position." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830546-0875)

⁸ The Embassy reported in telegram 449 from Belgrade, January 19: "Albanian foreign policy has undergone a major and dangerous change over the last several months. Albania no longer sees its security linked with that of Yugoslavia; indeed Tirana now appears to be seeking to destabilize Yugoslavia. Although for the moment, the main thrust of Albania's foreign policy seems to be [to] expand carefully relations with selected Western European states, the Yugoslav officials did not rule out an Albanian turn back to the east." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830033-0073)

⁹ A tandem memorandum on covert action was not found.

22. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 23, 1983, 4:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Secretary
Amb. Eagleburger
Mr. Mark Palmer

USSR

Amb. Dobrynin

The Secretary opened the meeting by noting that Dobrynin had indicated he had something to raise.

Dobrynin stated that Andropov had instructed him to convey an oral message in reply to our oral message on MBFR.²

The Secretary read the reply and described it as forthcoming. He said we would send the message to Ambassador Abramowitz. He stressed that the key to MBFR is verification. The so-called data issue is really a verification issue. If we can find methods which are mutually satisfactory on verification, we can move ahead. It is not the starting numbers but the ending numbers which matter.

Dobrynin noted that the Soviets had made their suggestions several weeks ago and they are awaiting our substantive move.

The Secretary then stated he wanted to note that our Embassy in Moscow had reported that Lidia (the Pentecostalist outside the Embassy) had telephoned to our

Embassy. In her hometown, she has been called in and told to submit forms for departure. She intended to do so tomorrow. We were very pleased to learn of this movement. We give the Soviets the credit. The family members had called London and it would get into the press. Our Embassy will confirm this.

Dobrynin recommended that there be no special statement. The less talk, the better. There would be a chain reaction of why, where, etc.

The Secretary stated that he agreed we should keep a lower profile, but noted that a refusal to say anything at all would simply make matters worse. The Secretary then asked whether Dobrynin had anything more to say on this subject.

Dobrynin said that he had nothing more. He recommended that we wait until it is final.

The Secretary agreed that we would wait until Lidia had left the country and then go to work to approach the other family members.

The Secretary then said he wished to give the Soviet Union an advance copy of the President's speech to be delivered that night. He noted that the defense position of the speech is couched basically in descriptive language. What he wanted to call Dobrynin's particular attention to was the section entitled "Call for a Bold Defense". This section puts forward the notion that given the sophistication of technology, it may in the future be possible to provide defense against ballistic missiles.³

The Secretary continued that the President is saying here that the U.S. is pursuing an R&D effort. This is consistent

with the ABM Treaty, and we presume that the Soviet Union also has a similar effort underway.

This effort is being undertaken in the context of our seeking methods for further stabilization, the Secretary said. It is therefore not intended to destabilize the situation.

The President points out in his speech that we are pursuing arms control. The Secretary said the President will have something further to say on arms control in a speech he will be giving a week from tomorrow (Thursday, March 31).⁴ The Secretary noted that we would be in touch with the Soviets before that speech at the negotiating table, and that he would see Dobrynin here in Washington beforehand too.


Dobrynin responded that he was disturbed to see the U.S. pursuing a new area in the arms race. This Administration seems to be piling one area on top of another, and there is nothing moving in the negotiations. If the U.S. produces something, the Soviets will do so as well.


The Secretary responded that this is not a new area, and that what is involved is only a research effort consistent with the ABM Treaty.

The Secretary then noted that he also has in mind the other things (on our agenda). He pointed out that Dobrynin's meeting with the President had been kept quiet except for a mention in "Time" magazine. We have prepared low-key press guidance in case it does get more attention. The Secretary concluded by noting that he has mentioned the progress on Lidia to the President, and the President is appreciative of the effort under way.


¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, March 16-23 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Palmer; cleared by Eagleburger, Seitz, and Hill. Eagleburger initialed for Seitz and Palmer initialed for Hill. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office.

² The Soviet oral message is not attached to this document. A copy was found in the Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, E.4, President/Andropov Correspondence.

³ Shultz provided Dobrynin with an advance copy of the President's speech on "Defense and National Security," given on March 23 at 8 p.m. in the Oval Office. Reagan's speech is in [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 145](#) .

⁴ On March 30, Reagan gave brief remarks announcing a "Proposed Interim Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Reduction Agreement." For the text, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book I, pp. 473-474. On March 31, he also gave a speech in Los Angeles at the World Affairs Council luncheon, in which he discussed INF reductions and other U.S.-Soviet issues. See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book I, pp. 479-486. See also [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 146](#) .

23. Editorial Note

At 8 p.m. on March 23, 1983, President Ronald Reagan delivered a televised address to the nation on defense and national security. During the speech, Reagan called for research on a new initiative designed to protect the United States from incoming nuclear ballistic missiles. This program eventually became known as the Strategic Defense Initiative or, colloquially, by reporters and detractors of the program, as “Star Wars.” The origins and development of the Strategic Defense Initiative will be documented in [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, volume XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981-1984](#) .

During a campaign trip to NORAD in 1979, Reagan learned that the United States had no defense against an incoming nuclear missile attack. Since that visit, the idea of developing some kind of defense against nuclear missiles resonated with Reagan. In his memoir, he wrote: “I came into office with a decided prejudice against our tacit agreement with the Soviet Union regarding nuclear missiles. I’m talking about the MAD policy—‘mutual assured destruction’—the idea of deterrence providing safety so long as each of us had the power to destroy the other with nuclear missiles if one of us launched a first strike. Somehow this didn’t seem to me to be something that would send you to bed feeling safe. It was like having two westerners standing in a saloon aiming their guns at each other’s head—permanently. There had to be a better way.

“Early in my first term, I called a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—our military leaders—and said to them: Every offensive weapon ever invented by man has resulted in the creation of a defense against it; isn’t it possible in

this age of technology that we could invent a defensive weapon that could intercept nuclear weapons and destroy them as they emerged from their silos?

“They looked at each other, then asked if they could huddle for a few moments. Very shortly, they came out of their huddle and said, ‘Yes, it’s an idea worth exploring.’ My answer was, ‘Let’s do it.’” (Reagan, *An American Life*, page 547)

In his February 11, 1983, diary entry, Reagan wrote: “An almost 2 hr. lunch with Joint Chiefs of staff. Most of time spent on MX & the commission etc. Out of it came a super idea. So far the only policy worldwide on nuclear weapons is to have a deterrent. What if we tell the world we want to protect our people not avenge them; that we [a]re going to embark on a program of research to come up with a defensive weapon that could make nuclear weapons obsolete? I would call upon the scientific community to volunteer in bringing such a thing about.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 196)

According to Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane, Reagan asked him to begin working on a special insert for the upcoming defense and national security speech, which would propose research and development for SDI. Reagan told McFarlane: “‘I want you to keep this tightly under wraps.’ and ‘Do the work in your own staff and write the speech and let’s get ready to give it.’” (McFarlane, *Special Trust*, pages 229–231) McFarlane, with assistance from National Security Council Staff members Raymond Pollock, Richard Boverie, and John Poindexter began work on the insert, while the White House speechwriters worked on the main parts of the speech.

By March 21, word of the speech reached the Department of State. In his memoir, Shultz recalled: “On Monday morning, March 21, Larry Eagleburger reported to me on a conversation he had just had with Bud McFarlane. ‘The president will give a speech on Wednesday, March 23,’ he told me. The Joint Chiefs had convinced the president, he said, that the MX would remain vulnerable but that there was an alternative. ‘The alternative is a high-tech strategic defense system that can protect us against ballistic missiles and thereby protect our offensive capabilities. The president is intrigued and wants to make strategic defense the subject of his speech.’

“‘The chiefs,’ I countered, ‘are not equipped to make this kind of proposal. They are not scientists.’

“Eagleburger went on to say that the president had nevertheless decided that ‘by the close of the century we should turn to a strategic defense and by then banish all nuclear weapons.’ Bud McFarlane wanted to get up a message to our allies, said Eagleburger.

“‘We don’t have the technology to say this,’ I interjected.

“‘The White House has a whole public campaign planned,’ Eagleburger responded. It sounded to me like Fortress America. ‘This changes the whole strategic view and doctrine of the United States,’ I said.

“Rick Burt came into the meeting. When Eagleburger described to him the president’s idea, Burt was flabbergasted. ‘Not only is a nuclear-free world a pipe dream, but a speech like this by the president will unilaterally destroy the foundation of the Western alliance,’ he said.

“After this meeting, I confided to my executive assistant, Ray Seitz, that I had heard of the strategic defense idea before: first at my dinner with the president and subsequently when I had argued with Bill Clark about the strategic defense question the previous Friday. ‘There is an interplay between policy and technology,’ I said. ‘Technology can make policy obsolete. The president is saying that defensive measures have a lot of promise, and he’s right. But they should redraft the speech to recognize the evolving technology without changing our strategic doctrine.’

“About eleven o’clock that morning, Bill Clark called on the secure line about the new defensive concept that was to be part of the president’s speech on the defense budget.

“‘This is so sweeping,’ I told him, ‘that it must be carefully considered. It could hit the allies right between the eyes. This is the year when we especially need a cohesive alliance in our negotiations with the Soviets. Why place so much confidence in the Joint Chiefs of Staff? They are in no position to make what amounts to a scientific judgment.’

“Later in the afternoon I went to the White House for a meeting with the president. I found great resistance to any change in the words for the speech. ‘This paragraph is a revolution in our strategic doctrine,’ I told President Reagan. He had Keyworth [Science Adviser to President Reagan] called in. I asked him, ‘Can you be sure of an impenetrable shield? And what about cruise missiles? What about stealth bombers? Your language is sweeping. I’m not objecting to R and D, but this is a bombshell. What about the ABM Treaty? What about our allies and the strategic doctrine on which we and they depend? You don’t say anything about those questions.’ His answers were not at

all satisfactory to me.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pages 249–250)

Reagan wrote in his diary on March 21: “Geo. Shultz came by concerned about an insert intended for inclusion in Wednesday T.V. speech on defense. He had a point but I think the writing of the insert is at fault. I find it hard to understand myself.—I think I’ll have to try rewriting it.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 208)

On March 22, Shultz expressed concerns in a meeting with Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs William Clark and McFarlane. Although no formal record of this meeting has been found, Shultz briefed Charles Hill, who prepared the following handwritten notes:

“*Speech on defensive weapons.*—S [Secretary] has pissed in the punch bowl. Not happy w him at WH.

“—Clark and McF have [committed?] P [President] to it w/o thinking it through & now embarrassed to go & back him off. McF to blame.

“—Cap won’t accept it.

“—Will send our draft to P. They have not agreed that they must pull P back. But know that S opposed & won’t support it. Gaping holes in the concept (stop all of nucl-attack ag U.S.) [illegible] says that we *can* stop Sov stealth bomber while asking Cong to spend for our stealth. How do we know we cld stop it.

“—S has carried big load & been hurt by it. He has had to say WH *wrong*. But did right thing, has cost him with P

“—idea came fr *PFIAB*. And JCS strong supporters. (until later said they only meant ballistic missile)

This does not amt to full defense of nucl attack

“And wld have us violate the ABM treaty.

1. The JCS, PFIAB predicted what can't be known
2. but was there a philosophical basis behind it—fortress America

“—philosophical [unilateralism?] The circle where left & rt meet in the circle. Isolationism meets America out & Yankee go home

“F’stein meets the Wolfman.” (Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, Entry for March 22, 1983)

Shultz raised his concerns with Reagan in a telephone call that evening, March 22. As he recounted in his memoir: “At 6:30 in the evening, the president called me. ‘I think the wording of the speech is better in this current draft, and some of the Qs and As are helpful,’ I told him, ‘but I still have great reservations, not about the R and D effort, but about advancing this as something of such tremendous importance and scope. It implies we are changing our strategic doctrine. There are a host of unanswered technical questions. There is tremendous strength in both offensive and defensive measures, but the former historically has the upper hand. I can’t see being certain of one system defending against cruise missiles on submarines and stealth bombers, let alone ballistic missiles. I can see the moral ground you want to stake out, but I don’t want to see you put something forward so powerfully, only to find technical flaws or major doctrinal weaknesses.’ I went on, ‘I have been sitting here trying to

think it through. It raises questions about the B-1 bomber and stealth and INF deployments. I have to say honestly that I am deeply troubled. Of course, I will support you. I'm sure you know that.'

"President Reagan responded, stressing the overwhelming attractions to him of a defensive system.

"I agree that if we get there, we'll be in the catbird seat,' I said. 'So we must push our R and D if for no other reason than because the Soviets are. But it can be destabilizing as to what the Soviets do and how they respond. They will assume that we have a major scientific breakthrough. I don't know the implications of that.'

"The president interrupted to say that this was the part that would make a news item and attract the networks.

"It's more than a news item. It's a sweeping proposal,' I said.

"I looked over the draft text again and said, 'A lot of weight is put on Keyworth. It suggests that we really have the technology. I don't have the information. Is stealth irrelevant? Perhaps I could redraft a few alternative paragraphs that support R and D, state that the research is consistent with the ABM Treaty and that we continue to rely on our strategic doctrine of deterrence. We don't want to make the prospect sound as if this is an overall and imminent solution to our problems. Should I give it a whirl?'

"The president told me to go ahead.

"Half apologetically I said, 'I feel I would be derelict if I didn't tell you what I think.' That was the end of the conversation.

“I was impressed with the president’s call. Again, I could see the depth of his feelings about this issue, his abhorrence of reliance on the ability to ‘wipe each other out’ as the means of deterring war, and, of course, I could agree that if we could learn how to defend ourselves, that would be wonderful.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 253)

Reagan wrote in his diary that evening: “On my desk was a draft of the speech on defense to be delivered tomorrow night on T.V. This was one hassled over by N.S.C., State & Defense. Finally I have a crack at it. I did a lot of re-writing. Much of it was to change bureaucratic into people talk.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 208)

Throughout the day on March 23, the struggle over the contents of the speech continued between the NSC and State Department. As Charles Hill wrote in his notes for the day: “—*More on P speech on defensive issues* blood level high.

“—Clark distancing himself from it now he sees it as big mistake. S fears that McF will take the rap & not survive. (Clark will go to the press about it & blame someone so as to avoid trouble himself)

“—still unclear what is to be said, but we toning it down, less dramatic. Not as hair raising as headed for yesterday. S was the only one athwart it.

“—(a total collapse of the whole NSC decision making procedure)

“—NSC sold P a bill of goods. Preempt freeze mvt, etc.” (Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, Entry for March 23, 1983)

On March 23, Reagan wrote in his diary: "The big thing today was the 8 P.M. T.V. speech on all networks about the Nat. Security. We've been working on the speech for about 72 hrs. & right down to deadline." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981-October 1985, page 209)

In his televised address that evening, the President stated: "One of the most important contributions we can make is, of course, to lower the level of all arms, and particularly nuclear arms. We're engaged right now in several negotiations with the Soviet Union to bring about a mutual reduction of weapons. I will report to you a week from tomorrow my thoughts on that score. But let me just say, I'm totally committed to this course.

"If the Soviet Union will join with us in our effort to achieve major arms reduction, we will have succeeded in stabilizing the nuclear balance. Nevertheless, it will still be necessary to rely on the specter of retaliation, on mutual threat. And that's a sad commentary on the human condition. Wouldn't it be better to save lives than to avenge them? Are we not capable of demonstrating our peaceful intentions by applying all our abilities and our ingenuity to achieving a truly lasting stability? I think we are. Indeed, we must.

"After careful consultation with my advisers, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I believe there is a way. Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope. It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive. Let us turn to the very strengths in technology that spawned our great industrial base and that have given us the quality of life we enjoy today.

“What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?”

“I know this is a formidable, technical task, one that may not be accomplished before the end of this century. Yet, current technology has attained a level of sophistication where it’s reasonable for us to begin this effort. It will take years, probably decades of effort on many fronts. There will be failures and setbacks, just as there will be successes and breakthroughs. And as we proceed, we must remain constant in preserving the nuclear deterrent and maintaining a solid capability for flexible response. But isn’t it worth every investment necessary to free the world from the threat of nuclear war? We know it is.

“In the meantime, we will continue to pursue real reductions in nuclear arms, negotiating from a position of strength that can be ensured only by modernizing our strategic forces. At the same time, we must take steps to reduce the risk of a conventional military conflict escalating to nuclear war by improving our non-nuclear capabilities.

“America does possess—now—the technologies to attain very significant improvements in the effectiveness of our conventional, non-nuclear forces. Proceeding boldly with these new technologies, we can significantly reduce any incentive that the Soviet Union may have to threaten attack against the United States or its allies.

“As we pursue our goal of defensive technologies, we recognize that our allies rely upon our strategic offensive power to deter attacks against them. Their vital interests

and ours are inextricably linked. Their safety and ours are one. And no change in technology can or will alter that reality. We must and shall continue to honor our commitments.

“I clearly recognize that defensive systems have limitations and raise certain problems and ambiguities. If paired with offensive systems, they can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and no one wants that. But with these considerations firmly in mind, I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.

“Tonight, consistent with our obligations of the ABM treaty and recognizing the need for closer consultation with our allies, I’m taking an important first step. I am directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles. This could pave the way for arms control measures to eliminate the weapons themselves. We seek neither military superiority nor political advantage. Our only purpose—one all people share—is to search for ways to reduce the danger of nuclear war.

“My fellow Americans, tonight we’re launching an effort which holds the promise of changing the course of human history. There will be risks, and results take time. But I believe we can do it. As we cross this threshold, I ask for your prayers and your support.” (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book I, pages 442-443)

Reagan also wrote in his diary that a special group was invited to the White House for the speech, including

“several former Secs. of State, Nat. Security Advisors, distinguished Nuclear scientists, the Chiefs of Staff, etc. I did the speech from the Oval office at 8 & then joined the party for coffee. I guess it was O.K. they all praised it to the sky & seemed to think it would be a source of debate for some time to come. I did the bulk of the speech on why our arms build up was necessary & then finished with a call to the Science community to join me in research starting now to develop a defensive weapon that would render nuclear missiles obsolete. I made no optimistic forecasts—said it might take 20 yrs. or more but we had to do it. I felt good.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 209)

24. Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Palmer) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with the President on US-Soviet Relations, March 25

I recommend that you use your meeting tomorrow with the President to reconfirm his approval for the strategy you have proposed for US-Soviet high-level dialogue over the coming months. This should include both the series of meetings you are having with Dobrynin and our plans to have Art Hartman renew his dialogue with Gromyko and Korniyenko. I have prepared a speaking paper based on your most recent memorandum to the President which you may wish to use in your discussion with him.

The President will also be interested in your assessment of a number of events in US-Soviet relations which either have taken place in the last few days or which are pending. I have prepared talking points for your use on the following topics:

—Your exchange with Dobrynin on the Pentecostals;²

—Andropov's reply to the President's message on MBFR;³

—Gromyko's appointment as First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers;

—Developments in the arms control area (i.e. Your plans to convey our new INF position to Dobrynin on Saturday, and the general points you will be making to Dobrynin on arms control next week).⁴

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1983 August 10, Secretary's Meetings with the President. Secret; Sensitive. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Although the memorandum is undated, Hill initialed it on March 25. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.

² See [Document 20](#).

³ See [Document 22](#).

⁴ See [Document 31](#). The memorandum lists three tabs. Tab 1 is printed as [Document 19](#). Tabs 2 and 3, talking points summarizing Shultz's memorandum on "Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations" and talking points on "recent and pending developments in US-Soviet relations" are attached but not printed. See [Document 26](#).

25. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 25, 1983

SUBJECT

Next Steps in U.S.-Soviet Relations

The attached memorandum (Tab A)² outlines Secretary Shultz's proposals for relations with the Soviets according to his understanding of your guidance at last week's meeting.³ His basic thrust is that both he and Ambassador Hartman should continue talks with the Soviets to press them on issues of special concern to us including human rights issues, arms control, regional issues and bilateral relations.

This memo represents a continuation of State's insistence on intensified U.S.-Soviet dialogue. However it appears to recognize a bit more explicitly than previous communications on this subject the dangers of being perceived as returning to "business as usual" with the Soviets. State thus reassures you that our public statements should continue to emphasize our concerns about Soviet misbehavior.

With a couple of exceptions, State's proposals, if carried out discreetly and judiciously, may serve our interests in small but concrete ways. They may yield some very limited positive results. But we must be under no illusions: the Soviets will neither change their communist system to please us nor pull out of places like Afghanistan until they are forced to by exceedingly high costs. They may let the

Pentecostals or Shcharansky go, but their only real motivation for doing so would be to encourage the illusion in Western minds that bigger and better things can be accomplished (when the fact is that the kinds of things we really want cannot be accomplished without major political change in the Soviet system). Thus, certain concessions they might make to us are part of the general Soviet strategy of deception.

It is for this reason that the way we go about a dialogue with the Soviets, the way we handle it publicly, is the most critical question here. It is a very delicate balancing act. On the one hand, we want to appear reasonable, peaceful, and ready to deal with the Soviets in ways that minimize the possibility of war. On the other hand, this entails the enormous risk of raising false public expectations—i.e., deceiving our own people about the possibility of achieving a true accommodation with communism.

Since the number one theme of Soviet disinformation strategy is to make the West believe that true peace is possible with the USSR, we must be extremely wary about serving as accomplices to this Soviet deception. That is why it is encouraging to see State's acknowledgement that our public statements will continue to be tough. Nevertheless, I have my reservations about how State will handle all this. Its heart is in dialogue and detente and not in the kinds of public statements that are necessary to sustain public vigilance and support for our defense buildup.

Unfortunately, whenever you tell the blunt truth about the nature of communism, too many people at State cringe in embarrassment. The issue here is that the truth is the only real weapon we have in our political competition with the Soviets, whose principal weapons are falsehood and deception.

The other great danger in the way we handle any limited dialogue is the kind of signal we may be sending to the Soviets. If we appear too eager to make concessions, or to pursue a greatly expanded agenda for talks, they will get the immediate impression that their manipulation of Western public opinion forced us into talks with them, and that we are weakening and they are getting stronger. *We* may not see things this way. But this is the way the *Soviets* look at it. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, they believed that their greater political and military strength had actually forced us into talks and negotiations with them. It was on the basis of these kinds of perceptions of U.S. weakness that they made many of their calculations to advance geopolitically worldwide.

I have strong reservations about State's two proposals for bilateral relations.⁴ The first, a new cultural agreement, seems innocuous enough. But the issue is part of a whole complex of questions that relate to reciprocity and controlling the KGB presence in our country, I will be sending you a more detailed explanation on this. But for now, we should not yet authorize any negotiations until the issue has been thoroughly aired at an NSC meeting. The second proposal is equally problematical: opening a U.S. consulate in Kiev and a Soviet consulate in New York. This also needs much further study.

Otherwise, so long as State's proposed talks are held very discreetly, with no public fanfare, no bragging about great accomplishments, I believe we can achieve the two political results we want: projecting our peaceful intentions and maintaining realism and vigilance with regard to the Soviet threat.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (5). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. The memorandum is unsigned. Prepared by Lenczowski. Clark wrote in a covering memorandum: "Mr. President: Preparatory to your 2:30 meeting with George Shultz, it might be well you review the attached two papers. Bill." A stamped notation indicates the President saw both memoranda.

² See [Document 19](#).

³ Reference is presumably to the March 10 meeting on U.S.-Soviet relations. See [Document 17](#).

⁴ See the "Bilateral Relations" section of Shultz's March 16 memorandum, [Document 19](#).

26. Editorial Note

Secretary of State George Shultz and President Ronald Reagan met privately at the White House on the afternoon of March 25, 1983, to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) In his diary entry for the day, Reagan wrote: "An hour meeting with Geo. S. just the 2 of us to talk about our quiet diplomacy efforts with Dobrynin. We may get those Pentacostalists out of the embassy in Moscow yet." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 210)

In his memoir, Shultz explained the origin of this private meeting in relation to the March 10 meeting (see [Document 17](#)) and his March 16 memorandum to Reagan (see [Document 19](#)). As Shultz recounted: "On Thursday, March 24, Bill Clark called. He told me he had arranged a meeting the next afternoon with the president to discuss relations with the Soviets. It would be a small meeting. 'You should be there,' I said. Clark said he would try to arrange to have that sort of meeting a couple of times a week. He told me he had a heart-to-heart talk with the president, urging him to spend more time talking about foreign policy issues. According to Clark, the president had told Deaver to put this on the schedule. He also passed on an invitation to come to the White House in the morning to listen to a report by Dick Wirthlin on opinion poll findings about foreign policy. I was also invited to have lunch with the president, along with Arthur Sulzberger. When I hung up the phone, I laughed—apparently my office was bugged by the NSC.

"In my private meeting with President Reagan on the afternoon of March 25, a Friday, I recalled to him our earlier conversation on the snowy evening in February

when we had dinner together in the White House. [See [Document 9](#).] 'If Andropov is willing to do business, so am I,' he had told me then. He was ready to work with the Soviets. But one camp of his staff did not want him to try. The president told me he was 'open to a summit meeting,' but only if there was some substantive movement. I reminded him of my initial meetings with Dobrynin and the Soviets' prompt response on the Pentecostals. 'We have to take that as a direct signal,' I said. 'If we are going to pursue this, we have to outline a series of steps that build on each other.' We needed to 'create the right background music on human rights and bilateral issues as precursors to the agendas on arms control and regional issues,' I said." The discussion moved to the long-term grain agreement, with Shultz suggesting that negotiations begin in April. "On INF and arms control issues," the Secretary added, "the president told me to make sure Dobrynin realized that we were serious, and he agreed that I should talk to Dobrynin about arms control between the sessions of our negotiations in Geneva." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pages 269-270)

Shultz continued to struggle against Clark and other members of the NSC Staff to move forward in negotiations with the Soviets. He wrote: "I had no illusions—Clark was *not* on board with the president's and my Soviet agenda—but I seized on this to say to President Reagan that we had to have a fast-track way to get decisions. 'The Soviets will outmaneuver us at every turn if we have to refight the fundamental direction of policy with each and every action memorandum.' We also needed, I said, a way to slip the existence of our dialogue with the Soviets into the public domain rather than have it emerge as a sudden and sensational discovery. My testimony on U.S.-Soviet relations before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, then scheduled for mid-April, would be the way. The president

said he agreed. 'Let's proceed.'" (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 270)

In a handwritten note to Reagan, dated March 26, Clark wrote: "Mr. President: Following your meeting with George Shultz, he dropped by my office to leave the attached notes used during your meeting. His opening comment to me was 'I don't know what kind of game is being played over here in your not attending my meeting with the President.' Mr. President, if our plans for Soviet (or any other issue in my area of responsibility) are not coordinated with Cap and Bill and Jeane, we will fail. —Bill." Reagan initialed Shultz's handwritten notes on the meeting, indicating that he saw them. (Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (4))

27. Note of a Meeting Between President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Hill)¹

Washington, March 25, 1983

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

P [President]—Doby [Dobrynin] mtg [meeting] is origin of all this East-West Rels [Relations]

S [Secretary]—P Friday Readout

What S said: If Sov [Soviets] by what it did showed it ready for constr [constructive] rel [relations], P was willing. (Basic dec [decision] that we wld [would] try for more const rel) —He wld welc [welcome] mtg w Andrp [Andropov] but only if sure to produce subs [substantive] advances. In P-Doby mtg he had talked of Pentac [Pentecostals] as first of symbolic steps. Doby sent it in & Sov had responded & then we did. Today another resp [response] in what Lidia got—approval. (a direct signal). Then we wld try to outline steps that interruptible, but cld [could] become larger. Bgnd [Background] music of human rts [rights]. They must play it and many bilat [bilateral] steps that they like & we can take. But large agenda is arms control & reg [regional] issues.

I disc [discuss] w [with] Doby here & Hartman there.

Then: S-Gromyko in Moscow (so he sees Andrp) When Gromy [Gromyko] at UN, he wld see P

All to move twd [toward] P- Andrp late '83 summit conf [conference] '84

—Talked Pentac: P suppose they out, but in Bonn? No problem Clark says.

MBFR. We shld [should] go into verif [verification] & not stress data. See where we end up & then see if we can verify. Howe doing paper. P agreed. P thinks it easier for Sov to move troops back than for us.

Bilats I described cult [cultural] agreement & consular opening Kiev. On LTA I said its coming. He agreed. So do what we can before being forced to by Cong [Congress]. Maybe April. I promised something on LTA. Clark says get it to P w/o [without] domestic wing seeing it or we will lose control.² On INF I shld talk to Doby. Say it serious effort. We wld put fwd [forward] that at Geneva & work on it betw [between] rounds. We shld have Nitze say we will table it. And advance next round. (LSE: I will have 2 drafts tomorrow, one no, one w/o). Rick says Ruth says not now, give later number. He opposed by most who favor a concrete proposal. If not a # now, there will be one.³

I sd [said] betwe [between] rounds Doby shld come to me to talk about START and then INF [unclear].⁴ P said ok. I sd we'd get Gromyko mtg w [with] agenda.⁵

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, Entry for March 25, 1983. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the text from an entry in Hill's handwritten notebooks. An image of the note is Appendix B. After his meeting with Reagan on March 25, Shultz returned to the Department and briefed Hill.

² Hill wrote in the left margin: “EUR *Palmer* hand carry to Clark.”

³ Hill wrote in the left margin: “check on Doby Mon.”

⁴ Hill wrote in the margin: “(tp [talking points] for S-Doby Mon Dobbins).” He originally wrote “Howe” but crossed this out.

⁵ Hill wrote in the margin: “(EUR, S/P, Howe EUR)”

28. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, March 25, 1983

SUBJECT

Soviet SALT Compliance and U.S.-Soviet Relations

The Immediate Issue

The immediate issue is how to handle the latest apparent Soviet arms control violation: the testing of the PL-5. The intelligence community unanimously believes that this test has raised enough questions about Soviet compliance that a major diplomatic demarche is necessary. The problem here is that this issue cannot be treated in isolation without causing severe problems for the President and his overall foreign policy.²

The Surrounding Immediate Issues

Coming up very soon are several critical issues, all related: the Adelman vote, the MX votes, the nuclear freeze votes, the defense budget vote, and a decision on how to proceed at the INF negotiations—whether to present a new fall back proposal or not. Each one of these issues hinges on the answer to one question: how will the President conduct U.S.-Soviet relations? Each one of these issues represents a challenge to the President's views and policies. What the President must decide is whether or not he will try to win each battle by presenting the strongest case he can make

or whether he is willing to risk losing these battles by compromising his views and thus making a weaker case in order to accommodate his critics.³

The Real Issue

To view these various issues and upcoming battles in Congress in the context of the compliance issue presents a situation that cuts to the core of how we conduct our policy toward the USSR. This situation compels us to address several key questions:⁴

- Who is responsible for U.S.-Soviet tensions?
- Who is responsible for progress or lack of progress in arms control negotiations?
- Is it possible to trust the Soviets?
- Is it unreasonable, provocative or belligerent to conduct a policy based on a suspicion about true Soviet motivations and behavior, especially in the field of arms control?
- Is true peace and accommodation possible between the U.S. and the USSR, between democracy and communism?

Each of these questions depends upon a certain theory about the nature of the Soviet system and communism. Thus, the compliance issue in combination with its surrounding issues, at bottom, addresses the whole question of whose assessment of the USSR is correct—that of the President and those who are realistic about the Soviets, or that of his critics—the proponents of detente and those who are inclined toward wishful thinking and a

mirror-image perception of the USSR. Put yet another way, the real question here is: are the Soviets actually communists or not, and if they are, will we conduct our foreign policy on the basis of this fact?

The Position of the President's Critics

The President's critics answer every one of the above questions on the basis of a wishful-thinking, mirror-image view of the USSR.

—They believe that the Administration is just as responsible as, if not more responsible than, the USSR for U.S.-Soviet tensions, the arms race and lack of progress in arms control. This is evident in their pressures on the President to back off his zero-zero proposal in order to “get the negotiations moving again.” Apparently, the fact that they are not criticizing and pressuring the Soviets to do something means that in their view, the Soviet position is reasonable and the President's is unreasonable. Somehow it is the Soviets and not the President who deserve the benefit of the doubt. Implicit in this view is the mirror-image perception that the Soviets must feel threatened by the prospective U.S. INF deployments and defense buildup and that their fears are legitimate ones.

—They either trust the Soviets (on account of the fact that they never raise questions about Soviet treaty compliance) or they argue that we need not trust them: instead we can rely on the fallacious, mirror-image assumption that the Soviets have just as much incentive to control arms as we do (e.g., the problems of their domestic economy). Their trust of the Soviets

manifests itself in another, even more important way: they refuse to believe that the Soviets are using arms control negotiations as an integral part of their ideological struggle against democracy and that such negotiations are the key to the Soviet strategy of deception.

—They believe that the President (and Adelman as well) is not truly committed to arms control, and that as a result, the Administration position is not only unreasonable but even provocative toward the Soviets. Not one of the Senators opposing Adelman acknowledged that there is any legitimacy to the President's (and Adelman's) hesitation about rushing Cranston-style into new agreements with the Soviets—a hesitation based exclusively on a realistic suspicion about Soviet motivations and behavior.

—They believe that some kind of real peace and accommodation can be reached with Soviets if only we try harder and give the Soviets the right incentives to cooperate with us to realize our alleged “mutual interests.” Arms control negotiations are thus seen as the key to this process. Originally, it was detente that made arms control both possible and desirable. But, since the policy of detente was called into question by Soviet misbehavior, the only thing left to keep detente alive was arms control—the only arena where there appeared to be a mutuality of interest, an interest in avoiding war. Thus the President's critics see arms control as a cooperative enterprise in confidence building and reduction of tension, a process of mutual concessions, mutual interests and mutual advantages. This is in direct contrast to the Soviet, ideological approach to diplomacy which considers negotiations as an arena

of class struggle, a zero-sum game where one side must win and the other must lose.

The common denominator of each of these positions held by the President's critics is that the Soviets are not really communists and therefore do not pursue the unlimited international objectives of a revolutionary communist power, using any means necessary to achieve these goals. Instead they feel that the Soviets are just like any other normal great power, possessing limited international objectives, and desiring their fair share of the spoils. The assumption here is that once the Soviets get their fair share, which may include a "legitimate" security buffer, then they will behave like a good citizen in the existing international order and find an ever greater mutuality of interest with us in controlling arms and maintaining a peaceful international status quo.

If this view of the Soviets is correct,⁵ then the policy of detente with its elements of appeasement and accommodation would be a legitimate foreign policy path to explore. If it is incorrect, then all elements of the policy of detente, including arms control, are put into question and we have to face up to the possibility that we are facing not just a "potential adversary" but a real, live, communist enemy, for whom the mere existence of a democratic United States is an ideological and therefore internal security threat.

As part of their wishful thinking, the President's critics refuse to listen to any portrayal of the East-West conflict that is couched in moral terms. They refuse to acknowledge that military forces are a *reflection* of political, ideological and moral differences and not the cause of them. To repeat, they refuse to believe that the Soviets are really communists.

The President's critics are so unwilling to face this possibility (just as Chamberlain and Co. were unwilling to take Naziism's unlimited revolutionary objectives seriously), that they remain committed to doing everything they can to try to teach the Soviets to be something they cannot be.

To find an arms control violation thus represents not only a failure of these efforts and a failure of the policy of detente, but it represents a repudiation of their wishful-thinking, mirror-image view of the USSR, a view which is the only thing that seems to sustain their hope that peace on earth is possible. Thus, any violations of agreements must be made to go away: either they did not occur, they were passing aberrations, or they have no significant military or political consequences.

It is for this reason that the Carter Administration defined a SALT violation *not* as an act contrary to the terms of the agreement, but as a deliberate act, contrary to the precise terms of SALT, *which results in a significant increase in Soviet strategic power.*

The Soviet Role

The Soviets have one overall objective in this context: to change the correlation of forces (both political and military) in their favor. Their immediate objective is to stop our INF deployments and force us to reduce our defense budget and our strategic programs. Their principal means for achieving these goals are the use of deception and intimidation.

Deception: Their primary deception—their number one disinformation theme—is to convince the West that they are really not communists and that therefore a true

accommodation is possible between us and them. They try to cultivate the notion that they do not really believe in their ideology any more, that they have lost their revolutionary elan, and that there is a new non-orthodox “pragmatic” group in power. The more they can promote this fallacious mirror-image perception in the minds of Western leaders, the more those leaders can be convinced that the Soviets are as interested in arms control as they are.

A related disinformation theme is the idea that the Soviets have as much to fear from Western military forces as we do from theirs. This theme promotes the idea that the U.S. is as responsible as, if not more responsible than the USSR for the arms race and lack of progress in arms control.

If the Soviets can compel Western publics to accept these premises and assumptions, then they can much more easily force us to play the peace game on their terms rather than ours. Thus, they can come to the arms control table and make countless false statements, engage in all sorts of circumventions and violations, and still compel us to sit at the table with them. In spite of a decade’s worth of unilateral U.S. restraint, in spite of all our peaceful international intentions and behavior, much of the West accepts these false notions to be true.⁶

Intimidation: As part of their effort in psychological conditioning, the Soviets have used various forms of intimidation to compel Western publics and leaders to accept their terms of the “peace” game. Principal among these is to encourage us that there will be dire consequences if the arms control process does not continue. Other forms of intimidation include the recent threats that INF deployments would compel the Soviets to target European cities and station similar weapons close to

American borders, and the threat of nuclear attack against the Japanese.

The Soviet Assessment of Western Behavior

The one factor that rarely is considered in situations like this is the true Soviet view. Almost always, the fallacious, mirror-image perception of the Soviet view is the basis upon which Western decisions are made. This mirror-image perception invariably explains that the Soviets will see how their own alleged interests in reducing their own military expenditures and reducing tensions with the West are advanced by the arms control process. This mirror-image perception also explains that the Soviets regard all U.S. negotiating proposals as signs of U.S. strength and self-confidence: after all, isn't the reverse true?—didn't we tell ourselves that the Soviets would never negotiate until they felt strong enough to bargain from a position of relative parity and therefore strength?

The facts are the complete opposite. The Soviets view the very fact that we are sitting at the table with them as something they forced us to do.⁷ Every time we impatiently come up with another negotiating proposal (usually a fall-back position), they regard it the same way. Most significant of all is their perception of our utter lack of response in the face of their continuing circumventions and violations of existing agreements. They can only see this as proof that the correlation of forces has shifted so much in their favor that Western leaders have no choice but to accommodate themselves to the Soviet position that no violations have occurred.⁸

What Is To Be Done

As things currently stand, we are in the intolerable position of being forced by our allies to reject the zero-zero proposal as if we were the ones responsible for no progress in the INF talks, as if we have been negotiating in bad faith.⁹ In other words, we are being forced to act as if we are the principal cause of East-West tensions and the arms race. Since this is unequivocally not so, the Soviets can only view their disinformation efforts as successful and remain convinced that even under Ronald Reagan, the U.S. is too weak to compete politically with them.

If the President loses the nuclear freeze vote (a Soviet proposal, after all), the defense budget vote, the Adelman vote, the MX vote, the Soviets will be even further convinced of the Administration's and America's political weakness. And they will make further plans for more geopolitical offensives around the world based on this view.

The only recourse available to us to reverse this situation is to expose Soviet bad faith in arms control. No explanations of arcane weapons comparisons or military force balances (which can be easily manipulated by sophisters) will either be as convincing or comprehensible to Western publics as a clearcut accusation that the Soviets have been cheating.

If, however, the President accuses them of a violation only on the PL-5 issue, and only on the grounds of impermissible changes in the RV to throw-weight ratio (which would be utterly incomprehensible to the public), then he will be put in a very politically precarious position. His critics will easily be able to portray him as having gotten overly exercised about a miniscule violation that is strategically insignificant. They will try to make the President look petty and foolish.

What he must do, therefore, is to explain to the public that this is the last straw—the straw that broke the camel’s back. He would then explain what all the others straws are.

Presenting the Catalog of Soviet Deceptions, Circumventions and Violations

The President can then point out that:

—The Soviets have consistently violated the 1972 Agreement on the Basic Principles of Relations between the U.S. and the USSR.¹⁰ Since the SALT II Treaty states in its preamble that it “proceeds” from the Basic Principles Agreement, the only foundation of SALT II is being violated.

—The Soviets have violated the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreements of 1962 on the placement of offensive weapons in Cuba. (The President and three top national security officials are already on record with this charge.) Specific violations include the TU-95 Bear, the nuclear capable MIG 23/27’s and others.

—The Soviets have committed more than 30 violations of both SALT I and II and other arms control agreements.

Explaining Why Soviet Deceptions, Circumventions and Violations are an Intrinsic Element of Soviet-Communist Strategy

The most convincing way the President can present the catalog of Soviet violations is by putting them in the context of communist (particularly Leninist) strategy. For the first time in decades, the President can explain the real

basis of the East-West conflict and thus why both sides have the kinds of arsenals they do.

What this really means is that he must show the American people that the Soviets really are communists. He must explain that whether they believe in the ideology or not, the system requires that they must behave as if they believe in it entirely. He must show how the Soviet Party leaders use their ideology as the standard against which deviationism is measured—and how this is the way they identify threats to their rule and thus stay in power.

From this analysis necessarily follows a foreign policy which cannot accept a “social status quo” and thus which considers negotiations as part of the class war.

What Then?

If the President comes forward with these charges and explanations, many will instantly conclude that arms control is dead and that he is leading us to war. To curtail the effect and spread of such accusations, he can immediately declare that the U.S. will continue to negotiate with the Soviets and do everything possible to reach a verifiable agreement—only now it will be on our terms and no longer on Soviet terms.

A Challenge Brewing in the Senate

If the President fails to raise the entire compliance issue he will face a major challenge from conservative Senators. As far as I can tell two measures are being prepared: a SALT II withdrawal resolution and an amendment prohibiting U.S. unilateral compliance with SALT II (on Constitutional grounds).

—If the resolution or amendment wins, SALT II is dead.

—If either fails, it will be followed by passage of a Senate advice and consent resolution on SALT II ratification.

—If this wins, the conservatives will have at least prompted U.S. compliance with SALT II to be in accordance with their Constitutional powers on treaty making.

—If consent for SALT II ratification is given then the President will be in a very difficult spot. He will have to ratify a treaty which he declared to be “fatally flawed” and he will have to do so in the context of the recent evidence of Soviet violations, and face charges of appeasement and cover-up.

—If the President refuses to ratify SALT II after Senate consent, he may face a major conflict with the Senate that may have Constitutional implications.

If the President fails to charge Soviet violations in his March 31 speech, it is very likely that he will be faced with this predicament.

Conclusion

If the President follows the recommendations in this memo:

—He will not only avoid the potential challenge in the Senate;

—He will seize the moral high ground;

—He will take the steam out of the freeze movement;

—He will demonstrate to the Soviets his and America's political strength, thus strengthening our military deterrent in a non-military way;

—He will re-enter the peace game on American terms while rejecting Soviet terms;

—He will gain as good a chance as any of winning the votes on Adelman, the MX, the freeze, and the defense budget;

—He will have told the unadulterated truth, thus confounding the Soviets' number one foreign policy priority—namely to silence Ronald Reagan, and aborting the efforts of their principal disinformation campaign—to convince the West that they are not really communists and that a true accommodation, especially in the form of a good faith arms accord can be reached with them.

—He will have made the strongest case he could possibly make in each of the upcoming political battles he faces.

—He will have avoided appealing to the weakness of the American people—their naive good will and willingness to give others (including the Soviets) the benefit of the doubt; but rather,

—He will have appealed to the strengths of the American people—their pride and greatness, their commonsense view of right and wrong, their devotion to truth, justice and fair play.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (4). Secret. Sent for information. A notation in an unknown hand at the end of the memorandum reads: "Sven Kraemer and Ken DeGraffenreid concur."

² Reagan wrote the number one in the margin of this paragraph. In addition to his marginalia, Reagan also responded in an attached handwritten note, with points relating to these issues. Concerning "The Immediate Issue," he wrote: "1. I think we should seriously discuss with Sec. Shultz a strong demarche—re the test of the P.L.5."

³ Reagan wrote the number two in the margin of this paragraph. Concerning "The Surrounding Immediate Issues," Reagan wrote: "2. Of course we make a strong fight on these issues before long. Decision has been reached on I.N.F."

⁴ Reagan wrote the number three in the margin of this paragraph. Concerning "The Real Issue," Reagan wrote: "3. We know the answers to these questions re—the Soviets and détente as done or attempted was not the answer. There is some truth however that the Soviets are mistrusting of us because they are Russians. They've had a sensitive inferiority complex for centuries. We can be realistic about them & still try for peace. Not to do so is unthinkable."

⁵ Reagan underlined this phrase and wrote in the margin: "This is not correct."

⁶ Reagan underlined this phrase and wrote in the margin: "We must do better than we have in refuting this."

⁷ Reagan underlined this sentence and wrote in the margin: "I can't agree to this. History shows they have always resisted coming to the table."

⁸ Reagan wrote in the margin here: "I agree we must insist on enforcing *to the letter* every agreement we have."

⁹ Reagan underlined this sentence and wrote in the margin: “I don’t believe this is accurate. We knew from the 1st we might have to settle for less but whatever gains we made might make it easier to ultimately get zero-zero.”

¹⁰ The Basic Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations was issued on May 29, 1972, during the Nixon-Brezhnev summit. For the text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 633-635. See also [*Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1972, Document 233*](#).⁴

29. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, March 25, 1983, 1527Z

3597. USSTART/USINF/USSCC. Subject: Soviet Reaction to President's Speech.

1. (C) Summary: After initially charging that U.S. deployments of anti-missile systems would violate the ABM treaty, TASS backed off later in the day yesterday with a more detailed reaction to the President's speech which did not repeat this charge.² In a private conversation, an MFA official with apparent advance warning of the speech commented: "Americans have such confidence in their technology," but "we will do what we need to." We can expect a more authoritative and detailed Soviet public reaction in the next few days. End summary.

TASS Comments

2. (U) The first Soviet reaction to the President's speech was a short TASS dispatch March 24 which asserted flatly that deployment of "systems of anti-missile defense" would violate the ABM treaty and protocol. The item was carried on the Russian language wire, but not on the English language wire meant for foreign audiences or in the March 25 central Soviet press.

3. (U) Later in the day March 24 TASS English carried a longer Washington dispatch asserting that the President's speech was meant to facilitate passage of his "mammoth" arms programs. TASS noted that "observers" had focused on the President's remarks concerning U.S. development of

new anti-missile systems, but made no mention whatever of the ABM treaty. *Pravda* March 25 carried a short excerpt of this TASS item, but without mentioning the strategic defense aspects of the President's speech. (*Izvestiya* March 24 comments reported in septel.) Foreign Ministry Official 4. (C) In a March 23 conversation with French EmbOffs, MFA USA Department Deputy Director Tarasenko dwelled on the theme that "Americans have such confidence in their technology." (French EmbOffs inferred subsequently that Tarasenko had advance knowledge of the President's speech.)³ The Soviet diplomat cautioned, however, that "we'll do what we need, at whatever price, so this military competition makes no sense." Tarasenko added that the U.S. approach in START also would force the Soviet Union to compete technologically. "The U.S. tells us 'you are at a dead end, we'll make your systems obsolete, so destroy them and follow us in the development of new systems.'" Tarasenko drew an analogy between what the U.S. and what the USSR had to do to restructure their strategic forces under U.S. START proposals: "The U.S. wants to negotiate on how to decorate its attic, but wants us to move the foundations of our house."

Embassy Comment

5. (C) We can expect a more authoritative and detailed Soviet public reaction in the next few days. The Soviet media's ambiguous treatment of the question of whether U.S. development of a modern strategic defense would violate the ABM treaty implies that the Soviets have yet to develop a definitive line on this point. Nevertheless, Soviet spokesmen are certain to attack the President's strategic defense plan, emphasizing that it is a new effort to achieve strategic superiority. Soviet military leaders have appeared to be deeply concerned about U.S. programs to modernize

strategic offensive forces. The reawakening of American interest in strategic defenses will compound this concern.

Hartman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830166-0101. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Secretary of Defense, USNATO, and the Mission in Geneva; sent for information to Ankara, Athens, Beijing, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Reykjavik, Rome, The Hague, Tokyo, US MBFR Delegation Vienna, USNMR SHAPE Belgium, CINCSAC Offutt AFB in Nebraska, USCINCEUR Germany, and the Consulate in Leningrad.

² For Reagan's March 23 speech on "Defense and National Security," see [Document 23](#).

³ See [Document 22](#).

30. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, March 28, 1983, 1528Z

3657. Geneva for USINF, USSTART. Subject: Andropov on President's Defense Speech.

1. (U) Andropov's *Pravda* March 27 interview,² on TASS March 26 (presumably available in Washington) disputed the President's March 23 description of the U.S.-Soviet military equation.³ Andropov claimed the President told a "deliberate untruth" in saying the USSR had not observed its unilateral moratorium on deployment of medium-range missiles. He charged that the U.S. intention to acquire ballistic missile defense (BMD) reflects U.S. desire to gain a first strike capability against Soviet strategic forces, which would be deprived of the capability of executing a second strike. Andropov asserted when the USSR and the U.S. negotiated the ABM Treaty, they established an inseparable link between strategic offensive and defensive arms. Along standard lines Andropov warned that the USSR will not allow the U.S. to gain military superiority, and that the U.S. is threatening the whole world.

2. (C) Comment: The tone of Andropov's remarks was the sharpest we have seen from the top Soviet leader for some time. It probably reflects continuing Soviet irritation with the Orlando speech,⁴ as well as concern about the challenges inherent in the President's defense policy speech. The tone, and specifically the statement that the President lied, also may reflect growing Soviet defensiveness about Western charges that SS-20 deployments in the European USSR have continued since

Brezhnev announced the moratorium a year ago March.⁵ Andropov did not attempt to claim that the President's proposed BMD program would violate the ABM treaty, as TASS had charged in the initial Soviet reaction to the President's speech.

Hartman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830170-1044. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to the Consulate in Leningrad, USUN, USNATO, London, Paris, Bonn, the Mission in Geneva, Secretary of Defense, USNMR SHAPE Belgium, USCINCEUR Germany, US Delegation MBFR Vienna, and Mission in Geneva for the INF and START delegations.

² For the full text of Andropov's interview, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXV, No. 13 (April 27, 1983), pp. 4-5.

³ See [Document 23](#).

⁴ See [Document 15](#).

⁵ In a speech on March 16, 1982, Brezhnev proposed a moratorium on deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe. For an extract of his speech, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 118-121.

31. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 28, 1983

SUBJECT

Meeting with Dobrynin

My meeting with Dobrynin today covered four subjects: Andropov's statements about your speech, our new INF proposal, the dialogue on the overall US-Soviet relationship, and the Soviet response to our proposal on the Threshold Test Ban.

I began by pointing out that your speech last week was not polemical but descriptive²—setting forth the facts as we see them. The evidence that deployment of the SS-20s was not frozen is overwhelming. I said that Andropov's claiming you had lied was troublesome and unnecessary, particularly when you had stayed away from invective.³ I reiterated that your statements on ballistic missile defense were consistent with the ABM Treaty and designed to enhance stability. I noted that the Soviet Union was doing work in this field and alone has a deployed ABM system.

Dobrynin responded that the Soviets believe the facts you set forth were not correct, that they should know better whether or not they are adding SS-20s, and that based on the language of the interview Dobrynin believed Andropov was "angry." Dobrynin stressed that the word Andropov used was "untruth" not "lie," and that there is a difference in Russian. He said your speech contradicts the spirit if not the letter of the ABM Treaty.

After once more reiterating the stabilizing objective of your remarks on ballistic missile defense, I turned to INF. I informed Dobrynin that today Paul Nitze had given Kvitsinskiy the approach you had authorized him to make, and I gave Dobrynin the essence of the approach. I stressed that this is consistent with the principles you set forth in the American Legion speech. I noted that we deliberately had not set it in highly explicit form with specific numbers as we regarded this as a matter of negotiation, wanted to invite a Soviet response, but will be ready to put in numbers when the time comes. I underlined that we continue to believe that zero-zero is the best outcome. However, we are not making agreement in principle to zero-zero a condition for agreement on our interim approach. I noted you would be mentioning your proposal in a speech later this week. And I suggested that it be useful for Dobrynin to get together with me and Ambassadors Nitze and Rowny to discuss INF and START respectively between rounds. I urged the Soviets to study our proposals carefully as they are made in the utmost seriousness.

Dobrynin responded in a “preliminary” and uninstructed way by stating that there is a difference in philosophy—the Soviet Union wants reductions, but the United States wants to increase for itself, while asking the Soviet Union to go down. The Soviet Union insists on “equal security” and that French and British systems must be counted. And in perhaps his most important point, Dobrynin said: “It is difficult to see that we will sign an agreement introducing American nuclear missiles into Europe.”

I reiterated the seriousness of our approach and said that it should be viewed in the context of our discussions on bilateral relations. I informed Dobrynin that I would be prepared later this week to resume our discussions on the

broad agenda:⁴ arms control, including the Andropov message on MBFR; the Pentecostals, Shcharanskiy and other such cases; regional issues; and bilateral issues.

Dobrynin then delivered an oral statement in response to our proposal for improvements in the verification provisions of the threshold test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties. We are sending you the full text separately.⁵ The Soviets reject our proposals, claiming that the treaties as written have adequate verification provisions. They urge us to go ahead with ratification of the treaties.⁶ They also urge that we resume negotiations on a comprehensive test ban (CTB) in April or May, 1983. This is obviously a propaganda ploy, as they know we will not renew the CTB talks at this point. We will have further analysis and suggestions for you on this issue.⁷

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (03/24/83-03/25/83). Secret; Sensitive. According to another copy, the memorandum was drafted by Palmer and cleared by Blackwill. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D 188, Sec/Dobrynin 2/15/83) Clark forwarded the memorandum and summarized its main points in an undated memorandum to the President. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, US-Soviet Diplomatic Contacts (3/5)) Reagan initialed the memorandum from Shultz, indicating he saw it.

² See [Document 23](#).

³ See [Document 30](#).

⁴ In his personal notes of a White House meeting the following day on March 29, Dam reiterated Shultz's points on engagement: "The principal meeting of the day occurred in the Situation Room and later in Judge Clark's office. The Secretary, Allen Wallis and I met with Judge Clark and Bud McFarlane, as well as two junior staffers, to discuss the East-West studies. We also talked about how they fit into the discussion of East-West matters at the Williamsburg Summit."

Dam continued: "We then turned to a discussion of relations with the Soviets. The President has agreed in principle to putting in place a process which little by little will lead toward a much broader relationship with the Soviet Union and eventually to a well-prepared summit at which progress could be recorded, if not indeed made. However, it is clear to me that the NSC staff is none too happy about this game plan and tends to resist at each step of the way. How this will work itself out remains to be seen, but it is rather clear that the resolution will be extremely important, not only to U.S.-Soviet relations but also to the posture of the President going into the 1984 elections." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983)

⁵ The oral statement was not found.

⁶ The Threshold Test Ban Treaty was signed in Moscow on July 3, 1974. The Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions was signed in Washington and Moscow on May 28, 1976. In a message to the Senate in 1976, President Ford stated: "The TTB Treaty and the PNE Treaty are closely interrelated and complement one another. The TTB Treaty places a limitation of 150 kilotons on all underground nuclear weapons tests carried out by the Parties. The PNE

Treaty similarly provides for a limitation of 150 kilotons on all individual underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, August 23, 1976, p. 269)

⁷ Reagan highlighted the last five sentences in the margin.

32. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 1, 1983

SUBJECT

New Long-Term Grain Agreement (LTA) with the USSR

The present one-year extension of the Long-Term Grain Agreement with the USSR expires September 30, 1983. As you know, I believe negotiating a new LTA has become a political necessity from many points of view. By moving now, you can take the initiative; receive credit with Congress and the American people; and make sure by our handling of the issue that our Allies and the Soviets understand how the move fits in our overall Soviet policy.

The Administration faces increasing pressures for an LTA from the farm community, the grain trade, and the Congress. All of these sectors view an LTA as an important test of USG support for agriculture trade and the logical culmination of your agricultural export policy. Soviet reluctance to enter our markets, despite your statements on agricultural export policy, has only reinforced the belief that an LTA is essential in reestablishing the US as a reliable supplier. Senators Percy and Dole are now pushing a sense of the Senate Resolution, which calls on you to negotiate a new LTA. It is now scheduled to come to a vote on April 13-14.

I believe that we should move forward quickly on this issue. I recommend that you announce a decision on April 12th—thus moving before the Senate vote. In doing so, however, we must take care to manage a number of political problems that are sure to arise.

The Allies need to understand that this step fits into our approach to the current studies on east-west trade and our discussions with the EC on agricultural exports. I think this problem can be managed by informing them on April 11th that our grain sales will be on commercial terms and will not be subsidized, that the LTA will structure our grain trade to avoid export dependence on the Soviet market, and by reminding them that they are pursuing normal grain sales to the Soviet Union.

The Soviets will need to understand that we are taking this step as part of our strategy of testing the Andropov leadership's intentions on a step-by-step basis. If you agree, I would inform Ambassador Dobrynin in the context of our dialogue that this decision is a manifestation of your desire to work towards improved relations, provided the Soviets are willing to engage in give-and-take and to take similar positive steps. In recent bilateral grain consultations in Moscow, the Soviets affirmed their interest in a new LTA and suggested it could lead to increased purchases.² Of course our negotiating leverage with the Soviets will be limited by the grain market glut, the Durenberger Amendment delivery assurance and the USSR's LTA's with Canada and Argentina; the PIK Program, however, works in our favor.

Our public needs to understand that we are not stepping back from our firm approach to Soviet misbehavior and our Afghanistan/Poland sanctions regime. We would point out to domestic and foreign audiences that our concerns about the USSR's behavior—including its military buildup, its geopolitical expansionism and its record of human rights violations—remain unchanged. However, the Poland sanction postponing LTA negotiations has already made our political point, and at considerable cost to the American

farmer. It is unfair to make him continue to pay this price alone.

I recommend you authorize me to inform our Allies on April 11 that we are now willing to negotiate a new LTA. Bill Clark and I would inform Don Regan, Jack Block, Mac Baldrige, Cap Weinberger and Bill Brock the same day that you had decided to go ahead. I would inform Ambassador Dobrynin the next day. We also would inform key Senators and Congressmen that same day as well as issue a public statement. It is important that we keep this decision to the fewest possible people until April 11th or we will have additional problems with the Allies and lose your impact on the Congress, the public and the Soviets.³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/01/83). Secret; Sensitive. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Burt forwarded a draft to Shultz on March 31. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, March 17-31) Clark forwarded the memorandum to the President on April 5. See [Document 35](#) and [footnote 5](#) thereto.

² In telegram 3691 from Moscow, March 29, the Embassy provided a full report of these meetings: "The US-USSR semi-annual grain consultations were held in Moscow March 24-25. The sessions were cordial throughout, and the atmosphere was improved over previous consultations. The Soviets were unusually forthcoming with import data. The delegations reviewed the current world grain market and the new PIK program. The Soviet side hinted that financial conditions in 1982 had caused some drawing down of grain reserves in lieu of purchases, but did not

provide any 1982 harvest figures. After voicing usual criticisms of U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union, the Soviets said they were interested in a long-term grain agreement, and implied they would buy more from the U.S. if a new LTA were negotiated. They did not rule out further purchases from the U.S. this year.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830173-0091)

³ Reagan did not initial his approval or disapproval of the recommendation, but see [Document 47](#).

33. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 2, 1983

SUBJECT

Gromyko's Press Conference

As expected, the focus of Gromyko's press conference—both his one-hour, essentially ad-libbed opening statement and the follow-up questions and answers—was the INF negotiations.² He said explicitly that our interim proposal was “unacceptable,” characterizing it as a step backward in the negotiations and inconsistent with the principles of “equality and equal security.” However, in his tone Gromyko was restrained by Soviet standards, according to Embassy Moscow; while lamenting that the U.S. does not want improved US-Soviet relations, he was careful to avoid *ad hominem* attacks on you or other U.S. officials.³

Gromyko cited three reasons why agreement on the basis of our proposal was impossible:

- Our refusal to limit U.S. nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe and on aircraft carriers;
- Our refusal to take British and French nuclear forces into account in calculating the level of INF on the U.S. side; and
- Our insistence on limiting SS-20s in the Asian part of the USSR.

At the same time, he did not exclude the possibility of continued Soviet participation in the INF negotiations after

U.S. deployments were initiated.

Judging by Gromyko's approach, it is evident Moscow is still determined to hinder our INF deployments and undermine our negotiating position by political means. By throwing cold water on the new U.S. proposal and by seeking to occupy the high ground in the ongoing war of words between Washington and Moscow, the Soviets calculate that the renewed West European support for our position will quickly dissipate—leading to pressures on us even before the next round to make more substantial concessions.

Highlights of the Press Conference

The conference lasted about two hours, the first half of which was taken up by Gromyko's opening statement. In those remarks, Gromyko said that the U.S. was "erroneously" asserting that serious negotiations were taking place in Geneva, and declared that your new INF proposal was "not a road to peace." He called "absurd" the U.S. position on exclusion of nuclear-capable aircraft from the negotiations, and went on at length on the need to take British and French forces into account. Citing data showing that NATO's advantage in intermediate-range warheads would increase from 50% to 250% under the U.S. proposal, Gromyko suggested that the U.S. designed the proposal so as to ensure Soviet rejection, since our sole aim was to deploy new U.S. missiles.

In the follow-up questions, Gromyko stated explicitly that the Soviet Union would not dismantle SS-20s reduced in the European USSR, but insisted on the right to transfer the missiles to Asia to offset U.S. nuclear capabilities in the Far East, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf. (Given the

growing Japanese and Chinese concerns, it is surprising Gromyko was so explicit on this point.) He also insisted that the USSR was keeping its word on its moratorium on European SS-20 deployments.

Gromyko was evasive in response to questions about Soviet policy in the event U.S. deployments actually went forward. He refused to state that the Soviets would suspend negotiations, or that they would not accept an agreement under which some U.S. deployments were permitted. He side-stepped a question on counterdeployments in Cuba, stressing only that the USSR would not accept a position of "inequality."

Gromyko gave a lengthy and obviously well-prepared response to several questions on US-Soviet relations. With reference to your Orlando speech, Gromyko said that insults against the USSR were "unbecoming" to the U.S., and that the Soviets do not seek to impose their ideology on anyone. He asked rhetorically whether a country proposing the renunciation of nuclear first-use and the elimination of all nuclear weapons could be described as the "focus of evil." To a follow-up question, he declared that the Soviet Union seeks better relations with the U.S., that such relations would be in both sides' interests, but that the U.S. was insisting on fundamental concessions detrimental to legitimate Soviet interests. He called on the U.S. to be more "objective." (Gromyko avoided any comment on your speech proposing accelerated ballistic missile defense research.)

We will be releasing a statement shortly that refutes Gromyko's main points, and sustains the momentum of your new initiative.⁴

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/13/83-04/15/83); NLR-748-24-10-2-8. Secret. Reagan initialed the attached FBIS press report, which summarized U.K. Foreign Minister Pym's rebuttal to Gromyko's press conference. (FBIS 58, April 2, 1983; "Pym Attacks Gromyko's Rejection of Reagan's Proposals")

² Gromyko held a press conference in Moscow on April 2. His remarks were largely responding to Reagan's March 30 remarks proposing an interim agreement on INF forces. See [footnote 4, Document 22](#).

³ In telegram 3952 from Moscow, April 2, the Embassy reported: "During a two hour April 2 press conference, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko conveyed an image of firm restraint in responding to U.S. proposals for an interim INF agreement and commenting on a range of international issues. Gromyko's tone seemed deliberately calculated to prevent further escalation in U.S.-Soviet rhetoric, and as to avoid frightening European and U.S. public opinion." The Embassy continued: "Gromyko was equally cautious in response to questions on U.S.-Soviet relations and international issues. Asked to comment on the President's characterization of the USSR as the 'focus of evil,' Gromyko praised Moscow's international role rather than attacking the U.S." and "reasserted Soviet interest in improved relations with the United States. In short, we read Gromyko's performance as an effort to impress the U.S. and other audiences with Soviet seriousness and responsibility as it moves into the next, crucial stage of the year of the missiles." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830183-0773) For extracts of Gromyko's statement before a question-and-answer session, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 253-261.

⁴ The Department's statement was transmitted in telegram 90889 to all NATO capitals, Moscow, Beijing, and Tokyo, April 2. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830183-0840)

34. Editorial Note

By early April 1983, the situation with the Russian Pentecostals who had taken refuge in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow since June 1978 began to take a turn. Since their meeting with President Ronald Reagan on February 15 (see [Document 10](#)), Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and Secretary of State George Shultz had continued the discussions about the Pentecostal situation. On February 28, Soviet Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov delivered a message to Shultz (see [Document 12](#)), which Shultz deemed a “significant overture” in his memoir. (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 168) Due to an illness, one member of the Pentecostals, Lidia Vashchenko, had been allowed to leave the Embassy to be admitted to the hospital. She then returned to her home town in Siberia in January 1983. On April 2, Shultz sent a memorandum to Reagan informing him that “Soviet authorities have requested Lidia Vashchenko to apply formally for exit permission and on March 30 she did so. She is now in her hometown, Chernogorsk, awaiting a decision on her application. If it is approved, she will receive an Israeli visa (her nominal destination) in Moscow and exit via Vienna.”

Shultz went on to comment that the United States might have difficulties convincing the other six Pentecostals to leave the Embassy and apply for exit permission. “Even a dramatic development such as Lidia’s departure may not make this easy, since the Vashchenko and Chmykhalov families remain deeply afraid of what may happen to them.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/02/83))

Shultz planned to send Dr. Olin Robison to Moscow to visit the Pentecostals in the Embassy. He wrote in his memoir:

“Robison, president of Middlebury College and a lay Baptist minister, had spent time in the embassy during the Carter administration and knew the Pentecostals well. He was the right person, we felt, to explain to the Pentecostals what had happened and to express our view that if they left the U.S. embassy, the Soviets would likely grant them permission to leave the Soviet Union.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 170)

Robison came to Washington and met with Shultz on April 5. Robison also met with Sokolov, whom he had known for many years. In an April 5 memorandum to Shultz, Richard Burt reported: “Robison made clear at the outset that he was seeking neither assurances nor responses from Sokolov. He wanted Sokolov to be fully aware of what he was doing. Robison told Sokolov he was going to Moscow because he is convinced after seeing both the Secretary and the President that the time is propitious for the Pentecostals to leave the Embassy, and because of his concern for them as individuals.” Robison stressed that the “Soviets surely know how important it is to ranking members of the U.S. Government that this matter come out right.” He continued that “this is an exceptional opportunity for something constructive to transpire, and Lidia’s current travel has led him and others to be optimistic.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive File, April 1–8 1983)

In the meantime, Lidia Vashchenko was given an exit visa to leave the Soviet Union. In his diary entry on April 6, Reagan wrote: “They have let Lydia—the young hunger striker member of the family that’s been living in the embassy basement in Moscow for 4 yrs. go. She is in Vienna as of today.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 212) Lidia

being allowed to leave the Soviet Union helped compel the departure of the remaining Pentecostals. In his memoir, Shultz recalled: “Dr. Robison and others in our embassy had a strong set of arguments to work with and Lidia’s departure was the clincher. On April 12, the Vashchenko and Chmykhalov families left the U.S. embassy, took flights to their village in Siberia, and applied for permission to leave. Lidia’s invitation to her family to join her in Israel fulfilled the final condition imposed on the Vashchenkos for their departure from our embassy.” Shultz “assured President Reagan that we would monitor the developments in Siberia as closely as possible, but, of course, we had no American personnel there. We now had taken the fate of these human beings into our hands. And by this time we were dependent on the reliability of the inferences the Soviets had encouraged us to make from their statements.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pages 170–171) On April 12, Reagan wrote in his diary: “*Today the Pentacostals left the Am. Embassy basement in Moscow where they’ve lived in the basement for 4 yrs. They left at our request. We think—well more than that we’re sure we have a deal that they will be allowed to emigrate.*” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 215)

35. Memorandum From Norman Bailey, John Lenczowski, and Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, April 4, 1983

SUBJECT

Shultz Memo to the President on a New Long-Term Grain Agreement (LTA) with the USSR

Secretary Shultz has written to the President (Tab A)² recommending that he be authorized to announce to our Allies on April 11 and to Ambassador Dobrynin on April 12 our decision to negotiate a new long-term grain agreement (LTA) with the Soviets. The reasons given for wanting to do this are:

- It is a political necessity.
- To preempt the Percy/Dole Senate resolution calling on the President to negotiate a new LTA (scheduled for vote April 13 or 14).
- We would gain credit with Congress and the public.

The memo sets forth a series of steps to deal with Allied and public criticism and proposes that Regan, Block, Baldrige, Weinberger and Brock be notified of the President's decision the same day (April 11) we notify the Allies.

We believe this to be part of the State Department's attempt to implement on a piecemeal basis Secretary Shultz's strategy memos on U.S.-Soviet relations of January

and March.³ The memo further states: “The Soviets will need to understand that we are taking this step as part of our strategy of testing the Andropov leadership’s intentions on a step-by-step basis.” This is indeed the intent of the strategy suggested by the earlier Shultz memos. But, whatever the merits of a new LTA, we do not see how it can be construed as a means of “testing” Andropov’s intentions.

Our principal reservation with the Secretary’s proposal is that launching negotiations for an LTA at this particular moment does not seem to be in complete consonance with what we understand is the President’s overall approach to U.S.-Soviet relations. It is our impression that the President wants an incremental process:⁴ some concrete progress on some of the smaller issues such as the Pentecostals; and if the Soviets are willing to concede something on such issues first, then we would return a Soviet favor by negotiating certain agreements with them. Then, having established a pattern of negotiating behavior which impresses the Soviets with our strength and ability to enforce reciprocity, we could approach them on larger issues like an LTA without suffering the consequences of negotiating like a supplicant from a position of weakness.

Additionally, the timing Shultz’s proposal suggested is bad for the following reasons:

- The President may announce soon Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements.
- The East-West economic relations studies are in a delicate stage and grain sales are a red flag before the European bull.
- Such an announcement is likely to impinge unfavorably on an harmonious economic Summit.

The most persuasive arguments for an LTA are domestic political and economic ones. So, if a decision is reached to proceed with this, it would be in spite of a variety of compelling foreign policy considerations.

Finally, at Bill Brock's urging, you have requested that the LTA issue be put on the SIG-IEP agenda, and it is scheduled for April 14. Of course, it can be taken off, but what explanation do we make to Brock? Indeed, what explanation do we give to *all* the Cabinet officials listed above when they are told on April 11 of a decision in the formulation of which they not only had no role but were not even given a chance to have a role?

If Shultz's proposal is approved, it would cause an uproar from other Cabinet members who have an abiding interest in this issue. This, in conjunction with the other foreign policy problems, could be damaging not only to the President, but to Secretary Shultz.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That you sign the attached memo to the President (Tab A).⁵

That you raise orally with the President the potential problems this proposal creates within the Cabinet and for the Administration as a whole.⁶

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/01/83) (3). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for Urgent Action. In a cover note to Poindexter, McFarlane wrote: "The attached memo, which Shultz sent over by courier, is being staffed (closehold) by Norman Bailey in coordination with John

Lenczowski, Doug McMinn and Don Fortier. The Secretary's proposal that no one else be involved until the day of the announcement (Brock, Block, Regan etc) won't work. Still we can find a way to do it discreetly."

² See [Document 32](#).

³ See [Documents 1](#), [13](#), and [19](#).

⁴ "Incremental process" is underlined, likely by Clark.

⁵ Clark indicated neither his approval nor disapproval of the recommendation; however, the memorandum from Clark to Reagan, with Shultz's April 1 memorandum attached, was sent on April 5 (see [Document 32](#)).

⁶ Clark indicated neither his approval nor disapproval of the recommendation.

36. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 6, 1983

SUBJECT

The Menu of Current Issues in East-West Relations

We currently have before us several State Department proposals on East-West relations requiring decisions. Although you have received individual memoranda on each of these, we believe it would be useful for you to consider each in the broader context. The specific proposals are:

- To negotiate a new cultural exchange agreement with the Soviets (Tab 1);²
- To negotiate a new Long-Term Grain Agreement (LTA) with the Soviets (Tab 2);³
- To set up new consulates in New York and Kiev (a proposal contained in Tab 3);⁴
- To adopt a new strategy for Poland, including: a linkage between debt rescheduling and a lifting of repression, an offer to the Polish regime to renew LOT (Polish airlines) charter flights, and an effort to seek Soviet acquiescence on a national reconciliation in Poland (Tab 4).⁵

While these proposals have merit, taken together they may give the appearance of expanding ties and increasing cooperation, allowing the contention that we are tilting toward detente.

Each proposal forms a part of a broader set of issues. The cultural exchange question might be handled in tandem with the problem of enforcing reciprocity and controlling the hostile intelligence presence. The SIG-Intelligence is developing a broader set of options on part of this issue that will need high-level discussion. This is an issue on which our Allies are working seriously. Seven of our Allies have expelled Soviet agents this year alone.

The proposal for new consulates has been presented with virtually no pros and cons and we might discuss those today with George. Of all the proposals, this one gives the greatest appearance of expanded diplomatic ties and cooperation. Whether or not you proceed with it might depend on a careful balancing of the intelligence benefits versus the various disadvantages. The LTA proposal has not been handled through the interagency process, and currently presents potential problems for us with our Allies. Finally, of the various proposals for Poland, any request for the Soviets' assistance must be placed in the context of the extreme unlikelihood that they would actually help us to bring about reforms in Poland; and the proposed renewal of LOT flights must be analyzed in terms of how the Soviets would perceive such a move: as yet another "first step" or olive branch extended by the US as if we were responsible for the tensions in US-Polish relations—as if our sanctions were somehow mistaken and deserved to be retracted.

All of these proposals, of course, appear in an even more complex context. Other issues bearing on them are also coming up soon:

—The whole problem of Soviet compliance with arms control agreements. The NSC staff is working on an options paper that will raise serious questions about how we are to deal with the Soviets in light of ever-

increasing evidence that they have not been playing fairly. If indeed we raise the compliance issue, as I believe we inevitably must (given the mounting evidence), the prospect of conducting a whole new set of negotiations, expanded ties and cooperation may appear to be totally illogical and short-sighted. It gives the impression to the Soviets, our Allies and the American people that Administration is neither serious about treaty compliance nor capable of coordinating both right and left hands at the same time.

—The wholesale Soviet rejection of your latest INF proposal.⁶ Apparently the Soviets must still believe that the correlation of forces is tilting so much in their favor that they can risk rejecting a proposal that at least today has won the support of our European allied governments. The only conceivable reason for this summary rejection is that they must feel that their disinformation, propaganda, and manipulation of Western public opinion has been so successful that they believe that they can stoke up enough public opposition to your proposal in the next few months to pressure Allied governments once again to call for a new, more satisfactory US INF proposal. The Soviets feel that they succeeded in doing this to your zero option and that they can do the same again.

—Andropov has personally accused you of lying.⁷ This raises to new levels the temerity with which the Kremlin feels it can deal with the West. Although the Soviet propaganda machine regularly makes such accusations, the last time in anyone's memory that such an accusation was made by the Party boss was when the Soviets were in a position of relative weakness—a position that was definitely perceived as

such by the Kremlin itself. The difference today is that the Soviets perceive that the correlation of forces is tilted in favor of socialism worldwide—especially in the most critical element in their view—the political-ideological measurement. How you might handle this new Andropov accusation is at issue.

—Georgi Arbatov, the well-known Soviet scholar-disinformation agent, has applied for a visa to come to the US for several weeks to attend conferences and utilize the US media for Soviet purposes. State recommended⁸ granting him a visa despite the fact that the technical-legal circumstances of his visa application permit us to deny him one. His planned activities here are symbolic of the utter lack of reciprocity in these matters—especially access to the mass media. This issue gives special impetus to deal with the legal mechanisms at our disposal to enforce real reciprocity.

—Our effort to persuade the Pentacostalists to leave our Embassy.⁹ If the Soviets actually permit them to emigrate, it will be a victory for quiet diplomacy and the humanitarian cause of these beleaguered people. However, there are two dangers involved here: First is the possibility that the Soviet will not follow through. If this is the case, we must be prepared to inflict a sanction that must do justice to the pain that these poor people may have to suffer. Secondly, there is the danger that the Soviets may attempt to show the world what great liberals and humanitarians they are. This is standard practice most every time a communist regime lets somebody out of the gulag or permits someone to emigrate. This is a normal element of their strategy to deceive the West about their real intentions.

—Finally, we have the defense budget, the MX, the nuclear freeze and Adelman votes coming up in Congress. How we conduct the overall US-Soviet relationship, including our assessment of how much a political as well as military threat the Soviets present, will have enormous bearing on each of these issues.

All this is not to say that State's proposals should be rejected. For example, there *is* merit in a new exchange agreement *so long as* we utilize existing legal mechanisms first to enforce reciprocity and to gain negotiating leverage. There is merit to an LTA—but for domestic, political and economic reasons. The question of new consulates may have some merits—but pros and cons have yet to be aired.

In conclusion, NSC staff feels that all these issues must be discussed as part of the broader context. They also feel that things are moving much too fast and deserve more caution and coherent planning. Each issue has enormous public diplomacy implications which have not been adequately raised as yet. Since these public questions, both domestic and foreign, affect such things as the defense budget and our intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities, I feel that Defense, CIA and other relevant parties should be permitted some input into these decisions. Too much is at stake here to permit their absence.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (5). Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Lenczowski. A note in an unknown hand at the top of the page reads: "For discussion with Geo. Shultz at 4 pm."

² See [Document 18](#).

³ See [Document 32](#).

⁴ A memorandum from Shultz dated March 16 is listed but not attached.

⁵ A memorandum from Shultz dated March 28 is listed but not attached.

⁶ On March 30, Reagan proposed an “Interim Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Reduction Agreement,” in remarks at the White House. “To this end, Ambassador Paul Nitze has informed his Soviet counterpart that we are prepared to negotiate an interim agreement in which the United States would substantially reduce its planned deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles, provided the Soviet Union reduce the number of its warheads on longer range INF missiles to an equal level on a global basis.” (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book I, p. 474)

⁷ For Andropov’s reaction to Reagan’s March 23 speech proposing a new U.S. missile defense program (see [Document 23](#)), see [Document 30](#).

⁸ An unknown hand revised this to read “may recommend.”

⁹ See [Document 34](#).

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37. Memorandum of a Meeting

Washington, April 6, 1983, 4 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (5). Secret. Not for the System. Shultz initialed the memorandum. A notation in an unknown hand indicates that the original was carried to the White House by the Secretary on April 7. In an April 7 covering memorandum to Shultz, McManaway noted that the memorandum had been dictated by Dam and explained: "As you know at your breakfast meeting this morning Judge Clark asked for a memorandum that would codify the decisions made with the President yesterday on the subjects you would discuss with Ambassador Dobrynin; and that such a memo be provided to him for review prior to your meeting with Dobrynin. "Ken Dam has dictated the attached memorandum in response to Judge Clark's request. Charlie and I would like to suggest that there is some risk in actually providing the paper which could find its way down

to the NSC staff and invite reopening of decisions made. We also question the establishment of such a precedent. If you agree with these concerns you might want to use the attached paper for a phone call to the Judge in lieu of sending him a memorandum.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive April 1-17)

38. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 7, 1983, 2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Memoranda of Conversation 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt; cleared by Eagleburger, McManaway, and Farrell. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office.

39. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, April 7, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/05/83-04/07/83). Secret; Sensitive. Clark's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

40. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Hill) to the President's

Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, April 7, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive April 1-17, Confidential. In a covering memorandum to Shultz, Burt wrote: "I understand that at the NSPG Friday [April 8] you may want to raise these issues. At Tab 1 are talking points. At Tab 2 are options papers we sent to the NSC." The NSPG meeting on April 8 did not address the exchanges and consulate issues; instead, it dealt entirely with Poland. Information on this NSPG meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. IX, Poland, 1982-1988.

41. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan, Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, the Ambassador to the United Nations (Kirkpatrick), and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, April 14, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, April 9-20 1983. Secret.

42. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 14, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D188, Reagan/Shultz/Dobrynin plus Shultz or Dam/Dobrynin in Washington, D.C. February-1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt.

43. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 18, 1983, 5:45 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Memoranda of Conversation 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt; cleared by Dam and Hill. An unknown hand initialed for Dam and Hill. The meeting took place in the Deputy Secretary's office. Dam was acting for Shultz, who was in Mexico City to attend the meeting of the U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission. On April 18, Dam sent the President a memorandum summarizing the meeting with Dobrynin. He noted that the State Department would "initiate the appropriate inter-agency action to follow up on the Soviet response." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, April 9-20 1983) Telegram 106831/Tosec 30036, to Secretary Shultz in Mexico City and for information to Moscow, April 19, contained a summary of the meeting and the text of the Soviet oral statement. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Memoranda of Conversation 1983)

44. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Howe) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, April 20, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, April 9-20 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley and Minton; cleared by Hall, Combs, Palmer, Dean, and Labowitz. Forwarded through Eagleburger. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.

45. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, April 21, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/21/83). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. In a forwarding memorandum to Shultz, Palmer noted: "I have prepared the attached memorandum to the President reporting on your meeting this afternoon with Dobrynin. Given the fact that Dobrynin did not yet have any definite answer on the LTA and the continuing sensitivity of this issue, I have not included any reference to that matter in this memo." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, April 18-30)

46. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, April 22, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/13/83-04/15/83). Confidential. Sent for information. Prepared by Dobriansky, who forwarded a draft to Clark on April 20. Reagan initialed this memorandum, indicating he saw it.

47. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)

Washington, April 22, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982-Sept. 1983. Secret. Dictated on April 22.

48. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 5, 1983, 11:15 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, May 1-15. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Palmer. Cleared by Eagleburger, Dam, and McManaway. The meeting took place in the Acting Secretary's office.

49. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State (Dam) to President Reagan

Washington, May 5, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/02/83-05/06/83). Secret; Sensitive. In a May 5 action memorandum to Dam, Burt wrote: "In accordance with usual practice, we have prepared appropriate reports on today's meeting with Dobrynin for your approval." Attached to Burt's memorandum were: "1) a memorandum to the President on today's meeting with Dobrynin; 2) a cable to the Secretary and Ambassador Hartman on the INF discussion; and 3) a separate cable to the Secretary and interested posts on the Middle East discussion." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D188, Reagan/Shultz/Dobrynin plus Shultz or Dam/Dobrynin in Washington, D.C. February-May 1983) In a May 10 memorandum to Clark, Lenczowski wrote: "Acting Secretary Kenneth Dam has sent the President a memcon of his meeting with Dobrynin. (Tab A) Your cover memorandum to the President (Tab I) briefly summarizes Dam's memo but adds no further comment. The only comment the memo might deserve is that it demonstrates yet again how fruitless most of our dialogue with the Soviets really is. This is not to say that the dialogue is politically worthless to the United States: the mere fact that we can say we are talking to the Soviets is beneficial. But it is to say that the President's policy of general caution in dealing with the Soviets and avoiding putting too large an investment in this dialogue in hopes of achieving a true peace with the Soviets is a wise and far-sighted policy." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File,

Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/02/83–05/06/83)) Clark wrote “I agree,” and he initialed his approval that the memorandum be forwarded to the President. Reagan initialed Clark’s May 16 covering memorandum, which forwarded Dam’s May 5 memorandum.

50. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, May 11, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files: Lot 85D308, Memos To/From S, 1983. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation reading “GPS” and Hill’s handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating they saw it. Shultz was in the Middle East to negotiate a troop withdrawal from Lebanon from April 25 to May 8, then traveled to Paris from May 8 to May 11 for the OECD meeting.

51. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)

Washington, May 17, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983. Secret. Dictated on May 17.

52. Memorandum From William Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, May 18, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/19/84-06/27/84); NLR-748-25A-5-7-7. Confidential. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Lenczowski. Poindexter wrote in the top margin: "President has seen. JP."

53. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, May 20, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (6). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

54. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, May 21, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (6). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. In forwarding a draft to Shultz on May 17, Burt wrote: "Per your instructions this afternoon, we have prepared the attached memorandum to the President."

You may find the last paragraph too strongly worded for your tastes. If so, you could decide to delete all but the first sentence." No changes were made in the paragraph.

(Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, May 16-23 1983) On an NSC routing slip attached to Shultz's memorandum, Poindexter wrote: "Judge, I have tasked the staff to prepare a cover memo for this to go to President on Sunday [May 22]. George just will not follow the interagency process. After my conversation with you yesterday, I told State 10 June NSC meeting on U.S.-Soviet Relations was still scheduled and we still needed an interagency paper on consulates and cultural agreement. My tasking memo is attached. I had passed verbal instructions to them earlier. I'm sure George will want to talk about this at 0945 on Monday. JP." (Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (6))

55. Note From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, May 21, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (6).
Secret; Sensitive.

56. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)

Washington, May 23, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983. Secret. Dictated on May 23.

57. Letter From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, May 26, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, May 1983. Sensitive; Eyes Only. Not for the System.

58. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, May 27, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (7). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

59. Memorandum From Douglas McMinn of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, June 9, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/09/83). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Bailey. Clark's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

60. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, June 14, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, June 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System. Forwarded through Eagleburger.

61. Editorial Note

62. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 15, 1983, 4:50-5:50 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers, Working File: Contains Originals (14). Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information on the

memorandum. The meeting took place in the Treaty Room in the Residence of the White House.

63. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, June 16, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/14/83) (1). Confidential. Sent for action. Prepared by Matlock.

64. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 18, 1983, 9:45 a.m.-12:15 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1983 May-June, Mtgs. w/A. Dobrynin. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. The memorandum of conversation was approved by the Secretary in telegram Secto 7003 from the Secretary's aircraft, June 23. The text printed here incorporates the changes approved in the telegram. Brackets are in the original. On June 20, Shultz sent the President a memorandum summarizing his conversation with Dobrynin. At the end of the memorandum, Shultz noted: "As I see it, by your decision we have now taken the initiative to move our dialogue forward on the basis of our agenda, and the ball is truly in the Soviet court. We cannot at this point predict how they will respond, but we are at least in a position to say we have undertaken a major effort." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and

Soviet Union, USSR (06/19/83-06/24/83)) Reagan initialed Shultz's June 20 memorandum, indicating he saw it.

65. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Hill) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, June 22, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/19/83-06/24/83). Secret; Sensitive. This memorandum is based on another, undated, from Burt through Eagleburger to Shultz. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive June 9-16 1983)

66. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, undated

Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 6/16-30/83. Secret; Sensitive. Hill initialed for Shultz. On June 23, Bosworth sent Hill a draft of the memorandum and attached paper, which Hill forwarded to Clark. Hill commented in a covering note to Clark "Attached is the Secretary of State's reply to the President's memorandum of June 7 on our foreign policy goals and priorities over the next 18 months. We have treated this reply as particularly sensitive and have not distributed it in the Department of

State. It includes, at the end, an annex on Presidential travel which refers to some sensitive matters discussed between the President and the Secretary. If this paper is given a wider circulation (which we do not recommend), you have the option of detaching the last section.” (Ibid). On June 13, in a memorandum to Bosworth, Shultz wrote: “I look to you to organize a discussion of this important subject sometime within the next 10 days. It seems to me that all the members of your council should be included. We might consider, also, some people outside of the Department, in Government or out. I am not suggesting a gigantic meeting but some way of organizing discussions promptly and aggressively.” (Ibid.)

67. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, undated

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/25/83-06/28/83). Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. A stamp on the memorandum reads: “Received 83 Jun 25.” On June 16 in a note to Matlock, McFarlane wrote: “For many reasons—some good and some not so good—we owe the President a thoughtful treatment of whether, and if so, why and how a Summit meeting should be held. We have already given him two solid papers which treat the historical record, and emphasizing the damage which can be done to our long term interests by creating a false euphoria in the minds of Americans which makes it difficult to contend with the continued misbehavior by the Soviets in the wake of a summit. In short, we have stressed that for a summit to be worthwhile, it must involve the resolution of

problems, not atmospheric.” McFarlane requested a paper from Matlock addressing a possible agenda and topics for discussion. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File—Summitry—USSR (2/2)) While no drafting information was found on Clark’s memorandum, it seems likely it originated with McFarlane’s request to Matlock.

68. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, June 27, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/25/83–06/28/83); NLR-748-24-27-4-8. Secret. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. A handwritten note reads: “PDB—0930.”

69. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, July 7, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, Summitry—USSR (2/2). Secret. Sent for information.

70. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Andropov

Washington, July 11, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Andropov (8290913, 8391028, 8391032). No classification marking. The editor transcribed the letter from Reagan's handwritten original. An image of the handwritten letter is Appendix C. In his memoir, Shultz noted: "I later discovered that the president had shown his first draft to Bill Clark and, on the advice of Clark, he had taken out the sentences 'If we can agree on mutual, verifiable reductions in the number of nuclear weapons we both hold, could this not be a first step toward elimination of all such weapons? What a blessing this would be for the people we both represent.' President Reagan was consistently committed to his personal vision of a world without nuclear weapons; his advisers were determined to turn him away from that course." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 360)

71. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, July 13, 1983

Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 7/1-15/83. Secret; Nodis. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Hill's initials are stamped on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

72. Memorandum From the Chief of the International Activities Division, Central Intelligence Agency, to Director of Central Intelligence Casey

Washington, July 14, 1983

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 85M00363R: Box 13, Folder: DCI Meetings with Secretary of State (Shultz), 7/15/1983. Secret; Sensitive. [text not declassified]. Forwarded through the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director for Operations.

73. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 15, 1983, 8-9 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, July 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt; cleared by Seitz. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. Shultz summarized the meeting in a memorandum to the President on July 15. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (07/08/83-07/19/83)) On July 22 in a covering memorandum to Seitz requesting approval of this memorandum of conversation, McKinley wrote: "The second question is tricky. Rick Burt wants to send to the members of the START IG the pertinent extract of the Dobrynin conversation, as well as the START portion of the 'oral statement.' The START IG will appreciate this gesture. It could head off disputes and disagreements. It also makes Burt look good. On balance, however, I would recommend against letting the memo go. Despite the fact that Rowny has the START related portion of the conversation already by cable, we have in the past gotten away with not circulating Dobrynin memcons in Washington. This partial break with that precedent could whet the appetites of other agencies for full disclosure or lead to charges that we were

manipulating information. Please give me your guidance.”
(Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, July 1983)

74. Memorandum From Paula Dobriansky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, July 21, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (07/20/83). Secret. Sent for action. Lenczowski, Matlock, and Sims initialed their concurrence.

75. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, August 3, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive August 1-15 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons and Palmer. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on August 3.

76. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, August 4, 1983

Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 8/1-15/83. Confidential. Drafted by Sestanovich; cleared by Azrael and Boeker. An unknown hand initialed for Sestanovich, Azrael, and Boeker.

77. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, August 4, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, Presidential Briefing [1983-1984]. Secret. Prepared by Dobriansky. Copies were sent to Bush, Meese, Baker, and Deaver. Reagan initialed at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

78. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, August 10, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (08/05/83-08/09/83). Confidential. Sent for action. Fortier, Kraemer, Raymond, Sims, and Sommer concurred with this memorandum. Lenczowski initialed for Fortier, Kraemer, and Sims.

79. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, August 18, 1983, 2058Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830007-0378. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis. A notation in the telegram indicates that “#” indicates an omission in the original.

80. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, August 23, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (08/05/83-08/09/83). Confidential. Sent for information. Prepared by Lenczowski.

81. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Andropov to President Reagan

Washington, August 27, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985-1986, E.4 President/Andropov Correspondence. Secret. A typed notation on the letter reads: “Translation from the Russian.” The letter was forwarded to the President with an attached covering memorandum from Shultz on August 29 (see Document 82).

82. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, August 29, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Brezhnev (8290913, 8391028, 8391032). Secret; Sensitive. A notation on the routing slip for Shultz's memorandum reads: "Sep 02 83 Pres Noted."

83. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, August 30, 1983

Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 8/16-31/83. Secret. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Burt and Azrael forwarded the memorandum to Shultz through Eagleburger under cover of an action memorandum on August 30. Simons drafted the August 30 action memorandum on August 26, which was cleared by Palmer, Kelly, and Sestanovich.

37. Memorandum of a Meeting¹

Washington, April 6, 1983, 4 p.m.

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

PARTICIPANTS

Shultz
Clark
Baker
Meese
Dam

The meeting dealt with both long-term and immediate short term relations with the Soviet Union.² The President confirmed that he is prepared for a step-by-step effort toward a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union if those steps are substantive and that the present game plan was to proceed in a manner consistent with a summit in early 1984, if circumstances warrant and substantive and significant results could be confidently expected. Working back from that date, it would be necessary to have a number of matters well in train in 1983, so that the summit could have some substance. The President agreed that one should be in a position so that if conditions warranted it, Secretary Shultz would be able to go to Moscow in mid-summer to meet with Gromyko and possibly Andropov. A Gromyko meeting with the President could then be held at the time of the U.N. General Assembly meeting in late September.

It was therefore agreed that Secretary Shultz should call in Dobrynin this week to express our satisfaction with the Pentecostals events and to lay on the table four proposed courses of action:

1. Negotiation of a long-term grain agreement.
2. Conversations on arms control between Shultz and Dobrynin with Rowny present for START talks, Nitze for INF talks, and Abramowitz for MBFR talks. These would be probing discussions to see if any progress can be made at respective negotiation tables.
3. Probing discussions on regional issues (Afghanistan, Poland, Kampuchea, etc.) by Ambassador Hartman in Moscow.
4. Progress on our human rights agenda, particularly emigration of the remainder of the embassy Pentecostals, Soviet Jewry emigration and Poland.

It was agreed that options papers would be prepared for the President on two other possible Dobrynin agenda items:

- (1) A cultural agreement in order to control Soviet access to U.S. audiences and to permit penetration of the closed Soviet society; and
- (2) Opening of consulates in Kiev and in New York.

In addition, it was agreed that State should immediately propose an options paper on current issues in Poland.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (5). Secret. Not for the System. Shultz initialed the memorandum. A notation in an unknown hand indicates that the original was carried to the White House by the Secretary on April 7. In an April 7 covering memorandum to Shultz, McManaway noted that the memorandum had

been dictated by Dam and explained: “As you know at your breakfast meeting this morning Judge Clark asked for a memorandum that would codify the decisions made with the President yesterday on the subjects you would discuss with Ambassador Dobrynin; and that such a memo be provided to him for review prior to your meeting with Dobrynin.

“Ken Dam has dictated the attached memorandum in response to Judge Clark’s request. Charlie and I would like to suggest that there is some risk in actually providing the paper which could find its way down to the NSC staff and invite reopening of decisions made. We also question the establishment of such a precedent. If you agree with these concerns you might want to use the attached paper for a phone call to the Judge in lieu of sending him a memorandum.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive April 1–17)

² In his diary entry for April 6, Reagan wrote: “Learned in office George S. is upset—thinks NSC is undercutting him on plans he & I discussed for ‘quiet diplomacy’ approach to the Soviets. They have let Lydia—the young hunger striker member of the family that’s been living in the embassy basement in Moscow for 4 yrs. go. She is in Vienna as of today. [See [Document 34](#).] We had a meeting later in the day with George & cleared things up I think. Some of the N.S.C. staff are too hard line & dont think any approach should be made to the Soviets. I think I’m hard line & will never appease but I do want to try & let them see there is a better world if they’ll show *by deed* they want to get along with the free world.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 212)

38. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 7, 1983, 2 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Secretary
SecDef Weinberger
Deputy Secretary Dam
Under Secretary Eagleburger
Assistant Secretary Burt

U.S.S.R.

Ambassador Dobrynin
Minister-Counselor Sokolov

The Secretary began by noting that he and Dobrynin had discussed a variety of things in their meetings, and he would have more to say about these matters today and in later meetings. He had asked Secretary of Defense Weinberger to join them today because the President had decided to propose a new set of confidence-building measures. Secretary Weinberger would present the outlines of these proposals to Dobrynin, and we would have more to say about them in other channels later.

Secretary Weinberger said that we had developed these proposals in order to clear up ambiguities and prevent misunderstandings, particularly in a period of crisis. There were new technologies, such as high-speed data transmission and facsimile transmission, which we should make use of to upgrade the capabilities of the existing U.S.-Soviet hotline. We would also be proposing the establishment of a new military-to-military communications link.

Dobrynin asked how such a military-to-military link would be helpful. Secretary Weinberger replied that we could use it to provide notifications about military maneuvers, missile test launches, and military movements which might cause misunderstandings. Dobrynin asked who would be in charge of such a link on the U.S. side, the Chiefs of Staff? Weinberger replied that the Secretary of Defense would exercise control on the U.S. side, since we have a history of civilian control of the military.

Weinberger said that we would also be proposing an upgrade in the quality of communications between the State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the Soviet Foreign Ministry and its Embassy in Washington. Finally, we would be proposing that the U.S. and the Soviet Union hold discussions on the handling of nuclear events involving terrorism. Dobrynin asked whether such consultations should take place when such an event happens or beforehand. Weinberger replied that we see such discussions as most useful beforehand—as contingency planning for response to such a crisis.

In summing up the new CBM's proposals, Weinberger noted that we see them as a means of clarifying intentions on each side, eliminating accidents and misunderstandings, and improving communication in a crisis. We are particularly interested in building greater redundancy into the existing hotline. Dobrynin asked whether our proposals involved only technical improvements. Should U.S. and Soviet delegations meet to work these out? Weinberger responded affirmatively, and Secretary Shultz told Dobrynin that we would provide the Soviet Embassy with more information in writing about our CBM's proposals as soon as possible.

Dobrynin said that the idea of a military to military link is new. He personally would favor it, but we must recognize that it is a new departure. Weinberger said that there are two questions involved in such a link. First, there is the question of new technologies which are available, and then there is the question of how they should be used. Dobrynin said that we would need to do some preliminary thinking about these questions, possibly even develop a charter for the use of such a channel. Weinberger stressed that we see it as a potentially convenient and useful means for exchanging information in a fastbreaking situation.

Dobrynin asked what was meant by our proposal to upgrade communications between our respective foreign ministries and embassies. He recalled that a special telephone link had been established between his Embassy and Moscow in 1974 at the time of Brezhnev's visit to the U.S.² This link had proven so troublesome because of the time difference between Moscow and Washington that he had had it removed as soon as the Brezhnev visit was completed. Weinberger recalled that, when he had been Secretary of HEW in the 1970's,³ a direct Telex link with Moscow had proven useful in conveying urgent information under U.S.-Soviet cooperative agreements on medical research.

Returning to the suggestion of U.S.-Soviet exchanges on events involving nuclear terrorism, Weinberger noted that U.S.-Soviet discussions could ultimately be expanded to involve many nations. Secretary Shultz added that such discussions could build nicely upon U.S.-Soviet bilateral talks on non-proliferation which are already taking place.

Secretary Shultz noted that the Administration is scheduled to send a report on our new CBM's proposals to Congress on April 11. Indeed these proposals were, in part, a

response to Congressional interest in the idea of confidence-building measures. Dobrynin said it would be better to have Soviet agreement before the proposals were sent to Congress; otherwise it would look as if we were more interested in the public impact of the proposals than in reaching an agreement on them with the Soviet Union. Dobrynin thought he could obtain at least a preliminary response from Moscow by Monday or Tuesday.⁴ Weinberger asked whether Dobrynin had in mind a joint announcement. Dobrynin replied that this was not needed, but that it would be useful to have a general Soviet response before we made our proposals public.

Without making any commitment, Weinberger offered to see what could be done about delaying the report to Congress for a short period. Secretary Shultz emphasized that the report could not be held up for long and urged that Dobrynin obtain the earliest possible response from his government. Dobrynin asked when he would receive the written material on the U.S. proposals, and Weinberger replied that we would transmit it to the Soviet Embassy on Friday April 8.

Turning to the START and INF negotiations, Secretary Shultz said that we continue to look for areas where progress might be made. In this connection, he thought it might be useful if he and Dobrynin met with Nitze and Rowny, and possibly MBFR negotiator Abramowitz, during the current recess between rounds of the respective negotiations. These meetings would not be for the purpose of negotiation, but would seek to elaborate upon and facilitate greater understanding of our respective positions on an informal basis. Dobrynin asked what would be the real nature of such meetings. They would only be useful if they did not become simply a sterile defense of existing positions. If they were to be useful such meetings should

focus on one or two points and see whether progress might be made. Secretary Shultz agreed.

With regard to START, Dobrynin asserted that all the Soviet side had heard in the last round was Rowny repeating the same unacceptable statements that he had made in previous rounds. Secretary Shultz replied that, in our view, there had been a retrogression in the Soviet position in the last round of START. At this point, Dobrynin agreed to the Secretary's suggestion of further meetings on arms control to which the U.S. negotiators would be invited.

Turning to TTBT, the Secretary reminded Dobrynin that we had made a positive suggestion for improving the verification provisions of the treaty, but the Soviets had responded negatively. Dobrynin said that the Soviet response had made three points: (1) that we should first ratify the TTBT and PNET and then decide whether additional verification measures might be needed;⁵ (2) that the U.S. should agree to resume tri-lateral negotiations on a CTB; (3) did the U.S. intend to restrict its tests to the 150 ktn threshold provided for in the TTBT.

Secretary Shultz noted that the TTBT, as currently drafted, does provide for additional verification measures. However, in our view, even these measures would not be sufficient to provide adequate verification of compliance with the treaty provisions. It is clear that verification is a critical consideration, since both sides have raised questions about the yield of a number of tests. With regard to a CTB, Secretary Shultz said that the Soviet position seemed to indicate a desire to run before we had learned to walk in the area of nuclear testing limitations. Dobrynin asked whether it would not be possible to pursue discussions on a CTB in tandem with discussions about improving the verification provisions of the TTBT. Secretary Shultz replied

that we saw no utility in pursuing CTB talks at this time. He and Secretary Weinberger told Dobrynin that we had no present plans to test above the 150 kt. threshold of the TTBT.

Dobrynin said that our position on the TTBT was another example of a growing U.S. habit of not following through with treaties which it had signed. Secretary Shultz replied that we had no intention of ratifying a treaty if we could not verify compliance with its provisions. Dobrynin replied that the treaties as drafted contained a mechanism for verification. Secretary Weinberger replied that, in our view, this mechanism is not adequate. Secretary Shultz said that he would ask Assistant Secretary Burt to call in the Soviet Embassy for further discussion of our TTBT proposal and urged that the Soviet side take another look at it. Dobrynin said that the Soviet side would, of course, consider whatever material Burt might provide about our proposal.

On bilateral relations, Secretary Shultz told Dobrynin that the President had decided on a one-year extension of the U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Fisheries Agreement.⁶ Secretary Shultz said that he also had some new information for Dobrynin about the U.S.-Soviet Long-term Grains Agreement. The President had decided in principle that it was time to begin negotiations for a new agreement. As Dobrynin knew, this was a matter of considerable political sensitivity in the U.S., and the decision had not been an easy one for the President. We would begin the process of internal preparation for the negotiations, and we hoped for an early Soviet response to our proposal. The Secretary recalled that Dobrynin had, in previous meetings, indicated that the Soviet response to such a decision on our part would be positive. Dobrynin replied that we would have to see.

The Secretary said that we were considering an announcement of our decision to negotiate a new LTA on Saturday.⁷ Would it be possible to have a Soviet response by that time? Dobrynin said that he doubted it but that he would try to obtain an answer from Moscow as quickly as possible.

Turning to human rights, Secretary Shultz noted that Lidia Vashchenko had left the Soviet Union and that we viewed this as a positive development. He wanted to inform Dobrynin of the President's personal appreciation for this positive Soviet action. As Dobrynin knew, human rights issues, such as the Pentecostalist situation and the level of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, are very important to us. In the Pentecostalist case, as in other such matters, we have focused on results, not on making a public noise. The President has written a letter to the Pentecostalists in the Embassy and Dr. Olin Robison will be meeting with them in an effort to sustain momentum toward a solution of this problem.⁸

With regard to regional issues, Secretary Shultz noted that these problems have proven very difficult for us. Much of the tension in U.S.-Soviet relations at present is due to Soviet conduct on these issues. We would like to see progress toward a negotiated solution in Afghanistan. In this connection, we have little information about Secretary General Perez de Cuellar's visit to Moscow,⁹ but we have instructed Ambassador Hartman to see Gromyko or Korniyenko on Afghanistan and on the Middle East. We may also have more to say later on southern Africa. The Secretary said that he hoped that Ambassador Hartman would have access in Moscow comparable to that enjoyed by Ambassador Dobrynin here. Dobrynin replied that, when Hartman has something to say or specific proposals to make, he is afforded access to the Soviet leadership.

In conclusion, the Secretary noted that he and Dobrynin had established an agenda on which progress might be made. However, unless the Soviet side took concrete steps to address our concerns on regional issues, it would be very difficult to bring about an overall improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. Dobrynin suggested that he and the Secretary identify three or four regional issues for discussion; then questions of time and venue could be worked out. Secretary Shultz noted that we had tried to establish such a dialogue on regional issues but, in our view, these discussions had been more academic than operational. Dobrynin replied that it is nonetheless useful for us to discuss these issues as a means of clarifying our respective positions.

Before concluding the meeting, the Secretary and Dobrynin agreed to meet the next week on arms control, with the subject matter of the meeting to be established.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Memoranda of Conversation 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt; cleared by Eagleburger, McManaway, and Farrell. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office.

² Brezhnev came to the United States in June 1973, not 1974, for the Washington Summit. For documents on this summit, see [Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972-August 1974, Documents 119-133](#).

³ Weinberger was Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare from February 1973 to August 1975.

⁴ April 11 or 12.

⁵ See [footnote 6, Document 31](#).

⁶ In telegram 97341 to Moscow, April 9, the Department reported: “On April 8, Sov Deputy Director Yalowitz handed note to Soviet Embassy Economic Counselor Shershnev proposing extension of the Governing International Fisheries Agreement (GIFA) for one year. We planned following the same procedure as last year, that is to effect the extension through the exchange of diplomatic notes.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830197-0906)

⁷ April 9. See [Documents 32](#) and [35](#). The announcement was made on April 22. See [Document 47](#).

⁸ See [Document 34](#).

⁹ United Nations Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar visited Moscow in March 1983. Before taking the post of Secretary General, Pérez de Cuéllar served as UN Special Representative of the Secretary General on the Situation in Afghanistan.

39. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 7, 1983

SUBJECT

Meeting with Dobrynin—April 7, 1983²

Pursuant to our discussion of yesterday,³ Cap Weinberger and I met today with Dobrynin for approximately 70 minutes.⁴ We covered the full range of our established agenda for US-Soviet relations—arms control, regional issues, human rights, and bilateral relations. The tone of the meeting was businesslike and generally constructive, and there will be a number of follow-up actions to be undertaken in coming days.

I. *Arms Control:*

Confidence-Building Measures: Cap began by outlining the new proposals for confidence-building measures you have recently approved, emphasizing that our purpose is to reduce the risk of a misunderstanding or accident that could lead to the inadvertent outbreak of war. Dobrynin expressed interest in our proposals and asked a number of substantive questions. Cap and I agreed to provide him more details in writing tomorrow and asked that he seek an early response from his government. Dobrynin suggested that our public announcement of the proposals—now scheduled to go to Congress April 11—be delayed until Moscow has had an opportunity to respond privately. Cap and I noted that our proposals are, in part, a response to Congressional interest and that their transmission to the Hill could not be held up for long. Nevertheless, we agreed

to see whether a short delay is possible and again urged Dobrynin to seek a quick response from his government.

START and INF: I noted that we continue to look for ways to make progress and suggested that Dobrynin and I meet separately with Paul Nitze and Ed Rowny during the current break between rounds. In offering these meetings, I emphasized that their purpose would not be negotiation but clarification and informal discussion of our respective positions. After noting that he hoped these discussions would not be simply a sterile rehash of our respective positions in Geneva, Dobrynin agreed to go ahead with these meetings.

TTBT and PNET: I reminded Dobrynin that we had made a serious proposal to negotiate stronger verification provisions for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET), and that we had been disappointed by the negative Soviet response. Dobrynin responded with the usual Soviet line that we should first ratify the treaties as they are and then consider whether additional verification measures might be needed. He also asked whether we intended to continue observing the 150 kiloton limit on underground nuclear tests provided for by the unratified TTBT. Finally, he reiterated the suggestion that we resume trilateral negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban.

In response, I noted that we have no plans, at present, for underground tests above the 150 kt. level, but that serious concerns about verification precluded our ratification of the TTBT until these concerns were addressed. I added that the Soviet emphasis on a CTB seemed to reflect a desire to run before walking in the field of nuclear testing limitations. Finally, I stated that Assistant Secretary Rick Burt would be calling in one of Dobrynin's deputies soon on our TTBT

proposal. I urged that the Soviet side reconsider our proposal. Dobrynin offered to consider whatever information we provided on our proposal.

II. *Human Rights*

After underscoring again the importance we attach to these issues, I told Dobrynin of your personal appreciation for the positive Soviet actions in the Pentecostalist case.⁵ Emphasizing the need to keep up the momentum toward final resolution of this problem, I told Dobrynin of your letter to the Pentecostalists in the Embassy and Olin Robison's visit to Moscow. I noted that we had proceeded quietly in this case, as is our general intention in handling human rights issues, and pressed Dobrynin for Soviet action on other "Madrid" issues, such as the level of Jewish emigration.

III. *Regional Issues*

Noting that Soviet misconduct in regional conflicts had been a major source of tension in our relationship, I pressed Dobrynin for concrete Soviet actions on Afghanistan, in southern Africa, and other regional trouble spots. I reiterated our readiness to play a positive role and told him that Art Hartman has instructions to see Gromyko on Afghanistan and the Middle East. Dobrynin suggested that we identify three or four priority areas for discussion on regional issues and develop specific proposals for solutions. I responded that we had tried to establish such a dialogue, but that the talks had seemed to us more academic than operational. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to move far in improving our relations unless there

was concrete evidence of Soviet action to meet our concerns on these regional issues.

IV. Bilateral Issues

Having placed discussion of our bilateral relations in this overall context, I informed Dobrynin of your decisions to extend the fisheries agreement for one year⁶ and to propose negotiations for a new grains LTA.⁷ Noting that the decision on a grains LTA had been a particularly difficult one for us, I told Dobrynin that we intended to make an announcement on Saturday. Dobrynin was noncommittal on a new LTA and again noted that we were planning a public announcement before the Soviets could reply to our proposal. I replied that it would be extremely difficult to maintain the confidentiality of this decision while waiting for a Soviet reply. Dobrynin did not say when we might expect a reply, but later told Rick Burt that our proposal might have to be put on the weekly Politburo agenda—thus delaying a Soviet reply until at least the end of next week. While making no commitments about the timing of our announcement, I pressed Dobrynin to seek an early reply from Moscow.

Next Steps:

I will be taking the following actions to follow-up on today's meeting:

1. Rick Burt and Richard Perle will call in an appropriate official from the Soviet Embassy tomorrow to convey more information in writing on our CBMs proposals and to press for an early Soviet response. Cap and I will confer on whether to delay transmission of the proposals to Congress for a few days in order to give the Soviets an opportunity to

reply. Rick will also convey to the Soviet Embassy further information on our TTBT proposal as soon as possible.

2. I will schedule a meeting with Dobrynin next week to discuss either START or INF with Nitze or Rowny.

3. We will take another look at possibilities for dialogue on regional issues in light of Dobrynin's suggestion that we identify three or four issues for priority work.

4. On the grains LTA, I believe we should try to give the Soviets a reasonable opportunity to respond before we make a public announcement, despite the difficulties this will cause us. Senators Dole and Percy have agreed to hold off on their legislation. I have already informed Jack Block of your decision and asked that it remain confidential for at least a few days. We have therefore told the Soviets that we intend to postpone an announcement for a few days.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/05/83-04/07/83). Secret; Sensitive. Clark's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² The Subject line incorrectly dated the meeting as April 7, 1982.

³ See [Document 37](#).

⁴ See [Document 38](#).

⁵ See [Document 34](#).

⁶ See [footnote 6, Document 38](#).

⁷ See [Documents 32](#) and [35](#).

40. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Hill) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, April 7, 1983

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations: Kiev/New York Consulates and Cultural Agreement

We have been looking into the pros and cons of taking action in two areas of our relationship with the Soviets:

- (1) Consulates General in Kiev and New York City;
- (2) Cultural Exchange Agreement.

We believe there are some clear benefits to be gained by U.S. initiatives in these areas, but each also has some public relations or foreign policy drawbacks. Attached are our analyses of the options available to us on these issues and the pros and cons of each.

Regarding cultural exchanges, you will recall that NSDD 75 states, inter alia, that the exchanges framework should not be further dismantled; and that those exchanges that promote positive evolutionary change within the USSR should be expanded at the same time that the U.S. will insist on full reciprocity.

Charles Hill²

Attachment 1

Options Paper Prepared in the Department of State³

Washington, undated

ISSUE: Consulates General in Kiev and New York City:
Options

Option 1. Inform the Soviets that the U.S. is ready to establish Consulates General in Kiev and New York City and propose a public announcement and the resumption of technical discussions toward this end.

Pros and Cons

In terms of assets, we would gain substantially from the opening of a Consulate in Kiev; by comparison, the Soviet presence in New York City would increase only marginally. As matters stand, because of the UN presence, the Soviets have free run of New York and we have nothing comparable in the USSR. A [*less than 1 line not declassified*] presence in the heart of the Ukraine, expanded contacts with important minority nationality and religious groups, and consular access for our citizens would prove most advantageous to the U.S. Government. It would also respond to the wishes of the U.S. Ukrainian community and many in the U.S. Jewish community who have long stressed the need for a consulate in the area.

On the down side, the lifting of an Afghan sanction will evoke some criticism. While this move may effectively show the American public, the Allies and the Soviets that confrontation is not the only arrow in our quiver, it may at the same time raise unrealistic expectations both here and abroad about overall improvements in our relations.

Practical Steps

Even if we were to agree in principle to open Consulates General, the timing and cost of our actions would be determined by decisions on several subsidiary issues. The first decision involves the type of establishment we wish to open in Kiev. We have the choice of a simple, unclassified operation which would constitute an American presence and give some consular protection to American visitors, or a full-scale post, with [*less than 1 line not declassified*] advantages in a key non-Russian area. Devolving from this decision will be the question of timing. An unclassified establishment in Kiev could be organized fairly easily and quickly in terms of personnel and money, whereas full-scale establishment would take years.

Establishing a full-scale post would entail a great deal of effort to secure the necessary personnel and funding, and to resolve numerous technical and logistical difficulties. However, depending upon how rapidly we would wish to implement this, several approaches are available. If quick results are crucial, we could immediately start the process of securing preliminary funding, TDY personnel for an advance team, and logistical support in order to have the consulates operational (though with a skeleton staff) within approximately a year. At the other end of the spectrum, we could do a limited amount of initial planning until Congressional support was assured and all funding requirements approved. A third approach would involve sending a temporary advance team as soon as possible and then developing an overall strategy for the selection of long-term personnel, the briefing of Congressional committees, the acquisition of funding, and the fulfillment of all the technical requirements of the facility. The implementation of this strategy would follow as soon afterwards as considered desirable or feasible.

Option 2: Propose to the Soviets that we resume *discussions* on the possibility of establishing Consulates in Kiev and New York, but not move quickly actually to open the Consulates and make no announcement at this time.

Pros and Cons

This approach would enable us to do the preliminary work both with the Soviets and within the U.S. Government necessary for the opening of the Consulates General at some future date. At the same time, it does not obligate us to take the more visible steps of actually putting an Advance Team in place now or allowing the Soviets to resume construction work on the building that will eventually house our Consulate General. The decision on whether or when to undertake these steps could depend on progress in the technical discussions and the overall state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Since the discussions would be technical, no formal announcement would be required at this time. Similarly, no final decision would have to be made regarding the lifting of an Afghanistan sanction. On the other hand, the Soviets would regard this as a positive decision and it would allow us to begin allocating personnel and resources and setting up a logistical support system.

However, if Congress or the public becomes aware that we are identifying positions and earmarking funds for Kiev, we would probably be asked what this meant for our sanctions policy. Other disadvantages of this option are limited.

Option 3. Tell the Soviets that we are actively considering the resumption of negotiations for the establishment of Consulates General.

Pros and Cons

The main advantage of this option is that it simply allows us to await a more favorable moment. It also enables us to avoid any criticism, except from the Ukrainian-American community which is pushing us to open in Kiev. Its primary drawback is that it accomplishes little. In terms of U.S.-Soviet relations, it is devoid of benefits, since the Soviets would see it as a do-nothing statement. After the suspension of our agreement to establish these Consulates General in 1980,⁴ a weak consensus emerged on the policy level that on balance the suspension was an ill-advised move.

Option 4. Say nothing to the Soviets and adhere to the status quo.

Pros and Cons

The one advantage inherent in this position is that we are spared from justifying the lifting of an Afghan sanction. The costs of our current practices are high. Financially, we bear the burden of three apartments in Kiev for which we pay rent but have no use. (We have kept the apartments because we previously spent substantial money on reconfiguring them for U.S. use, and because if we gave them up, we would have a lot of trouble obtaining other adequate apartments later.) We also risk the loss of the office building which the Soviets have, to date, kept open for us. The cost of reconstructing an alternate building will be considerably higher in the future. Finally, we face criticism from U.S. visitors to Kiev, especially Jewish groups, whom we are unable to assist.

Attachment 2

Options Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁵

Washington, undated

Cultural Exchanges Agreement: Options

As matters now stand, the Soviets have almost unlimited access to American media and other forums. And we have only limited means to penetrate the Soviet Union with our ideology. Our open society and the legal restraints on our ability to refuse visas to Soviet citizens except on national security grounds make this possible. We are fortunate that the Soviets since 1979 have chosen not to send performing artists here; otherwise, the Bolshoi Ballet, the Moscow Circus and similar major groups could be touring the US annually without any reciprocity for American groups in the USSR. There are indications that the Soviets are rethinking this policy, and may start sending performers again. We currently have no means of ensuring reciprocity in this area, nor do we have leverage to gain Soviet agreement for us to conduct thematic exhibits in the USSR. Such exhibits, with American guides speaking Russian or other local language, have proven to be one of the most effective means of reaching thousands of Soviet citizens with the American message. For example, Vladimir Bukovsky has stated that he became a dissident when he visited the US Exposition in Moscow in 1959.

To increase our penetration of Soviet society through cultural exchanges, we need to consider the most effective means. We see three basic options:

1. Negotiate a new exchanges agreement, replacing the one that expired in 1979, that ensures reciprocity.

PROS: The exact form of an agreement would have to be worked out in interagency discussions to ensure

that all USG interests would be considered. At a minimum, it would define the areas in which reciprocity must be provided, including the performing arts. We should be able to improve our access to influential Soviet circles by putting continued access to US audiences on a reciprocal basis. Exhibits would be an important part of an agreement, as would all other legitimate means of penetrating Soviet society. We would also require access to Soviet television.

CONS: This would involve negotiating a highly visible agreement and raise questions about how it conforms to our sanctions policy. It would cause speculation whether we are returning to a policy of detente.

2. Combine negotiation of an exchanges agreement with a stricter visa regime, through legislation restoring our ability to refuse visas for foreign policy reasons or by invoking the "Baker Amendment." Such draft legislation is now at OMB for review and decision. The Baker Amendment involves an official determination, which can be made by the Secretary of State, that the USSR is not in substantial compliance with the Helsinki Final Act.

PROS: This would permit us to generate greater leverage to get the kind of truly reciprocal exchanges agreement we want. It has the additional virtue of allowing us to refuse visas for policy reasons and not have to justify refusals on national security grounds. We could choose which Soviets we would admit or exclude.

CONS: This has the same problems as Option 1, somewhat mitigated by combining it with instituting

tougher visa controls. In addition, visa refusals are a crude tool, subject to easy retaliation not necessarily confined to the visa field. American sponsors of Soviet visits would criticize arbitrary refusals, and those who invested money in long-term planning to bring Soviet performers here might have a legal claim. Invoking the Baker Amendment raises issues of foreign policy and long-term US-USSR relations that require careful study.

3. Continue current practice.

PROS: This involves no change and is easy to administer, with few decisions having to be referred to senior levels for political decision.

CONS: This does nothing to ensure reciprocity and leaves the Soviets with easy access to US society.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive April 1-17, Confidential. In a covering memorandum to Shultz, Burt wrote: "I understand that at the NSPG Friday [April 8] you may want to raise these issues. At Tab 1 are talking points. At Tab 2 are options papers we sent to the NSC." The NSPG meeting on April 8 did not address the exchanges and consulate issues; instead, it dealt entirely with Poland. Information on this NSPG meeting is scheduled for publication in [*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. IX, Poland, 1982-1988*](#)².

² McManaway signed for Hill above Hill's typed signature.

³ Confidential.

⁴ Preparations for establishment of the consulates were suspended after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

5 Confidential.

41. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan, Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, the Ambassador to the United Nations (Kirkpatrick), and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, April 14, 1983

The attached memorandum, "Meeting the Soviet Challenge in the Third World" is required reading. While we spend hundreds of billions to counter Soviet missiles and armies threatening the United States and Europe, the Soviets have succeeded with a cost-effective strategy of creeping expansionism, positioned Soviet power on China's southern flank, in South Yemen and Afghanistan where they threaten the oil resources of the Middle East, close to the choke points in the world's sea lanes and on our very doorstep in the Caribbean and Central America. The current furor in the media and Congress emphasizes that our strategy for dealing with this Soviet strategy is inadequate. The attached memorandum lays out the Soviet strategy in the Third World and how it has succeeded and U.S. counter-strategy which, in my view, is urgently needed if we are to protect our future.

William J. Casey²

Attachment

Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency³

Washington, April 8, 1983

SUBJECT

Meeting The Soviet Challenge in the Third World

I. *A Little History*

Somehow Americans thought their first loss of a major foreign war—Vietnam—would have no important consequences, especially inasmuch as it was accompanied by detente with the Soviet Union and the opening to China. Yet it was in fact a major watershed in post World War II history, especially as it coincided with other historic developments:

—The collapse of Portugal's colonial empire in Africa; the last such in the Third World.

—A return to the international stage of Cuba's Castro in 1975, willing, for internal reasons, to send Cuban soldiers abroad in large numbers to defend revolutionary regimes and radicals determined to consolidate their power.

—Immediately after the US expulsion from Saigon, the US Senate confirming for all the world America's withdrawal from the Third World by its defeat of a pittance of aid for Western supported forces in Angola, and the accompanying Clark Amendment.

—Soviet determination, initially at Castro's prodding, to seize the opportunity presented by the US defeat in Asia and resulting American abhorrence of involvement in the Third World.

—A revolution in Ethiopia, bringing to power the radical Mengistu.

—And, a wavering and misguided policy by the Carter Administration on human rights, and key allies that played a major role in revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua.

The effects of American defeats in Vietnam, Iran, and Nicaragua—and the coming to power of bitterly antagonistic and aggressive, destabilizing governments in all three countries—undermined the confidence of US friends and allies in the Third World (and Europe and Japan) and ensured that an opportunistic Soviet Union would see in the Third World its principal foreign policy opportunities for years to come. A Soviet strategy evolved in the mid-1970s that built on historic events and opportunities and combined them into an approach to the Third World that, even should the US decide to compete, would help frustrate an effective US response.

II. *The Soviet Strategy*

The Soviets themselves suffered setbacks in the 1960s and early 70s in the Third World. They suffered one setback after another in Africa. They saw their hopes in South America dashed by the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile and were humiliatingly expelled from Egypt in 1972. When they turned again to the Third World in 1975, it was with a strategy designed to minimize the chance of a repetition of those setbacks. The strategy, enriched and strengthened over several years, is realistic and calculated to exploit effectively both events and opportunities.

—First, shown the way by Castro in Angola, they helped him consolidate the radical power of the MPLA there, creating a government dependent on Soviet and Cuban support for survival. This was

followed by the dispatch of thousands of Cuban troops to Ethiopia, where in his turn Mengistu became dependent on their support. Unlike Sadat, neither the MPLA nor Mengistu could afford to order the Cubans and Soviets out. The cornerstone of the new Soviet approach then was the use of Cuban forces to establish and sustain the power of “revolutionary governments.” The tactic of using Third World radical states as “surrogates” in the Third World would subsequently involve assisting Vietnam’s conquest of the remainder of Indochina, Libya’s designs in Chad and plotting against Sudan, the PDRY’s aggression against Oman and the YAR, Algeria’s support of the Polisario Front, Cuba’s nurturing of revolutionary or radical regimes in Nicaragua, Grenada, and Suriname, and its support of the insurgency in El Salvador. All had one feature in common—the principal, obvious role in Third World countries was played by another Third World state; no superpower was seen to be guiding or arming or directing the radical forces at work; no numbers of white faces interfered in the internal affairs of Asian, African, or Latin countries; and wherever possible the host government was maintained by foreign advisors and troops who could not be expelled. It was a strategy that made (and makes) any direct response appear neo-imperialistic, and a change of heart by the host government difficult if not impossible.

—Second, when radical governments came to power without the aid of foreign troops, as in Nicaragua or Suriname, the Soviets directly or through their surrogates helped in the establishment of an internal security structure to ensure that any possible challenge from within would be stamped out. There

would be no more Allendes. Sometimes it worked—as in Ethiopia, and sometimes there was not enough time—as in Jamaica.

—Third, the Soviets continued to supplement these tactics with its more traditional offerings, such as technical (and political) training in the USSR; the rapid supply of weapons to regimes which either felt threatened or wished to use them for aggression; and, of course, the use of a wide range of active measures (covert action) to support friends or help destabilize unfriendly governments.

—Fourth, consistent with Russian expansionist policy of a thousand years, where a vacuum existed or the costs and risks were low, the USSR proved still willing to launch its own forces at targets on its periphery—Afghanistan, and perhaps elsewhere when and if circumstances seemed right.

—Fifth, the Soviets advised new radical regimes to mute their revolutionary rhetoric and to try to keep their links to Western commercial resources, foreign assistance, and international financial institutions. Moscow's ambitions did not cloud recognition that it could not afford more economic dependents such as Cuba and Vietnam.

This strategy was intended to achieve three principal Soviet objectives in the Third World:

—The further spread of Communism in countries on the path of Soviet-style Socialism. However much Western commentators may assert the death of ideology among Soviet leaders, there is a genuine ideological conviction that this is an historical

imperative and that the future of Communism and its eventual victory depends on success in the Third World, a thesis put forward by Lenin himself.

—To achieve great power ambitions, including access to port facilities, airfields, and intelligence and reconnaissance installations; to obtain allies and friends whose support in international politics is assured; gain access to raw materials and markets and obtain hard currency customers for Soviet goods and weapons; and to acquire influence and power over dependent states.

—Finally, to divert and distract the United States through many simultaneous challenges—some pinpricks, some major; to exploit lingering repugnance in the US to Third World engagements and to build on resulting controversy to complicate other foreign policy and national security initiatives, including defense programs; and to deny the US access to facilities abroad such as the USSR itself seeks.

The centrality of the Third World in Soviet foreign policy is suggested by the fact that Moscow has chosen to allow its relationship with three successive US Administrations to deteriorate in substantial measure because of its refusal to moderate its aggressive pursuit of Third World opportunities, principally in Angola (Ford); Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Afghanistan (Carter); and Central America (Reagan).

III. *The Soviet Balance Sheet*

A Soviet Union that had found itself in 1972 without major successes and with many failures in the Third World after

two decades of effort could count the following achievements by the end of 1982, ten years later:

- Victory in Vietnam and Hanoi's consolidation of power in all of Indochina.
- New radical regimes in Ethiopia, Angola, and Nicaragua.
- Possession of Afghanistan, a Russian goal for over a century.
- Cuban control of Grenada (and new military facilities there for support of further subversion).
- An active insurgency in El Salvador where US assistance had rekindled all the old Vietnam memories at home.
- US expulsion from Iran, which, though not through any Soviet action, represented a major strategic gain for the USSR.
- Rapid progress toward Cuban control of Suriname, the first breakthrough on the South American continent.
- Pro-Western regimes under siege in Chad and the Sudan.

Beyond these successes, the Soviets could see opportunities, actual or potential, to achieve its objectives in many other places:

- Success in El Salvador would likely bring gains in Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Honduras, perhaps then

opening the way to creating problems for the US in Panama and even Mexico.

—Habre in Chad and Nimieri in Sudan both are vulnerable and the fall of both, but especially Nimieri, seems only a matter of time.

—Mozambique on the verge of requesting Cuban forces to fight the South African sponsored insurgency.

—Zimbabwe on the brink again of civil war, perhaps offering an opportunity to make gains lost by Mugabe's victory.

—A big prize, Zaire, continues to tantalize, the Soviets aware that Mobutu cannot last indefinitely and that a struggle will follow his departure.

—Long-time Soviet support for SWAPO, promising opportunity in Namibia either by its inclusion in a government or by civil war.

—Insecure regimes in both the Seychelles and Mauritius interested in expanding contacts with the Soviet Union.

—Zia's regime in Pakistan growing weary of the burdens of supporting the Afghan insurgency and confronted with mounting internal problems.

—In Asia, prospects less bright but the insurgency in the Philippines worth watching and potentially a major breakthrough in the region.

Against these successes and opportunities, the Soviets had to count:

- A still weak position in the Middle East.
- Failure to make any headway with the Iranian regime.
- US aid to the Salvadoran regime, Habre, and Nimieri.
- The regional strength of ASEAN and general internal stability of its members.
- Vietnamese inability to crush the Kampuchean resistance totally, and
- Soviet inability to crush the Afghan resistance.

All in all, the balance sheet is strongly favorable and encouraging to the Soviets. The opportunities for and ease of destabilizing regimes and exploiting economic and social problems promise continued high priority of the Third World and intense Soviet involvement and success in the Third World in the last decade and a half of the century.

IV. A US Counterstrategy: The Realities

Three successive Presidents have tried to grapple with the Soviet offensive in the Third World. While their actions have at times increased the costs to the Soviets and their surrogates, in only one instance—Chad—have they succeeded fully in blocking externally supported destabilization. Moreover, in virtually every instance, the US reaction has been principally through covert action—out of fear (or realism) that overt US involvement was not sustainable politically at home.

A US counterstrategy in the Third World needs to be based on domestic and foreign realities:

—The Vietnam Syndrome is a reality; the Congress will not support or allow the use of US combat forces in the Third World. As El Salvador has shown, even a training role is suspect.

—Nearly every Third World government, friend or foe, is authoritarian and can fairly be accused of repression, corruption, and failure to observe democratic procedures and basic human rights. Thus, few if any countries we seek or need to help will meet the standards of behavior set by many in Congress and the media.

—The US cannot provide sufficient economic assistance to every friendly government which faces destabilizing economic problems susceptible to foreign exploitation.

—Covert action is becoming increasingly suspect in Congress as a means of helping some Third World governments or hindering others. The cost also is growing.

—It will be difficult to develop political support in the US to help most Third World countries threatened with destabilization or insurgencies. The Soviet hand will be ambiguous at best and the benefit to the US of maintaining or restoring a friendly government will often be difficult to demonstrate concretely. This will be especially true of small countries like Suriname, Grenada, or Mauritius; of some large ones like the Philippines where insurgencies will be regarded in the US with some accuracy as the consequence of

repression and corruption (a view that will be fostered by emigre activities); and of many countries remote to Americans like Chad, Zaire, Mozambique, and Namibia.

—Overt US intervention—political, military, or economic—will be castigated abroad as neo-imperialism, as motivated by US economic interests and the like. It will appear to be both bullying and racist.

V. A US Counterstrategy: What is to be Done?

Soviet ambition in the Third World is not exactly a new problem, even though the tactics are in some respects. Thus, while the US is in need of a new strategy, many components of that strategy also are familiar, though they must be approached and linked in new ways. What follows is a number of steps to address the Soviet challenge in the Third World. They have the additional appeal that they represent also a sensible American approach to the Third World whether or not the USSR is involved.

1. As stated above, the Third World has (and has had for years) a central priority place in Soviet foreign policy. If for no other reason than this, the US must begin to take the Third World and its problems seriously. We have too often neglected our friends and neutrals in Africa, Latin America, and Asia until they become a problem or are threatened by developments we consider hostile to our interests. The Third World now buys 40 percent of our exports; that alone is reason enough to pay greater attention to the problems of the LDCs before we confront coups, insurgencies, or instability that affect us adversely. Except when we confront a situation we consider dangerous to ourselves,

the Third World has been a very low priority. This has resulted in a case by case, fragmented response to Soviet and Cuban actions. The priority of the Third World in our overall foreign policy must be raised and sustained.

2. The Executive Branch must do more to educate the public, the Congress, and Third World governments about Soviet strategy in the LDCs generally. This requires low-key, factual briefings and meetings on a sustained basis—keeping people up to date on developments and sharing as much of our intelligence as we safely can. One or two media campaigns or Presidential speeches are not the answer. A continuing information program designed to inform and tie together developments in areas widely distant is needed and must be pursued intelligently over a long term.

3. The US Intelligence Community, and especially CIA, must continue to give priority to learning more about developments in the Third World and creating analytical methods to provide early warning of economic, social, and political problems that foreshadow instability and opportunities for exploitation by the USSR or its allies. Policy agencies should then use this information in developing approaches to LDC governments that are aimed at dealing with these problems promptly (though the solutions may take years) when the cost often will be modest. We should serve as a clearing house of information useful to threatened countries, for example, seeing to it that lessons learned in successful anti-insurgent campaigns in Malaysia and Thailand are brought to the attention of the El Salvador and Philippine Governments.

4. The US can provide some help to many countries (and does) but must establish for itself priorities in terms of major commitments. President Nixon wanted to rely on key

regional states as bulwarks for stability and keeping the peace. There are some dangers in this approach (Iran was to be the key state in the Persian Gulf), but it is generally a sensible strategy. If our early help fails to prevent serious trouble, for which countries are we prepared to put our chips on the table? We should address this ahead of time so that we do not expend political and other assets on places of marginal importance because we must decide such matters in haste and lacking perspective. Also, we should choose in consultation with key members or committees of Congress so that their support at crucial moments is more likely. Great losing battles for FMS, economic assistance, and the like—as for Angola and El Salvador—played out on the world stage and at critical times represent devastating setbacks for the US with ramifications going far beyond the affected country. Even politically bloody success—e.g. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan—can result in the costs outweighing or offsetting the gains.

5. We must be more demanding *in private* of those who seek our help. Public criticism of sovereign governments may be spiritually satisfying but it is the surest way to policy failure. The human rights campaign in the first two years of the Carter Administration is a case in point. By the same token, the very great numbers of Jews permitted to emigrate from the USSR between 1971-1976 as a result of private pressure from the US demonstrates that we can affect the behavior of even our adversaries. We must be prepared to demand firmly but tactfully and privately that our friends observe certain standards of behavior with regard to basic human rights. It is required by our own principles and essential to political support in the US. Moreover, we have to be willing to talk straight to those we would help about issues they must address to block foreign exploitation of their problems—issues such as land reform, corruption, and the like. We need to show how the Soviets

have exploited such vulnerabilities elsewhere to good effect to make clear we are not preaching out of cultural arrogance but are making recommendations based on experience elsewhere. We should also point out how policies in other areas, such as nuclear proliferation, undermine Congressional support. In sum, we have a right and a responsibility to condition our support—but must do so in ways that make it possible politically for the recipient to comply.

6. We must press for changes in our foreign military sales laws to permit the US to provide arms more quickly to friends in need and to do so without hanging out all their dirty linen for the world to see. It does not serve any rational purpose to humiliate those whom we would help. We also need to change our military procurement policies so as to have stocks of certain basic kinds of weapons more readily available. Telling a requestor we can get him a weapons system in several months or even two or three years from now is not satisfactory when he wonders whether he will be in power in six weeks. Nor is it satisfactory to be forced to take weapons out of the inventories of our own forces. Finally, we need to be tougher with requestors when they seek weapons—such as F-16s—for prestige but their military needs and economic well-being would be better served by less sophisticated, less expensive weapons.

7. As we rely more on overt means to meet the Soviet challenge in the Third World, covert action can be used, as in the past, to create problems for hostile governments, to provide discreet help to friendly organizations and governments, but especially to expose and discredit Soviet and surrogate actions in the Third World. With few exceptions, covert action is most effective when its purpose

is limited and specific. It is a complement to our overt help; it cannot be a substitute.

8. We must find a way to mobilize and use our greatest asset in the Third World—private business. Few in the Third World wish to adopt the Soviet economic system. Neither we nor the Soviets can offer unlimited or even large-scale economic assistance to the LDCs. Investment is the key to economic success or at least survival in the Third World and we, our NATO allies and Japan need to develop a common strategy to promote investment in the Third World. The Soviets are helpless to compete with private capital in these countries. The US needs to explore incentives to encourage the private sector to play a greater role in the LDCs, especially in countries of key importance.

9. At times, our friends in the Third World are going to need armed assistance. In view of the political difficulties involved in the US undertaking such help, we need to take a leaf from the Soviet book and explore the possibility of our Third World friends taking on this responsibility. There are some examples already—Morocco in Zaire in 1978; Pakistan in Saudi Arabia; and Egypt in the Sudan and Chad. Others may be willing. We should not shrink from encouraging such involvement when it can help a friendly government (and our own interests). Friends such as Korea also could serve as a source of weapons when we cannot help.

10. Finally, the Executive Branch must collaborate more closely in the setting of strategy with key members and committees of Congress. Too often opportunities to counter the Soviets have been lost by clashes between the two Branches, often by last minute, poorly thought out or poorly explained initiatives from the Executive. The independent stand of Congress is a fact of life, and any

effort to counter the Soviets in the Third World will fail unless the Congress is made a party to the Executive's thinking and planning—all along the way. This is anathema to Constitutional purists in the Executive who see foreign policy as the necessary preserve of the Executive (and I am one of those), but it is reality and if we do not accommodate to it we will have no success against the Soviets in the Third World. In the same vein, support for a Third World policy must be bipartisan and stable. The flip-flops and zig-zags of the past eight years have led to confusion and uncertainty among our friends and neutrals who doubt our constancy and our reliability. It may be naive to call for this at this point in our history, but without a sustained, constant policy applied over a number of years, we cannot counter the relentless pressure of the USSR in the Third World.

As I warned, none of these measures are new. What would be new is linking them in a well-thought out strategy applied with consistency and keeping in mind that they are all related and must be applied as a package. Above all, it is past time for the American Government—Executive and Congress—to take the Soviet challenge in the Third World seriously and to develop a broad, integrated strategy for countering it. It will be the principal US-Soviet battleground for many years to come.

Robert M. Gates Deputy Director for Intelligence

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, April 9-20 1983. Secret.

² Casey signed "WJ Casey" above his typed signature.

³ Secret. Prepared by Gates.

42. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 14, 1983

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam
START Negotiator Ambassador Edward Rowny
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Richard Burt
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, Soviet Embassy
Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov, Soviet Embassy

The Secretary noted that Secretary of Defense Weinberger's Report to the Congress on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) had been held up for a few days, but had been finally released since the Soviet Embassy had not gotten back with a reply from Moscow.²

Ambassador Dobrynin stated he had waited too, but had received no instructions in time.

The Secretary made reference to the just-released TASS article on the CBMs proposal and expressed the hope this did not constitute the formal and final Soviet response.

Ambassador Dobrynin said he hoped so as well. He did not know the background of the article in TASS, which generally reflects prevailing opinion. But, he cautioned, we should wait to see what develops.

The Secretary noted Rick Burt would be calling in Sokolov soon to discuss Threshold Test Ban Treaty verification improvements.

Ambassador Dobrynin stated that was fine.

The Secretary noted that by some miracle, the decision on the Long-Term Agreement (LTA) had not yet leaked.

Ambassador Dobrynin interjected that Agriculture Secretary Block was aware.

The Secretary noted he had informed Secretaries Block and Regan personally. Nevertheless, when would the Soviet government reply on this question?

Ambassador Dobrynin stated he would get in touch as soon as he received word from Moscow.

The Secretary noted that in his absence, the Ambassador should get in touch with Ken Dam or Rick Burt directly.

The Secretary went on to observe that he had read the report of Ambassador Hartman's most recent conversation with Korniyenko.³ Not much had been accomplished, he noted, save that we were at least meeting for such discussions. He emphasized that somehow we must make progress on these regional issues.

The Secretary then noted the unfolding case of the Pentecostals.

Ambassador Dobrynin stated the Pentecostals were all back home now and expressed the hope the next steps would work out.

The Secretary stated that we had kept this low-key as the Soviets asked.

Ambassador Dobrynin acknowledged this fact.

The Secretary then stated the main topic he wished to discuss this day was START.

Ambassador Dobrynin interjected when would we finish?

The Secretary noted that to reach any eventual agreement, our present START dialogue would have to be opened up. The Ambassador had earlier suggested the utility of informal exchanges on this issue. The Secretary was now taking him up on this to demonstrate the seriousness of the Administration in seeking progress towards a mutually-acceptable START agreement. Such meetings should not replace the Geneva talks, but rather explore possible directions to be pursued by the negotiators.

The Secretary observed that there had been a disappointing lack of results in the last round of START negotiations in Geneva. The U.S. had taken several important steps, such as proposing limitations on air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). For their part, the Soviets had tabled a draft treaty but had continued to leave key elements of their proposal blank.

Ambassador Dobrynin interjected this showed how flexible the Soviet proposal was.

The Secretary stated that nonetheless, the Geneva talks currently lacked a sense of direction which these informal and exploratory conversations might help to determine. In that regard, he had some questions for Dobrynin on three areas in which flexibility would be necessary.

The Secretary noted that in Geneva, the U.S. Delegation had proposed a ceiling of 850 deployed ballistic missiles and 400 heavy bombers. These figures, of course, could not be simply added together because of the significant differences between the weapons systems. The Soviets had proposed reductions to total of 1800 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The gap between the U.S. and Soviet

numbers was major, but they were not that widely apart. The Secretary stated he did not wish to negotiate these figures here, but posed the general question to the Ambassador whether the Soviet figures could come down if the U.S. numbers went up?

Ambassador Dobrynin stated he would get back to Moscow with the Secretary's interesting proposal. He noted that the current Soviet proposal in Geneva dealt with weapons across the board whereas the U.S. proposal differentiated between missiles and bombers. Perhaps even more important than numbers in regards these reductions proposals was their structure. The U.S. proposal, with its undue emphasis on ICBMs and its philosophy—as publicly expressed by Ambassador Rowny—of making the Soviet Union “buy now and pay later,” was unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

The Secretary suggested that, on the basis of the Ambassador's remarks, there were three components to the Soviet Union's problems with the U.S. proposal—the timing of reductions, the ratio of missiles versus bombers, and the ICBM sub-limits within the ballistic missile category.

Ambassador Dobrynin agreed and then inquired whether the structure of the U.S. proposal in this regard was fixed.

Ambassador Rowny noted that the 850 limit on deployed ballistic missiles in the U.S. proposal included not just ICBMs but SLBMs as well. His “buy now, pay later” remark, he explained, had been meant to reflect his belief that proposed reductions would be in the ultimate interest of the Soviet Union.

The Secretary noted that both the structure of reductions and the composition of remaining forces were legitimate subjects for negotiation.

Ambassador Rowny offered his personal view that ICBM sub-limits might be easier to deal with in this regard than the issue of launcher limits in separate categories.

Ambassador Dobrynin stated that the Soviet Union continued to think SALT II had been sound in dealing with weapons across the board. The Soviets did not accept the U.S. theory of differing destabilizing effects of various weapons systems. Rather, the U.S. proposal focused on those weapons which were the backbone of Soviet strategic forces, some 70 percent. There was a need for greater balance in the U.S. proposal.

The Ambassador went on to note the U.S. proposal offered a equal ceiling of 400 heavy bombers at a time when the Soviet Union had only some 150. The U.S., of course, even included Backfire in this category. The Ambassador related an anecdote from SALT II in which Soviet Marshal Ogarkov reportedly offered a inter-continental ride in a Backfire to General Rowny to prove the plane would run out of fuel well before reaching land.

Ambassador Rowny interjected that he had not turned down that invitation.

The Secretary stated that we would consider this question of structure.

The Secretary then raised the question of ALCMs. He noted that in Geneva Ambassador Rowny had made quite clear the U.S. position that the Soviet call for a complete ban on all long-range cruise missiles was unacceptable. The U.S. considered ALCMs a reality and a necessary element in our

modernized deterrent forces in the case of increasing Soviet air defenses. The U.S. was, however, ready to discuss a system of realistic limitations on ALCMs. Was the Soviet Union, he asked, now ready to negotiate with us seriously on this question?

Ambassador Dobrynin said he had no flexibility at this time on this. The Soviet Union still sought a complete ban. Did the Secretary have any more on this?

Ambassador Rowny noted that in START the U.S. had proposed ALCM limitations analogous to SALT II.

The Secretary moved on to his third question in regards to the effect of any agreement on the large numbers of Soviet heavy and medium missiles. He stressed that the U.S. perceived the MIRVed Soviet heavy SS-18's and medium SS-17's and SS-19's as a very real threat to our deterrent forces. This was not, he stated, a contrived or peripheral issue for the U.S. In Geneva, the U.S. delegation had proposed various direct and indirect constraints on these missiles which the Soviet Delegation had rejected without offering any alternative of meeting these basic U.S. concerns. At times, he went on, the Soviet Delegation had alluded to possible reductions of heavy missiles in connection with its own reductions proposal but had essentially avoided direct discussion of this issue.

The Secretary concluded by noting that the Ambassador had asked whether the U.S. numbers in its proposal were frozen. The answer was no, but that the U.S. was still in dark as to the Soviet proposal and particularly its effects on this heavy/medium missile problem.

Ambassador Dobrynin stated that the Soviets were quite familiar with the arguments advanced by Ambassador

Rowny in Geneva on this, but were nonetheless prepared to look at this further.

The Secretary noted that, in general, the U.S. was looking for a readiness on the part of the Soviet Union to work together on the successful resolution of these problems. The general purpose of U.S. efforts was to facilitate progress. He noted that despite the importance of the INF, MBFR and other negotiations, START was truly the most serious and far-reaching in its implications.

The Secretary emphasized his seriousness and that of the President in achieving a mutually-acceptable agreement. He noted the President's careful interest in this question and stated that if the President were able to get satisfactory START agreement, he would be able to get it ratified. The Secretary noted that he had spent the previous weekend with the President at Camp David where, during the course of long discussions, the President had expressed his desire to see something accomplished in START.⁴

Ambassador Dobrynin noted in response that the Soviet Union was prepared to make arms reductions. Both countries, he went on, desired reductions. The key fact, however, was that all systems should be dealt with on an equal basis. The U.S., he remarked, was inviting the Soviet Union to restructure its forces along U.S. lines; while the Soviet Union could make similar proposals, it would not do so because the U.S. would reject such a proposition. A reductions agreement must have equal application, he stated, but the U.S. was seeking more in this regard from the Soviet Union than it was itself prepared to do. The present U.S. proposal would, he concluded, leave the U.S. with more missiles and warheads.

The Secretary asked just what effect the Soviet proposal would have on throw-weight numbers.

Ambassador Dobrynin stated he could find out, but cautioned realism in regards this issue of throw-weight. Even Henry Kissinger, he remarked, had agreed that throw-weight was not that important in connection with the U.S. decision in previous years not to build heavier missiles.

The Secretary noted that even Henry Kissinger had not always been right.

The Secretary stated that the U.S. was not seeking an agreement which would be to the obvious disadvantage of one party. Rather, he explained, he was seeking to determine through his talks with the Ambassador a way to find a mutually advantageous agreement. He agreed that both countries wanted to reduce their forces, but their differing force structures clearly complicated that effort. Perhaps less important than the numbers reduced, he commented, would be where the two sides ended up.


Ambassador Dobrynin suggested this would not necessarily be so if the end result reflected an unwarranted focus on ICBMs.

The Secretary noted that he hoped to meet again with the Ambassador before too long on INF and MBFR matters. In his absence, however, Ken Dam might meet with the Ambassador.

Ambassador Dobrynin promised to let the Secretary know of Moscow's response to his questions and comments on START.

On this note, the meeting ended.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D188, Reagan/Shultz/Dobrynin plus Shultz or Dam/Dobrynin in Washington, D.C. February-1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt.

² Shultz, Weinberger, and Dobrynin discussed CBMs during their April 7 meeting (see [Document 38](#)). On April 12, Reagan made a brief statement: "I am pleased to note the completion of the report of the Secretary of Defense on Direct Communications Links and Other Measures to Enhance Stability. I believe that the proposals in this report, which was prepared in accordance with Public Law 97-252, are fully consistent with our goal of reducing the risk of nuclear war." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book I, p. 525) The report is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 309-324. See also [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 159, footnote 8](#) .

³ Hartman and Korniyenko met in Moscow on April 9 to discuss the situations in Afghanistan and the Middle East. (Telegram 4311 from Moscow, April 9; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830003-0219)

⁴ Reagan wrote in his diary for April 8-10: "Then off to Camp David. We had the Shultz's with us as guests." He continued: "They are nice to be with. George & I had hours of discussion of all our international problems." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 214)

43. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 18, 1983, 5:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations: CBM's and Pending Bilateral Issues

PARTICIPANTS

The Acting Secretary
Assistant Secretary Burt
Ambassador Dobrynin
Minister-Counselor Sokolov

Ambassador Dobrynin asked to see Acting Secretary Dam in order to deliver Moscow's reply to the President's CBM proposals, put forward by Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger on April 7, 1983.² The meeting lasted about 15 minutes.

Dobrynin handed the Acting Secretary the attached text (in English) of his instructed demarche. Dobrynin said that the Soviet side found certain measures regarding communications worthwhile. The Direct Communications link (Hotline) was an example, and Moscow therefore had no objection to upgrading the Hotline. This could be done through discussions at the technical level, with the time and place to be determined through diplomatic channels.

Since the Soviet side felt that existing channels were adequate, it did not consider establishment of new, military-to-military channels as "expedient." The Soviet attitude was the same regarding the U.S. proposal to upgrade communications between our two capitals and respective embassies. Any new communications channels could be incorporated into the Hotline.

The Soviet side was prepared to listen to further U.S. ideas regarding its proposal to undertake multilateral consultations on nuclear terrorism. Dobrynin wondered if the U.S. had approached anyone else on this matter; Burt responded that we had not.

The Acting Secretary welcomed the Soviet response on the Hotline and nuclear terrorism, but regretted the negative Soviet attitude on the other two proposals. Dobrynin said that if the U.S. had further information on these two proposals, the Soviet side would listen. The Acting Secretary took due note of that, pointing out that we felt the military-to-military link was particularly desirable.³

The Acting Secretary asked if Dobrynin had any word on other pending issues. We could understand that the START issues were complex, and that Moscow might not have prepared responses to the Secretary's questions. We were concerned over the lack of a Soviet response on the LTA issue, which, as Secretary Shultz had indicated, could become public knowledge at any moment. Dobrynin said he would get back to the Department on the LTA question as soon as he heard from Moscow, adding that the issue "was not as simple as it looked."

Attachment

Soviet Oral Statement⁴

Moscow, undated

The U.S. Government, of course, is fully aware of the consistent position of the USSR favoring the adoption of effective measures aimed at enhancing stability and preventing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war. In the present circumstances this would be best of all facilitated

by reaching at the current Soviet-American negotiations mutually acceptable agreements on the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms. In the context of such agreements an important place could be assigned also to confidence building measures in order to prevent the emergence of crisis situations, including the ones arising from all kind of accidents or miscalculations. Of course, such measures must be substantive, and they should really restrict certain types of military activities of the sides and not just be confined to a mere recording of facts.

We also believe that certain specific measures which were agreed and adopted by our countries in the past are worthwhile and serve a useful purpose. This applies, in particular, to the Direct Communication Link between Moscow and Washington. As is known, the existing bilateral agreements in force on this matter provide for the possibility of making arrangements for upgrading and improving the quality of the Direct Communication Link. We have no objections to having a discussion on this subject. This could be done, as was the case in the past, at the level of technical experts with the venue and time of such consultations to be agreed through diplomatic channels. We also understand that the U.S. side intends to present additional clarification on this question.

Since the Direct Communication Link meets the existing requirements, has demonstrated that it is secure and efficient, the setting up of some other parallel channels, for instance, between defense ministries, would not be expedient. It is our view too, that our embassies, considering the functions assigned to them, have sufficient capabilities to maintain efficient communications with their respective capitals.

We would be prepared to listen to additional considerations that the U.S. side said it would present with regard to multilateral consultations on crises resulting from the seizure of nuclear weapons or nuclear materials. It would also be useful to know if the U.S. side has approached anybody else on this matter or whether it intends to do so.

Generally speaking, we would like to emphasize again that, on our part, we maintain a fully serious attitude to the elaboration and implementation of measures designed to strengthen confidence and to prevent the danger of a nuclear confrontation. But we are, of course, against having the question of confidence building measures used primarily for propaganda purposes and as a substitute for real steps in curtailing the arms race and in lowering the military levels of the opposing sides, first of all nuclear levels. The specific initiatives in this area advanced in the statements of the Soviet leaders, including their recent statements, as well as our detailed proposals made at the negotiations in Geneva, Vienna and Madrid open up a realistic prospect for reaching agreements on these pressing issues. Regretfully, we have to note that so far the U.S. has been avoiding their businesslike consideration.

If the U.S. side is genuinely seeking to restore confidence and to uphold it, to clear the atmosphere of mutual suspicions, it is necessary to abandon the preaching of animosity and hatred, the propaganda of nuclear war and the attempts to break the existing military balance to its own advantage. It is necessary to start to exert resolute efforts toward curbing the arms race, and not increasing it, toward restoring the normal and correct relations between our countries. And, of course, the real nature of the approach of the U.S. to confidence building measures may be determined by whether the U.S. side will be willing to reconsider its unobjective and lop-sided stand at the

negotiations on the limitation and reduction of weapons, above all, nuclear weapons.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Memoranda of Conversation 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt; cleared by Dam and Hill. An unknown hand initialed for Dam and Hill. The meeting took place in the Deputy Secretary's office. Dam was acting for Shultz, who was in Mexico City to attend the meeting of the U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission. On April 18, Dam sent the President a memorandum summarizing the meeting with Dobrynin. He noted that the State Department would "initiate the appropriate inter-agency action to follow up on the Soviet response." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, April 9-20 1983) Telegram 106831/Tosec 30036, to Secretary Shultz in Mexico City and for information to Moscow, April 19, contained a summary of the meeting and the text of the Soviet oral statement. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Memoranda of Conversation 1983)

² See [Document 38](#).

³ Dam wrote in his personal notes, April 18, that the Soviets "have been unwilling to agree to several other CBMs, including the joint military-to-military link. I am sure that this will upset Cap Weinberger, who had been very strongly advocating such a link. People in the State Department have been concerned about it because of the possibility of losing control in a crisis. On the other hand, there are technical reasons for thinking that in a time of near war, such communication might be useful. But there is a strong fear that it will be abused, and moreover, there are

great dangers of too many channels of communication at a time of a crisis. Different messages, including conflicting messages, can be sent on different channels, and such a proliferation of message channels could actually deepen the crisis.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982-Sept. 1983)

4 No classification marking.

44. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Howe) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, April 20, 1983

SUBJECT

Follow-Up to Soviet Response on CBMs

Issue For Decision

As you are aware, Dobrynin called on Ken Dam April 18 with a formal Soviet response to our proposals for additional confidence-building measures (CBMs).² We need your agreement to our general approach on the next steps in our follow-up to this Soviet message.

The Soviet Response

The tone of the Soviet reply—in the form of an “oral statement”—was one of cautious interest in some, but not all of our proposed CBMs. While reiterating at some length their position that CBMs cannot be allowed to divert public attention from the central issues of arms reductions, the Soviets did state a willingness to discuss both upgrading the Hotline and our proposed multilateral convention on procedures for handling crises involving nuclear weapons and terrorism. They rejected, however, the suggestions to establish a Joint Military Communications Link and high-data rate links between our respective foreign ministries and embassies.

In sum, the Soviets are prepared to talk with us about two of the proposed CBMs. We should bear in mind, however, that they may well stall or back away entirely from such discussions should it appear to them the U.S. is reaping significant public relations benefits from this as a demonstration of progress in Soviet-American arms control. Thus in our follow-up, we will need to be especially careful in balancing our public diplomacy needs with the requirements for a quiet, businesslike approach to substantive negotiations.

Next Steps

Your Meeting With Dobrynin: In your arms control meeting with Dobrynin tomorrow, it will be important for you to give a personal reply to the Ambassador's demarche. We will be providing you with talking points promising that we will approach the Soviets shortly with more specific ideas on the two proposals they have agreed to discuss, and urging their renewed consideration of the other two.

Next Interagency Steps: Thus far, these measures still have the public status of DOD recommendations only. It is expected that sometime within the next week or so, the President will announce his official approval of them. Secretary Weinberger will be eager to move quickly to interagency agreement on negotiating modalities for the Hotline upgrade and the convention on nuclear terrorism as well as on concrete U.S. recommendations for presentation to the Soviets and our allies, so that the President can include these specific decisions in his public statement. Additionally, OSD is certain to press for the President to renew publicly the call for establishment of a Joint Military Communications Link, their favorite measure but one which Moscow has already rejected.

These matters will be considered by the START interagency group, probably later this week or early next week. If you agree, we propose to take the following general approaches:

1. *Multilateral Convention on Nuclear Terrorism*: Because this issue is closely related to nuclear non-proliferation and the key parties are the same, we believe Dick Kennedy should handle the diplomatic approaches on this. He is scheduled to travel to Moscow this June for our non-proliferation bilaterals with Soviet counterparts; this would appear to be the most appropriate time and venue for presenting greater detail on this proposal with the Soviets. He could brief the relevant Allied Ambassadors in the Department sometime before then. OSD, however, may seek to shorten this time frame drastically by having the President speak to negotiating considerations in his public statement. Since the effectiveness of such bilaterals rests in part in their low-key nature, we believe too much public detail at this stage would be a mistake.

Recommendation: That Dick Kennedy be selected to take the lead in discussions of this proposal with the Soviets and Allies during the course of his already-scheduled bilaterals.³

2. *Hotline Upgrade*: The Soviet "oral message" refers to past precedent in expressing a willingness to hold discussions on this subject "at the level of technical experts." At this stage, we believe that the most productive approach might be to dispatch a technical team to Moscow for negotiations to be headed up by Ambassador Hartman on our side (Conversely, a Soviet team could come to Washington). Given the present Soviet tactic of stonewalling on all areas of potential agreement within the START talks, we think it would be a mistake to attempt to

insert this proposed measure into those negotiations—thus making Hotline upgrade hostage to larger Soviet START concerns and confounding our desire for tangible progress in this area.

Recommendation: That we seek to negotiate the Hotline upgrade through Ambassador Hartman, backed up by an appropriate team of technical experts to be sent out to Moscow.⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, April 9-20 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley and Minton; cleared by Hall, Combs, Palmer, Dean, and Labowitz. Forwarded through Eagleburger. A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.

² See [Document 43](#).

³ Shultz initialed his approval of this recommendation.

⁴ Shultz initialed his approval of this recommendation.

45. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 21, 1983

SUBJECT

My April 21 Meeting With Dobrynin

In accordance with our earlier discussions, I met with Dobrynin today to talk about the INF negotiations. Paul Nitze, Ken Adelman, Ken Dam, and Mark Palmer joined me. The meeting also touched briefly on the Pentecostals, Shcharanskiy, your new confidence-building measures proposals, and our bilateral fisheries agreement.

On INF, I underscored for Dobrynin that the zero option remained on the table, but that we had presented an alternative, interim proposal in order to emphasize our flexibility and our willingness to discuss any reasonable approach based on equality. I then posed a series of four questions for Moscow to ponder, in order to determine whether there is any give in the Soviet position:

First, was there any finite, equal level of U.S. and Soviet INF warheads-on-missiles that the Soviet Union was prepared to accept?

Second, did the USSR insist that an INF agreement must totally exclude Soviet systems located in the Eastern part of the Soviet Union? (I cited the mobility and transportability of the SS-20 as arguments against a Europe-only approach.)

Third, is it the Soviet view that even an interim INF agreement must include aircraft as well as longer-

range INF missiles? (I noted that the U.S. was prepared to consider aircraft in the context of a two-phased approach.)

Fourth, is it conceivable that we can design an INF agreement between the U.S. and USSR based on parity and equality (i.e. without accounting for British and French forces)?

On each of these questions, Dobrynin interjected with comments indicating no change in the Soviet positions as had been set forth earlier either in Geneva or at Gromyko's recent press conference.² I took issue with Dobrynin's consistent "No's," noting that this suggested no progress at all was possible in INF. In light of his earlier comments to me that Soviet negotiators never act without instructions, I expressed some puzzlement how he could square this with Paul Nitze's exploratory conversations with his Soviet counterpart last year ("The Walk in the Woods"), during which there had been some deviation from these Soviet positions.

In response, Dobrynin tacitly admitted it had been the Soviet side which broke off those discussions on the grounds they were apprehensive they "were negotiating with an individual and not with a government." I stressed to him that we were seeking precisely that sort of informal, exploratory discussion to find a mutually-agreeable INF solution.

After reiterating various familiar Soviet arguments (the "strategic" threat posed by the Pershing II, the need to be compensated for UK and French systems, and a refusal to negotiate on systems beyond Europe), Dobrynin attempted to put the onus on the U.S. for coming up with new ideas to solve the current stalemate. I reminded him that no such

ideas would be possible if the Soviets continued in their inflexibly negative responses to questions expressing our basic concerns. Dobrynin promised to pass on our questions to Moscow, but was not particularly sanguine about the likely replies.

Other issues

On the Pentecostalists, I noted that the two families were now back home in Siberia waiting for their visas. I expressed the hope that Moscow would proceed in a reasonable fashion to grant them permission to leave. I also reminded Dobrynin that we want the Soviets to release Anatoliy Shcharanskiy soon. He did not respond on either of these subjects.

With respect to your new confidence-building measures proposals, I told Dobrynin that we would be approaching them soon with ideas on how to begin discussions on the two which Moscow had accepted (upgrading the Hotline, and developing a multilateral convention for consultations in the event of the use or acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists). I also urged the Soviets to reconsider their position on the two proposals they did not accept, including the proposed Joint Military Communication Link.

On economic matters, Dobrynin confirmed that the Soviets today had conveyed their acceptance of our proposal for a one-year extension of the bilateral fisheries agreement.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/21/83). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. In a forwarding memorandum to

Shultz, Palmer noted: "I have prepared the attached memorandum to the President reporting on your meeting this afternoon with Dobrynin. Given the fact that Dobrynin did not yet have any definite answer on the LTA and the continuing sensitivity of this issue, I have not included any reference to that matter in this memo." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, April 18-30)

² See [Document 33](#).

46. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 22, 1983

SUBJECT

Prospects for the Embassy Pentecostals

Kenneth Dam forwarded you a memorandum (Tab A) which provides an update on the Pentecostals.² Briefly, our Embassy in Moscow has been in touch with the two families, the Chmykhalovs and the Vaschenkos, by telephone and expects both to apply for exit permission sometime next week. Simultaneously, our Embassy in Tel Aviv is assisting Lidia Vaschenko submit formal invitations to her family through the appropriate Israeli officials.

In continuing to maintain a low-key approach on this issue, State intends to pursue the following steps: give the Soviets a list of the family members seeking to emigrate, establish regular telephone contact with the families in Chernogorsk, work with the Israelis to get all their visa authorizations and maintain continuous contact with various Pentecostal support groups in the U.S. Already, George Shultz has raised the subject with Dobrynin.³

State's memorandum alerts you to several obstacles that may arise in the upcoming weeks. These include: delays in the application processing, potential hostile scrutiny by various Pentecostal support groups, release of several family members at a time, and the families' destinations. State will keep you abreast of developments and will

provide you with recommendations for necessary action if such problems arise.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/13/83–04/15/83). Confidential. Sent for information. Prepared by Dobriansky, who forwarded a draft to Clark on April 20. Reagan initialed this memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² Dated April 15; attached but not printed.

³ See [Document 42](#).

47. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, April 22, 1983

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

Today was the day that we decided to go public with our offer to the Soviet Union to negotiate a new long-term grain agreement.² On April 7 Shultz had proposed to Dobrynin a negotiation of such a long-term agreement,³ but when we did not hear from the Soviets as to their willingness, the decision was to go public. The decision was taken for two reasons. First, the Hill and particularly the Democrats on the Hill were gaining the initiative in beating up on the Administration on the ground that we were not interested in a long-term grain agreement, an obviously high-powered issue in the farm states.⁴ Secondly, the danger of a leak grew as time passed, as more and more people came to know of the offer. There was, of course, reluctance within the Administration to take this step, because the ending of the five-year grain agreement had been one of the Polish sanctions. Of course, the sanction had been imposed by the Carter Administration, which had actually imposed an embargo, but nevertheless, the decision to negotiate a new agreement was a hard step to take. It was essentially thrust upon us by the politics of the situation, recognizing that the embargo and the cancellation of the agreement had not had any significant effect upon Soviet willingness to be moderate on Polish matters. On the other hand, it is not so clear that it has hurt the United States all that much, because the Soviets, in shifting to purchases from other wheat exporters, were at the same time creating new markets for U.S. exporters.

That is to say, there is a single international wheat market. But in a period of over-supply and surpluses, it was difficult for the farm community to see the issue that way.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983. Secret. Dictated on April 22.

² In a statement released on April 22, the President announced: “we have proposed to the Soviet Union the negotiation of a new long-term grain agreement (LTA). We are taking this step to reaffirm our reliability as a supplier of grain. The present U.S.-Soviet long-term agreement, which originally covered the 1976–1981 period, was extended last September for a single year, through September 30, 1983. Negotiation of a new long-term agreement is consistent with United States agricultural export policy and reflects our commitment to reestablish the U.S. as a reliable supplier. Assuming the Soviets accept this proposal, these negotiations will be conducted by the U.S. Trade Representative in close coordination with the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of State.” (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book I, pp. 575–576) See also [Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 147, footnote 3](#).

³ See [Document 38](#). In an April 15 memorandum, Burt provided Dam with a full report on LTA actions and outstanding decisions. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive April 1–17)

⁴ See [Documents 32](#) and [35](#).

48. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 5, 1983, 11:15 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The Acting Secretary
Under Secretary for Political Affairs Lawrence S. Eagleburger
ACDA Director Kenneth Adelman
INF Negotiator Paul Nitze
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Richard Burt
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, Soviet Embassy
Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov, Soviet Embassy

Ambassador Dobrynin noted he had received a reply to the Secretary's earlier questions on INF.² It was, however, now the Soviet Union's turn to ask questions.

The Ambassador then read from a non-paper, translating into English from the original Russian:

"During our conversation of April 21 the Secretary of State touched upon the key elements of the problem under discussion; the sides' position on precisely these key elements will determine whether there is progress at the negotiations.

However, the very nature of the questions he raised in this connection by no means demonstrates a desire on the part of the U.S. side to reach a mutually acceptable outcome and to break the deadlock which still exists at the negotiations as a result of the unconstructive U.S. position.

1. Let us begin with the question of whether the U.S.S.R. would agree to the deployment of 'some specific number' of new U.S. missiles in Europe.

This way of putting the question is in itself incompatible with the objective of the current negotiations, which is to achieve maximum reduction in the level of nuclear confrontation in Europe, to the extent of completely ridding the continent of both medium-range and tactical arms, and which is certainly not to agree on a buildup of such arms.

But since the Secretary of State did nonetheless raise this question, in order to clarify his train of thought we, in turn, would like to ask the following: how would the U.S. react to the appearance of a certain number of Soviet medium-range nuclear systems in areas from which they could reach U.S. territory?

Incidentally, this would be fully consistent with the principle of 'equal rights and limits' with respect to medium-range arms, regardless of their location, which has recently been proclaimed by the U.S. side.

2. Let us take the other U.S. question: will the U.S.S.R. agree not to take into account the nuclear systems of England and France in the agreement?

We have already provided repeated and detailed explanations as to why the Soviet Union cannot consent to an agreement on limiting nuclear arms in Europe without taking into account the English and French systems.

If the Secretary is still somehow unclear on this point, then one would think the following question might help to clear things up: if some Soviet Warsaw Pact allies had at their disposal medium-range nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, would the U.S. agree not to take them into account in the agreement?

3. Turning to our medium-range missiles in the eastern parts of the U.S.S.R., we will state plainly that questions

whose point it is to somehow justify reductions of our arms in the eastern part of our country cannot be regarded as pursuing a constructive goal or even as serious questions at all. These arms are totally unrelated to the subject of the negotiations in Geneva.

Or should we take the Secretary's statements to mean that the U.S. agrees to consider the question of all the relevant nuclear systems in Asia which are countered by our arms?

4. As for nuclear weapon delivery aircraft, we believe it is necessary and essential that they be included in the agreement. After all, no matter which delivery vehicles—whether missiles or aircraft,—deliver the nuclear warheads the consequences of their use remain the same. The reductions must cover all medium-range systems in Europe—aircraft as well as missiles. Otherwise, a nuclear arms limitation agreement would be inequitable for the Soviet Union.

In this context we would like to ask the following question: what numerical parameters for possible reductions and limitations on aircraft would be acceptable to the U.S. side?

5. We would like particularly to emphasize that the best option for solving the question of limiting and reducing nuclear arms in Europe would, of course, be to rid Europe completely of nuclear arms—both medium-range and tactical—as proposed by the Soviet Union. With such a radical solution many problems currently creating difficulties at the negotiations would disappear by themselves.

The Soviet Union is prepared to do everything in its power to carry out precisely such a far-reaching solution.

Does the U.S., for its part, agree to act in a similar fashion, with a view toward completely ridding Western Europe of nuclear arms?" (This ended the non-paper).

Ambassador Nitze asked whether this Soviet proposal covered all nuclear weapons, including Soviet strategic weaponry.

Ambassador Dobrynin responded in negative, stating it covered only those weapons under discussion in INF.

The Acting Secretary stated we would look at these Soviet responses, but he was not terribly encouraged by them. In regard to the Ambassador's first question, he asked for clarification of the phrasing—Would in fact the Soviet Union accept any U.S. deployments?

The Ambassador repeated the response—to what extent the U.S. would accept any comparable Soviet deployments.

The Acting Secretary stated he was not sure the Soviet ideas had brought the two sides very far in narrowing various differences.

The Ambassador noted the Soviet side had not been particularly encouraged either. In their earlier meeting the Secretary had only asked questions and had not introduced any new elements.

The Acting Secretary replied that the purpose of this particular channel was not to negotiate, but rather to explore possible new avenues.

The Ambassador noted that this applied to both sides. We should explore, but not simply pose questions. He had been involved in such efforts for many years, and stressed that

they do not get anywhere without the introduction of new ideas.

The Acting Secretary then changed the subject to the Middle East (Ambassador Nitze and ACDA Director Adelman left the room at this point).

The Acting Secretary noted that the Secretary was currently in the Middle East, engaged in difficult and personally dangerous negotiations to achieve a settlement in Lebanon, including the withdrawal of all foreign forces.³ We believe, however, we have the possibility of achieving an agreement. We trust that despite the many differences between the U.S. and Soviet Union on issues in the region, the Soviet Union does not want to stimulate conflict in the area. In that regard, we are worried that many recent Soviet statements and media reports may have the effect of increasing the possibility of conflict.

The Acting Secretary stated he was particularly concerned about Soviet statements regarding Israeli intentions to attack Syria as in the Soviet statement of March 30. We have noted these alarmist and emotional reports have been picked up by the Syrian press and seem to reinforce Syrian intransigency. At a time when diplomatic efforts hold real promise for peace in Lebanon, these statements are unhelpful. In that regard, we hope you will hold down the rhetoric and attempt to temper, not excite, tensions in the region.

The Acting Secretary went on to note that if we are able to achieve an early agreement, we expect Syria also to keep its commitments to withdraw its forces as well. We ask you to use your influence to that end.

Ambassador Dobrynin then asked what commitments the Syrians had made in regards withdrawal.

The Acting Secretary noted the Syrians had made such commitments in the Fez Communique, the Non-Aligned Declaration and in a variety of public and private statements since.

The Ambassador stated that to his knowledge, there had been no Arab decision to remove Syria's peace-keeping mandate in this regard.

The Acting Secretary noted that this was primarily a matter for the sovereign government of Lebanon to decide. While we would of course speak to the Syrians about this, this was not a matter for negotiation.

The Ambassador noted that this was an Arab matter, but that he was nevertheless unaware of these Syrian commitments.

The Acting Secretary stated we would bring these to his attention with a paper. He again cited the Fez Communique.

The Ambassador persisted in asking just what obligations of the Syrian government was the Acting Secretary referring to. If these were in fact clear, then why was the Secretary going to Damascus? He added this was not his business, but he needed to clarify this for his government.

The Acting Secretary stated that in any event, our two nations had a common interest to facilitate peace in the area. There was a need for both calm and restraint.

The Ambassador noted that press comments were a problem in both countries, but that as for official

statements—no Soviet official had attacked the U.S. As for Lebanon, he went on, an arrangement which would partition Lebanon, which would give the Israelis a right to intervene—where is Lebanese sovereignty in that? This is what we mention in our statements and press commentary. The Soviet Union is not involved in this; the Syrians have ideas of their own. They are worried about an Israeli attack on which they have some information—as do the Soviets. U.S. leniency with Begin allows him to do anything he wants.

The Acting Secretary replied that the Ambassador's description of the emerging agreement was incorrect and that when it became public, he would see where he had been wrong. The U.S. objective is a fully sovereign Lebanon, including its borders.

The Ambassador interjected that if that were the case, the Soviet Union would welcome it.

The Under Secretary noted that when the Soviet press, whether inspired or unintentionally, charges that Israel is about to attack, these reports are picked up by the Syrians, which is very dangerous situation. It is not our impression the Israelis are going to attack Syria. Soviet reporting is creating a difficult atmosphere.

The Ambassador responded that it was a Soviet right to be concerned that Israel could do this—a sincere concern given recent history. Could the U.S. guarantee that Israel will not do this? If so, then the situation would be clear.

The Acting Secretary replied that the U.S. was not asking the Soviet Union for guarantees but rather to exercise helpful influence.

The Ambassador stated there were no grounds to question the sincerity of Soviet concerns. He expressed the hope that the U.S. really knew the intentions of the Israelis, as he recalled several previous senior U.S. officials had spoken to him one way and the situation had turned out otherwise in the past.

The Acting Secretary stated the U.S. had no information on an Israeli attack. If the Soviet Union had such information, we would like to see it.

The Ambassador noted that if the Israelis in fact left Lebanon, then the situation would be improved.

On that note, the meeting ended.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, May 1-15. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Palmer. Cleared by Eagleburger, Dam, and McManaway. The meeting took place in the Acting Secretary's office.

² See [Document 45](#).

³ Shultz traveled to various capitals in the Middle East from April 25 to May 8.

49. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State (Dam) to President Reagan¹

Washington, May 5, 1983

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Dobrynin—May 5, 1983

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin came in on May 5 to deliver the response from Moscow to the various INF-related questions the Secretary had posed in their April 21 meeting.² Paul Nitze was present. I also used this meeting to convey to Dobrynin our serious concerns about rising Israeli/Syrian tensions and the unhelpful Soviet role in stimulating them. In this connection, I reminded Dobrynin of our own commitment to help bring about withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and of our hope and expectation that all parties will act with restraint during this critical period.

INF: The general tenor of his presentation was tough and rhetorical, offering nothing in the way of substance that might be construed as movement in the Soviet position. Dobrynin began his presentation by noting that the very phrasing of the Secretary's questions had indicated an "unconstructive" U.S. attitude and continued unwillingness to make progress in INF. Essentially turning aside our April 21 queries, he posed counter-questions of his own.

In response to the Secretary's question whether there was any finite number of deployed U.S. LRINF missiles acceptable to the Soviet Union, Dobrynin asked what number of comparable Soviet missiles able to reach the U.S. would we find acceptable. In regard to British and French systems, he questioned how the U.S. would propose

to count similar missiles if they were at the disposal of other Warsaw Pact nations. As for the Asian theater, which he asserted had nothing to do with the current negotiations, he raised the issue of nuclear weapons systems other than the Soviet SS-20's in that region. Stating the inclusion of aircraft was "indispensable" in any INF agreement, he asked what new military parameters for the possible reduction and limitations of aircraft would be acceptable to us.

Concluding with a claim of Soviet interest in a "radical solution" to the problem, he urged U.S. consideration of the Soviet proposal to remove all nuclear weapons from Europe (though his subsequent comment made clear that as before, this offer would not affect Soviet strategic weapons within the U.S.S.R.).

In sum, Dobrynin broke no new ground, essentially reiterating Soviet assertions we have already heard at length in Geneva. His rhetorical question to us about numbers of Soviet LRINF missiles able to reach the U.S. was an explicit repetition of the Soviet threat to put the U.S. in an "analogous position." It is interesting to note, however, that although Andropov's latest negotiating offer to accept equality in warheads with the British and French is barely three days old,³ Dobrynin's message from Moscow and his personal comments made no mention of this at all. This absence suggests that the Soviets themselves see Andropov's proposal as primarily a public diplomacy ploy rather than a serious negotiating position.

Israeli/Syrian Tensions: On the Middle East, I reminded Dobrynin that the Secretary is currently engaged in difficult and personally hazardous negotiations which could lead to real progress toward peace in the region. At the same time, Soviet statements had not been helpful and had

indeed contributed to rising Israeli/Syrian tensions. I told Dobrynin that this is a particularly sensitive period in which all parties should exercise restraint in the interest of peace. Finally, I expressed the hope that, if we were able to obtain Israeli and Syrian agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, the Syrians would keep their own commitments to withdraw.

In the ensuing discussion, Dobrynin asserted that Syrian forces are in Lebanon under Arab League mandate and questioned whether the Government of Syria had undertaken any commitment to withdraw them. I reminded Dobrynin that we considered the Lebanese Government sovereign in this matter. Shifting his ground, Dobrynin said that Israel might attack Syria and asked whether we could give any guarantee concerning Israeli behavior. I replied that guarantees were not the issue; we would continue to work for peace and were urging the Soviets to exercise their influence in a constructive manner. Finally, I told Dobrynin that we had no evidence of Israeli preparations for an attack on Syria and asked if the Soviets had any such evidence. Dobrynin did not reply directly, but said that, if the U.S. could achieve an agreement for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, this would improve the situation.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/02/83-05/06/83). Secret; Sensitive. In a May 5 action memorandum to Dam, Burt wrote: "In accordance with usual practice, we have prepared appropriate reports on today's meeting with Dobrynin for your approval." Attached to Burt's memorandum were: "1) a memorandum to the President on today's meeting with Dobrynin; 2) a cable to

the Secretary and Ambassador Hartman on the INF discussion; and 3) a separate cable to the Secretary and interested posts on the Middle East discussion.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D188, Reagan/Shultz/Dobrynin plus Shultz or Dam/Dobrynin in Washington, D.C. February-May 1983) In a May 10 memorandum to Clark, Lenczowski wrote: “Acting Secretary Kenneth Dam has sent the President a memcon of his meeting with Dobrynin. (Tab A) Your cover memorandum to the President (Tab I) briefly summarizes Dam’s memo but adds no further comment. The only comment the memo might deserve is that it demonstrates yet again how fruitless most of our dialogue with the Soviets really is. This is not to say that the dialogue is politically worthless to the United States: the mere fact that we can say we are talking to the Soviets is beneficial. But it is to say that the President’s policy of general caution in dealing with the Soviets and avoiding putting too large an investment in this dialogue in hopes of achieving a true peace with the Soviets is a wise and far-sighted policy.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/02/83-05/06/83)) Clark wrote “I agree,” and he initialed his approval that the memorandum be forwarded to the President. Reagan initialed Clark’s May 16 covering memorandum, which forwarded Dam’s May 5 memorandum.

² See [Document 48](#). For the Secretary’s questions, see [Document 45](#).

³ Andropov made this proposal in a May 3 speech in Moscow. For extracts of his speech, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 389-391.

50. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, May 11, 1983

SUBJECT

Welcome Home Report

The following is a status report on the issues you asked me to track prior to your departure, as well as a few that have arisen in the interim.

I. *U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS*

- *The Dobrynin Channel.* We have kept the Dobrynin channel active during your absence. In the course of five meetings with Dobrynin, we have received answers on START, our PL-5 and Syrian demarches, and some of the answers on INF. There has been very little movement in the Soviet positions on these issues. Most troublesome was the Soviet counter-demarche on the Middle East, the bottom line of which was that we cannot resolve Lebanon's problems without Soviet involvement. Still pending are the Soviets' answers on the LTA. For our part, we owe the Soviets responses to Andropov's proposal for a meeting of scientists to discuss ballistic missile defense and to Dobrynin's START presentation,² as well as further details on our CBM proposals. Also, we have not responded to Dobrynin's latest demarches on the Neutral and Non-Aligned draft concluding document for the Madrid CSCE review.³ We must determine a position as soon as possible since Max leaves for Madrid this week. As you know, the Soviets have offered a package on performance. Max thinks

we can improve on it if the President is willing to see Andropov in the context of the UNGA.

I have asked Larry and Rick Burt to chart a strategy for the entire Dobrynin channel process, to include topics and timing over the next several months.

You should know that Rowny has suggested that we disband the Dobrynin channel on START and turn it over to him when he is at Geneva. This concept has absolutely no support in this building.

- *START*. We have had several discussions of START in my arms control group. I also attended an NSC meeting on Wednesday, May 10 to discuss our position on START.⁴ The upshot will be a Presidential letter to Congress expressing the Administration's willingness to conduct a thorough review of our START proposal in light of the Scowcroft Commission recommendations.⁵ The letter will also express an interest in and willingness to give serious thought to the so-called "build-down" proposal and to the proposal to establish a bipartisan arms control commission.
- *MBFR*. The issue paper for an NSC meeting on MBFR has been forwarded to the NSC staff.⁶ OSD was not altogether pleased with the options and talked about submitting its own, separate paper. To date, OSD has not produced. An NSC meeting is now tentatively scheduled for May 17.
- *Kiev/New York Consulates and Cultural Agreement*. After discussions with Bill Clark, he has agreed (after some reluctance) to move these subjects to the NSPG after developing a more rigorous options paper for the President. I think we are going to continue to face resistance on both these issues.

- *Technology Transfer*. The CIA briefing on Soviet acquisition of western technology raises a number of serious problems which you will be better able to gauge once you have had this briefing.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Memos To/From S, 1983. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation reading "GPS" and Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating they saw it. Shultz was in the Middle East to negotiate a troop withdrawal from Lebanon from April 25 to May 8, then traveled to Paris from May 8 to May 11 for the OECD meeting.


² See [Document 42](#).

³ Documentation on the Madrid CSCE Review Conference is scheduled for publication in [Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. V, European Security, 1977-1983](#).

⁴ Documentation on this NSC meeting is in [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. XI, START I, Document 66](#).

⁵ On January 3, 1983, the White House released a statement announcing the establishment and membership of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces. The Commission consisted of Chairman Brent Scowcroft, Vice Chairman Thomas Reed, and members Nicholas Brady, Harold Brown, William Clements, John Deutch, Alexander Haig, Richard Helms, John Lyons, Levering Smith, and James Woolsey. Marvin Atkins of the Office of the Secretary of Defense served as Executive Secretary of the commission. (*Public Papers; Reagan, 1983*, Book I, pp. 4-5)

⁶ The NSC meeting on MBFR took place on May 18, 1983. Documentation is scheduled for publication in [Foreign](#)

Relations, 1981-1988, vol. V, European Security, 1977-1983 .

51. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, May 17, 1983

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

A good deal of time was spent this afternoon with Secretary Shultz in an internal meeting with Eagleburger, Seitz, and Hill (as well as Burt and Palmer for part of the meeting), discussing how we can work out a better working arrangement with the NSC. One aspect of the problem has to do with the Soviet Union, where there is a Presidential decision to probe the Soviet Union across a number of fronts to see whether there is any prospect of making progress with them, particularly the kind of progress that might permit a well-prepared summit. However, in practice, because of the reluctance of the NSC staff and the opposition of Cap Weinberger, it is almost impossible to get decisions to move forward on individual items. What we need to do is to work out some sort of a system where each item does not have to be fully staffed by the entire bureaucracy. Particularly because of the way Defense proceeds, by essentially taking a position and then sticking to it with no compromise, it is extremely difficult to move forward. I personally fear that the President will be under enormous pressure for a summit meeting, particularly with the election coming up, and it will be one in which we will not be prepared and expectations will be dashed because nothing can be agreed upon at the summit. I also fear that pressure for an arms control agreement before the election will become very great, and again we will not be prepared to move forward because we cannot make decisions within the executive branch.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982-Sept. 1983. Secret. Dictated on May 17.

52. Memorandum From William Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)1

Washington, May 18, 1983

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Summitry

We can expect continuing pressure for a Reagan-Andropov Summit from State, our allies and others. So far, the President has wisely resisted a summit until the Soviets demonstrate better intentions through concrete, positive actions. He should continue to hold the line for reasons explained below.

The President is, in a way, emulating Eisenhower's wise example. After Stalin's death in 1953, Eisenhower stated he would go to a summit if the Soviets agreed to: A German Peace Treaty, an Austrian State Treaty or significant arms control measures. The Soviets agreed to the Austrian Treaty in 1955 and a summit took place in Geneva a few months later. The resulting "Spirit of Geneva" reinforced a Soviet detente campaign which was beginning to weaken NATO until detente ended with the Hungarian Revolution. At least Eisenhower made the Soviets pay a price for the summit.

The record of U.S.-Soviet summit meetings would indicate that they should be avoided altogether. With one exception, Camp David in 1959, these summits have ranged from being merely unnecessary to being nearly disastrous. For example, I have long believed that the 1961 Vienna summit (in which I was involved) convinced Khrushchev that

Kennedy could be pushed around, and the result was the Berlin Wall and later the Cuban missile crisis. Camp David, on the other hand, bought us valuable time needed to toughen our position on Berlin.

The 1961 Vienna summit illustrates a principal danger in summitry. There is bound to be an unbridgeable gulf between the mind-set of a Soviet leader and that of any American President. This compounds the danger of misunderstandings and miscalculations. This danger is further compounded by the fact that summits are perforce short and rendered even shorter by the necessity of translation; therefore, the serious and complex subjects, which are usually on the agenda, can be only superficially discussed.

The Soviets presently feign disinterest in a summit; however, they would probably leap at one were it offered. Summits help them promote detente and "peace" campaigns, provide a convenient propaganda platform, and are regarded by the Soviets as necessary reaffirmations of their co-equal status as a "super power." U.S. participation in a summit may temporarily buy the Administration some domestic and foreign political advantages, but can also backfire when unrealistic expectations are dashed by the usual absence of concrete results—for which the U.S. may be blamed as much as the Soviets (or even more). Of course, this would not be the case if a summit only ratified agreements already concluded—which is the only circumstance under which I feel a summit is warranted at all.

1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/19/84-06/27/84); NLR-748-25A-5-7-7. Confidential. Sent for

information. A copy was sent to Lenczowski. Poindexter wrote in the top margin: "President has seen. JP."

53. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, May 20, 1983

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Dobrynin—May 19, 1983

I wanted to give you a more complete account than was possible last night of my first meeting with Dobrynin since my return from the Middle East.² The meeting lasted about eighty minutes. During the first part of it we were joined by our senior staffs for a discussion of a wide range of issues—the Sakharov case, the grains LTA, the Israeli-Lebanese agreement, the MBFR negotiations, and a number of pending bilateral problems. We also met alone for a discussion focusing on the Soviet-Syrian relationship, the dangers of the current situation in Lebanon, and the overall substance and tenor of our bilateral relations.

I led off with our serious concern over the health of Andrey Sakharov and his wife Yelena Bonner and urged that the Soviets permit them to return to Moscow for medical treatment. I referred to Congressional interest and your Sakharov Day proclamation, and noted to Dobrynin that we had treated this matter with considerable discretion.³

On MBFR, I told Dobrynin that we would be back to him soon with some ideas for introducing new momentum into the negotiations. On the grains LTA, I told Dobrynin that although I was not yet in a position to give him an official response, his suggestion that the grains consultations previously scheduled for June 1-2 be devoted to preparations for the negotiations seemed a generally good

idea, and I saw no reason why we should not treat the parameters of a new agreement at the meeting.

Turning to the Middle East, I gave Dobrynin a fairly full briefing on the negotiations leading to the Israeli-Lebanese agreement. I recalled that all parties to the negotiations had bargained hard and in good faith. For the Lebanese, the bottom line had been to retain the exclusive right to guarantee the security of their borders, and we were satisfied that this had been achieved. I concluded that Lebanon now deserves a chance to address its internal problems, and can do this best if all foreign forces would withdraw. Israel had now committed itself to withdraw, and it was up to others to follow suit.

At this point, I invited Dobrynin to take the floor, and he began with the familiar line that the Sakharov case was an internal Soviet matter. To my comments about the LTA, Dobrynin responded positively, and assured me we could work with the Soviet in charge of the June 1-2 talks, but added that a new agreement should contain assurances against future embargoes. Responding to my comment on MBFR, Dobrynin said that he would wait to see what we had to say. He noted that the Soviets were themselves waiting for our response to their proposal for confidential consultations between U.S. and Soviet scientists on the implications of your ballistic missile defense initiative.

Turning to bilateral relations, Dobrynin noted that in our meetings earlier this year, we had reviewed a number of issues which were of particular concern to the Soviet side. Among these he listed the bilateral agreements on cooperation in Transportation and Atomic Energy up for renewal this year, the Soviet proposal for more activity under other bilateral agreements still in force, and the Soviet request that we take another look at seven bilateral

arms control negotiations which are now suspended. He also noted that, at one point, I had mentioned the possibility of taking another look at negotiations for a new cultural agreement and consulates in Kiev and New York, but had had nothing more to say to him on these issues, so that he wondered what we propose to do. Finally, he said that the Soviet side looked forward to my meeting with Gromyko at the UNGA this fall and hoped that other meetings preliminary to it would take place.

At this point, Dobrynin and I adjourned for a private meeting. I told him of our concern that the tensions in Lebanon were becoming more dangerous. There are Soviets in the Bekaa, I noted, and the Soviets are associated with the Syrians in Lebanon, with the PLO, with other groups. Who controls such groups is an open question; one had bombed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, and we had one report that there was Soviet involvement in this. I had told the official who said it that we had no evidence of that. But the fact is that the Soviets are involved with various irresponsible groups in Lebanon, I said, and that they are playing with fire. And their increased military deployments in Syria meant that they would inevitably be involved in any new war from the outset. The situation is extremely dangerous.

Dobrynin replied that he had understood my message and did not think the Syrians were seeking a conflict nor doing anything to bring one about. In this connection, he said the Soviets had counselled Damascus to be careful. (I said we had done the same with the Israelis.) On the question of the broader Middle East peace process, Dobrynin said it was not up to the U.S. to determine whether the Soviets have a role. He asserted that the Soviet Union needed no U.S. "ticket" to play in the Middle East game, perhaps signalling

Soviet sensitivity over their current position on the diplomatic sidelines.

Dobrynin and I then privately reviewed our personal dialogue over the past few months, agreeing that it would rate a grade of C-plus at best. Noting the possibility of a trip by me to Moscow this summer for meetings with the Soviet leadership, I told Dobrynin frankly that not enough progress had been made to justify the trip at this point.

Dobrynin replied that, from Moscow's perspective, the results of our dialogue had not been impressive. The only real accomplishment had been our LTA offer, and this had been accompanied by our statements that this step had no broader political significance. Dobrynin continued that, when asked by Moscow for a list of steps the U.S. had taken in the interest of improved relations, he had little or nothing to report. In these circumstances, Moscow is of the opinion that the U.S. Administration has a hostile attitude toward the USSR.

The meeting concluded on this note. Dobrynin and I agreed, however, that it is important for us to stay in touch, and that we should meet after the Williamsburg Summit and before the NATO Ministerial, in the first week of June.⁴ While there was a certain amount of characteristic posturing in Dobrynin's remarks, his attitude was businesslike, and I believe the overall thrust of his presentation should be taken seriously. I look forward to our discussion together with Bill Clark Monday morning on next steps in our relations with the Soviets.⁵

¹ Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (6).

Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² Shultz returned from the Middle East and Paris on May 11.

³ On May 18, Reagan signed Proclamation 5063, declaring May 21, 1983, to be National Andrei Sakharov Day. Sakharov, a noted Russian physicist, human rights activist, and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, was exiled to the city of Gorky in the Soviet Union. See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book I, pp. 731-732.

⁴ The G-7 Economic Summit took place in Williamsburg, Virginia, May 28-30. The NATO Ministerial meeting took place in Paris June 9-10.

⁵ See [Document 56](#).

54. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, May 21, 1983

SUBJECT

Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations

At your direction, I have embarked on a process of intensive dialogue with Dobrynin on the full range of US-Soviet issues;² Max Kampelman has been engaged on sensitive Madrid issues; and Art Hartman has also had a role in Moscow. We have identified four necessary topic areas for discussion:

A. Human Rights: In this area there has been some movement. It began with your initiative to break the impasse in the Pentecostalist case, but in recent weeks the Soviets, in the context of reaching a CSCE agreement in Madrid, appear to have been moving toward us on other human rights issues of special concern.

B. Bilateral Relations: Dobrynin and I have reviewed outstanding issues in our bilateral relations to see where we might move to mutual advantage. In this area, our principal move was your proposal to begin negotiations for a new Long Term Agreement on grains. They knew we wanted an agreement, and they have now accepted the proposal.³

C. Arms Control: Here the results of our discussions have been mixed. We have covered virtually every topic in your arms control negotiating program, and the Soviet responses have ranged from some modest movement on START, MBFR, and your recent CBMs proposals; through a

serious but still unsatisfactory reply to our démarches on their tests of the PL-5 ICBM; to a blank wall on INF. At the same time, there is some momentum in our bilateral exchanges with the Soviets on nuclear non-proliferation (Ambassador Richard Kennedy will hold a second round of these consultations in Moscow in mid-June). As you know we are now reviewing our positions on some of the central arms control issues and, depending on what we decide, we may have more to say to the Soviets on these subjects.

D. Regional Issues: We have had a fair amount of dialogue with the Soviets on issues such as Afghanistan, but positive results have been meager. Our task remains to drive home to the Soviets the importance of progress on these issues if there is to be a meaningful and lasting improvement in our relations.

Against this background, we are now in a position where we need to take further steps if we want to see whether a visit this summer to Moscow for meetings with Andropov and Gromyko, an invitation to Gromyko to Washington for a meeting with you at the time of the UNGA this fall, and ultimately a meeting between you and Andropov would be in our interest. I believe the next step on our part should be to propose the negotiation of a new US-Soviet cultural agreement and the opening of U.S. and Soviet consulates in Kiev and New York, as I suggested some months ago. Both of these proposals will sound good to the Soviets, but are unambiguously in our interest when examined from a hardheaded American viewpoint. I am enclosing copies of the options papers on these issues the Department earlier sent to Bill Clark.⁴

In NSDD 75 on US-Soviet relations, you endorsed the idea that getting an adequate formal framework for exchanges is the only way to ensure reciprocity in cultural, academic

and media contacts with the Soviets, and to penetrate the Soviet Union with our own ideology. To get it we need to negotiate a new US-Soviet cultural agreement with the Soviets, and that is what Charlie Wick and I have proposed for your decision.⁵

The opening of U.S. and Soviet consulates in Kiev and New York would have the advantage of getting us onto new Soviet terrain while increasing the Soviet presence here only marginally. The Soviets already have a big UN Mission in New York, while our consulate in Kiev would be the first Western mission in the capital of the Ukraine. There is growing interest in a Kiev consulate in Congress and among American Jewish and Ukrainian groups. A U.S. presence in Kiev would also help us broaden our access to and ideological penetration of Soviet society.

In order to continue the dialogue process you have authorized me to pursue, I would like to propose to Dobrynin next week that we move forward with the cultural agreement and the consulates. So far it is the Soviets who have made most of the moves in the process, particularly on the LTA and human rights.⁶ It is now time for us to take some modest steps of our own. These steps are necessary (but obviously far from sufficient) ingredients to development of the possibility of a substantive meeting with real results between you and Andropov during your first term.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (6). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. In forwarding a draft to Shultz on May 17, Burt wrote: "Per your instructions this afternoon, we

have prepared the attached memorandum to the President. You may find the last paragraph too strongly worded for your tastes. If so, you could decide to delete all but the first sentence." No changes were made in the paragraph. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, May 16-23 1983) On an NSC routing slip attached to Shultz's memorandum, Poindexter wrote: "Judge, I have tasked the staff to prepare a cover memo for this to go to President on Sunday [May 22]. George just will not follow the interagency process. After my conversation with you yesterday, I told State 10 June NSC meeting on U.S.-Soviet Relations was still scheduled and we still needed an interagency paper on consulates and cultural agreement. My tasking memo is attached. I had passed verbal instructions to them earlier. I'm sure George will want to talk about this at 0945 on Monday. JP." (Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (6))

² On May 21, Dobriansky sent a memorandum to Clark that addressed her issues with Shultz's memorandum. She recommended against Shultz meeting with Dobrynin "for the following reasons:

"—The current international environment (Soviet obstinacy in Geneva, sabotage of US peace efforts in the Middle East, new round of pressures on Polish regime to intensify repression of workers, etc.) makes the raising of these symbolic issues untimely.

"—Second, the impending June 10 Central Committee Plenum of the Communist Party might change or clarify the Soviet internal power balance, thus enabling us to judge Soviet moves better.

“—Third, before these issues can be addressed, there is a need to develop an overall operational strategy as to how to implement the goals set forth in NSDD-75 (US Policy Toward the Soviet Union).

“—Fourth, a June 10 NSC meeting is scheduled already to discuss the pros and cons of a cultural agreement and new consulates.” (Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (6))

³ See [Document 59](#).

⁴ The options papers are attached; printed as attachments to [Document 40](#).

⁵ See [Document 18](#).

⁶ Reagan drew two parallel vertical lines in the right-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote a question mark.

55. Note From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, May 21, 1983

Judge Clark

SUBJECT

Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations

I have not sent this paper to Cap or Bill for reasons of security and negotiating strategy.²

What do I mean? As you know, I have a fundamental problem with the way we are conducting our dialogue with the Russians. These deal with both style and substance. Here are the parameters as I see them:

—We are now strong enough and have enough leverage to get real concessions from the Russians—in short we are bargaining from strength.

—We must not fritter that leverage by making public what it is (consulates etc) because if it leaks, we are steamrollered into making some deal to suit the special interest group involved in the congress or the country at large. We must play our cards close to the vest.³

—In playing our cards, however, we must know what we want to achieve. Surely some of our leverage is more valuable than others. We should use it wisely and get substantial quids for it. This means we must

have priorities. What do we want to get for consulates, for a cultural agreement, for the grain deal etc. Surely these agreements must not be signed for nothing more than “improved dialogue.” In short, what are our priorities?⁴

—Once we have our priorities set, we must have a negotiating strategy which tells us which cards we play first, second, etc; what our fallbacks are; when we stonewall etc.

Assuming we can put this together—and let me stress I do not believe it can be done within the European Bureau and perhaps not even within the Department at all—it must be handled very discreetly. Otherwise it will leak and we will come under enormous pressure to forfeit our advantages for the sake of agreement. This means we cannot staff US-Soviet Relations through the bureaucracy.

How should we proceed? I think the only way to deal with this issue is to handle it from the White House. The options are that you deal with it personally; that I handle it privately with Dobrynin; or that the Vice President handle it. There are advantages to each of these. I guess I come down on the Vice President option for reasons of low visibility.

But we cannot go on as we are with State continuing to fritter away leverage, not being taken seriously by the Soviets and, at the end of the day, ending up with no strategic gain to show for our several incremental concessions.

Could we discuss this?

¹ Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (6). Secret; Sensitive.

² See [Document 54](#).

³ Clark bracketed this point and wrote “style” in the margin.

⁴ Clark wrote “strategy” in the margin next to this point.

⁵ Printed from a copy with this typed signature. At the bottom of the page, Poindexter wrote: “Judge, I agree with this. As long as we have a strategy that the President agrees with the various aspects of such issues as consulates and exchange agreements can be analyzed outside the interagency process. John.”

56. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, May 23, 1983

I attended a dinner this evening at the White House for Members of the House of Representatives. The purpose was to lobby for the approval of the MX. The evening ended when Tom Foley, the House Democratic Whip, announced that he was going to support the approval of the MX. This suggests that the vote should be rather strongly for the MX. If this is true, this culminates a period of aggressive Presidential activity on behalf of this ICBM system. The strongest arguments have been the arms control arguments, namely, that the determination of the Congress to support the MX will induce the Soviets to come to the table to negotiate seriously in the START talks and that we cannot expect our NATO allies to agree to the deployment of the Pershing II and GLCM missiles unless we are willing to deploy the MX.

I attended a meeting with Secretary Shultz and the President this morning in the Oval Office.² Shultz's purpose was to convince the President that he should go ahead with his plan of engaging the Soviets on a broad range of discussions.³ Specifically, the Secretary sought approval by the President of the Kiev-New York consulates and the cultural agreement. It was an awkward situation, because a number of people were there who had nothing to do with foreign policy (specifically, Ed Meese and Jim Baker). Among the foreign policy group there was, of course, Bill Clark and Bud McFarlane, as well as the Vice President. This was in effect a continuation of the normal 9:30 meeting on national security matters. The President said

that he was willing to go forward with the consulates but that he was troubled about the cultural agreement. Although he realized that the cultural agreement would be in the national interest, because at present the Soviet Union was able to bargain and pick and choose among private sponsors of Soviet cultural events in the United States and the cultural agreement would give us some control of that process and some equal bargaining power, he felt, nevertheless, that voters would not understand the applause for the Bolshoi Ballet and laughter concerning Soviet circuses at the same time that Soviets were gassing Afghan rebels in Afghanistan. The Secretary did the best he could with the situation and tried a number of tacks in discussions with the President, but the President clearly was unable to focus on the broader subject of relations with the Soviet Union. Bill Clark had already frightened him to death with our intelligence reports on the number of Soviet ships visiting Nicaragua, something that was brought home to me when he raised it again this evening at the dinner with the House Members on the MX. It was not a hopeful harbinger of the future. Indeed, even worse news arose later in the day when I realized that Bill Clark had appointed Ron Lehman, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, as his principal arms control staff man on the NSC staff. Although Lehman is an honorable man and certainly one who understands the technical aspects of arms control, he has thus far been aligned with those who tend to view any arms control agreement as a threat to national security. How he will turn out remains to be seen, but the initial reaction at the State Department is to view this as a very ominous development.

My arms control discussion group met this morning to discuss the next eighteen months of arms control negotiations. Because I was meeting with the Secretary and the President, I arrived after the discussions had

started. I arrived to find that Richard Perle and Richard Burt were scoring points off each other and generally raising each other's temperature. I have sought to make these arms control discussions a calm and reasoned place in which issues can be discussed, but I find that that consensus about purposes of the discussions is beginning to dissipate. On the one hand, the change of temper must be because the question of arms control is becoming a major national issue. On the other hand, Richard Burt, who is clearly one of the brightest and most dedicated analysts of arms control matters, is also a person who doesn't know how to use his ammunition carefully in an interagency debate. Since he joined the group, I find it difficult to maintain the atmosphere of civility with our Defense Department colleagues. Until he was confirmed, I did not include him in the discussions, because I felt that it was not in his self-interest to be so deeply involved in arms control matters, and especially in view of the strong opposition among the high conservative members of the Senate. Obviously he belongs in the discussions, but it shows how deeply held the views are and how emotional some of them are when he enters into these discussions with his opposite numbers in the Defense Department.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983. Secret. Dictated on May 23.

² Shultz and Dam met alone with Reagan from 9:43 to 10:23 a.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) In his May 23 diary entry, Reagan wrote: "Met with Shultz re our moves with the Soviets. I thought we've come to a point where we should include Bill Casey & Cap W. in some of

our decisions.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 229)

³ See [Document 54](#).

57. Letter From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Dear George:

Washington, May 26, 1983

I am very conscious of frustration over the US-Soviet dialogue—indeed, I share it. It is because I—and I know, the President—share your interest in getting results that I have wanted to assure that we—and I include all those with a legitimate interest—are all supporting you based upon a clear understanding of strategy and tactics. We hope through this letter to utilize an expeditious and existing process through which we can create this solid base of support so that you can proceed on an overall plan that holds promise of success.

Let me be more specific. It seems to us that the policy enunciated by the President in NSDD 75 is clear. Based upon its objectives, it seems worthwhile for us to translate it into specific priorities—what we are trying to achieve in their rank order—and then to forge a negotiating strategy which is based upon the judicious use of our several elements of leverage so that at the end of the day a year from now we will have achieved one or two extremely important goals en route to our objectives.

Regarding your negotiating strategy, there are no prejudgments against concluding these kinds of agreements, e.g., cultural or consulates; we only ask whether, as a matter of strategy, these ought not be put together with a comprehensive list of others which are

bargained for with an overall sense of priorities so that they take on a strategic, and not merely a tactical and perhaps illusory quality.

As a separate but related matter, it is clear that some of the areas you will wish to negotiate involve by necessity the interests of other agencies. [*2 lines not declassified*] We know you are conscious of this, but believe it is useful for you to have discussed the important considerations [*2 lines not declassified*]. There are other examples but the point is clear. Other advisors to the President in the national security area need to understand our strategy.

In order to put us in a position for you to be able to step off with the full support of all (and as a corollary, not to have to worry about having your agreements undermined later by disaffected bureaucrats), we believe it would be worthwhile for you, me, Bill and Cap to get away (from phones) together for a period so that you could lay out your proposal on how we should proceed. Your presentation could include: what should we try to achieve in the way of solving problems in the next year and in what order (START, human rights, cultural, MBFR, regional security, etc.); what is our leverage, again in descending order of value; what are we willing to give up in exchange for our high-value goals and increased security.

I believe we could emerge from such a meeting with a consensus. Given the President's endorsement, you could move out with great latitude in implementation. It seems worth a try to me. Indeed, I find it difficult to imagine another way. What do you think?

Sincerely,

William P. Clark²

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, May 1983. Sensitive; Eyes Only. Not for the System.

² Clark signed "Bill" above his typed signature.

58. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Dear Bill:

Washington, May 27, 1983

Attached are some comments with respect to the State Department memo proposing several new openings to the Soviets, which you and I have discussed.²

Please let me know if you want anything more.

Cap

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense³

Washington, May 25, 1983

Comments on State's Memo on US-Soviet Relations: Next Steps

1. The specific proposals of this memo come down to the following initiatives:

—a SecState visit to Moscow to be followed by an invitation for Gromyko to visit Washington; — negotiations on a new Cultural Agreement; and — opening of consulates in Kiev and New York.

2. Regarding the *visit of SecState to Moscow*, one should consider that SecState visited there at the occasion of Brezhnev's funeral. A better first step might be a Gromyko visit to Washington early in September. This makes the United States appear less as the petitioner. A SecState visit to Moscow as early as this summer could put pressure on the US—far more than on the Soviets—to produce results. It would be our Secretary who would be seen as having to come back with results if he goes all the way to Moscow *at the President's initiative*.

3. The *Cultural Exchange Agreement* was permitted to expire in 1979 as part of the Carter Administration's response to Afghanistan. Resuming negotiations toward such an Agreement could be misconstrued as our having forgotten and forgiven the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The memo points out that the asymmetry in the visits between the US and the Soviet Union is troublesome, but this point ought to be broadened. There is a disturbing lack of reciprocity favoring the Soviet Union in a wide variety of US-Soviet relationships. The Soviets have a larger Embassy staff and trade missions; their visitors generally have more access to the American people and the media; and their trade relationships with us (as George Schulz has pointed out in another context) is one-sided because they are a single government monopoly with a great deal of information about the US economy and US firms, while we have private firms competing with each other to do business with the Soviet Union.

Thus, the problem that a new Cultural Exchange Agreement is supposed to fix is much broader than cultural affairs. And even in the realm of cultural affairs, it cannot be fixed by such an agreement. What we need is more effective implementation of the tools we now have to enforce reciprocity, plus perhaps some legislative changes.

We should therefore develop a framework for US-Soviet reciprocity in diplomatic, business, cultural, scientific, and other such relations, and proposals on how to enforce it. Once we have such a framework in place, a new Cultural Exchange Agreement might well fit into it and accomplish its desired purposes.

4. A critical question on all these initiatives is *timing*. If there is a possibility of a summit next year or later this year, the agreement on the consulates and the signing of the Cultural Agreement (based on rigorous reciprocity) may be precisely the kind of limited substantive outcome that we need to hold in reserve, so as to keep open for the President the option of a summit. We should not get into a situation where a summit may be desirable for a variety of reasons, but achievable with a substantive outcome only by massive last-minute US concessions on arms control negotiations or other difficult issues. If a Cultural Agreement and consulates are the things the Soviets are perhaps more eager to get than we, these items could give us the leverage to avoid one-sided pressures on the President in conjunction with a summit.

5. The State memo omits the flat Soviet rejection of our proposal to negotiate verification improvements for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. We must not accept that turndown and go on to other business more convenient for the Soviets, such as cultural affairs and consulates. We should not be left dangling with an unverifiable treaty that we comply with; this would establish a bad precedent for other arms control. Hence, the verification negotiations on TTB ought to be part of any package of new initiatives.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (7).

Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

² See [Document 54](#).

³ Secret; Sensitive.

59. Memorandum From Douglas McMinn of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)1

Washington, June 9, 1983

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Negotiations on a New Long-Term Grain Agreement (LTA)

The initial round of negotiations for a new LTA (June 2, in London) was constructive and non-polemical. While major differences remain on several issues, the Soviets made clear their readiness and desire to conclude a new LTA soon. There was joint agreement to use the existing LTA framework as the basis for negotiations.

With regard to the next round of negotiations, to be held in Moscow June 20-21, the Soviets hinted they would like this to be a major negotiation session with the signing of an agreement some time shortly thereafter. It is open to question whether such an optimistic timetable is possible. The Soviets also made known their desire that a Cabinet-level official sign the agreement and they would like the signing ceremony in Moscow. Our negotiators told the Soviets that no decision had been made on who might sign for the U.S. and where.

Based on the June 2 discussions, the major substantive differences between the Soviets and ourselves are as follows:

Minimum Purchase Levels

Whereas the present agreement has a range of 6-8 million tons for the minimum and maximum purchase levels, the Soviets suggested a range of 6-12 million tons with delivery assurances not only on those amounts, but also on additional amounts offered during regular bilateral consultations (in effect on all Soviet purchases of U.S. grain). The Soviets also want separate USG assurances to intervene in case of longshoremen boycotts, strikes, etc. The U.S. side countered with a minimum purchase range of 16-19 million tons, which the Soviets rejected; the U.S. indicated we were willing to consider a lower number. *The U.S. side "hung tough" on the supply assurances issue and offered no more than current Article 2 delivery assurances.*

Short Supply

The Soviets reacted negatively to the U.S. proposal that the short supply trigger (permitting the U.S. to reduce deliveries if our crop situation dictated) be raised from 225 million tons to 280. The Soviets want to delete this provision altogether, arguing it makes the LTA imbalanced because it gives the U.S. an "out" whereas the Soviets do not have one.

Quality

The Soviets argued for inclusion of a provision that the USG would guarantee quality levels set in contracts and that the Soviets would be relieved of their purchase obligations if grain were not up to particular quality standards. The U.S. side suggested it would explore a "good offices provision" by the USG, but strongly rejected the notion of a Soviet escape clause from its minimum purchase obligations.

Maritime Agreement

The Soviets argued for negotiation of a new maritime agreement, even though acknowledging that shipments were proceeding smoothly now in the absence of a maritime agreement. They indicated that at a minimum, retention of Article 7 of the present agreement was essential. (We have no problem with retaining Article 7, which merely stipulates that grain shipments be conducted in accord with the maritime agreement in effect at the time, but the U.S. delegation simply noted we were not authorized to negotiate a new maritime agreement).

** In private discussions with our chief negotiators this week, I reaffirmed the President's position that he favors mutually beneficial trade with the Soviets, on the basis of regular commercial considerations, i.e., no "special deals." I emphasized that major additional guarantees to the Soviets on supply assurance (over and above those in the existing agreement) would run counter to the President's position.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/09/83). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Bailey. Clark's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

60. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, June 14, 1983

SUBJECT

The Political Context of US-Soviet Dialogue Over the Next 18 months

From the beginning of the Administration, and particularly during your recent series of meetings with Dobrynin, we have been able to conduct an intensive and comprehensive dialogue with the Soviet Union despite increasing tensions in East-West relations. While concrete results have not been impressive, we have demonstrated to Moscow the durability of our basic approach (e.g. realism, strength, and negotiation). Additionally, the process of dialogue has been to some extent insulated from the impact of political events beyond the parameters of the US-Soviet bilateral relationship.

However, this period is rapidly coming to an end. Our dialogue with the Soviets will be profoundly affected by a number of events over the next 18 months—most importantly our INF deployments and the Soviet reaction to them;² the handling of the summit prospect by both sides; and the onset of the Presidential political season in the U.S. We foresee the following pattern: a period of opportunity from now until mid-fall; a period of relatively high tension and low prospects for new movement in US-Soviet relations as INF deployments begin; a second possible interval of opportunity in the spring of 1984; and decreased chances for progress as the U.S. Presidential campaign goes into high gear next summer.

If we are to exploit the creative possibilities inherent in the dialogue we have worked to establish, we must recognize how the emerging political context will establish the limits of possible progress in the US-Soviet bilateral relationship. But we must also move now to put ourselves in a position to take advantage of whatever possibilities may emerge by creating incentives for the Soviets to behave with restraint and engage us in the give-and-take of real negotiations on the agenda we have established.

The Emerging Political Context of US-Soviet Relations

1. The INF Factor

We have long recognized that, from the Soviet perspective, our INF deployments later this year are and will remain the preeminent issue of East-West relations. In the period remaining before deployments begin, the Soviets will pull out all the stops in a last-ditch effort to derail the NATO decision and prevent the political and military recoupling of the U.S. and Western Europe. At the same time, the Soviets have no doubt absorbed the full implications of the displays of Alliance unity on INF at Williamsburg and Paris and may well have concluded that deployments will actually begin later this year.

Should deployments go forward, Moscow will have no choice but to make good on its repeated promises to respond, although the Soviet leadership probably has not yet made a final determination of the extent and shape of its response. Thus, during the final quarter of this year and the first quarter of 1983, movement in the overall US-Soviet relationship will become increasingly difficult as our deployments begin and the Soviet response takes shape.

This suggests that we may have only a period of few months in which to test seriously Soviet willingness to address our concerns before an inevitable period of increased tension begins. If we are able to use this “window” to establish a credible posture of readiness to explore possibilities for progress in other key areas of the relationship, such as START, the Soviets *may* have some incentive to attenuate their response to INF deployments. Indeed, this may be the only hope of heading off a severe Soviet rejoinder that would, in turn, force us to respond—an action-reaction sequence which would all but eliminate the chances of accomplishing any constructive results in our dialogue with the Soviets during this Presidential term.

If this analysis is on the mark, a possible trip by you to the Soviet Union in July or August takes on importance beyond that normally attached to a meeting between you and Gromyko.³ At a minimum it would be a useful U.S. analogue to the Kohl visit, thus reducing the impression (and reality) of West German isolation in high-level dialogue with Moscow this summer.⁴ Beyond this, a visit would provide the opportunity for you to deliver a dual message—that INF deployments will go forward, but that we remain ready to explore the possibility of a more constructive relationship, including arms control, in the post-deployment period. Of course, if such a message is to carry any weight with a Soviet leadership already preoccupied with INF, it will have to be accompanied by concrete evidence of our readiness to address Soviet concerns on key issues, such as START. It will also require that you be in a position to speak authoritatively on another topic of potential interest to the Soviet leadership—a possible US-Soviet summit.

2. The Summit Factor

As we head into the homestretch of the “year of the missile,” pressures will inevitably grow for a US-Soviet summit. From the Soviet perspective, a summit before INF deployments begin could be attractive as a means of building European pressures on us for further concessions in the negotiations or possibly even for a delay in the deployment schedule. It is also conceivable that Andropov might be attracted to a summit as a means of consolidating his position within the Soviet leadership. Moreover, the upcoming UNGA session and Prime Minister Gandhi’s call for Heads of State to meet in New York gives Andropov a ready-made opportunity to create the prospect of a meeting with the President without having to become the demandeur.

In my view, a summit before INF deployments begin would be highly undesirable. Beyond giving the Soviets a golden opportunity to pressure us on the INF issue, a premature summit would forfeit the opportunity for the President to meet his Soviet counterpart in a much stronger position once deployments have actually taken place. Thus, from the perspective of U.S. interests, a much more advantageous period for a summit would be the spring of 1984 when INF deployments will have commenced, our own economic recovery will be more advanced, and we will have had more time to solidify the emerging domestic consensus on strategic forces modernization and arms control.

Of course, we cannot control the Soviet decision about Andropov’s possible trip to the UNGA. If such a visit does materialize, we will have to assess the situation at the time and determine a course of action that will minimize the possible adverse consequences for INF deployments. If it does become necessary for the President to meet with Andropov under such circumstances, I believe strongly that we should move quickly to keep expectations here and in

Europe in check by keeping the meeting as short and as non-substantive as possible.

In these uncertain circumstances, a trip by you to Moscow this summer could help us manage the summit prospect. If you were able to present Andropov and Gromyko with a realistic scenario for a substantive summit in 1984, the Soviet incentive to exploit the UNGA opportunity for a premature and essentially meaningless Reagan-Andropov meeting might be substantially reduced. Such a presentation might include the prospect of an invitation to Gromyko to meet with the President during the UNGA if such a meeting appeared justified in light of events at the time.

A serious effort to encourage a responsible Soviet approach to the summit issue would require that your substantive presentations during a July visit convey a credible prospect of U.S. readiness to engage in a real give-and-take on issues of critical importance to Moscow. If you could accomplish this, there is at least a reasonable chance that the Soviets would prefer a well-prepared summit with real prospects for concrete accomplishments in the spring of 1984 to a hastily organized and inevitably disappointing meeting in New York this fall.

3. The Presidential Political Factor

One more limiting factor on prospects for US-Soviet dialogue over the coming 18 months should be mentioned—the onset of the 1984 Presidential campaign season in the U.S. If by the beginning of summer next year we have not registered some concrete achievements in our dialogue with the Soviet Union, the incentive for the Soviets to hunker down and wait out the results of the November balloting will be overwhelming. This would be particularly

true if the Soviets conclude that the election will be close and that, by denying the Administration any success in US-Soviet relations, they could damage the President's prospects for reelection.

Even if Moscow were convinced that the President would be reelected, we would find it difficult, if not impossible, to respond to any Soviet interest in forward movement in the midst of the Presidential campaign. Thus, unless we are in a position to have registered some important concrete accomplishments in US-Soviet relations by the spring of 1984, we will probably not again be in a position to do so until January 1985.

Conclusion:

If the above analysis is correct, the remaining 18 months of the President's first term break down into two periods of possible movement and two periods of likely stasis in US-Soviet relations. From now until the middle of the fall, we have an opportunity to engage in a serious dialogue with the Soviets before INF deployments begin. While INF deployments and the Soviet response will put prospects for progress on hold for a period of several months, it is possible that seeds planted in the coming three or four months could survive this "winter of discontent" and emerge as the substance of a substantive summit in the spring of 1984. A trip by you to Moscow this summer could be a crucial factor in using this likely cyclical pattern of US-Soviet relations to best advance U.S. interests.

We have no illusions that this process will be easy. It could be derailed at any point—by Soviet intransigence, an unrestrained Soviet reaction to INF deployments, or both. But it could also be stillborn if we are not able to introduce

enough new substance into our dialogue to give the Soviet Union some incentive for restraint in its behavior and flexibility in its negotiating positions. In short, if we are going genuinely to test Soviet willingness to work with us, and lay the groundwork for a substantive summit, we must begin to do so soon.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, June 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System. Forwarded through Eagleburger.

² The United States was scheduled to begin the deployment of INF missiles to Western Europe in November.

³ Shultz did not travel to the Soviet Union during the summer of 1983.

⁴ West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl went to Moscow for discussions with his Soviet counterpart in July.

61. Editorial Note

On June 15, 1983, Secretary of State George Shultz testified publicly before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on U.S.-Soviet relations. In his opening statement, Shultz said: “The management of our relations with the Soviet Union is of the utmost importance. That relationship touches virtually every aspect of our international concerns and objectives—political, economic, military—and every part of the world. We must defend our interests and values against a powerful adversary that threatens both. And we must do so in a nuclear age, in which a global war would even more thoroughly threaten those interests and values. As President Reagan pointed out on March 31: ‘We must both defend freedom and preserve the peace. We must stand true to our principles and our friends while preventing a holocaust.’ It is, as he said, ‘one of the most complex moral challenges ever faced by any generation.’” (Department of State *Bulletin*, July 1983, page 65)

In his memoir, Shultz explained the thrust of his testimony was “captured in my statement: ‘Strength and realism can deter war, but only direct dialogue and negotiation can open the path toward lasting peace.’” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 277) Jack Matlock, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs in the NSC Staff, later wrote in his book that this testimony was “the most comprehensive and forward-looking explanation of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union since Reagan had taken office.” He concurred that Shultz’s sentence quoted above became the “basic thrust” of the administration’s approach to relations with the Soviet Union. (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, page 61) The full

text of Shultz's testimony is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 1983, pages 65-72.

Much attention was given to drafting Shultz's testimony. Originally written in the Department of State, the testimony was then coordinated with Matlock. On April 21, Charles Hill, Executive Secretary of the Department of State, forwarded an early draft to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs William Clark. As Shultz wrote in his memoir: "I had worked on this testimony with great care. Jack Matlock had taken an important part in the effort." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 276) Matlock had joined the NSC Staff in early June and later commented in his book that his "first major task was to work with Richard Burt, my counterpart in the State Department, and his deputy for Eastern Europe, R. Mark Palmer, on a statement to be delivered by Secretary Shultz to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I found the State Department draft consistent with my own views, made a few minor suggestions, and recommended that the president approve it." (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, page 61)

On June 8, Clark forwarded Reagan the most recent State Department draft of the Secretary's testimony with notes, edits, suggested changes, and a page of typed footnotes by National Security Council Staff member John Lenczowski. Lenczowski had numbered sections in the draft and typed out 11 corresponding footnotes, suggesting changes to the testimony and providing analysis. For example, on page 3 of the draft testimony, Lenczowski crossed out the following lines: "We believe our people cannot—and need not—accept as inevitable the prospect of endless, dangerous confrontation with the Soviet Union. For if we do, then many of the great goals that the United States pursues in world affairs—peace, human rights, economic progress, national independence—will also be out of reach.

We can—and must—do better.” In his corresponding footnote 1, analyzing this section, he wrote: “It is unrealistic and misleading to hold forth the hope that the essential political-moral conflict with the USSR will end within the foreseeable future. It is even more misleading to hint that we can mitigate this basic conflict through ‘dialogue.’ That is not to say that dialogue is not in the national interest—but it is to say that if we are to speak publicly about the prospect of ending the conflict, it should be in the context of our confidence that democracy will ultimately triumph and not that true compromise can be reached between irreconcilable forces.” (Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, NSC Files, Chron File June 1983)

In another example, Lenczowski crossed out the text: “respect legitimate Soviet security interests,” and wrote in footnote 5: “We must never acknowledge that an illegitimate regime has legitimate security interests.” And in the following section of the testimony he took issue with the statement that “the Soviet Union is and will remain a global superpower,” countering in footnote 6: “The idea that the USSR ‘will remain a superpower’ is standard Soviet propaganda that we should not repeat.” (Ibid.)

After reviewing the draft testimony and Lenczowski’s comments and suggestions, Reagan wrote on the June 8 memorandum from Clark: “I have crossed out most of the numbers in the margins to indicate I don’t think the footnotes they indicate apply & thus the crossed out lines should be restored. As to insert on P.20A I would only offer that to Sec. Shultz as a suggestion and leave it to him to accept or reject.” Lenczowski had added a typed insert on page 20A entitled: “Rebuilding America’s Moral, Spiritual and Political Strength.” The first few lines read: “Finally there is the question of America’s moral-political-spiritual strength. This is the factor of our own national power that

the Soviets scrutinize most closely. It is on the basis of their assessment of the levels of this strength that the Soviets make most of their strategic decisions.” (Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers, Working File: Contains Originals (13)) None of this suggested section was added to Shultz’s final testimony.

In his note to Clark, Reagan commented: “I read the footnotes loud & clear but believe they fail to recognize some of the problems we are trying to resolve with Congress. At the same time some of them suggest or could be taken as indicating that war is inevitable. I can’t accept that.” (Ibid.) In accordance with Reagan’s note, very few of Lenczowski’s additions and changes were incorporated into the final version of the testimony. In each of the examples above, the testimony remained as it was originally written in the draft.

In his memoir, Shultz recalled: “Several days before testifying, I took a copy over to the White House, gave it to the president, and went over it with him line by line.” Shultz continued: “I got the committee’s attention by telling them of President Reagan’s personal involvement. ‘The President has taken the time not only to talk with me about this, but he has read through this testimony and made a few suggestions,’ I said, adding with a smile, ‘which I found it possible to accept.’ Everyone laughed. I continued, he ‘has signed off on the testimony, so I feel very confident in saying that I am speaking not only for myself but for the President in this statement.’” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 276)

During his testimony, the Secretary addressed the primary factors contributing to tensions between the United States and Soviet Union: “A peaceful world order does not require that we and the Soviet Union agree on all the fundamentals

of morals or politics. It does require, however, that Moscow's behavior be subject to the restraint appropriate to living together on this planet in the nuclear age. Not all the many external and internal factors affecting Soviet behavior can be influenced by us. But we take it as part of our obligation to peace to encourage the gradual evolution of the Soviet system toward a more pluralistic political and economic system and, above all, to counter Soviet expansionism through sustained and effective political, economic, and military competition. In the past decade, regrettably, the changes in Soviet behavior have been for the worse. Soviet actions have come into conflict with many of our objectives. They have made the task of managing the Soviet-American relationship considerably harder and have needlessly drawn more and more international problems into the East-West rivalry. To be specific, it is the following developments which have caused us the most concern." Shultz listed four developments: first, "the continuing Soviet quest for military superiority even in the face of mounting domestic economic difficulties;" second, "the unconstructive Soviet involvement, direct and indirect, in unstable areas of the Third World;" third, "the unrelenting effort to impose an alien Soviet 'model' on nominally independent Soviet clients and allies;" and fourth, "Moscow's continuing practice of stretching a series of treaties and agreements to the brink of violation and beyond." (Department of State *Bulletin*, July 1983, pages 66-67)

Shultz explained several ways the United States worked to increase its strength in the face of Soviet challenges: "In a rapidly evolving international environment, there are many fundamental ways the democratic nations can, and must, advance their own goals in the face of the problem posed by the Soviet Union. We must build a durable political consensus at home and within the Atlantic alliance on the

nature of the Soviet challenge. We must strengthen our defenses and those of our allies. We must build a common approach within the alliance on the strategic implications of East-West economic relations. And we must compete peacefully and even more effectively with the U.S.S.R. for the political sympathies of the global electorate, especially through the promotion of economic dynamism and democracy throughout the world. Finally, we must continue rebuilding America's moral-spiritual strength. If sustained over time, these policies can foster a progressively more productive dialogue with the Soviet Union itself." (Ibid., page 67)

Shultz also listed four items on the U.S. agenda in dealing with the Soviet Union: "To seek improvement in Soviet performance on human rights, which you emphasized, Mr. Chairman [Senator Charles H. Percy], in your opening statement; To reduce the risk of war, reduce armaments through sound agreements, and ultimately ease the burdens of military spending; To manage and resolve regional conflicts; and To improve bilateral relations on the basis of reciprocity and mutual interest. This is a rigorous and comprehensive agenda, and our approach to it is principled, practical, and patient. We have pressed each issue in a variety of forums, bilateral and multilateral. We have made clear that the concerns we raise are not ours alone, but are shared by our allies and friends in every region of the globe. We have made clear that each of our concerns is serious, and the Soviets know that we do not intend to abandon any of them merely because agreement cannot be reached quickly or because agreement has been reached on others." (Ibid., page 69; brackets are in the original)

Shultz concluded his testimony by examining prospects for improvement in Soviet-American relations: "We have

spelled out our requirements—and our hope—for a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. The direction in which that relationship evolves will ultimately be determined by the decisions of the Soviet leadership. President Brezhnev's successors will have to weigh the increased costs and risks of relentless competition against the benefits of a less tense international environment in which they could more adequately address the rising expectations of their own citizens. While we can define their alternatives, we cannot decipher their intentions. To a degree unequaled anywhere else, Russia in this respect remains a secret. Its history, of which this secrecy is such an integral part, provides no basis for expecting a dramatic change. And yet it also teaches that gradual change is possible. For our part, we seek to encourage change by a firm but flexible U.S. strategy, resting on a broad consensus, that we can sustain over the long term whether the Soviet Union changes or not. If the democracies can meet this challenge, they can achieve the goals of which President Reagan spoke at Los Angeles: both defend freedom and preserve the peace." (Ibid., page 72)

On June 27, the Embassy in Moscow reported on Soviet reactions to the Secretary's testimony: a "June 24 article by *Izvestiya* political observer S. Kondrashov sharply criticizes the Secretary's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 15 as sounding conciliatory, but, in fact, presenting no new U.S. approach toward the Soviet Union. Kondrashov notes that the Secretary's speech had been called the 'most detailed, comprehensive description to date' of the Reagan administration's approach to U.S.-Soviet relations and that the President 'looked over' the speech himself, 'corrected' it and 'gave it his blessing'. Kondrashov accuses Shultz of supporting President Reagan's 'crusade' against the Soviet Union, claiming that while Shultz's approach is 'more measured',

his desire to 'encourage the gradual evolution of the Soviet system' is just a sweeter way of pushing for 'interference in the Soviet Union's internal affairs.'" The Embassy commented: "Kondrashov's rejection of the sincerity of the U.S.'s 'flexible' and 'conciliatory' approach to arms control talks follows the standard Soviet line. His vehement opposition to the Secretary's remarks on bilateral relations, and to what he views as unwarranted attempts to interfere in Soviet internal affairs, shows Moscow's continued sensitivity to the U.S. ideological offensive." (Telegram 8095 from Moscow, June 27; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830364-0999)

62. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 15, 1983, 4:50-5:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

The President, Vice President Bush, Counselor Meese, Chief of Staff to the President Baker, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Clark, Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Deputy Director of Intelligence McMahon, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs McFarlane

BACKGROUND: The purpose of the meeting was for the attendees to receive a status report on the state of US-Soviet relations as expressed in the dialogue undertaken at the President's instruction by the Secretary of State in February 1983. There have been approximately ten meetings between the Secretary and Ambassador Dobrynin which have been focussed upon four generic areas: Human Rights; Regional Issues; Arms Control; and Bilateral Issues.

The Secretary of State opened with a summation of the President's thinking for why the initiative had been authorized originally. He referred to the President's success in establishing a solid beginning toward the restoration of our military strength. More recently, Williamsburg had presented solid evidence of greatly improved allied cohesion which would contribute significantly to Soviet perceptions of Western strength in any negotiation we might undertake.

The Secretary stated that the President's instructions had been to explore Soviet responsiveness to our interests in each of the four general areas. These discussions were to take place at the Ambassadorial level and based upon the

results a decision could be taken as to whether or not the dialogue should be elevated to the Foreign Minister level with a view ultimately toward a meeting between the Heads of State.

STATUS REPORT: The Secretary of State then went into the results thus far achieved in each of the four generic areas.

Human Rights. There appears to be some promise of progress in the human rights area as exemplified by the release of Lydia Vaschenko. The other members of her family have applied for their visas. The other family (Chymkhalov) has experienced difficulty in making their application. In short, while the process seems to be in motion all except Lydia remain in the Soviet Union.²

The Secretary noted the possible promise of a channel established by Ambassador Kampelman with his KGB counterpart in the Soviet delegation at the CSCE-Madrid. While a solid agenda had been discussed no tangible results have thus far been achieved however. Time will tell.

Regional Issues. The Secretary of State said that with regard to discussions on Afghanistan, Poland and Central America, essentially nothing had been achieved. He noted that the Soviets had expressed an interest in discussing the Middle East. He had intentionally restricted references to the Middle East to only the most summary comments.

Arms Control. The Secretary noted that we have had mixed results in discussions on arms control. Today he had heard that the Soviets had made a somewhat encouraging statement in response to the President's recent START announcement. With regard to INF, we have thus far not been able to make progress. Concerning MBFR, we have

had an apparent “nibble.” Finally, concerning confidence building measures (CBMs) the Soviets appear to have some interest in two of the four proposals we had made.

Bilateral Issues. In this area the Secretary said the only initiative proposed by either side had been our offer for negotiation of a new long-term grain agreement (LTA).³ He noted that the Soviets viewed this proposal as serving our interests and not theirs. As a consequence it had a rather ambiguous standing.

The Secretary then went on to describe the format for the sessions with Dobrynin. These normally included two phases: the first in which staff specialists contributed to particular issues on the agenda, (e.g., Ambassador Nitze on INF); followed by a private one-on-one session between the Secretary and Ambassador Dobrynin.

Before going on to propose an agenda for the forthcoming meeting on Saturday, June 18,⁴ he asked if anyone had any comments.

Deputy Director McMahon noted that Chernenko’s speech at the CPSU Central Committee Meeting in support of Andropov was an indicator of the latter’s strength.⁵

The next meeting. The Secretary then proposed that the forthcoming meeting follow the same format as before with the agenda this time to include a discussion of our recent initiative at MBFR (Ambassador Abramowitz to attend) and the President’s recent proposal for START (Ambassador Rowny to attend for this item). The Secretary of State said he would also describe the Williamsburg Conference—the point to be made, that of Allied solidarity. In addition to these subjects, the Secretary proposed going once more into each of the four generic areas. With regard to bilateral

relations, the Secretary proposed that he be authorized to express US willingness to open talks toward the establishment of a Soviet Consulate in New York City and a US Consulate in Kiev.⁶ In addition, he proposed that he be authorized to express our willingness to open talks devoted to the negotiation of a new cultural agreement. The Secretary went on to explain that the net benefit from any such agreements would accrue to the United States. Specifically, with respect to the proposed consulates the Secretary noted that the improved intelligence accruing to the Soviets from a New York City consulate would not add that much to the capability they already enjoy through the United Nations presence. On the other hand, a window for the United States in Kiev would provide us a substantial improvement in our collection capability.

With regard to the cultural agreement, the Secretary noted at the moment the Soviets were free to send as many cultural representatives to this country as they wished since these are arranged through private sources and the government now has no real control over them. He noted that a treaty would give us an instrument for seeking greater reciprocity in this area and would also legitimize a higher flow of cultural visits from West to East.

The Secretary then noted that with regard to regional issues the situation had worsened in *Central America* and that this might be an outgrowth of a flaw in the marker we had earlier laid down to the Russians. Specifically, our statement that we would find the introduction of high-performance aircraft or Cuban combat units “unacceptable” may have implied that all actions other than these would be tolerated. The Secretary stated that we should clarify this.

Judge Clark noted that in the early 70's when the Soviets commenced submarine operations out of Cienfuegos, Cuba, the Administration had characterized this as "an unfriendly act." Ultimately this had led to the termination of these operations. He recommended that the Secretary treat current Soviet activities in Central America in the same fashion—that is, that their activities which contribute to unrest generally (not just the introduction of modern weapons and combat units) will be unacceptable. The President approved this proposal.

The Secretary then raised the matter of how any mention of a summit ought to be treated. He reiterated existing Administration policy with regard to summits: that is, that we are not opposed in principle however they would need to be well prepared in advance and hold the promise of significant accomplishment.

Secretary Weinberger noted the inconsistency which would be represented by our conducting discussions of the possibility of a summit while the Soviets remained in Afghanistan, Poland and Central America.

This subject was not conclusively resolved.

At this point the meeting evolved into round-table remarks which were basically supportive of the Secretary proceeding according to the *format* he had proposed. *The Vice President* noted in particular the value of the private meeting after the larger set piece agenda had been disposed of. He believed that this private session held the most promise for getting results.

As the participants rose to leave, the Secretary of State asked whether he should bring Ambassador Rowny back to

participate in Saturday's meeting. *The President* agreed that he should.

The Secretary also asked, "what about the other items?" *The President* answered go ahead.

Conclusions: After the meeting it was confirmed that the President approved:

- The convening of a meeting by the Secretary of State with Ambassador Dobrynin on Saturday, June 18.
- That this meeting should be conducted according to the same format as meetings of the past.
- That the Secretary should summarize important issues and proposals put forth by our side since the last meeting (e.g., START proposal and the results of Williamsburg).
- He should discuss human rights, arms control, regional issues and bilateral issues.
- That in discussing the situation in Central America, the Secretary should protest the recent Soviet escalation of military deliveries to Nicaragua and state that we consider these actions and other Soviet measures of support to Nicaragua for the export of revolution to neighboring countries to be unfriendly actions which must cease.
- That Ambassador Rowny and Ambassador Abramowitz should return to participate in the arms control portion.

- With regard to bilateral issues the Secretary was authorized to propose that the U.S. and the Soviet Union open talks devoted to the conclusion of agreements for the establishment of consulates in New York City and Kiev; and for the conduct of cultural exchanges between the two countries.

There were no conclusions reached with regard to:

- Any future possibilities of a summit meeting, or
- Travel by the Secretary of State to Moscow for meetings with Soviet officials.⁷

¹ Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers, Working File: Contains Originals (14). Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information on the memorandum. The meeting took place in the Treaty Room in the Residence of the White House.

² See [Documents 34](#) and [46](#).

³ See [Documents 32](#), [35](#), and [47](#).

⁴ See [Document 64](#).

⁵ Chernenko gave the keynote address at the June 14-15 session of the Central Committee Plenum. For the full text of his June 14 speech, see the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXV, No. 24 (July 13, 1983), pp. 1-10. On June 16, McMahon prepared a Memorandum for the Record and noted: "The next thing that surprised me was in regard to a discussion on Andropov. In response to a question from Ed Meese, I noted that Andropov seemed to be gaining in strength in light of Chernenko's speech at the Plenum which was very much in deference to Andropov. Clark dismissed this completely and said that it was only propaganda given out to the newspapers; that a struggle

was still continuing in the Soviet Union and further it really didn't matter because we were dealing with a system, not a person. I countered by noting that since Andropov has come to power evidence suggests that he is very much calling the tune and decisions that have been made in the Soviet Union were pro-Andropov decisions. I further noted the rise in priority of the agriculture and home economic issues—which are very much the priorities of Andropov. I commented how rolled steel and aluminum were diverted from the military to the agricultural sector. This was news to Shultz who was quite surprised by that.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 86M00885R: Subject Files, Box 6, Folder 94: 1983 DDCI Meetings with NSC/State/Defense)

⁶ McMahon's Memorandum for the Record above also noted: “I was somewhat stunned by Clark's eagerness for the Kiev consulate until I learned later in the discussion that State was feeling a great deal of pressure from the Jewish community because of the number of Ukrainian Jews who center and focus around the Kiev area.” (Ibid.)

⁷ In his personal notes, Dam wrote after this meeting: “The Secretary gave us a readout this afternoon of his meeting with the President earlier in the afternoon in which the President basically signed onto the Secretary's program on negotiations with the Soviet Union. The President agreed, in the presence of Weinberger and Clark, to allow us to negotiate on a cultural agreement (which will be placed in broader terms than pure culture to include industrial expositions and the like) as well as new consulates in New York and Kiev. The meeting with Dobrynin will be held on Saturday.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982-Sept. 1983)

63. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 16, 1983

SUBJECT

Renewal of U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation

Issue: Should the 1973 U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation (which will expire automatically on June 19, 1983) be extended for a further six-month period? Should we propose to the Soviets now that a working-level meeting take place during the six-month period to consider a longer term amended agreement?

Facts: The 1973 U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation will expire on June 19, 1983. State forwarded a memorandum (Tab A) recommending that the agreement be extended for a further six-month period and that during this time a working-level meeting of both sides be convened to consider a longer term agreement.² State endorses renewal of the agreement as it is consistent with our policy enunciated in NSDD 75 (U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union)—not to dismantle further the framework of exchanges with the USSR. The Department of Transportation (Tab A-2) believes the agreement has resulted in tangible benefits to the U.S.³

Discussion: Six-month renewal of this agreement has been approved by the appropriate agencies. However, Commerce and DOD have expressed some concern about the risk of

technology transfers through certain activities conducted under the agreement.

As extension of the agreement upholds the guidelines set forth in NSDD 75, I concur with State's recommendation that it be extended. However, before a working level meeting is proposed to the Soviets, a thorough review of the agreement and the risks of technology transfers entailed should be made. The appropriate vehicle to undertake this review would be the NSC-chaired Polish-Soviet Sanctions Monitoring Group. Also, if a negotiating strategy is developed through the interagency process, it should be submitted to the Monitoring Group for consideration.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That the 1973 U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation be extended for a further six-month period.
2. That a working level meeting of both sides not be proposed to the Soviets now, but that the Polish-Soviet Sanctions Monitoring Group undertake a thorough review of the agreement.⁴

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/14/83) (1). Confidential. Sent for action. Prepared by Matlock.

² Tab A, the memorandum dated June 14, is attached but not printed.

³ Tab A-2 is attached but not printed

⁴ Clark approved both recommendations. On June 17, Poindexter wrote under the recommendations: "President

briefed by Matlock and President approved both recommendations.”

64. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 18, 1983, 9:45 a.m.-12:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of State
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs
Edward Rowny, Ambassador, U.S. START Negotiator, Geneva
Morton I. Abramowitz, Ambassador, U.S. MBFR Negotiator, Vienna
Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Director, EUR/SOV

USSR

Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador, Washington
Oleg M. Sokolov, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy, Washington
Viktor F. Isakov, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy, Washington

The meeting was divided into a private session [during which Burt separately raised four other topics with Sokolov and Isakov], a larger meeting, and a concluding private session.

In the *initial private session the Secretary* said he would be introducing a number of items previously discussed, but wished to make one main point: the President continues to be willing to engage the Soviets in serious dialogue aimed at solving problems. The Secretary would be making various proposals designed to determine whether the Soviets are also prepared for such dialogue, but he wanted Dobrynin to understand that from the point of view of U.S. policy the whole is larger than the sum of these parts.

The Secretary also raised *two regional issues* in that session:

—As the President had instructed him to do, he told Dobrynin that Soviet/Cuban activities in *Central America*—and in particular their support for Nicaragua and Nicaraguan activities and their arms shipments to the area—were in our view “unfriendly acts.” *Dobrynin* responded that Nicaragua is a small country that does not pose a threat to the U.S. *The Secretary* said in reply that he did not wish to argue the point, but that the Soviets should understand our view and take it into account.

—On *Lebanon*, the Secretary reiterated that we wish to see all foreign forces out of the country, and that the sooner they leave, the sooner our MNF forces could also leave. If the Soviets are concerned about MNF, they should know that we have no long-term plans for it, but there is a relationship between the role the MNF would have to play and the role of UNIFIL.

In the larger meeting, Deputy Secretary Dam, Under Secretary Eagleburger and Assistant Secretary Burt joined the Secretary, and Minister-Counselors Sokolov and Isakov joined Dobrynin. Five specific subject areas were discussed.

Human Rights. The Secretary raised three issues:

—On the Pentecostals, the Secretary said we are following the families’ progress with their emigration applications very closely, but it is slow; he asked if Dobrynin had any information. *Dobrynin* said he had no specific information to provide officially, but he “had heard” that the families do not seem anxious to leave now that the Embassy has provided them with money. *The Secretary*

said he understood one family is awaiting approval, and the other forms to apply.

—On CSCE, the Secretary said the Madrid process is at a critical point, and we want a satisfactory conclusion. We had thought there was some promise in Max Kampelman's earlier discussions with the Soviets, but more recently the Soviets had become intransigent on the language of the NNA draft document. The Spanish had now made an initiative, and this might provide a way to break the deadlock. *Dobrynin* replied that we have put in two years of time and work in Madrid, and argued that the NNA document is not Soviet. *The Secretary* rejoined that it is still not good enough. *Dobrynin* urged that we "finish this nonsense." *The Secretary* stressed that our proposals are on the table, and that improvements on human rights in the draft concluding document are needed. *Dobrynin* said he had not seen the Spanish initiative, but it was perhaps OK.

—*The Secretary* raised the issues of Sakharov, Shcharanskiy and Jewish emigration, noting he had seen a number of American Jewish leaders in the previous week. *Dobrynin* responded merely that these were "internal matters."

The Secretary then went over the *series of meetings the Western Allies had just completed*—the OECD Ministerial, the Williamsburg Summit and the NATO Meetings of Defense and Foreign Ministers.² He stressed that these meetings demonstrated Western economic recovery and renewed growth, and that this will help not only Western economies but other economies too. On the security side and on East-West economic relations, he said, the meetings demonstrated the genuine view of the Western powers that they must maintain their cohesion and unity, and, specifically on INF, they demonstrated that behind their

resolve to deploy lay a genuine desire to negotiate. On East-West economic relations, the focus was on controlling trade of direct military application; nobody wants economic warfare. The main point, the Secretary concluded, is that the West is strong and cohesive, on the one hand, and ready to negotiate, on the other.

Dobrynin said the Soviets had followed these meetings and read the Secretary's SFRC testimony that week,³ and we should know the situation looks different to them. In the economic field, it seems to them that we are doing all we can to cut off East-West trade. *The Secretary* interjected that our objective relates to the security aspects of trade and in no sense implies a trade war with the Soviets.

Dobrynin went on that the Secretary's testimony seemed to imply a view that economic pressure would stop Soviet behavior the U.S. does not like. On the security side, the U.S. seemed to want military power not for defense but for foreign policy purposes, to use strength to impose its views on others.

The Secretary objected that our purpose is not to impose our views; conversely, the Soviets had made countries like Japan feel threatened with their SS-20 deployments.

Dobrynin said the Soviets are willing to leave Japan in peace, but the U.S. seeks to militarize the Soviet Union's eastern border area, and make it like NATO. This may be wrong; but the Williamsburg declaration, signed by a non-NATO power, does not make pretty reading. *The Secretary* reiterated that this does not result from a push by the U.S.; rather, the Japanese are worried by the SS-20's. *Dobrynin* replied that if there were no U.S. forces in Asia, there would be no SS-20's there. *The Secretary* reminded him that our military deployments are purely defensive.

Dobrynin responded that one tragedy of history is that both sides believe this about their deployments. If we would take

up the Soviet "proposal" to discuss arms control in Asia, they were prepared to talk about the issue.

The Secretary said the main point is that the West is determined to maintain its defenses, but also to lessen tensions and reduce armaments. *Dobrynin* asked what actions expressed this. *The Secretary* replied that he would be suggesting some at this meeting.

MBFR. After Ambassador Abramowitz joined the group, *the Secretary* began by noting that MBFR talks had lasted ten years. The President and Andropov had exchanged messages earlier in the year, and we are now prepared to respond. The two sides agree that we should seek reductions through a process leading to parity as the ultimate outcome. This will mean asymmetrical reductions. We think the principal task is verifying reductions to equal levels, putting in place a verification system that will result in the capacity to ensure correct data. In other words, the Secretary said, we are prepared to defer the problem of prior agreement on data if we can agree on adequate verification procedures. He suggested that we authorize our Vienna negotiators to explore this privately.

Dobrynin said he would report back, but had one point to make: we should begin with something practical, the small symbolic step of reducing 13,000 U.S. and 20,000 Soviet troops. He was not saying the Secretary's idea was a bad one, but a small step like that would also help elsewhere in arms control negotiations. *The Secretary* replied that we should shift gears to verification, and in that context the idea of a small initial step was not significant although, in the context of a broader understanding, it could be the way to start the withdrawal process. Ambassador *Abramowitz* added that we are seeking not minor reductions, but a way to break the deadlock toward significant compromise.

Dobrynin concluded that his points had been meant to be constructive.

START. After Ambassador Rowny replaced Ambassador Abramowitz in the group, *the Secretary* said we have made some new decisions and would be putting our proposal on the table in Geneva, but the basic point is the President's desire for real give-and-take in Geneva. Our decisions bear on four topics:

—We give highest priority to reductions in warheads.

—There must be reductions in destructive potential, and there are various ways to go about this.

—Concerning limitations on deployed missiles, we are ready to envisage higher levels than in our previous proposal.

—We are prepared to envisage equal limits on bombers and air-launched cruise missiles.

We now need a sharper focus and a more dynamic process, and we would like the Soviets to be more explicit and precise than they have been.

On confidence-building measures, the Secretary said we have put forward some proposals in *START*, and the Soviets have too. We should establish a working group in *START* that could consider the ideas of both sides.

Dobrynin said he did not have detailed instructions, but could make several general points. If the U.S. approach continued to single out Soviet land-based missiles, or sought direct throw-weight limits or highly restrictive sublimits like the 110 ceiling on heavy missiles, there would not be much progress. The Soviets are prepared to

look at warhead limitations, but not to make substantial cuts in the major leg of their strategic forces. *The Secretary* replied that if the talks are to get anywhere there must be cuts in heavy missiles. The largest cuts would come through warhead limitations, but the Soviets had to understand that reductions in destructive potential, where there is a huge disparity in their favor, are important.

Bilateral Issues. The Secretary informed Dobrynin that the President is prepared to renew discussions leading toward openings of consulates in New York and Kiev, and to negotiate a new cultural agreement. If the Soviets respond positively, we could work out the modalities for discussion. *Dobrynin* said he would report this back to Moscow.

In the *concluding private meeting*, the *Secretary* reiterated that while each individual issue has its own importance, we have a broad agenda, and the overall signal we wish to make is that we are prepared to discuss that whole agenda seriously. *Dobrynin* finished with three broad points:

—Gromyko’s speech at the Supreme Soviet June 16 dealt with U.S.-Soviet relations to an “unprecedented” extent.⁴

—Chernenko’s speech at the Central Committee Plenum June 14 laid heavy emphasis on the need to combat the President’s democracy initiative, as well as our statements about yellow rain and other objectionable Soviet activities: the Soviets view all this as an attempt to discredit the USSR.

—Dobrynin dwelt at great length on the Soviet perspective on INF, and especially on the Pershing II “threat.” He made it sound as if this is the almost overwhelming Soviet preoccupation of the moment, and almost pleaded for us to put ourselves in their shoes, and see the situation as they

see it. He concluded by suggesting that we need a kind of philosophical discussion on how the world looks to the two sides.

The Secretary concluded that he would be back in the U.S. and available for discussions and for Soviet responses to our proposals in early July.⁵

While the concluding private session was going on, *Isakov* asked Burt separately to confirm that when we said discussions on consulates, we had in mind Kiev and New York.⁶ *Burt* replied that the 1974 agreement specifies “two or three” cities for new consulates, but we wish to discuss Kiev and New York. *Isakov* informed the U.S. side that the office building prepared for our use in Kiev is in use by the municipal authorities. They had pressed the U.S. on this issue last year, and received no definite answer. *Simons* recalled that last spring we had asked the Soviets to hold the building for our use, and were proceeding on the assumption that this had been done. *Simons* asked *Isakov* to ascertain whether, if our discussions were successful, that building would be made available to the U.S. *Isakov* said that in reporting the U.S. proposal he would say that the U.S. side remains interested in using that building.

For the Record: During the discussion on MBFR and START, the Secretary gave Dobrynin an inter-agency agreed “non-paper” on each subject. Copies of these “non-papers” are attached.⁷

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1983 May–June, Mtgs. w/A. Dobrynin. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office. The memorandum of conversation was approved by the Secretary in telegram Secto 7003 from the Secretary’s

aircraft, June 23. The text printed here incorporates the changes approved in the telegram. Brackets are in the original. On June 20, Shultz sent the President a memorandum summarizing his conversation with Dobrynin. At the end of the memorandum, Shultz noted: "As I see it, by your decision we have now taken the initiative to move our dialogue forward on the basis of our agenda, and the ball is truly in the Soviet court. We cannot at this point predict how they will respond, but we are at least in a position to say we have undertaken a major effort."

(Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/19/83-06/24/83))

Reagan initialed Shultz's June 20 memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² The OECD Ministerial meeting took place in Paris from May 8 to 11. The G-7 Williamsburg Summit took place from May 28 to 30. The meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers was held in Paris from June 9 to 10. The NATO Defense Ministers met in Lisbon in late March.

³ See [Document 61](#).

⁴ See [Document 65](#).

⁵ Shultz was on official travel in Asia and the Middle East, returning to Washington on July 9. In his personal notes for June 18, Dam wrote: "Dobrynin took all of this on board without too many comments and said that he would report to his government, with the assumption that he will be back to us after the Secretary returns from Southeast Asia. He did complain about our failure to understand how the Soviets look at the world and the fact that we insist on discrediting them in connection with such things as yellow rain." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982-Sept. 1983)

[6](#) Shultz's June 20 memorandum to Reagan provided additional details of Burt's discussion: "Burt took up the following issues with Embassy Minister-Counselors Sokolov and Isakov:

"—He gave them a short statement that the first launch of the Peacekeeper, a new type of 'light' intercontinental ballistic missile (under SALT II criteria) took place June 17, and pointed out that this notification parallels their notification of a new-type test last October.

"—He urged the Soviets to take another look at Cap Weinberger's communications confidence-building measures [see [Document 38](#)]; proposed that State and Defense experts join Art Hartman in Moscow for further discussions of these measures plus the idea of a multilateral convention against nuclear terrorism; and said we would be getting back soon with a proposal on timing.

"—In responding to the Soviet proposal for meetings of scientists on ballistic missile defense, Burt said we believe such discussion must be on a government-to-government basis, given its policy and strategy implications, and proposed that it take place between official representatives in the established fora of START and SCC, augmented by experts as necessary.

"—Burt informed the Soviets that the U.S. has approved extension of the Transportation Agreement for a six-month period, and would be proposing an exchange of notes that would register extension before the expiration date next week [see [Document 63](#)]." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/19/83-06/24/83))

[7](#) MBFR Talking Points and a paper on START are attached but not printed.

65. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Hill) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, June 22, 1983

SUBJECT

Gromyko's and Chernenko's Recent Speeches

Dobrynin told the Secretary on Saturday that Gromyko's June 16 speech to the Supreme Soviet dealt with US-Soviet relations to an "unprecedented" degree, and that Chernenko's June 14 plenum speech on ideology should be taken as an important indicator of Soviet leadership attitudes toward the United States.² The two speeches do, in fact, convey the impression of a Soviet regime that sees itself the target of a concerted U.S. campaign to weaken the USSR militarily and discredit it politically. This can be seen as the context for Dobrynin's plea that we try to put ourselves in their shoes and see the situation as it looks from Moscow.

Gromyko's Supreme Soviet Speech

While by no means unprecedented, the largest portion of Gromyko's speech was, indeed, a comprehensive and polemical critique of U.S. policy toward the USSR, with particular emphasis on the security and arms control aspects. Gromyko reaffirmed Moscow's desire for "smoother" relations with Washington; but he was typically pessimistic about the prospects for US-Soviet relations, implying that confrontational U.S. policies have been the norm since World War II, with détente an aberration.

Gromyko's speech struck us as defensive in tone. He conveyed the impression that the Soviets see themselves as under assault by the United States on several fronts:

- rearmament in pursuit of military superiority;
- efforts to wage economic warfare against the USSR and its allies;
- destabilization of Eastern Europe and an ideological crusade aimed at the rollback of socialism; and
- an aggressive public-relations campaign designed to put the onus on Moscow for lack of progress on arms control.

Gromyko came out swinging on all counts. He assured his Soviet audience that the Soviet leadership will take all necessary steps to defend the USSR and its “socialist gains” at home and in Eastern Europe. He rebutted U.S. allegations about the Soviet Union's arms control positions, and sought to discredit U.S. proposals as unbalanced and unserious. Most striking were his denunciations of U.S. nuclear doctrines that are allegedly based on the “admissability of nuclear war.”

On specific substantive questions Gromyko broke little new ground. The most noteworthy aspect was his adoption of the harshly critical Soviet press line on the President's new START proposals—he described them as the “facelifted U.S. position” that was “fully tailored to suit the current further expansion” of U.S. programs. He endorsed the concept of a nuclear freeze, but did not specifically foreshadow the Supreme Soviet's subsequent call for a multilateral freeze among the USSR, US, UK, France, and China.³ He also

called for resumption of the CTB trilaterals and ratification of the TTBT and PNET.

Gromyko was especially disparaging of our CBMs proposals, alleging that we seek nothing more than information exchange, whereas the USSR supposedly favors real limits on military activity designed to preclude the development of crises. Gromyko also insisted, defensively, that the USSR is for “universal and complete” verification of arms agreements.

Gromyko treated the FRG quite gently (no threats of the dire consequences that will attend INF deployments), perhaps in deference to Kohl’s forthcoming visit. He directed harsh language against the Japanese, however, for their having joined in the U.S. “strategy of confrontation.” There was also familiar fare about U.S. efforts to force agreements on the Lebanese “at gunpoint” and to pressure the Syrians, as well as denunciation of our “aggression” in Nicaragua.

Despite his bleak assessment of the US-Soviet relationship, Gromyko concluded on a confident note. He asserted that the USSR’s international position remains solid, that the tide of history is rolling in socialism’s favor, and that it is a well recognized fact that “not a single serious question of world politics can be solved, and in practice is not solved,” without the USSR’s participation. “That is how it should be,” Gromyko boasted, implying that US-Soviet relations can improve only if the U.S. accepts the USSR as an equal superpower.

Chernenko’s Plenum Speech

The main event of last week was, of course, the Central Committee Plenum. The focus of published leadership

speeches (Chernenko and Andropov) was on internal rather than foreign problems.⁴ Chernenko did touch on US-Soviet relations, however, in calling for efforts to counter the U.S. ideological offensive. His remarks were harshly critical of Administration policies and he seemed to be adopting the same defensive tone as Gromyko in explaining Soviet policies.

Chernenko stated that the United States and its NATO allies are following an extremely dangerous course (a possible reference to INF deployment) and that the President has announced a new crusade against Communism. In calling for a new propaganda counteroffensive against the West, Chernenko seemed to convey the sense of the Soviet Union at disadvantage.

Chernenko's June 14 delivery of the main plenum speech is of interest in Soviet domestic political terms. That Chernenko gave the speech indicates that the Politburo and Secretariat member is holding his own in the leadership—at least for now. He retains at least some of the ideological portfolio formerly held by Suslov.

From our perspective, however, the more interesting statements on internal matters last week were made by Andropov in his concluding speech. Andropov referred on several occasions in his speech to a new Party Program—suggesting that this might be his vehicle to set a new policy direction, not yet proclaimed. On economic topics, nonetheless, Chernenko was of interest precisely because he echoed themes previously sounded by Andropov: frank, if vague, admission of past shortcomings, together with an emphasis on the need for discipline and order. He also downplayed incentives to spur productivity.

Chernenko did keep the door open for some kind of economic reform by urging more fresh thinking from Soviet academics and think tanks. Andropov is believed to be interested in economic reform, and Chernenko's remarks could signal a developing leadership consensus to move ahead. There is no evidence, however, that the leadership has agreed on the scope and timing of economic change.

Chernenko's speech had a strong orthodox cast that moves him closer to Andropov on ideological issues as well. He called on various Soviet ideological organizations to be more aggressive and repeated the standard call for a vigorous struggle against such chronic problems as drunkenness, theft and bribe-taking. Chernenko called for better attention to Soviet public and social concerns—a theme that has gained currency among the leadership since the 1980 disruptions in Poland, and one on which he has spoken out in the past.

Charles Hill⁵

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/19/83–06/24/83). Secret; Sensitive. This memorandum is based on another, undated, from Burt through Eagleburger to Shultz. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive June 9–16 1983)

² See [Document 64](#). Excerpts of Gromyko's speech were printed in the *New York Times*, June 17, 1983, p. A8. Regarding Chernenko's speech, see [footnote 5](#), [Document 62](#).

³ For the text of the June 16 Supreme Soviet resolution containing a proposal for a freeze on nuclear weapons, see

Documents on Disarmament, 1983, pp. 499-501.

⁴ The Central Committee Plenum took place June 14-15. Andropov's speech focused on economic matters. (Dusko Doder, "Andropov Makes Decisive Break With Past Policies," *New York Times*, June 19, 1983, p. A11)

⁵ McManaway signed for Hill above Hill's typed signature.

66. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT
Goals and Priorities

Attached is my reply to your memorandum of June 7, in which you asked me to identify our goals and priorities in foreign policy over the next 18 months.²

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State³

Washington, undated

GOALS AND PRIORITIES

In your memorandum to Cap and me on June 7, you asked us to identify the priority objectives in foreign policy on which we should concentrate our energies over the next 18 months, with special emphasis on your activity and involvement. This paper lists these priorities and lays out our strategy for pursuing them.

As your memorandum said, we have achieved a great deal in the first half of this Presidential term. In the second half of the term, however, we will need to start drawing dividends from our efforts. The restoration of our military strength, our firmness with the Soviets, the greater unity of the allies, and the promising initiatives we have launched in many areas are a solid foundation from which we can

now move forward. The next six months—before the full Presidential campaign begins—are particularly important.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Our foreign policy priorities through the remainder of this term, it seems to me, are the following:

—We must maintain allied cohesion through the difficult period of INF deployment. This will require intensive Presidential contacts with key allied leaders (including Japan); public diplomacy to neutralize the expected sharp Soviet reaction to our deployment; and efforts to ensure that the Soviets, and not we, are blamed if negotiations fail.

—We should use our new leverage with the Soviets to explore the possibilities of constructive dialogue aiming at visible progress on our own agenda, including arms control. The question of a summit should be considered in terms of whether it is a way to make the Soviets face up to the long-term direction of our relationship and whether it is an effective way to demonstrate to our public and our allies that we are not to blame for any tensions.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

ANALYSIS

Success or failure in any one of these areas will affect our success or failure in the others. Our success in holding the democracies together obviously will affect our negotiations with the Soviets, and vice versa. Success in the Middle East would affect our Alliance relationships; a setback in Central America would weaken us in all areas. Bearing in mind

these interrelationships, let me discuss each of the priority areas in turn.

The Democracies and INF

The electoral victories of Thatcher, Kohl, and Nakasone are reflections of a strengthened resolve among our democratic allies, and the Williamsburg Summit showed an impressive unity among free world nations. Nevertheless, we are still basically dealing with an uncertain and dispirited Europe, as reflected in the deep polarization in some societies (particularly West Germany). Therefore, it will be no easy task to help these leaders manage through this critical year. Plans have been announced for very large and possibly violent "peace" demonstrations this fall. This will put unprecedented strain on allied solidarity and on West Germany's political cohesion. The Soviets will try to lure wavering allies into seeking a "delay" of INF deployments while negotiations continue, threatening new missile deployments and an increase in tensions if NATO deployments go forward.

Our strategy for maintaining allied unity in support of deployment will require, first of all, continual consultation at the highest level, drawing heavily on your close personal relationship with the key leaders. Bilateral and perhaps multilateral meetings with key leaders may well be essential as the December date of deployment approaches (particularly with the heads of government of the three initial basing countries: FRG, UK, and Italy). You will need to stay in constant touch with all of them. Next year's UK-hosted Economic Summit will undoubtedly be an important occasion for reaffirming allied cohesion and our willingness to negotiate with the Soviets on INF.

The second key component of our strategy will be public diplomacy. A bellicose posture is risky for the Soviets, since it could forfeit much of what they have gained through detente in Europe; we should be prepared to exploit it. As the Soviets prepare to stir up tensions to intimidate the allies, our job is to prepare the allies psychologically so they are not shaken by these pressures, and to ensure that European publics place the blame squarely on the Soviets for whatever tensions arise.

Related to this is the third component: our negotiating strategy toward the Soviets on INF. The allies will want reassurance that we have negotiated in good faith and that the blame for failure rests on the Soviets. This may require, down the road, some agile maneuvering and tactical flexibility, at least in presentation. Whether or not we make any further adjustments in our negotiating position, a major Presidential speech on arms control may be helpful at the appropriate moment.

A possible US-Soviet summit could come after the Soviets have given up hope of delaying the start of INF deployments. That timing would put you in the best position to move the dialogue to your agenda. Any such summit, in any case, should probably also be preceded by your meeting with at least Thatcher, Kohl, Mitterrand, and the Italians in Europe.

A Dialogue with the Soviets

Over the next 18 months, we are sure to come under increasing pressure at home and abroad to do more to improve Soviet-American relations and in particular to hold a summit meeting between you and Andropov.

At a minimum a summit could help demonstrate to our public and our allies that we are pursuing every avenue of possible progress, and that if no progress results, the Soviets are to blame. However, while the shaping of public attitudes is important, our real starting point in assessing a possible summit should be whether it contributes to attaining our policy goals.

Looking to the next year and a half we can distinguish between our minimum objectives in US-Soviet relations and a series of more ambitious but still reasonable goals:

—Regional conflicts: at a minimum, our aim is no new Soviet gain or critical US setback owing to Soviet sponsorship; if possible, a Soviet retreat from a major geopolitical position (e.g., Angola, Nicaragua).

—Arms talks: at a minimum, no uncompensated sacrifice of key Western weapon systems; if possible, a breakthrough agreement on acceptable principles.

—Human rights: at a minimum, sustaining unified Western pressures for improved Soviet performance; if possible, a major dissident release or emigration increase.

Our record to date gives reason for confidence that all the minimum goals are attainable. By the standards of the 70's this will represent a real achievement. It will require vigilance and effort, especially to sustain public support at critical junctures.

What is less certain is whether meeting our minimum goals is sufficient for sustaining the tougher, more realistic policies this Administration has introduced. I believe that putting the superpower relationship on a more satisfactory footing for the long term may depend in part on whether

we can move *beyond* minimum goals in the short term. If not, our policies may be vulnerable to charges of a poor return on our investment (and allowed to unravel, as happened to even the Nixon-Ford policies under Carter). Particularly if the Soviets react to our INF deployments by increasing tensions, the payoff for our firm approach may be still further questioned.

Protecting our minimum goals over the rest of the decade may depend, in short, on making a serious effort to attain at least some of our more ambitious objectives. For this purpose, the leverage we have developed over the past two years—especially our military strength as leverage in the arms talks, and the public consensus that gives all our policies credibility—will be invaluable. However, it is likely that we will have to give increasing attention, as in any negotiation, to defining acceptable adjustments in the two sides' positions. And we will have to find ways of bringing these issues to a decision point for the Soviets.

My judgment is that a summit may prove a useful device for focusing Soviet attention on the longer-term direction of our relationship. While it cannot by itself substitute for leverage developed in other ways, it may help us to put this leverage to the test.

The prime worry in connection with a prospective summit is how to ensure public understanding of an event which might well produce only limited results or no results at all. I believe this problem will be manageable, especially as your political position continues to strengthen.

If the Soviets prove utterly inflexible and we end up having to tough out the next 18 months without any improvement in US-Soviet relations, we will not necessarily be any worse off whether or not a summit has taken place. In either case,

we will face the real job of showing that the Soviets are to blame. Avoiding a summit will not free us of this task.

The problem of public expectations applies not just to a summit that does not produce results but perhaps even more to one that does. You will have to make a major effort to control expectations generated by whatever agreements we are able to achieve. We will need to make clear—within the government, in public, and to the Soviets—that we are capable of sustaining a competitive posture even if the Soviets try to use agreement in one area as a kind of safety valve. To put Soviet-American relations on this secure footing for the long term may be as challenging as restoring our competitive posture in the first place.

On balance, I believe you would enter a summit in a relatively strong position. Precisely because you will not need the meeting to attain your minimum goals, you should be able to shift the negotiating burden to the Soviets. But even if a summit does not produce major progress, as is quite possible, it could have some tangible benefits. The preparations are likely to have a constraining effect on Soviet conduct, and the follow-up to a summit could be quite productive if it became clear to the Soviets that the fact of holding it had strengthened your hand.

Making a decision in principle, of course, would still leave many issues unresolved—timing, preparations, content, and (perhaps crucially) how to protect against the possibility of failure. My tentative view is that a meeting relatively early next year might be desirable, especially to help keep the INF confrontation within bounds. If Andropov comes to the UN General Assembly in the fall, we will face a different set of considerations, which must be carefully examined. These questions will require thorough consideration over the rest of this summer, so that we can have in place by the fall a

plan that can be well insulated against the coming Presidential campaign season. I will be sending you further analyses of these questions in the next several weeks.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 6/16-30/83. Secret; Sensitive. Hill initialed for Shultz. On June 23, Bosworth sent Hill a draft of the memorandum and attached paper, which Hill forwarded to Clark. Hill commented in a covering note to Clark "Attached is the Secretary of State's reply to the President's memorandum of June 7 on our foreign policy goals and priorities over the next 18 months. We have treated this reply as particularly sensitive and have not distributed it in the Department of State. It includes, at the end, an annex on Presidential travel which refers to some sensitive matters discussed between the President and the Secretary. If this paper is given a wider circulation (which we do not recommend), you have the option of detaching the last section." (Ibid). On June 13, in a memorandum to Bosworth, Shultz wrote: "I look to you to organize a discussion of this important subject sometime within the next 10 days. It seems to me that all the members of your council should be included. We might consider, also, some people outside of the Department, in Government or out. I am not suggesting a gigantic meeting but some way of organizing discussions promptly and aggressively." (Ibid.)

² On June 7, the President sent Weinberger and Shultz a memorandum asking them "to reflect on the demands and opportunities in your respective areas and submit as detailed a forecast of your recommendations as possible.

By forecast, I intend your priority objectives together with your prescription of the actions/milestones along the way to meeting them.” The memorandum continued: “I ask that Bill Clark convene a meeting soon to review our thoughts and then to seek your help in integrating these individual efforts into an overall strategic agenda by the first of July.” (Ibid.) The memorandum is in [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 155](#).³

³ Secret/Sensitive. An earlier version of the cover memorandum indicates the paper was drafted by Rodman. (Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 6/16-30/83)

67. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT
Summitry

I have submitted papers to you earlier pointing out the dangers of summitry in the absence of assurance that substantial progress can be made on issues of primary importance to us,² and believe that the considerations set forth in them remain valid. However, public and Congressional pressures are building for a summit meeting, and although the rationale is often fuzzy and the premises mistaken, this is a political fact of life with which we must deal.

At this point it is clear that we are well on track in rebuilding our defense strength and in rallying our Allies on the most critical issues. Our economy is showing increasing signs of long-term recovery, and your position of leadership is strong and assured. Andropov, in contrast, is faced with a myriad of problems far more fundamental and intractable than ours. The *basics*, therefore, are moving unmistakably in our direction and our negotiating strength is stronger than it has been for many years. Our task is to manage the U.S.-Soviet relationship in a manner which will insure that these trends continue over the long term. In other words, we must insure the *sustainability* of our current policies.

This means, among other things, that we must deal with the summit issue in a manner so that pressures for a

summit do not erode our ability to maintain our defense programs or allied unity, particularly on the INF deployment issue. Our goal should be more ambitious than mere damage limitation, however. We should aim to use the summit issue in a manner which enhances our leverage rather than weakening it (which would be the case if we were forced by ill-founded public, Congressional or allied opinion to enter into an inadequately prepared meeting without clear objectives.) I believe that this can be done, provided that we are clear in our own minds about our objectives, avoid raising false public expectations, and pursue a purposeful, well-coordinated negotiating track over the coming months.

U.S. Objectives

Our confrontation with the Soviet Union is and will continue to be a protracted one. Summitry, to the extent we choose to indulge in it, should be viewed as just one instrument in a long-term, sustained effort. Although it is possible that a major breakthrough can be achieved within a year in some area of primary interest to us, this is far from certain and, indeed, does not seem likely. There are two basic reasons for this: (1) Despite the favorable trends running in our direction, the Soviet leaders will continue to balk at offering proof that our policy of strength pays off, and are likely to continue for some time to try to undermine our strength and determination rather than making the hard choices required; and (2) Andropov, even with his accession to the titular chief of state role, has probably not consolidated his position to the degree that he can force painful decisions on powerful interest groups.

Therefore, if there is a summit within twelve months, our most important objective will be to impress upon Andropov

that our will and capacity to confront him successfully is firm and unalterable in the absence of a significant modification of Soviet behavior. This could prepare the ground for more significant Soviet concessions in 1985.

A second objective should be to obtain significant progress (though not necessarily formal agreements) in several of the areas of primary interest to us: human rights, Soviet restraint in third countries, arms reduction and confidence-building measures, and bilateral relations—particularly those aspects which strengthen our capacity to communicate with the Soviet public at large and thus to build pressure for a gradual “opening” of Soviet society.

A third objective should be to demonstrate—both to the more pragmatic elements of the Soviet leadership and to our own public—that we are in fact serious negotiating partners and that we are not making unreasonable demands in order to block settlement of disputes.

The Agenda

The agenda for any summit will be effectively shaped by the content of negotiations prior to it. Our negotiations, therefore, should cover, persistently and systematically, those issues on our list, whether they seem amenable to progress or not. For it is important to keep hammering at the themes important to us, whether or not there is a Soviet response. Prospects in the various areas vary, of course, as do the appropriate channels we should use. The following examples are meant to be illustrative rather than comprehensive:

—*Human Rights*: Here the Soviets can make concessions regarding specific persons if they choose, but they are unlikely to make any in overall procedure. In my view, we

can aim realistically to obtain the emigration of the Pentecostals, the release and emigration of Shcharansky, at least some improvement in Sakharov's position (e.g. medical treatment in Moscow), and increased Jewish emigration. We should continue to use the Kampelman channel for most of this, and are likely to get the most from quiet diplomacy, backed up by publicity generated by private organizations and—as appropriate—support from allied and other governments (e.g., the Stoessel mission).³ We should offer nothing in return for these Soviet actions, other than an improved atmosphere.

—*Third Areas*: These promise to be among the most contentious and intractable issues we must manage. The Soviet aim will be to draw us into a form of geopolitical horse-trading based on an implicit recognition of spheres of influence. (For example, they promise to ease off arms supplies to Central America in return for a free hand in Poland.) We must, of course, totally reject going down this path, since it ultimately would undermine our alliances and weaken the moral basis for our policies. Our leverage on these issues varies with the local situation; it is most powerful when political conditions in the area and the military balance act as a barrier to Soviet penetration and weakest when one or both of these barriers is absent. But while our most effective counter to Soviet adventurism must be defeating it on the spot, we should make it clear that irresponsible Soviet behavior is a major impediment to the whole range of U.S.-Soviet relations. “Linkage” in this general sense is a political fact of life, and we must not let the Soviets forget it.

It is difficult to say at this juncture what we can expect in this area from a summit, but as a minimum I believe we should have credible assurance that there will be no further dramatic Soviet or surrogate military moves to tip

the balance in a regional situation. We should, of course, continue to probe Soviet intentions in each individual situation and be prepared to use the implicit leverage of an upcoming summit to push the Soviets toward a solution we favor.

—*Arms Reduction and CBM's*: We should be able to make progress on some of the confidence-building measures we have proposed, but a real breakthrough in any of the three major arms reduction talks seems highly problematic, although possible. If we are to move toward a summit, however, we should use that process to pressure the Soviets to get more forthcoming proposals on the table, and should hold off agreeing to a summit until our positions have narrowed on at least some of the key issues. Presumably both sides must be able to say after the meeting that some significant progress was achieved in this area.

—*Bilateral issues*: Here, we can reasonably expect some limited progress. If the Soviets agree to a cultural and information exchange agreement which enhances our access to the Soviet public it will be in our interest. Establishment of a consulate in Kiev would provide us with a window on the largest Soviet minority nationality and enhance our ability to exploit the potential nationalities problem. We may be able to achieve some greater access to the Soviet media, and possibly a cessation of jamming of VOA, as well as some minor improvements in the consular and travel areas. While none of these topics are likely to be suitable for extended discussion at a summit, the latter could provide some leverage for favorable results in negotiations preceding the meeting.

Is this Enough?

If the analysis above is accurate, it would seem that we can expect at this point only limited gains from a summit. So limited, in fact, that they might not justify the risk of public euphoria (some is inevitable, even if not encouraged) followed by a let-down and recriminations. For this reason, I believe we should continue to proceed cautiously and deliberately and avoid committing ourselves to a summit until our negotiations provide a clearer picture of how much give there is in Soviet positions.

There are other reasons for proceeding with caution. If the Pope's spectacular success in rallying the Polish people and humiliating Jaruzelski results in heavy-handed Soviet interference in Poland, it would, to put it mildly, make it difficult for you to meet Andropov. Also, we would want to be sure that the trial of the Pope's would-be assassin in Italy is unlikely to produce persuasive evidence of a "Bulgarian connection," since you will not want to sit down with a man whom the public believes—rightly or wrongly—to have taken out a contract on the Pope.⁴

I believe that the Soviets want a summit, since it enhances their stature—at home and in the rest of the world—to be seen dealing as equals with the President of the United States. It is also useful to Andropov personally in consolidating his power internally to be accepted by you as an equal partner. They will not abandon the store to us for the privilege of a meeting, but they will pay something (in human rights cases and in access to their population) if we negotiate these issues skillfully and avoid making them a public test of strength. But in order to squeeze the maximum out of them, we must position ourselves so that we will not be seen needing a summit more than they.

The Soviets clearly recognize the danger of appearing over eager, and I believe this was behind Gromyko's June 21

statement accusing us of having “no constructive goals” and implying that we must change *our* policies to make a summit possible.⁵

How to Proceed

While we must be prepared to handle the matter in public with the same coolness Gromyko has shown, we should do what we can in diplomatic and private channels to probe Soviet flexibility. And if we can speed up this process without becoming the demandeur, we should do so.

I believe that Secretary Shultz’s testimony on the Hill last week and his recent approach to Dobrynin,⁶ coupled with Kampelman’s conversations in Madrid and our proposals in the arms reduction talks in Geneva and Vienna provide an appropriate start to the process of setting an agenda for a possible summit. At this point, my judgment is that what we have put on the table is appropriate, but that we should go no further on any matter of substance until the Soviets respond with something of their own. We should press for significant progress in each of the areas we have outlined, utilizing both formal diplomatic channels, and—whenever appropriate and potentially useful—special channels such as that through Kampelman and his KGB interlocutor.

In fact, as we enter into a more intensive dialogue with the Soviets, we should give careful thought to establishing a private channel for frank discussion of sensitive issues of a broader nature than those handled by Kampelman. I believe that such a channel can be useful provided we manage it in a manner so that the heads of key agencies in our own government and our principal negotiators are aware of the messages passed, and that discussion is

shifted to formal channels before firm commitments are made.

In preparing for a possible summit, timing will be a factor almost as important as substance. On the one hand, we need to make clear to the Soviets that we are prepared to deal if they are and to give impetus to their sluggish policy making. On the other, it is important not to appear to be in a hurry lest our negotiating position be weakened.

If we do not take a step to force the pace of negotiations, the scenario would look something like the following:

A. Continue diplomatic exchanges (Shultz/Dobrynin, Hartman/Gromyko) until late September.

B. You and Shultz meet with Gromyko in late September, when he comes here for the UN session.

C. Assuming these exchanges produce some progress, plan a Shultz visit to Moscow in December. (I think it important that he not go in October or November so as not to provide an excuse in Europe to delay scheduled INF deployments.)

Although this scenario might provide enough evidence of the prospects for a summit to permit a go/no go decision by the end of the year (for a summit around March or April), it would do little to raise the visibility of our negotiations or to increase pressure on the Soviets for quick decisions. Also, a Shultz visit immediately following INF deployments might not be acceptable to the Soviets.

With these considerations in mind, Ambassador Hartman has recommended that Shultz propose a visit to Moscow in July or early August, provided he can be assured of a meeting with Andropov. Hartman argues that such a visit would exert pressure on the Soviets to respond promptly to

our latest proposals, give us the opportunity to explain the implications of our latest START proposals to Andropov directly (Hartman believes he has not really grasped their potential), and demonstrate to our public and the Allies that we are negotiating seriously.

These are powerful arguments in favor of an early Shultz visit to Moscow, but I am concerned over the impact of our taking the initiative in suggesting a visit before we have any forthcoming responses from the Soviets to our latest proposals. Obviously, we must make a decision on this very soon if the trip is to be possible at all, and over the next few days I shall be reviewing the pros and cons and exploring possible alternative ways to speed up the diplomatic process.

Public Handling

Until we have decided whether to proceed to the summit and have nailed down the arrangements with the Soviets privately, we should hold strictly to our current position (that one could be useful in the future if properly prepared), and avoid speculation on whether and when one might be possible.

We should also consider approaching key Senators and Members of Congress privately to encourage them to avoid pressing publicly for a summit, which only erodes our negotiating position in arranging one. (Percy's comments during the Shultz hearing, for example, were distinctly unhelpful.)²

As we proceed with those negotiations you approve, it will be absolutely essential to avoid premature leaks. Therefore we will probably need to develop special "close hold"

procedures to avoid wide dissemination of our negotiating plans in the bureaucracy. I expect to have some specific suggestions for you shortly on this subject.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/25/83–06/28/83). Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. A stamp on the memorandum reads: “Received 83 Jun 25.” On June 16 in a note to Matlock, McFarlane wrote: “For many reasons—some good and some not so good—we owe the President a thoughtful treatment of whether, and if so, why and how a Summit meeting should be held. We have already given him two solid papers which treat the historical record, and emphasizing the damage which can be done to our long term interests by creating a false euphoria in the minds of Americans which makes it difficult to contend with the continued misbehavior by the Soviets in the wake of a summit. In short, we have stressed that for a summit to be worthwhile, it must involve the resolution of problems, not atmospherics.” McFarlane requested a paper from Matlock addressing a possible agenda and topics for discussion. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File—Summitry—USSR (2/2)) While no drafting information was found on Clark’s memorandum, it seems likely it originated with McFarlane’s request to Matlock.

² See [Document 52](#).

³ For documentation on the Stoessel mission, see [Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLI, Global Issues II, Documents 60–65](#).

⁴ In his book, Matlock commented: “One cloud hung over thoughts of a Reagan-Andropov meeting. During the Italian investigation of possible accomplices in the attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II in May 1981, evidence had come to

light suggesting that Bulgarian intelligence—and, therefore, the KGB—might have been involved. What if it turned out the KGB had been behind the shooting? How could any American president meet with the former director of the KGB if that organization had tried to kill the pope?

“We asked the CIA to examine what was known and make a judgment. Forensic specialists went through the evidence meticulously and advised that it was not conclusive. Mehmet Ali Agça, the would-be assassin, had indeed testified early in the investigation that an officer of the Bulgarian security service had been involved, but he later changed his story, and many of his early allegations had proven false. The analysts concluded he was a pathological liar. However, none of this proved that the KGB had *not* been involved. Soviet officials were obviously upset when a Polish prelate was elected pope, and they feared his influence on the political situation in Poland. But this was not proof of their involvement in the shooting.” (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev* p. 66) Documentation on the Bulgarian connection to the Papal assassination attempt is scheduled for publication in [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. X, Eastern Europe](#).

⁵ Gromyko made the statement in an interview with TASS. (Dusko Doder, “U.S.-Soviet Summit Is Doubtful,” *Washington Post*, June 22, 1983, p. A17)

⁶ Shultz testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 15. See [Document 61](#). For his meeting with Dobrynin, see [Document 64](#).

⁷ In his memoir, Shultz recounted Percy’s questions during his June 15 appearance before the SFRC: “Senator Percy led off the questioning by asking about the prospect of a

summit between President Reagan and General Secretary Andropov and urged that there be one:

“SENATOR PERCY: I would like to see us issue an invitation in the reasonable near future. . . . When can we look forward to a summit meeting with a properly prepared agenda but no high expectations and the world put on notice, that its purpose is just to gauge each other to be sure there is no miscalculation or misunderstanding, and to try to better understand each others policies

“SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President’s view is that a summit meeting could be a good thing. He is ready to have one if the meeting is well prepared and if there is a high probability of some significant outcome from it, so that it is substantive in nature. He fears that a meeting for the sake of a meeting would raise expectations very high, and if all that happened was that there was a meeting, it would do more harm than good.

“So there is in principle a readiness to have that meeting, but an operational requirement, that it have a substantive content that is prepared and on which we can move forward

“Negotiations were on everyone’s mind. ‘What is certain is that we will not find ourselves in the position in which we found ourselves in the aftermath of détente. We have not staked so much on the prospect of a successful negotiating outcome that we have neglected to secure ourselves against the possibility of failure,’ I said. ‘Our parallel pursuit of strength and negotiation prepares us both to resist continued Soviet aggrandizement and to recognize and respond to positive Soviet moves.’ I said further: ‘The direction in which that relationship evolves will ultimately be determined by the decisions of the Soviet leadership.

President Brezhnev's successors will have to weigh the increased costs and risks of relentless competition against the benefits of a less tense international environment in which they could more adequately address the rising expectations of their own citizens. While we can define their alternatives, we cannot decipher their intentions. To a degree unequaled anywhere else, [the Soviet Union] in this respect remains a secret.' I went on, 'Its history, of which this secrecy is such an integral part, provides no basis for expecting a dramatic change. And yet it also teaches that gradual change is possible. For our part, we seek to encourage change by a firm but flexible U.S. strategy, resting on a broad consensus, that we can sustain over the long term whether the Soviet Union changes or not.'" (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 278-279; brackets are in the original)

68. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, June 27, 1983

SUBJECT
Summitry

As I told you on Sunday,² after my quick reading, I like your memorandum on summitry.³ Reading it carefully again, I have two reservations and one suggestion. The reservations are in the paragraph on the critical issue of Third Areas on page 3. They are these:

1. The Soviets have little or no interest in drawing us into a form of geopolitical "horse-trading based on an implicit recognition of spheres of influence." They have their spheres of influence nailed down, they are presently targetting and expanding in other areas which we have shown little capacity to defend. For example, why would they give up the prospect in Central America in return for a free hand in Poland, which to all intents and purposes they already have.

2. We hardly have to make it clear that "irresponsible Soviet behavior is a major impediment to the whole range of U.S.-Soviet relations." They have been told that by at least five Presidents and in each case they have demonstrated that they were not willing to give up their efforts to expand their influence in the Third World in return for improved U.S.-Soviet relations.

Now for my suggestion. I agree that we don't want a summit without adequate preparation. I further believe

that there is no way the Soviets would do a summit meeting in mid-1984 because they will do nothing to help President Reagan be reelected. But what they might find to be in their interest is a non-substantive meeting in New York at the UN. This would have to be informal with no White House hype to build up expectations, no intent to arrive at agreements, but merely an opportunity to get acquainted and talk about the agenda before the two countries. This would be sufficiently before the crunch period on deployment. It might serve Andropov's domestic purposes. The President would be showing flexibility and willingness to talk to the American public as well as the Europeans. If the Soviets were to decline the meeting that word would get out both at home and in Europe which would help the President. It could be an afternoon's talk followed by a small dinner or a small dinner followed by an evening's talk, perhaps with the Director General of the UN as host to minimize protocol problems.

William J. Casey⁴

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/25/83-06/28/83); NLR-748-24-27-4-8. Secret. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. A handwritten note reads: "PDB-0930."

² June 26.

³ See [Document 67](#).

⁴ Casey signed "Bill" above his typed signature.

69. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, July 7, 1983

SUBJECT

Summitry: Casey's Memo of June 27

My reaction to Bill Casey's thoughtful comments are as follows:²

(1) *Meeting on fringes of UN*: I think this has its dangers, but we must recognize that if Andropov decides to come to the UN, the President will have no alternative to meeting him. I doubt if Andropov would come without our encouragement, but if he should, we can minimize the negative fallout by making clear that (a) such a meeting is not a summit in the sense we have been using the term, but simply a courtesy due a major foreign chief of state coming to the U.S. on other business; and (b) such a meeting need not foreclose a proper, full-fledged summit if conditions make that desirable.

Whether we should encourage Andropov to come is a separate question, and at this point I would be inclined to advise against it since it would probably raise too many hopes and might well get in the way of INF deployments. However, we should keep the possibility of such a meeting in mind over coming weeks and say nothing publicly which would make it more difficult to manage it if future developments should increase the desirability. If at any point we decide for any reason that we *want* such a

meeting, we should try to arrange it privately before issuing a public invitation.

(2) *Soviet willingness to arrange Summit next year:* I do not agree with Casey that there is “no way” the Soviets will agree to a summit in mid-1984. They, in fact, may be eager for one if Andropov’s health holds. Their assessment of the likelihood of the President’s reelection will be important, of course. Almost as important will be their assessment of the possibility of concluding *any* deal with the Reagan Administration, and one task of our diplomacy (public and private) over the coming months will be to make clear that we are willing to conclude mutually advantageous agreements.

Aside from these considerations, however, there is a deeper reason for the Soviets not rejecting a summit next year, even if they feel that it contributes to the President’s reelection chances. This is that the Soviets prefer the known to the unknown and unpredictable; more importantly, they prefer an interlocutor who can deliver if a deal is struck to one who might be voted down by the U.S. Senate. Given their experience with Carter’s vacillations—which they found maddening—they may well actually prefer a strong U.S. President to an unpredictable one. And they appreciate the fact that a President with strong anti-Communist credentials offers more long-term reliability as an interlocutor than one who is weak at home. In sum, paradoxical as it may seem, they may favor the President’s re-election as the lesser of two “evils.”

(3) *Third Areas:* Though they will never say so directly, I feel strongly that the Soviets do have a strong urge to indulge in geo-political horse trading. This is implicit in almost every frank conversation with them I can recall when dealing with “third area” questions. The fact is that

they do *not* feel that they have “their” spheres of influence “nailed down.” They know they are not there legitimately, but only because they have been able to force themselves on these areas. Therefore, *legitimizing* their position is of great importance to them. Since theirs are not true alliances (as ours are) they stand only to gain from the appearance of legitimacy. Conversely, we stand only to lose. For this reason, it is a policy we should reject. Any analysis of what they theoretically might accept in such a “trade off” session is not only beside the point, but dangerous.

(4) *Linkage*: I am not sure the Soviets have really taken on board the implicit linkage of their overall behavior and our ability to conclude major agreements. It is true that every postwar U.S. President has made the right noises (at times) on this point, but few have *acted* as if it is important, and this is what counts. In fact, the Carter Administration consciously and explicitly de-linked SALT-II from any other factor. (We did not even warn the Soviets regarding Afghanistan during the period between the Taraki coup in 1978 and the Soviet invasion in December 1979, which caused some Soviet officials to complain after sanctions were applied, “How were we to know it made any difference to you?”) Therefore, I consider it important to continue to make the linkage point, since I am not confident that it is really understood.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, Summitry—USSR (2/2). Secret. Sent for information.

² See [Document 68](#).

70. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Andropov¹

Dear Gen. Secretary Andropov Washington, July 11, 1983

I appreciate very much your letter pledging an, “unbending commitment of the Soviet leadership and the people of the Soviet Union to the course of peace, the elimination of the nuclear threat and the development of relations based on mutual benefit and equality with all nations.”

Let me assure you the government & the people of the United States are dedicated to, “the course of peace” and “the elimination of the nuclear threat.” It goes without saying that we also seek relations with all nations based on “mutual benefit and equality.” Our record since we were allied in W.W. II confirms that.²

Mr. General Secretary could we not begin to approach these goals in the meetings now going on in Geneva? You and I share an enormous responsibility for the preservation of stability in the world. I believe we can fulfill that mandate but to do so will require a more active level of exchange than we have heretofore been able to establish. We have much to talk about with regard to the situation in Eastern Europe, South Asia, and particularly this hemisphere as well as in such areas as arms control, trade between our two countries and other ways in which we can expand east-west contacts.

Historically our predecessors have made better progress when communicating has been private and candid. If you

wish to engage in such communication you will find me ready. I await your reply.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Andropov (8290913, 8391028, 8391032). No classification marking. The editor transcribed the letter from Reagan's handwritten original. An image of the handwritten letter is [Appendix C](#). In his memoir, Shultz noted: "I later discovered that the president had shown his first draft to Bill Clark and, on the advice of Clark, he had taken out the sentences 'If we can agree on mutual, verifiable reductions in the number of nuclear weapons we both hold, could this not be a first step toward elimination of all such weapons? What a blessing this would be for the people we both represent.' President Reagan was consistently committed to his personal vision of a world without nuclear weapons; his advisers were determined to turn him away from that course." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 360)

² On June 17, Reagan sent Andropov a letter of congratulations upon his election as Chairman of the Presidium. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, Andropov (4)) On June 22, Andropov sent a short reply including the lines Reagan quotes in his letter. (Ibid.) In a July 6 memorandum to the President, Clark wrote: "Andropov's reply (Tab A) to your congratulatory message avoids the code words known to be offensive to us (such as 'peaceful coexistence'). However, instead of speaking of working together, as you did in your message,

he implies in his last sentence that the burden of proof is on us to take 'practical steps.'

"This thrust is consistent with Gromyko's recent comments on the prospects for a summit, which also implied that a change in U.S. policy is necessary. I consider this an obvious but not surprising attempt to position the Soviets as the aggrieved party. The main implication for our own public statements is to continue the same cautious, non-committal line we have followed up to now in commenting on the prospects for a summit meeting." (Ibid.) Reagan initialed Clark's memorandum, indicating he saw it.

71. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, July 13, 1983

SUBJECT

View from Moscow—Red Team Redux

This memorandum updates the December 13 paper on the same subject.² It was drafted by the same “Red Team,” chaired by Jeremy Azrael and composed of specialists from S/P, P, EUR, and INR.

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the “Red Team” of the Department of State³

Washington, July 13, 1983

RED TEAM REDUX

The View from Moscow, Mid-1983

Introduction

The eight months that have passed since Brezhnev’s death have confirmed our judgment that the first phase of the Soviet succession would be marked by policy continuity.⁴ If anything, there has been even less tactical dynamism and innovation than we foresaw. The persistence of this pattern cannot, however, be taken for granted. The record of Soviet foreign policy during the past eight months, while containing a few pluses from Moscow’s perspective, has

been decidedly negative overall. The setbacks of this period—taken together with a changing Soviet perception of the Reagan Administration’s staying power and willingness to do business with Moscow—have likely prompted the Soviet leadership to reassess its approach to a number of international issues, including the US-Soviet relationship itself.

In the view of some members of the “Red Team,” moreover, there are signs that established Soviet policies and priorities are being subjected to unusually systematic scrutiny, most obviously in the realm of internal development but in foreign affairs as well. These analysts interpret a number of recent leadership statements as reflecting a wide-ranging reassessment of established Soviet tactics in East-West relations, Eastern Europe, and the Third World. If such a comprehensive review is, in fact, underway, it could suggest that we are entering a period of fluidity in Moscow’s foreign policy, one in which US actions and the state of US-Soviet relations could play a greater role than in recent years in affecting Soviet policy choices.

Other “Red Team” members believe that any reevaluation of Soviet positions on international questions is likely to take place on an issue-by-issue basis, rather than in a comprehensive review. This appears to have been the general practice of the past two decades, and Andropov, Gromyko and Ustinov, who have helped to frame Soviet policy throughout that period, may feel less inclined toward a wide-ranging review than would a team of newcomers. They probably do not regard recent negative trends as so adverse as to require a comprehensive reassessment of Soviet strategy. If so, changes in Soviet foreign policy are likely to be *ad hoc*, and US actions and the state of US-Soviet relations will affect Soviet behavior to a more limited extent.

In any event, policy reassessment—be it comprehensive or *ad hoc*—does not necessarily imply policy redirection. In fact, we do not expect Moscow to undertake any radical foreign policy departures over the next year and a half, even though significant shifts in several specific areas could well occur.

I. *The Domestic Context*

Yuri Andropov stimulated high expectations on becoming General Secretary, for many different reasons including his personal style and Leonid Brezhnev's ossified rule. The picture of a dynamic and resourceful leader, which was so useful in the West, also had its impact at home. He was expected by many to begin an early assault on the more problematic elements of Brezhnev's legacy, especially the stalled economy.

In the event, as should have been expected, he was guided primarily by any new Soviet leader or leadership team's imperative—to consolidate power—and expectations of change have as a result been largely disappointed. To be sure, Andropov has strengthened his position, gaining increased public deference from his peers, and rounding out the full set of titles held by Brezhnev. But despite the lack of a major challenge to his position, it appears that the leadership turnover will be very gradual, with considerable jockeying and few policy departures. To date, Andropov does not appear to have gained control over local and regional party appointments. Lacking the ability to create an independent base of supporters, he will tend to remain in debt to—and in policy matters, constrained by—the senior colleagues whose backing gained him the top position in the first place. Gromyko and Ustinov are the most important of these; together with Andropov, their

dominance is marked by military promotions to the Central Committee, the key positions held by KGB officials, and Gromyko's acquisition of a First Deputy Premiership.

Whether or not because of limits on his power (as well as his uncertain health), Andropov has shown circumspection in approaching major policy questions. In particular, he appears to have no well-developed set of programs for dealing with the economy's ailments. To date, his most conspicuous break with the past has been a style of frank recognition of the magnitude and structural nature of the difficulties faced, and an implication that responses are being canvassed in every quarter. Few major policy initiatives have appeared. If anything, what the Soviet public has been told most clearly is that economic reforms are to be introduced slowly, only after a long review and search for solutions.

This combination of candor and delay was one of the most pronounced aspects of the recent Central Committee plenum;⁵ particularly characteristic was Andropov's admission that the Soviet system is weakest at making use of new technology, the very factor on which modern economies depend for growth. On this evidence, few dramatic departures over the next two years should be expected, despite increasing public attention to (and the leadership's own insistence on) the need to do something. The leadership will probably make do for some time with what have until now been used as substitutes for reform—its campaign against corruption, and appeals for discipline and vigilance against foreign enemies and influence. In the latter, traditional Russian xenophobia has been given an overlay of ideological rhetoric to support stricter educational, intellectual and cultural policies. (Cultural exchanges with the West have been singled out for suspicion.) These policies may be the harbingers of more

sustained and systematic repression, something that the leadership may regard as the political and social requisite of economic reform.

Overall, unresolved policy and personnel issues have, since Brezhnev's passing, demanded a high priority for domestic concerns; they will continue to do so, although not to the exclusion of issues on the foreign policy agenda. Nor will they require retrenchment where the Soviet Union otherwise has the means to sustain its diplomacy.

II. *Foreign Policy Balance Sheet Since November 1982*

The achievements of the Brezhnev era leave the Soviet Union with the military might of a superpower and a strong desire to compete with the United States on the basis of an asserted equality. The past eight months have seen small improvements in some areas, but on balance the record of Soviet foreign policy has left much to be desired. It has failed to capitalize on important opportunities, has witnessed better relations among adversaries who had appeared to be at odds with each other, and has been unable to resolve major outstanding problems. Although some of the Soviets' setbacks may well prove transitory, the Soviet leadership probably feels more on the defensive than immediately upon Andropov's accession.

Assessment of the US. Events since the end of last year have done nothing to alter fundamentally Moscow's view of the Reagan Administration, whose hostility to the Soviet Union and disposition to compete actively with it around the world are not doubted. Although domestic US and other constraints put certain limits on this competition, the Administration's commitment to compete has introduced added caution into Soviet decisionmaking.

Until this year, however, the Soviet leadership probably lacked a settled view of how long this stance might endure: whether the President had any interest in even limited accommodation with the Soviet Union, or (failing that) whether internal pressures might force him into it. Both points are somewhat clearer now. The President's political strength has plainly impressed Moscow: he is seen as highly likely to be re-elected, and still able to dominate domestic debate over military spending and arms control. He has salvaged weapons systems that last year seemed in jeopardy, and may even—thanks to the Scowcroft Commission—have established the basis of a broadening consensus about strategic issues.

At the same time, the Soviets have not missed the markedly greater Administration commitment to negotiation. Moscow surely suspects US statements of interest in "dialogue" as a necessary ploy to maintain domestic and allied support, and will remain suspicious. Some Soviet commentators have expressed the conviction, or hope, that the presidential campaign will further increase pressure on the President to conclude arms control agreements. Yet in combination with his stronger political position, the President's more open bargaining posture has made a Soviet strategy of waiting out Reaganism less tenable. In fact, it may have led the Soviet leadership to consider whether the coming year may not offer a better basis for bargaining with the US than a second Reagan Administration.

Western Europe. Last year Western Europe appeared to be the area where Soviet policy was making greatest headway, aided by nuclear issues, above all INF; alliance disagreement over East-West economic policy was a further Soviet plus. Since then, however, political trends have been almost uniformly adverse (above all, the setback of the

West German elections),⁶ Soviet propaganda has been ineffectual and the peace movement markedly weakened; the result has been a revival of Alliance cohesion both on INF and on other issues. Moscow has had to take stock of successive shows of unity at Williamsburg, at Madrid, and at a series of ministerials. As a result, Soviet spokesmen increasingly speak of INF deployments as a *fait accompli*.

Despite this resignation, Soviet efforts to make use of the European peace movement and anti-nuclear sentiment will continue, and conceivably increase. The Soviets may still believe that an intensified peace campaign in the final run-up to INF deployments could be effective in straining Atlantic ties, even if blocking deployments no longer seems achievable. Moreover, Soviet policy of the past six months, in absorbing these setbacks in Europe, has already begun to display greater effort in exploiting West European interest in other East-West forums, including MBFR, CSCE, and in preparations for a CDE. The anticipated pay-off of such efforts, of course, is sharply less than the hoped-for Soviet returns from a full-blown INF crisis.

Eastern Europe. At Brezhnev's death, the Soviet leadership probably believed the worst was past in Poland. While still impressed by Jaruzelski's ability to prevent its recurrence, they have also been reminded that the internal security situation is still volatile and potentially dangerous. Above all, the Pope's visit was a dramatic demonstration that the Polish people remain alienated from the regime.⁷ In this setting, Moscow is no doubt uneasy about Jaruzelski's plans to follow up the visit by developing his relation with the Church, ending martial law and freeing political prisoners.

Perhaps because of his experience as ambassador to Hungary and Party Secretary for bloc relations, Andropov's speeches have stressed themes of economic integration,

political coordination and ideological orthodoxy. He may have pressed the Hungarians to be firmer with dissidents and has proposed measures to improve Warsaw Pact and CEMA machinery. Clearly his efforts are meeting resistance. The East European summit did not issue as strong a statement on INF as Moscow wanted.⁸ Divided over increasingly difficult economic problems, CEMA has repeatedly had to put off the economic summit. Meanwhile, the costs of maintaining this empire remain high, and the economic troubles of the region, together with East European reliance on Western trade and financing, are complicating Soviet influence.

China and Japan. Before Brezhnev's death, the Soviets had achieved an atmospheric breakthrough in relations with the PRC; some also saw his passing as a Soviet opportunity to review and improve ties with Japan. Since then, however, the Soviets have shown little inclination to take major steps toward better relations with either state.

With the Chinese, they have held another round of bilateral talks, have agreed to increase trade and have opened a remote border crossing point. Moscow has not, however, acted on the issues that China has asserted are central to a genuine improvement in relations: Kampuchea, Afghanistan, or—most importantly—Soviet troops in Mongolia and on their border. Despite the apparent opportunity afforded by the downturn in US-China relations last year, the Soviets made no concrete gestures; they did not draw down or draw back their forces. They have in fact continued to strengthen their force posture throughout the region; Soviet Far East INF deployments are an area of increasing friction in Sino-Soviet relations. For their part, the Chinese have continued to criticize Soviet "hegemonism," while making small but significant moves to rebuild their damaged US connection.

Toward Japan, the Soviets have reacted with harsh criticism of Nakasone's bolder leadership style and his closer identification with the US on defense issues. Rather than trying to woo Nakasone or Japanese public opinion, the Soviets have sharpened their threats, raised historical antagonisms, and rejected any suggestion that the northern territories issue can even be discussed.

The past six months have shown Moscow that measurably improved relations with both China and Japan require a higher price than they might have envisioned, demanding concessions that they are unwilling to make. As a result, the Soviets regard East Asia as posing a series of problems rather than opportunities. They remain cautious and distrustful of their major Asian neighbors, and see their range of choices as very narrow.

Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf. Since last year any Soviet hopes that Islamabad would readily acquiesce in a pro-Soviet settlement—or cut its aid to the rebels—have been largely disappointed. The UN-sponsored talks continue (and may eventually aid the Soviets in gaining *de facto* recognition of the DRA), but, on the core question, the Pakistanis show no signs of weakening, at least under present pressure, while the Mujahadeen more than hold their own. Even while experiencing intermittent defeats—as in the Panjshir Valley, for example—Soviet forces are in no danger of being driven out; they cannot, however, make significantly greater progress, at least for the foreseeable future, without incurring significantly greater costs.

While relations have been deteriorating for some time, Soviet-Iranian friction increased sharply this year, exemplified by Iran's effort to crush the Tudeh party outright, and by its militancy concerning Afghanistan. Earlier Soviet attempts to mediate an Iran-Iraq settlement

have come to nothing, reflecting in part the Soviets' sacrifice of a broker's role by resuming arms deliveries to Iraq. Moscow may be consoled that US relations with both parties also remain extremely poor, although the formation of the new Central Command may be seen as evidence that American ability to protect its interests in the region is slowly recovering from the fall of the Shah.

Middle East. Following the setback they suffered in Lebanon last year, the Soviets have made a determined effort to restore relations with their principal regional clients, to frustrate progress on US initiatives, and to achieve an enhanced role for themselves in any subsequent peace negotiations. Their minimum objective has been achieved: to consolidate their relationship with Syria through the SA-5 deployments and other arms supplies, to bolster Syrian intransigence in negotiations on Lebanon and thereby to block the Reagan initiative.

From the Soviet perspective, these developments at least partially recoup the ground lost last year—albeit by running a much greater risk of direct involvement in a future Israeli-Syrian conflict. With the current impasse in the US negotiating effort in Lebanon, as well as Jordanian unwillingness to enter the peace process, they likely believe that the gains have justified the risks taken, and that they are in a stronger position to frustrate US diplomatic efforts in which they are not involved. The Soviets also recognize, however, that they are not well positioned to take the diplomatic lead (which may account for Andropov's reluctance thus far to put on the record his own views regarding a Middle East settlement). With this in mind, they may also doubt the long-term congruence of their own and Syrian interests and fear that Damascus will eventually participate in US-sponsored diplomatic initiatives, thereby isolating them in the region.

Central America. Central America's instability may look like one of Moscow's most useful levers against the US. The affairs of the region obviously could compel increased US attention, probably at the price of involvements and commitments elsewhere, and—unlike many other areas—at little risk of producing a dangerous Soviet-American confrontation. Without exaggerating its own ability to affect, much less govern these events, Moscow has probably calculated that proxy escalation serves its interests. Yet while the Soviets may still hope that domestic opinion will constrain US policy, recent Administration statements and actions have likely made the Soviets more wary. Not only might increased Soviet involvement come at the expense of improved Soviet-US relations, but the prospect of an outright reverse—the downfall of the Sandinistas—has probably been taken seriously for the first time in Moscow; for this reason, and to counter US moves throughout the region, Cuba appears to be increasing its involvement in Nicaragua.

Southern Africa. The Soviet perspective on southern Africa has lost the strategic optimism and dynamism that was so pronounced in the late 1970s. Moscow now seems preoccupied with maintaining, and if possible consolidating, its large long-term stake in key southern African countries such as Angola and Mozambique. Yet both of these Soviet clients are threatened by increasingly effective insurgencies that enjoy the overwhelming regional military and economic backing of South Africa. The Soviets cannot be certain that the beleaguered Angolan and Mozambican leaderships will not seek relief from these pressures by cooperating with US diplomacy—thereby freezing Moscow out of the regional role it seeks, with no credit for contributing to the process. Recent developments have increased these worries, but the Soviets are probably still not convinced that the US can bring off a Namibia

settlement involving withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola. Moscow retains considerable leverage over the regimes in Luanda and Maputo, primarily by manipulating the flow of Soviet and Cuban security assistance on which these regimes depend.

III. Soviet Policy Decisions and Options

The Soviet leadership's assessment of foreign policy trends since Brezhnev's death is, on balance, almost certainly negative. This will no more ensure a redirection of policy than declining growth rates ensure economic reform. Moreover, cyclical downturns will not be mistaken for secular trends, nor failures to advance for outright defeats.

Nonetheless, in the next 18 months, many particular issues will approach unavoidable decision points, at which existing policy lines will have to be either changed or reinforced. In responding to each of these, the leadership will face choices between becoming more cost-conscious and risk-averse on the one hand, and, on the other, accepting increased costs and risks, whether in exploiting new opportunities that appear or in making a concerted effort to resolve existing difficulties.

Relations with the US. The onset of the presidential election year forces the Soviets to decide how to respond to apparently increased US receptivity to bargaining. The meager content of discussions proposed thus far (consulates, etc.) may suggest to Moscow a US reluctance to address more important arms issues; the leadership may also be skeptical that the interval between the cooling-off after INF deployments and the heating-up of the electoral campaign will be long enough for serious bargaining.

Given this uncertainty about US purposes, and about what the calendar will allow, the Soviets will be cautious in probing for US flexibility. They are unlikely to invest more than token capital in their own initiatives, to avoid wasting unreciprocated concessions. The same wary hesitation will also limit Soviet responses to American probes. Small unilateral steps are likely, however, on the model of changes recently made in the Soviet START position. Under time pressure, and witnessing the progress of new US systems, the Soviets will also feel obliged to be responsive to US initiatives; an American summit offer, for example, is more likely than not to be accepted. Recalling the fragility of this entire process, they also may be more cautious about provoking the US on second-order issues.

In START, the Administration's success in winning support for new strategic systems will not by itself induce Soviet acceptance of our offers. The Soviets will not accept proposals that require early and costly restructuring of their forces so as to make them resemble those of the US. But if the period of adjustment is further stretched out, they may become more receptive. This is, moreover, one area where the political strength of the Soviet military is not necessarily an obstacle but perhaps an asset: the Soviet military have looked to arms control as a technological equalizer, and in addition to this incentive they now have a stronger budgetary motive as well.

Western Europe. The Soviets appear increasingly resigned to the failure of their efforts to halt deployment. They will understand that overreacting could be counterproductive, but this need not foreclose a tough response; for they will also want to make good on their threats and avoid defusing the issue by appearing to acquiesce in deployments. These considerations will argue for prompt military counterdeployments at a minimum, and could point to

political actions designed to heighten tensions. The options to be considered probably include a break-off of talks and, as Andropov implied to Kohl, an array of pressures directed at Germany. At the same time, despite the failure of their peace offensive to date, the Soviets will make further use of diplomatic initiatives aimed specifically at European opinion and at generating Allied pressure on Washington. In particular, greater Soviet activism in all arms forums that treat European issues should be expected.

After demonstratively reacting to US deployments, and insisting that deployments as such will not make them more flexible, the Soviets will nevertheless need to weigh the value of limiting these new systems short of the full 572. Accepting the "legitimacy" of these systems, almost unthinkable now, may prove significantly less sticky for the Soviets after the first tranche or two are already in place, particularly if a new negotiating framework serves as cover. Even in 1984, the value of a satisfactory INF agreement will probably be judged chiefly by how much it contributes to other Soviet interests, especially to an agreement in the more important START categories.

Eastern Europe. The Soviets have no expectation of an early alleviation of their problems in managing the East European bloc, but absent a major blow-up in Poland they probably have greater confidence that none of these difficulties will be an impediment to improved relations with the United States. They probably believe that the West is slowly climbing down from its program of pressures against Poland; this may offer some slight incentive to keep the situation there cool, perhaps even allowing Jaruzelski increased flexibility. But on balance the leadership probably expects Polish developments to have little importance one way or the other and this will limit the pressure they feel to allow significant liberalization.

China and Japan. The past six months suggest to the Soviets that outbidding the US for Chinese favor would be difficult; Sino-Soviet improvements could stimulate more intense courtship of Beijing by the US, and Moscow has no wish to be used as such a lever. For this and other reasons, the Soviet purpose toward China is more to stabilize than improve relations, while preserving what it can of last year's atmospheric gains. The conduct of this effort will not be greatly affected by Soviet policy toward the US. Unlike the US, the Soviets probably do not expect progress in relations with Washington to affect relations with China, for better or worse.

Japan is expected to be a growing threat to Soviet security interests, separately and in concert with the US. The Soviets have not yet decided the question of whether or how to adjust their security policy toward Japan in response; they may doubt that Japan can be wooed very far from the US, and appear to believe that inducements are not the best means for dealing with Japan in any event. They will continue to expand economic ties, while seeking to insulate these from their poor political/security relationship, and from the continuing policy of intimidation that accompanies it.

Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf. Like Poland, the *status quo* in Afghanistan is probably seen by the Soviets as a declining impediment to other East-West business. They do not (in contrast to policy toward Poland) expect Western and other pressures on their position in Afghanistan to ease up appreciably, even in the context of improved Soviet-American relations. Were such an improvement to materialize, however, Moscow's principal hope would be to play on Pakistani anxiety about a superpower deal. Keeping the UN negotiating process alive may be helpful, in the

long term, as an instrument for gaining Pakistani acquiescence in a pro-Soviet outcome in Afghanistan.

The current visit of the Soviet Deputy Defense Minister to Kabul could contribute to a limited increase in Soviet forces in Afghanistan or possibly to larger-scale escalation.⁹ That the latter could set back East-West relations is well understood; this consideration might deter Moscow as long as the situation on the ground had not worsened; it would not by itself deter escalation if the military outlook began to deteriorate or if a military breakthrough seemed achievable.

Iran commands growing Soviet attention and even worry; while Moscow desires to position itself to exploit opportunities, it sees no openings at present.

Middle East. Soviet policy has played a larger role in damaging ongoing US diplomatic efforts in the Middle East than in any other region. In so doing, they have kept regional tensions high, even at the risk of direct confrontation with either the US or Israel. Despite this, Soviet-American rivalry in this region has not significantly complicated relations overall, and is probably not seen in Moscow as an obstacle to movement on arms control. Reassured by this separation between Middle East tension and the superpower relationship as a whole, the Soviets will not believe that improved relations with Washington will require more constructive policies in the region. They would, of course, make a stronger effort than in recent years to gain US support for a Soviet role in the Arab-Israeli negotiating process. Having abetted Syria's obstructionist policy, they may feel their claim to such a role is better than in some time. Their hope of involvement will, however, be complicated by the likely medium-term immobility of the Arab-Israeli processes (owing in part to

the state of the PLO, whose patron Moscow had hoped to appear). It will be further weakened by the very limited leverage that the Soviets can demonstrate in moving the parties toward constructive bargaining positions.

Southern Africa. As in the Middle East, the Soviets have no direct role in the principal diplomatic peacemaking process in southern Africa, despite regular exchanges of information on the process with the US, and retain enough leverage to pose a credible threat to Western peacemaking efforts. In the near term they probably doubt that they will face the choice of using or losing this leverage. If, however, the Namibia process comes to a head—and particularly if it appeared that Cuban troops were about to be ousted unceremoniously, with no credit to Moscow for having produced a good result—Soviet leverage could be used in a number of ways. At a minimum, it might help the Soviets to parlay their position into some formal role in the process. Even this, however, would seem a Soviet defeat, if it required the sacrifice of a military presence and geopolitical position from which to influence the unfolding Black African struggle against *apartheid*. Therefore, the Soviets are likely to increase where necessary their assistance to, and involvement in, Angola and Mozambique and to seek to demonstrate that South Africa and indirectly the US are responsible if the Namibia process breaks down. In view of their relatively low investment in the area, however, it is also possible that the Soviets would consider a less obstructive role if they conclude that this would put them in a more favorable position for dealing with the core issues of East-West relations.

Central America. Recent US policy toward Central America may have increased Soviet sensitivity to possible linkage between the events of the region and Soviet-American ties. For this reason, if a more active phase of superpower

negotiation opens, the Soviets will at a minimum endeavor to keep their Central American activities separate from it. They will dissociate themselves from regional flare-ups while the process is in train, and if favorable results are at hand in Washington, they may avoid contributing to escalation in the region. Although some reduction in arms supplies might be used as a signal, the Soviets prefer not to make such side-payments. The most difficult policy dilemma would arise for Moscow if, at the same time that arms agreements came within reach, pressure on the Nicaraguan regime threatened to topple the Sandinistas. Soviet assistance would of course be rendered through Cuba, but even this would certainly increase the danger of a confrontation with the US and—if Cuban involvement were provocative enough—might force the Soviets to consider how to protect their ally against direct US pressure.

IV. Summary Judgment

Soviet policy has been less activist than our projection of last year, and has not been notably successful, even in areas where new initiatives have been pursued. Whether or not as part of a comprehensive reassessment of its priorities, Moscow may undertake certain policy shifts in the next 18 months, particularly in its approach to the Reagan Administration.

In dealing with the US, the Soviet leadership is likely to conclude that their “wait-them-out” strategy is no longer adequate. Such an approach will appear both less effective and less attuned to emergent possibilities for doing business with the Reagan Administration. As a result, Moscow may be ready for small steps that probe US intentions, while moving slowly so as to avoid helping the

US to appear flexible or to confirm that the Administration's tough line has worked. Soviet diplomacy will aim, for the most part, to gain advantages by depicting US policy as *inflexible*.

The Soviets may also conclude that more confrontational or costly policies are needed in particular areas—to keep the INF controversy alive in Europe, to consolidate in Afghanistan, to exploit US vulnerability in Central America, and preserve a Soviet role in the Middle East. Certain of these decisions, and especially their timing, may be affected by whether the Soviets detect a short-term opportunity to make progress in Soviet-American relations. Even if this progress materializes, however, Soviet policy will not be diverted by it from the pursuit of long-term objectives. Instead, Moscow will in some instances see improved East-West relations as an opportunity to pursue a broadened policy role for itself and to gain Washington's cooperation, particularly in unstable regions where US policy has complicated Soviet efforts.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 7/1-15/83. Secret; Nodis. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Hill's initials are stamped on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² A copy of the December 13, 1982, paper is attached but not printed.

³ Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Sestanovich; cleared by Azrael, Baraz, Johnson, and Vershbow. Sestanovich initialed for the clearing officers.

⁴ Brezhnev died on November 10, 1982.

⁵ See [footnote 4, Document 65](#).

⁶ On October 1, 1982, Helmut Schmidt's government in West Germany collapsed. Helmut Kohl, leader of the Christian Democratic Union, became the new Chancellor of West Germany. His party's coalition won a majority in the federal election on March 6, 1983.

⁷ Pope John Paul II visited his native Poland in June 1983.

⁸ The joint statement issued on June 28 after a meeting in Moscow of the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 507-511.

⁹ Soviet Deputy Defense Minister General Valentin Varennikov.

72. Memorandum From the Chief of the International Activities Division, Central Intelligence Agency, to Director of Central Intelligence Casey¹

Washington, July 14, 1983

SUBJECT

Talking Points for Discussion with Secretary Shultz Re Expanded Soviet CA Program

1. *Action Requested:* We have been advised by Mr. Linton that the Secretary of State intends to raise the status of the expansion of the Soviet/East Europe Covert Action Program through a new Finding with you on 15 July. Attached are Talking Points for your use with the Secretary of State. (Attachment A).
2. *Background:* In April we forwarded a draft new Finding to expand the Soviet/East Europe CA Program (see Attachment B).² You have been holding action on this Finding. As you are aware, since last fall we have been holding periodic discussions with Mark Palmer (DAS for Soviet/East European Affairs at State), Dennis Kux (DAS for Intelligence Coordination at State), and Walt Raymond of the NSC on policy coordination relative to the expanded CA program. The last such discussion was held on 11 July.³ State has consistently pressed us to get on with the expanded program on as large a scale and as soon as possible. Their view has been that this covert action pressure against the Soviets is a necessary ingredient to prod the Soviets to accept certain diplomatic initiatives.
3. We have commenced a number of new activities in the Soviet/East European target area under the authority of the

1978 Finding.⁴ [*1 line not declassified*] we have reached the point now where additional funding is necessary [*less than 1 line not declassified*] if the momentum in this program is to be maintained. Some contemplated new operations have not yet been undertaken, since we would only be able to mount them with new authority sought in the new Finding. In the attached Talking Points, three possible courses of action are indicated:

—Proceed with the new Finding and a related Reserve Release;

—Go forward with a Memorandum of Notification reinterpreting the 1978 Finding to provide limited expanded authority and concurrently proceed with a Reserve Release;

—Do not seek new authority at this time, and proceed only with a Reserve Release under the 1978 Finding.

[*1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified*]

[*name not declassified*]⁵

Attachment A

Talking Points⁶

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Talking Points Re Expanded Soviet/EE CA Program

1. The Soviet/EE Covert Action Program as it existed at the beginning of FY-83 consisted of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] operational activities budgeted at 6.5 million dollars with an additional [*amount not declassified*]

allocated for developmental activities. [*number not declassified*] major new activities have been undertaken to date in FY-83, which have obligated the [*amount not declassified*] developmental funds. Advanced planning has gone forward for additional operations, for which specific funds have not yet been expended. [*1½ lines not declassified*] will be needed during the remainder of FY-83 to keep up the momentum in the expansion of the existing operations and the further development of those initiated during FY-83.

2. Assuming full-scale development of the expanded program under a new Finding (which would include clandestine radio and political action operations) [*less than 1 line not declassified*] is anticipated. If expansion of the program under the 1978 Finding *only* is approved, we will need a Reserve Release in FY-84 of [*amount not declassified*]. The major difference between these two programs involves the drop-out of clandestine radio broadcasting into the Soviet Union in the smaller program. A new initiative package involving the full expanded program has been included in the draft DDO FY-85 Budget in the amount of [*amount not declassified*] (see Attachment C).⁷

3. [*3 lines not declassified*]

4. New expanded operations already in process in FY-83:

—A new Ukrainian historical journal to appear early spring 1984;

—A subsidy to allow the continuation of the Russian edition [*less than 1 line not declassified*];

- A new Russian-language “newspaper” of moderate leftist viewpoint which will appear next summer;
- A Soviet Central Asian newsletter which should appear next year;
- A re-institution of support for a Hungarian newspaper and a few books;
- A new Czech-language “Readers Digest”-type publication;
- A new journal appealing to dissident West European communists;
- A new journal in the three Baltic languages to appear in fall 1983.

All of these operations have policy approval in the 1978 Finding.

5. A number of other planned publishing projects authorized under the 1978 Finding are contemplated for early FY-84 if sufficient funding is available. Two projects,

- Support from Western Europe of internal peace movement in the Soviet Union and East European countries
- Establishment in exile of the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and [*less than 1 line not declassified*] for support operations into the USSR

could most effectively be carried out under the new Finding but could be configured in a less effective form under the existing Finding if “publicity” was redefined to include “political action.”

6. If the new Finding includes clandestine radio broadcasting, we could commence operations on a limited scale six to eight months [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. At that time we probably could go on the air with programming in Uzbek. By the end of FY-84 we probably could also be broadcasting in the Russian language, the Baltic languages, and Ukrainian.

Attachment B

**Memorandum From the Chief of the International Activities Division,
Central Intelligence Agency, to Director of Central Intelligence Casey⁸**

Washington, April 20, 1983

SUBJECT

Finding With Expanded Authority for Soviet/East Europe CA Program

1. *ACTION REQUESTED*: It is requested that you approve the attached draft Finding and Scope Paper proposing an expansion of the Agency's Soviet/East Europe covert action program for formal external coordination and subsequent consideration by the National Security Planning Group. This draft Finding and Scope Paper have received informal approval by the Department of State.

2. *INITIATIVE*: At the time [*less than 1 line not declassified*] at the NSPG last fall and approved by the President on 4 November 1982, a broader and more comprehensive Soviet/East European covert action program was discussed. It was decided to wait until the NSC completed action on NSDD-75 concerning overall policy toward the Soviet Union. NSDD-75 was signed by the President on 17 January 1983.⁹ This proposed Finding specifies measures to be taken by CIA to support NSDD-75.

3. *POLICY*: Current U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union as set forth in NSDD-75 is to involve “external resistance to Soviet imperialism (and) internal pressure on the USSR to weaken the sources of Soviet imperialism. . . . To promote . . . the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic policy and economic system in which the power of the privileged ruling elite is gradually reduced Expose at all available fora the double standards employed by the Soviet Union in dealing with difficulties within its own domain and the outside world. . . . To loosen Moscow’s hold on (Eastern Europe) while promoting the cause of human rights in individual East European countries.”

Current U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe is set forth in NSDD-54, dated 2 September 1982,¹⁰ which states that “the primary long-term U.S. goal in Eastern Europe is to loosen the Soviet hold on the region and, thereby, facilitate its eventual integration into the European community of nations.”

4. *ISSUE FOR DECISION*: The extent and characteristics of an expansion of CIA’s covert action program toward the USSR and the Bloc.

5. *ACTION PROPOSAL*: The existing Soviet/EE CA programs are authorized in a series of Presidential Findings: the Soviet Union and Eastern European Section of the omnibus Finding of 7 June 1978, a separate Finding of 25 September 1980, an amplification of the 1978 Finding on 7 March 1979,¹¹ [*1½ lines not declassified*] these Findings limit Agency activities to the publication and distribution of literature and related publicity.

The new Finding will allow us to

—Initiate selected clandestine radio programming to the USSR and the Bloc, [*2½ lines not declassified*]

—Undertake a full range of propaganda and countermeasure operations against the Soviets at home and abroad [*1 line not declassified*]

—Initiate political action activities which will have impact in the USSR, [*1½ lines not declassified*]

We would continue and expand the existing program of literature production and distribution presently authorized to wider audiences in the USSR and the Bloc, [*2 lines not declassified*]. This program will be augmented under the new Finding.

6. *RISKS*: New operations undertaken in expansion of the existing program should not involve any particular increased risk to the U.S. Government or to the individuals concerned in the activities themselves. There has been a record of tolerance of this type of activity by allied governments in Europe, [*5½ lines not declassified*].

On the other hand, the Soviets will assume CIA or other Western intelligence services must be behind the initiation of clandestine radio broadcasting and any major hard-hitting program of propaganda and political action. The Soviets can be expected to take vigorous diplomatic action to influence foreign governments from whose territory clandestine broadcasts, for example, might be undertaken to close down such activity.

The Soviets may step up internal security measures and vigilance campaigns directed at new political action activities we may undertake. It is our understanding that the Department of State recognizes these risk factors, and wishes such activities undertaken, but with the

understanding that as specific problems in relations with the Soviet Union may be resolved, some of these activities might be suspended in the future. [*5 lines not declassified*]

7. *BACKGROUND*: For more than the past 25 years, the Agency has engaged in a covert action program against the Soviet Union and certain countries of Eastern Europe. The aim of this program since its inception has been to provide support and encouragement to reform-minded elements in those countries as a form of political pressure on the regime. This new Finding provides a response to current policy, which requests an expansion and broadening of our current efforts. Although we will proceed as rapidly as possible to implement the new Finding (as funds and additional staff personnel are made available), time will be needed to test and build up operational mechanisms and mount the new operations in a secure and professional manner. A few of the operations could be up to full strength action by early FY-84 if additional funding is made available promptly, while most of the program would not be up to full strength operation before the end of FY-84 or early in FY-85.

Discussions with the NSC Staff and the Department of State indicate that there should be two major aspects to our Soviet/East Europe covert action program: the carefully modulated soft-sell appeal for moderation of the Soviet system over the long haul aimed at the Russian and East European populations; and a harder hitting program aimed more at causing basic problems for the Soviet regime, although also having an impact on populations. We have advised State and the NSC that our covert action alone will not make significant impact on Soviet leaders if not accompanied by related overt policy and diplomatic actions. The present program of print media production and distribution along with the widening of this program to

additional national, ethnic, and special interest groups will accomplish State's first objective. The institution of operations involving clandestine radio broadcasting and the operation of political actions in the Soviet Union would contribute to State's second objective.

8. *COORDINATION*: The basic thrust of the Finding, the Scope Paper, and the general concept of the developmental operational program have been discussed with Mr. Walter Raymond of the NSC Staff and with Deputy Assistant Secretaries Palmer and Kux of the Department of State. Mr. Palmer has advised that the general aspects of the program have been discussed with Under Secretary Eagleburger and with the Secretary.

9. *FINDING*: The expanded program will require a Presidential Finding and report to the Congress pursuant to Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. A draft Finding and Scope Paper are attached. [12](#)

10. *FUNDING*: The total estimated FY 1983 cost of the ongoing and proposed Soviet/East Europe covert action programs is \$10,557,000. [7 lines not declassified]

The total estimated FY-1984 cost of the ongoing and proposed Soviet/East Europe covert action programs is \$17,361,000, [4½ lines not declassified].

The total estimated FY-1985 cost of the ongoing and proposed Soviet/East Europe covert action programs is \$18,750,000, [5½ lines not declassified].

*OPERATIONAL FUNDING SUMMARY
FOR TOTAL SOVIET/EE CA PROGRAM*

[4 rows and 4 columns of table not declassified]

TOTAL 10557K 17361K 18750K

11. [14 lines not declassified]

12. *STAFF POSITION*: This memorandum and the attached draft Finding and Scope Paper have been coordinated with the EXDIR, OGC, the Comptroller, and the DDI. Comments from D/SOVA AND D/EURA provided by the DDI are attached.¹³

[name not declassified]

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 85M00363R: Box 13, Folder: DCI Meetings with Secretary of State (Shultz), 7/15/1983. Secret; Sensitive. [text not declassified]. Forwarded through the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director for Operations.

² The April draft finding is attached but not printed. Also attached at Attachment B is a cover memorandum [text not declassified] to Casey explaining the need for expanding the covert action program, which is printed below. No final signed copy of the April finding has been found. [text not declassified] the Soviet/East Europe covert action program continued to operate under the 1978 finding (see [footnote 4](#), below).

³ No record of this meeting was found.

⁴ Reference is to the June 7, 1978, omnibus Presidential finding, which is in the National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Presidential Findings/MONs. The "Soviet Union and Eastern Europe" section of the omnibus finding contains the following description: "Publish and infiltrate literature into the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries and generate publicity to support and

encourage the citizens of these countries who favor liberalization and the moderation of their countries' foreign and domestic policies." For documentation on earlier implementation of the Soviet and East European covert action program, see [Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 162](#), [273](#), [280](#), [284](#), and [287](#); and [Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. XX, Eastern Europe, Documents 2](#), [3](#), [20](#), [28](#), and [32](#).

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears two typed signatures. [*name not declassified*] typed signature appears above the [*name not declassified*] typed signature.

⁶ Secret; Sensitive.

⁷ A budget chart is attached but not printed.

⁸ Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on April 19. Forwarded through the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director for Operations.

⁹ See [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 260](#).

¹⁰ Documentation on this NSDD is scheduled for publication in [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. X, Eastern Europe](#).

¹¹ On March 7, 1979, President Carter signed a finding to "amend" the worldwide section of the omnibus finding of June 7, 1978. In the worldwide section, "under the guidelines cleared with the Department of State," the President directed the CIA to "task or encourage the network of agents or other contacts in foreign countries to provide non-attributable propaganda, or related actions, not amounting however to separate major initiatives, in support of following U.S. foreign policy objectives." [*text not declassified*] (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Congressional Affairs, Job 81M01032R: Subject Committee Files (1943-1980), Box 9, Folder 25: Covert Action Pres Find World-Wide)

¹² Attached but not printed.

[13](#) Attached but not printed.

73. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 15, 1983, 8-9 a.m.

SUBJECT

Secretary's Meeting with Dobrynin, July 15

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

George P. Shultz, Secretary of State

USSR

Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador, Washington

The Secretary met for one hour with Ambassador Dobrynin on July 15 prior to the Ambassador's return to Moscow that day for summer leave. The session was businesslike throughout, focussing on the Madrid wrap-up and Shcharanskiy, but included discussion of U.S.-Soviet agenda across-the-board.

The Secretary led off the discussion by emphasizing the importance we attached to the Soviet commitments on human rights as part of the conclusion of the Madrid meeting. He particularly stressed the Shcharanskiy case, quoting the commitment the Soviets made to us (in Madrid) that he would be released from jail and allowed to leave the country shortly after January 1984. He also urged that they release Shcharanskiy on September 15 or earlier because of the latter's ill health. Having set the context, the Secretary informed him we intend to join the consensus at Madrid.

Dobrynin took these points without reacting and then gave the Secretary a long "oral statement" (translation attached). The statement predictably begins with arms

control and makes points supporting their freeze proposal, complaining about our negative reaction. Otherwise, it includes the following:

—On INF and START, the statement contains standard criticisms of our positions and calls on us to respond to their move to limit rather than ban ALCMs. But it also conveys their agreement to discuss our CBM ideas at Geneva in a special working group, an approach they had resisted until now.

—On MBFR, the Soviets agree to continue exploratory discussions with Ambassador Abramowitz in Vienna and state their willingness to consider further verification measures beyond what they have tabled. They are not, however, otherwise helpful on substance.

—On BMD, the statement turns aside our proposal to discuss ballistic missile defense on an official basis in START and the SCC, reaffirming the propagandistic Soviet proposal for open discussion among scientists.² At this point in the conversation, the Secretary told Dobrynin that he thought existing official channels were sufficient to discuss this issue. If necessary, of course, our delegations could be augmented by appropriate scientists, but a confidential official setting was necessary. The Secretary and Dobrynin concluded by urging each other to reconsider positions.

—On bilateral issues, Dobrynin stated Soviet agreement to hold negotiations in Washington on the opening of Consulates General in Kiev and New York and on a new cultural exchange agreement. He also gave consent to extension of the transportation and atomic energy agreements. The cultural agreement portion does, however, lay down a marker on the defection issue, and appears to

represent return to a position that we believed was becoming more flexible; however, the test will come in the negotiations. To Dobrynin's query as to whether we were thinking in terms of a more narrowly-defined cultural agreement, the Secretary responded that we are prepared to have a broader agreement similar to the last one.

There was some talk on how the talks on the two agreements would proceed. Dobrynin said he was instructed to conduct the discussions in Washington with participants coming from Moscow, but it was left to Burt and Sokolov to work this out.

Dobrynin also asked about the Secretary's plans at the UNGA this year. When the Secretary said he thought his participation would be much the same as last year, Dobrynin responded that Gromyko's plans would also be similar to the past. (We take this comment as indication that Andropov does not plan to come to the UNGA.)

The possibility of a Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Madrid was also discussed, but in non-committal terms. Dobrynin noted that Gromyko was planning to begin his vacation on July 25. The Secretary commented that we were not pushing for a Foreign Ministers' meeting to conclude Madrid, but that we would look at the issue as it arose.

Summit prospects were also discussed briefly. Both agreed that a summit is desirable in principle but that it should be well prepared and offer a good prospect of substantive results.

In conclusion, the Secretary emphasized once again that although arms control is important to us, as it is to the Soviets, Soviet conduct on regional issues has caused tremendous damage to the relationship in the past, and no

issue is more central than human rights. The Secretary noted that we welcome progress on the Pentecostals, but reiterated once again that progress is necessary on Shcharanskiy. In general, he stressed that we have to address the issues before us across-the-board if we wish to get anywhere. Dobrynin did not disagree.

Attachment

Soviet Oral Statement³

July 15, 1983

Soviet Oral Statement of July 15, 1983 Translated from the Russian

1. It has been noted in Moscow that the Secretary of State in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador spoke of the wish of the U.S. leadership to see Soviet-American relations somewhat more improved.

As is known, we, for our part, have already expressed the view as to the basis on which Soviet-American relations can and should be built, if one is guided by the goal of their improvement, which would undoubtedly be of great significance both in itself and from the standpoint of the positive impact it would have on the entire international situation.

Unfortunately, frankly speaking, we see no signs of readiness on the part of the U.S. to move jointly in this direction and to introduce substantive corrective changes into its policy with regard to the Soviet Union. In fact, the Secretary of State himself did not deny that we may have reasons to draw such a conclusion.

Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that it would be possible realistically to count on the normalization of Soviet-American relations in the absence of a mutual desire to seek points of contiguity or to take into account one another's interests on the central issues determining the nature of those relations and, above all, on questions concerning the security interests of our two countries—in other words, questions of war and peace.

But it is precisely in searching for a common language on questions of safeguarding and consolidating peace and strengthening international security that lies the key both to the rectification of the abnormal situation that has developed in our relations and to the improvement of the general political atmosphere in the world.

In this connection we would like to draw attention, in particular, to the necessity in the present situation—as has been emphasized at the recent meeting in Moscow of the leaders of a number of Socialist countries⁴ —of taking immediate steps capable of pushing back the danger of war and turning the course of world events in the direction of detente, toward healthier relations among states.

Guided by these objectives, the Soviet Union has put forward a program of far-reaching measures aimed at putting an end to the perilous development of events and ensuring a decisive turn for the better in the international situation. It would seem there is no need to enumerate all of those measures once again. They are well known. We would like only to recall our recent proposal that all the nuclear powers freeze their nuclear arsenals.

It is regrettable that the U.S. side hastened to express a negative reaction to this proposal. The arguments advanced in this regard can in no way be considered

convincing. Such a position can only reinforce the view that the U.S. is not interested in taking practical steps to curb the nuclear arms race.

We would like to hope that the American side will consider this question further. A positive answer to the nuclear arms freeze proposal would demonstrate U.S. readiness, together with the Soviet Union, to set a good example in the cause of peace.

2. Of great importance, without a doubt, are the negotiations now being conducted between our two countries on nuclear arms. The state of affairs taking shape at the Geneva negotiations on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe is, to be frank, totally unsatisfactory.

If one asks the question what the reasons are, there can only be one and the same answer: the explanation lies in the absolutely unconstructive position of the American side, one that is, indeed, totally divorced from reality.

It is impossible, after all, seriously to count on reaching agreement when the objective of the negotiations is posed not as the reduction of European nuclear arms, but as the deployment in Europe of new American missiles, whose numbers we are called upon now to discuss. Such an approach can in no way be regarded as constructive.

We would also like to express the hope that the American leadership will once again weigh from all angles all the consequences of such a course.

3. What is also taking place in Geneva at the negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms looks no better. Here too there is no evidence whatsoever of a desire on the part of the U.S. side to seek mutually acceptable solutions.

References to the fact that some flexibility has appeared in the U.S. position are not substantiated by reality. All this "flexibility" is designed to achieve the same purpose: to destroy the existing structure of the Soviet strategic forces while leaving the U.S. a free hand to build up its own nuclear arms.

Of course, we will not accept this, and no prospect of reaching agreement on the problem of strategic arms will emerge, until the U.S. approach to this problem is brought into line with the principle of equality and equal security.

For our part we have proposed solutions which do not prejudice anyone's security. Guided by a desire to seek mutually acceptable outcomes on specific issues, the Soviet side has taken a substantial step to meet the U.S. position: it expressed readiness to agree not to a total ban on air-launched cruise missiles but to their limitation to a specified level in the context of the resolution of other questions. So far, no adequate reciprocal step on the part of the American side has followed.

As to the confidence-building measures being discussed in Geneva, we remain convinced that such measures should be an integral part of the general agreement on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms. Proceeding on this basis and taking into account the expressed readiness of the U.S. side to consider not only its own confidence measures but also the ones proposed by the Soviet side, we do not object to continuing the discussion of such measures at the Geneva negotiations, including in a special working group.

Overall, we would like to hope that the U.S. government will weigh carefully the situation that now obtains, and that it will take steps which would open up the possibilities for

reaching a mutually acceptable agreement on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms. It is our deep conviction that the U.S. should be interested in this no less than the Soviet Union.

4. We are bewildered by the reaction of the U.S. side to our proposal concerning a discussion of the consequences of the creation of a large-scale ABM system.

The U.S. idea of creating a comprehensive ABM system not only is in direct contradiction with the 1972 treaty of unlimited duration between the USSR and the U.S. on the renunciation of wide-area ABM systems, but also does not correspond to the aims of the current negotiations on strategic arms. The creation of such a system would, in effect, result in discarding the very principle on which negotiations on strategic arms—both offensive and defensive—have thus far been based.

The rationale for our proposal to convene a meeting of authoritative scientists of our two countries is to form a clearer perception of the nature and scale of the consequences for the entire strategic situation that could result from the development of a comprehensive ABM system. The American side alters the subject of the exchange of views that we are proposing: it, in essence, proposes to give the discussions such a form and content as if the advisability of developing comprehensive ABM systems were a given, and as if the only thing to do were to discuss practical questions connected with it.

We can in no way agree with such an approach. And we confirm our proposal that Soviet and American scientists meet and assess in an authoritative way a problem which, in the long run, could have very serious and dangerous consequences.

5. On the part of the American side there appears to be a readiness to make an effort to overcome the impasse at the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, and to forego the fruitless data discussion. Such an intention would be welcome. However, an examination of those preconditions which are set forth and the way the verification issue is posed does not confirm such a conclusion. In this case, too, the negotiations would be deadlocked, albeit by a different method.

The socialist countries have recently put forward at the Vienna negotiations a draft agreement designed to bring those obviously protracted negotiations to a speedy and successful conclusion. This draft also provides for verification measures corresponding to the task posed and adequate to the scale of the reductions. In this regard, we do not rule out the possibility of also considering certain additional measures, if the need arises for them in the process of practical reductions. What is necessary, however, is that the verification measures not be an end in themselves, inasmuch as the purpose of the negotiations is different.

If the American side is actually prepared to conduct constructive discussions, the head of the Soviet delegation in Vienna will be ready to listen to the considerations of the U.S. representative.

6. Concerning the Madrid meeting: We are working actively and constructively in favor of its successful conclusion. It is also from this perspective that we approach the well-known initiative of the government of Spain. The Soviet delegation in Madrid is maintaining appropriate contacts with the U.S. delegation. What is important is that no new and fresh obstacles be raised to a positive conclusion to this meeting.

7. On the set of questions on bilateral relations, our position was presented concretely and thoroughly in February to the Secretary of State.⁵ At that time and subsequently, the U.S. side on more than one occasion confirmed that it owed us an answer. Since the June 18 conversation between the Secretary of State and the Soviet Ambassador touched upon only some of those questions, we proceed on the assumption that the American side is continuing to consider the views that we have expressed.

In regard to what was said by the Secretary of State in that conversation, we would like, first of all, to stress the need not to mix questions of mutual interest with questions concerning only one side—let alone those strictly in its own internal competence. It is simply not proper to raise such questions.

With respect to the few specific proposals made by the Secretary of State, we would like to say the following.

a) We have no objections to the extension of the agreements on cooperation in the field of transportation as well as on peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

b) Taking into account the readiness of the U.S. side to do so, we agree to hold negotiations on the opening of Consulates General in New York and Kiev.

c) In principle, we have no objections to holding negotiations on the conclusion of a new agreement on exchanges in the field of culture. However, it is not clear what is meant here by the U.S. side, since the previously existing agreement dealt with contacts, exchanges and cooperation not only in the cultural area, but also in a number of other fields. In any case the conclusion of such an agreement—and it is important that the American side

know this beforehand—can be considered possible only given readiness on the part of the U.S. to provide official guarantees of security for Soviet participants in such exchanges.

Second Soviet Oral Statement, July 15, 1983

As to the practical discussion of the questions of Consulates General and a cultural exchanges agreement, the Soviet Embassy in Washington has been instructed to conduct such a discussion with the participation, as necessary, of appropriate representatives from Moscow.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, July 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt; cleared by Seitz. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. Shultz summarized the meeting in a memorandum to the President on July 15. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (07/08/83–07/19/83)) On July 22 in a covering memorandum to Seitz requesting approval of this memorandum of conversation, McKinley wrote: "The second question is tricky. Rick Burt wants to send to the members of the START IG the pertinent extract of the Dobrynin conversation, as well as the START portion of the 'oral statement.' The START IG will appreciate this gesture. It could head off disputes and disagreements. It also makes Burt look good. On balance, however, I would recommend against letting the memo go. Despite the fact that Rowny has the START related portion of the conversation already by cable, we have in the past gotten away with not circulating Dobrynin memcons in Washington. This partial break with that precedent could whet the appetites of other agencies for full disclosure or lead to charges that we were

manipulating information. Please give me your guidance.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, July 1983)

² On April 27, telegram 5443 from Moscow April 27, reported: “The Soviet Academy of Sciences announced today the convening of a public meeting of scientists on May 17–19 to discuss nuclear weapons issues. The main purpose of this propaganda ploy appears to be to attack new U.S. strategic programs, particularly ballistic missile defense (BMD). In this connection, IMEMO’s Oleg Bykov tells us that Andropov’s proposal for U.S. and Soviet scientists to discuss BMD envisages participation by ‘official’ U.S. scientists; unofficial U.S. scientists, he said already agree that large-scale BMD is technologically infeasible.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830248–0954)

³ Secret; Sensitive.

⁴ See [footnote 8, Document 71](#).

⁵ See [Document 11](#).

74. Memorandum From Paula Dobriansky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, July 21, 1983

SUBJECT

USG Posture on Pentecostals

On July 18, the second of the two Pentecostal families, the Chmykhalovs, arrived in Vienna. State has forwarded you a memorandum (Tab I)² pointing out that during the coming weeks we should expect heightened press interest in the role of the U.S. Government in the families' departure from the Soviet Union and recommending that the USG continue to maintain a low profile.

Our recent efforts on the Pentecostals behalf have been based on unpublicized diplomatic contacts.³ We have indicated to the Soviets that we would not exploit the release of the Pentecostals for political purposes. Hence, any significant departure from this policy of downplaying the USG role would be viewed as a breach of our promise and could endanger our current efforts on behalf of Shcharansky and other prominent figures. It also would contradict the President's expressed desire to maintain a low profile on such human rights cases.

For these reasons, State believes (and I agree) that the USG should confine its remarks to expressions of satisfaction that the families have succeeded in emigrating. They suggest that we should not provide the media with details on the exchanges which led to their departure from

the USSR and should deflect any requests by the families to meet with the President or other major Administration figures. At Tab II is suggested press guidance. At Tab III is a memorandum from Kimmitt to Hill concurring with State's press guidelines.⁴

John Lenczowski, Jack Matlock and Bob Sims concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the press guidance provided by State at Tab II, thereby authorizing the Kimmitt to Hill memorandum at Tab III.⁵

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (07/20/83). Secret. Sent for action. Lenczowski, Matlock, and Sims initialed their concurrence.

² Attached but not printed.

³ See [Document 46](#).

⁴ Tabs II and III are not attached to this memorandum and were not found.

⁵ Poindexter initialed his approval.

75. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, August 3, 1983

SUBJECT

Soviet Response on Shcharanskiy

Soviet Chargé Sokolov called me today in response to Larry's and my comments to him on Shcharanskiy on the fringes of your July 29 meeting.² Sokolov read the following statement:

“Our position on the matter, which is totally in the internal competence of the Soviet state, has been stated to the U.S. side more than once, including to the Secretary of State personally. That position remains unchanged.”

I pressed Sokolov hard to state just what their position is. Sokolov refused to restate it, but he did refer to your meeting with Dobrynin on July 15.³ As you know, our record of that meeting shows no response by Dobrynin to your points on Shcharanskiy.

We are not sure how to read this response. It may mean:

- 1) The Soviets do not want this sensitive subject discussed outside the KGB channels. An innocuous response keeps their paper trail essentially clean;
- 2) The message is merely a stall and does not convey either a positive or negative signal at this point;

3) They believe that Shcharanskiy has yet to fulfill their conditions for the agreement (i.e. his refusal to sign an appeal for early release on health grounds); or

4) It is a polite brushoff.

You should also be aware that our discussions with the Poles on a Zacharski/Shcharanskiy deal have been a dry well thus far.⁴

We will soon have another chance to test the Soviet response. Max is due to meet with Kondrashev on August 25, and he will raise the Shcharanskiy issue then.⁵ The response then may clear up whether or not the Soviets have qualms over a discussion of the deal in formal diplomatic channels (You will recall in this regard that Kondrashev told Max “It so happens that it is in our interest to allow certain people to depart. If it happens that these are the same names brought to our attention by the U.S., this is purely coincidental. We will deny any deal.”)

We have now made our position and that of the President on Shcharanskiy unmistakably clear for Soviet policymakers. At this point, I believe we should wait to see what comes of Max’s talk.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive August 1–15 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons and Palmer. Hill’s handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on August 3.

² In a July 29 memorandum to Reagan, Shultz wrote: “I called in the Soviet Chargé today to deliver demarches on

two serious arms control compliance issues,” and that “at the conclusion of the meeting Larry Eagleburger pressed Sokolov once again on Shcharanskiy.” Shultz wrote: “On Shcharanskiy, Larry Eagleburger noted that we had not received a response to the points I had raised with Dobrynin on July 15. He told Sokolov that you [Reagan] have taken a personal interest in this matter, and have requested that we convey on your behalf to Andropov our expectation that Shcharanskiy’s release will go forward as discussed with Ambassador Kampelman in Madrid. [See [footnote 2, Document 104.](#)] Larry added that there was a new element in the case with the recent appeal by Shcharanskiy’s mother that he be released now due to his declining health. He told Sokolov that we were prepared to make a humanitarian gesture of our own, and to do so now. He urged Moscow to do so as well. Sokolov said he would have to stand on what the Soviets have said previously on Shcharanskiy, but would pass our latest message to Moscow.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (07/23/83-07/29/83))

³ See [Document 73.](#)

⁴ On June 29, 1981, Marian W. Zacharski was arrested by the FBI in California on espionage charges. Zacharski was a Polish citizen, working in the United States for the Polish American Machinery Company.

⁵ Kampelman and Kondrashev were scheduled to meet at the CSCE meetings in Madrid.

76. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, August 4, 1983

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Grain Agreement

A number of press accounts have treated the signing of the new grain agreement as a concession by Moscow.² While the negotiations did go very smoothly, we believe this interpretation is mistaken and will put us on the wrong footing, both domestically and in our continuing dialogue with the Soviets.

Two kinds of evidence suggest that the Soviet readiness to raise the LTA's purchase floor was not a political signal: first, the state of the international grain market; second, unfolding Soviet needs.

—In the world market, US stocks have become a much-larger factor in the past several years and now exceed 60% of world supplies. Without returning to near-exclusive purchases from the US, the Soviets may well also want to avoid buying too *small* a share of their imports from us. (The old floor—6 million tons—was barely 15% of the 35-40 million ton annual average of total Soviet grain imports over the past 4 years.) Driving down the US share only increases the leverage of other suppliers, with most of whom the Soviets will also be renegotiating their LTA's during the next several years. Finally, Soviet buyers have expressed concern that our PIK program will reduce American grain output; if this was in fact their worry, a higher floor in the US-Soviet LTA would serve the Soviet

interest by encouraging US production and thereby helping to keep the world market glutted.

—A glutted market, always valuable to the world's largest grain importer, is probably of *increasing* importance to the Soviet leadership now, for the level of imports has extremely sensitive political implications. With the reduction in Soviet grain imports in 1982 came a measurable drop in per capita consumption of meat and dairy products; particularly during a succession, this is a potentially dangerous course, as food riots in the past few years have made all too obvious. And in fact the most recent information we have suggests that the drop in food supplies for consumers is now being turned around; if the leadership has made a decision that these should continue to increase, the Soviets are almost certainly going to have to increase grain imports as well.

None of this is an argument for trying to use grain sales for political leverage against the Soviets; we have been down that road already. But on balance the evidence suggests that the Soviet stake in imports is still larger than ours; moreover, it reflects one of their most severe systemic weaknesses.

In this light, it would be especially unfortunate if it appeared that the Soviets had sent us a signal that we were now obliged to reciprocate. We need, especially in the coming period, to avoid giving undue weight and attention to Soviet gestures on the minor parts of the agenda, and even more to avoid imagining concessions where none have been made. Our credibility both at home and in Moscow will depend on this. *The Soviet decision was almost certainly made on economic grounds, as was ours.* Our policy interest is best served by keeping the issue in this perspective.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 8/1-15/83. Confidential. Drafted by Sestanovich; cleared by Azrael and Boeker. An unknown hand initialed for Sestanovich, Azrael, and Boeker.

² On July 28 in Vienna, the United States and Soviet Union reached agreement on a new long-term grain agreement to commence on October 1. "Under its terms, the USSR will purchase from the United States 9 million metric tons of grain annually, in approximately equal quantities of wheat and corn." (Telegram 212275 to all OECD capitals, July 28; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830431-0073) In telegram 10884 from Moscow, August 26, the Embassy reported on Secretary of Agriculture John Block's trip to Moscow and the signing of the agreement on August 25. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830492-0760)

77. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, August 4, 1983

BRIEFING ON THE SOVIET UNION

DATE AND TIME: Friday, August 5, 1:30 p.m.

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

I. *PURPOSE*: To provide a briefing on the Soviet Union—Soviet views, intentions and policies.²

II. *BACKGROUND*: U.S.-Soviet relations are presently at a low ebb. Ongoing arms control negotiations have failed thus far in finding common conceptual ground. The Soviets also have not displayed any signs of moderation on such regional issues as Afghanistan or the Middle East. At the same time, considerable domestic and Allied pressures for enhanced dialogue and summitry are building.

In view of the current situation, a briefing has been scheduled to provide you with a comprehensive review of Soviet views of the current international situation and prospective developments, as well as Soviet intentions and policies. Specifically, the briefing will cover: 1) the nature of the Soviet system and underlying determinants of Soviet behavior, 2) leadership psychology, 3) Soviet threat assessment/view of Soviet international position, and 4) the Soviet foreign policy agenda and its implications for future U.S. decisions. Given the crucial upcoming decisions on our policies toward the Soviet Union that lie ahead, the briefing will provide an informative backgrounder which will be

useful in devising effective responses to the Soviet challenge.

III. *PARTICIPANTS:*

The President

The Vice President

Secretary of State Shultz

Secretary of Defense Weinberger

Director of Central Intelligence Casey

William P. Clark, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Jack F. Matlock, NSC

Paula Dobriansky, NSC

John Lenczowski, NSC

IV. *PRESS PLAN:* Not applicable.

V. *SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:*

1. Briefing (30 minutes)

2. Qs and As (30 minutes)

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff³

Washington, undated

BRIEFING OUTLINE

I. INTRODUCTION

An attempt to describe how the Soviet leaders view the world and the implications of this for U.S.-Soviet relations. There is often a tendency to assume that the Soviets view the world as we would if we were sitting in Moscow. This is emphatically not the case, and today we shall try to explain some of the more important characteristics of Soviet thinking. John Lenczowski will discuss the nature of the Soviet system, Paula Dobriansky will take a look at how the Soviets view their international position and assess the threats to it, and Jack Matlock will describe the psychology of the Soviet leaders and discuss some implications for U.S. policy.

II. NATURE OF SOVIET SYSTEM, FOREIGN POLICY DETERMINANTS AND STRATEGY (Lenczowski) The USSR as a Communist Power

A. Distinction between a communist power and a traditional imperialist great power: limited versus necessarily unlimited objectives.

B. Various influences encourage us to believe that USSR is no longer communist:

1. Wishful thinking.
2. Mirror imaging.
3. Soviet disinformation.

C. Inescapable fact: USSR must be communist because of the role of ideology in the system.

1. Ideology as source of legitimacy.
2. Ideology as key to internal security system: Emperor's New Clothes.
3. A key index that this is so is to observe that ideology defines basic structure of society.

D. Ideology and Foreign Policy.

1. Ideology serves as frame of reference to view the world.
2. Ideology defines international reality as struggle between two social systems: capitalism and socialism, a struggle inevitably to be won by socialism.
3. Therefore ideology determines friends and enemies—it sets an international standard of behavior.
4. Ideology presents a discrete set of strategies and tactics of revolutionary behavior.
5. Ideology sets a standard of measurement of correlation of forces: strategic decisions to advance or retreat are made on the basis of "scientific" assessments of the correlation of forces. Ideological strength or weakness is the key criterion.
6. Ideology serves as a weapon of political influence: an instrument of subversion and deception.
7. Foreign ideologies (and therefore any competing version of the truth) are the principal threats to the Soviet system.

A. Because USSR is prisoner of the ideology, its lies, and its predictions, it is compelled to try to fulfill those predictions. This means:

1. Creating false appearances—therefore a strategy of deception.
2. Creating new realities, by exporting revolution.

B. The principal means of Soviet expansionism is “ideological struggle”.

1. To win men’s minds.
2. To deceive those who cannot be won.
3. Therefore propaganda, subversion and disinformation are the key features of Soviet foreign policy.
4. Suppression of the truth is the ultimate objective—self-censorship by Soviet adversaries is prelude to political uniformity.
5. A principal effort: to define the acceptable vocabulary of international political debate—both words and issues.

C. Military power is the principal adjunct to this.

1. It can forcibly create the new reality.
2. It can serve to intimidate and accelerate the process of ideological subversion.

D. Struggle between two systems as a protracted conflict.

1. Soviet control over the time frame of the conflict enables them to control timing of attack and choice of battlefield while permitting possibility of strategic retreat.

2. Proper understanding of time permits strategy of attrition—nibble at edges of Free World, never risk final showdown.

3. Strategy of indirect attack:

—A deceptive means of escaping culpability.

—Use of proxies, front groups, agents of influence, etc.

4. Strategy of monopoly of offensive.

5. Strategy of psychological conditioning:

—War-zone, peace zone.

—Demarcation of scrimmage line.

—Soviets have conditioned us to believe that peace zone is inviolable but war zone is not.

—Therefore Soviets have developed a no-lose strategy: they have nothing to lose by continually trying to cross the scrimmage line.

III. SOVIET THREAT ASSESSMENT: THREATS, OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES (Dobriansky) A. *Zero-sum mentality*: The U.S. poses the greatest threat to Soviet security as it is the main obstacle to the achievement of Soviet geo-political objectives. Ergo, Soviet foreign policy is generally designed to reduce and curtail the U.S. geo-

political position. Moscow evaluates all international situations from one perspective—whether they would detract or enhance the Soviet position vis-a-vis that of the U.S.

B. Soviet conception of a threat: In contrast to the Western conception of a threat—an action which might undermine one's existing position—the Soviet definition also includes any actions which might frustrate potential Soviet gains. As the Soviets strive for absolute security, any attempts to upset the current balance or Soviet gains are perceived by Moscow as a threat. There are two underlying reasons: (1) Soviet penchant for expansionism to solve security problems (2) Existence of democratic societies poses constant threat to domestic Soviet stability by providing an example of an alternative social and political entity. Public and private Soviet complaints indicate that U.S. ideological offensive is taken seriously and regarded as an important threat.

C. Role of military power in foreign policy: Soviet leaders regard military strength as the foundation of the USSR's status as a global superpower and as the most critical factor underlying successful Soviet foreign policy. Yet, concern about the danger of nuclear war has been a serious consideration in Soviet foreign policy decisions. Essentially, the nature of the Soviet dilemma has been how to wage a successful expansionist foreign policy without unduly increasing the risk of a nuclear war.

Soviet Assessment of Current International Environment/Projected Trends A. U.S.: Despite domestic opposition, budgetary pressures and Intra-Alliance tensions, the Soviets expect that the U.S. is likely to sustain

its present foreign and defense policies (i.e., MX, INF, etc.) which seek to curtail Soviet expansionism.

B. *Western Europe:* Despite Intra-Alliance tensions, the peace movement, etc., the Soviets do not realistically expect a break up of NATO, and believe that Western European governments would continue to follow (by and large) the U.S. lead on major security issues.

C. *Third World:* Soviets anticipate acceleration of the process of disintegration, anarchy triggered by economic stagnation, border and resource disputes and the lack of stable political organizations. They anticipate many Third World crises which will present both opportunities and threats to Soviet security. Soviet concern is that a newly assertive U.S. bent on stemming Soviet expansionism would intervene in a future Third World conflict.

Regional Geographic Assessments: Threats/Opportunities (Countries are listed in order of priority from Soviet perspective) A. *Eastern Europe: Only area which offers no opportunities, only potential threats;* B. *Western Europe: European military capability is minimal threat in short term, but with U.S. support it is a significant military threat. Substantial ideological/political threat, moderate opportunities.*

C. *Asia:* High threat/high opportunity; East Asia—China, Japan, Korea—growing security threat; main option—containment; Southeast/Southwest Asia—opportunities, of immense strategic value.

D. *Middle East:* Moderate Threat/Moderate Opportunity; do not anticipate dramatic successes.

E. *Africa*: Low risk/low threat/moderate opportunities; no dramatic successes; recognition of gains and losses.

F. *Central America*: High risk/low threat/high opportunities; creation of strategic diversion—tying up U.S. resources, distracting U.S. attention from other critical areas, generating U.S. domestic cleavages.

IV. PSYCHOLOGY OF SOVIET LEADERS (Matlock) A. *Some widespread characteristics*

—Communist ideology, Russian traditions and the imperatives of ruling a highly bureaucratized, multinational empire are fused in the thinking of the leadership.

—The legitimacy of the rulers rests entirely on the ideology; they must cling to it even if they do not fully believe it.

—Their first priority is preserving their system; their second is expanding their power, so long as it does not conflict with the first.

—Legitimacy and status are extremely important to them and comprise an important foreign policy objective. This contributes to an acute sense of saving face.

—Their attitude is fundamentally totalitarian: citizens are viewed as property of the state, allies as puppets (or else they are not really allies).

—They take a long-term view and do not accept defeats as permanent. A defeat in one area is viewed

as a challenge to find other means to achieve the same objective.

—They are persistent bargainers, adept at exploiting time pressures on the other side, but willing to strike deals rapidly if they feel compelled to.

—They are often prisoners of their own ideological proclivities and thus misjudge the effect of their actions on others.

—They are much more preoccupied with the United States than we are with them.

B. Soviet view of Reagan Administration

—Soviets cautiously welcomed the President's election because they were fed up with Carter and thought a Republican president might return to the Nixon-Ford policies.

—When they realized in early 1981 that there would be no return to "detente," they played with the idea of "waiting out" the Reagan Administration, in the hope that it would only last four years.

—They have been surprised and impressed by the President's ability to get his defense programs through, keep unity in the alliance, and get the economy moving again. At the same time, they have experienced a series of foreign policy defeats and growing economic difficulties at home.

—There are signs now that they are reassessing their foreign policy. They *may* feel overextended, and in need of some reduction of tension to allow more attention to domestic problems. They seem convinced

that the President is likely to be reelected, and if so must be asking themselves whether it might not be better to deal with him before rather than after his reelection.

—Given their preoccupation with U.S.-Soviet relations, they may well exaggerate the political benefits to the President in dealing with them. This could lead them to overplay their hand.

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY

A. The struggle is long-term. There are no quick fixes. This means that we must devise a strategy which can be sustained for a decade or, probably, more.

B. Two broad options in theory:

1. Unrelenting pressure on the Soviets; and
2. Negotiation of specific differences on basis of strength, with follow-up to keep gains permanent rather than temporary.

Only the second seems sustainable in a democratic society, but it requires a recognition that agreements are only stages in the struggle, not the end of it.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, Presidential Briefing [1983–1984]. Secret. Prepared by Dobriansky. Copies were sent to Bush, Meese, Baker, and Deaver. Reagan initialed at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² According to the President's Daily Diary, the briefing took place on August 5 from 1:38 p.m. to 2:45 p.m. (Reagan

Library, President's Daily Diary) No minutes or summary was found. Reagan's diary entry for August 5 merely notes: "In-depth briefing in 'Situation Room' on Soviet U." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 255) ³ Confidential.

78. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, August 10, 1983

SUBJECT

Speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations

In the memorandum attached at Tab A to the President, Secretary Shultz suggests that the appended speech on U.S.-Soviet relations be delivered by either the President or himself in the near future.² The Secretary's apparent rationale for this speech is that it would help gain public support for the Administration's policy toward the USSR and might profitably set the stage for his upcoming meetings with Gromyko or for the impending INF deployments. Since he is not clear on either the timing or the precise context of events in which the speech would be given, the implication he seems to be making is that the contents of this particular draft so skillfully present the Administration's not-easily-reconcilable objectives of resistance to Soviet expansionism and intensified dialogue that the speech is worth making for purposes of general public support.

The Secretary does have a point. His Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony on our Soviet policy was reported in considerably divergent ways by the press.³ The *Washington Post* described it as outlining a policy of "opposition" to the USSR. The *New York Times* described it as focusing on "dialogue" with the Soviets. Other commentators described it as a mixed bag. In other words,

there is a strong case to be made to explain more clearly that the President not only wants to restore our strength and meet Soviet challenges, but is prepared to engage in genuine good-faith negotiations with them and explore avenues to secure a more peaceful, stable relationship.

My only problem with the message outlined in this draft is that it embodies some of the very inconsistencies detected by the press in the SFRC testimony. The first third of the speech describes the history of disappointments in U.S. dealings with Moscow and states that we have no illusions that Moscow will readily abandon its aggressive course. But the last part of the speech entertains precisely some of those illusions. What is the public to understand by such passages as this on page 12: "If we could eliminate some of the most important points of conflict, it would prove much easier to solve the remaining problems that divide us. On this basis we could begin to develop a relationship of very broad mutual benefit indeed."? Is this not the very kind of illusion and wishful thinking that has yielded us so many of the disappointments of the past? And do not such illusions erode our efforts to secure an adequate defense budget, not to mention public support for our efforts to resist communism in Central America?

I recognize that it is not an easy political task to resist the Soviets while simultaneously trying to negotiate with them and play the role of peacemaker. Perhaps if this draft were fixed up a bit it could help explain the complexities of our policy. Even as it stands, I think it makes a better explanation than the SFRC testimony did. Nevertheless, I think an undiluted message of "peace through strength" will be much more comprehensible to the public and capable of winning its support than the message in this draft.

Because the specific context for the speech has not been specified, I believe (as does Jack Matlock) that to decide on its tone and perhaps even its timing may be premature. A good case can be made that we should wait and see how the first Shultz-Gromyko meeting turns out and perhaps even how the INF situation develops in the early fall before we decide on the formal contents of the speech.

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President forwarding Secretary Shultz's memorandum and recommending that the three of you discuss a strategy for the speech.⁴

Fortier, Kraemer, Raymond, Sims and Sommer concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.⁵

Tab A

Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan⁶

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations

I believe that the attached draft speech⁷ on U.S.-Soviet relations contains an important message to the Soviets and would be effective in shaping European and American public opinion on East-West issues. In my opinion it manages to reconcile three key objectives that are not always easily combined:

—to provide a hard-hitting description of the character of the Soviet system and the disappointing experience of U.S.-Soviet relations;

—to highlight the post-Brezhnev succession as a possible (though not probable) turning point and to encourage a Soviet policy reassessment; and

—to emphasize U.S. negotiating flexibility as well as firmness.

The structure and tone are designed to convey a clear sense of political realism and moral purpose, while dispelling any suspicion of zealotry or intransigence. It thus continues and extends the strategic approach you approved for my SFRC testimony on U.S.-Soviet relations in June.

To maximize the anticipated benefits of the speech, I strongly recommend that you yourself deliver it on an appropriate occasion in the near future. There are several possibilities. I will be meeting with Gromyko in Madrid in early September, and the speech could be a useful scene-setter for these discussions, or for discussions with him later in the month at the UNGA. Alternatively, giving it in October might maximize its impact on domestic and allied opinion as the date of INF deployments approached. If you prefer, I could arrange to deliver the speech myself.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (08/05/83–08/09/83). Confidential. Sent for action. Fortier, Kraemer, Raymond, Sims, and Sommer concurred with this memorandum. Lenczowski initialed for Fortier, Kraemer, and Sims.

² The memorandum at Tab A is attached and printed below.
The draft of the speech was not found.

³ See [Document 61](#).

⁴ See [Document 80](#).

⁵ Clark checked the Approve option.

⁶ Confidential.

⁷ See [footnote 2, above](#).

79. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, August 18, 1983, 2058Z

10508. Subject: CODEL Pell Discussion With Andropov.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary. During an hour and three-quarter discussion with nine Democratic senators led by Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI), Andropov launched a Soviet anti-satellite initiative and engaged in unprecedented back and forth exchanges on most of the major US-Soviet issues. On ASAT, Andropov told the group that it was the first to be told the Soviet decision not to be the first country to launch into outer space any types of ASAT weapons; Andropov said that the Soviet Union would initiate a unilateral moratorium for as long as others, including the U.S., refrained from launching ASAT weapons of any kind. Andropov's prepared remarks on INF and START were along familiar lines. On INF, he chose to downplay and generalize the threat of retaliation to U.S. deployment: He said that deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles would have consequences "for us and for you" and that Americans would feel the difference between the situation before and the situation after deployment. The Soviet leader laid great stress on the freeze. On Central America, he said that things would not be solved by threat of arms, "arrogant military demonstrations", or interference in internal affairs. Following Andropov's prepared statement, Senator Pell read a statement summing up the views of his group (full text septel).² The Pell statement proposed, inter alia, greater political and military contacts between the two

countries, a U.S.-Soviet summit, and the consolidation of the START and INF negotiations. Senator Pell also expressed on behalf of his delegation concern about the Soviet military buildup; Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Poland, Southeast Asia, Africa, Central America; and concern regarding Soviet human rights performance, naming Sakharov, Wallenberg, Orlov and Shcharansky. The last half of the meeting was a give and take in which Andropov, with animation and sometimes heat, responded to the Senators. Pushed by Senator Pell on whether the Soviet Union was prepared to dismantle its ASAT systems, he bobbed, weaved, and finally changed the subject. Andropov gave a somewhat rambling response to the group's proposal for the summit. He said that the Reagan administration had put forward proposals on CBMs which boiled down to a discussion of the Hot Line and wondered how the two Presidents could sit down and talk about such minor things. He said that, until the Soviet Union is convinced that the U.S. is ready to discuss substantive, important issues, the summit would be meaningless. On Southern Africa, Andropov said that not a single Soviet soldier was, is, or would be in Angola. On Poland, he said that nobody had been able to discover any Soviet influence on the situation, including American representatives who have visited Poland and the Pope who—though not an American representative—acted like one. On Afghanistan, he said the Soviet position was unchanged, then challenged the U.S. to get out of Nicaragua and the French to get out of Chad and “then we’ll talk about Afghanistan.” Andropov took a tough position on human rights, specifically addressing the names Senator Pell had mentioned. He said that Sakharov was “mentally ill” and had written an article in “Foreign Affairs” urging the U.S. to declare war on the Soviet Union (sic). He said that Shcharansky must serve out his sentence before there can be discussion of his leaving; Andropov’s interpreter Sukhodrev, questioned by

the Chargé following the discussion, said that Andropov's statement would not be inconsistent with a pardon for Shcharansky since Andropov had not said that Shcharansky had to serve his "full sentence." Andropov said the statement on Shcharansky also applied to Orlov; regarding Wallenberg, "he is not here." On the merging of START and INF, Andropov said that no decision had been made but that he saw no point in merging the two negotiations. Andropov was intellectually vigorous during the whole meeting, not flagging during the whole hour and three quarters. As on other occasions, he walked with a shuffle although unattended; and his hands shook occasionally especially when he seemed to be making deeply felt points. End summary.

3. The meeting was held at one p.m. August 18 in Andropov's Kremlin meeting room. Andropov was accompanied by First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko, his aide Aleksandrov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities Ruben, and his interpreter Sukhodrev. On the American side were Senators Pell, Long, Bumpers, Leahy, Metzenbaum, Riegle, Sarbanes, Sasser, and DeConcini; Secretary for the Senate Minority (Griffin) and Senate staff members Ritch and Ashworth; and the Chargé. Andropov entered the room last, possibly to save on the amount of time he would have to stand up. Andropov sat at the head of a long table, with the two sides ranged on either side.

4. After the Soviet press was admitted—during which time Andropov smiled and joked—he greeted Senator Pell and his group and began by expressing his concern about the state of Soviet-American relations. He said that he saw the group as responsible political figures with an influence on policy making. It was not important that they were representatives of only one political party; he would say

exactly the same thing to Republican Senators. Andropov said that the tensions which characterized all areas of our relations are not the Soviet choice. There are some in Washington who prefer situations of tension and games played with no rules; but the Soviet Union does not share this view. Would the U.S. allow the other side to achieve superiority? Andropov doubted it and said that the Soviet Union could not allow it either. Soviet policy is directed at a level of accord assuring normal, stable, and good relations to the common profit and to the benefit of universal peace. The Soviet Government wants to conduct matters on an equal footing taking account of each other's legitimate interests.

5. Turning to INF, Andropov said that whether we can find a solution acceptable to both sides and thus arrest a dangerous new round will determine where we go from here. The Soviet side feels that in America people may not be aware of how much is at stake. Perhaps they believe that the issue is not important because it's thousands of kilometers away. But they are wrong, because deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles would have "consequences for you and for us." Americans would feel the difference between the situation before deployment and the situation after deployment. This is not a threat, but there is simply no other way out; such are the linkages inherent in this issue.

6. Continuing on INF, Andropov said that the Soviet Union proposes a balance at the lowest possible levels. It seeks equality via the largest possible reductions. Its first choice is that neither the USSR nor NATO should have any intermediate or tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. What is unfair about that? Only those who don't want equality think it's unfair. It provides truly zero levels with a solid reserve behind. Since the U.S. has shown no desire even to

discuss that option, Andropov went on, we came out with several constructive proposals. If those proposals took effect, there would be a threefold reduction in the quantity of medium nuclear systems on the Soviet and NATO sides. Moreover, NATO would only reduce airborne systems, while the Soviet Union would reduce missiles, including a considerable number of SS-20's. We would be left with less than we had in 1976, when nobody said we had particular superiority. Why is that unacceptable? We are very flexible; if the U.S. showed an interest in an honest agreement on an equitable basis, success in Geneva is still possible. But our flexibility has limits. The security of our people and of our allies means that we will make no unilateral concessions, not even five minutes before midnight.

7. Turning to START, Andropov said that if the negotiations failed, more sophisticated and horrendous weapons systems would emerge, causing disarray. Such systems are imminent. If the U.S. wants an agreement, it is wrong to portray some bombs and missiles as frightening and some as acceptable. Moreover, it's absurd to presume that you can compel the other side to reduce the basic components of its strategic forces while leaving yours a free hand. Andropov added that, as long as the U.S. position remains what it is, it is meaningless to show artificial optimism. Unless a solution is found, the threat of nuclear war will increase; we in the Soviet Union are against that.

8. Andropov then launched into a strong defense of a freeze on American and Soviet strategic arms. He said that military technology is moving faster than discussions to limit it. The risk is therefore that the talks will focus on yesterday's problems; a freeze would allow the diplomats to catch up with the arms makers. Andropov called for a no-increase rule on existing weapons, for no development and testing, and for limitations on modernization. He said the

Soviet side would also accept a freeze on nuclear components. In addition to checking the arms race and improving the political atmosphere, a freeze would make it easier to come to terms on cutting back our stockpiles.

Andropov contested statements that a freeze would solidify Soviet superiority in the strategic field. He said that during recent congressional hearings your Generals were asked if they would exchange nuclear arsenals with the Soviet forces; they said no. Andropov said that calls for a freeze were not coming only from the Soviet Union, but also from other countries and were not alien to political circles in the United States.

9. Andropov then moved on to the ASAT. He said that the danger of the arms race was spreading to outer space. The planet is saturated with nuclear weapons; now there is an effort to stuff outer space with it. Such a development must be prevented. He noted the concern of American legislators and a feeling against creating an ASAT capability or an anti-missile defense system involving the use of outer space. The Soviet Union proposes a ban on the use of force in outer space and from outer space.

10. Andropov outlined Soviet views on the prevention of militarization of outer space. He said it is necessary to agree on the full prevention of testing and deployment of any space based weapons designed to strike targets on the ground, in the air, or in outer space. We would agree to dismantle all existing ASAT systems and ban the development of new systems. Andropov said that detailed proposals would be submitted by the Soviet Union in the forthcoming UN General Assembly.³

11. He then unveiled a new Soviet decision which the Senatorial group "is the first to hear." The Soviet Union, he

said, [omission in the original] first to launch into outer space any type of ASAT weapons. The Soviet Government will introduce a unilateral moratorium for as long as others, including the United States, refrain from launching ASAT weapons of any kind. He said he would like to count on the U.S. as positively responding to this Soviet initiative.

(Comment: There is some ambiguity between this language as heard, and later TASS renderings of it. The issue is whether Andropov's language would exclude ground-based ASAT's or would exclude only orbiting ASAT's.)

12. Andropov then turned to regional issues. He had the impression that uppermost in the mind of many American politicians is the desire to explain away any international problem by blaming it on communist intriguers or Moscow's scheming. This approach can only multiply the explosive situations already existing in the world. In Central America, for example, causes of the problems run very deep. The threat of arms, "arrogant military demonstrations," or interference in internal affairs will not solve the problems but will only make them more dangerous. We are deeply convinced that only a political solution will help. Andropov gave credit to "those Latin American countries seeking solutions." He did not specifically name the Contadora Group. He said that the proposals for settlement advanced by Nicaragua and Cuba provide a good basis for solution." He did not specifically name the (#) is for solution. Everything must be done to ensure that the situation in and around Central America does not get out of control. Andropov said that throughout the world—for example, in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, and elsewhere—the top priority for the Soviet Union is lowering tensions and removing conflict situations.

13. Andropov then made his only reference to the internal situation in the Soviet Union. He said that the Soviet

people, guided by the Communist Party, were involved in a great and difficult effort to enhance the efficiency of the economy, improve management levels, and achieve new levels of scientific progress. If you've followed these events, you will know that our plans for peaceful cooperation are long lasting. Our foremost goal is to elevate the material and spiritual levels of the Soviet people. Therefore the main goal for the Soviet foreign policy is peace and avoiding the threat of nuclear war.

14. Andropov closed his prepared remarks on a bilateral note. He said that the Soviet Union is open to fruitful mutually advantageous cooperation with all states, including the U.S. However complicated the world situation is, we look at it with optimism and confidence that common sense will prevail. The normalization of bilateral relations must be one of the major components of that process. Referring jocularly to his position as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Andropov said he would not be a good Chairman unless he said that the Soviet Union was in favor of various forms of parliamentary contacts and that this includes contacts with the U.S. Congress.

15. Following Senator Pell's exposition (septel), Andropov agreed, at Senator Pell's request, to a dialogue. Andropov, noting that Senator Pell had proposed a joint US-Soviet moratorium on anti-satellite testing and a ban on ASAT weapons, said he didn't see what remained to be discussed. If the U.S. says that it won't launch anti-satellite weapons into outer space, the problem is solved. He asked Senator Pell to call that to the attention of U.S. authorities. Senator Pell responded that his group advocated not just a moratorium, but dismantling of ASAT weapons with on-site verification, and noted that the Soviet Union was ahead of the United States in this field. Andropov agreed that there

should be verification but did not address the issue of on-site. Nor did he make any direct reference to dismantling or destruction of ASAT weapons. He appeared somewhat discomfited by Senator Pell's persistence on this issue; he finally changed the subject, noting that little time remained for other topics.

16. Senator Long then argued for finding a way for each side to have early warning before an attack was launched. Andropov remarked that for a start, the U.S. should not put missiles in Europe since it only takes six minutes for them (sic) to reach the Soviet Union whereas Soviet missiles take 20 minutes to reach the United States.

17. Responding to the Senators' opening statement that Soviet leaders were badly informed about the United States, Andropov conceded that there was some truth to this and that not enough is done to provide knowledge about the U.S. in the Soviet Union. But he complained that even the bare minimum that the Soviet side tries to convey to the American public does not reach it.

18. On the Senators' proposal for a summit, Andropov seemed to get a little beyond his brief. He said that the Soviet Union is for a summit in principle, but what would be discussed? Recently we understand that the Reagan administration has put forward proposals on CBMs which boil down to discussion on the modernization of the Hot Line and certain other issues of that low level type. Do you think it would be proper for the two Presidents to sit down and talk about telephones? As for our proposals, they have been passed over in silence. Andropov concluded, until we are convinced that the U.S. is ready to discuss substantive issues, a summit meeting would be meaningless.
(Comment: Andropov is clearly confused about the

President's CBM initiative which was not proposed as a subject for discussion at a summit.)

19. Andropov took issue with the assertion by the Senators in one of their prepared questions that Afghanistan had caused the non-ratification of SALT II. He claimed that the U.S. had refused to ratify SALT II way before the Afghanistan problem appeared and that there was, therefore, no linkage there.

20. On the issue of the arms race, he asserted that the Soviet Union always had to play catch [up] to American military activities—first with the atomic bomb, then with MIRVs. At that point Korniyenko said that, at a time when there were no MIRVs, the Soviet Union had proposed a ban on them. Andropov then stated that the Soviet Union did not manufacture the cruise missile, the U.S. did; the Soviet Union therefore had had to try to catch up. The Soviet Union opposes any new spiral, any new type of weaponry. But if today the U.S. develops a new type of weapon, we will have to catch up.

21. On Southern Africa, Andropov said that, if you find a footprint of a single Soviet soldier or a single Soviet military unit in Angola, "then I'll surrender." He said that no Soviet unit was, is, or will be in that country. That is the Soviet approach toward Southern Africa.

22. Regarding Poland, he said that "your American representatives have visited Poland." The Pope has also visited Poland, although he was not your representative though he acted like one. They went there to find proof of Soviet influence on the situation in Poland, but nobody has yet found it.

23. On Afghanistan, Andropov said that the Soviet position has been that the Soviet Union will withdraw as soon as intervention ceases. But he'd also put it differently: Let the U.S. get out of Nicaragua, let French troops get out of Chad, and then we will talk about Afghanistan. Our position of principle on Afghanistan is unchanged.

24. The Soviet leader then took on the Senatorial group on the issue of human rights. He said it was an intricate and complex problem, with different understandings deriving from ideology, philosophy, and approach. We don't claim the right to make you think as we do; neither should you claim that right. The more often this issue appears, the more it leads to quarrels. It cannot help us achieve the ultimate objective of normal relations.

25. Andropov addressed one by one the names mentioned in Senator Pell's opening statement. On this subject he spoke with heat, his hands sometimes shaking. He said that Sakharov is mentally ill, although we don't say this publicly because we don't want to cast a slur on a member of the Academy of Sciences. He recently wrote an article in an American magazine (Korniyenko interjected that it was "Foreign Affairs") in which he urged the U.S. to declare war on the Soviet Union (sic). Andropov said he could produce thousands of letters from indignant citizens criticizing Sakharov's position. Would the Senators want his government to show disrespect for all these people in order to show respect for Sakharov?

26. Shcharansky, Andropov continued, was tried and convicted of espionage for a foreign power. There was nothing political about his actions. Therefore, my answer to you is "no." He is serving his sentence. He must serve his sentence before there can be a discussion about allowing him to leave. (Following the meeting the Chargé asked

Sukhodrev to check his notes on this passage, particularly whether Andropov was excluding the possibility of any pardon for Shcharansky. After checking, Sukhodrev said categorically that Andropov had not said that Shcharansky must serve his "full sentence"; therefore, Andropov's statement did not exclude a pardon, although of course Andropov was not explicitly including it or suggesting it.) On Orlov, Andropov said the same thing applied as to Shcharansky. On Wallenberg, Andropov said that the Soviet Union had said many times that "he is not here." (Comment: Andropov apparently did not know the Soviet position that Wallenberg died long ago in a Soviet prison.)

27. On Jewish emigration, Andropov read from a paper purporting to show that from 1945 until July 1983, 273,000 Jews have emigrated. This includes 20,000 to the U.S., 12,000 of them on temporary visas. Thus, there are no grounds for saying that the emigration rate is slowing down (sic). He said that 92 percent of all applications for emigration have been met. For the rest, most of those are people who have had access to state secrets. Aleksandrov interjected at this point that there are others serving terms as criminals, a comment which Andropov then repeated himself.

28. Andropov then addressed the issue of merging START and INF. He said that no decision has been taken as yet, since the Soviets wanted to see how the talks progressed. So far, the U.S. shows no desire for agreement in either set of negotiations; therefore, the Soviet side doesn't see any point in merging the two negotiations. Moreover, Andropov continued, if the Pershing II's and cruise missiles are deployed, that would put the whole thing into question.

29. In concluding, Andropov picked up on Senator Pell's reference to the Soviet Union and the U.S. as a bear and a

whale. He said he liked the metaphor. He said that a bear and a whale would not resort to nuclear arms. Therefore, our two countries should have the same mature approach.

30. At the end of the meeting, Andropov stood up, shook hands with every member of the American group, and walked with difficulty but without assistance into his anteroom. Apart from his difficulty in walking, an obvious shaking of his hands when he was stressing a point or holding a paper, and a few deep coughs, his health seemed very good. And his vigor in the discussion was sustained from beginning to end of the meeting.

31. Department distribute as appropriate.

Zimmermann

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830007-0378. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis. A notation in the telegram indicates that “#” indicates an omission in the original.

² In telegram 10642 from Moscow, August 23, an informal translation by the Department of State interpreter of Andropov’s opening remarks was sent to the Department. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830483-0669) No separate telegram with Senator Pell’s remarks was found.

³ On August 18, the Soviet Union submitted to the UN General Assembly a draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the earth. See *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 684-686.

80. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, August 23, 1983

SUBJECT

Proposed Speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations

George Shultz has sent you a draft of a speech on U.S.-Soviet relations that he suggests you deliver sometime in the near future (Tab A).²

Although he suggests some alternative times to give the speech, his main rationale seems to be that the public needs a fuller explanation of our policy toward the Soviets—a follow-up to his own Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony.³ Indeed, since the substance of that testimony was reported in considerably divergent ways by the press, there is a good case to be made that further explanation to the public is necessary to clarify the confusion. This draft is quite good in many respects, although it does need a little work in removing a few inconsistencies.

Unless George has a more specific strategy in mind, I feel that it may be premature to decide on the final contents, tone and timing of the speech.⁴ It may be a good idea to wait and see how George's first meeting with Gromyko turns out and how the INF situation develops in the early fall.

Perhaps the best thing to do at this point is for us to discuss with George a strategy for this speech and get a better idea of what he has in mind.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (08/05/83–08/09/83). Confidential. Sent for information. Prepared by Lenczowski.

² See [Document 78](#). Clark wrote at the end of the memorandum: “We will be meeting on this subject in preparation for George’s Madrid/Gromyko meeting when we return to Washington.” Reagan wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: “I believe the speech should be given *before* George’s meetings with Gromyko. It might make these meetings more fruitful. RR.” According to the President’s Daily Diary, the President was at his ranch in California from August 15 to September 2. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) Shultz was scheduled to meet with Gromyko in Madrid in early September at the CSCE meeting.

³ See [Document 61](#).

⁴ Fortier and Keyes sent Clark a separate memorandum on August 23 regarding the draft speech. Clark’s stamp appears on this memorandum with the date “8/24,” so it seems the memorandum reached Clark after he sent the memorandum to Reagan on August 23. Fortier and Keyes wrote: “We share many of the concerns John Lenczowski expressed in his recent cover memo on State’s proposed U.S.-Soviet speech. Should the speech be given in its present form, *its internal inconsistency would guarantee politically motivated criticism from all sides.*” The memorandum continued: “the speech must also help people to understand that *U.S.-Soviet relations consist of much more than what we do and say directly to one another.* Rather, what we do in places as diverse as Chad, Central America and Lebanon will shape Soviet perceptions of us as well as create disincentives for additional Soviet adventurism. This is a crucial point, but one that is

frequently obscured by fashionable talk about the need for 'dialogue'. The speech should also make it clear that it is precisely our concern for general peace in the nuclear era that causes us to view action based on intimidation and force as a grave threat to human welfare everywhere. As long as Soviet behavior relies upon these tools, we cannot be hopeful about an *end* to the *overall* competition between U.S. and Soviet policies and aims." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (08/05/83-08/09/83))

81. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Andropov to President Reagan¹

Dear Mr. President:

Washington, August 27, 1983

I found it necessary to draw your attention once again to a question, the importance of which would seem to be beyond doubt. I have in mind the problem of limiting nuclear weapons in Europe, on which the next round of Soviet-American talks will begin in about a week in Geneva.² A decisive breakthrough at those negotiations could be of fundamental importance from the viewpoint of how matters will develop in Europe and throughout the world, and consequently—and not least—between the Soviet Union and the United States as well.

The Soviet Union has just taken another major step which, if properly evaluated by the United States, will in many respects facilitate reaching agreement in Geneva. We have declared our willingness to liquidate in the European part of the USSR those of our medium-range missiles which would be subject to reductions. Among them there would be a considerable portion of SS-20 missiles as well, namely, that portion of those missiles which would be in excess of the aggregate number of medium-range missiles of Britain and France. It goes without saying that this can be done only if mutually acceptable agreement is reached as a whole on the problem of limiting medium-range nuclear systems in Europe, including renunciation of the deployment of new American missiles there.

The question of redeployment of SS-20 missiles to be reduced would thereby be removed, too. Indeed, American representatives have repeatedly emphasized the great importance for the progress of the negotiations in Geneva of what would happen to the Soviet missiles to be reduced in Europe.

Having taken this serious step for the sake of reaching agreement, we expect that the reciprocal step of the American side will be such as to make a mutually acceptable agreement possible.

As you understand, Mr. President, a great deal depends on what the forthcoming round of the negotiations will result in; we believe that an agreement is still possible and achievable. The Soviet delegation in Geneva will have instructions to exert additional efforts to work out an agreement based on the principle of equality and equal security. For success to be achieved, however, it is necessary for the U.S. delegation also to have corresponding instructions to work in the same direction.

The Soviet leadership is deeply convinced that the situation truly dictates the need for a broad, considered approach and for taking bold political decisions looking to the future. For its part, the Soviet leadership is acting in this manner. I would like to hope that your government and you personally will approach the resolution of the task we face with a sense of high responsibility for the fate of peace and international security.

With respect,

Yu. Andropov

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985-1986, E.4 President/Andropov Correspondence. Secret. A typed notation on the letter reads: "Translation from the Russian." The letter was forwarded to the President with an attached covering memorandum from Shultz on August 29 (see [Document 82](#)).

² INF negotiations were scheduled to resume in Geneva on September 6.

82. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, August 29, 1983

SUBJECT

Andropov's Proposal to Destroy Missiles

In an August 27 *Pravda* "interview," Andropov offered to destroy all missiles to be reduced under the Soviet proposal to limit SS-20s "in Europe" (probably referring to those missiles deployed west of their proposed 80-degree line) to the level they attribute to British and French missiles.² He has now sent you a letter (Tab 1),³ formally conveying that offer.

In the letter, Andropov portrays this move as "a serious step" toward a mutually acceptable agreement and states that the USSR expects a comparable reciprocal step from the US that would make such an agreement possible. He states that Moscow believes that agreement is still "possible and achievable," and that the Soviet Delegation will have instructions to "exert additional efforts" toward agreement in the next round.

Under their previous position, the Soviets maintained that the primary method of reduction would be destruction, although a certain percentage of systems could be withdrawn from Europe. We have pressed the Soviets in Geneva for some time as to whether or not any SS-20s to be reduced under their proposal would be destroyed, or merely relocated to the eastern USSR. Thus, the Soviet move is, at a minimum, a welcome clarification of their position. It is, however, also significant in that the Soviets have offered, for the first time, to destroy a number of new

systems (i.e., 80–100 SS–20s). Of course, the basic problems in the Soviet position—inclusion of British and French forces, a ban on any US INF missile deployments, and no limits on new SS–20 deployments in the Far East—remain.

The Soviet move is of course primarily directed toward European public opinion. It would not directly affect the options now before you with regard to possible new elements in our own INF position (i.e., inclusion of aircraft, regional subceilings, a proportional reduction of Pershing II). However, we can expect the Soviet move to find some resonance here and in Europe; it will likely generate additional pressures—both from publics and from some of the Allies—for movement on our part when the INF negotiations resume on September 6.

We will be in a better position to develop your response to Andropov's letter as a result of decisions to be taken on our INF position. In your letter we would then be able to outline the substance of any new elements of our position. My meeting with Gromyko in Madrid on September 8 would provide an opportunity to convey your response. These steps, properly presented to the Western public, will allow us to maintain the initiative and sustain Allied support for our deployments.

The NATO Special Consultative Group meeting scheduled for September 2 offers an opportunity to inform the Allies of Andropov's letter. Andropov may be sending similar letters to Allied leaders; if so, we can use this SCG to coordinate our replies.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Brezhnev

(8290913, 8391028, 8391032). Secret; Sensitive. A notation on the routing slip for Shultz's memorandum reads: "Sep 02 83 Pres Noted."

² In telegram 10897 from Moscow, August 27, the Embassy reported: "In a pre-vacation interview, leader Yuri Andropov has made his most significant statements in months on INF and China. Responding to questions by *Pravda* August 27, Andropov clarified that the Soviet Union would be prepared to destroy all missiles—including SS-20s—reduced in Europe under an INF agreement. His remarks revealed no change in the Soviets' insistence on taking into account UK/French systems or in their opposition to any U.S. deployments." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830494-0455) ³ See [Document 81](#).

83. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, August 30, 1983

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Gromyko in Madrid

I. *Our Strategic Approach*

My meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Madrid will be the first of a number of sessions with him in September.² I see this series of meetings as an opportunity to pursue our testing strategy with the Soviets in a way that maximizes pressure on them to be forthcoming on issues we can identify as ripe for doing business, and, possibly, to attenuate their response to the prospect of U.S. INF deployments in Europe later this fall. Substantively, the Soviets have been responding in small ways to our testing (on the Pentecostalists, the grains agreement, CSCE, and even in START and MBFR). Having back-to-back meetings in September gives us a chance to create bureaucratic incentives for positive decisions in Moscow by putting issues before Gromyko in Madrid to which he should respond three weeks later.

Realistically, we cannot expect major movement from the Soviets in the weeks and months ahead: they are in a sour mood, and are facing a serious political defeat on INF deployment. Hence, we will not want my meetings with Gromyko to be seen as harbingers of a major breakthrough, or even a significant improvement in relations. If European pressures grow for a delay in INF deployment we may have to put less emphasis on the progress we have made and

more emphasis on continuing Soviet intransigence. We want to maintain hope that obstacles to progress can be overcome; but suggesting that the Soviets are being less obstructionist than they really are could jeopardize INF deployments and our strategic programs.

The risk we currently face, however, especially with the allies, is not one of excessive expectations. Rather, they are worried about no progress at all, and as the INF deployment date approaches they will see a danger of all-out confrontation. These mounting concerns are being used to bring pressure on us to make concessions to the Soviets in arms control. For the present, I believe one antidote may be public perception that some modest movement in other areas of U.S.-Soviet relations is possible. At the same time, we must counter any new over-optimism which could eat into support for our rearmament program by continuing to point to Soviet obstructionism on the essential issues.

The setting seems more favorable than for my meeting with Gromyko a year ago. We are regaining the initiative in international affairs from the Soviets. Our economic recovery and improved ties with our allies and friends give us reason for confidence in dealing with the USSR; we have a lead in the INF debate in Europe; and the prospect of your and Cap Weinberger's visits to Asia will demonstrate that we are on the move there as well.³ Of course, we will need alert U.S. diplomacy if we are to manage the strategic/MX debate here and the INF "hot autumn" in Europe successfully. We also face problems in the Middle East which give the Soviets satisfaction. But overall they will be on the defensive, trying to walk the line between demonstrating their unhappiness with the INF deployments and threatening counter-actions, and keeping the door open to dealing with the U.S.

We understand Gromyko's people have recommended to him that he engage me in a broad review of the relationship in the shorter Madrid meeting, and reserve discussion of specifics for New York. At Madrid, I will certainly want to convey to him that we are sticking to our broad agenda, and that there can be no basic improvement in relations before they show us in deeds that they are willing to act on our concerns about human rights and regional issues as well as arms control and bilateral matters. I will underscore our willingness and ability to sustain and win a long-term competition and undercut any illusion that they can simply wait us out.

But it would be a mistake, as I see it, to play Gromyko's game by putting off discussion of specifics to New York. On our side, we have, as you know, serious problems about treaty compliance in the arms control field and about fulfillment of their earlier commitment to liberate Anatoliy Shcharanskiy by early 1984 (assuming he appealed for early release, which he has been unwilling to do so far). We have major concerns over Soviet activities in Central America, Libyan forces in Chad, and Soviet-encouraged Syrian intransigence in the Middle East. I will want to press all these issues: they cannot wait.

At the same time, in order to get the most from the multiple-meeting scenario I should be in a position to demonstrate that we are ready to move toward settlements that are consistent with the interests of both countries. I do not expect Gromyko to be a willing partner: diplomats on the defensive rarely are. But rather than debate him on philosophy or on INF, I would like to put forward some new ideas in the arms control field. My hope would be that some of the modifications we are making in our negotiating positions in key negotiations—START, INF and MBFR—will combine with our continuing military buildup and our

revived activism in the Third World to make the case for restraint and compromise more credible within the Kremlin.

The decisions we will be considering on arms control issues over the coming weeks will therefore be critical to success in my September meetings with Gromyko. If we wish to give the Soviet bureaucracy a push, in other words, we also need to give a push to ours.

Following the Madrid session, we may wish to consider whether we should invite Gromyko to Washington after the New York meeting. In that case he could meet with you as well as me. If properly managed such a visit could drive home both the seriousness of your message and contribute to the perception that we are doing our utmost to probe for Soviet flexibility. It would also position us well to make use of what may have to be our second theme of the fall—that despite our efforts we are prevented from moving forward on the issues by Soviet intransigence.

II. *The Madrid Agenda*

At Madrid, I plan to take up all four areas of our long-standing agenda with Gromyko, but I will want to lead with human rights and arms control.

Human rights will head my list both because of its importance and the CSCE context of our meeting. Unless we have some word on Shcharanskiy before we meet, I will give his case—and the promise Max Kampelman was given for his release—top priority. In addition to Shcharanskiy, I will mention Sakharov, the Pentecostals, Soviet Jewry and the recently established “Anti-Zionist Committee,” and the Soviet spouses of Americans that the Soviets are not allowing to emigrate. To put these cases in a broader

framework I will also elaborate the themes of my CSCE speech, on the connection between human rights and security.

Gromyko will, as always, attach highest priority to *arms control*, arguing that for Moscow this is the litmus test of U.S. seriousness in pursuing more constructive relations. I will need to be able to deal with arms control in this meeting in a way that denies him the claim that we are intransigent in this important area. Accordingly, I propose to emphasize two basic themes:

—that we are serious about reaching agreements in START, INF and MBFR, and are prepared to be flexible as long as the end results meet our criteria of reductions, equality, stability, and verifiability;

—but that Soviet failure adequately to address our concerns about compliance with existing agreements will undercut any prospects for reaching agreements.

On specific negotiations, I propose to proceed as follows:

—On INF, I would like to give a substantive reply to Andropov's weekend message to you⁴ by previewing with Gromyko the new elements of flexibility that Paul Nitze will be outlining in the first days of the new round in Geneva. One thought would be to hand him your answer to Andropov. At the same time, I will want to reiterate that any increase in tensions from Soviet counter-deployments will be the Soviets' fault.

—On START, I will point to the important changes tabled by Ed Rowny in the last Geneva round, and emphasize our flexibility in finding a mutually acceptable way to reduce the throw-weight disparity. Given Moscow's complaints that

our proposal seeks radical restructuring of Soviet strategic forces, I would like to inform Gromyko in Madrid that at our UNGA meetings later in the month, I will be prepared to address possible changes to the framework of the U.S. proposal, *if* the Soviets are prepared to take similar steps to meet our basic concerns.

—On MBFR, I plan to pick up on Dobrynin's reference to the possibility of additional verification measures, and urge that the Soviet negotiator present more specific ideas when he and Ambassador Abramowitz resume their private exchanges in Vienna.

As for compliance, the Soviets have to understand that much is at stake. I intend to voice in strong terms our concerns about the new large phased-array radar's compatibility with the ABM Treaty. I will state bluntly that the Soviet claim that the radar is for space-track rather than ABM purposes is implausible, and that failure to resolve the situation will undermine our arms control efforts. I will also reiterate our dissatisfaction with Soviet explanations about the PL-5's consistency with SALT II, and point to the corrosive effect on mutual confidence of Moscow's telemetry encryption practices.

I also plan to press Gromyko on *regional issues* of importance to us. On Central America, I will reiterate our warnings against the introduction of Cuban combat troops or jet aircraft into Nicaragua and emphasize the danger that current Soviet policies—particularly the large supply of arms—could lead to a confrontation. Larry Eagleburger has just warned the Soviets about Syrian foot-dragging on a pullout from Lebanon, but I would plan to press the point again with Gromyko. Afghanistan will, of course, be touched on, but New York on the eve of the UNGA Afghanistan debate is probably a better place to press the

Soviets. We want to keep up the pressure on the Soviets over Afghanistan, and if we are careful should be able to assure that they take the blame for any failure of the UN-sponsored negotiating effort currently underway. Similarly, in order to keep the Soviets from claiming that lack of consultation on southern Africa excuses their foot-dragging there, I plan to offer Gromyko another side meeting at senior working level—with Chet Crocker on our side as before—at the UNGA.

I plan to use *bilateral issues* essentially as means to suggest to the Soviets that further progress may be possible in our bilateral relationship if they are willing to meet our concerns on other, more vital issues. If we can develop negotiating positions on the consulates and exchanges agreement in time, these could serve as examples. But I will underscore to Gromyko that small steps forward in such areas cannot substitute for agreement on more substantive questions.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 8/16-31/83. Secret. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Burt and Azrael forwarded the memorandum to Shultz through Eagleburger under cover of an action memorandum on August 30. Simons drafted the August 30 action memorandum on August 26, which was cleared by Palmer, Kelly, and Sestanovich.

² Shultz and Gromyko were scheduled to meet in Madrid during the CSCE on September 8.

³ Reagan went to South Korea from November 12 to 14 and visited China in late April 1984. Weinberger was on a trip to Asia from September 23 to October 3, visiting China,

Japan, and Pakistan. A joint State-Defense message noted that Weinberger would be “prepared to discuss with the Chinese the full range of Asia-related security issues, including the Soviet threat, Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, and Afghanistan, as well as other issues of mutual concern.” (Telegram 206535 to multiple Asian capitals, July 23; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830419-0910)

⁴ See [Document 81](#).

September 1983-October 1983

“Controlled Fury”: Shutdown of KAL 007

[84. Editorial Note](#)

[85. Telegram From the National Security Agency](#)

Washington, September 1, 1983, 0156Z

Source: Reagan Library, Intelligence Directorate, NSC Records, 1981-1989, Series I: Subject File, Korean Airlines Disaster 09/01/1983: (09/01/1983-09/15/1983); NLR-262-1-17-4-7. Secret; Spoke; Flash. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

[86. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs \(Burt\) to Secretary of State Shultz](#)

Washington, September 1, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, September 1-8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Drafted by Simons and John Hawes (EUR/RPM); cleared by Hartman and Palmer. Simons initialed for Hartman and Palmer.

87. Memorandum From Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, September 1, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Donald Fortier Files, Subject File, KAL Shoot Down 09/01/1983; NLR-195-6-57-1-6. Secret. Sent for information. Clark's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

88. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, September 1, 1983

Source: National Security Council, Institutional Files, NSPG Meetings, Box SR 108, NSPG 0068, 2 Sep 83 Soviet Downing of Korean Airliner. Secret; Sensitive.

89. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, September 2, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, September 1-8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Hartman and Palmer. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Simons initialed for Burt, Hartman, and Palmer. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on September 2.

90. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, September 2, 1983

Source: National Security Council, Institutional Files, NSPG Meetings, Box SR 108, NSPG 0068, 2 Sep 83 Soviet Downing of Korean Airliner. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. On September 2, Reagan returned to Washington from his ranch in California, arriving at the White House at 5:43 p.m. The NSPG meeting Clark discussed in this memorandum began in the Situation Room at 6 p.m. From a comment in Shultz's memoir (see Document 84), it is clear that Clark was with Reagan in California, and likely returned with him to Washington on Air Force One. See also footnote 3, Document 88.

91. Notes by Secretary of Defense Weinberger of a National Security Planning Group Meeting

Washington, September 2, 1983

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Appointment and Diary File, Box 9, Notes Set B, 1983 #25-41. No classification marking. The editor transcribed this text from Weinberger's handwritten notes of the NSPG meeting. An image of the notes is Appendix D. The NSPG meeting to "discuss the Soviet attack on the Korean civil airliner" was held in the Situation Room from 6 p.m. to 7:57 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No formal record of the meeting was found.

92. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, September 3, 1983, 1451Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830008-0162. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Palmer, Burt, McKinley, and in S/S-O; approved by Eagleburger.

93. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, September 3, 1983

Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 9/1-15/83. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by R. Braibanti on September 2; cleared by M. Wiznitzer (PM/RSA), L. Einaudi (ARA/PPC), and for information by M. Minton (EUR/SOV).

Braibanti initialed for all clearing officials. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the covering memorandum of this packet, indicating Shultz saw it.

94. Editorial Note

95. National Security Decision Directive 102

Washington, September 5, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 102, U.S. Response to Soviet Destruction of KAL Airliner. Secret. On September 6, Clark sent the signed NSDD to Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, Kirkpatrick, Vessey, Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth Dole, Wick, and Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration J. Lynn Helms. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron November 1983 (2/4))

96. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, September 5, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot

96D262, ES Sensitive, September 1-8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons; cleared by J.H. Smith (L/LEI) and Palmer. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Simons initialed for all clearing officials.

97. Editorial Note

98. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State and the Embassy in Spain

Moscow, September 6, 1983, 1935Z

Source: Reagan Library, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, NSC USSR File, USSR-KAL Incident (09/01/83) (3); NLR-170-17-40-1-9. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information to Leningrad, Bonn, London, Paris, USNATO, USUN, Seoul, and Tokyo. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

99. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger to President Reagan

Washington, September 6, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, NSC Files, Chron File September 1983; NLR-324-11-25-2-0. Confidential. A note on the routing slip indicates that

Poindexter presented this information to Reagan during his daily briefing on September 7.

100. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Hill) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, September 7, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Robert Lilac Files, Arms Transfer, Subject File/1981-84, AT (Arms Transfers): [Korean Airlines] KAL [09/10/1983]; NLR-332-14-35-1-4. Secret. A covering memorandum dated September 10 to Clark from Lilac and Robinson indicates the NSC received this set of papers.

101. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz in Madrid

Washington, September 8, 1983, 0630Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830516-1096. Confidential; Flash; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Moscow, Seoul, Tokyo, the White House, and USUN. Drafted and approved by Kelly. Cleared in S/S-O and the KAL Working Group.

102. Memorandum From John Lenczowski and Kenneth deGraffenreid of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, September 8, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Robert Lilac Files, Arms Transfer, Subject File/1981-84, AT (Arms Transfers): [Korean Airlines] KAL [09/07/1983]; NLR-332-14-32-1-7. Secret. Sent for action. Lenczowski initialed for deGraffenreid.

103. Memorandum From John Lenczowski and Kenneth deGraffenreid of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, September 8, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, NSC Files, Chron File September 1983; NLR-324-11-25-6-6. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Lenczowski initialed for deGraffenreid.

104. Memorandum of Conversation

Madrid, September 8, 1983, 2-2:30 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz/Gromyko in Madrid September 8, 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Krimer; approved by Shultz. The meeting took place in the U.S. Ambassador's Residence in Madrid. In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "I went over to our ambassador's residence after lunch to prepare for Gromyko's arrival. I planned to take him into a small room with only our interpreters and try to talk to him directly, first about human rights and then about the KAL downing.

When he arrived, we went into the study for half an hour. The atmosphere was tense. He was totally unresponsive.” Shultz continued: “I then turned to the Soviets’ attack on KAL 007. Once again, Gromyko was totally intransigent. I regarded this meeting as a last effort to come to grips with this crisis with him on a human level, but it was fruitless.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 369–370)

105. Memorandum of Conversation

Madrid, September 8, 1983, 2:30–4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz/Gromyko in Madrid September 8, 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Krimer; cleared by Matlock, Hartman, Burt, and Palmer; approved by Shultz. Brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the U.S. Ambassador’s Residence in Madrid.

106. Editorial Note

107. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, September 8, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, September 1-8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on September 8.

108. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the White House

Madrid, September 9, 1983, 0152Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Flash; Nodis.

109. Memorandum From Richard Levine and Peter Sommer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, September 9, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Robert Lilac Files, Arms Transfer, Subject File/1981-84, AT (Arms Transfers): [Korean Airlines] KAL [09/09/1983]; NLR-332-14-33-4-3. Confidential. Sent for action. Cleared by Lilac and Robinson. Sommer initialed for Levine, Lilac, and Robinson.

110. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Gates) to Director of Central Intelligence Casey and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (McMahon)

Washington, September 9, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1983, 400641. Secret. Casey forwarded the memorandum to Clark on September 12. In an attached covering memorandum to Clark, September 12, deGraffenreid noted: "The DCI marked this IMMEDIATE, so I am sending it to you directly without complete staffing. However, Gates' points seem well taken, and I recommend that it be circulated widely on our staff and Gates' points fully considered." Clark wrote "NO" to the side of this recommendation and noted at the bottom: "Let's hold up for now." In a follow-up note to Poindexter, deGraffenreid reported: "Bob Gates called to say he had just learned that the DCI sent his memo here. He is a bit worried that because his criticism of State could be misinterpreted that we limit distribution of his memo. I agree. We can just pull out the thoughts."

[111. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Foreign Intelligence Council \(Casey\) to the National Foreign Intelligence Board and the National Foreign Intelligence Council](#)

Washington, September 12, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1983, 400683. No classification marking. Although an unidentified "Attachment 1" is noted at the bottom of the memorandum, no attachment was found.

[112. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs](#)

(Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, September 15, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, September 1-8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe and Simons; cleared by Niles. Simons initialed for Pascoe. Kelly initialed the memorandum for Burt. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on September 16. An administrative action changed the title of the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs on September 15.

113. Memorandum From Robert Lilac of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, September 19, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Robert Lilac Files, Arms Transfer, Subject File/1981-84, AT: [Korean Airlines KAL 007: Intelligence] (Binder); NLR-332-14-55-2-1. Secret. Sent for action. Lenczowski, Sommer, deGraffenreid, Raymond, and Robinson concurred. Lilac initialed for Lenczowski, and a note indicates that Raymond's concurrence was verbal. Clark's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

114. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Foreign Intelligence Council (Casey) to the

National Foreign Intelligence Board and the National Foreign Intelligence Council

Washington, September 21, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1983, 400683. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs.

115. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, September 23, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, October 1-8 1983. Secret; Wnintel; Noform; Nocontract; Orcon. Drafted by James F. Schumaker (EUR/SOV); cleared by Simons, Kelly, Vershbow, Donald Graves (INR/SEE), and in substance by [name not declassified] (CIA/SOVA; J. Beyerly (Emb Moscow). Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on September 23. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Brackets are in the original. All tabs are attached but not printed.

116. Memorandum Prepared by the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Gates)

Washington, September 27, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, September 20-30 1983. Secret. In a cover note to Shultz, Gates wrote: "Mr. Secretary: As you requested last Saturday morning [September 24] after breakfast, I have jotted down some thoughts along the lines that I was expressing at the table. They are strictly personal. I hope they are of some use to you." A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears at the top of the note, as well as a handwritten note that reads: "R.B. Pls see me re this. CBA's are focal point."

117. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, September 27, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, KAL (3/3). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons on September 21; cleared by Burt and Eagleburger. Drafting information is from another copy. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, 1983 Sept 1-8)

118. Memorandum From Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, September 28, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, KAL (3/3). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. This memorandum is unsigned.

119. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

New York, September 29, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive Chronology (09/29/1983-09/30/1983); NLR-775-10-11-3-5. Secret; Sensitive. In an attached covering memorandum to Shultz, Burt wrote: "The boycott of flights in and out of the Soviet Union will come to an end on Thursday, September 29th. In anticipation of this, you will want to keep the President informed of our efforts here in New York to shape the continuing international response to the KAL incident."

120. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, September 29, 1983, 1523Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830565-0577. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Leningrad, Beijing, Bonn, London, Paris, USNATO, USUN, USIA, and for information to Stockholm, Belgrade, Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Prague, Munich, Sofia, Warsaw, Department of Defense, USCINCEUR, USDelMBFR Vienna, and the Mission in Geneva.

121. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, September 30, 1983, 1532Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830568-0222. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Leningrad, USIA, USUN, Ankara, Athens, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Reykjavik, Rome, The Hague, Berlin, USNATO, Bern, Dublin, Helsinki, Stockholm, Vienna, Seoul, Tokyo, Belgrade, Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Munich, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, Department of Defense, and the Mission in Geneva.

122. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, October 1, 1983, 0934Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830570-0390. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to USNATO, Tokyo, Beijing, London, Paris, Rome, Seoul, the Mission in Geneva, USUN, Bonn, and USDelMBFR Vienna.

123. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, October 3, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, October 1-8 1983. Secret; Sensitive.

Forwarded through Eagleburger. Printed from a copy that indicates Eagleburger initialed the original.

84. Editorial Note

On September 1, 1983, a Soviet jet fighter shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007, which had mistakenly strayed into Soviet airspace near Sakhalin Island, killing all 269 people on board. In his memoir, Secretary of State George Shultz noted that he received a call at 6:30 a.m. informing him that the airliner had “‘disappeared’ over Soviet territory: it had probably been shot down by the Soviets.” He further recalled that “at 8:20 a.m. [EST], I called Bill Clark, who was with the president in California. [Reagan was on holiday, scheduled to return to Washington on September 4.] President Reagan already had been notified. We exchanged information, as yet somewhat sketchy. I told Larry Eagleburger to call in Oleg Sokolov, the Soviet chargé. Within an hour, much more information was coming in: the CIA had a transcript, I was told, of the Soviet pilot’s conversation with his ground control, who ordered him to shoot the aircraft down, the pilot’s acknowledgement, and then his confirmation that he had been successful.

“A heated internal debate bubbled up over whether we could use such intelligence without dangerously compromising the means by which we got it. I told Eagleburger to work on the CIA, and he convinced them that the stakes were so high and that they must agree I could use it, both with the Soviets and in public. The debate now shifted, with even greater intensity, to what our public statement should be and who should make it. The president agreed that I should hold a press conference and get the facts out quickly. How should we characterize them? A decision had to be made now about how the United States would treat this disaster. What was said in the next hour or so would shape our reaction in a fundamental way. People

began to give me drafts of what I should say. I found them all dangerously overdrawn, couched in an ominous tone that might suggest some form of U.S. military reaction or retaliation. I rejected the confrontational rhetoric.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 361)

At 10:45 a.m. EST, Shultz held a press conference at the Department of State and outlined the available facts as follows: “At 1400 hours Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) yesterday, a Korean Air Lines Boeing 747, en route from New York to Seoul, Korea, departed Anchorage, Alaska. Two hundred and sixty-nine passengers and crew were on board, including Congressman Lawrence P. McDonald [D-Georgia].

“At approximately 1600 hours Greenwich Mean Time, the aircraft came to the attention of Soviet radar. It was tracked constantly by the Soviets from that time.

“The aircraft strayed into Soviet airspace over the Kamchatka Peninsula and over the Sea of Okhotsk and over the Sakhalin Island. The Soviets tracked the commercial airliner for some 2½ hours.

“A Soviet pilot reported visual contact with the aircraft at 1812 hours. The Soviet plane was, we know, in constant contact with its ground control.

“At 1821 hours, the Korean aircraft was reported by the Soviet pilot at 10,000 meters. At 1826 hours, the Soviet pilot reported that he fired a missile, and the target was destroyed.

“At 1830 hours, the Korean aircraft was reported by radar at 5,000 meters. At 1838 hours, the Korean plane disappeared from the radar screen.

“We know that at least eight Soviet fighters reacted at one time or another to the airliner. The pilot who shot the aircraft down reported after the attack that he had, in fact, fired a missile, that he had destroyed the target, and that he was breaking away.

“About an hour later, Soviet controllers ordered a number of their search aircraft to conduct search-and-rescue activity in the vicinity of the last position of the Korean airliner reflected by Soviet tracking. One of these aircraft reported finding kerosene on the surface of the seas in that area.

“During Wednesday night, U.S. State Department officials, particularly Assistant Secretary [for European Affairs Richard R.] Burt, were in contact with Soviet officials, seeking information concerning the airliner’s fate. The Soviets offered no information.

“As soon as U.S. sources had confirmed the shooting down of the aircraft, the United States, on its own behalf and on behalf of the Republic of Korea, called in the Soviet Charge d’Affaires in Washington this morning to express our grave concern over the shooting down of an unarmed civilian plane carrying passengers of a number of nationalities. We also urgently demanded an explanation from the Soviet Union.

“The United States reacts with revulsion to this attack. Loss of life appears to be heavy. We can see no excuse whatsoever for this appalling act.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1983, page 1; brackets are in the original) A brief question-and-answer session followed. According to Shultz, Roger Mudd, co-anchor of NBC Nightly News, characterized his press conference as “controlled fury.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 362)

At 1:07 p.m. EST, the Soviet Union issued the following statement via TASS: "An unidentified plane entered the airspace of the Soviet Union over the Kamchatka Peninsula from the direction of the Pacific Ocean and then for the second time violated the airspace of the U.S.S.R. over Sakhalin Island on the night from August 31 to September 1. The plane did not have navigation lights, did not respond to queries, and did not enter into contact with the dispatcher service.

"Fighters of the anti-aircraft defense, which were sent aloft toward the intruder plane, tried to give it assistance in directing it to the nearest airfield. But the intruder plane did not react to the signals and warnings from the Soviet fighters and continued its flight in the direction of the Sea of Japan." (John F. Burns, "Moscow Confirms Tracking of Plane," *New York Times*, September 2, 1983, page A1; Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1983, page 2)

At 2:33 p.m. on September 1, White House Deputy Press Secretary Larry Speakes read the following statement on behalf of President Ronald Reagan at the Sheraton Hotel in Santa Barbara, California: "I speak for all Americans and for the people everywhere who cherish civilized values in protesting the Soviet attack on an unarmed civilian passenger plane. Words can scarcely express our revulsion at this horrifying act of violence.

"The United States joins with other members of the international community in demanding a full explanation for this appalling and wanton misdeed. The Soviet statements to this moment have totally failed to explain how or why this tragedy has occurred. Indeed, the whole incident appears to be inexplicable to civilized people everywhere.

“Mrs. Reagan and I want to express our deepest sympathy to the families of the victims. Our prayers are with them in this time of bereavement, and they have my personal assurance that I will make every effort to get to the bottom of this tragedy.

“I have ordered flags of the United States flown at half staff at all Federal installations and U.S. military bases around the world.” (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book II, page 1221)

85. Telegram From the National Security Agency¹

Washington, September 1, 1983, 0156Z

Follow-up two to Critic 2-83.

(SC) A probable Republic of Korea civil aircraft was reflected descending over the Soviet littoral on 31 August 1983.

(SC) The aircraft was reflected at 5557N 16515E at 1617Z heading southwest to a position at 1818Z of 4723N 14245E. The aircraft was identified as a border violator at 1821Z located at 4710N 14235E. The aircraft then continued southwest to a last noted position of 4617N 14115E at 1838Z. Additionally two Soviet Sokol (4716N 14246E) based fighters were probably escorting the aircraft from 1818Z to the aircraft's last noted position. Also at least three additional fighters were active from Sokol and Sovetskaya Gavan' Vanino (4902N 14014Z) in defensive patrols in areas bounded by 4617N 14035E to 4830N 14335E between 1821Z to 1941Z.

(SC) The probable civil aircraft was noted descending in altitudes from 100 hectometers to 50 hectometers between 1818Z and 1830Z. The aircraft operated at speeds up to 900 kph. The fighters operated at speeds up to 950 kph and altitudes up to 95 hectometers.

(SC) According to a recently available Soviet tactical fighter communications, at least one Sakhalin Island based fighter performed live missile firing during the mid-1800Z hour of 31 August 1983.

Comments: (SC) Believe this activity may represent hostile action against a South Korean civil airliner which was reportedly lost over the Soviet littoral area. According to a collateral source a United States Congressman possibly was on board the aircraft.

1 Source: Reagan Library, Intelligence Directorate, NSC Records, 1981-1989, Series I: Subject File, Korean Airlines Disaster 09/01/1983: (09/01/1983-09/15/1983); NLR-262-1-17-4-7. Secret; Spoke; Flash. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

86. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, September 1, 1983

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations after the Korean Plane: The Near Term

Over the next hours and days, we will be concentrating on making sure the Soviets pay an international price for an act that was stupid at best, malicious at worst, and barbarous in any case.² Here we are proceeding on two main tracks:

—We are calling a UN Security Council meeting to put them before the tribunal of international opinion.³

—We are seeking an emergency session of the ICAO Council to mobilize the world civil aviation community,⁴ and we are examining ways to penalize Aeroflot. Neither the US nor South Korea has direct flights with the Soviet Union, of course, so broad international support will be required. The international pilots' association is already engaged, and we support NSC staff suggestions that we lobby in international meetings for the following actions:

1. Immediate allied and third country agreement to refuse to accept Aeroflot flight plans for a specified period. This will be particularly attractive as a signal of international solidarity, and appears to be the most achievable of these steps.

2. Review all outstanding discussions between the USSR and international civil aviation bodies with a view to

interrupting arrangements such as routing awards, requests for waiver of landing fees, etc. This is likely to be harder to get, but might be possible in tandem with refusal to accept Aeroflot flight plans.

3. Review all outstanding US, allied and third country equipment sales to the Soviet aviation industry and seek agreement to terminate or suspend these deliveries. This may well be hardest to achieve, both because it is a pocketbook issue and because it would raise the ghost of oil and gas sanctions, but could be worth a try.

We are working to put these issues in decision form preparatory to a possible NSC meeting Saturday.⁵

Bilaterally, in addition to our demands for an explanation, we are taking or have proposed to you the following actions:

—We are instructing our delegation to the international communications conference in Tashkent this week to spotlight the shutdown in its interventions, and not to accept any invitation from the Soviets. We considered withdrawing the delegation, but most members have already left, and we think it unwise to use international meetings of this kind for sanctions.

—As you are aware, we have proposed to withdraw the note given the Soviet Foreign Ministry August 31 proposing an 18-month extension of the bilateral Transportation Agreement that expired in June, subject to negotiation of amendments.⁶ In this case, we hesitated to recommend a step further dismantling the structure of the bilateral relationship, but the practical effect will be small, at least at the outset, and the political signal unmistakable.

How we choose to reflect our outrage in US-Soviet bilateral relations beyond these steps will depend importantly on two factors:

—1. *The Soviet response.* The TASS report and Gromyko's very slight expansion on it in his message to you were not only inadequate, but incomplete: they note that a plane violated Soviet airspace over both Kamchatka and Sakhalin; and claim it did not have navigational lights, did not respond to queries and did not enter into contact with the "dispatcher service"; and did not react to signals and warnings from Soviet fighters trying to direct it to the nearest airfield, but continued on.⁷ The denouement is not described. The Soviets know they have a problem, but have not yet decided how to handle it.

—2. *Our own intelligence analysis.* We are currently sifting and collating the data to determine what did and did not happen, relative to internationally accepted procedures. There are still very important uncertainties, e.g. communications capabilities, attempts and failures, degree of daylight, degree of Soviet ground command and control. [5½ lines not declassified]

The TASS report and Gromyko message have made it harder for the Soviets to admit wrong-doing, so we should not be optimistic. At the very best, the Soviets could admit obliquely that they made a mistake, and we may determine that they either made appropriate efforts to warn and force down the plane, or were unable for technical reasons to do so. In that case, the impact on our relations will be serious—since no conceivable rationale could justify the act—but not fundamental. If, on the other hand, the Soviets present no frank and conciliatory explanation of their action, and we determine that the claims of good-faith efforts in the

TASS and subsequent statements are lies, the effects will be deep and long-lasting.

However, important uncertainties concerning both the facts and Soviet intentions are likely to subsist. In that gray type of situation, public and political opinion in the West will be united in condemning the Soviet action, but divided as to whether it was a blunder or a crime. Both publicly and privately, we should handle the issue in a way that stresses Soviet irresponsibility and callousness. We have a policy framework vis-a-vis the Soviet Union which accommodates this approach.

Both in public and in private, we should put the emphasis on the loss of human life and on Soviet willingness to resort to force; explain (along the lines of your suggested CSCE speech for Madrid) that the incident shows once again the interrelationship between security and human rights issues, since excessive security-mindedness in contravention of normal international practice appears to have led to tragic loss of human life; and note that this point has been and will continue to be at the center of all our discussions with the Soviets under this Administration.

I have three specific recommendations for action vis-a-vis the Soviets over the next week, in line with this general approach:

—1. We should tell the Soviets that the working lunch/working session format agreed to for your Madrid meeting with Gromyko would not be appropriate under these circumstances. We must face the possibility that the Soviets will respond by cancelling the whole meeting.⁸ In that case, however, we would be on the high ground of being willing to continue talking but not to socialize, while they would be insisting unreasonably on socializing too,

and they will probably grumble but assent to this proposal. You will recall that Khrushchev used the U-2 shutdown to cancel the Paris Summit,⁹ with widespread sympathy from others; we would in fact have implemented a similar step, but on a more modest scale and on purely humanitarian grounds.

—2. You should feature this incident both in your CSCE remarks and in your opening presentation to Gromyko on the same grounds we will be taking in public: the Soviet penchant for force, Soviet callousness and the interrelationship between human rights and international security. Jack Matlock has suggested, and I agree, that you identify three conceptual problem areas to Gromyko in your opening remarks: use of force to settle disputes, the cost of armaments, and bilateral trust and confidence. This is a perfect example of what has gone wrong in relations, and who is at fault, and should serve to exemplify these three themes.

—3. We should explain publicly that we are taking these steps in the bilateral dialogue to register our extreme unhappiness and concern; that the United States, South Korea, and others will continue to pursue the issue in international fora to make the Soviets realize the gravity of what they have done; and that while we are aware of our responsibility to work with the Soviet Union as well as other countries to find peaceful solutions to international issues, the irresponsibility the Soviets have shown in this instance will inevitably make this work more difficult in the period ahead.

Finally, there is one step in US-Soviet relations I believe we should *not* take in the immediate near term because of the shutdown: telling the Soviets about adjustments in our position in INF. This will require a decision over the

weekend. I continue to believe that the substantive proposals we have made are correct, and that the US position should be developed along those lines this fall. There is no better bulwark of American strength vis-a-vis the USSR than Alliance unity behind the 1979 dual decision, and to maintain it through a difficult autumn we must demonstrate our vigorous pursuit of the Geneva negotiations. We should use this argument to press for a decision this weekend in favor of our proposals. But I also believe the scenario we initially envisaged is no longer viable after today, and that we should delay our presentation of new proposals to the Soviets. It would be incongruous for you to present them to Gromyko in Madrid September 8 under present circumstances. Rather, I would recommend that after the President sees Paul Nitze Sunday, we hold the new position until the following week. This would permit us to consult on it in the Alliance at the SCG meeting now scheduled for London September 12,¹⁰ and allow Paul to present it in Geneva later in the week and you to follow up on it with Gromyko in New York.

Otherwise, I think we should hold off deciding what further steps we should take in bilateral relations and in arms control until after the Madrid meeting. At this point I suspect we will find it inappropriate to invite Gromyko to Washington after our UNGA sessions, but there are still so many uncertainties that we need to see how things develop before proceeding further. Clearly, the tenor of our relations with the Soviets will be even more sober than before the shutdown; what cannot be clear is how the incident should affect the specifics of our discussions across the spectrum of the agenda.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, September 1-8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Drafted by Simons and John Hawes (EUR/RPM); cleared by Hartman and Palmer. Simons initialed for Hartman and Palmer.

² See [Document 84](#).

³ See [footnote 5, Document 89](#).

⁴ According to the United Nations' International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) website, the ICAO is a "specialized agency of the United Nations. . . created in 1944 to promote the safe and orderly development of international civil aviation." The organization "sets standards and regulations necessary for aviation safety, security, efficiency and regularity. . ." The ICAO met later in September to review the KAL incident. See the official website of the ICAO. See [footnote 2, Document 112](#).

⁵ The meeting to discuss the KAL shutdown was an NSPG meeting that took place on Friday, September 2, from 6 to 7:57 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No formal record of this meeting was found; however, see [Document 91](#) for a transcription of Weinberger's handwritten notes from the meeting.

⁶ See [Document 63](#).

⁷ The message from Gromyko is attached but not printed. The TASS statement was issued 22½ hours after the plane disappeared, and merely confirmed that "its jet fighters in the Far East had intercepted and warned an 'unidentified plane' intruding into Soviet airspace. But it made no mention of any attack on the plane." (John F. Burns, "Moscow Confirms Tracking of Plane But TASS Statement is Silent About an Attack on Airliner," *New York Times*, September 2, 1983, pg. A1) See [Document 84](#).

⁸ Shultz and Gromyko met as scheduled in Madrid on September 7 and 8. See [Documents 104](#) and [105](#).

⁹ Khrushchev and President Eisenhower were scheduled to meet in Paris shortly after Frances Gary Powers's U-2 plane was shot down and crashed in the Soviet Union. See [Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. X, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus, Part 1, Document 147](#) and [Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. X, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Part 2, Document 27](#).

¹⁰ The NATO Special Consultative Group met in London on September 12. The Embassy summarized the meeting in telegram 19405 from London, September 12, and forwarded the text of Burt's public statement after the meeting in telegram 19374 from London, September 12. (Both in Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number])

87. Memorandum From Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, September 1, 1983

SUBJECT

Responding to the Soviet Attack on a Korean Airliner

The shooting down of a Korean airliner demands a serious Western response. The scale of the tragedy is dramatic—surely one of the worst in civil aviation history. We cannot know for sure at this moment whether the action was the result of an authorization by Moscow or merely the work of a local commander. Neither answer should give us much encouragement. If the latter proves true, it suggests that Soviet decision making routines are so rigid that war could ignite as a result of inflexibility; if the former is correct, it suggests that the Soviet leadership has decided to issue a major provocation to our allies. It is also possible that the action was authorized by Soviet military officers as a signal to Andropov of their independence, or to influence the succession struggle.

While there will be a tendency on the part of some to want to view this incident in a narrow context it is worth noting that, in addition to turbulence in Central America, Chad and Lebanon, the Soviets have now decided to create a serious incident in Asia. This means that for the first time in a long while serious trends are unfolding in every principal theater. We have to soberly consider whether this may in fact be a deliberate message from the Soviets on the eve of the talks in Madrid: Do business with us or we can

make things infinitely worse for you. By the way, given what we know about the Soviet system, it is hard to believe that a decision of this type was not—in the two-and-a-half hours the plane was being hounded by Soviet fighters—referred at least as high as the Chairman of the General Staff.

We need to think hard about an appropriate response. One of the things that seemed to me unfortunate about the Secretary's immediate decision to go to Madrid—before all the relevant information on the incident was even at hand—is that it removed an important tool for trying to leverage an effective allied response. My sense is that the allies want us at Madrid so badly that they would be prepared to join in some serious response if they felt the alternative would be the cancellation of our appearance.

Words alone are not enough, but words can be important and we must choose them carefully. Instead of an unfocused outrage, we need—at the moment—to crystallize our rage into certain compelling themes:

—*The first is to note that this sort of behavior is completely uncivilized.* Not only is this true, it also strikes the Soviets in a very vulnerable area: the need of the regime to establish its legitimacy domestically by demonstrating that the Soviet Union is no longer an outcast but rather the equal of any other state.

—*Second, we should note, sadly, that the incident again forces us to make a critical distinction between what the Soviets do and what they say.* This has relevance for many things, not least of which is INF.

—*Third, we need to make people understand that this is not an isolated and inexplicable incident but seems*

rather part of a pattern of Soviet intimidation through force. We have seen in recent days continuing Soviet threats against Japan,² Soviet advisors in Chad to assist with Libya's aggression (a fact that, curiously enough, has still not been publicized), and Soviet unwillingness to calm the situation in Lebanon.

It seems to me that the President should himself communicate these themes. Indeed, nothing could more dramatically illustrate the contrast between the President's concern for humanity and the Soviet Union's persistent callousness—in short, a Presidential appearance at this moment would tellingly demonstrate that it is the Soviet Union—and not the President—that “militarizes” everything it touches.

There are concrete actions we should consider as well. Rather than accepting a pro forma Soviet “regret,” we might ask for an internal investigation with the results reported to the world. This, after all, is what civilized nations do. It is what we did after Klaus Barbie;³ and what the Israelis did after the tragedy at the Lebanese refugee camps. Other examples abound. Moreover, the Soviets recently held a widely publicized investigation of a Volga boating accident in which a hundred people were killed on a pleasure cruise. In a rare break with precedent, a Politburo member led the investigation and a number of responsible officials were publicly fired for negligence. We could make the point: Is the Soviet Union so callous toward the outside world that it is unwilling to do the same when over two hundred innocent people are killed as a result of Soviet actions.

There are other steps we should consider, though each has its pros and cons, such as 1) collective Western prohibition on Aeroflot flights until either such an investigation is held

or—somewhat softer—until the Soviets apologize and agree to full compensation; 2) accelerating the planned deployment of F-16s to Japan (so that we look like we are responding prudently to violence and uncertainty rather than initiating an arms buildup); and 3) discouraging the Japanese from further work with the Soviets on oil drilling in the Sakhalin Island area. There are other forms of cooperation we should urgently reconsider and suspend—not as a sanction, since the febleness of each gesture would make us look weak—but rather as an inevitable consequence of our disgust.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Donald Fortier Files, Subject File, KAL Shoot Down 09/01/1983; NLR-195-6-57-1-6. Secret. Sent for information. Clark's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² In telegram 17066 from Tokyo, September 1, the Embassy reported: "an official of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) announced in a press conference on August 30 that the Soviet Union deployed more than 10 MIG-23 aircraft to an existing military airfield on Etorofu Island in the Soviet-occupied northern territories just north of the Japanese island of Hokkaido." The JDA seemed unsure if this was a temporary or permanent deployment by the Soviets. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830505-0453)

³ Klaus Barbie was the Nazi Gestapo chief in Lyon, France during World War II. After the war, he was employed by U.S. Army intelligence, which later helped him evade capture and flee to South America. In August the Department of Justice released a report admitting that the Nazi war criminal had been in the employ of U.S. Army intelligence and apologized to France for helping him escape.

88. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 1, 1983

SUBJECT

U.S. Response to Soviet Attack on Korean Airliner: Current Status and Next Steps

As you return for Saturday's NSC meeting,² I want to review for you the situation with regard to the Korean airliner and the next steps we are working on for your consideration.³

The Current Situation

The Soviet attack on an unarmed civilian aircraft resulting in the deaths of two hundred sixty-nine people, including approximately thirty-five Americans, was a callous and brutal act that is certain to have far-reaching international impact. It is obvious that our own bilateral relations with the Soviet Union cannot remain unaffected by a fresh and particularly irresponsible Soviet resort to force and violence. Indeed, we have already taken some unilateral punitive steps, and we will need to consider other possibilities in the days and weeks ahead. At the same time, we must also ensure that the Soviets pay the full political costs of their actions in ways which go well beyond the US-Soviet bilateral relationship. Thus, it is essential that we work to build and sustain the broadest possible international response to this appalling act.

Twenty-four hours after the Korean aircraft was shot down there remain a number of gaps in our knowledge of the events leading up to the attack. For example, it remains

unclear how the Korean flight crew could have strayed so far off course and within Soviet airspace. It is not entirely certain whether the pilots of the Soviet interceptors knew that the Korean aircraft was a civilian airliner, although some evidence suggests that they did. The extent of involvement in the incident by Soviet ground controllers and higher authorities in Moscow is also unclear. However, it is clear beyond any doubt that Soviet aircraft did move into close proximity before firing at the airliner and that the attack was carried out in disregard for the loss of life that resulted. By any recognized standards of international law and conduct, the Soviet attack must be regarded as deliberate and unjustified.

Moreover, the Soviets have sidestepped our diplomatic efforts to elicit an explanation of the incident. As you know, Larry Eagleburger called in Soviet Chargé Sokolov this morning to demand an explanation. This afternoon Sokolov telephoned Rick Burt to convey a “personal message” from Gromyko to me that acknowledges Soviet interception of the airliner but not a Soviet role in its destruction. I instructed Rick to inform Sokolov that Gromyko’s response was totally inadequate and to reiterate our insistence on a satisfactory explanation of the affair. We have issued a public statement to this effect.⁴

As you know, CINCPAC is already conducting a search and rescue mission in the area where the aircraft appears to have gone down. We plan to request access to Soviet territorial waters to facilitate this search, and to pave the way for possible salvage operations later on.

Elements of a U.S. Response

As you know, we have formed an interagency task force to examine the various aspects of the case, and to consider

different responses that the U.S. and other concerned nations could take. The U.S. response must involve both steps in our bilateral relationship and a far-reaching effort to build and sustain a strong international response. We have thus far identified the following general areas for action.

A. Bilateral Steps

1. We have already notified the Soviets that the U.S. will not move forward with the planned extension of the bilateral agreement on cooperation in Transportation. This agreement provides for cooperation in various areas of transportation technology, including civil aviation safety and high-speed water-borne transport.
2. We will have to consider urgently what impact this incident should have on my planned meeting with Gromyko at Madrid. I intend to go forward with the meeting and to use it as a vehicle for conveying to the Soviets at Politburo level our strong revulsion at their actions and our determination to respond vigorously.
3. We are in contact with a number of prominent Americans who are planning to travel to the USSR in the near future, including Congressmen Gray, Boxer, and Solarz. We are not actively discouraging their travel, but are recommending that, if they feel they must go ahead with their trips, they convey their views on this incident to the Soviets in the strongest terms.
4. We are instructing our delegation to the international communications conference in Soviet Central Asia this week to spotlight this incident in what they say, and to refuse all Soviet social invitations.

5. We are examining a number of other options for steps across the gamut of our bilateral relations, including in the economic area. For instance, we might consider reviewing all outstanding equipment sales to the Soviet aviation industry, while pressing our allies to undertake similar steps.

B. Multilateral Initiatives

1. We have called for an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council and will use this forum to condemn the Soviet attack in the strongest possible terms and seek a resolution calling for a special international investigation. In particular, we intend to use the Council debate to expose Soviet efforts to evade responsibility for the attack by including in the U.S. statement verbatim excerpts from the communications of Soviet pilots who fired the missiles. We will be pressing other nations to join with us in issuing condemnatory statements both in the Council debate and outside it.

2. We are urgently considering steps to organize and support international action against Soviet civil aviation interests, particularly Aeroflot international operations and flights by third-country airlines to the Soviet Union. For example, we could seek immediate allied and third-country agreement to refuse to accept Aeroflot flight plans for a specified period. We would pursue actions of this kind within organizations such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, but much work will also have to be done in bilateral consultations with other nations. In this connection, we are studying ways to exploit the building condemnation of the Soviet attack by private organizations, such as the International Pilots Association.

3. We have looked at the possibility of bringing a case before the International Court of Justice, but this procedure would be time-consuming at best, and probably inconclusive.

C. Public Diplomacy

1. The statements already issued by you and me put us in the correct position of condemning in strongest terms the Soviet attack, while calling on them to explain it if they can.⁵ By contrast, the weak and evasive Soviet statements issued thus far will only fuel international skepticism of whatever line Moscow may ultimately adopt to “explain” its actions.

2. We have already approached our European and Japanese allies to urge that they issue similar condemnatory statements. The British have already made a strong statement, and we will continue pressing others to follow suit.

3. We will be developing on an urgent basis a public diplomacy strategy to exploit this incident. As we implement this strategy, we must recognize that U.S. leadership will be essential. However, we will want to avoid repetition of the “Olympic Boycott” syndrome in which the U.S. role overshadowed that of other nations and private interests. Instead, the U.S. should encourage initiatives by others and adopt a supporting and facilitating role where possible and appropriate.

I believe that, taken together, these steps put us on the right track in developing the U.S. response to the Soviet attack. We will be constantly reevaluating and exploring new possibilities in the days and weeks ahead, and offering recommendations for your review.

¹ Source: National Security Council, Institutional Files, NSPG Meetings, Box SR 108, NSPG 0068, 2 Sep 83 Soviet Downing of Korean Airliner. Secret; Sensitive.

² September 3.

³ Reagan was at his ranch in California when the shutdown occurred. He returned to Washington on the afternoon of September 2. His diary entry for Friday, September 2 reads: “Then as the week went by the Soviets shot down a Korean Airliner with 269 passengers—53 of them Americans including Cong. Larry McDonald. The traffic in conference calls got heavy. We were due to return to Wash. on Labor Day but realized we couldn’t wait so we left on Fri. It was heartbreaking—I had really looked forward to those last 3 days. When we got in Fri. I went directly to an N.S.C. [NSPG] meeting re the Soviet affair. We’re going to try & persuade our friends to join us in banning Aeroflot flights & in demanding reparations for the victim’s families.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 259) The NSPG meeting took place on Friday, September 2, in the White House Situation Room from 6 p.m. to 7:57 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) See [Document 91](#).

⁴ In his memoir, Shultz recounted this meeting: “By 12:30 p.m., we got the first response from the Soviets when Oleg Sokolov came into the State Department. Gromyko, he told us, said KAL 007 was warned off but kept on. Sokolov speculated that the plane probably crashed, adding ‘This is what they told me to tell you,’ a highly unusual comment coming from a Soviet official.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 363)

⁵ For Shultz’s press conference at 10:45 a.m. on September 1 and the President’s statement later that day, see [Document 84](#).

89. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, September 2, 1983

SUBJECT

Your Participation in the September 2 NSC Meeting: Talking Paper on KAL Follow-Up

The following paper reflects our luncheon discussion today on the structure you will wish to give your remarks.²

I. Overall Objective

—This terrible tragedy paradoxically gives us an opportunity to reinforce the President's overall policy of strength and purpose. We should use it.

—We should punish the Soviets for their barbaric action, but we should above all speak and act so as to point up how it shows the differences between our two systems. We should not act as though this incident has come as a big surprise. Instead, it only portrays what we have long known about the Soviet system. But we should work to ensure that others—at home and abroad—understand this point.

—This does not mean that we should shy away from talking to the Soviets. I plan to see Gromyko next week so I can tell him face-to-face what we think of the Soviet action and to insist on a real explanation.

—On that point, we must also be sure we show it is the Soviets against the world, and not just the U.S. against the

Soviet Union. This afternoon's preposterous TASS statement shows clearly that the Soviet tactic is to try to turn this into a U.S.-Soviet issue.³ We should not play their game. Our game should be international solidarity.

II. *The Shootdown and the Most Serious Issues*

—We should capitalize on this stark reminder of the contrast between us and the Soviets to advance on the most serious issues we face.

—On *Central America*, I see this as a golden opportunity to get rid of the Boland/Zablocki Amendment.⁴

—On *Lebanon/Syria*, if we need to build our strength in the area we now have a much better political context than before to do it.

—On the *defense budget and especially MX*, the Soviets have just reminded the American people and our Allies how dangerous they are, how easily they throw their military strength around, and how much we need a strong defense. We should drive the message home.

III. *Mobilizing International Solidarity*

—We have moved quickly to mobilize the international community to express its outrage and impose costs on the Soviets, especially in the aviation field. We are meeting daily with our European and Asian Allies and friends. We should keep it up.

—The UN Security Council met this afternoon at the request of the U.S., Japan and South Korea.⁵ I will be

asking Jeane Kirkpatrick to come back and take over our effort there.

—You have before you a list of seven measures we are proposing for immediate action (attached at Tab 1):

1. Refusing to accept Aeroflot flight plans;
2. Suspending non-safety-related discussions between the Soviets and other national civil aviation bodies;
3. Boycotts against Aeroflot;
4. Censuring the Soviets at a special meeting of the ICAO Council next week;
5. Reaffirming our existing sanction against Aeroflot flights to the U.S.;
6. Making a claim against the Soviets for the death of our citizens; and
7. Cancelling interline ticketing arrangements with Aeroflot.

—Some of these are actions for governments to take, others for private organizations like pilots' unions.

—On those that require government action, we met with Transportation and the FAA this morning, and are in agreement with them that we should proceed.

—On those requiring private action, Larry Eagleburger met with Lane Kirkland and we met also with the Airline Pilots' Association and the Air Transport Association to see what they are prepared to do, and we will be following up.

—We may find that not all these proposals are feasible, but I would like your authorization to begin exploring them with private groups and foreign governments.

IV. *U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Relations*

—The defense budget, Central America and the Middle East are important elements in the U.S.-Soviet equation, but we need to decide how to handle others that are more directly bilateral.

—I am thinking about three categories.

—1. On the *Madrid meeting with Gromyko*, I intend to shorten and toughen it, drop the working luncheon we had agreed to, and focus the whole meeting on three topics:

—the shutdown;

—human rights, especially Anatoliy Shcharanskiy;
and

—arms control treaty compliance.

—We have to make the Soviets at the highest levels of government understand how dangerously and irresponsibly they are acting, and tell the world we are making these points. That is why I need to meet Gromyko in Madrid.

—2. On *other bilateral topics*, we have already told the Soviets we are not moving to renew the *Transportation Agreement* that expired in June because of the shutdown.

—I also want your agreement not to proceed at this point to renew discussion of *consulates in Kiev and New York and a new exchanges agreement*. I have supported these steps

because both things would be in our long-term interest and we should go ahead at some point. But that point is not now.

—3. On *arms control*, it is important not to turn an opportunity to shift weight against the Soviets into a defeat for the U.S. This is especially true concerning Europe and in the arms control field. We want to keep things focussed on what the Soviets have now done rather than on what we are not doing.

—For that reason, Mr. President, I think we should make the *INF* decisions that have been proposed, but *not* make this public, and *not* convey it to the Soviets in Geneva at this point. We would tell our Allies, but hold off going to the Soviets and publicizing your decision until later in the month.

V. *Presidential Action*

—Mr. President, you have already taken the lead to turn the anguish we all feel into support for your policy of strength and purpose. The American people will expect you to continue.

—I have here a statement (at Tab 2)⁶ that I would like you to make tomorrow morning, so that it gets picked up in the Sunday papers.

—It tells the world that today's Soviet statement on the KAL shutdown is preposterous. It says you have instructed me to go to Madrid for a short, blunt meeting with Gromyko to tell him of our extremely serious concerns about Soviet behavior in this and a number of other areas. It says you have directed me to pursue the initiative which the world aviation community itself has undertaken to

make clear to the Soviets that they have created a real danger to international travel and travellers' safety.

—By Tuesday,⁷ we should have the actual tapes of the Soviet conversations before the shutdown. Making excerpts public would be a very effective step, and I think we should do so.

—We are checking with other governments with citizen victims about their plans for memorial services, and keeping in touch with Congressman McDonald's family on their plans. I think a memorial service at the National Cathedral with you and the Ambassadors of those countries in attendance would be a fitting gesture, and if you agree I will be recommending a time to you soon.

Tab 1

Options Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁸

Washington, undated

Near-Term Actions on Civil Aviation

At today's NSC meeting, we should consider concrete measures to register our condemnation of the Soviet attack on the Korean Air Lines aircraft and to impose a real cost on the Soviets.⁹ To maximize the cost and impose it quickly, we should concentrate on steps that can most efficiently exploit international outrage and generate multilateral solidarity. The world's attention is focused on Soviet use of unprovoked force against peaceful air travellers.

Thus, we believe it important that our measures be concentrated in the civil aviation area and fully reflect the international outrage this incident has evoked. We need to

spark international penalization of this egregious act without lending credibility to the inevitable Soviet claim that we are using the incident to freeze East-West relations even further. By sticking to the humanitarian and air safety aspects, in other words, we can avoid sacrificing the unity of outrage that presently exists. We think the following package of measures strikes the right balance.

1. *We should seek immediate agreement by as many countries as possible to refuse to accept flight plans for Aeroflot for a minimum period of 30-60 days or until the Soviets have provided a satisfactory response to the international community.* This would have the immediate advantage of registering a broad international condemnation of the Soviet action, but within a specific time frame so that it would be acceptable within the international community. Critical to the success of this effort will be securing the cooperation of the Canadians (since Montreal is the only remaining Aeroflot destination north of the Rio Grande), the Japanese, the Koreans, and several European countries. We would begin by diplomatic approaches to these critical countries and expand the effort, assuming we have a reasonable chance of success.

2. *We should seek to suspend non-safety related ongoing discussions between the USSR and other national civil aviation bodies with a view to interrupting such arrangements as route awards, requests for the waiver of landing fees, etc.* This measure, which would be raised with other governments in connection with step one, might have considerable impact on Soviet plans to expand their civil aviation operations worldwide, but could be acceptable to many in the international community, since it would not affect current operations once the steps taken under option #1 were terminated.

3. *Boycott.* The Air Line Pilots' Association (ALPA) has already communicated with Andropov, Dobrynin, and ICAO, and is considering steps to implement an international boycott aimed at halting Aeroflot service outside the USSR and international airline service to Moscow as well. In addition, airlines may wish to join this effort. Other American labor leaders as well as foreign pilots' groups may be contemplating similar steps.

We will be meeting with these groups to learn more about their intentions, which could well serve to emphasize the level of international reaction.

4. *Initiate procedures to censure the USSR at a special meeting of the ICAO Council next week.* The President of the ICAO Council is attempting to arrange an urgent meeting of the Council, at which we will seek an ICAO investigation of events leading to the destruction of the KAL flight. That meeting will probably occur early next week. We may wish to ask the UN Security Council to reinforce this request. Our subsequent tactics will depend on developments in both fora.

5. *Strong Reaffirmation of Existing Sanction.* We would make a strong public reaffirmation that our present suspension of all regularly-scheduled Aeroflot service to this country remains the policy of this Administration and we have no plans to alter it. U.S. reactions to the shutdown showed that much of the public is not aware of this sanction, which has been very keenly felt by the Soviets. There has been pressure building to lift this sanction so that the reaffirmation would further underscore our abhorrence of this particular Soviet action.

6. *Claims.* Under international law, the U.S. would be entitled to make a claim against the Soviet Union for the

wrongful death of our citizens. Korea and other affected countries would also have this right. There is precedent for making such a claim for compensation and for demanding that they take all appropriate measures to prevent a recurrence, inform us concerning those measures and punish all persons responsible for the incident. We will prepare such a claim against the Soviets, to be conveyed through diplomatic channels, and discuss the matter with the Koreans with a view to including any claim they may wish us to present on their behalf.

7. Cancel interline ticketing arrangements with Aeroflot. At present, Aeroflot has arrangements to write tickets for travel on other airlines. If this and the attendant appearance of Aeroflot flights in other airline computers were cancelled, this would present the Soviets with serious impediments to selling tickets for travel into and outside the USSR. We will investigate the feasibility under U.S. domestic law of requiring our airlines to cancel these arrangements and the willingness of other countries to join us in similar steps.

We also considered a review of all outstanding U.S., Allied and third country equipment sales to the Soviet aviation industry. On balance, we think this would get in the way of achieving the more immediate steps above and might even jeopardize the safety of international aviation operations by cutting sales of necessary safety-related equipment to the USSR.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, September 1-8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Hartman and Palmer. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Simons initialed

for Burt, Hartman, and Palmer. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on September 2.

² These talking points for Shultz were prepared for the September 2 NSPG meeting on the KAL incident. See [Document 91](#).

³ The TASS statement was issued on the September 2. For the full text, see "Text of Tass Statement On Downing of Airliner," *New York Times*, September 3, 1983, p. 4.

⁴ Representatives Boland and Zablocki proposed an amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act to stop U.S. support for covert military operations in Nicaragua.

⁵ For the full text of the September 2 statement of Charles M. Lichenstein, the Acting Permanent U.S. Representative to the United Nations, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1983, pp. 3-5. The *New York Times* reported that several UNSC members denounced Soviet actions as "barbarous," "nothing short of murder," and "quite simply a massacre in the sky." (Bernard D. Nossiter, "'Murder' and 'Massacre' Charged As U.N. Council starts Its Debate," *New York Times*, September 3, 1983, p. 1) The Security Council held six meetings between September 2 and 12 to consider the KAL incident. See *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1983*, pp. 218-223.

⁶ Tab 2, a Draft Presidential Statement, was not found.

⁷ September 6.

⁸ Secret.

⁹ This options paper was distributed to participants for the September 2 NSPG meeting. (National Security Council, Institutional Files, NSPG Meetings, Box SR 108, NSPG 0068, 2 Sep 83 Soviet Downing of Korean Airliner)

90. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 2, 1983

SUBJECT

NSPG Meeting: Soviet Shoot-Down of KAL Airliner

INTRODUCTION

The shooting down of a Korean airliner demands a serious international response. The scale of the tragedy is dramatic—surely one of the worst in civil aviation history.

The Soviets have a long history, beginning in 1946, of shooting down unarmed aircraft near their borders. Moreover, they have had a policy of electronic deception of radio air navigation aids which have lured many aircraft across their borders, only to be shot down. This is the second time they have shot down a Korean airliner.

Some will want to view this incident in a narrow context. However, it is worth considering whether the Soviets were deliberately seeking an opportunity to increase tensions in Asia in order—after events in Lebanon, Chad, Central America—to test us in multiple theaters simultaneously. It is entirely likely that the decision to attack the airliner was made at a very high level.

It is therefore important that you focus the discussion at today's meeting on the broader ramifications of this incident. What does it say about how far the Soviets may now be prepared to go in trying to intimidate our Asian

allies—who, like the Japanese, have shown some greater willingness to take new steps for effective defense—or our European allies on the verge of INF deployments? What does it say about the growing cynicism and boldness of the current Soviet leadership? And, based on the answer to this question, what does it say about the character and possibilities for our bilateral relationship in the immediate future?

The chief dilemma over the near term is how to translate the concern of the world into meaningful actions without making it appear that we are improperly capitalizing on the tragedy itself. How to devise measures that can be sustained? How to focus the existing rage in ways that enable us to influence domestic and international reaction of others on important issues before us; e.g., Soviet supported terrorism, use of chemical biological weapons, etc.

In past cases where the Soviets have committed egregious crimes they and their apologists have attempted through disinformation and lies to turn the focus away from their actions and somehow blame the U.S. or its allies. Unless we take the offensive they will try to put *us* on the defensive.

We need to think hard about an appropriate response, and we have to consider what message the Soviets may have tried to send as George Shultz prepares to meet next week with Gromyko in Madrid. If we decide that meeting should proceed, as George has announced, we need to consider very carefully the message we want to send.

OBJECTIVES

Your personal statement and early return have already set the tone of our concern.² We must now ensure that follow on actions are directed and structured to achieve recognizable and coherent objectives. These objectives must be shared by the American people, the Congress, our major allies and reflect our status as leader of the free world. We believe that our actions in the coming days and weeks must be designed to achieve the following objectives:

- *Reverse Soviet “Peacemaker” Image and Register an Appropriate Political Protest.* The incident presents us with the opportunity to reverse the false moral and political “peacemaker” perception that the Soviets have been cultivating. Their active propaganda in this regard has cast the Soviet Union as flexible, legitimate and searching for peace. This has, in turn, created severe problems in our efforts to convince the free world of their true objectives. Actions to achieve this objective should be aimed at securing domestic and international support for your programs to strengthen western security.
- *Justice.* We must be seen as a leader (but not alone) in the international community in calling for justice. Civilized societies demand punishment and restitution in order to deter and raise perceived costs of future egregious acts. Despite numerous incidents of this kind, the Soviets have never acceptably investigated, reported or identified their victims. We must demand that they do so now. In order to be effective, the action we take to achieve this objective must be tailored to appear proportional to the crime. We cannot be perceived as too harsh, too weak or ineffective in the sanctions we call for or endorse.

- *Bolster the confidence of Intimidated States.* What we do or fail to do in supporting the Koreans and Japanese in the days and weeks ahead will be a telling signal to friends and allies alike. We must be responsive and cooperative, without appearing excessive, particularly in the case of military support.

ILLUSTRATIVE ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES

- *Actions to Reverse Soviet "Peacemaker" Image and Register Political Protest.*

- A major Presidential speech addressing the objectives and methods of Soviet grand strategy.

- Review the degree to which our presence at negotiating tables with the Soviets reinforces the idea that the Soviets are good-faith negotiators. Consider withdrawal from various or all negotiations.

- Diplomatic effort to secure public statements and resolutions condemning the Soviet Union in relevant international fora.

- Major information campaign by USIA.

- Consider cancelling the forthcoming Shultz-Gromyko meeting. Such a meeting could be boycotted until the Soviets provide an explanation for the incident, an apology and reparations.

- Consider closing the Soviet consulate in San Francisco; it is a center for their spy network against the U.S. electronics industry.

- *Actions to secure justice.*

—Soviets grant unimpeded Western access to crash site.

—Soviets publicly document to world-wide aviation bodies their procedures in the case of airliners crossing into Soviet airspace.

—Soviets provide specific assurances against destructive force being used again against straying airliners.

—Consider seizure or attachment of Soviet owned commercial assets in the U.S. in connection with filing an international claim against the USSR on behalf of American citizen victims.

—Soviets document that no future incidents of electronic desception of radio air navigation signals will occur.

—Soviets must provide full reparations to Korea and to the families of the dead on accepted international scales.

—Options should be prepared concerning internationally implementable procedures to impede Aeroflot activities, world-wide, and discourage flights to the Soviet Union for a specified period of time.

—Review all outstanding U.S., allied and third country equipment sales to the Soviet aviation industry and seek immediate agreement from as many countries as possible to terminate or suspend indefinitely these deliveries.

- *Actions to Bolster Confidence of Intimidated States*

- Lease or sell AWACS to Japan to help defend regional air routes.
- Possible acceleration of F-16 deployment in Japan.
- Carrier battle group deployment to the region.
- Discussions with allies in the area to bolster regional security arrangements.

The NSPG meeting tonight will be too brief to discuss all of these matters. This paper, however, provides you with some thoughts to guide the discussion. Most importantly, in whatever we decide to do or not to do, we should keep these objectives in mind.

¹ Source: National Security Council, Institutional Files, NSPG Meetings, Box SR 108, NSPG 0068, 2 Sep 83 Soviet Downing of Korean Airliner. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. On September 2, Reagan returned to Washington from his ranch in California, arriving at the White House at 5:43 p.m. The NSPG meeting Clark discussed in this memorandum began in the Situation Room at 6 p.m. From a comment in Shultz's memoir (see [Document 84](#)), it is clear that Clark was with Reagan in California, and likely returned with him to Washington on Air Force One. See also [footnote 3, Document 88](#).

² In addition to the September 1 statement (see [Document 84](#)), Reagan spoke to the press at Point Magu Naval Air Station when he was departing from California. See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book II, pp. 1223-1224.

91. Notes by Secretary of Defense Weinberger of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 2, 1983

NSC—Sit [Situation] Rm [Room]

President

V.P.

GPS [George Shultz] Even if USSR thought it was a US recon [reconnaissance] plane—they shot it down w/o any inquiry. No hotline, etc.

Shows they'd do a 1st strike. We should use this to help us get Big Defense Budget & to get rid of Boland-Zablocki amend [amendment].²

& maybe in Lebanon.³

Sanctions—try not to hurt us.

USSR—says they regret loss of human life but blame us.

Options State Civil aviation options RR [Ronald Reagan]
But something to get reparations CW [Caspar Weinberger]
—Ct [Court] of Int'l Justice—& direct demand of USSR for
reparations RR—they shot down our planes in 50s & 60s
RR—what if we just turn around a USSR ship going into
Corinto⁴

CWW—seek meetings of NATO & ASEAN

RR—get other countries to join with us for reparations & in actions to block USSR Aeroflot RR—make public list of US planes shot down by USSR in 50s & 60s Don Regan— Economic sanctions probably won't get agreement of other countries Stop tourism & ask other nations to do same until we could get answers fr [from] USSR

Stop imports from USSR—allies wouldn't [unclear— budge?]

Titanium & chrome No on blocking USSR assets deposited CWW rescue task force INF

GPS Gromyko meeting

General Vessey—[unclear—Soviet recon missions?]

RR need arms reductions. We should proceed & meet with them.

Rescue mission

Reparations.

Stop sending ships to Nicaragua or we'll stop them for you GPS Mistake not to go to Madrid Mistake to refuse to talk to people Shorter meeting

Agenda

Shoot down

Human rights—Shcharansky Compliance with treaties Ed Meese—need to do more things that relate to air safety Memorial service at Nat'l Cathedral and [unclear— churches?]

RR—Attitude

INF—great opportunity to go after USSR—the best way to stop deployment—if you eliminate then we won't deploy. But we [unclear—can or could?] leave table if you [unclear—leave Eur?]

You have [unclear]

Statement by President Planning—what can be done on behalf of victims [unclear—Tape?]

GPS—Range of options

[unclear—Comments?]

[unclear—call for?] react [reaction] & condemnation & general support Lebanon—McFarlane

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Appointment and Diary File, Box 9, Notes Set B, 1983 #25-41. No classification marking. The editor transcribed this text from Weinberger's handwritten notes of the NSPG meeting. An image of the notes is [Appendix D](#). The NSPG meeting to “discuss the Soviet attack on the Korean civil airliner” was held in the Situation Room from 6 p.m. to 7:57 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No formal record of the meeting was found.

² See [footnote 5, Document 89](#).

³ Weinberger wrote “Arms reduction” in the margin in a box on the left-hand side.

⁴ Corinto is a port city on the northwest Pacific coast of Nicaragua.

92. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, September 3, 1983, 1451Z

252822. Eyes Only for Chargé. Subject: Eagleburger-Sokolov Meeting September 2: Korean Airliner Incident; Lebanon.

1. S—Entire text

2. Summary: Soviet Chargé Sokolov called on Under Secretary Eagleburger September 2 to deliver Soviet démarche on Korean airliner incident. Démarche is substantively identical to TASS statement released earlier in the day (minus direct personal attack on President), alleging airliner was on pre-planned, U.S.-sponsored espionage mission and accusing U.S. of “dirty insinuations” about Soviet Union.² In response, Eagleburger handed Sokolov copy of statement made by the Secretary prior to the meeting rejecting substance of TASS statement.³ In response to question from Burt, Sokolov said he had no reply to U.S. request concerning search and rescue operations in Sea of Japan. Eagleburger also used meeting as opportunity to deliver démarche on Lebanon situation condemning August 31 TASS statement and unconstructive Soviet behavior in area. Sokolov rejected U.S. characterization of USSR and its behavior and stood by TASS statement. End summary.

3. Soviet Chargé Sokolov called on Under Secretary Eagleburger at 1800 September 2 at his request to present a Soviet oral statement on the KAL shutdown. Eagleburger was accompanied by EUR Assistant Secretary

Burt, EUR/SOV Director Simons and Eagleburger aide Johnson; Sokolov was alone.

4. Sokolov began by saying he assumed Eagleburger had read that afternoon's TASS statement, but he was instructed to make an "oral statement" which repeated some of the TASS elements but was not confined to them. He drew Eagleburger's attention especially to the last paragraph, and left a Russian text with an unofficial embassy English translation (Department's translation below, para 9).

5. After reading through the Soviet statement, Eagleburger commented that we had indeed seen the TASS statement, and handed Sokolov a copy of the Secretary's remarks to the press at 1745 (septel). Sokolov said he would study it. Eagleburger said we would make the White House aware of the Soviet statement.

6. Eagleburger then said he would like to switch subjects, and provided Sokolov with the text of a U.S. démarche on the situation in Lebanon (text in para 10).

7. After glancing through the text, Sokolov said he would reiterate the substance of the August 31 TASS statement on this subject. In the Soviet view it accurately describes both the situation and the actions of the various parties. He could not accept our characterization of the Soviet Union or Soviet behavior. The Soviet position was well known, and he did not have to repeat its details.

8. Burt asked Sokolov whether he had a reply to our request concerning search and rescue efforts involving the KAL aircraft. Sokolov said the Embassy has received only some coordinates for planes flying September 2, and had not received a reply to our request.

9. Begin text of Soviet démarche on Korean airliner incident (Department's translation):

—On the night from August 31 to September 1 of this year, an unidentified plane grossly violated the Soviet state border and intruded deep into the Soviet Union's air space. The intruder plane had deviated from the existing international route in the direction of the Soviet Union's territory by up to 500 kilometers and spent more than two hours over the Kamchatka Peninsula, the area of the Sea of Okhotsk, and the island of Sakhalin.

—In violation of international regulations, the plane flew without navigation lights, did not react to radio signals of the Soviet dispatcher services, and itself made no attempts to establish communication contact.

—It was natural that, during the time the unidentified intruder plane was in the USSR's air space, Soviet anti-air defense aircraft were ordered aloft which repeatedly tried to establish contact with the plane using generally accepted signals and to take it to the nearest airfield in the territory of the Soviet Union. The intruder plane, however, ignored all this. Over Sakhalin Island, a Soviet aircraft fired warning shots with tracer shells along the flight path of the plane.

—Soon after this, the intruder plane left the limits of Soviet air space and continued its flight toward the Sea of Japan. For about ten minutes it was within the observation zone of radar systems, after which it could no longer be observed.

—The American side has already been informed that, as a result of measures we had taken, debris of an aircraft were discovered in the vicinity of Moneron Island. The facts which became known thereafter give ground to believe that

the itinerary and the nature of the flight were not accidental. One's attention is drawn to the fact that already in the first report about the disappearance of a South Korean airliner, reference was made to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

—It is indicative that now, after the fact, the American side not only officially admits the fact of that plane's violation of Soviet air space, but also cites data which indicate that the relevant U.S. services followed the flight throughout its duration in the most attentive manner.

—So one may ask that, if it were an ordinary flight of a civil aircraft which was under continuing observation, then why were no steps taken by the American side to end the gross violation of the air space of the USSR and to get the plane back to an international flight route?

—Why did the American authorities, which now resort to all kinds of dirty insinuations about the USSR, not try to establish contact with the Soviet side and provide it with the necessary data about this flight? Neither was done, although the time for this was more than sufficient.

—It is appropriate to recall that instances of deliberate violation of the state frontiers of the Soviet Union by American planes, including in the Far East, are far from rare. Protests have repeatedly been lodged with the U.S. Government in this regard.

—In the light of these facts, the intrusion into the air space by the mentioned plane cannot be regarded in any other way than a pre-planned act. It was obviously thought possible to achieve special intelligence objectives without hindrance using civilian planes as a cover.

—Moreover, there is reason to believe that those who organized this provocation had deliberately desired a further aggravation of the international situation, striving to smear the Soviet Union, to sow hostility to it and to cast aspersions on the Soviet peaceloving policy. This is also illustrated by the slanderous propaganda campaign which has been unleashed in the United States and which has been joined by American officials.

—The Soviet Union, as is known, has expressed regret over the loss of human life and at the same time has resolutely condemned those who consciously or as a result of criminal disregard have allowed the death of people and are now trying to use this occurrence for unseemly political purposes.

—It should be clear to the U.S. Government that continuation by them of a policy aimed at whipping up further tensions in Soviet-American relations and in the world as a whole neither would be in the interests of our two countries, nor would it help resolve the major problems which really exist.

[Omitted here is the text of the démarche on Lebanon.]

Shultz

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830008-0162. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Palmer, Burt, McKinley, and in S/S-O; approved by Eagleburger.

² See [footnote 3, Document 89](#).

³ Shultz issued a statement at 5:45 p.m. on September 2 to rebut the TASS statement. (Department of State *Bulletin*,

October 1983, p. 5) See also Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 364.

93. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, September 3, 1983

SUBJECT

The Soviet Union and the Western Hemisphere

This memorandum assesses the Soviet Union's growing involvement in the Western Hemisphere. The Executive Summary, Tab 1, includes suggested talking points for your meeting with Gromyko at the UN. Tab 2 provides additional background information on: the Soviet Union's evolving attitude toward the Americas, possible future Soviet actions, the U.S. response, and how to discuss this problem with the Soviets.²

Tab 1

Executive Summary of a Paper Prepared in the Policy Planning Council³

Washington, undated

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE (Executive Summary)

The Soviet Union's growing assertiveness in the Western Hemisphere poses new challenges for the U.S. Until the mid-1970's the Soviets placed the region at or near the bottom of their foreign policy agenda. But during the 1970's the Soviets had reason to reevaluate their assumptions about Latin America. The Soviets apparently

have now accepted the validity of the Cuban “armed struggle” thesis, at least for Central America.

Elements of the trend toward greater Soviet involvement include the use of Cuba as a political-military proxy, increased weapons deliveries to Cuba, intensified use of Cuba as a Soviet military platform, military assistance for Nicaragua and Grenada, and expanded trade with South America.

The cumulative effect of Moscow’s actions in the Western Hemisphere is to undermine the two-ocean security buffer that the U.S. traditionally has relied upon for protection of the Americas from its major adversaries. There is also a growing danger that Soviet miscalculation of how important the region is to the U.S. could lead to a superpower military confrontation.

Soviet deployment of nuclear weapons in the Western Hemisphere seems unlikely, even in response to INF deployments in Western Europe. There are, however, a number of steps Soviets might take over the next few years that would cause the U.S. serious problems. Of most immediate concern is the possibility of:

- expansion of direct Soviet military involvement in Nicaragua,
- support for Cuban combat troops in Nicaragua,
- delivery through intermediaries of sophisticated weapons to the Salvadoran guerrillas.

There are no magic “linkage” or “talking tough” strategies that will make the Soviet threat in this hemisphere disappear. The core of our response must remain the set of concrete actions we take *in this hemisphere* to demonstrate

our resolve and to make the region a less favorable environment for the Soviets.

But our concrete actions can be reinforced by a policy of communicating our concerns clearly and forthrightly to the Soviets so that they can avoid a miscalculation that could be disastrous for both sides. Our recent actions—the President's strong public commitment to protecting U.S. interests in Central America, the *contra* program, the training facility in Honduras, and large-scale military maneuvers—provide a window in which we can now convey a somewhat sterner message to the Soviets.

Our most serious and immediate concern is the Soviet/Cuban role in Central America. We want the Soviets to 1) pressure Cuba and Nicaragua to end their support for Salvadoran and other Central American revolutionaries, and 2) sever Soviet/Cuban military ties with the Sandinistas. By setting forth these long-range objectives to the Soviets at this point, we can help them avoid miscalculation and condition them to their ultimate acceptance. We should place our Central America concerns within the broad trend of increased Soviet involvement in the Western Hemisphere, however, lest the Soviets be encouraged to move in areas where we have neglected to raise objections.

We suggest that you make your UN meeting with Gromyko the primary vehicle for a broad discussion on Latin America. Following are points that might be included in the discussion:

—Soviet and Cuban actions in the hemisphere have grown increasingly bold and provocative over the last few years.

—These actions include support for Central American subversives, the military buildup in Nicaragua, the modernization of the Cuban armed forces, growing Cuban/Soviet security ties with Grenada and Suriname, and more intensive Soviet use of Cuba as a military platform (mention as an illustration the recent TU-142 Bear F ASW aircraft flights out of Cuba, since we have not raised this with the Soviets yet; we should not, however, label the flights “unacceptable.”)

—We do not view these as isolated actions, but as part of a pattern of increased Soviet interference in the Americas. We note with particular concern that the Soviet Union now seems to support fully the Cuban doctrine of “armed struggle” as the best path to revolution in Central America.

—The U.S. has important interests in Central America; the Soviet Union does not. The Soviet Union and Cuba should have no illusions about our determination to uphold our interests. Such illusions will only increase the chance of dangerous confrontation, which neither side seeks.

—You should also know that we will hold the Soviet Union responsible for the activities of its clients that directly or indirectly affect U.S. interests in the Americas. This includes the sending of jet fighters or armed Cuban forces to Nicaragua, or any similar escalation, which would be simply unacceptable.

—We are pursuing a policy that we hope will lead to a peaceful solution to the Central America crisis.

—U.S. policy is working. We intend to provide the Salvadoran government with enough military assistance to turn the tide against the FMLN-FDR, and we will continue to press for reforms to broaden that government's popular appeal. In contrast, there is every indication that the Sandinista government in Nicaragua is losing popular support and that the *contras* are growing, and will continue to grow, in strength.

—In sum, it is clear that events in Central America are running in our favor.

—We intend to press our advantages until Nicaragua and Cuba terminate their support for Central American revolutionaries and Nicaragua severs its military ties with the Soviet bloc. We also support the Contadora process, and hope that it can reach a solution consistent with these goals, as well as the other goals of the Act of San Jose.

—But if the negotiations process fails, you should know we are prepared to employ the other means at our disposal to uphold our interests.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 9/1-15/83. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by R. Braibanti on September 2; cleared by M. Wiznitzer (PM/RSA), L. Einaudi (ARA/PPC), and for information by M. Minton (EUR/SOV). Braibanti initialed for all clearing officials. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the covering memorandum of this packet, indicating Shultz saw it.

² Tab 2 is attached but not printed.

3 Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Braibanti.

94. Editorial Note

After the National Security Planning Group meeting on the evening of September 2, 1983, Secretary of State George Shultz and members of his staff worked to find a balance between dealing with Soviet culpability in the downing of KAL 007 and maintaining recent progress in U.S.-Soviet relations. (See [Document 91](#).) As Shultz recalled in his memoir, by September 3: “Our approach was still evolving, but already decisions had been taken on what *not* to do. We were not going to cancel my meeting with Gromyko. We were not going to pull out of the INF and START talks. This was not going to be easy to manage. The knee-jerk reaction of Cap and other hardliners was to stop all contacts. Others pointed to the Nixon-Kissinger ‘linkage’ approach to US-Soviet relations to argue that we must not move forward in any area when an outrageous act is committed in another area. I regarded President Reagan’s support for Paul Nitze and Ed Rowny’s return to the arms control talks as courageous in this charged atmosphere.

“I told my staff I wanted four papers, one on financial claims against the Soviets, another on how to approach the United Nations, a third on civil aviation matters, and a fourth on the nature of potential boycotts. [See [Document 100](#).] ‘We must bring other countries along with us,’ I instructed.

“As we sought to prove what had happened, evidence mounted against the Soviets. Public emotions escalated correspondingly. By noon on Sunday [September 4], we received from the Japanese the actual tape recording of the Soviet fighter pilot talking with his ground controller: the pilot had followed the airliner, assessed and reported on its position, and under orders from his ground control, shot it

down. The pilot's words, 'The target is destroyed,' would chill the world when it was played at the United Nations and subsequently on the news, worldwide." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 366)

According to the President's Daily Diary, there were two meetings on the KAL incident on September 4: From 9:30 to 10 a.m. President Ronald Reagan met in the Oval Office with Vice President George Bush, Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Chief of Staff James Baker, Counselor to the President Edwin Meese, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs William Clark, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane, and other White House staff; then from 10:05 to 12:45 p.m., the President and his team met with Congressional leaders in the Cabinet room. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) Reagan wrote in his diary that evening: "To the Oval Office for a meeting with Congressional leadership—Dems. & Repubs. Met with our team at 9:30 A.M.—general meeting at 10 A.M. Meeting was very good—ran til 1 P.M. Dealt 1st & longest with Korean plane. Ran a tape of conversation between 2 Soviet pilots including the one who stated he had locked his radar guided air to air missiles, launched them & 'target destroyed.' I'm going on air 8 P.M. tomorrow night to tell the story & announce our plans. Strom Thurmond made a great suggestion. We know the whereabouts of many K.G.B. agents [. . .]. We're looking into the practicality of this. [. . .] That would be shooting ourselves in the foot." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 259; brackets are in the original)

Shultz recalled in his memoir that during this meeting there was speculation over "whether Gromyko would cancel our meeting in Madrid under these circumstances.

Cap argued once again that we should be the ones to cancel.

“Afterward, President Reagan telephoned to ask me about the idea of the KGB expulsions. He didn’t think much of the idea; neither did I. The Soviets would retaliate with their own expulsions, I said, and that would hurt us, as an open society, more than it would hurt them. ‘We do not want to turn this whole thing into a U.S.-Soviet issue,’ I stressed once again.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 366)

On Labor Day, September 5, Reagan wrote in his diary: “only thing scheduled for the day was lunch at the pool with the Wicks & at 8 P.M. a T.V. speech on the Korean airline massacre. Well I put on my trunks but the speech draft arrived at 9:30 A.M.—in fact 2 drafts. I didn’t like either one so I spent the day til 5:15 P.M. rewriting. It turned out OK & everyone seems to think it was A. O.K. I spent the day in my trunks sitting on a towel in my study but changed into a blue suit for the speech. It went well & everyone seemed pleased.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 260) A handwritten draft of this speech is in Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Subject File, Korean Airlines Shootdown (08/31/1983–November 1983) (12/22). Shultz recalled: “I made a note to check carefully the president’s upcoming speech, which would be televised nationwide Monday evening, to be sure that someone didn’t slip the KGB expulsion idea in at the last minute. Only I and a very few others knew how intent the president was on developing his relationship with the Soviets and that he had sent a personal letter to Andropov in early July.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 366) For Reagan’s letter, see [Document 70](#).

At 8 p.m. that evening, Reagan delivered a televised address to the nation from the Oval Office on the Soviet attack on KAL Flight 007. After expressing his condolences, Reagan declared: “But despite the savagery of their crime, the universal reaction against it, and the evidence of their complicity, the Soviets still refuse to tell the truth. They have persistently refused to admit that their pilot fired on the Korean aircraft. Indeed, they have not even told their own people that a plane was shot down.” Reagan continued by presenting the available facts of the case. Then, in a dramatic moment, he played the tape of the communications between the Soviet pilot and ground control, and explained the actions of the pilot. Reagan concluded: “They deny the deed, but in their conflicting and misleading protestations, the Soviets reveal that, yes, shooting down a plane—even one with hundreds of innocent men, women, children, and babies—is a part of their normal procedure if that plane is in what they claim as their airspace.

“They owe the world an apology and an offer to join the rest of the world in working out a system to protect against this ever happening again.” For the full text of Reagan’s speech, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book II, pages 1227–1230.

95. National Security Decision Directive 102¹

Washington, September 5, 1983

U.S. RESPONSE TO SOVIET DESTRUCTION OF KAL AIRLINER (U)

INTRODUCTION

This directive defines the measures the United States will undertake to respond to the Soviet Union's shooting down of a Korean Airlines civil airliner, an act that resulted in the loss of 269 lives. This action demands a serious international and U.S. response, with primary focus on action by the world community. This Soviet attack underscores once again the refusal of the USSR to abide by normal standards of civilized behavior and thus confirms the basis of our existing policy of realism and strength. (U)

OBJECTIVES

- *Seek Justice.* We must consult with, and help to lead, the international community in calling for justice. Civilized societies demand punishment and restitution to deter, and raise the costs of, future egregious acts. We have a responsibility to impress upon the world that the Soviets, at a minimum, owe the international community:

- A full account of what happened, an apology, an admission of responsibility, and appropriate punishments to those responsible. (U)

—Immediate access to the crash site for joint efforts by Korea, Japan, and the United States to recover the bodies of their citizens and, if possible, the wreckage of the Korean airliner. (U)

—Firm assurances that the USSR will not use destructive force against unarmed aircraft in the future, including necessary alterations in Soviet procedures for handling cases in which aircraft mistakenly cross its airspace. (U)

—Agreement to provide compensation for the benefit of the aggrieved families and KAL. (U)

- *Demonstrate Resistance to Intimidation.* Bolster the confidence of our Asian friends, and others, and demonstrate that Soviet intimidation will not achieve its intended end of discouraging our friends from cooperating with us, particularly on mutual security concerns. (S)
- *Advance Understanding of the Contrast Between Soviet Words and Deeds.* Soviet brutality in this incident presents an opportunity to reverse the false moral and political “peacemaker” perception that their regime has been cultivating. This image has complicated the efforts of the Free World to illuminate the USSR’s true objectives. (U)

ACTION

In order to realize the objectives above, the United States will take the following bilateral and multilateral actions in the areas of diplomacy, aviation security and safety, and regional confidence building:

- *Diplomacy and Justice.* The following steps should be continued or undertaken immediately to mobilize the

international community:

—Conduct intensive efforts to secure coordinated international action. (U)

—Seek maximum condemnation of the Soviet Union in the U.N. Security Council and provide wide dissemination of statements made in these sessions. (U)

—Announce that the US-Soviet Transportation Agreement will not be renewed and suspend all discussion on the issue of consulates in Kiev and New York and on a new exchanges agreement. (U)

—Continue to conduct a search in international waters, in consultation with Japan and Korea, for the remains of the aircraft. Assure the government of Korea that we will vigorously support their request to conduct, participate in, or observe salvage operations. Indicate our clear willingness and desire to assist the government of Korea in recovering the bodies and flight recorder as appropriate and in accord with international law. (U)

—Make joint request with the government of Japan for Soviet authorization for access to Soviet territorial waters and airspace to search for remains of the downed aircraft. (U)

—Initiate a major public diplomatic effort to keep international and domestic attention focused on the Soviet action and the objectives outlined above. (U)

• *Aviation Safety and Security.* The United States will work with—and help to lead—other members of the international community in formulating and implementing measures that

will adversely affect the operation of the Soviet national airline, Aeroflot. The United States will also focus immediate attention on measures to enhance airline safety and security, while vigorously pursuing recovery efforts and the issue of reparations. Accordingly, we will:

—Seek international governmental support for punitive actions in the civil aviation area for a period to be determined, with duration dependent upon the extent to which the Soviets demonstrate a willingness to honor essential standards of aviation safety. If the Soviets fail to provide concrete reasons to show that they are truly willing to observe such standards, we will consult with other nations about renewing the measures. (S)

—Specifically seek immediate agreement by as many countries as possible to stop Aeroflot flights into their countries, to cancel interline ticketing arrangements, and to take other possible measures to inhibit Aeroflot operations. We should especially seek Canada's and Japan's support for these and other possible sanctions against Aeroflot. We will avoid any actions that could affect the safety of international civilian aviation. (S)

—Support appropriate measures against Aeroflot by U.S. and international non-government groups, in their efforts to isolate Soviet aviation. Consult with other governments to further this objective. (S)

—Work to suspend non-safety related discussions between the USSR and other national civil aviation bodies. (S)

—Work to achieve a meaningful censure of the Soviet Union at a special meeting of ICAO Council, with reinforcing measures at ICAO to be pursued.² (S)

—Develop an omnibus U.S. claim against the Soviet Union for compensation for the loss of life and property. Offer to present to the USSR similar claims on behalf of the Korean victims. Also coordinate claims with the governments of other countries with citizens on the aircraft to dramatize the USSR's responsibility for its actions. (U)

—Reaffirm the existing U.S. sanctions against Aeroflot that predate the Soviet attack on KAL. (U)

- *Regional*

—Recognize that this act occurs in a theater where the Soviets have increasingly sought to intimidate our friends and discourage them from expanding security cooperation with the United States. (S)

—Continue to consult actively with our Asian friends to develop measures we can take to further bolster their confidence. Provide tangible signals to the Soviets through this allied cooperation that the USSR's campaign of intimidation will only accelerate, not retard, our support for friends. (S)

—Actions taken to advance this objective need not be directly linked to the aircraft tragedy, but should stand as a quiet, independent signal to the Soviets of our resolve to resist their intimidation. (S)

IMPLEMENTATION

The Secretary of State, in concert with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Transportation, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the JCS, the Director of USIA, and the Administrator of the FAA, will develop a coordinated action plan to implement the provisions of this Directive. This plan should include a legislative, public affairs, and diplomatic strategy and be forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by Wednesday, September 7, 1983.³ (U)

Under the direction of the Secretary of State, an interagency group will continue to evaluate and explore additional possibilities for international and U.S. actions consistent with this Directive. The first report on this continuing effort should be forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by September 14, 1983. (U)

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 102, U.S. Response to Soviet Destruction of KAL Airliner. Secret. On September 6, Clark sent the signed NSDD to Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, Kirkpatrick, Vessey, Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth Dole, Wick, and Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration J. Lynn Helms. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron November 1983 (2/4))

² The International Civil Aviation Organization Council met September 15-16. See [footnote 2, Document 112](#).

³ See [Document 100](#).

96. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, September 5, 1983

SUBJECT

Your Presentation to Gromyko at Madrid

Attached is a revised version of the presentation I am suggesting that:

- incorporates the points you wanted made on our direct military-to-military links proposal;
- reflects the more forthcoming tone and specific requests the Soviets have been making about our search operations near the crash site;
- tells Gromyko formally that it is not now possible to proceed with extension of the Transportation Agreement or further discussion of consulates and a new exchanges agreement; and
- puts U.S. markers on Central America and the Middle East on a contingency basis only, since taking the initiative on regional issues is too likely to invite a broad-ranging diatribe designed to divert attention from the issues you wish to raise.

The NSC has asked for a new Memorandum to the President on the Gromyko meeting to help prepare for your pre-departure meeting tomorrow, and we have sent it to you separately.²

The presentation I am suggesting focusses on three set of issues: the airliner (and the President's proposal for military-to-military communications links), arms control treaty compliance (missile testing and especially the radar), and human rights (Shcharanskiy plus Jewish emigration/anti-Semitism).

All three issues fall basically into the same category of Soviet behavior that constitutes a threat to international order. On all three we are justly accusing the Soviets of irresponsible conduct that makes it difficult to move forward in any field, and demanding corrective action at Gromyko's level. All three fit well within the conceptual framework suggested by Jack Matlock for the meeting as originally planned: we cannot solve all problems, but we need to deal seriously with the three interrelated problem areas of use of force to settle disputes, the high and rising level of armaments, and the shortage of trust and confidence in the relationship.

At the same time, there is a basic tension between the airliner tragedy, arms control compliance and the Middle East/Central America—where we wish basically to warn the Soviets at Gromyko's level—and Shcharanskiy—where we want the Soviets to release him. The tougher we are on the first three, the less forthcoming Gromyko is likely to be on Shcharanskiy.

There is no way to eliminate this tension, but we can perhaps reduce it by shaping the tone, order and format of your presentation. Our suggestions are embodied in the attached text. They are:

—Use Jack's conceptual framework in setting the scene, and key each issue you raise to it: the airliner illustrates use of force, but also the Soviet arms buildup, and it

damages trust and confidence; arms control compliance is a trust and confidence issue first, then an arms buildup issue; Shcharanskiy is pre-eminently a matter of trust and confidence; we wish to move forward if the Soviets are willing, but they are making things immensely difficult by their actions and unwillingness to explain on all these issues.

—Break the meeting into a session with advisors dealing with the airliner and arms control compliance, and a more private session on Shcharanskiy and Jewish emigration/anti-Semitism.

—Conclude the session with advisors by a summation that ticks off the small steps we have managed to take in recent months, before asking for the private meeting, and finish on a more-in-sorrow-than-in-anger note, in order to set a more positive tone for an exchange on Shcharanskiy.

—Frame your remarks on Shcharanskiy in terms of the Soviet leadership's commitment to release him but also the opportunity for them to gain credit for a compassionate gesture at this time, and the danger of further damage if they do not follow through, and of catastrophe if he dies in prison.

An oblique mention of our offer to trade for Shcharanskiy is included in your points. We have discussed whether this mention should be more explicit, and you may wish to consider this point further. Our tentative conclusion, however, is that the mention should remain oblique for two reasons:

—If the Soviets decide to release Shcharanskiy as a humanitarian gesture, we would be better off without a trade;

—The Foreign Ministry is not always informed about discussion of trades, and if Gromyko weighs in in Moscow following a heated conversation with you the option could be eliminated.

Gromyko will have his own agenda, and at least two options for deflecting your stress on Soviet international misbehavior. One is to launch into a complaint along the lines of the egregious TASS statements of recent days that the Soviets were defending their territory against U.S. intelligence penetration.³ The other is a long and bitter monologue about alleged U.S. lack of interest in making the world a safer place, which raises a whole series of topics, probably including the Middle East. I suspect he may try to use both.

Contingency responses in case he specifically raises the RC-135 and intelligence charges are included in your book, and we will also have for you specific material to counter a Gromyko diatribe on U.S. intelligence activities by citing confirmed facts about the airliner shootdown.

The best antidote to a diversionary monologue is firmly but calmly to seize and keep the initiative, and stick to your three topics. I have revised my earlier view that you should raise Central America and the Middle East in this meeting. To do so would be too much of an invitation to Gromyko to declaim. But if he raises regional issues (and only in that case), you should take the opportunity to lay down the appropriate markers on both the Middle East and Central America. Contingency talking points are at the end of the attached presentation. Otherwise, I think you should tell him that the meeting is short and that you would like to defer extended discussion of other topics to New York.

Attachment

Washington, undated

*YOUR MEETING WITH GROMYKO AT MADRID
SUGGESTED OPENING REMARKS*

I. INTRODUCTION

At the end of our meeting in New York last year, we agreed that it would be a good thing for us to meet before another year had gone by, if progress on the various issues in our relations justified it.⁵

I wish I could say that was the reason we are meeting now. It would be an encouraging sign not just in our relations but in international relations generally if we were able to say that we had gotten together in Madrid because we had succeeded in making enough progress in resolving differences between our two countries to warrant meeting earlier this year.

I regret that this is not the case. But we must frankly face the fact that it is not the case. And I would be less than candid and less than realistic if I told you that we think the progress that has been made so far makes us optimistic about the larger prospect in our relationship.

II. THE KAL SHOOTDOWN

Your brutal attack on an unarmed civilian airliner has shocked all Americans profoundly. The explanation offered by TASS is preposterous. Your attempt to turn a tragedy where very many lives from many nationalities were lost

into a problem in U.S.-Soviet relations is repugnant. The act itself, and your reaction, point up for us the many and profound differences between our two countries.

I do not intend to discuss this aspect here. But I would like to explain to you how this terrible event looks to us in the total context of our relations, so that you will understand at the outset how the United States is approaching this meeting and the meetings we will have later in the month in New York.

This tragedy and your reaction to it have made us more aware than ever that the central issue between our two countries is how to improve world security and make our appropriate contribution to establishing a basis for peaceful resolution of international disputes. This is a grave responsibility. We take our portion of it very seriously. It is impossible for us to have confidence that you take your share of responsibility with equal seriousness. In general, we face three interrelated types of problems, and last week's destruction of the Korean airliner by Soviet military forces in the Far Eastern area brought these problems together for us with almost overwhelming vividness.

The first problem is the high and increasing level of armaments. I will not dwell on our concerns about the level of Soviet armaments in this area: our negotiations in Geneva touch on certain aspects of the problem, and our concerns and those of the East Asian countries are well known to you. President Andropov's statement to *Pravda* that the Soviet Union would be willing to destroy missiles withdrawn from Europe under an agreement with us seemed to us a step in the right direction.⁶ But it still did not address our underlying concern about unlimited increases in Soviet military capacity in the area—a concern

we share with all your other neighbors and other countries in the region as well.

The second problem is the shortage of trust and confidence in our relationship. I do not know if the lack of confidence which your pilot's action showed was as shocking to you as it was to me and to the President. I would be happy to hear from you that it was. What I can tell you is that our confidence in the ability of our two countries to conduct necessary business together has received another blow. We know that our two countries are fated to live together on a dangerous planet, and that we have a common responsibility of historic magnitude to control the dangers we face together, and to reduce them. But your unprovoked and unjustifiable action has shown once again that we have a limited fund of trust and confidence with which to work, and that the base for progress we have managed to build is terribly narrow, and the road ahead terribly hard.

The third problem is the use and encouragement of force to settle international disputes. For us, your action last week was an outrageous example of your country's willingness to use force in situations where my country—and the rest of the world—believe and earnestly desire that peaceful solutions can be found.

This is not a new concern of ours. It is one that President Reagan and I share with all our predecessors since the war. Over the past two years, you have heard Secretary Haig and me discuss it with respect to Afghanistan, with respect to Kampuchea, with respect to the Middle East, with respect to southern Africa, with respect to Central America and the Caribbean. It lies at the heart of our approach to your military buildup, to our discussions on arms control.

I know that you and your colleagues in the leadership do not accept this analysis of the problems between us. That is part of the problem too. But I must tell you that the airliner tragedy convinces us more than ever that if we are to put our relations on a more constructive course, you and your colleagues must recognize that the United States and the rest of the world community are convinced that you will use your vast military forces with restraint and with responsibility. That is precisely what you did not do last week.

These are the fundamental questions that were raised by your action. But they are not more fundamental than our anguish about the very many American lives that have been lost. For these reasons I ask you formally, once again, for a full and reasonable explanation of how this tragedy took place; for all the information that is available to you about the fate of the plane and its passengers; for permission for our forces to participate with yours in the search now going on off Sakhalin Island; and for prompt access if the plane and any bodies are recovered. I would like to be encouraged by our recent exchanges concerning coordinates and other data about our search operations in the area.

III. ASSURING AIR SAFETY: THE MILITARY LINKS PROPOSAL

In the wake of this tragedy, ensuring the safety of peaceful international air travel is an issue on which the whole world must cooperate. We must take every feasible step to make sure that this sort of thing cannot happen again.

The Soviet Union must give the assurances the world needs and take specific steps to ensure the safety of international

civil aviation.

But I would also like to remind you that even before this tragedy we proposed to you a number of measures we could take to improve communications between us.

Our discussions on adding a facsimile transmission capability to our hotline communications have made the most progress, but we had also proposed direct links between our military authorities. In fact, our delegation to Moscow described our concept to you at some length early last month.

Had such links been in place last week, it is conceivable that this tragedy could have been averted. They would have provided one way for you to seek additional information and clarify the identity of the plane your interceptors were pursuing.

I would urge you most seriously to consider our proposal for direct communications links between our military authorities once again, and I would appreciate a considered reply at the earliest possible opportunity.

IV. ARMS CONTROL TREATY COMPLIANCE

I wish I could tell you that the airliner tragedy is the only instance that has reinforced these concerns in recent weeks and months. Unfortunately, we also find ourselves with increasing evidence of actions that raise questions about the Soviet Union's compliance with its obligations under existing arms control agreements.

I cannot emphasize too much how such actions erode the trust and confidence we must have that you will punctiliously carry out your treaty commitments to us, and

how important it is to any progress in arms control that you address our concerns seriously and specifically. If we cannot be sure that treaties signed in the past are being carried out, then we will not be able to move forward with you to sign new agreements.

These are not new concerns. Secretary Haig already raised with you the troubling situation we see with regard to use of chemical and biological weapons. Today, I would like to stress two areas of concern that have arisen more recently.

For six months we have been discussing with you the questions we have about the ICBM first flight-tested on February 8, 1983. Despite the assertions your government has made, we remain unconvinced that this missile qualifies as a permitted modernization of an existing type of ICBM under the terms of SALT II. Moreover, the denial of telemetric information vital to verifying compliance—also inconsistent with the terms of SALT II—has simply reinforced our suspicions. We think the importance of the problem warrants a more forthcoming response in future discussions in the SCC and through diplomatic channels.

Even more serious questions have arisen in connection with the new large phased-array radar that you are constructing near Krasnoyarsk. Your claim that this radar is for space-tracking purposes is thoroughly implausible, since the radar is of the same type as ones you have specifically identified as being for ballistic missile early warning. Thus we demand a more convincing explanation for this radar in view of its apparent inconsistency with the ABM Treaty.

V. GENERAL MEETING SUMMATION

It is precisely because fundamental problems in our relations are involved that we seek adequate and

responsible Soviet explanations and actions on issues like these.

We are not seeking to destroy anything of what we have managed so painfully to achieve in the way of trust, confidence and mutually beneficial structure in our relations. It is your actions or refusal to take actions that pose a threat to the narrow base we have established. Our policy is unchanged. It will be based, as before, on strength, on realism, and on willingness to explore with you those areas where our two countries can work together to mutual benefit.

We do not underestimate the significance of the small steps we have managed to take together in recent weeks and months. The conclusion of the CSCE review conference here in Madrid is one of them: it is not a perfect outcome, and because of Malta it has been a difficult outcome, but it is a beneficial outcome.

The grains agreement we signed two weeks ago in Moscow was a similar beneficial step. The President and I appreciate the release of the Pentecostals who were in our Embassy and their families. We have agreed to renew the atomic energy agreement that expired in June. Even in the difficult arms control area, we have had useful discussions on confidence-building measures and on nuclear non-proliferation. And, although we have not yet gotten to the essential differences in our major negotiations, both sides have shown encouraging flexibility in START, in INF and in MBFR.

At the same time, it must be perfectly clear to you that such steps cannot be taken in isolation from other elements in the relationship. This last week has provided two fresh examples. As a result of your action in the Pacific, it is not

possible for us to proceed with extension of the Transportation Agreement that expired in June, and it is not possible at this time for us to follow up on your agreement in principle to renew discussions on opening consulates and on a new exchanges agreement.

Speaking for the United States, however, I can say that the President and I intend to continue the effort to develop a more stable and constructive relationship with the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union is willing to work with us to do so. The steps our two countries have taken perhaps show that we can do some serious business even in difficult times. I will want in New York to go over the whole range of issues between us.

For our part, we know we cannot hope to solve all problems at once. But our two countries must face the fact that the larger problems cannot be resolved in isolation from the others. And, in a spirit of realism and candor, I must also say that the Soviet actions and inactions I have described earlier make it immensely more difficult to move forward.

NOTE: We continue to believe that you should discuss human rights issues one-on-one with Gromyko. After summing up, therefore, we suggest that you ask for a private session following the general meeting.

VI. PRIVATE SESSION ON SHCHARANSKIY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The airliner tragedy is a human rights issue for us too, but I wanted to meet with you privately to discuss the more familiar problems of human rights in our relationship.

I cannot exaggerate to you the importance of these issues for both the present and the future. It remains true that no

other area of the relationship has such potential for improving or damaging American trust and confidence in the possibility of our countries doing serious business.

The President and I continue to believe that the best way to deal with these issues in our relations is quietly and privately. That is why I asked for this private session.

The case of Anatoliy Shcharanskiy is of very great concern to us, precisely because it so clearly involves the issue of trust and confidence.

As I noted in the general meeting, the President and I appreciated the way you dealt with the Pentecostalist matter after the President's meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin in February. We have been trying to deal with the Shcharanskiy case in the same quiet way.

That is why we were encouraged by President Andropov's letter to Marchais, and why we authorized Ambassador Kampelman to enter into confidential discussions with Mr. Kondrashev.

I must say we were initially encouraged by those discussions. They seemed to us to hold out some hope of progress without damage to the positions of principle on either side.

In particular, we were encouraged by Mr. Kondrashev's clear and solemn statement on behalf of the highest authorities in his government that Shcharanskiy could be released by February 1984.

We therefore made clear both to Mr. Kondrashev and to other authorized interlocutors that we on our side would be prepared to take steps of interest to the Soviet side if this commitment were in fact honored.

Our position remains the same, and we are interested in substance rather than in form. However, it is our impression that the Soviet side is no longer interested in moving forward to resolve the Shcharanskiy case, and is in fact departing from what we understood was a commitment.

I would like to hear from you urgently on what the official Soviet position on this matter is, and what the Soviet Union expects from the United States if it is to be resolved.

We have other serious concerns in the human rights field, and I will want to discuss some of them in New York. We are, for example, worried not only about the radical decline in Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union but also about what appears to us to be growing official encouragement of anti-semitic activities in the Soviet Union. In particular, the establishment of the so-called "Anti-Zionist Committee" can only be called a step that confirms this impression. You should be aware that we will have nothing to do with it, and will encourage private citizens to treat it with the contempt it deserves.

At the same time, the Shcharanskiy case is critical. Our relations will benefit if it can be resolved soon: there is no better time for this compassionate step. But our relations will inevitably be damaged even further if Shcharanskiy is made to serve his full term. We have conflicting reports on his state of health, and I would not want to make a judgment. But if he were to die in prison, it would be a catastrophe.

VII. *CONTINGENCY POINTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL AMERICA* (IF GROMYKO RAISES REGIONAL ISSUES)

We have a limited amount of time, and I would propose that we defer extended discussion of these kinds of issues to New York. I have only two points to make:

—We have had a number of exchanges on the Lebanon situation in recent days, and I merely wish to reiterate a number of points to you.

The situation is dangerous for all the area parties and for both our countries, and the root of that danger is the continued presence of foreign troops in Lebanon. Our objective is the elimination of the foreign troop presence in that country, so that the Lebanese government can establish full sovereignty on its own territory. With our encouragement, the Government of Israel has agreed to withdraw its forces in a situation where Syria does the same, and in fact took a first step in this direction last weekend even without Syrian agreement to follow this course. The unwillingness of Syria to remove its forces from Lebanon is an obstacle to progress with consequences that are dangerously serious to all of us. I would urge you once again to use your influence with Syria to encourage a more constructive approach.


—With regard to Central America, I would like to reiterate with utmost seriousness what I told you when we first met last year: that your military shipments to Cuba far exceed what Cuba needs for self-defense and are being used by Cuba to fuel dangerous tensions in the region; that you cannot escape responsibility for this effect of your actions; and that the arrival of Cuban combat troops and jet combat aircraft in Nicaragua would be unacceptable to the United States. We have no motive to make Central America an issue in our relations, but you may be sure that we will defend our interests.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, September 1-8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons; cleared by J.H. Smith (L/LEI) and Palmer. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Simons initialed for all clearing officials.

² An unsigned memorandum from Shultz to Reagan is *ibid.* A note on the routing sheet reads: "Taken to Sec's home by J. Howe 9/5 per CH." However, there is no indication the memorandum was sent to Reagan. It covers most of the same points in Burt's memorandum to Shultz regarding the upcoming meeting with Gromyko: the KAL incident, arms control compliance, and human rights. Before he departed for Madrid, Shultz and Reagan met in the Oval Office the next morning, September 6. See [Document 97](#).

³ See [Document 92](#).

⁴ Secret; Sensitive.

⁵ See [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 221](#) .

⁶ See [footnote 2, Document 82](#).

97. Editorial Note

From 9:30 to 10:12 a.m. on September 6, 1983, Secretary of State George Shultz met with President Ronald Reagan in the Oval Office to discuss Shultz's planned meeting with Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko in Madrid. Other participants in the meeting included Vice President George Bush, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard Burt, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Arthur Hartman, and Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs in the NSC Staff Jack Matlock. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) Reagan wrote in his diary entry for that day: "N.S.C. meeting with Geo. S. to discuss his meeting with Gromyko. Some are opposed but I think George is right—he should see Gromyko & eyeball him on the Korean plane shoot down. There were 61 Americans on that plane. This could be the 1st time Gromyko has been put on the defensive." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 260) In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "the president authorized me to meet with Gromyko in Madrid. He agreed that we should keep the focus on human rights and KAL 007. 'We will continue with the arms control talks, but we can't do anything more than that,' he said. We discussed whether KAL 007 was shot down with full knowledge by the top Soviet political leadership. We didn't know for sure about that, but certainly the top political leadership orchestrated the Soviet response. 'Their reaction to the event demonstrates the mentality that allowed it to happen in the first place,' I said. 'They still continue to blunder.'" (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 367)

98. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State and the Embassy in Spain¹

Moscow, September 6, 1983, 1935Z

11305. Madrid Pass to Secretary's Party. Subject: Definitive Soviet Statement on KAL Downing.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary. In stating that Soviet fighters “stopped the flight” of KAL 007, an authoritative Soviet Government statement has effectively admitted to having downed the Korean jetliner. The statement directly contradicts several points of President Reagan’s September 5 speech,² implies that the decision to shoot down the Korean aircraft was made at a relatively low level, and lays all responsibility for the tragedy at the feet of the United States. End summary.

3. Soviet admission. An authoritative statement by the Soviet Government on the KAL tragedy was simultaneously broadcast over Soviet television and carried by TASS the evening of September 6. The piece, stating that planes of the Soviet air defense forces “fulfilled the order of the command post to stop the flight” after it allegedly ignored tracer warning shots, effectively admits the Soviets downed the unarmed KAL airliner. The government statement nonetheless lays all blame for the incident at the feet of “the leaders of the United States of America,” which it accuses of having cynically organized the flight for reconnaissance purposes.

4. Soviet version of events. According to the statement, the “intruder plane” entered Soviet air space over Kamchatka “in an area where a most important base of the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR is located” “at the same time” as an RC-135 was flying “near the Soviet border at the same altitude.”³ Of several interceptors scrambled, one monitored the RC-135 while another signalled to the “intruder plane” that it had entered Soviet air space. This warning was ignored. When the aircraft approached Sakhalin, interceptors again attempted to establish contact, “including with the help of the general call signal on the international frequency of 121.5 megacycles.” These signals “had to be received by the intruder plane” but it did not respond to these or other signals. The statement then notes that “Soviet radio control services picked up short coded radio signals transmitted from time to time, such signals that are usually used in transmitting intelligence information.”

5. Implying that the shutdown decision was made at a relatively low level, the statement continues that “the anti-aircraft forces command of the area” analyzed the route of the aircraft passing as it did over “strategically important areas,” and arrived at the conclusion that it was a reconnaissance aircraft performing “special tasks.” “As envisaged by international rules,” the fighter plane fired warning shots, but these were ignored, as were demands to fly to a Soviet airfield, and the aircraft tried to evade pursuit. Then, “the interceptor-fighter plane of the anti-aircraft defenses fulfilled the order of the command post to stop the flight.”

6. Soviet justification. The Soviet statement justifies “stopping” the aircraft on the grounds that the interceptor pilots had no idea that this was a civilian aircraft and that such action is “fully in keeping with the law on the state

border of the USSR” which in turn is “fully in accord with international regulations.” The statement declares that it is one of the commonly recognized principles of international law that every state has the sovereign right to protect its borders, in particular its airspace. The Soviets continue to claim that the aircraft had no navigation lights, and that night-time visibility was bad. “The assertions of the United States President that Soviet pilots knew that it was a civilian aircraft are not in keeping with reality.”

7. President contradicted. At several points, statement directly disputes statements by President Reagan in his September 5 speech. It alleges that—contrary to President Reagan’s assertion—Soviet fighters are in fact capable of communication on the international emergency frequency and sought to communicate with the KAL aircraft on it. It accuses President Reagan of cynicism in remarking that “no one will ever know” how the KAL 747’s navigational computers were programmed. The plane’s deviation from its flight plan was not, according to the statement, a technical error, but a plan to carry out an intelligence operation.

8. Alleged U.S. motives. The statement, in speculating on U.S. motives for utilizing the KAL aircraft for an alleged provocation, points the direction of future Soviet propaganda damage limitation. The U.S., hoping to avoid the solution of major international tensions, according to the Soviets, chose the moment carefully to have maximum impact on arms control efforts. Using the incident to distract attention from Soviet peace initiatives, the USG is accused of seeking to intensify confrontation with the USSR in accordance with “the President’s credo—peace through strength.” The statement ends with the sentence: “The entire responsibility for this tragedy rests wholly and fully with the leaders of the United States of America.”

9. Comment. This evening's statement represents the definitive Soviet explanation of the KAL tragedy. Despite the statement's expression of condolences to the families of the KAL dead, there is no contrition in the Soviet statement, no admission of responsibility, nor willingness to take steps to ensure it is not repeated. This is the statement of a regime caught in an abhorrent act it can no longer deny, and seeking desperately to avoid the consequences.

10. Embassy is distributing to U.S. and West European press the following statement, attributed to an Embassy spokesman: Begin text: The Soviet statement is much too little and much too late. While the Soviets have finally been compelled by the weight of the evidence to admit that they shot down the Korean airliner, virtually every other element in their statement is obviously designed to evade their full responsibility for the atrocity which they have committed. End text.

Zimmermann

¹ Source: Reagan Library, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, NSC USSR File, USSR-KAL Incident (09/01/83) (3); NLR-170-17-40-1-9. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information to Leningrad, Bonn, London, Paris, USNATO, USUN, Seoul, and Tokyo. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² See [Document 94](#). For the text of the September 6 Soviet statement, see the *New York Times*, September 7, 1983, p. A16.

³ In a statement on September 5, Eagleburger explained: "A U.S. RC-135 aircraft was in the vicinity of the Korean

airliner on August 31 when the airliner was initially detected by Soviet radar. Both aircraft were then in international air space. The U.S. routinely conducts unarmed RC-135 flights in the international air space off the Kamchatka Peninsula to monitor by national technical means Soviet compliance with the SALT treaties. The Soviets conduct similar monitoring activities near U.S. missile testing sites. The Soviets are aware of our flights and track them routinely. They know that our aircraft do not enter their air space. The Korean aircraft's inadvertent entry into Soviet territory should have been an early and strong indication to the Soviets that the flight was not a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft." (Telegram 253015 to Montreal, September 7; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830511-0542)

99. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 6, 1983

SUBJECT

Developments on Korean Airlines Incident

Today's major development in the Korean Airlines incident was the Soviet announcement acknowledging for the first time that they had downed KAL 007, but reiterating in stronger terms their now familiar claims regarding U.S. responsibility for this action.² I issued a statement at 6:00 p.m. refuting the Soviet claims,³ and Acting Assistant Secretary Kelly then called in Soviet Charge Sokolov to deliver formally the text of our message.⁴ We believe that this prompt, public U.S. rejection of Soviet claims will enable us to maintain the initiative in the continuing public affairs struggle.

On the diplomatic front, we are sending separately for your approval messages to Thatcher, Kohl, Nakasone and other key leaders asking their support for your proposals. Department officers called in today Embassy officers representing European neutrals and a group of key African, Middle Eastern and Asian countries to request their support for your proposals.⁵ Although noncommittal, the Embassy representatives were generally positive. The reactions to Assistant Secretary Burt's September 5 briefing of NATO, ANZUS, Japan, Korea and other Asian Embassies⁶ have not yet begun to come in, except for a call from the French Embassy reporting that France would support us in efforts to strengthen ICAO. On the non-official side, the reported decision by the International Association

of Airline Pilots' Associations to recommend a boycott of services to and from the USSR by its member unions for period of 60 days was a most encouraging development.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick's presentation in the Security Council today was most effective, and we continue to receive considerable support in the Council from other countries.⁷ The debate will continue through the end of this week. There seems to be a good likelihood that a resolution, which may be tabled tomorrow, could receive the nine votes needed for passage (though a Soviet veto will doubtless be cast). I am working with CAB Chairman McKinnon on a directive to US carriers ending interline arrangements with Aeroflot. We have initiated the steps required to close the remaining two Aeroflot offices in the United States. Secretary Dole has sent a message to her counterparts in more than forty countries requesting their support for our efforts, particularly in ICAO.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, NSC Files, Chron File September 1983; NLR-324-11-25-2-0. Confidential. A note on the routing slip indicates that Poindexter presented this information to Reagan during his daily briefing on September 7.

² The Soviet statement claimed: "The Soviet pilots, in stopping the actions of the intruder plane, could not have known that it was a civilian aircraft." The statement continued: "It was flying without navigation lights, at the height of night, in conditions of bad visibility and was not answering signals." The statement also "charged that the airliner had been on a spying mission for the United States and that 'the entire responsibility for this tragedy rests wholly and fully with the leaders of the United States of America.'" (John F. Burns, "Moscow Concedes A Soviet

Fighter Downed Airliner, *New York Times*, September 7, 1983, p. A1) The full text of the September 6 statement by the Soviet government is available in *New York Times*, September 7, 1983, p. A1.

³ For the text of Eagleburger's statement, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1983, p. 11.

⁴ In telegram 253973 to Moscow, September 7, the Department reported that "Kelly called in Soviet Chargé Oleg Sokolov at 1930 EDT to hand over a copy of public statement made earlier in evening by Acting Secretary Eagleburger." The report continued: "Kelly reiterated continuing U.S. dismay with unresponsive nature of Soviet statements and emphasized need for Soviet Union to make full accounting of incident." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830513-0934)

⁵ Telegram 254088 to all diplomatic posts, September 7, provided "materials for briefing foreign governments on Soviet destruction of Korean airliner, U.S. actions taken in response, and U.S.-proposed international measures for responding to Soviet actions." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number])

⁶ Telegram 253010 to multiple diplomatic posts and all NATO capitals, September 6, reported on Burt's briefings and efforts to garner international support for U.S.-proposed measures against the Soviets. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830511-0516)

⁷ For the text of Kirkpatrick's statement, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1983, pp. 8-11.

100. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Hill) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, September 7, 1983

SUBJECT

Transmission of Implementation Strategy for NSDD on the U.S. Response to the Soviet Destruction of the KAL Airliner

We are attaching an implementation strategy for the NSDD on the U.S. response to the Soviet destruction of the KAL airliner.² Several of the steps have already been taken or are already in process. This study reflects the input of the KAL interagency group and the papers prepared by its working groups which are attached.³ The paper has not been cleared by the IG but it has been distributed to the member agencies. Should we receive substantive comments from them, these will be reported to the NSC staff.

Charles Hill⁴

Tab 1

Strategy Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁵

Washington, undated

Strategy Paper for Implementation of NSDD on the KAL Incident

The Soviet attack on an unarmed Korean passenger airplane is a clear violation of international law and a threat to international civil aviation security. While the immediate threat is particularly in or near the Soviet Union, the Soviet action raises serious questions regarding the system as a whole. The NSDD defines the measures the United States will take with the international community to promote our objectives of seeking justice, demonstrating resistance to intimidation, and advancing understanding of the contrast between Soviet words and deeds. The strategy for implementing these specific measures including diplomatic, public diplomacy and congressional approaches as developed by the KAL IG follows below. Also described are issues for future decision. The detailed papers prepared by the various IG working groups are attached at the annex.

The NSDD sets out specific actions for seeking justice in five areas:

1. *Full Accounting.* Even though the Soviets have now admitted downing the KAL aircraft, our most immediate requirement remains pressing the Soviets for a full accounting of the incident, including access to the crash site, recovery of the victims, technical equipment (black box), wreckage and other material such as personal property and a thorough and impartial investigation of what happened. We have already made these demands forcefully, both in diplomatic channels and publicly. Secretary Shultz will be making these points at the highest level with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Madrid on September 8 and the issue will be pursued through vigorous intervention in the appropriate international organizations.

2. *Develop Omnibus U.S. Claim.* A draft United States claim for reparation, in the form of a diplomatic note, has been prepared and circulated to other interested governments whose nationals perished in the tragedy, with a request that they take similar action. The note is a concise statement that we consider the Soviet action as wrongful under international law, giving rise to a Soviet obligation to make reparation. After responses from other governments, we will present the Soviet Chargé with the diplomatic note on September 12.⁶ This claim will be supplemented with details and documentation after consultations with the families of the victims. We have invited those family members who will be in Washington for the memorial service to a briefing on the claim at 4:00 p.m. on Friday, September 9.

3. *Measures Against Aeroflot.* The NSDD calls for the United States to work with and help to lead other members of the international community in formulating and implementing measures that will “adversely affect” Aeroflot’s operations. Unilaterally, we have already:

- reiterated the existing sanction suspending regularly-scheduled Aeroflot service to the U.S.;

- notified the Soviets we will not renew our bilateral transportation cooperation agreement, nor proceed with discussions on consulates in Kiev and New York and on a new cultural exchanges agreement;

- the Department of State is sending a letter for the President’s signature requesting the CAB to initiate action to suspend relations between U.S. carriers and Aeroflot as well as Aeroflot’s remaining commercial activities in the United States;

—begun to undertake the necessary steps prior to informing the Soviets of the closure of the Aeroflot offices in New York and Washington.

Multilaterally, we are seeking the isolation of the Soviet Union in world aviation until it provides a satisfactory response to our collective concerns for aviation safety. Specifically we have proposed that for an initial period of 60-90 days:

—that other governments suspend Aeroflot's operations to and from their territories;

—that they suspend interline arrangements between their respective carriers and Aeroflot, and other commercial opportunities for Aeroflot, such as sale of tickets;

—that they investigate other possible restrictions on support services.

A crucial ingredient in this strategy is that the U.S. not be seen to be ahead in its reaction and that it consult fully with its friends and allies in developing a coordinated, coherent and sustained international reaction. Thus, while we should continue to discuss our proposed measures publicly in general terms, we should continue now to avoid specifics so that the ongoing consultative process can reach agreement on specific steps. We are urging the key European countries to coordinate their actions and not undercut one another.

The key element in the diplomatic strategy is Secretary Shultz' participation at the Madrid conference, where he will have intense consultations with five of the countries (Italy, FRG, France, U.K. and Canada) whose cooperation is essential. Japan, not present in Madrid, will be handled

bilaterally. His speech to the CSCE plenary on September 9 will include a full statement of U.S. condemnation and the implications for East-West relations. We have encouraged other ministers to do the same, and the response has been excellent.

Multilaterally, the NATO Allies, Japan, Korea, ASEAN, ANZUS and other key countries of Europe and the third world have been briefed in Washington. This approach has been reinforced in capitals. We have forwarded to the White House letters from the President to the heads of government of the U.K., FRG, Japan, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Canada. Letters are under preparation to other leaders, including France, Italy, Ireland and Australia. Secretary Dole has sent messages to her counterparts in the key ICAO Council member countries to ask their support in ICAO, and also in adopting the proposed civil aviation measures against Aeroflot.

Our top priority will be to monitor this diplomatic offensive and apply the necessary measures to follow up the NSDD.

4. *Private boycott.* A worldwide aviation industry response would help isolate Soviet aviation and promote a satisfactory Soviet response to aviation safety concerns. The decision by the International Federation of Airline Pilot's Associations to institute a 60-day boycott of flights to and from the USSR is very encouraging. To be effective, any boycott must remain a private, not a USG, initiative. Our strategy should be to maintain contact with U.S. pilot and other groups through one or two key representatives to keep up to date on actions being taken by the aviation industry. We will use these contacts to give them a signal: that we favor all efforts consistent with U.S. law and policy to isolate Soviet aviation in order to elicit satisfactory

Soviet response to the case and the safety concerns it raises.

5. *International Organizations.* We will sustain the efforts to obtain appropriate action in appropriate international organizations. Our objectives are the broadest condemnation of the Soviet Union, an investigation, and remedial actions to enhance flight safety and prevent a recurrence of this tragedy. Tactically, we should keep Japan, Korea and others in front while mobilizing broad support for constructive remedies. Specifically, in the international organizations, we should:

—seek a strong resolution at the September 15 ICAO Council meeting, in which we would seek to condemn this Soviet violation of international law, express shock and outrage at the Soviet Union's callous disregard for human life and its refusal to cooperate in search and rescue as well as investigation efforts, and direct the ICAO Secretary-General to conduct an immediate investigation. We have the votes for a resolution along such lines;

—seek a tough UNSC resolution equally critical of the USSR, but not as detailed as the ICAO resolution seeking many cosponsors;

—seek no emergency special session of the General Assembly, but seek a new agenda item for the plenary, or as a second choice, committee consideration. We will raise the issue under existing agenda items in committees, consulting with allied and friendly delegations;

—work for a good resolution at the New Delhi conference of the World Tourism Organization in

early October;

—raise the issue in the UNESCO Executive Board, IPU and Subcommittee on Human Rights.

International Court of Justice direct adversary proceedings would have only symbolic value since the Soviets have not accepted the ICJ's mandatory jurisdiction. We may, however, wish to demand that the Soviets enter into a special agreement with us for referral of this case to Court if only to have the Soviets publicly reject impartial scrutiny of their action. An advisory opinion proceeding is also possible but has many disadvantages for USG interests.

Demonstrate and Encourage Resistance to Soviet Intimidation

The NSDD cites the objective of bolstering the confidence of our Asian friends. Central to any effort to support NE Asian nations in their resistance to Soviet intimidation will be the necessity to demonstrate consistency and steadiness in U.S. diplomatic policies and security presence within the region. In large part, this would represent a continuation of policies and programs already in train, though these could be highlighted as locally appropriate by specific U.S. statements and actions. We should bear in mind, however, that regional anti-Soviet sentiment could be undercut by too explicit or vigorous U.S. encouragement.

—A basic theme of the President's visit to the East Asian region later this fall will be a reaffirmation of the American commitment to the peace and stability of the region. The KAL incident will inevitably increase the force and importance of the President's statements.

—In Japan, we must continue close consultations with the GOJ—both on immediate questions related to the KAL incident as well on the longer-term coordination of our national policies towards the Soviet Union, letting the Nakasone government take the lead in any capitalizing on domestic anti-Soviet feelings.

—With the PRC, we should follow through with the Secretary of Defense's visit and the easing of technology transfer requirements, but, given China's own strong condemnation, we do not need to underscore for Beijing the implications of Soviet behaviour in the KAL incident.

—With the ROK, our short-term requirement will be to continue close consultations with Seoul, while over the longer-term we will need to provide continuing assurances of the firmness of our security commitment, including our readiness to support Korea's considerable defense efforts and our intention to maintain the U.S. troop presence in Korea.

Confidence-Building Measures.

Since the KAL incident was one in which improved communications channels could well have been used, we should:

—Renew through diplomatic channels at a high-level our proposals to the Soviets for consideration at a Washington follow-on meeting of communications improvements beyond solely the Hotline upgrade; and

—Simultaneously publicize our call to the Soviets for expanded communications for the prevention of such incidents, specifically citing the KAL tragedy, underscoring the U.S. flexibility in exploring various proposals, and noting previous Soviet assertions that such measures were unnecessary.

Public Diplomacy. In addition to the extensive media coverage and public affairs support for the U.S. position given to date by USIA, the Agency plans several steps in the immediate future:

—VOA will maintain an intensified broadcast schedule to the Soviet Union in several languages;

—the incident will continue to be a prominent item for all VOA language services;

—public affairs guidances reflecting and supporting Administration policy have been and will be sent to USIA posts;

—Agency foreign press centers in Washington and New York will continue to arrange interviews, press backgrounders, or on-the-record briefings for the foreign press on the incident.

—We must bear in mind the sensitivities and perceptions of our Asian allies, particularly Japan. This should include consultation with our allies, not only to keep them informed, but to offer an opportunity for them to join in our efforts.

Congressional Strategy. We are working on a draft text of a joint Congressional resolution. We do not anticipate any difficulty in passage when Congress returns September 12. The effort already begun to keep Congress fully informed

through briefings will continue, but with an expanded focus to include those committees of both Houses dealing with tourism and aviation as well as foreign affairs, armed services, and intelligence. The State Department is continuing its briefings of key staffers prior to the reconvening of Congress. Once Congress reconvenes on September 12, we will offer formal briefings for members on the event itself and on the actions we are taking and considering.

Outstanding Issues. The KAL IG has surfaced two issues for future decisions:

1. *Abrogation of the bilateral US-USSR Civil Aviation Agreement.* Those who argue for abrogation believe it is a small but necessary step to demonstrate our revulsion, particularly in view of the actions we are asking other countries to take. Further, if the U.S. ever decides to initiate service, termination of the bilateral would not pose a further substantial obstacle to restoring service. Others prefer to keep the Agreement in place as a basis for reestablishing a more normal civil air relationship if conditions should permit. These argue that abrogation could be portrayed as going farther than other countries (those that suspended operations temporarily, for example) and could be used as an indication that the U.S. was intent upon a confrontation with the USSR.

2. *Whether a subsequent CAB order should suspend a) relations of foreign carriers with Aeroflot, even within the U.S. or b) carrier relations with Aeroflot wholly outside the territory of the U.S.* Some argue that we should refrain from any punitive action against foreign carriers at least as long as there is some basis to hope that these carriers, or their

national governments, will take these actions on their own. Such action at this point could seriously compromise our chances of obtaining the cooperation of our key Allies in measures against Aeroflot. Others believe that this is a necessary step, and that failure to face it would make us look weak.

Future Action. The NSDD states that the duration of punitive action is dependent upon Soviet willingness “to honor essential standards of aviation safety,” and directs work to achieve censure in ICAO “with reinforcing measures at ICAO to be pursued.” We are now examining existing ICAO commitments to determine how they can be strengthened, and develop appropriate recommendations. If the existing measures are adequate and the problem is enforcement, we should also examine whether it is in our interest to propose new arrangements providing for international punitive sanctions in the event a state fails to meet its obligations under the existing Convention.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert Lilac Files, Arms Transfer, Subject File/1981-84, AT (Arms Transfers): [Korean Airlines] KAL [09/10/1983]; NLR-332-14-35-1-4. Secret. A covering memorandum dated September 10 to Clark from Lilac and Robinson indicates the NSC received this set of papers.

² See NSDD 102, [Document 95](#).

³ Attached but not printed are the following papers, which were also incorporated into the strategy paper: “Private Boycott of Soviet Aviation;” “Claims;” “10 Strategies for Dealing with the KAL Incident;” “Isolation of the Soviet Union in Aviation (A Strategy for the U.S.);” a memorandum on “Strategy for Dealing with Congress on the KAL Incident;” “USIA Public Affairs Followup regarding the KAL

Plane Incident;" and "Proposed Public Posture and International Public Diplomacy Strategy."

⁴ Deputy Executive Secretary Covey signed for Hill above Hill's typed signature.

⁵ Secret.

⁶ Acting Assistant Secretary of State Kelly presented the note to Sokolov on September 12. For the statement issued at the time and the note, as well as a note presented on behalf of the Korean Government, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1983, pp. 14-15.

101. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz in Madrid¹

Washington, September 8, 1983, 0630Z

Tosec 90120/254963. Subject: Soviet Statement on KAL Airliner.

1. (C—Entire text.)
2. Shortly after midnight Washington time Soviet Embassy DCM called Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Kelly at home. DCM Sokolov stated that he was under instructions to deliver immediately an oral statement from the Soviet Government to the USG “in conjunction with Soviet statement issued September 6.”² Sokolov continued that Ambassador Dobrynin who arrived Washington evening September 7 had advised him statement would be coming and he was to deliver regardless of hour.
3. Sokolov began to read statement reported below over phone. After several minutes Kelly interrupted and told Sokolov to meet him at Department. Sokolov arrived at 1:00 am at Department and read text which follows.
4. Following Sokolov’s rendition, Kelly responded, asking Sokolov to inform Moscow. Kelly said that any blackening of Soviet name occurred when Soviet authorities shot down an innocent unarmed Korean airliner which had strayed off course. Kelly rejected allegations in Soviet statement, emphasizing rejection that USG had had a role in the Korean airliner flight. As to the questions presented in the Soviet statement, Kelly said that the [garble—answers] are contained in the tape which Ambassador Kirkpatrick played

on September 6 at the United Nations. Those tapes demonstrated clearly the culpability of the Soviet Government in this atrocity. Sokolov said that he would relay Kelly's comments to Moscow.

5. Begin text of Soviet statement: The facts set forth in the published statement of the Soviet Government of September 6, clearly indicate that the intrusion of the South Korean plane into the Soviet airspace in the Far East on the night from August 31 to September 1 has been organized by U.S. special services. This is confirmed also by other information in our possession, but we do not intend to make it public through reasons of secrecy.

There is no doubt that it was a major intelligence operation executed in a strategically important region of the Soviet Union, with the use for such purposes of the specially equipped plane with passengers aboard.

The fact that it is not for the first time that the U.S. intelligence does use South Korean passenger planes for its dirty aims, is not a secret at all. That inhumane practice has more than once led to the death of innocent people.

The U.S. leadership, irrespective of whether or not it is informed in advance of each of these actions, bears full responsibility for such barbaric practices and its tragic consequences.

As for this particular case, the entire ensuing development of events leaves no doubt that U.S. special services acted with the knowledge and approval of the highest authorities.

Otherwise a whole number of (word indistinct) could not have occurred without the approval of U.S. leadership:

Why did the South Korean plane, going from the U.S., soon deviate from the established international route by almost 500 kilometers, and not to the left at that—that is toward the open but to the right—in the direction of the USSR territory?

Why was the route of that plane over the USSR territory going precisely over the important military installations?

Why was the plane flying in violation of all navigation rules and did not react to the attempts of the Soviet air defense means—both ground ones and air ones—to make contact with its crew?

Why didn't the U.S. air navigation services, tracking the flights of planes in the area of their responsibility, not sound alarm when the plane left the corridor earmarked for it, and the plane went into the Soviet territory?

Why didn't the Japanese air navigation services do the same when the plane did not appear in due time and place in the area of their responsibility?

Why didn't either the U.S. or Japanese authorities come into contact with the Soviet side until it was too late?

Instead of asking oneself all these and many other questions and find those responsible of such "strange" happenings, which led to the tragic consequences, the U.S. leaders, including the President himself, immediately came out with quite unpardonable, unbecoming of statesman, insinuations against the Soviet Union, trying to blacken it in the eyes of world public.

To say nothing of the fact that it is impermissible in general for statesmen of one state to resort to such statements—both in terms of their contents, and language—with regard

to another state with which diplomatic relations are maintained, it is quite clear that all this is in gross contradiction with the statements of the U.S. leadership regarding its desire for the normalization and bettering of relations with the USSR.

Moreover this type of behavior of the U.S. administration gives ground to believe that, taking into account the kind of outcome of intelligence operation which [garble—really?] occurred, the administration had planned it beforehand and then unleashed a broad provocative campaign aimed not only at blackening the USSR, but also at bringing tensions in the world at large even higher. In conjunction with other actions of the U.S., the anti-Soviet campaign unleashed, clearly tells that all that is being done to try to justify the militaristic course pursued by the U.S. which evokes an ever greater condemnation and rebuff on the part of the peoples of the world.

The Soviet side, while resolutely and indignantly rejecting the attempts of the U.S. Government to relieve itself of the responsibility of the deaths of the people flying aboard the South Korean plane, and to shift that responsibility onto the Soviet Union, warns the American side against dangerous consequences of continuation by the United States of its present irresponsible course in the relations with the USSR and in the world arena in general. End text.

6. Above text is from Sokolov's personal longhand translation from Russian. Sokolov said Soviets do not plan to make this statement public.

Eagleburger

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830516-1096. Confidential; Flash; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Moscow, Seoul, Tokyo, the White House, and USUN. Drafted and approved by Kelly. Cleared in S/S-O and the KAL Working Group.

² See [Document 98](#).

102. Memorandum From John Lenczowski and Kenneth deGraffenreid of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, September 8, 1983

SUBJECT

The Next Soviet Move in the Korean Air Lines Massacre: Disinformation and Distraction

On the basis of standard Soviet practices, their bizarre midnight demarche² and today's recent announcement that "they had now found wreckage and papers,"³ it is likely that the Soviets are about to engage in a massive active measure to show the world that KAL 007 was on a spy mission for the U.S. We strongly suspect that the Soviets will produce forged documents, tapes or equipment allegedly recovered from the wreckage. We believe this could occur as early as tomorrow at a scheduled press conference in Moscow.

—When the Soviets have committed their most egregious crimes, they and their apologists, both here and abroad, have attempted to turn such incidents somehow into the blame of the U.S. or its allies.

—Routinely, on almost any international question, the Soviets try to cast themselves as flexible and legitimate interlocutors searching for peace. Although other countries often recognize this image to be false, out of fear they are required to pay it homage. For this reason, success in these matters for the Soviets is a question of damage limitation by

distorting the truth of their crimes, diverting world attention and raising doubts in peoples' minds about Soviet culpability. The Soviet handling of this event has been standard operating procedure: (1) denial, (2) counter charges against the West; (3) laying the groundwork for justification of their action; (4) mobilizing their apologists to proffer exculpatory explanations (e.g., the Soviet "paranoia" argument); (5) distracting international attention with accusations of crimes committed by the "imperialists", and (6) finally the Big Lie: the creation of a Western crime, even worse than the Soviet crime.

—A constant theme in Soviet active measures is the dirty work of Western spies.

While a Soviet forgery offensive will appear transparent, and indeed ludicrous, to most Americans, it will nevertheless be difficult to deal with internationally. Because the Soviets inspire fear, and because their latest terrorist act indeed does succeed in terrorizing people, there will be a willingness to accept even the most incredible Soviet charges. And on top of this, we are burdened by the fact that the media have a congenital desire to give credence to Soviet explanations and prove the U.S. Government to be a liar. Thus, it is critical that our strategy include the following considerations:

—Keep the Soviets on the defensive. This can be done by reminding the world of the many other Soviet crimes that are ongoing. E.g., people are being massacred daily in Afghanistan. We could publicize the daily death toll. USIA has just produced a film on the Soviet war there. We could ask Congress for permission to show this film in the U.S.

and the President could show it to the people on prime time TV.

—We should at the highest level dismiss the Soviet forgery as a lie and a typical active measure. All appropriate government press spokesmen should be prepared to pass out already-prepared State Department reports on the methods and themes of Soviet active measures. Talking points should also be prepared.

—We should then avoid giving credence to the false Soviet charge with detailed U.S. response, or else their effort will have been successful in distracting the world from their crime. A detailed response will lead to numerous questions about U.S. intelligence activities, and even if we are successful in “proving” that this flight was not an intelligence mission, the aroma of involvement by U.S. intelligence activities will remain.

—We might even try to preempt a Soviet forgery offensive by giving press briefings on the subject and voicing our suspicion that this may be the Soviets’ next move. This could be done by a senior foreign policy official.

We have tasked CIA and the State Department Active Measures Working Group to begin to prepare material in anticipation of what we suspect may happen. If the Soviets do in fact engage in this exercise, we suggest that the President may wish to consider further direct sanctions against the Soviets because by then the issue will have become, despite our best effort, a serious U.S.-Soviet confrontation.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you authorize us to develop a strategy to preempt a Soviet forgery offensive.⁴

2. That you authorize us to develop a strategy of response to such a forgery offensive.⁵

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert Lilac Files, Arms Transfer, Subject File/1981-84, AT (Arms Transfers): [Korean Airlines] KAL [09/07/1983]; NLR-332-14-32-1-7. Secret. Sent for action. Lenczowski initialed for deGraffenreid.

² See [Document 101](#).

³ The *New York Times* reported that “the Soviet Ambassador said on Thursday [September 8] that his Government had found debris from the downed South Korean airliner in international waters and would turn the recovered materials and documents over to Japan, Foreign Ministry officials said. The envoy, Vladimir Y. Pavlov, in a meeting with Yoshiya Kato, head of the ministry’s European and Oceanic Affairs Bureau, also said the Soviet Union would report on its search operations off the Soviet island of Moneron, near Sakhalin, in accordance with ‘international practices.’” (“Soviet Envoy Pledges to Give Jet Debris to Japan,” *New York Times*, September 9, 1983, p. A11)

⁴ On the Approve line, Clark wrote: “Had Eagleburger call Koppel.” Presumably, Clark is referring to Ted Koppel who was the host of ABC’s “Nightline” news program, which had been covering the KAL story.

⁵ Clark checked the Approve option.

103. Memorandum From John Lenczowski and Kenneth deGraffenreid of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)1

Washington, September 8, 1983

SUBJECT

Preemption of a Soviet Forgery Offensive

One way the President could preempt a Soviet forgery offensive designed to "prove" that the Korean airliner was on a spy mission would be for him to call Andropov on the Hot Line and give him a simple message: that he personally would regard a Soviet forgery offensive as a direct message that Moscow is not interested in improving or stabilizing relations with the U.S.

Such a move by the President would not be publicized whatsoever, nor would Secretary Shultz, or anybody else in the government know about it lest it be leaked even for ostensibly benevolent purposes. In this way the Soviets would get the message that these are President Reagan's personal feelings on the matter and not anything worked out as part of an interagency political strategy whose script the President was following.

Such a move would have to be undertaken as soon as possible: it may be necessary to do it before a press conference scheduled for tomorrow in Moscow.

RECOMMENDATION

That you discuss with the President the possibility of a Hot Line call to Andropov as soon as possible.²

¹ Source: Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, NSC Files, Chron File September 1983; NLR-324-11-25-6-6. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Lenczowski initialed for deGraffenreid.

² The Approve option is checked and the word "discuss" is circled. Poindexter wrote under the approval line: "This would not be call but a teletype message on the 'hot line.'"

104. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Madrid, September 8, 1983, 2-2:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.—Secretary Shultz
William D. Krimer, Interpreter
USSR—Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Secretary Shultz wanted to spend a few minutes to discuss some matters with Foreign Minister Gromyko in private. They were closely related to the subject matter of the Madrid Conference and concerned commitments a representative of the Soviet Government had made to President Reagan through Ambassador Kampelman on behalf of the highest authorities of the Soviet Union, specifically that Shcharanskiy would be released upon completion of half his sentence.² We believed that in the Soviet interpretation this would be in February 1984, although our own information was that Shcharanskiy first went to jail on September 15. Kondrashev had promised that he would check the appropriate date. There was also a commitment to release certain other people whose names had been furnished to Kondrashev.

Based on these commitments to Ambassador Kampelman, which he had reported at a meeting in Washington with President Reagan and the Secretary, we had moved ahead to agree on the concluding document here in Madrid. We still assumed that all the commitments made to us will be fulfilled.

We had made clear both to Mr. Kondrashev and to other authorized interlocutors that we on our side would be

prepared to take a step of interest to the Soviet side if this commitment were in fact honored.

Our position remains the same, and we are interested in substance rather than in form. However, it is our impression that the Soviet side is no longer interested in moving forward to resolve the Shcharanskiy case, and is in fact departing from its commitment. This would be a major breach of the confidence in commitments which is required for any government to deal with one another.

We have other serious concerns in the human rights field. We are concerned that steps be taken to secure family reunification and to unite divided spouses. We are worried not only about the radical decline in Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union but also about what appears to us to be increasing antisemitic activities in the Soviet Union.

At the same time, the Shcharanskiy case is critical. There is no better time for this compassionate step. But our relations will inevitably be damaged even further if Shcharanskiy is made to serve his full term. We have conflicting reports on his state of health. But if he were to die in prison, it would be another major catastrophe.

What is the official Soviet position on this matter?

Gromyko said his response would be simple.³ No commitments of any kind had been given to the US side by the Soviet side. If something had been understood in terms of the commitment that *Secretary Shultz* had referred to just now, it could only have been the result of a misunderstanding unless, indeed, it was a deliberate distortion. The Soviet position with regard to Shcharanskiy was as previously stated, and *Gromyko* would ask the Secretary not to search for any sort of loopholes in that

position. He had nothing further to add and would not add anything to what he had said on this subject. He asked the Secretary to proceed on this basis. As for the Secretary's hints to the effect that unless something was undertaken to meet the wishes of the US side in this matter, relations between our countries would be complicated even further in a negative direction, such remarks are inappropriate. He could not accept such a direction of thinking on the US side. Indeed, the US side would bear full responsibility for the consequences of such an approach.

In a word, he had nothing further to add on this matter and would ask the Secretary not to raise it again. Indeed, there were many important problems arising between our two countries, as well as problems that had arisen long ago, which required mutual efforts for their resolution. Basically they concerned matters of broad importance and were of wide international significance. So far—and when he said “so far” he had in mind the present US Administration—the US side had not displayed any willingness to work toward a solution of these problems. He was prepared to discuss them today with a view to finding common language and bringing the positions of the sides closer together. If the Secretary was equally inclined to discuss these problems, that could defuse the present tense situation and exert a beneficial influence on Soviet-American relations, as well as upon the world as a whole. This was what Gromyko wanted to talk about today, and he asked the Secretary for his views.

Secretary Shultz said that he was deeply shocked and disappointed by Gromyko's comments regarding the Shcharanskiy matter. Ambassador Kampelman was an exceedingly careful man and had held extensive discussions with Kondrashev whom we had regarded as a representative of the Soviet Government, authorized to

undertake commitments. There was no possibility at all that Ambassador Kampelman could have been mistaken, because he had been trained as a lawyer and was very familiar with this particular issue.

The Secretary was surprised and shocked that Gromyko was now disowning these commitments because they had been very clear. He would go beyond that and say that his comments regarding the importance of cases like Shcharanskiy's were a correct description of the attitude of people in the US, and elsewhere, to the relations between our two countries. As for Gromyko's suggestion to discuss a wide range of issues dealing with the relations between us, the Secretary emphasized that no one had pushed harder than he to use this occasion for that purpose; but the current situation resulting from the Korean airliner tragedy made this meeting one which was taking place under conditions of great strain, it was, therefore, unsuited to the discussion of broader issues, although he would point out to Gromyko that arms control matters were currently the subject of discussions between the delegations in Geneva and elsewhere. He would repeat that Gromyko's response was a great disappointment to him because when they both agreed to hold this meeting several weeks ago, they had thought that they could use it to explore and make progress in the relations between our countries. What would happen subsequently, of course, remained to be seen. Speaking for his government, he could only hope that Gromyko's response would be such as to make further progress possible.

Gromyko interrupted the Secretary at this point and said that he had no intention of discussing the Korean airliner matter today and would not discuss it until after they had exchanged views on several more substantive and serious matters. After that he would be prepared to listen to the

Secretary and provide a response. He stressed that if Secretary Shultz first spoke on that subject, he would not be in a position to respond. On the other hand, after discussion of broader issues he would be prepared to discuss the matter of the airliner incident and, indeed, would have something to say to the Secretary even if the Secretary did not raise it. He repeated that at the outset of their broader meeting, he did not intend to talk about the airliner matter.

Secretary Shultz interrupted to say that it was up to Gromyko to determine what he wanted to discuss, but on the other hand it was for the Secretary to determine the subject he wanted to raise.

Gromyko said that in that case the Secretary might find himself talking to himself, alone in this room. As he had said, he would not discuss the Korean airliner matter at the beginning of the broader meeting.

The Secretary said he would start his statement on the subject of the airliner; if Gromyko wanted to stay, that was up to him to determine, but that was what he had been instructed to do.

Gromyko repeated that he would be prepared to talk about the airliner matter later, after he had a chance to exchange views on truly substantive and important matters, even if only briefly. He would suggest that they agree on an agenda for the broader meeting. This was a perfectly legitimate request. This is the way in which his discussions with former Secretaries of State and, indeed, with Secretary Shultz had always been conducted. As for the Shcharanskiy matter, the Secretary had said that Ambassador Kampelman was a good man. Perhaps this was so, or perhaps he was a bad man or just an average man. It

seemed to him they were not discussing the merits of Ambassador Kampelman. He had told the Secretary the Soviet position on this matter as it actually was. Of course, he believed Shultz when he had said he was disappointed but that, of course, was up to the Secretary himself.

The Secretary said that he was more than disappointed. A commitment had been made to our Government, as reported by someone in our Government who was a careful listener, and it was with respect to this commitment that the Secretary expressed surprise at Gromyko's statement.

Gromyko noted that the Secretary was surprised and disappointed, but he had presented the Soviet position as it actually was.

Secretary Shultz referred to Gromyko's suggestion to agree on an agenda and the readiness at each side to discuss this, that or other question that may be put on such an agenda. If Gromyko was not prepared to discuss the Korean airliner, Shultz would nevertheless express to him the US point of view on that incident. If Gromyko wished to reserve his reaction until later, that would be up to him to decide.

Gromyko said that the Secretary was mistaken in saying that Gromyko was not prepared to discuss this matter. He had only said that he would not agree to exchange views on this matter at the very start of their broader meeting. He would be prepared to exchange views after discussing the important questions he had in mind, i.e., the Geneva negotiations on nuclear arms. After that he would be prepared to listen to Shultz and reply. He would ask the Secretary not to engage in attempts to repair his statements. They found themselves in a situation where, if the Secretary would start with the Korean airliner matter he might find himself in this room alone. Gromyko believed

that he had been invited here to exchange views on those questions that both sides wished to discuss. It seemed to him that Shultz was creating artificial difficulties. He would not object to exchanging views on the Korean airliner, but only after discussing more substantive issues.

The Secretary suggested that the principal purpose of this private meeting was to give Gromyko the background of the Shcharanskiy case as we understood it in the US Government, and to say to Gromyko that we hoped that the great tensions created by the Korean airliner shoot-down would be resolved in such a way as to make it possible to make progress at their level as well as in Geneva and elsewhere. He suggested that they go to the other room. He had some points he wished to make and then they would see.

Gromyko said again that on the first matter raised by the Secretary he could not add anything else. He would only ask not to pick some different Soviet position out of the air, as it were. As for the second matter, he would be prepared to talk about it after an exchange on substantive and important matters on which he had a great deal to say. He suggested they join the rest of their colleagues.

The Secretary said he always felt deprived at his meetings with Gromyko because he saw his hand gestures and his facial expressions, but did not hear the translation until later. He thought the interpreter should be trained in duplicating Gromyko's gestures and expressions.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz/Gromyko in Madrid September 8, 1983. Secret;

Sensitive. Drafted by Krimer; approved by Shultz. The meeting took place in the U.S. Ambassador's Residence in Madrid. In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "I went over to our ambassador's residence after lunch to prepare for Gromyko's arrival. I planned to take him into a small room with only our interpreters and try to talk to him directly, first about human rights and then about the KAL downing. When he arrived, we went into the study for half an hour. The atmosphere was tense. He was totally unresponsive." Shultz continued: "I then turned to the Soviets' attack on KAL 007. Once again, Gromyko was totally intransigent. I regarded this meeting as a last effort to come to grips with this crisis with him on a human level, but it was fruitless." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 369-370)

² In his memoir, Shultz recalled that during the spring of 1983 "in Madrid, Max Kampelman, our negotiator at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), was getting messages through his KGB contact, Sergei Kondrachev, that did not come through Foreign Minister Gromyko and that suggested some positive movement. The Soviets were not living up to the words on human rights that they had agreed to in the Helsinki Final Act. We insisted on deeds, actions. At the least, a few controversial dissidents should be allowed to emigrate as a beginning. Max seemed to be getting somewhere. Through Max's discussions with Kondrachev in the spring of 1983, the Soviets agreed that they would release Anatoly Shcharansky unconditionally if he would write a letter to Soviet authorities requesting his release. Kampelman pointed out that any requirement of a confession of guilt or any use of a word such as 'pardon' would be unacceptable to Shcharansky. Kondrachev asked Max to write down what he thought Shcharansky would be willing to sign. Max wrote, 'I hereby request that I be released from prison on the grounds of poor health.' That was all. Kondrachev

understood that this meant release from the Soviet Union as well as from prison. He checked with what he described as 'the highest authority,' and, after checking, he agreed." After consultations with his wife, Shcharansky rejected the deal." (Ibid., pp. 273-274)

³ Of this meeting, Gromyko recalled in his memoir: "We held this meeting on the day after our speeches, in an old mansion that had no doubt once belonged to a grandee and was now the US ambassador's residence in Madrid. It took no great perception to see that Shultz looked depressed. We had what is called a frank discussion.

"He started off straight away about human rights in the Soviet Union.

"I tactfully pointed out: 'It doesn't make sense to discuss this subject, as it only concerns our internal affairs.'

"Shultz then repeated almost word for word what he had just said, adding, 'The President instructed me to say this.'

"Again I told him: 'We have no intention of discussing our internal affairs with anyone.'" (Gromyko, *Memoirs*, p. 298)

105. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Madrid, September 8, 1983, 2:30-4 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.—Secretary Shultz
Assistant Secretary Richard Burt
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Ambassador Jack F. Matlock
Mr. William D. Krimer, Interpreter
USSR—Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
Deputy Foreign Minister Komplektov
Ambassador Makarov
Mr. Viktor Sukhokrev, Interpreter

The Secretary thought it would be fair to say that when he and Foreign Minister Gromyko agreed to hold this meeting several weeks ago, he had hoped that this meeting might make a modest step forward in the relationship between our two countries. Instead, the destruction of a civilian airliner carrying 269 people by a Soviet military aircraft has created a major new obstacle to progress.

Gromyko interrupted at this point, threw his glasses on the table, stood up and said he refused to discuss this matter as he had told the Secretary earlier.²

The Secretary interrupted and said he strongly insisted on such a discussion, that he had instructions to discuss this matter with Gromyko in order to draw his attention to how deeply this action had shocked all Americans. We were shocked by the cost in human life.

Gromyko interrupted again to say that he knew this without the Secretary telling it to him. He proposed that they first discuss an agenda on what issues were to be taken up at today's meeting.

The Secretary said that he would take up the Korean airliner shoot-down right now. If Gromyko did not want to listen, that was his privilege.

Gromyko said he proposed that they discuss the major, important questions of curbing the nuclear arms race, and did not agree to start off on another issue.

The Secretary said that we must start with the question of the Korean airliner since it was on everyone's mind as Gromyko surely heard in the conference room during the last two days. We must know the facts and how the Soviets plan to deal with them.

Gromyko said he knew this without the Secretary telling him, only he knew the facts of the matter better than anyone, i.e., he knew the truth.

The Secretary repeated that his agenda called for first discussing the question of the Korean airliner tragedy.

Gromyko repeated that he wanted to talk about nuclear arms first; later he would be ready to discuss the question of the airliner.

The Secretary said that the airliner matter was of first importance and this was the subject he proposed to discuss with Gromyko. Gromyko need not listen if he did not choose to, but he himself intended to explain his concerns.

Gromyko said he was reaching the conclusion that the Secretary did not want to discuss any other problem. In that case they had nothing to discuss at this meeting. The Secretary was in the clutches of an artificially built scheme.³

The Secretary interjected that if Gromyko did not want a meeting, so be it, and rose from his seat. He was disappointed that Gromyko did not want to hear our position. He pointed out that the other matters Gromyko had mentioned were the subject of discussions in Geneva and elsewhere but here, today, and under these circumstances, he had to address the problem that was foremost not only in his mind but also foremost in the views of most people throughout the world. Many Foreign Ministers had raised the question of the meeting here; airline pilots are very concerned; so are publics everywhere.

Gromyko said that the Secretary had already said a great deal on this question. He could report to the United States that he had only one matter to discuss, but Gromyko would report to his Government and to the whole world that the US side refused to discuss matters of such enormous importance as curbing the nuclear arms race and preventing the outbreak of nuclear war, and that he himself was prepared to discuss nuclear weapons. He added that he was entirely prepared to discuss other matters as well, including the Korean airliner matter. But priorities had to be agreed upon first and he would note that this was the first time that he found himself in a situation where the Secretary of State of the United States was attempting to impose an agenda for a meeting without taking into account the views of the other side.

The Secretary said that if Gromyko did not want to discuss this question with him, that would be his choice. But the Secretary's choice was to convey to Gromyko the information he had regarding this matter.

Pacing and greatly agitated, *Gromyko* said he would tell the Secretary what it was he was proposing to discuss. He

proposed first of all to address the question of our negotiations in Geneva, i.e., the question of nuclear arms. If the Secretary was not prepared to respond, that would be acceptable, but he insisted on first presenting his views. Later on he would be prepared to listen to the Secretary's setting forth whatever he believed necessary. He would repeat that he was prepared to discuss this matter and set forth the position of the Soviet Government and the Soviet leadership, to set out their views on critical questions. But he would also repeat that he had never encountered a situation when the other side tried to impose an agenda on him. He wanted to talk about the Geneva negotiations on nuclear arms. It would be up to the Secretary whether or not he wanted to respond. The Secretary was mistaken if he believed that Gromyko was trying to aggravate the relations between our countries. He had met many times with officials of the United States but had never encountered a situation such as the one he was encountering now. It was for this reason that he proposed first to work out an agreed agenda. For his part, he wanted to set forth the Soviet position on nuclear arms and then would be prepared to listen to the Secretary talk on the airliner matter. He did have something to say on that score. At this point, Gromyko being the guest, the Secretary sat down and said, "proceed," and Gromyko resumed his seat.

Gromyko wanted the Secretary of State to know that in his view there was no more important issue between us than the question of nuclear arms and that of preventing nuclear war. The Secretary had referred to the airliner matter as a question of first importance, but in his view the foremost importance should be attached to the urgent need of halting the arms race and preventing nuclear war. He was quite confident that the Secretary himself believed this indeed to be the case. He was certain that no American in his right mind would regard this question as anything but

Number One. Gromyko was speaking here on behalf of the Soviet Government and the entire leadership of the Soviet Union, including Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. He was authorized to draw the attention of the Secretary and the President of the United States to the fact that the Soviet leadership was deeply convinced that the world today was in an extremely dangerous state. It was sliding closer and closer toward the abyss of nuclear war. The situation is getting worse and worse. It was for this reason that he regarded this question as Number One today. There were no other countries in the world today that had to bear such a great responsibility for preventing this slide toward nuclear war as the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union was conscious of its responsibility in this respect and was drawing the proper conclusions from this fact. In the view of the Soviet leadership the US authorities, on the other hand, were not conscious of their responsibility, did not correctly assess the situation and underestimated its gravity. If it were otherwise, US policy today would be entirely different.

What we were witnessing today was a colossal increase in the production of arms and above all nuclear arms in the United States. Furthermore, whatever proposals aimed at curbing the arms race and limiting, let alone reducing, nuclear arms had been made by the Soviet Union, they had all been rejected out of hand, one after the other. No matter what had been proposed by the Soviet side, everything had been rejected. And yet, it was the United States and the Soviet Union together that had assumed the international obligation to prevent war and especially nuclear war. A document to that effect had been adopted by both sides, a number of joint and unilateral statements had been made by both countries to the effect that they would

do all in their power to make sure that such a tragedy would not happen. This was under a previous Administration; but it was a formal agreement obligating both sides to take all steps necessary to prevent war. There were a number of differences today between our two countries, including some very major differences, and of course no one had the right to ignore these differences. However, up to now, and by this he meant up to the present Administration of the United States, the United States had also taken a positive view of the necessity of seeking solutions to these differences. There were many documents and unilateral statements by former Administrations to the effect that this was absolutely necessary. The Soviet Union urgently called upon the United States to take this into account, and he would express the hope that both countries would seek practical and peaceful solutions to these differences. Even the present Administration had made statements in favor of contacts and dialogue. The Soviet leadership still had a glimmer of hope, paradoxical as it may seem, that this view would be reciprocated on the US side, and the present meeting also testified to the fact that even under such unfavorable conditions dialogue between the two countries and contacts between its leading statesmen were important and necessary.

Summing up, Gromyko wanted to say that even taking into account the differences between us, it was necessary to seek solutions at the negotiating table and not allow the leaden storm clouds hanging over the world today to result in a nuclear downpour. He was certain the Secretary knew very well what such a calamity would entail for both our countries and for the whole world.

Gromyko wanted to remind the Secretary of an occasion when President Nixon was in power and had come to Moscow for a meeting with Brezhnev.⁴ Upon entering

Brezhnev's office, Nixon had said that according to American scientific experts and their calculations, the Soviet Union and the United States had amassed a nuclear arsenal that would be sufficient to destroy each other seven times over. Isn't this too much, Nixon had asked. Brezhnev had replied that Nixon was right and that Soviet calculations showed the same thing—seven times over. It was too much, he had agreed. Brezhnev had then added that they should seek solutions to defuse that situation. One might very well ask how many times over we could destroy each other today and did this not surely make it incumbent on both our countries to display the necessary care and solicitude to prevent this situation from escalating and to build bridges between us wherever possible.

The world today was in a very fragile state, and it was necessary for us to be extremely careful. It was for this reason that he wanted to appeal to the President of the United States, to the Secretary of State and to the entire leadership of the US to do everything in their power together with the leadership of the Soviet Union to avert conflict, seek agreed solutions, and bring our positions ever closer together on all the issues between us. On the other hand, he would ask, what would follow if the United States proceeded with its intention of stationing new nuclear weapons in Europe? What would happen then? Obviously the Soviet Union and its allies will not be caught napping and will do everything necessary to preserve the equality in arms existing today. Peace will become more fragile. Thus, the question of what will happen can only be answered by pointing out that the world will become even more fragile than it is today. It was for this reason that it was incumbent on both sides to have a correct assessment of the current situation and to take up the kind of positions at negotiations that would bring us closer together.

In this connection, Gromyko wanted to draw particular attention to the proposal on nuclear missiles which was recently advanced by President Andropov.⁵

[Gromyko in an aside assured the Secretary that he was not greedy and did not have any malicious plans to take up the Secretary's time by lengthy presentations of Soviet views.]

What were these proposals? Earlier, when discussing reductions in the numbers of missiles stationed in Europe, the Soviet side had proposed that excess missiles be transferred beyond the Ural Mountains to the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union. The US side had maintained that such missiles could easily be redeployed back to Europe subsequently. Although this was a somewhat primitive kind of reasoning—because after all missiles were not something that were put in a basket to be shipped at will—the Soviet side had taken this US concern into account and was now saying that it would dismantle such excess missiles, including the SS-20s that the United States and its NATO Allies were concerned about. The Soviet side had clearly stated now that they would be dismantled. The Soviet leadership had hoped that this would build a bridge, drawing the positions of the sides closer together; but now it turned out that even this was not to the liking of the US side. This was one major point to which Gromyko wanted to draw the Secretary's attention.

His second point concerned the fact that the US Government and some US Allies, particularly Britain and France, although the Federal Republic of Germany could also be heard from here, were trying to prove that British and French nuclear missiles should not be taken into account. He wondered what sort of simpletons did the US side take the Soviet leadership for. Britain and France were US Allies and their nuclear missiles were part of NATO's

arsenal. It was therefore obvious that they would have to count in the balance. He was not saying they should be reduced, but only that they be taken into account. Previous US Administrations, in particular President Carter's, had realized this, and President Carter himself had told Gromyko that the Soviet side was right in maintaining that British and French missiles were aimed at the Soviet Union. He said that he had given this matter a great deal of thought but had not yet found a way to resolve it. Yet, ultimately, the solution to this matter had to be found. He wanted to emphasize this to the Secretary, that it was necessary to take into account British and French missiles, for otherwise they would become a sort of special premium for NATO's arsenal. He wanted to convey this thought to the Secretary as forcefully as he could so that no illusions be harbored on the US side. If they are not taken into account, there is no basis for an agreement (*'isklyvehenna dogovorennost'*). If the United States planned to deploy its new missiles in Western Europe come what may, what he had just said would not impress the Secretary. But if the US side was truly prepared to make an effort at bringing the positions of the sides closer together, then this statement of his would be meaningful.

Gromyko said that he had wanted to present the overall Soviet position without going into various details. He had wanted to make these two points which, of course, had various aspects. But, these aspects were being dealt with in Geneva at the START negotiations and at the negotiations to limit medium-range nuclear missiles. He had simply wanted to draw the Secretary's attention to some of the crucial aspects of these matters in the hope that perhaps the Secretary and the President would bear them in mind if they still believed that it was necessary to improve relations between our countries and to achieve a reduction in international tensions. He would assure the Secretary

that the Soviet Union wanted to have good relations with the United States and even at present would make every effort to even out the sources of friction between us. This is what he wanted to convey to the Secretary on a question that concerned the entire world, including the people of the United States, for he was sure that the people of the United States, like the people of the Soviet Union, did not want war but instead craved peace. He was sure that no one in their right mind in any country would welcome the prospect of war. He would conclude by noting that in the past the Secretary had made a few good speeches on this subject.

Secretary Shultz wanted to assure Gromyko that no one in the world was more dedicated to the preservation of peace than President Reagan. His concern over the threat to peace emanating from the buildup in nuclear arms had been fully borne out by his proposal for drastic reductions in strategic arms and complete elimination of an entire class of nuclear missiles—intermediate-range nuclear forces. Nor did his concern stop there: he was also advocating reductions in the area of conventional arms, elimination of chemical and biological weapons as well as a number of other initiatives. It was because of this very fact that in spite of the upheaval in the United States over the shoot-down of the Korean airliner, President Reagan had sent Ambassador Nitze to Geneva, where he would also soon be joined by Ambassador Rowny. Further, Ambassador Abramovitz would continue his efforts in Vienna.

And yet, it was not nuclear arms that were the number one issue today, nor the destruction of the Korean airliner. The number one issue today was human life and it was because of this that nuclear weapons with their holocaustical nature were so threatening and it was also this that triggered the indignation throughout the world over the shoot-down of

the Korean airliner. Nowadays multitudes of people fly all over the world and, naturally, now wonder about the safety of flight in airliners. The real concern is over human life and over what can happen as a result of the recent occurrence.

Therefore, the Soviets must recognize that the loss of 269 human lives had a stunning impact throughout the world. We wanted Gromyko to understand how deeply this action had shocked all Americans. We were shocked at the cost in human life. We were shocked at the apparent lack of effort to identify the aircraft, to communicate with it, or to assist it back on course. We were shocked at the refusal to acknowledge the destruction of the aircraft until just the day before yesterday, and the refusal to assume responsibility for the action, or to cooperate in efforts to search for survivors, if any, or their remains. The Soviet Union had not even allowed members of families in mourning to go to the scene and throw flowers on the water in commemoration of their loved ones. We are shocked at the efforts of the Soviet Government to shift responsibility and to levy entirely baseless and unsubstantiated charges against the United States Government. They surely must be seen as pure fabrications. Quite frankly, the Secretary was personally shocked by Gromyko's statement yesterday.⁶ The Soviet Government has stated flatly that it will take the same action in the future in similar circumstances. Yesterday Gromyko not only reaffirmed this position but stated that Soviet law requires such barbarism. Yesterday Gromyko said that Soviet territory was sacred. Our territory is sacred to us too. But for us human life is also sacred. Therefore, we balance our concern over the security of our territory against the sacredness of human life. President Reagan shares these sentiments in full. He had asked the Secretary to use this meeting to seek an explanation of this

incident and to secure the Soviet Government's cooperation in conducting search and rescue efforts, in compensating the families of those who lost their lives and in adopting measures to see to it that we and the whole world can agree to prevent such tragedies in the future.

Only through a full accounting of this incident can the damage it has done to our relationships begin to be repaired, the Secretary said. The Soviet Union must accept financial responsibility for this action. There can be no legal or moral basis for evading such an obligation. We sought Soviet cooperation in the organization of thorough search and rescue efforts. We provided the details requested by the Soviet side with regard to these proposed efforts, but we haven't heard anything further. We also wish to discuss positive steps which the Soviet Union can take in conjunction with all other nations to ensure that this tragedy is never repeated. We have earlier made proposals to the Soviet Union for direct communications links between our two military commands. Had such links existed in this case, a further channel to secure information on this flight would have existed and ensured against any mis-identification, although we believe that the aircraft in question could so easily have been identified that if this was not done, it should have been.

The Secretary wanted to emphasize to Gromyko that the American reaction to this incident stems from a commitment to human rights and to the importance of the individual human being, which is at the heart of our political and social system. These were the very considerations which give so much drive to our efforts toward reduction of nuclear arms.

The Secretary wanted to ask Gromyko: "Will you take part in an accounting of this tragedy, in an international effort to

ensure that all the facts are known? Will you compensate the families of the victims? Will you permit us to search the waters for any possible survivors or remains? And will you take part in a constructive way to search for means to assure that a tragedy such as this can never happen again?" These are the questions the Secretary had for Gromyko. He had tried to provide a background for our feelings on this matter.

Gromyko noted that the Secretary had started to speak on the main issue between us which Gromyko had raised at the very beginning of this talk, but had then switched to the question of the airliner incident. Gromyko very much regretted that the Secretary had not wished to speak on the important main issue in greater detail, or to present the views of the US Administration on the major nuclear question, that of reducing the nuclear arms build-up, of preventing war and slowing the nuclear arms race. Perhaps the Secretary intended to present the position of his Government later; if so, Gromyko would be prepared to listen at any time.

As for the Secretary's remarks concerning the airliner incident, the Secretary would be making a gross error if he thought that Gromyko would present some sort of defensive remarks in connection with what the Secretary had said. Absolutely not. Quite the contrary, Gromyko would level a charge against the US side on behalf of the Soviet leadership. The Soviet side accused the US side of having undertaken a large-scale hostile action against the Soviet Union. This was the only way that what had happened could be assessed. Of course, the Secretary would know better than Gromyko whether this action had been instigated by the highest authorities of the United States or whether US special agencies had perhaps acted within the framework of some general instructions in

undertaking this action. But the Soviet side had no doubt whatsoever that the entire incident had been pre-planned. All the statements made by the US side since the incident could not dispel this conviction of the Soviet side.

Secretary Shultz interrupted to tell Gromyko that this conviction had no basis in fact whatsoever.

Gromyko noted that the aircraft had deviated from the established international route by almost 500 kms, and not toward the left, that is toward international waters, but to the right, toward USSR territory. In fact, the plane was deep in Soviet territory and had spent more than two hours in its air space. How did this happen? Had the US Government answered this question? Indeed, it had not; this question was being carefully avoided. Was it not clear to the US Government that this flight took the aircraft over important prohibited areas of the USSR with installations of strategic significance. This is also being avoided. Was this deviation accidental or was it not? It could not have been accidental. How would the United States act if airplanes of other states flew over secret US bases? And why did this plane, flying deep in Soviet air space and over Soviet strategic bases, not obey the signals provided for in international law, given by Soviet ground services as well as Soviet air defense aircraft, signals that were both visual and radioed, as well as the physical maneuvers of the fighter interceptors? What happened? Had the pilot and crew suddenly lost their minds and had turned into idiots? Such things do not happen. They not only failed to obey all signals. They even ignored them demonstratively and flouted international standards as well as Soviet laws which are well known to all, since they have been published. Why was one of the United States' planes accompanying the airliner although it did so at a distance, outside Soviet air space? Isn't that significant? Evidently it was impossible to

conceal this fact. Why didn't the Japanese air navigation services notify the Korean plane and advise it to correct its flight pattern? He believed that US control of these air services is close indeed. Why didn't the US authorities get in touch with Soviet authorities either in Washington or elsewhere? Why did they fail to draw the attention of the Soviet side to the fact that this was an error, either in Moscow or locally, unless its intentions were hostile? After all, hours had passed where minutes would have been sufficient.

Secretary Shultz interrupted to say that this was a clear effort to avoid answering relevant questions by posing questions which have obvious answers; it was not worth the time to sit here. These questions are basically ridiculous and what's more Gromyko knew that very well. It therefore seemed to the Secretary that we had nothing further to discuss on this subject or perhaps any other.

Gromyko resumed by charging that the fact cannot be avoided: the United States organized this whole criminal action. The Soviet Union bore no responsibility for this matter, not financial responsibility nor any other. Those who organized this whole incident were responsible.

Gromyko also noted that the Secretary had linked this incident with human rights. Supposedly nuclear war had nothing to do with human rights although it would be a catastrophe costing hundreds of millions of lives. Here, in this distorted way, the Secretary had tried to link this incident with human rights. This was his response: The Soviet side charges US authorities with the responsibility for this action. The Secretary would know best what the relations were between the US central authorities and its various agencies and how this incident was organized. He

accused the US, and he had nothing more to say on this matter.

Gromyko further noted that the United States had undertaken many actions against the Soviet Union in many different areas. US authorities seemed to believe that there was no limit to such actions. And yet, there was very little left to be done to worsen the relations between our countries further. The Soviet Union regretted this fact, but responsibility for it rested on US shoulders. He noted that our respective representatives in Geneva could indeed achieve some things with respect to the important question of nuclear arms, but at the higher level you have little or no taste for any progress. The Secretary had limited himself to some very general comments on nuclear arms. That was not enough. Gromyko was prepared to listen to any response the Secretary might have.

As for the general tone of US officials when talking about the Soviet Union and the socialist system, they had used up an entire dictionary of salty words of abuse. The Soviet side decisively rejected and condemned these words and methods. They were totally unworthy of the high calling of statesmen. Abuse could not cover up the true aspects of US policy, the attempts to fuel the arms race and where the true blame belonged.

The Secretary interrupted Gromyko to say that his statements were growing more outrageous by the minute. We were constantly engaged in discussing issues, but Gromyko had refused to come to grips with Korean airliner tragedy. This was shocking. Gromyko had leveled unfounded charges against us in order to cover up the need for a complete accounting of the facts on a Soviet atrocity. This was even more shocking. In view of this, there was nothing further to discuss.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz/Gromyko in Madrid September 8, 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Krimer; cleared by Matlock, Hartman, Burt, and Palmer; approved by Shultz. Brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the U.S. Ambassador's Residence in Madrid.

² Matlock later recalled: "When Shultz announced he was prepared to discuss only the Korean airliner incident and started to set forth the American position, Gromyko exploded in fury and stood up as if to leave, literally throwing his glasses on the table. The rest of the delegation also rose, apparently uncertain as to whether the boss was on his way out. Shultz, seated across the table from him, also stood, as if prepared to see him out. Gromyko, pacing the floor, started a harangue that went on for a full twenty minutes. In his excitement he frequently interrupted Viktor Sukhodrev, his interpreter, in mid-sentence, so Shultz grasped only snippets of Gromyko's outburst.

"Once Gromyko started talking, his colleagues took their seats and began taking notes. Shultz stood with a look of amazement on his face and interjected periodically that he was following President Reagan's instructions. Gromyko thundered that *he*, the foreign minister of the Soviet Union, was not subordinate to Reagan and did not take orders from him. Those of us who were present were glad that a table separated the two. Shultz was outwardly calm, but his cheeks were flushed with anger." (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, p. 68)

³ In his memoir, Shultz recalled: “the plenary session developed into a brutally confrontational meeting. At one point, Gromyko stood up and picked up his papers as though to leave. I think he half-expected me to urge him to sit down. On the contrary, I got up to escort him out of the room. He then sat down, and I sat down. After the meeting ended, my interpreter, Bill Krimer, told me that he had been interpreting in high-level meetings with the Soviets for seventeen years and had never seen anything remotely like it.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 370)

⁴ Reference is presumably to the meeting between Nixon and Brezhnev in Moscow on May 23, 1972, when they discussed SALT. See [Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1972, Documents 262](#) and [263](#).

⁵ See [Document 82](#).

⁶ The *Washington Post* reported that in his speech at the closing session of the CSCE conference on September 7, Gromyko warned that “any future violations of ‘sacred’ Soviet borders, such as the South Korean airliner’s intrusion into Soviet air space last week, would receive the ‘full brunt’ of Kremlin retaliation.” (Peter Osnos, “Gromyko Threatens Further Soviet Violence,” *Washington Post*, September 8, 1983, p. A1)

106. Editorial Note

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Secretary of State George Shultz endured two tense meetings in the wake of the KAL disaster on the afternoon of September 8, 1983, in conjunction with the CSCE meetings in Madrid. (See [Documents 104](#) and [105](#).) Jack Matlock, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs in the NSC Staff, who attended these meetings, later wrote that when the larger plenary meeting ended: “Shultz, who rarely showed emotion, was fuming. As soon as Gromyko left the room in Ambassador Hartman’s company, Shultz summoned Rick Burt, Mark Palmer, and me and said, ‘If you fellows ever advise me to see that so-and-so again, you’re fired!’ We knew he wasn’t serious, so we assured him, tongue in cheek, that such a thought would never cross our minds.” (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, pages 68–69) As Gromyko recalled the meeting in his memoir: “That was virtually the end of my talk with Shultz. It was probably the sharpest exchange I ever had with an American Secretary of State, and I have had talks with fourteen of them.” (Gromyko, *Memoirs*, page 301)

According to the President’s Daily Diary, Shultz and President Ronald Reagan spoke via telephone on September 8 from 10:32 to 10:39 a.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) Shultz recalled in his memoir that when the meeting with Gromyko ended: “I called President Reagan and told him that Gromyko couldn’t bring himself to answer any of my questions. The meeting became so outrageous and pointless that we just ended it. But I told the president that the French and the other allies were hearing from their pilots’ unions and I believed that by the time the night was over, most of our allies would agree on significant actions: amendments on air traffic control

through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); prohibition of normal liaison operations with the Soviets by NATO military attachés; a call for better military and civilian coordination of flights; a move to take these matters to the UN Security Council; explicit support for the five South Korean demands of the Soviets; and support for a two-week moratorium in air traffic to and from the Soviet Union, starting on September 15.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 370) In his diary entry for September 8, Reagan wrote: “Talked to Geo. S. in Madrid—he terminated the meeting with Gromyko who insisted on repeating the Soviet lies about the Korean Plane Massacre. George says our allies may be hanging with us on taking more action against the Soviets. We’ll know more tomorrow.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 261) Shultz also reported on the meetings to Reagan and the Department of State in a telegram; see [Document 108](#).

Matlock concluded in his book: “The meeting was traumatic for both. In his otherwise bland and uninformative memoirs, Gromyko devotes three pages to his encounter with Shultz in Madrid, repeating in a tone of high dudgeon words he had used then. It made no sense to discuss human rights with Shultz, he said, ‘as it only concerns our internal affairs.’ And he included his accusation that the Korean airliner had been sent by the United States to spy.” [See Gromyko, *Memoirs*, pages 298–301.] Matlock continues: “When he was in Madrid it is possible that Gromyko did not have a full report on the KAL incident. But the Soviet navy managed to recover much of the wreckage and the plane’s black box. By the time Gromyko wrote his memoirs, he should have been informed that there was no evidence that the plane had been on a spy mission. Possibly he never asked and was never told. The Soviet cover story was for him the truth. He would

have considered any attempt by Soviet officials to question that version an act of disloyalty.” (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, page 69)

107. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, September 8, 1983

SUBJECT

KAL Affair's Impact on US-Soviet Relations

Under Jeremy Azrael's chairmanship, we have again assembled our "Red Team" of Soviet specialists. The attached paper is their analysis of the KAL affair's likely impact on Soviet policy, especially on US-Soviet relations.

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the "Red Team" of the Department of State²

Washington, September 8, 1983

Red Team Special Edition: The KAL Affair's Impact on US-Soviet Relations

Ten months after Leonid Brezhnev's death, Yuri Andropov and the Soviet leadership face their most serious foreign policy crisis. The international outcry over the KAL shoot-down leaves Andropov and his colleagues with three major tasks: to limit the damage, to deflect the outrage, and to regain some initiative on broader East-West issues, especially arms control. Moscow's unyielding initial approach to the incident may put those objectives still further out of reach. The Soviets' principal challenge now is to find a way to put the issue behind them as soon as possible. They probably believe their best hope lies in

making the issue US exploitation of the shoot-down rather than the shoot-down itself, in capitalizing on any West-West tensions that may emerge, and in using the incident to show that the dangers of East-West confrontation are very real.

Internal Decisionmaking

The initial decisions for dealing with the “intruding aircraft” were almost certainly governed by a combination of rigid standard operating procedures and the ingrained security-mindedness that created them. It is, and will probably remain, unclear who actually gave the order to destroy the aircraft, but even if it was approved in Moscow it was probably not handled as a matter of high policy, or seen as an opportunity to put pressure on the West. It is still less likely that it reflected military dissatisfaction with Andropov, or an effort by the military to undermine his security and arms control policies.

Despite overall policy unity between the civilian and military hierarchies, the incident may prompt the political leadership to reexamine whether the military’s operational procedures autonomy is too great, particularly where international repercussions are possible. (A mere regimental officer is reportedly empowered to order an intruding military aircraft shot down.) Yet whatever its conclusions, and even if it appears that Soviet rules of engagement were breached, we should not expect the leadership to be willing to offer an outright apology. This would not only be a greater slap at the military than Andropov can probably afford; it would also be inconsistent with his own campaign of vigilance against foreign enemies and with a conviction that to do so would signal dangerous weakness. For these reasons, despite the international

price that has been paid, the leadership will likely continue its counter-offensive on the issue of the downing itself, although with tactical adjustments as events dictate.

Assessing the Damage

Particularly if it remains unyielding, the leadership will soon have to consider the consequences of an atmosphere of growing US-Soviet confrontation that could engulf other East-West questions. Should it accept a broader breakdown of US-Soviet relations? If so, can it still advance its objectives in Western Europe—in particular, delaying if not blocking INF deployments? If not, how can it contain and compartmentalize the confrontation?

Moscow's answer will become evident in its approach to a series of coming events: Gromyko's speech to the UNGA; his bilateral(s) with the Secretary; the substance of Soviet positions in the arms talks and even the extent of Soviet participation in them. The Soviets will have to react to the isolation represented by a spreading pilots' boycott, and review its policy towards the ROK. In addition, they will have to react to a volatile Middle East situation and US demarches on the subject, evaluate their stand on particular human rights issues (especially Shcharanskiy), and so on.

Soviet decisions will depend on a still unfolding assessment of how much lasting damage has been done to the USSR's international position. Naturally, if within two or three weeks it appears that the storm will soon blow over, Moscow's policies—especially a renewed INF offensive—will emerge on former lines. At present, however, the high pitch of Western rhetoric is surely read by the Soviets as evidence that the US and allied governments expect less

public pressure on them to produce tangible progress in East-West relations, especially to reach arms control agreements. The Reagan Administration's very tentative shows of interest in doing business are seen to have receded to be replaced in all likelihood by a greater propensity to treat propagandistically issues that earlier they might have hoped would be confined to a low diplomatic key (e.g., arms control compliance and human rights). And, having earlier looked like a would-be peace candidate, the President is perhaps thought to be weighing the advantages of running for reelection on sharper, anti-Bolshevik themes.

Ordinarily, Moscow would be fully prepared to hunker down for the duration of a chill in East-West ties. Yet given the short time remaining before INF deployments, the increased Western freedom of action that accompanies the chill could very quickly have a significant political-military effect, above all in Europe. This is likely to strengthen the view that, even if a period of confrontation should be accepted on most other issues on the East-West agenda, much more active efforts will be needed soon to repair or at least limit the damage to Soviet negotiating credibility in arms control; without such efforts the Soviets will have still less hope of averting INF deployments, much less of producing a deal on terms acceptable to them.

This analysis is the more likely to be accepted by the leadership because it does not require that Soviet *strategy* change fundamentally. It will continue to seek exacerbated tensions within the Western alliance by trying both to arouse European fears, which are presumed to be higher than American, and to appear to meet European demands, which are thought to be lower. But given the weakness of the Soviet position, the same *tactics* employed to date may no longer seem adequate. As a result we are likely to see

an intensification and acceleration of Soviet effort, both to demonstrate reasonableness and to suggest just how bad a deterioration in East-West relations could become.

Gromyko's speech in Madrid is a strong indication that the Soviets are moving in this direction.

INF and Other Arms Control Issues

The outline of intensified and accelerated Soviet efforts may be clear enough, but both the hard and soft sides of Soviet policy will present certain dilemmas for the leadership:

—While the rhetorical atmosphere is still hot, the Soviets are likely to fear that concessions they offer will be lost in the KAL din, or merely pocketed by the West. It is not their style to make concessions to improve the atmosphere, lest the real bargaining begin (and end) on disadvantageous terms. Despite this, Moscow will certainly attempt an early resuscitation, probably with embellishments, of the arms control initiatives already taken just before the KAL incident, i.e. the ASAT test moratorium, and Andropov's SS-20 dismantling commitment. Beyond these proposals, more consideration will probably be given to accelerating whatever time-table of *new* offers had been devised for the fall. These may well include new suggestions in MBFR and an elaborate CDE proposal, to create the impression of possible progress across the board. Yet the heart of this campaign, if it is to have any chance of success, will remain INF. As a result, whatever incentives existed for putting forward a highly attractive new formula (perhaps a modified walk-in-the-woods offer) will also increase. All these initiatives can actually make direct use of the public's sense that a confrontation is at hand: the Soviets will offer their initiatives, perhaps directly to European governments

rather than to the US, as a contribution to calming the inflamed international situation.

—While stimulating hopes for a breakthrough in this area, the Soviet leadership may also want to review (and perhaps accelerate) measures already planned to increase European fears. The KAL crisis itself can be a basis for driving home the point that innocent bystanders, even allies, suffer when the US drives up East-West tension: hair-trigger responses, launch-on-warning procedures all become necessary—although dangerous—measures of self-defense. As a backdrop to this argument, Soviet counter-deployment threats may also become more explicit. Threats to cut off talks will also become more frequent (although this was likely even before the KAL incident). While recognizing the risk that an actual walk-out might only worsen their image in the West, the Soviets are also likely to consider the advantages of withdrawing dramatically (“more in sorrow than in anger”) from INF and/or START. If done early, this step could focus pressure on the US to take steps that would make the resumption of negotiation possible. Finally, to add to tensions, Moscow may launch an escalated counter-intelligence campaign—perhaps involving expulsions of Western (especially US) diplomats, discovery of “nests of spies”, etc.

The Rest of the Agenda

Even as it intensifies its traditional hard-and-soft tactics, Moscow is likely to protect itself by imposing certain limits on each arm of its policy.

—In seeking to *intimidate*, it will want to avoid authorizing operations that risk new incidents in which the Soviet Union would again be in the dock. What would otherwise

be routine military procedures are likely to get much closer scrutiny; continuing submarine probes in Swedish waters, for example, may now seem more ill-advised.

—In projecting *flexibility* on arms control, the Soviets will continue to fear conveying an impression of overall weakness. On issues that involve their international legitimacy and reputation, where the KAL affair has been most damaging, they are likely to doubt that any symbolic concessions will restore their good name, such as it was. This will be especially true as well of issues on the US-Soviet bilateral agenda; the Soviets will not be disposed to make the concessions that could improve relations or produce agreement. For example, barring a Soviet decision that the US-Soviet downturn must be kept strictly limited, the release of Shcharanskiy will seem unnecessary, even pointless (all the more so since his case involves the domestically charged themes of spying and vigilance). If Moscow for a time expects bad relations to prevail, then it may even decide to get the worst over with (as it did in exiling Sakharov immediately after Afghanistan).

Finally, on the issues of geopolitical rivalry, the leadership's objectives and risk calculations will remain largely unchanged, and their policies unadjusted in the wake of the KAL affair. While remaining extremely cautious in circumstances that carry the risk of direct confrontation with the US, they will be eager to show that the Soviet Union cannot be pushed around with impunity, and that US involvements are dangerous and costly, both for us and for those we convince to work with us. Yet these same considerations have obviously guided Moscow for some time, as the risks involved in the Syrian SA-5 deployments have shown. The extreme dangers created by Soviet policy in the Middle East are not lessened as a result of this incident, but they do not appear to be greater. In other

areas, where they can trip us up without incurring greater risks of direct confrontation, the Soviets are less likely to cooperate with us, particularly on issues like a Namibia settlement where the success for us will inevitably be much larger than for them.

In sum, it is our judgment that in pressing to blame the US for the incident the Soviets will not make an active effort to limit the damage to the US-Soviet relationship wrought by the KAL affair, or even to isolate the incident within the broader US-Soviet agenda. Rather, Soviet strategy—as evidenced by Gromyko’s defiant stance at his meeting with the Secretary in Madrid³—will be one of toughing it out with Washington, while seeking to reinvigorate Moscow’s carrot-and-stick strategy vis-à-vis Western Europe. Any impulse Soviet leaders may feel toward taking the initiative to defuse the latest tensions through more accommodating policies on US-Soviet issues is likely to be outweighed by instinctive Russian defensiveness and a desire to avoid appearing weak when under siege, and by the view that nothing short of fundamental concessions of principle will elicit a positive U.S. response.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, September 1-8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Hill’s handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on September 8.

² Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Sestanovich; cleared by Azrael, R. Baraz (INR/SEE), W. Courtney (PM), D. Johnson (P), and Vershbow.

³ See [Documents 104](#) and [105](#).

108. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the White House¹

Madrid, September 9, 1983, 0152Z

Secto 9022. For the President From Secretary Shultz. Subj: My Meeting With Gromyko, September 8, 1983.

1. (S—Entire text)

2. As I reported to you earlier,² today's meeting was totally unsatisfactory, and the statement I made to the press after Gromyko left said just that.³ In fact, his behavior and his treatment of the KAL atrocity were nothing short of outrageous.

3. Gromyko made clear from the outset that his strategy for the meeting was to concentrate on arms control, so that he could claim afterward that we are refusing to discuss peace and war—but prefer to whip up anti-Soviet feeling with the airliner incident we engineered in order to stoke the arms race. Both in a short private meeting in which I raised Shcharanskiy and other Soviet human rights issues, and the longer meeting with aides that followed, I drove home that American and world outrage at the massacre made human rights the necessary focus of this meeting.

4. I told him that the number one issue for us is not arms control, but human life. It is human life that makes nuclear weapons important, and our concern for human life is at the core of our outrage over the airliner. I told him it has had a tremendous impact on our people and the world community, and that the Soviets would have to give adequate responses and restitution if they wanted to repair

the damage to our relations. I went through all four categories of international demands on them: full accounting, financial responsibility, cooperation on search and rescue efforts, and concrete measures to assure that it never happens again. Gromyko had repeated that their territory is sacred, and I told him that ours is sacred to us as well, but I stressed that for us human life is also sacred, and what we are talking about is the relationship between human life and security.

5. Gromyko for his part wanted to talk about arms control, and went through the weary list of Soviet proposals without saying anything new about any of them. To short-circuit his clear intention to claim later that we will talk only about the airliner “provocation” and not about arms control, I told him that no man in the world is more dedicated to peace than you are, and mentioned your proposals for real arms control in START, INF, MBFR and CBW. I pointed out that despite the shutdown you had sent Nitze back to Geneva and would send Rowny and Abramowitz back to negotiations too precisely because of your commitment to peace and progress in arms control. But I insisted that this meeting was about human rights, and the rights of the KAL travellers in particular.

6. Forced to address the issue, Gromyko was even more outrageous in private than he was on the Madrid podium yesterday or than the Soviets were in the statement they gave us early this morning.⁴ He took his cue from that statement, and related the same set of rhetorical questions based on the filthy theory that the KAL flight was a U.S. intelligence operation, all put in the most insulting possible way. He told me that far from being put on the defensive the Soviets will henceforth accuse us of undertaking a “gross instigation” against them. They would pay no financial or other compensation, he said.

7. Rather than listen to more of his diatribe, I interjected that his effort to avoid answering relevant questions by asking easy-to-answer irrelevant ones was revolting and that there seemed no purpose in continuing a discussion of this subject, and perhaps any other.

8. Gromyko was, therefore, totally unyielding on all our concerns. In our private meeting he denied that the Soviets had made any commitment whatsoever concerning Shcharanskiy,⁵ and his diatribe in the larger meeting went on at high pitch. The discussion was tense and often heated. We were both on the point of walking out of the smaller meeting, and Gromyko began the general session by heading for the door, so that the first quarter-hour took place standing. He sat down after it was clear to him that an early end to the meeting would suit me fine. Jack Matlock has seen lots of Gromyko theatricals, but noted for the first time in his experience that Gromyko seemed on the verge of losing control of himself. Our own interpreter has been doing high-level U.S.-Soviet meetings since 1963, and says he has never seen a tenser one. So Gromyko appears to have been genuinely agitated.

9. After his last three meetings with American Secretaries of State Gromyko has made an airport statement before returning to Moscow. Today he told the press he had nothing for them "for the time being." The Soviets have now announced a Moscow press conference for tomorrow afternoon, but my guess is that Gromyko will also make a statement when he leaves for Paris tomorrow and will claim publicly that I refused to talk about peace and war and pounded away on an incident we are creating to blacken the Soviets, stir up war psychosis and gain military superiority. I think we should respond by stating that I pointed out to Gromyko that a host of serious arms control proposals demonstrate your commitment to peace, but that

the Soviets are the only ones who apparently do not see that respect for human life is the foundation of international security.

10. I think the meeting showed that the Soviet leadership is at this point totally unwilling to accept their responsibility for taking innocent lives, that they are digging in on a hard line, and that they will be trying vigorously to blame us for the atrocity, against all the evidence and against all reason. They are agitated and worried. The short-term result is that we are engaged in a propaganda exchange where we have all the real assets but will still need to remain resolute and alert. Their strategy will be to keep trying to make this a U.S.-Soviet issue and to frighten others off by fueling fears of confrontation, particularly in the arms control field. Our answer should be to continue our effort to catalyze the world community's demands for an honest explanation, an apology, full compensation and adoption of measures to keep this sort of thing from ever happening again. That is the best way to prove to the Soviets that they face the world, rather than just us. But an essential part of our strategy must also be to keep the administration's commitment to genuine arms control absolutely clear.

11. I also think we are making progress in mobilizing international response to the massacre. In this meeting we saw something of the Soviet leadership's state of mind as international pressure mounts. Gromyko was reacting verbally as a cornered beast would physically.

Shultz

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Flash; Nodis.

² See [Document 106](#).

³ See Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1983, p. 12.

⁴ See [footnote 6, Document 105](#).

⁵ See [footnote 2, Document 104](#).

109. Memorandum From Richard Levine and Peter Sommer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, September 9, 1983

SUBJECT

Secretary Shultz's Meeting with the President

The primary purpose of tomorrow's meeting is for Secretary Shultz to give the President and you a personal debrief on his bilateral meeting with Gromyko and to report on his efforts to galvanize international reaction to the KAL massacre.²

We think it important that you try to steer the discussion to some specificity, particularly with regard to additional pressure we should put on our Allies and friends to take stronger action.

There follows some points you may wish to make:

—The proposed NATO response of a two-week suspension of their interaction with Aeroflot is not enough.

—The USG has extended tougher sanctions against Aeroflot.

—We, with State in the lead, should continue to apply pressure to our Allies and friends to extend the suspension of interaction with Aeroflot to sixty days.

—The USG still has the unilateral capability to stop foreign airlines operating in the US from booking flights to or from

the US that involve Aeroflot. State opposes this option because of its extra-territoriality implications. While it is not the preferred option, you may wish to resurface it. Mention of it may be useful in getting State to take a tougher line (i.e., hardline letters and contacts) with our Allies.

—The Airline Pilots boycott of flights to the USSR will just switch air travelers to Aeroflot if foreign countries still accept Aeroflot flights. Thus, it is very important that the Allied severance of relations with Aeroflot be extended for as long a period of time as the Airline Pilot boycott (i.e., 60 days).

RECOMMENDATION

That you raise these points with the President and Secretary Shultz.³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert Lilac Files, Arms Transfer, Subject File/1981-84, AT (Arms Transfers): [Korean Airlines] KAL [09/09/1983]; NLR-332-14-33-4-3. Confidential. Sent for action. Cleared by Lilac and Robinson. Sommer initialed for Levine, Lilac, and Robinson.

² According to the President's Daily Diary, on Saturday, September 10, Reagan and Clark met with Shultz in the Oval Office at 10:29 a.m. Kelly and Sommer were present in the meeting as well. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) Reagan wrote in his diary on September 10: "Met with George S. 10:30 A.M. Nancy had left for Phoenix—back Sun. Nite. George reported in full on meeting with Gromyko. No doubt Gromyko was on the defensive & 'discombobulated.' I think it was our round. We've learned by continuing to electronically process the tapes to bring

out the few unintelligible lines that a Soviet pilot did report firing his canon. We don't know if that was *at* the KAL or as a signal—'tracers.' The Japanese tapes of the Korean transmissions give no hint that the pilot was aware of the Soviet planes even being in the air. We made this new information public." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. 1, January 1981-October 1985, pp. 261-262)

³ Although no recommendation was checked, Poindexter wrote in the margin: "Judge noted."

110. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Gates) to Director of Central Intelligence Casey and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (McMahon)¹

DDI #6508-83

Washington, September 9, 1983

SUBJECT

Crisis Management: The Korean Airliner Incident

1. Before the events of the last week get too far behind us I want to set down for you two problems that I perceive in the handling of the Korean airliner incident. [*portion marking not declassified*]
2. First, as I have mentioned to you, the interagency meetings that were held on this subject had a great number of participants. The SIG chaired by Larry Eagleburger had some 25 people there and the subsequent IGs had between 40 and 50 people in the room—standing room only.² Under these circumstances, it was very awkward to present intelligence briefings with anything like the completeness and the detail that senior policy officials needed to have. Even the FAA was reluctant in the IG meetings to provide details on some of their activities. [*portion marking not declassified*]
3. The State Department seems institutionally incapable of having a small meeting—or saying no to people. The only remedy for this in my view—and perhaps showing my earlier colors—is for this kind of incident or crisis management to be carried out by the NSC with the attendance at meetings limited to a very small number of

people (8-10) where all the information available to all of the Agencies can be placed on the table and actions and decisions be taken on the basis of the full range of data. [*portion marking not declassified*]

4. Second, the way the incident was managed by the Department from the standpoint of the release of intelligence information was at minimum awkward and more often highly risky for sources and methods. Because so many bureaus and parts of State and other elements of the government were involved in acquiring information and putting it out, it was inevitable that a great deal of information would be made available to the press by government officials. The problem is that there were so many people involved in the process that no one person or single institution had any purview over what was to be released and was able to make distinctions between what was sensitive and what was more usable. NSA did its best working with State but there were other institutions involved as well, including DoD and the NSC Staff. Here again, in future incidents, having a small group chaired by the NSC where the public relations and Congressional liaison people could be included would permit decisions to be made and the coordination of information to be released carried out much more effectively and with less cost to sources and methods. [*portion marking not declassified*]

5. In sum, the handling of this problem was simply too diffuse and involved too many actors sitting at the table. The result was a significant lack of discipline in the release of intelligence information, in part based on a lack of understanding of what was sensitive and what was not, and no centralized coordination of the release of information. [*portion marking not declassified*]

6. I know that there are significant bureaucratic equities involved in the handling of incidents such as this. I am well aware of differences between State and NSC over who should handle these matters. I simply would suggest that you weigh in with Judge Clark that from the standpoint of intelligence equities, these affairs in our view are far better handled by a group such as the Crisis Pre-Planning Group or small ad hoc committees chaired by the NSC than by the "town meeting" approach of the Department of State.³
[*portion marking not declassified*]

Robert M. Gates⁴

¹ Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1983, 400641. Secret. Casey forwarded the memorandum to Clark on September 12. In an attached covering memorandum to Clark, September 12, deGraffenreid noted: "The DCI marked this IMMEDIATE, so I am sending it to you directly without complete staffing. However, Gates' points seem well taken, and I recommend that it be circulated widely on our staff and Gates' points fully considered." Clark wrote "NO" to the side of this recommendation and noted at the bottom: "Let's hold up for now." In a follow-up note to Poindexter, deGraffenreid reported: "Bob Gates called to say he had just learned that the DCI sent his memo here. He is a bit worried that because his criticism of State could be misinterpreted that we limit distribution of his memo. I agree. We can just pull out the thoughts."

² No record of these meetings has been found.

³ On an attached routing slip, deGraffenreid wrote to Clark: "Judge: Gates' points are good, but a key element of the facts is missing: the VP *personally* decided not to go the SSG route on KAL, as we had done on Lebanon. Also, while

SSG and CPPG meeting are good and necessary, SIG/IG work must back them up. (I would venture to say that 1/5 of all meeting attendees at KAL SIGs were from the intelligence community—CIA, NSA, and DIA, INR).”

⁴ Gates signed “RG” above his typed signature.

111. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Foreign Intelligence Council (Casey) to the National Foreign Intelligence Board and the National Foreign Intelligence Council¹

NFIC-9.1/68

Washington, September 12, 1983

SUBJECT

Protection of Sensitive Intelligence

The President recently decompartmented and declassified, in furtherance of national policy, certain sensitive intelligence regarding the South Korean airliner atrocity. I am now concerned that additional disclosures are being made without authorization through some combination of an impression that related matters may now be discussed and a relaxation of discipline arising from the fact that authorized disclosures have been made.

Each authorized recipient of classified or compartmented intelligence is hereby reminded that the obligation to maintain the security integrity of such information remains fully in effect. Any disclosure without the requisite approval remains a serious security violation which can result in severe penalties.

Please bring this to the attention of all recipients of classified intelligence in your department or agency and require that renewed care be exercised at this time to protect intelligence sources and methods from damaging revelations.

William J. Casey

¹ Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1983, 400683. No classification marking. Although an unidentified "Attachment 1" is noted at the bottom of the memorandum, no attachment was found.

112. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, September 15, 1983

SUBJECT

Possible Further Steps on KAL Issue

The major upcoming events in our response to the KAL shutdown are the airline boycott and the ICAO Council meeting, beginning today.² Both will be high-visibility events and should generate numerous media stories on the world community's continuing response to the massacre. The pilots' boycott will also be well underway by that point with appropriate disruptions in Soviet connections with the outside world. By early next week, however, pressures may begin to mount again for more U.S. and international steps.

We were aware that the first few days of this week would be difficult for our policy. Congress is back and there are pressures, particularly in the Senate, to take strong actions against the Soviets. At best, it will take a few days for your briefings, and those of others, to calm the waters and create an understanding of what we are doing and why we are doing it. During this period, we will want to ensure that our rhetoric is consistent with the rest of our policy, and hence avoid giving the impression that Soviet actions are so awful that fiercer measures are essential.

Our basic message should be that the President's policy on this extremely difficult problem has been highly successful. His approach has demonstrated statesmanship at its best

and has been so judged by much of the American public. The rest of the world has drawn the same conclusion; as a result, other countries, and especially major Allies, have been willing not just to follow our lead but also to take independent action expressing outrage and calling for justice and restitution. The contrast between the response to our current policy and the Olympic Boycott and pipeline episodes could not be more striking. In those earlier cases, the major press story within two or three days was the argument between the United States and its Allies. This time, the vast majority of the Allies are working together to carry out the package you developed in Madrid. The world, including the Soviets, sees us working together, not in conflict.

We have a range of options for further steps. Most of them risk sacrificing the solidarity that has been the secret of success so far.

We can dribble out a few more small steps such as removing Aeroflot from the U.S. computerized reservations system or termination of the bilateral civil air agreement (although we think the latter step would be a mistake) within the current policy. The CAB proposal for additional actions against third country airline ties with Aeroflot could be instituted, but its extraterritorial aspects would inevitably get us into damaging arguments with our Allies. There are probably a few other items of a similar nature, but they are insufficiently weighty to satisfy those who want unilateral steps that really hurt the Soviets.

The same is true of an intermediate category of steps more serious than those considered so far but not serious enough to do much damage or garner much credit. Illustratively, this category could include: denying entry to Soviet shipping; invoking the Baker Amendment to deny visas to

Soviet visitors on grounds that the USSR has violated the Helsinki Final Act; or not renewing White House accreditation to Soviet correspondents in Washington. Basically, these are Carter Administration-type steps, taken more out of weakness than out of strength, and they would probably be reversed before too long.

Such steps have the same basic defect as the smaller steps: they would whet appetites, but are not strong enough to satisfy those pressing for genuinely punishing measures. And, in each case, there are good substantive reasons not to take these steps. Cutting off shipping would affect grains, phosphates and vodka (for Pepsico), cause a virtual *de facto* grain embargo, and arouse powerful interests here. If we do not renew the White House accreditations, we would face almost certain retaliation against our already overburdened American correspondents in Moscow, and a strong reaction from their home offices. Finally, invoking the Baker Amendment would put us on uncertain legal grounds and open the way to unending political battles over every visa for a prominent Soviet visitor. (We should instead amend the McGovern Amendment to give us discretion to refuse visas on foreign policy grounds.)

Finally, truly major retaliatory steps have also been suggested. They include:

- a grain embargo or abrogation of the long-term grain agreement;
- drastically reducing the official Soviet presence in the United States;
- closing down the INF, START, and MBFR talks;

—economic warfare actions against the USSR (including stopping or reducing imports, blocking Soviet financial assets, etc.).

The arguments against all these steps are well known: a grain embargo is politically unacceptable and has been specifically ruled out by the President; a major expulsion of Soviets in the U.S. would bring retaliation that would destroy our intelligence, DATT, and political/economic reporting operations in Moscow and the Soviets would continue to have their large establishment in New York; closing down arms talks would be the best favor we could do for the Soviets, since it would cripple European support for the INF dual decision at a critical time; and strong economic measures would require a Presidential declaration of national emergency and undoubtedly bring a more intense replay of the U.S.-against-the-Allies scenario of the Olympics and pipeline sanctions.

None of these actions would produce any useful long-term impact on the Soviets. What we have done so far has had impact—the Soviets consider “rhetoric” a political act, and see the international solidarity against them as something we have generated. Whether that impact is short- or long-term depends on whether we can sustain our current approach. An unending series of unilateral steps would be an admission by the Administration that its original measured response based on international solidarity was inadequate. Furthermore, such actions would directly contradict the Administration’s strongest argument—that we have been right about the Soviets all along, and that our policies of realism, strength, and willingness to talk are *the* effective long-range approach for dealing with the Soviets.

The actions we should take are those that are consistent with this policy. We should certainly reinforce our effort to

extend the scope and increase the effectiveness of the world-wide response. With the ICAO Council underway, we will soon have eliminated the reasons that led to our initial reticence to publicize others' efforts and identify ourselves with them. We might want to praise some groups and countries publicly for supportive actions and perhaps increase pressure on the reluctant ones.

There is one set of two steps we should take immediately. The Soviets have refused to accept the claims we have submitted on our own behalf and on behalf of Korea.³ We should keep up our pressure on the Soviets over the claims question, and I will be calling Sokolov in soon to reiterate our legal argument that they must accept our claims. Given Congressional attitudes, I have concluded that the option of taking our claim against the USSR to the International Court of Justice has particular attraction at this time. L and EUR are sending you a separate memo on how this can be done, including on how it can best be coordinated with the claims of other governments.

Other domestic steps:

—The basic thrust of our approach should be that the U.S. has an effective national security policy in place and that the best way to make the Soviets pay for their action is to implement the President's policies. Thus, our lobbying energies should be devoted to passage of the defense budget (particularly the MX) and support for our policies in Central America and Lebanon.

We can work the KAL theme effectively into our presentations on these issues, but we should make these basic elements of our policy, not the airliner, the cutting edge of our approach.

—We should follow up on the President's call for upgrading our radio broadcasting and other international communications efforts. This is a natural issue to promote in the face of Soviet lying and attempts at self-justification.

—The President has already promised we would do more to tighten technology transfer controls because of this incident. A renewed effort to move the COCOM process along seems to be a particularly appropriate response.

There are some steps that could be taken on regional issues in response to the KAL incident that would clearly show us as a global power willing to defend our interests. They include:

—Reviewing our covert action activities with an eye toward increasing pressures on the Soviets in Afghanistan and perhaps producing some major insurgent victories. We are seeing if the freedom fighters hold Soviet prisoners whose presence in the West refocus international interest on Afghanistan during this year's U.N. debate. We should look once again at eliminating some tenuous Soviet footholds in the Western Hemisphere. A dramatic reversal of Soviet influence even in a vestpocket country or two would strongly suggest that the tide continues to run against the Soviets.

—Redouble our efforts at exposing KGB agents and embarrassing Soviet establishments abroad. There is relatively little reason at the moment to treat the Soviets tenderly around the world. The incident at Leningrad gives us extra cause to be a bit tougher in

third countries, and if it were to be repeated, here as well.

Finally, the question of high-level meetings with the Soviets must be factored into our response. I have sent you a separate memorandum on this subject.⁴

Whatever steps we take, however, we should recognize that pressures to do more will continue from those who see the airliner tragedy as a way to undercut the third element of our policy approach, and seek to use it to assure that the U.S. and the USSR neither talk to nor do any serious business with each other for years to come. It is chimerical to believe that we can sustain strength and realism over the long term without willingness to talk. The three elements of our approach will stand together, or they will not stand at all. Thus, it is essential that we continue to rely on close consultations with Congress and our media blitz to get us through the next few weeks rather than a new sanction a day. Over the longer term, statesmanship—continuation of the combination of strong condemnation and measured action the President chose—will prove a far greater bulwark of American strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union than a series of pinpricks, or lurches on major issues, or a combination thereof.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, September 1–8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe and Simons; cleared by Niles. Simons initialed for Pascoe. Kelly initialed the memorandum for Burt. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on September 16. An administrative action changed the title of the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs to the Assistant

Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs on September 15.

² At its September 15-16 meeting in Montreal, the ICAO Council adopted a resolution condemning Soviet actions in the downing of KAL 007. The resolution also directed the ICAO Secretary General to investigate the incident. For the text of the resolution and the statement by the FAA Administrator at the meeting, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1983, pp. 17-20.

³ See [footnote 6, Document 100](#).

⁴ Not found.

113. Memorandum From Robert Lilac of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, September 19, 1983

SUBJECT

KAL Shootdown—Background Paper

In response to this morning's discussion at our 7:30 a.m. staff meeting, we are presenting you some considerations for possible use when you talk to Secretary Shultz.

State has told us that the background paper (aka white paper) idea is the result of a conversation between Shultz and the President. We do not debate the genesis—there is debate on the staff concerning whether the paper should be produced and also the substance of the paper.

The paper (draft attached Tab B)² tells the story *as we know it*. There is no way to tell the actual story unless the Soviets make a full accounting and the results of the ICAO investigation (if ever conducted) are known. Therefore, we run the risk of having the media, the Soviets, and every other detractor focus on taking apart *our* story. Every ambiguity, confusion, or mistake by us or the Koreans is offered as mitigation for Soviet action (see the Pincus piece in Sunday's *Post*).³ Our story accurately depicts facts, as we know them, which has never been done in one document; but such a document could reopen the discussion about [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. As of today, the media hype on the incident has slowed down on attacking the U.S. version. If we wish to keep attention on

our understanding of the shootdown, then the paper should be printed. However, discussion of the mundane facts about U.S. radars, etc., tends to trivialize the cold-blooded horror of the Soviet act. We run the risk of diverting attention and having to again defend our actions before, during, and after the incident.

There is also the substance of the paper. A straightforward factual accounting is best. However, there is also a case for presenting the story as an incident typical of Soviet behavior. However, we could be accused of using the paper as a propaganda piece rather than as a straightforward presentation of the facts.

In sum, we do not yet have all the facts. More evidence will come if the “black box” is found (by us or the Soviets). We need the investigation to attempt to determine why the airliner strayed off course. If we produce the background paper this week it will be out of date quickly and could be used against us as more of the story is told—especially while the President is at the U.N.⁴

Recommendation

That you discuss the background paper with Secretary Shultz using the talking points at Tab A.⁵

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert Lilac Files, Arms Transfer, Subject File/1981-84, AT: [Korean Airlines KAL 007: Intelligence] (Binder); NLR-332-14-55-2-1. Secret. Sent for action. Lenczowski, Sommer, deGraffenreid, Raymond, and Robinson concurred. Lilac initialed for Lenczowski, and a note indicates that Raymond’s

concurrence was verbal. Clark's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² The draft paper, entitled "The Destruction of KAL 007: A Special Interim Report, [Draft 2: 9/18/83]," 69 pages in length, is attached but not printed.

³ Walter Pincus, "The Soviets Had the Wrong Stuff," *Washington Post*, September 18, 1983, p. C5.

⁴ Reagan was scheduled to give the opening address to the UNGA on September 26. See [footnote 6, Document 117](#).

⁵ The talking points for Clark are attached but not printed. Clark did not initial approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

114. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Foreign Intelligence Council (Casey) to the National Foreign Intelligence Board and the National Foreign Intelligence Council¹

NFIC-9.2/69

Washington, September 21, 1983

SUBJECT

Guidelines for Protecting Sensitive Intelligence Information Relating to the KAL Shootdown Incident (U)

1. My memorandum of 12 September (Attachment 1)² stated my concerns regarding unauthorized disclosures regarding the KAL incident. My intention and that of the Intelligence Community is that it is now time to circle the wagons and stop talking. Contrary to any speculation which bringing down the veil generates, the only intended hiding is of sources and methods. The story has been told accurately and to push further will not provide valuable clarification but rather will put unnecessarily at risk future intelligence support to our national security. Any further discussion of the incident is not authorized; however, if pressed, you may quote from the official U.S. Government release at Attachment 2.³ (C) 2. All individuals are again reminded of their obligation to protect sensitive intelligence information. I would consider any further disclosures without my specific approval to be damaging to the national security and a serious security violation. Any discussion of information about the KAL Shootdown incident, other than the statement in Attachment 2, even if already in the public domain can lead to classified subjects and should be avoided. I have identified at Attachment 3 some of the most sensitive subjects that *must* be avoided.⁴

(U) 3. Please bring this to the attention of all personnel in your department or agency. (U) William J. Casey

¹ Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1983, 400683. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs.

² See [Document 111](#).

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ Attached but not printed.

115. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, September 23, 1983

SUBJECT

Soviet Officials Criticize Military over KAL: Divisions Within the Ranks or Good PR Strategy?

In recent days a number of mid-level Soviet officials have voiced “unofficial” criticisms to Westerners and Western media about the way in which the Soviet military handled the Korean Airlines incident. Thus far we have noted three instances in which Soviet officials have criticized their military before Westerners, and sought to excuse in some manner the political leadership for what happened.

On September 17, London Times correspondent Richard Owens reported from Moscow that “according to well-informed sources” Yuriy Andropov had been taking a rest cure in the Northern Caucasus at the time the KAL plane was shot down. He was “appalled” when he heard the news and rushed back to Moscow to handle the situation. “The Soviet leader was acutely aware of the long term impact on Soviet relations with the West, . . . but had been obliged to support the military actions.”

On September 18, Pravda’s Chief Editor Viktor Afanasyev told BBC in London that while he believed the KAL plane was on a spy mission and that the Soviet pilots were not at fault for being unable to distinguish between an RC-135 and a 747, he deeply regretted the fact that innocent people had died, and thought that Soviet “military people

[were] guilty” for not admitting immediately that they had shot down the KAL plane. Afanasyev also noted that Andropov had been on holiday at the time of the incident (Tab A).

Finally, on September 21, Viktor Linnik of the Central Committee’s International Information Department told BBC TV in Edinburgh that Soviet pilots had made a mistake in downing the South Korean airliner. He admitted that there was strong evidence that the KAL plane was not on a spy mission, but said Soviet pilots were “trigger happy” because “U.S. reconnaissance planes were flying over the area all the time.” Subsequently, on September 22, Mr. Linnik reversed himself in an interview with Independent Television News (Tab B). On this occasion, he said that there was strong evidence the plane was spying, and that he had not meant to say the reverse in the previous interview but had been trapped into it by BBC’s line of questioning and his own unfamiliarity with the English language. (It should be noted that Linnik’s English is so good that according to Embassy Moscow “in a non-Russian setting, one would not know that he is a Russian.” However, the manner in which the questions were posed could have confused him and caused him to answer wrongly.)

Conclusions

From these three episodes, we see emerging a general “unofficial” line which deviates from the official Soviet line in significant respects and makes the Soviet position somewhat more palatable to Western listeners. The “unofficial” line is as follows: the KAL plane was probably on a spy mission, although there is no absolute certainty of this; the Soviet pilots, if they had identified the plane as

civilian, wouldn't have shot it down; the decision to shoot the plane down was a local one—Andropov wasn't involved; and the Soviet military should have come clean sooner with the news that they had shot down the plane.

These “unofficial” criticisms could conceivably reflect real divisions within the Soviet leadership. However, the consensus of opinion among CIA, EUR/SOV, INR and Embassy Moscow is that they do not. While it is likely that there are some tensions over aspects of the military's performance, the “unofficial” criticisms of the military by Soviet officials probably are part of an orchestrated campaign designed to confuse the Western public about Soviet behavior and intentions. The purpose of such a campaign would be to induce receptive Westerners to rationalize Soviet behavior (“if Andropov had only known,” etc.) and therefore to excuse it as an aberration. This in turn would blunt international outrage at Soviet actions, while allowing them to hold the same official policy line.

Other Lines

This “unofficial” position contrasts rather interestingly with what the Soviets are telling “captive” audiences. [*3½ lines not declassified*] 1) the Soviet Union had shot down the plane with the full knowledge that it was a passenger plane; 2) the decision to shoot down the plane was not given from the Kremlin but based on standing orders; and, 3) the pilot of the SU-15 which downed the aircraft would have been court-martialed if he had refused to shoot down the plane. No mention was made of the spy plane excuse, though [*less than 1 line not declassified*] did express regret for the loss of 269 lives.

The “unofficial” line also contrasts interestingly with the views expressed by one [*less than 1 line not declassified*] official. [*2 lines not declassified*] the Soviet destruction of KAL 007 was a “horrendous mistake” on the part of the local Soviet military commander. He said there was no reasonable excuse that could be offered for the incident, criticized the manner in which the Soviet Government had initially handled the affair, and expressed concern about the effect the destruction of the Korean airliner would have on U.S.-Soviet relations. Perhaps here we have one genuine dissenting voice.

1 Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, October 1-8 1983. Secret; Wnintel; Nofofn; Nocontract; Orcon. Drafted by James F. Schumaker (EUR/SOV); cleared by Simons, Kelly, Vershbow, Donald Graves (INR/SEE), and in substance by [*name not declassified*] (CIA/SOVA; J. Beyerly (Emb Moscow). Hill’s handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on September 23. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Brackets are in the original. All tabs are attached but not printed.

116. Memorandum Prepared by the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Gates)¹

Washington, September 27, 1983

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations (Further on Breakfast Conversation)

1. It is probably true that US-Soviet relations are as pervasively bleak now—and prospectively—as at any time since Stalin’s death. Yet while Washington typically regards history as beginning with the last inauguration, the Soviet perspective is longer. So should ours be.

2. From the standpoint of both sides, “detente” quickly soured. As early as the 1973 Yom Kippur War, many in the US judged that detente had not changed Soviet behavior much. From the Soviet side, defeat of the US-USSR Trade Act in the US Senate in January 1975 signaled trouble. Since at least the mid-1970s, with only a few brief promising moments, the relationship has deteriorated more or less steadily. The roll call of actions and reactions on both sides during the past eight years adversely affecting the relationship is impressive (and instructive).

—*1975*: The Trade Act; Soviet intervention with Cuba in Angola; massive Soviet help to Hanoi resulting in US expulsion from Vietnam; cancellation of a range of bilateral meetings; quarrelling over the meaning of the Vladivostok Accords on SALT II; and the change in tone at the end of the year in the US pre-election climate amid charges of a sell-out in Helsinki at CSCE.

—1976: Public abandonment by US of “detente” and stalemate on bilateral issues during the US elections.

—1977: The new US President’s letter to Sakharov² and human rights offensive; US abandonment of Vladivostok approach in SALT for a radical deep cuts approach; no progress on arms control; Soviet support for insurgencies in Southern Africa; intense Soviet propaganda against deployment of the Enhanced Radiation Weapon (ERW or neutron bomb).

—1978: Soviet-Cuban intervention in Ethiopia; US normalization of relations with China; MIG 23 in Cuba issue; Korean airliner shootdown; first US measures on technology transfer.

—1979: MX decision; Soviet brigade in Cuba controversy; US Ambassador killed in Kabul;³ Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; Soviet-Cuban support for Nicaraguan resolution; NATO agrees to deploy INF; failure of SALT II.

—1980: US sanctions in response to Afghanistan; US warnings on Poland; US promoted boycott of Olympics; US election.

—1981-83: This period is more familiar and the list of bilateral problems is long, culminating in the second Korean airliner shootdown.

3. This long but still incomplete listing is offered to make two points:

—The halcyon days of US-Soviet detente lasted less than 2½ years in the early 1970s and the trend in the bilateral relationship has been generally downhill under three successive Presidents of both parties.

(Some would begin the decline with the Yom Kippur War, thus including a fourth President—the one who began the process).

—Every time an opportunity to begin reversing that downward trend has presented itself—and there have been some—events or actions in Washington, Moscow or in the Third World have killed the opening. In short, the Soviets see their problems with the US as transcending this Administration. And this makes overall developments and the future all the more worrisome to them.

4. There is no doubt they see this Administration as more dangerous than its predecessors—but less because of its attitudes and rhetoric than the fact it has been more successful than its predecessors in countering the USSR in at least three major areas:

—*Defense*. A massive US rearmament long feared by the Soviets threatens to offset their strategic gains 20 years in the making.

—*Third World*. The US and its friends are causing the Soviets real trouble in Afghanistan, Mozambique, Chad, Angola, Namibia, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. The kind of moves the Soviets made easily in 1975-1979 are now more complicated and difficult. Momentum seems to be changing.

—*INF*. Defeat of ERW in 1978-79 was a major Soviet victory, vindicating “differentiated” detente which set the US aside and focused on the West Europeans. Deployment of INF will be a major Soviet defeat, far offsetting ERW strategically and calling into doubt an important Soviet objective of detente—undermining

European commitment to strengthening NATO militarily.

5. All this has taken place against a backdrop in Moscow of Brezhnev's long physical decline and Andropov's succession. Despite a good deal of wishful thinking in the West, Andropov is the first General Secretary to come from within the security service-military sector; he shares their values and ruthlessness and depends upon their political support. I believe that Moscow's behavior in the Yom Kippur war and its turn to more aggressive exploitation of Third World opportunities in 1974-75 was due in some measure to the elevation to the Politburo in 1973 of Andropov, Gromyko and Defense Minister Grechko (Succeeded by Ustinov in 1976). Their influence in foreign affairs became clearly dominant as Brezhnev's vigor declined in the mid to late '70s. They now control that policy. While some point out (and take encouragement from) broad "continuity" in Soviet foreign policy since Brezhnev's death, I would suggest this derives from Andropov-Ustinov-Gromyko domination of that policy before Brezhnev died—a policy of aggressive intervention in the Third World, the opening to China, and brute force where deemed necessary and low risk (as in Afghanistan). They are a very tough bunch. And, as you noted at breakfast, Andropov's supposed mastery of clever manipulation and political maneuvering has not prevented them from some pretty ham handed efforts at bullying and intimidation when a lighter touch would have paid them important benefits (even as inspiring fear sometimes pays benefits).

6. All that said, and despite the past eight years or so of post-detente problems, the Russians—in my view—still recognize the need to do business with the US and will do it with this Administration, but probably not until 1985.

They cannot “write off” any Administration and are prepared to be patient for the US side “to come around”. A range of economic, political and strategic motives *impels* the USSR to cultivate ties with the US, though not at any price. The past eight to ten years repeatedly have illuminated Soviet limits:

—They will not abandon an active role in the Third World, promoting radical causes and anti-Western movements. Indeed, while they will move cautiously where the US has great preponderance of military power (e.g., Central America), their cost-benefit calculus elsewhere probably has shifted toward greater risk-taking.

—They will not tolerate attempts to interfere in or change their domestic policies, for example, on human rights. They will, however, use Soviet Jews, dissidents and political prisoners as bait or “trading truck” with the US.

—They will not allow the US to use arms control to restructure Soviet strategic forces; they will not dismantle their heavy missile force to satisfy us on throwweight.

—They will not be cowed by threat of sanctions or of economic warfare; they know the Europeans and Japanese too well.

—They will abandon none of their global pretensions or ambitions; the best that can be achieved is a stable stand off in Europe and between the US and Soviet strategic forces (whether through arms control or tacit arrangements), and some thawing in atmosphere—reduction of tensions. Hopes for (and

promises of) more have contributed to bilateral tensions (and political problems here).

The Next Year

7. Given the foregoing, what specifically can we expect in the next year? The bilateral prospects are bleak. The KAL shutdown makes it difficult for the US to initiate a dialogue at least for the rest of this year. We will then be in the midst of INF deployment and the Soviet reaction thereto. They *will* react and I predict one or another of their early responses will further worsen US-USSR relations. By then the US will be in the middle of an election campaign, during which the Soviets will be hoping with all their hearts for defeat of the President. Even if they conclude he will be re-elected, it would come too late to cut a quick arms control deal. In sum, I believe bilateral relations will be in a deep freeze until 1985 when the US will be in a position to seize the initiative. The Soviets probably will make new offers in INF and START this fall, but they almost certainly will not provide a basis for compromise or agreement.

8. Elsewhere:

—*Middle East: Syria* holds high cards in Lebanon and the Soviets will continue to stake Assad. They probably believe the changes are good for eventual emergence of a pro-Syrian government in Beirut. To bolster Assad, the Russians could send a token detachment of troops to Damascus, as well as new tactical surface to surface missiles, pilots and more aircraft. They are helping to rearm the PLO. They will not themselves militarily challenge US and Israeli power in Lebanon, but no doubt see opportunities to

tie up American forces there indefinitely—with growing political costs in the US and in the Arab world—even as they work to block negotiated outcomes. Their worries probably are that Israel will re-enter the fray if Syrian or PLO role becomes too threatening and that US power will somehow induce Assad to compromise.

—*Third World*: The prospects are for greater military and subversive intimidation of *Pakistan's* Zia and the *Iranians* to reduce their support for Afghan insurgents; continued indirect support of *Nicaragua* coupled with warnings to both Havana and Managua that they not provoke the US too seriously; greater attention to opportunities in the *Philippines*, especially if the situation there worsens, and in *Chile*; continued support for Qadhafi's destabilizing efforts in *Central* and *West Africa*; and continued efforts to improve relations with *China*.

—*Europe and Japan*: Once INF deployment begins, the Soviet focus will shift to preventing full deployment both diplomatically and by making deployment as painful and costly domestically as possible. The FRG will be the main target both for intimidation and persuasion. The economic card will be flashed prominently. Intimidation will be the order of the day vis-a-vis Japan in an attempt to tone down or “de-fang” Nakasone.

9. In sum, the next year will see the Soviet Union pursuing a continued aggressive policy in the Third World, taking a tough line on INF deployments and waiting out the US elections in anticipation of a change for the better in 1985 whoever is elected.

10. Given this bleak forecast, how do we get through the next year without a further dangerous increase in tensions? The major *foreseeable* problem will be the Soviet response to INF and the US response to that. Missiles in Eastern Europe are probably the minimum possible Soviet reaction, perhaps with a periodic deployment of cruise missile carrying submarines near US coasts (analogous response). They cannot do this all at once, so it would extend over several months. A matter of fact US response to these long anticipated developments would help avoid an action-reaction-action-reaction cycle that could get out of hand. We need to keep our eye clearly on our political and strategic objectives and not get caught up in one-upmanship.

11. Beyond this the relationship might be kept from deteriorating further by proceeding with routine business and meetings, making clear to Moscow our understanding that some lines of communications must be kept open. An important role in this can be played by Art Hartman in Moscow and State's dealings with Dobrynin here—no effusive warmth but correct, candid conversations. As mentioned at the breakfast, a new initiative on confidence building measures could form part of a substantive agenda for such conversations—and be very consistent with global concerns growing out of the KAL shutdown. A continued business-like approach at START will help. These types of actions, if done properly, need not involve the US signaling eagerness to resume business as usual, but rather a need to keep talking to one another. Use of the Ambassadors is unobtrusive and does not convey high level eagerness “to get on with it” that some sort of senior private envoy or intermediary suggests. In my view this sort of keeping the lines open is the best way to get through the year and to set the stage for possibly some improvement in the relationship in 1985.

12. A note of caution to close. I mentioned above the times in recent years when promising dialogue has been cut short by events. There are all too many places these days where such events can take place. It will take considerable skill and luck just to keep things from getting even worse during the next year.

Robert M. Gates

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, September 20-30 1983. Secret. In a cover note to Shultz, Gates wrote: "Mr. Secretary: As you requested last Saturday morning [September 24] after breakfast, I have jotted down some thoughts along the lines that I was expressing at the table. They are strictly personal. I hope they are of some use to you." A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears at the top of the note, as well as a handwritten note that reads: "R.B. Pls see me re this. CBA's are focal point."

² See [Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 5](#).

³ Adolph Dubs, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, was kidnapped and killed in Kabul on February 14, 1979. See [Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan](#).

117. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 27, 1983

SUBJECT

KAL: Managing the Next Phase

The month since the shutdown has shown the Soviets at their worst and the U.S. at its best. Our task has been twofold: first, to highlight the moral and political lessons—that the Soviets were acting like Soviets, and that we have the right policy for dealing with them over the long haul—and, second, to mobilize the international community to demand justice and restitution.

I think we have been successful on both counts. At home, there has been some criticism and some natural pressure for stronger unilateral acts, but by and large your message that this is an issue of the world against the Soviets has been persuasive, and your firm but moderate approach has carried public opinion with it and gained us new support. Internationally, the “automatic majorities” that have supported Soviet positions and refused honest criticism of the USSR in recent years have vanished, and governments and private groups have imposed an unprecedented series of concrete measures against the USSR.

We are now entering a new phase. Emotional reactions will level off, and political calculation will resurface. People in and out of government everywhere have learned what you and others knew all along about the Soviets, but this is not enough. We need to initiate a series of steps that keep the lesson of Soviet misconduct before the world, but without

playing to the counter-strategy the Soviets have now put in place.

The Soviets have clearly begun to implement a program designed to eat away at the solid front of world outrage by playing on the ambiguities of the evidence; to divide the U.S. from the rest of the world by portraying KAL as a U.S.-Soviet issue; and to put the issue behind them by renewed concentration on carrots and sticks in the arms control field.

To manage the next phase, we will require a comprehensive program. Some of these steps are already underway; others need to be put in place soon; others are for further down the road.

First of all, we should *keep the lesson of KAL before the public and the Congress* in our public statements and in our continuing work on defense issues on the Hill.

Diplomatically, we should *follow up strongly in Asia*. Working closely with our Asian allies and friends on KAL has materially strengthened their confidence in the U.S. as a reliable ally. With regard to China, we should expect the Soviets to exploit any possibility of improving relations with the PRC to escape from the KAL box and regain some leverage on us, but Cap's trip to Beijing should help keep the Chinese on an even keel. Further along, your Far Eastern trip in November will be an opportunity to consolidate area gains.²

In Europe, looking beyond the INF debate (where your decision to move forward on INF should help us materially), we should also engage the Allies in an intensified dialogue to draw the consequences of what KAL has shown about the Soviets for *European defense*

spending, and for our part we should be making the same points in pressing our *critical security assistance requests* involving Europe in the Congress.

We should keep up the pressure in a number of fields. We have a running start: the widespread condemnations of the Soviets at the normally supine UNESCO Executive Board and General Conference September 22-23 and in the OAS are examples of what we should be seeking.³ Over the next weeks and months, we should proceed in the following areas:

1. *The Search and Rescue Effort.* The Soviet turnover of debris on Sakhalin Island on September 26 proceeded smoothly. By diplomatic note, however, we protested strongly the Soviet exclusion of Korean representatives and advised the Soviets that because Korea is the owner of the aircraft, and because Korea has authorized only the U.S. and Japan to conduct search and recovery operations, no other country including the USSR, is entitled to search for and recover such materials in international waters. The note also stated our expectation the USSR will not interfere with U.S. recovery operations.⁴ Meanwhile, the Navy will continue its intensive search efforts, in cooperation with Japan, expanding the search area as necessary, and we have put plans in place for handling the flight recorder should it be recovered, including inviting a ICAO observer aboard a U.S. search vessel.

2. *The Public Boycott.* A number of potential participants did not join the two-week suspension of air service to and from the USSR, and that suspension will end September 29. We have continued our efforts to bring other countries in, with stress on key Asian and Latin American countries that have regularly scheduled Aeroflot service. Meanwhile, we should consult closely with the participating NATO

Allies, Japan and Switzerland about extending the boycott. We must be realistic, however, and as emotions cool, we must expect less extensive support than over the past three weeks. We should thus avoid any public confrontation with the Allies over extension, since this would play into Soviet hands and undo much of what we have accomplished to date.

3. *The Private Boycott.* Consistent with U.S. law and practice, we will continue to follow the independent efforts of pilots and other private sector groups to express their indignation in concrete work actions. In the long run these may prove the most effective concrete measures taken.

4. *The Diplomatic Front.* We will be keeping up international pressure in a number of fora:

—*ICAO.* Here we will need to work closely with Allies and concerned developing countries to prevent the Soviets from watering down the tough investigation mandated by the Extraordinary Council September 16,⁵ and to get a solid interim report from the SYG when the 110th Council organizational session meets October 14. The complete report should be ready for the Regular Council session scheduled for December 14-16.

—*Aviation Safety Measures.* We are now examining existing ICAO commitments to determine how they can be strengthened, and are supporting the French proposal that the Chicago Convention be amended to outlaw use of force against civilian aircraft, subject to the provisions of the UN Charter.

—*UN General Assembly.* We are studying effective ways to raise KAL in the General Assembly following your speech

Monday.⁶ Friendly countries will be encouraged to raise this issue under every suitable agenda item.

—*Fifth World Tourist Organization (WTO) Assembly in New Delhi, October 3-14.* The USSR and Korea are members, and we are asking key WTO capitals to cosponsor or support a resolution condemning the Soviet action and endorsing the right of all people to travel for tourism in safety.⁷

—*International Parliamentary Union (IPU) Conference in Seoul, October 3-10.* Our delegation is exclusively Congressional, and we are consulting with the delegates on how best to proceed about raising the KAL issue in Seoul.

5. *Claims.* The Soviets have twice rejected notes demanding compensation on our behalf and Korea's, and have done the same with similar notes from other countries.⁸ We have warned them that continued refusal to accept these notes is yet another act giving rise to right of redress under international law, and we are urgently pursuing the question of presenting our claims to the International Court of Justice in conjunction with other claimants, particularly the Canadians and British whose initial reactions have been tepid. We are also soliciting preliminary Japanese, Korean and Australian views. If these governments' final responses are negative on simultaneously filing an application to the ICJ, we are considering seeking their support in making parallel demands on the Soviets to submit to the jurisdiction of the ICJ or another international tribunal.

6. *Public Diplomacy and Congress.* You have given the lead to the whole government in keeping the issue before the public, and this effort will continue. USIA will continue to give the tragedy priority attention, with major play in the

immediate future to the ICAO Council Resolution and the ICAO investigation. On September 20 we forwarded the text of a special report on the incident to the White House,⁹ and publication of an appropriately updated document will be a strong public diplomacy initiative. With the Congress, we will be following up on the unanimous Joint Resolution condemning the Soviets. Here we must keep in mind that Congressional support is neither monolithic nor permanent, and that many members will continue to urge strong unilateral sanctions against the USSR. We will therefore need to keep key members fully briefed on developments, to demonstrate that international condemnation plus your measured response focussing on civil aviation is producing a far more effective and lasting reaction than a series of unilateral steps that simply feed Soviet efforts to “bilateralize” the issue.

If we can continue to manage the KAL issue successfully along these lines, we will not only keep pressure on the Soviets to provide the restitution the world demands, but we will improve the prospects for forward movement on our larger foreign policy goals as well.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, KAL (3/3). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons on September 21; cleared by Burt and Eagleburger. Drafting information is from another copy. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, 1983 Sept 1-8)

² See [footnote 3, Document 83](#).

³ During the September 26 Executive Board Plenary Session of UNESCO, the KAL incident was discussed at length, with presentations from Ukraine and the Korean Ambassador and then a retort by the Soviets. (Telegram

35850 from Paris, September 27; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830559-0749) The OAS Permanent Council met on September 21. In a statement on September 22, Speakes expressed Reagan's thanks for the OAS member nations' expressions of condolence. (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book II, p. 1327)

⁴ In telegram 274915 to Moscow, September 27, the Department reported that "Acting EUR Assistant Secretary Kelly presented diplomatic note to Soviet DCM Sokolov at 1600 hours Monday, September 26." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830557-1018)

⁵ See [footnote 2, Document 112](#).

⁶ Reagan addressed the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly on the morning of September 26. While the main focus of his speech was peace and cooperation in arms control, he made two references to the KAL tragedy, connecting Soviet actions in this incident with broader complexities in U.S.-Soviet relations. "Reactions to the Korean airliner tragedy are a timely reminder of just how different the Soviets' concept of truth and international cooperation is from that of the rest of the world. Evidence abounds that we cannot simply assume that agreements negotiated with the Soviet Union will be fulfilled." Later in the speech, he stated: "In recent weeks, the moral outrage of the world seems to have reawakened. Out of the billions of people who inhabit this planet, why, some might ask, should the death of several hundred shake the world so profoundly? Why should the death of a mother flying toward a reunion with her family or the death of a scholar heading toward new pursuits of knowledge matter so deeply? Why are nations who lost no citizens in the tragedy so angry? The reason rests on our assumptions about civilized life and the search for peace. The confidence that

allows a mother or a scholar to travel to Asia or Africa or Europe or anywhere else on this planet may be only a small victory in humanity's struggle for peace. Yet what is peace if not the sum of such small victories?" The full text of the speech is printed in [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 169](#).

⁷ In telegram 21034 from New Delhi, October 15, the Embassy reported that the WTO "meetings were largely successful and all US principal objectives were achieved." The United States "succeeded in gaining sufficient votes to pass a resolution 'deeply deploring' USSR action in downing KAL 007, a civilian aircraft. Resolution cites negative impact on tourism of actions of this type." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830600-0243)

⁸ A September 16 Department statement noted: "Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Richard Burt called in Soviet Minister Sokolov and presented him with a second diplomatic note demanding that the Soviet Union accept diplomatic notes which the United States had attempted to present the Soviet Union on its behalf and on behalf of the Republic of Korea. These notes demand compensation from the Soviet Union for the lives and property of U.S. and Korean nationals lost as a result of the wrongful shutdown of Korean Air Lines #007 on September 1." The full text of the September 16 diplomatic note follows this statement. (Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1983, p. 21)

⁹ This draft paper was sent to the White House on September 19. See [footnote 2, Document 113](#).

118. Memorandum From Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, September 28, 1983

SUBJECT

KAL: The Forgotten Elements

Tocqueville once observed that under despotisms people are told nothing, while in free societies they are told everything. In the latter case, fundamental questions are sometimes obscured by a forest of detail. The validity of this observation has been driven home anew in the KAL incident. There, both the press and the bureaucracy have focused on a disparate array of issues: the retrieval of debris, the duration of the boycott, the pursuit of claims, the functioning of Soviet air defenses, airline safety measures, and so forth. These are all laudable objects of attention—and indeed the President's public posture has been just right. The Secretary's memo to the President continues to focus on these matters, and the follow-up actions he recommends are essentially correct.² I do believe, however, that his memo overstates the actual punitive effect of what our allies have done to date. Indeed, there is evidence that the pilots' association—demoralized by the limited duration of official boycotts—may be on the verge of relaxing its measures as well.

Are there, however, important—if subterranean—fundamentals that are now being lost sight of as we grind away on operational matters? I think so. To me the neglected questions are as follows: What does the incident

and its handling tell us about relations between Andropov and the Soviet military? Second, leaving aside the precise motivation for the attack, what impact is the incident likely to have on the security attitudes of our Asian partners (and others). And, if the most likely long-term reaction from them is greater fear rather than responsiveness, what can we do to offset this tendency? Third, apart from our statesmanlike public posture, are we adequately communicating—through quiet measures in Afghanistan and elsewhere—the kind of firmness that can signal the Soviets that we can impose real costs, as well as symbolically effective ones.

Regarding the first question, much confusion exists. For example, in discussing the unusual prominence of the Soviet military in “explaining” the incident, some columnists have suggested the military is now in a more dominant position than ever. Another possibility, however, is that Andropov has pushed the military onto center stage to distance himself from world opprobrium and to protect his own position in the succession crisis. Some speculate that the Soviet general staff—miffed at certain decisions that have not gone their way—deliberately failed to notify the political authorities as a show of independence. If so, then similar such displays may occur in the future. We may not be able to precisely answer any of these questions, but we need to put our best minds to the task. These are not just theoretical questions, inasmuch as the answers hold vital implications for U.S. foreign policy over the next year and beyond.

Second, how is the incident likely to affect our security partners, and what does it suggest in terms of an *increasing* Soviet tendency to use force for intimidation? You correctly advised State not to put out the line that recent Soviet toughness in the Middle East and elsewhere

is a *consequence* of the KAL. Indeed, if anything, the KAL shutdown is but part of a pattern of toughness worldwide. That pattern is longstanding, and comes as no surprise, but we still need to ask ourselves *whether that pattern has not recently taken a noticeable turn toward the worse*. The answer would appear to be yes. In addition to the obvious examples: ever more aggressive support for client states and an unwillingness to try to shape a face-saving retreat in Afghanistan (indeed, the Soviets have suddenly begun to increase their Afghan infrastructure on the Iranian border), we have less obvious indicators, such as provocative submarine intrusions in the northern flank that have caused some Norwegians and Swedes to believe the Soviets are self-consciously accelerating their war planning. And we have seen Soviet nuclear threats to Japan and Korea that are so blunt as to be reminiscent of the Khrushchev era.

I believe that consciously—or subconsciously—this pattern of more overt intimidation is having some effect. If so, we may find the short-term outrage and cooperation (in Europe and Asia) giving way to greater implicit fear of the Soviet Union—and hence greater accommodation. If we are to offset this we must do *more* than consult. We need to concentrate on measures—described in the original decision memo but ignored in the current State plan—such as deployments of F-16s to Japan, AWACs, and so on. These measures do not need to be advertised publicly; indeed, they shouldn't. But we have to be clear enough about their importance internally that the bureaucracy does not lose sight of them.

Finally, there is the question of the signals we privately send to the Soviets. I am myself confused by the Secretary's recent reassurance to the allies that we do not intend to allow the incident "to throw our policy toward the

Soviet Union off course.” If he means we won’t sidetrack arms control, that is one thing. But I assume our policy toward the Soviets continues to be a mix of incentives and disincentives, of dialogue and firmness. If so, then, if anything, the Korean incident suggests we need to *more comprehensively enrich our package of available disincentives*. That to me is the importance of the Afghan measures I recommended to you at the time of the shutdown—measures which Diane Dornan has now fleshed out.

Moreover, if the trend of Soviet intimidation by force continues, and indeed if dramatic new incidents arise, then we will also need other tools with which we can work. The *New Republic* wrote that the Korean incident demonstrated that—given the futility of sanctions—the West has no effective response to Soviet brutality.³ We cannot allow this perception to take root. The most effective long-term response is the one we have emphasized—rebuilding our strength. The problem is this may not deter the Soviets *over the near term* where they will enjoy the fruits of their own extended buildup and years of Western disinvestment in defense. We need to then concentrate on political-military measures we can take to increase costs over the near term. At our earlier direction, the CIA has been working on a series of papers on the vulnerabilities of key Soviet proxy states. The problem is that these studies are not due to be completed until late next year, [*1½ lines not declassified*]. *These studies need to be accelerated and a parallel and highly restricted policy group established to develop contingent responses based on this work.*

One final note. One of the signal achievements of this Administration has been to elevate the importance of public diplomacy. The danger in this is that sometimes public

diplomacy serves as a tempting substitute for real policy. We cannot allow that to happen here.

How then to translate all this porridge into action? I recommend the following:

First, we should concur generally in the work program outlined by the Shultz memo, though we will want to follow the International Court of Justice option closely to ensure we do not have to pay a heavy price for the involvement of others. Roger Robinson will monitor this package.

Second, Jack Matlock, Ken deGraffenreid and I should convene a small group of Soviet experts—both inside the government and out—to review the data and explore the implications of the incident for Soviet internal politics and future decision making. We will submit a short report directly to you.⁴

Third, the Korean incident has made the political-military dimension of the President's Asian trip more important than before.⁵ I recommend that you send a directive to Shultz and Weinberger making this point and directing that Gaston and I jointly chair a small panel—comprised of Howe, Wolfowitz, Armitage, and General Thompson—to explore trip-related political-military proposals that help to build upon existing regional concern in light of the shutdown.

Fourth, we need quick follow-through by CIA on the Afghanistan options. Moreover, we need to ask Casey to accelerate and restructure the proxy vulnerability work. (We will prepare a separate memo on this should you concur.)⁶

Fifth, in order to be better prepared to have quiet but effective responses to future Soviet intimidation, Jack and I should take the lead in transforming the CIA studies into action proposals. This should be a highly restricted effort.

Roger Robinson, David Laux and Jack Matlock concur.

Recommendation

That you sign your memo at Tab I to the President forwarding Secretary Shultz's memo.⁷

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, KAL (3/3). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. This memorandum is unsigned.

² Attached at Tab A is the September 27 memorandum from Shultz to Reagan; see [Document 117](#).

³ See Joseph Finder, "Reagan's Big Schtick," *New Republic*, vol. 189, Issue 14, pp. 13-15.

⁴ Reagan traveled to Tokyo from November 8 to 12 and Seoul from November 12 to 14.

⁵ Not found.

⁶ Not found.

⁷ Tab I, the undated memorandum from Clark to Reagan transmitting the copy of Shultz's September 27 memorandum (see [footnote 2, above](#)), is attached but not printed. Clark did not check his approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

119. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

New York, September 29, 1983

SUBJECT

KAL: My Talks in New York

My discussions of the KAL incident thus far in New York have confirmed the correctness of the basic approach contained in my memorandum to you of September 27.² Specifically, I have found broad support here for the way in which you have handled the KAL tragedy and an encouraging understanding among a wide range of countries, by no means restricted to the NATO Allies, of what this incident tells us about the Soviet Union.

My discussions in New York have also made clear that our efforts following the September 29 end of the two-week boycott of service to and from Moscow by most of our key Allies should concentrate on two key areas, namely,

- (1) efforts in ICAO to obtain a clear and conclusive report on the shutdown, with recommendations for follow-up action in that organization to prevent future occurrences of this type; and
- (2) continued pressure on the Soviet Union, together with the other countries whose nationals perished in this tragedy, to provide compensation.

We should also press forward with the search effort. If we can recover either or both of the flight recorders, we will be in a better position to put to rest once and for all any Soviet allegations that the KAL aircraft was engaged in a

spy mission on behalf of the United States. Our handling of the search effort, in particular the inclusion of ICAO representatives as well as officials from several other of the countries involved, and our readiness to allow the ICAO to analyze the recorders if they are found, puts us on the high ground as far as this important aspect is concerned.

In my talks here with Allied and other friendly Foreign Ministers, I have explored with them the possibility of extending the boycott beyond September 29. Not unexpectedly, I have detected that we should avoid high-level pressure on our friends and Allies to extend the boycott so as not to place in jeopardy what we have accomplished to date. Rather, I believe we should declare victory in view of the impressive line-up of countries which joined the boycott, while privately encouraging key countries to continue this effort. We should also continue to work quietly with the pilot groups and other unions which might be prepared to continue their boycott of service to and from the Soviet Union.

The KAL tragedy will doubtless figure importantly in my press backgrounder in New York on Friday afternoon.³ On this occasion and elsewhere, the press will seek to draw us into a dispute with our Allies regarding the extension of the boycott. Given the success which you have achieved thus far in establishing a common, consistent and coherent international reaction to the KAL tragedy, I believe that we should refrain from any public criticism of our Allies for not extending the boycott and, as I suggested above, call attention to the impressive participation in this manifestation of revulsion at the Soviet action. This is the line which I propose to take at my Friday press backgrounder.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive Chronology (09/29/1983-09/30/1983); NLR-775-10-11-3-5. Secret; Sensitive. In an attached covering memorandum to Shultz, Burt wrote: "The boycott of flights in and out of the Soviet Union will come to an end on Thursday, September 29th. In anticipation of this, you will want to keep the President informed of our efforts here in New York to shape the continuing international response to the KAL incident."

² See [Document 117](#). Shultz was in New York for the UN General Assembly session.

³ Not found.

120. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, September 29, 1983, 1523Z

12430. Geneva for USINF. Subject: Andropov Blasts U.S., Addresses KAL.

1. (C—Entire text).

2. Summary: Andropov's September 28 statement raises to the most authoritative level long-standing Soviet criticism of the Reagan administration and of the President personally.² It is pessimistic about future dealings with the administration, asserting that there can no longer be any illusions on this score, but balances this pessimism with sober assurances that "Soviet policy is not based on emotion." The General Secretary's response to the President's INF initiatives was negative,³ but essentially nonsubstantive, and does not rule out further Soviet examination of our proposals. In endorsing in toto the Soviet version of the KAL affair, Andropov was bowing to the inevitable. The fact that it has taken him nearly a month to do so is as significant as the fact that he has now associated himself with the coverup.

3. We read this highly defensive statement as an attempt to recapture the arms control high ground Andropov staked out in his August 29 *Pravda* interview,⁴ only to lose it three days later with the KAL shutdown. Andropov's tough language on the United States probably reflects accurately high-level Soviet resentment over what they regard as U.S. exploitation of the KAL affair. Aside from simple spleen-venting, the statement's objective is to focus foreign

attention away from KAL and back on the coming battle over INF deployments. End summary.

Harsh Words for the U.S.

4. Andropov's September 28 statement is the strongest and most comprehensive attack on the United States by a Soviet leader in years. The substance of most of his allegations (U.S. efforts to attain world dominance; administration "slander" of the Soviet Union; Washington's having undertaken a "crusade" to rid the world of the USSR) have appeared regularly in Soviet press criticism of the administration over the past three years. Andropov has raised them to the most authoritative level and has catalogued them in unprecedented detail. He has also used his strongest language to date in describing President Reagan personally. Andropov characterizes the President's UNGA performance as "convincing no one" and accuses him of setting the tone of anti-Soviet rhetoric for the administration. He complains that unidentified leaders of the U.S. have resorted to "foul-mouthed abuse mingled with hypocritical sermons on morality and humanity" in their attacks on the Soviet Union and its people.

5. The most disturbing element of Andropov's remarks on the U.S. is his assertion that "recent events"—presumably KAL—have "dispelled any illusions about the possibility of a change for the better" by the administration. This language recalls articles by lower-level Soviet spokesmen (e.g. Arbatov and Bovin) last year suggesting that it would prove impossible to conduct serious business with the administration. While he makes no bones about his view of the administration and its approach, however, Andropov stops short of burning any bridges and stresses the basic continuity of Soviet policy in arms control and other areas.

While expressing Moscow's indignation over its handling by the U.S., he concludes that Soviet nerves are "strong," and that Soviet policies are not "built on emotions."

INF—U.S. Proposals Not Rejected

6. The continuity of Moscow's approach in the wake of KAL comes through strongly in Andropov's handling of INF and security issues in the second half of his speech. This part of his statement could have been written before August 31. Its appeal to the European peace movement and suggestion that Europeans are "hostages" to U.S. INF policy are standard Soviet themes, as is Andropov's suggestion that European leaders are inadequately protecting their peoples' interests in supporting the two-track NATO decision. His statement that deployment would be a step of major proportions by the U.S. against the cause of peace seems designed, like the first part of his statement, to keep the focus on the United States as the "problem" in arms control.

7. Andropov's response to the President's most recent INF initiative failed to address the substance of the new U.S. proposals. Instead, Andropov complained that the "so called new move" was simply a rehash of past U.S. proposals which would bless U.S. deployments while requiring unilateral Soviet reductions. Like Gromyko in his September 26 toast to visiting Czech Foreign Minister Chnoupek, however, Andropov did not reject the detailed elements of the U.S. proposals, or even divulge their contents.

First Statement on KAL

8. Andropov's statement marks his first public mention of, or association with, the KAL tragedy. Using the incident as an illustration of U.S. willingness to stop at nothing to advance its militaristic designs, Andropov endorsed in toto Moscow's version of the event as articulated in the September 6 Soviet Government statement.⁵ There is no way, in our view, that he could have avoided this. The fact that he waited almost a month to do so is probably as significant as the fact that he has finally associated himself with the shutdown.

Defensive Tone

9. Nonetheless, the KAL incident largely set the stage for Andropov's statement, and is no doubt responsible for the defensive tone which runs throughout it. Like Marshal Ogarkov's article a week before,⁶ Andropov conveys an impression of the Soviet Union's being pressed hard by United States military and ideological initiatives. He digs deep—to Vietnam, to distortions of the U.S. role in Lebanon—to portray the U.S. as the real locus of evil in the world. He takes pains to emphasize that the Soviet Union threatens no one, has no aggressive designs on any other country, does not intend to change other nations' social order. But he is concerned to reassure the Soviet people that Soviet defense capabilities are capable of discouraging any attacks.

Comment

10. Andropov's statement simply makes clearer what was already obvious—the period ahead will be a frigid one in U.S.-Soviet relations, and Moscow will do nothing to make our life easier. His tough treatment of the U.S. probably

reflects accurately high-level Soviet perceptions that the U.S. exploited Moscow's mishandling of the KAL episode, and will not miss future chances to gouge the Kremlin. At the same time there is clearly an operational side to the Soviets' rhetoric. Andropov, like Ogarkov and the Soviet media in general, is seeking to make the U.S. "the problem", and to get out of the glare of KAL. The Soviets no doubt see some advantage to making the Europeans and others believe the bear has been backed into a corner and could lash out. They hope that this will translate into pressure on Washington in Geneva.

11. At the same time Andropov's speech, as he stated explicitly, was an appeal to the Soviet man in the street. His message was twofold. On the one hand his appeal was a patriotic one. While less blatant than Ogarkov's the week before, Andropov's was a call to rally round the leadership at a time of national danger. At the same time, he sought to reassure the populace lest their fear of war lead to despair. Most importantly, he sought to make clear that Andropov was personally in control and able to deal with the threat from without.

Hartman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830565-0577. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Leningrad, Beijing, Bonn, London, Paris, USNATO, USUN, USIA, and for information to Stockholm, Belgrade, Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Prague, Munich, Sofia, Warsaw, Department of Defense, USCINCEUR, USDelMBFR Vienna, and the Mission in Geneva.

² In telegram 12421 from Moscow, September 29, the Embassy reported that Andropov's statement was read on

the *Vremya* news program on September 28. A printed version appeared in Soviet papers on September 29, which differed slightly from the other text. The Embassy commented: "A passage on the value of joint Warsaw Pact military exercises replaced three paragraphs on ideological competition which appeared in the press. The change had no apparent substantive significance, and we are unable to explain why it occurred." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830566-0109) For the text of the statement, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 881-816.

³ In his address to the 38th Session of the UNGA in New York on September 26, Reagan proposed several new arms control initiatives. (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book II, pp. 1350-1354) See also [footnote 6, Document 117](#). In his memoir, Shultz wrote that Reagan "called for global limits on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and without giving up on our ultimate goal of the complete elimination of these weapons, asserted that the United States was open to negotiation over the number of Pershings and GLCMs to be deployed in Europe. He also proposed discussions on verifiable limits on some Soviet and American land-based aircraft." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 371)

⁴ See [footnote 2, Document 82](#).

⁵ See [Document 98](#).

⁶ Ogarkov's September 22 TASS article was discussed in telegram 12073 from Moscow, September 22, and telegram 12158 from Moscow, September 23. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830549-0006 and D830562-0007 respectively)

121. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, September 30, 1983, 1532Z

12494. Subject: The KAL Tragedy and Soviet Political-Military Relations.

1. (C—Entire text).

2. Summary: The KAL tragedy has evoked interest in the role of the military in the Soviet power structure, a question we examine in this message. We find it credible and in keeping with Soviet tradition that a military commander took the decision to shoot down the plane. The authority to deal with intruders has always belonged to the military and was recently confirmed in new legislation. Although it has been speculated that the military took its decision in a defiant mood, to flex its muscle, it seems more plausible to us that in a situation of imperfect information, the military acted at the last moment in accordance with their standing instructions and in the absence of any other guidance on this incident.

3. The question of the military role in subsequent Soviet handling of the episode is more open to question. There is no evidence of differences within the political leadership over the decision to close ranks behind the military after the fact, a common Soviet reaction when confronted with hostile world opinion. The civilians would have shared with the military a sense of the sanctity of Soviet borders, would have seen quickly that the military had acted within its authority, and would have found it difficult to admit to their

own public that any component of the Soviet state had made an egregious error.

4. At the same time, we find it significant that the substantial Soviet effort to explain the shootdown and later to shift blame to the U.S. has been a joint undertaking of the propaganda apparatus and the military. Senior civilian leaders—except Gromyko, who couldn't avoid the issue in Madrid—[garble] clear of public identification with the issue for a month until Andropov put his blessing on the Soviet official version of the incident. Nor was there any public acknowledgement in the minutes of the weekly Politburo meeting that the subject was under discussion in the leadership, although the major public statements of September 2 and 6 were the acknowledged product of leadership deliberation.² In short, none of the political leaders wanted to hold the KAL hot potato.

5. Whatever the civilian leaders think of the military handling of the KAL issue, they heed closely the views and the needs of the armed forces. They are conscious of the key role played by the military in the Brezhnev succession and the likelihood that a similar role will belong to the armed forces in the next succession. Party control of the army is still a cardinal principle of Soviet politics, but the growing prominence of military leaders in national security decision making in the later Brezhnev years, perhaps epitomized in Brezhnev's October 1982 meeting with military commanders and highlighted in the new accessibility of top military figures to the press and foreign leaders, has compelled the party to reckon with the military viewpoint and perhaps adopt it as the national consensus on many key issues. End summary.

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

Hartman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830568-0222. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Leningrad, USIA, USUN, Ankara, Athens, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Reykjavik, Rome, The Hague, Berlin, USNATO, Bern, Dublin, Helsinki, Stockholm, Vienna, Seoul, Tokyo, Belgrade, Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Munich, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, Department of Defense, and the Mission in Geneva.

² For the September 2 statement, see [Document 84](#). For the September 6 statement, see [Document 98](#).

122. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, October 1, 1983, 0934Z

12501. USINF USSCC USSTART. Subject: US-Soviet Relations After KAL—The View From the Kremlin.

1. (C—Entire text).

2. Summary: The KAL tragedy has produced some of the most hostile anti-US rhetoric to come out of the Soviet Union in the post-war era. Has it caused parallel changes in how the Soviet leadership views the administration and in its willingness to engage on issues of concern to us? While it is still early for definitive conclusions, we suspect not.

3. The limited steps taken by Moscow last summer toward a more positive agenda were of ambiguous significance at best. It seems unlikely that they would have led to major moves in areas of importance to us before the INF drama had played itself out. Even then, we suspect Andropov's willingness to start a real dialogue with the President would have depended on other factors—primarily his assessment of the President's reelection prospects. We doubt that KAL has changed this calculus in any fundamental way. We are—as Andropov's September 28 statement made clear—in for a frigid fall and winter.² But a Soviet reassessment and move toward engagement next spring cannot be ruled out. End summary.

After KAL—Questions

4. It has been a month since KAL went down in flames over the Sea of Japan. With Andropov's speech September 28, Moscow's transfer of KAL articles recovered since the tragedy, and the beginning of the end of international civil aviation sanctions against the Soviets, the time is ripe to assess where KAL has left US-Soviet relations, and where they may go from here. (We address the question of the leadership's handling of the episode and the role of the Soviet military in a separate telegram).³

5. KAL was Andropov's first foreign policy crisis. Moscow's handling of the affair has been an unmitigated disaster from the standpoint of Soviet international interests. However "necessary" the Soviets cover-up of the shutdown may have been in domestic terms (and our sense is that the Soviet people have generally responded to the leadership's appeals to their patriotism and innate suspicion of foreigners), it has cut the ground out from Soviet efforts to deal with such pressing issues as INF and put to rest any illusions that Soviet international behavior under the ostensibly sophisticated Andropov would be more benign than under his predecessors.

6. Soviet efforts to shift the blame for their atrocity on to us have not washed. But their failure to avoid responsibility for the incident has been accompanied by some of the most lurid rhetoric toward the United States, the administration, and the President personally that we have seen since the height of the cold war. Is this simply the lashing out of a desperate power caught in an act it cannot explain? Or has the incident and US handling of it really changed Kremlin perceptions of the President and his administration's motivations, and with it the Soviet leadership's willingness to do business with the US in the months ahead? In either case, what are the implications for the future course of US-Soviet relations? How one answers those questions

depends very much on one's analysis of the Soviet leadership's view of the administration before August 31. There are at least two variants.

KAL as the Final Straw

7. The first way of interpreting the Kremlin's view of the US before August 31 has been popularized by such well-connected but relatively low-level Soviet spokesmen as USA Institute Director Arbatov and columnist Aleksandr Bovin. In articles published in late 1982, both suggested that Moscow had in effect written off trying to do business with Washington during President Reagan's term in office, especially after the President's Orlando speech.⁴ They elaborated on this theme, seeking to portray the Soviet leadership as personally offended by the administration's ideological bent, and determined to do nothing (e.g., accept a summit) which might make the President's reelection more likely.

8. Proponents of such a view might argue (although we have not yet heard such sentiments here) that US handling of the KAL incident was in effect the straw which broke the camel's back—an experience which confirmed the leadership's worst fears as to the President's motives, and which reinforced its determination to do everything possible to bring him down in 1984, no matter what the risk. They would view Andropov and his colleagues as backed into a corner in the wake of KAL, and left with no choice but to fight back. This would manifest itself in a tightening up of internal order, an accelerated arms program, a willingness to break off the INF talks after (or even before) deployment, stirring up the pot in regional hotspots, and more overt threats in Europe. The objective would be intimidation: to create a climate of fear and

apprehension among US allies and the US electorate which would cripple the President at the polls in November.

Another View

9. We have tended to regard such a perception of the Soviet leadership's stance toward the administration as self-serving, since it is what the Soviets want some of the fainter-hearted in Europe to think. But we see no signs that the dire scenario outlined above is upon us. That being said, there is no question that the leadership is united in its strong distaste for the President's policy and its public enunciation, and were well before August 31. Their willingness to engage even to the limited degree they have since 1981 has been in spite of their feelings for the President, rather than because of them. There has doubtless been a strong predisposition to wait the President out.

10. We believe, however, that at least by the spring of this year, the Soviets were coming to the conclusion that this was not a viable option. By then, our efforts to restore military parity had the support of Congress and the public and had begun to have some effect; Williamsburg proved that the alliance was not about to come apart over INF and the Siberian pipeline;⁵ and our economy was beginning to turn up. President Reagan had begun to look like a two-term incumbent. Moscow's positive response to his expression of concern about the Pentecostals,⁶ and their subsequent hints of greater flexibility in START appeared to have been indicators of a dawning Soviet awareness that they could not afford to wait the President out on every issue. Additional signs were the warm treatment of Secretary Block,⁷ the willingness to discuss at least aspects of the President's initiative on CBM's in the

communications field,⁸ readiness to resume negotiations on new consulates and on an exchanges agreement,⁹ and Soviet agreement on the Madrid final document.¹⁰

11. As of August 31, however, our guess is that this somewhat more positive Soviet approach was by no means universal or definitive. Summer press speculation on a rush to the summit by Andropov was premature. Many of the developments on which such speculation was based were ambiguous at best in terms of what they told us of Soviet motivations and objectives. Andropov's tete-a-tetes with Harriman, Pell and Winpisinger,¹¹ for example, were essentially end runs of the administration to important elements of the US electorate. Moscow's acceptance of a new long term grains agreement served its interests as well as ours.¹² The Soviets had backed out of their Madrid assurances on Shcharanskiy even before the ink was dry on the Madrid compromise.¹³ Rather than reflecting a decision to engage the administration in any meaningful way, these steps in many respects can be seen as tactical moves by the Kremlin for limited objectives, and from which Moscow could reap credit for the "good will" they displayed in the run-up to INF deployments. Then KAL changed the script.

12. Aside from the tenuousness of Soviet interest in early engagement with the administration prior to KAL is the fact that the timing was all wrong for such a move from Moscow's standpoint. Even, as we think likely, if the Soviets were moving to the conclusion that they would ultimately have to do business with the President, they recognized that the immediate forecast was for a worsening, rather than an improvement, in bilateral atmospherics. INF loomed large, and Moscow clearly had a no-holds-barred offensive planned for the fall (Andropov's August 29 *Pravda* interview was the opening salvo).¹⁴ If deployments

nonetheless occurred (as we believe they had concluded they would), there would be a Soviet response. Only after that, and once Moscow had had time to see where things stood in terms of public dynamics in Europe, might the Soviets have been prepared to shift positions substantially on issues of concern to the administration. The stakes in Europe, and internal pressures to see the game through, would simply have been too high to make a move before this possible. Even then, given Moscow's distaste for the President and preference for "lyuboy drugoy" ("anyone else"), the Soviets would have been unlikely to open up a serious dialogue with the administration unless the President looked a very strong bet to be reelected. Thus, even if KAL 007 had never strayed off course, it seems doubtful that there would have been any but cosmetic movement in US-Soviet relations before next spring.

Implications

13. What are the implications of such an assessment of Soviet motivations before August 31 for our policy toward Moscow in the year ahead?

14. The first is that we need to be careful in interpreting Soviet rhetoric. As we have noted, the KAL affair has been an unmitigated disaster for the Kremlin, and the Soviet leadership doubtless feels we exploited its predicament. We suspect there is a lot of behind-the-scene finger-pointing going on now, and a parallel need to demonstrate "toughness" toward the administration. Rhetoric is a natural outlet for such feelings, and, as Andropov's statement made clear, it is likely to be unprecedented in its stridency. We are seeing more than simple spleen-venting, however. The Soviets hope that vituperative attacks on us and the kind of defensive saber-rattling we have seen lately

will frighten our allies and others into pressuring us to back off and make concessions in INF. (This may be coupled with further Soviet INF initiatives; see para. 15 below.) We can take a lot of the steam out of such tactics by conveying a sense of strength, confidence and responsibility in our own statements. The President's UNGA address was right on the mark.¹⁵

15. A second point is that the period ahead is going to be a sterile one in terms of the agenda we have been pressing on Moscow since 1981. Moscow's natural inclination to wait the administration out has almost certainly been reinforced by the KAL affair. But if we have it right, there was little prospect of meaningful concessions any time soon in any case. In the months ahead, we would expect that:

—On human rights issues, prospects are bleaker than ever. The general tightening up we had seen even before KAL is likely to continue and may accelerate.

—On regional issues, an area where we had made little progress even before August 31, we can expect no favors. We would be surprised, however, to see a more activist Soviet policy. Moscow's relative quiescence in the developing world under Andropov has been more a function of real constraints at home and unfavorable circumstances abroad than a bow to our concerns. These factors remain as real now as they did a month ago.

—On arms control issues, we remain pessimistic that there will be serious Soviet moves this year, but we do expect an eleventh hour INF proposal—or even more than one—aimed at deferring—and thereby stopping—deployments. But we doubt such a gesture will amount to more than a propaganda ploy which, while it will complicate our plans, is unlikely to meet our needs. (Our belief that Moscow has

not yet played out the skein of INF negotiating ploys leads us to the conclusion that the Soviets will not stage an early walk-out from Geneva; they will need a forum for the introduction of their new initiative(s).) A more serious approach in INF, we believe, is imaginable only after deployments have occurred despite Moscow's best efforts, the Soviets have responded with "counter-measures," and they have had time to assess the result. That, we would guess, is likely to take us at least through March 1984.

16. A final point is that KAL has not necessarily put paid to prospects for successful engagement with the Soviets between now and November 1984. Soviet rhetoric will continue to blow strong in the months ahead; it may even intensify as the INF issue enters its final phase. But, as veteran Soviet diplomat Lev Mendelevich reminded us last week, we should not underestimate Moscow's capacity for changing course when it serves its interest. If Ronald Reagan looks vulnerable next spring, Yuri Andropov will do everything in his power to prevent his reelection, and the intransigence and rhetoric we will see this fall will simply be prelude to more of the same next year. If, on the other hand, we get safely past deployments; if we maintain alliance unity in the face of an inevitable Soviet response; and if our economy looks as strong next spring as it does now, Andropov is capable of drawing the logical conclusions. He will recognize that circumstances for finally coming to terms with the President will never be better, and he may not wish to lose the opportunity.

Hartman

1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830570-0390. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to USNATO, Tokyo,

Beijing, London, Paris, Rome, Seoul, the Mission in Geneva, USUN, Bonn, and USDeIMBFR Vienna.

² See [Document 120](#).

³ See [Document 121](#).

⁴ See [Document 15](#).

⁵ Reference is to the G-7 Economic Summit held in Williamsburg, Virginia, May 28-30; see [footnote 5](#), [Document 53](#), and [footnote 3](#), [Document 60](#).

Documentation on the Siberian pipeline, is scheduled for publication in [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. VII, Western Europe, 1981-1984](#).

⁶ See [Documents 34](#), [46](#), and [74](#).

⁷ Secretary of Agriculture John Block went to the Soviet Union August 24-26 to sign the new 5-year grain agreement and "received a warm reception during his visit to Moscow." (Telegram 10884 from Moscow, August 26; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D8300492-0700).

⁸ See [Documents 38](#), [42](#), and [44](#).

⁹ See [Document 54](#).

¹⁰ At the CSCE meeting in Madrid, a Concluding Document was signed on September 9. The text is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1983, pp. 53-60.

¹¹ Harriman met with Andropov on June 2. (Telegram 6967 from Moscow, June 3, and telegram 168467 to Moscow, June 17; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830315-0815 and D830345-0234 respectively) Senator Pell led a delegation to Moscow, meeting with Andropov on August 18; see [Document 79](#). William W. Winpisinger was the International President of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers.

¹² See [Document 76](#).

¹³ See [Document 75](#).

¹⁴ See [Document 82](#).

¹⁵ Reagan addressed the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly on the morning of September 26. See [footnote 6](#), [Document 117](#) and [footnote 3](#), [Document 120](#).

123. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 3, 1983

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations Post KAL-007

As most participants in your Saturday session on U.S.-Soviet relations concluded, the KAL shoot-down, while not changing the nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, has modified the timetable in a way which could in turn have significant impact upon those relations.² Prior to that event, we had underway a process of gradual and tentative expansion of the U.S.-Soviet dialogue. This expansion affected the level of contacts, with two Gromyko meetings scheduled this month alone and the possibility of a Summit next year, and their substance, with agreements on grain, consulates and cultural exchanges in hand or in prospect, with progress on specific human rights cases, and movement on MBFR and START.

Our objectives were to restrain the Soviet reaction to INF deployment, to reassure the European and American people during a difficult period, and to open the prospect for significant East-West agreements in several areas. The key element of the pre-KAL U.S. strategy, both for restraining the Soviets and for achieving significant new agreements, was movement on START. For the Soviet part, there was some tentative evidence of a willingness to also move in START and meet us half-way on several other issues which divide us.

While the KAL shoot-down has not necessarily derailed this strategy, its evolution has been slowed to the point where there is little prospect for meaningful movement in U.S.-Soviet relations before the U.S. electoral season intervenes next summer. As a consequence, the plight of KAL-007 has also diminished our ability to restrain the Soviet response to INF deployment or to modify Soviet behavior in other areas. In shooting this plane down, the Soviets had made it more difficult for us to expand either the form, or the substance, of our dialogue, as we had intended.

Continuing Incentive for Dialogue

As your discussions in New York have illustrated,³ there is general and, I believe, justified view that the Soviets are likely to maintain their current tough and unyielding attitude for some time, probably through 1984—unless they see a greater likelihood than they now do of getting something substantial in negotiations with the United States. Events in the coming months, in particular INF deployment, will lead the Soviets toward further steps which are likely to increase still more the strain upon our relations. While it remains unlikely that the Soviets, in reacting to our deployment, would court a major confrontation—over Cuba or Berlin, for instance—we cannot be certain. In any case, there are measures short of nuclear deployments to Cuba or pressure on Berlin which could force U.S. responses, and Soviet countermoves, the net effect of which could produce confrontation, or something approaching it.

Another INF move is probable, designed to stop our deployments. There is some evidence the Soviets could be considering a unilateral withdrawal combined with a joint moratorium on new deployments. We also should not rule

out a more major “peace initiative,” e.g., proposal for a summit premised on no U.S. deployments. Over the next six weeks they could focus on raising the level of fear, getting Europeans really scared and then hit with their peace initiative. On balance, however, we think a basically tough stance is most likely—with only a cosmetic move on INF.

Other factors will also intervene throughout the year to further complicate the U.S.-Soviet relationship. In the early months of next year, for instance, the Chinese Prime Minister will visit Washington, and the President will visit China. These events, and the statements which will accompany them, will further feed Moscow’s sense of encirclement. Stimulating Moscow’s paranoia can be beneficial, in giving the Soviets a motivation to improve their own ties to Washington, but for this benefit to be realized, we must be in a position to channel Soviet frustrations in positive directions. This will be difficult in early 1984. Later in the year, the U.S. election campaign will divert Washington attention, and affect, in ways not yet fully predictable, Soviet calculations.

American military power and other factors impose important disincentives to provocative Soviet action. Yet vigorous and, when possible, positive dialogue can also help avoid misunderstanding or miscalculation, and add incentives for restraint to Moscow calculations.

In the current, pre-deployment period, American initiatives to explore areas for agreement with the USSR can pay immediate benefits, in allowing us to occupy the high ground in public perceptions and in calming the mood in the United States and particularly Europe. Such initiatives can perhaps also temper decisions which will be made in Moscow in these months, the results of which will become apparent only after the U.S. deployment begins.

But with Allied confidence in our ability to deploy on schedule growing, our principal concern should gradually shift toward the management of the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the post-deployment period, when new and threatening Soviet statements and actions must be anticipated. Given the pressures to which U.S.-Soviet relations will be subject throughout 1984, it is in our interest that we fully engage all the governors on that relationship which a dialogue can provide.

Incentives for Restraint

As before KAL-007, arms control, particularly START, will have to carry the weight of any positive effort to restrain Soviet behavior. To take steps now on arms control may be politically difficult; significant movement in other areas is almost certainly out of the question at least for the immediate future. In INF, we can and should elaborate upon our new offer in the coming months. We must recognize, however, that we have taken the last major unilateral step we can afford in this negotiation, and prospects for progress now really do depend upon Soviet movement, which is improbable before December. In MBFR, we should pursue the bilateral dialogue which the Soviets have agreed to open, and also take a forward step in the multilateral negotiations. Yet we should recognize that there is nothing we can offer the Soviets in this negotiation which would affect their concerns over INF deployment.

Only in START, ultimately the more important of the two nuclear negotiations, could the prospect of a mutually advantageous accommodation significantly affect the Soviet behavior in other areas. In particular, only the prospect of achieving meaningful limits on the strategic threat could

help offset the consequences on U.S. INF deployment for Soviet planners.

Unfortunately, the now-approved “build-down” concept will not strike the Soviets as a plausible basis for negotiated arms control, although we can expect them to seize upon aspects of the idea to impose unilateral constraints upon American force planning. Neither should we expect the other modest steps on START which were discussed at the NSPG to lead to a more optimistic Soviet assessment of the prospects for this negotiation.⁴ If strategic arms negotiations are to play any significant role in either Washington’s or Moscow’s calculations over the coming months, we will need to revitalize consideration of steps designed to merge the U.S. and Soviet negotiating frameworks.

In moving toward a more dynamic START negotiation, we cannot realistically aim for an agreement, even a Vladivostok-type framework agreement, by next year. START remains, however, the most powerful of the positive potential governors on the U.S.-Soviet relationship. It is thus an important device with which to help manage this relationship through what is likely to be a rough period.

Opening Channels

We also need to consider steps to restore the appearance of a dialogue between Washington and Moscow. President Reagan has not yet responded to Andropov’s message on INF of several weeks ago.⁵ He should do so soon, and we should let this become publicly known. When and if significant decisions are taken on START, we might consider despatching Brent Scowcroft to Moscow as a Presidential envoy to explain the new American ideas.


Lower level exchanges with the Soviets (e.g., Chet Crocker with his counterpart, perhaps Max Kampelman with appropriate Soviet officials on human rights and CSCE follow-up, perhaps further talks on hot-line upgrade and other CBM's) should continue. We also might consider sending someone from the Department to Moscow for another review of the bilateral relationship, as part of showing that a dialogue still exists. We should not anticipate, however, that these lower level exchanges can make more than a marginal impact, either perceptually or substantively, on the dialogue.

Thus we also need to consider when and how to resume contacts at your level. As substantive developments allow, I recommend you take up again your discussions with Dobrynin on START, MBFR and other issues, letting the fact, but not the content, of these meetings become publicly known. The next natural occasion for a meeting with Gromyko will not occur until next Fall's UN General Assembly, unless a Ministerial level opening of CDE this January is agreed. I understand the reasons you prefer that such a CDE session not be held. Yet the potential benefits, in terms of renewing the high level U.S.-Soviet dialogue and demonstrating continuity in the East-West relationship in the immediate aftermath of INF deployment, are sufficiently great that I recommend you not exclude altogether the possibility of eventually agreeing to join in a January meeting in Stockholm. Neither should we entirely exclude, at this point, the possibility of proposing a meeting with Gromyko at some other neutral site this Fall, although we will want to be wary of feeding unrealistic hopes for a last moment breakthrough on INF just as the deployments begin.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, October 1-8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Printed from a copy that indicates Eagleburger initialed the original.

² Shultz held regular Saturday morning meetings with various Soviet experts to discuss issues and policies related to U.S.-Soviet relations. There was no consistent note taking for these meetings.

³ See [Document 119](#).

⁴ An NSPG meeting on START took place on September 29. See [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. XI, START I, Document 80, footnote 2](#) .

⁵ See [Document 81](#).

October 1983-February 1984

“The Winter of Soviet Discontent”: INF Walkout, the War Scare, and the ‘Ivan and Anya’ Speech

124. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Montgomery) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, October 11, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, October 1-31 1983. Secret; Noform; Nocontract; Orcon. Drafted by Wayne Limberg, INR/SEE; cleared by L. Carter, NESAS/OA. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on October 11.

125. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 11, 1983, 12:30-1:45 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron October 1983 [10/11/1983-10/24/1983]. Secret. According to a typed notation from Matlock, the meeting took place at "The Buck Stops Here" cafeteria. A covering memorandum from Matlock to Clark on October 14, is stamped "RCM has seen," indicating that McFarlane saw the memorandum of conversation.

126. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, October 12, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Kenneth deGraffenreid Files, Subject File, [Active Measures: 1983-1985]. Confidential. Sent for action. Prepared by deGraffenreid. Reagan wrote in the upper right-hand corner: "Could I have the attached for possible use in Sat. Radio broadcasts? RR." On an attached routing slip, Poindexter wrote to Linhard: "Bob, See President's note. Judge would like to have a radio address prepared for Pres that talks about Soviet active measures in a general way. JP."

127. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, October 19, 1983, 1245Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830010-0138. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

128. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, October 25, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 10, Executive Secretariat Sensitive Chronology (10/22/1983-10/31/1983); NLR-775-10-25-5-8. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley and Tefft; cleared by Pascoe and Niles. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. McKinley's handwritten initials are in the upper-right corner, indicating he saw it on October 26. In the upper right-hand margin is a typed note to Burt from Shultz: "An excellent memo. Pls turn into a Sec-Pres, undated, to send over on Friday. G." An undated, unsigned copy of a memorandum from Shultz to Reagan is *ibid*.

129. Note From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, October 28, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 1, Executive Secretariat Super Sensitive Chronology (10/28/1983-11/14/1983); NLR-775-1-58-3-4. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe on October 25. McKinley's handwritten initials are in the upper-right corner, indicating he saw it on October 29.

130. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, October 28, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (10/26/83-10/31/83); NLR-748-24-38-10-9. Secret.

131. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, November 1, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (10/26/83-10/31/83). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Prepared by Matlock. A copy was sent to Bush. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. With the resignation of Clark, Reagan appointed his deputy, Robert "Bud" McFarlane to the position of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs on October 17.

132. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, undated

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1983 (10/20/1983-11/07-1983); NLR-362-3-14-1-0. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes

Only. Although undated, the memorandum was likely sent on November 3 or 4.

133. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, November 9, 1983, 1744Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830658-0555. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to the Consulate in Leningrad, Beijing, Bonn, London, Paris, USNATO, USUN, Belgrade, Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Munich, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, Tokyo, and the Mission in Geneva.

134. Article in the National Intelligence Daily

Washington, November 10, 1983

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 88T00528R: Policy Files (1982-1984), Box 1, Folder 1: VC/NIC Chron January-March 1984. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified].

135. Editorial Note

136. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, November 16, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Chronological File, Chron (Official) November 1983; NLR-362-6-10-5-7. Secret.

137. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 18, 1983, 3-4:15 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, November 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Eagleburger; approved by Shultz on December 6. Shultz's approval is noted on another copy. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1983 Soviet Union Nov) A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. The surnames for Kondrashev and Kvitsinskiy are misspelled throughout the document. On the cover note from Eagleburger, Shultz wrote: "LSE, excellent summary."

138. Notes of a Meeting

Washington, November 19, 1983, 7:30 a.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, [Saturday Group Notes] (November-December 1983). No classification marking. The meeting took place in the

Secretary's Dining Room at the Department of State. In his book, Matlock explained the origin of the small group meetings: "Despite his impatience to get relations with Moscow on a constructive track, Reagan did not seem to be focusing on the substantive issues. Decisions were stalled by squabbles among the various agencies. Shultz noticed this, of course, and tried to break the logjam within the administration by starting a series of Saturday breakfasts for senior officials. Shultz and McFarlane asked me to organize the meetings and act as executive secretary. They wanted to make sure that all the participants could be seated around a single table in a dining room on the eighth floor of the State Department. They also insisted that the fact of the meetings, as well as the content of the discussions, be kept confidential." (Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, p. 75)

139. Action Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, November 22, 1983

Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 11/16-30/83. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Sestanovich; cleared by Azrael and Kaplan. Forwarded through Eagleburger, who wrote in the margin: "G.S.: This is very much worth reading. LSE." A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. McKinley's handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on November 22, and Hill's

handwritten initials are in the upper-right corner, indicating he saw it on November 28.

140. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, November 22, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 1D, 1983—Soviet Union—November. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons and Palmer on November 16. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Simons initialed for Palmer. McKinley's handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on November 22.

141. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, November 23, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 1D, 1983—Soviet Union—November. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley; cleared by Simons and Palmer. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Simons initialed for Palmer. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. Two handwritten notes in the upper right-hand corner read: "Given direct to McFarlane by GPS 12/3" and "done & given to Bud." McKinley's handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it, and Hill's handwritten

initials are in the upper-right corner, indicating he saw it on December 3.

142. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, December 7, 1983, 1607Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis.

143. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, December 12, 1983, 1531Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830731-0263. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Bonn, London, Paris, USNATO, USUN, Brussels, Copenhagen, Ottawa, and Rome.

144. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, December 13, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (12/13/83); NLR-748-24-43-1-3. Confidential. Sent for information. A

handwritten note at the top of the page by McFarlane reads: "This just doesn't seem plausible to me (i.e. severe anxiety & fear of war). M."

145. Memorandum From the Chief U.S. Arms Negotiator, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations (Nitze) and the Chief U.S. Arms Negotiator, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Rowny) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, December 15, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive December 1983. Secret. Forwarded through Adelman. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.

146. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)

Washington, December 16, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive December 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley on December 9; cleared by

Simons, Palmer, Haass in substance, Kelly, and Baraz for information. An unknown hand initialed for Dunkerley. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on December 16. A stamped notation indicates Eagleburger saw the memorandum on December 19. He wrote in the margin: "Very good piece! LSE."

147. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, December 19, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) December 1983. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action. A handwritten notation in the upper right-hand corner, likely by McFarlane, reads: "Return by courier."

148. Talking Points Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, December 19, 1983

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 88B00443R: Policy Files (1980-1986), Box 14, Folder: DCI Memo Chron (1-31 Dec '83). Secret. The talking points were likely drafted by Gates for Casey's discussion with Reagan on the "Spy War" and the general reporting on the increased Soviet intelligence activities related to the "war scare." (See Document 135.) In his memoir, Gates recalled: "Casey met with Reagan on December 22 and advised him that we had learned that in

November there had been a GRU (Soviet military intelligence) instruction to all posts to obtain early warning of enemy military preparations so that the Soviet Union would not be surprised by the actual threat of war. All posts were to try to determine 'the enemy's' intentions and actions. Finally, the GRU elements were to create new agent groups abroad with the capability of communicating independently with GRU headquarters. The DCI told the President on that December day that the KGB and GRU information 'seems to reflect a Soviet perception of an increased threat of war and a realization of the necessity to keep intelligence flowing to Moscow during wartime or after a rupture in diplomatic relations.'" (Gates, *From the Shadows*, pp. 271-272) No record of a meeting with Casey on December 22 appears in the President's schedule. However, a telephone call from Reagan to Casey at 5:15 p.m. was noted. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) On December 23, Casey sent the President a memorandum dated December 22 on "the Spy War and Doomsday Talk," which directly correlates to these talking points; however, the memorandum was a short summary and did not include as much detail on Soviet collection activities. In the covering memorandum to Reagan, Casey wrote: "In line with our telephone conversation, I am sending a little reading for your trip west: First, is a memo reporting on the latest development in the ongoing espionage war. Together with the report I sent to you a few weeks ago, it may say a lot about the Soviet state of mind today. There are other reports indicating a range of reaction from prevailing nervousness to fear and grudging respect for our policies in the Soviet view of the state of our relationship today. Whether this represents a threat or an opportunity is the continuing question." (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 88B00443R: Policy Files (1980-1986), Box 1, Folder: Meeting w/the President (Backup) (10 Jan '84))

149. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, December 23, 1983, 2239Z

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, E.4, President/Andropov Correspondence. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Hill; cleared in S/S-O and by McFarlane; approved by Dam. Sent for information Immediate to Shultz. A handwritten note reads: "Letter delivered to Gromyko on 12/24—no cable (reported by phone)."

150. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, December 26, 1983, 1448Z

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (12/20/83-12/28/83); NLR-748-24-46-6-5. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Reagan initialed this copy of the telegram, indicating that he saw it.

151. Report Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, December 28, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (12/20/83-12/28/83); NLR-748-24-46-8-3. Secret; [handling

restriction not declassified]. Prepared by [3 names not declassified]. Reagan initialed this copy of the report, indicating that he saw it.

152. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, January 4, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/03/84-01/04/84). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt on January 3. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. A handwritten note on a Department of State copy of this memorandum reads: "Original Sec/Pres hand carried by GPS to WH." A telegram was drafted for Hartman in Moscow on January 4 reporting on this meeting. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 2C, 1984—Soviet Union—January)

153. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, January 5, 1984

Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 1/1-15/83. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Eagleburger's Executive Assistant, William Montgomery, initialed for Eagleburger. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum,

indicating Shultz saw it. McKinley's handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on January 5. In a covering memorandum to Shultz, Bosworth wrote: "The attached memorandum is an effort by Jeremy Azrael and Steve Sestanovich to identify some US initiatives that may deserve consideration as you prepare for your meeting with Gromyko. We are aware that each of these initiatives raises serious bureaucratic, political, and strategic problems. However, we are also conscious of the problems that could arise from a continued stalemate in US-Soviet relations and believe that this is the almost certain outcome of our standing pat on attempting to revive our former 'small step' gameplan." See footnote 4, Document 31.

154. Memorandum From the Deputy White House Chief of Staff (Deaver) and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, January 5, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR, President's Soviet Speech (01/16/84) (2). Secret. Sent for information. Prepared by Matlock. A copy was sent to the Vice President. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. Additionally, a stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner indicates that he saw it.

155. Memorandum From Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, January 7, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR, President's Soviet Speech (01/16/84) (2). Confidential. Sent for information. Sestanovich wrote next to Fortier's name and initials: "(dictated and signed in his absence) S.S." Brackets are in the original.

156. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, January 10, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1984, 400010. Secret. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Matlock, deGraffenreid, Lehman, and Raymond. McFarlane's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it. McFarlane wrote in the margin: "John—Don't you expect this was Seweryn Bialer? He has left a lot of people very nervous in Eur." Seweryn Bialer was a professor of Political Science at Columbia University who focused on Soviet and contemporary Russian studies.

157. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, January 11, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, System II Intelligence Files—INT #2, Folder #2, 8490035-8890278. Secret. Sent for information. McFarlane's stamp appears on the

memorandum, indicating he saw it. He also wrote in the margin: “Jack—I have sent this to Shultz & Casey asking their views on” and drew an arrow to the final paragraph of the memorandum.

158. Editorial Note

159. Memorandum of Conversation

Stockholm, January 18, 1984, 3-8:10 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/24/84-01/25/84). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Krimer. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm. In a covering memorandum to McFarlane, Matlock noted: “Although it is an advance, unofficial copy which has not yet been reviewed by Secretary Shultz, you may wish to review it. It is being handled on very close hold in State, and Shultz has given orders that only one file copy be held in the Executive Secretariat.” Although several copies of this text were found, no final version with Shultz’s clearance was located. McFarlane’s stamp appears on the covering memorandum, indicating he saw it.

160. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the White House

Stockholm, January 19, 1984, 0103Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840037-0071. Secret; Niact Immediate. Sent for information to the Department of State.

161. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, January 25, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984-1989, January 16-31, 1984. Secret; Sensitive. In a covering note to Seitz, Burt wrote: "Ray—I have done the attached memo in its present form because of the extreme sensitivity of the subject matter, given that we are not yet even back into negotiations with the Soviets. However, given that the Secretary now is clearly interested in the topic, I think he will find this memo of interest. I hope he will find the time in the next few weeks to read it. Rick." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 22, Arms Control (01/24/1984-03/25/1984)) In a covering memorandum to Shultz on January 25, Eagleburger wrote: "Rick has done an excellent analysis of two approaches to a merger of the INF and START negotiations and of the advantages and disadvantages of each. "Rick suggests that we consider first the more modest alternative of a 'compartmentalized merger.' That approach will be easier to sell in Washington and may be more appealing to Moscow but is likely to result in little more than a return to stalemated nuclear arms control talks in a slightly different package. As Rick suggests, the 'full merger' approach

promises more benefits but also poses greater risks. In the end, we may not want to make that leap, but I suggest you discuss the full merger idea with Ken, Rick and Jon before ruling it out." A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on Eagleburger's memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984-1989, January 16-31, 1984)

162. Memorandum From Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)

Washington, January 27, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/27/84-01/31/84). Confidential. Sent for information. In a handwritten note to McFarlane at the bottom of the page, Poindexter explained: "Bud, This is in response to Jim Baker's question to me earlier in the week. Bob Sims has provided copy to Jim. Jim and Paul Laxalt appear on Sunday talk shows and they may use the points made here. John."

163. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 26, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/27/84-01/31/84). Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. The

meeting took place in Poindexter's office. Reagan initialed the memorandum of conversation, indicating he saw it.

164. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Andropov to President Reagan

Moscow, January 28, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8291507, 8490115). No classification marking. In a covering memorandum to Reagan, Shultz explained that Dobrynin delivered this letter from Andropov during their meeting on January 30. (See Document 165.) The Soviet Embassy provided the translation of this letter. A routing slip indicates McFarlane sent the memorandum to Reagan for information on February 1.

165. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, January 30, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 11, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (01/29/1984-01/31/1984); NLR-775-11-13-3-2. Secret; Sensitive. A cover memorandum shows that it was drafted by Burt.

166. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, undated

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—(1/26/84–2/13/84). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Prepared by Matlock. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it, and wrote at the bottom, “P.2 of Andropov’s letter—he suggests that they want an elimination of nuclear weapons? In Europe that is. Let’s take him up on that.” See Document 164.

167. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, February 6, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/04/84–2/11/84). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. McFarlane’s stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

168. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, February 7, 1984, 1201Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840003–0057. Confidential; Nodis.

169. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, February 8, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (02/01/1984-02/08/1984); NLR-775-11-14-5-9. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons and Palmer. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on February 8.

124. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Montgomery) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 11, 1983

SUBJECT

CIA Report on Soviet Policy in Afghanistan

A recent CIA report [*less than 1 line not declassified*] confirms earlier indications that the Soviets remain committed to their long-term goal of subduing the Afghan insurgency despite the protracted military and economic costs. Moscow recognizes that this process will take years and is ready to shoulder the burden. It is not planning, however, to increase its troop levels.

The report, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] provides [*less than 1 line not declassified*] insights into Soviet thinking on Afghanistan to date. According to the report, the Soviets are aware that:

- the Babrak Karmal regime is incapable of defending itself and would be overthrown if Soviet support were withdrawn;

- the USSR must continue to control all government and industrial, (i.e., urban) centers and lines of communication and transportation in Afghanistan until the Afghan army has been sufficiently retooled and a new generation of Afghan leaders trained in the USSR;

—Afghanistan must be restructured and administered along Soviet lines, the final subjugation and pacification of Afghanistan will take several decades if not longer.


The Soviets recognize that their efforts to rebuild the Afghan army have not yet succeeded but that they are not prepared to increase the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. [*2 lines not declassified*] it may reflect some of the findings of the inspection of the military situation in Afghanistan conducted by Marshal Sokolov in early August.

The Sokolov mission prompted speculation that the Soviets were unhappy with the lack of progress in Afghanistan and were contemplating drastic changes in their policy including Babrak's replacement. [*1 line not declassified*] As a recently completed SNIE on Afghanistan argues, the Soviets may change their tactics but there are no signs of a fundamental shift in strategy or goals.² They will probably stick with Babrak if for no other reason than they have no alternatives at present.

[*5½ lines not declassified*] since the Afghan adventure would last years and involve sustained Soviet assistance, some belt-tightening must take place. This may be an effort to answer long-standing Soviet military complaints that the Afghans were unable to pull their weight and that more resources were needed.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, October 1-31 1983. Secret; Nofoin; Nocontract; Orcon. Drafted by Wayne Limberg, INR/SEE; cleared by L. Carter, NESA/SOA. Hill's

handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on October 11.

² Scheduled for publication in [*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. XXXIV, Afghanistan, February 1981-October 1985*](#). 

125. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 11, 1983, 12:30-1:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

Sergei Vishnevsky, *Pravda* Columnist
Jack F. Matlock

Background: Vishnevsky, whom I had met during my tours in Moscow, telephoned October 7 to say that he was in the U.S. for a few weeks (ostensibly to replace temporarily the *Pravda* correspondent in New York, who has terminal cancer) and would like a meeting, completely off the record. After consulting Judge Clark, I agreed to meet with him for lunch on October 11.

Vishnevsky's Comments: Though his presentation was rather disjointed, he made the following points of possible interest, presenting everything as his "personal view:"

—The state of U.S.-Soviet relations has deteriorated to a dangerous point. Many in the Soviet public are asking if war is imminent. He himself is worried and personally uncomfortable because now he must write nothing but propaganda about the U.S. rather than the more objective stories he prefers, and was permitted to write in the mid-70's.

—The Soviet Union is now run by a triumvirate of Andropov, Ustinov and Gromyko. They have been in the leadership so long that they tend to be rigid about basic policy issues. (In this regard, he observed, "President Reagan is mentally and physically ten years younger than

his age; our leaders are ten years older.”) But the Soviet leaders recognize that they need a decrease in tension to concentrate on economic reform (he spoke of the economy as being “a total mess, and getting worse”), but are frustrated because they feel beleaguered and simply don’t know how to proceed.

—Andropov’s statement of September 28 was virtually unprecedented and is a reflection of the leadership’s current frustration.² It was intended primarily for the Soviet audience (to warn them that they could not expect an easing of tensions with the U.S. and had to be prepared to tighten their belts) and to “our friends in Europe” (the anti-nuclear movement). But the leadership is convinced that the Reagan Administration is out to bring their system down and will give no quarter; therefore they have no choice but to hunker down and fight back.

—Their frustration is heightened by a recognition that the President is in fact successful in achieving his objectives. His defense budgets get passed; the NATO Alliance is holding; the U.S. economy is picking up. And he constantly outmaneuvers them: the President’s handling of the KAL “incident” was “absolutely brilliant”: it left the Soviet leaders “wallowing in the mud.”

—The Soviets know that we will succeed in starting INF deployments, and are convinced that the President is very likely to be reelected next year. He implied, however, that their current mood was so truculent and their prestige so much at stake that they are unable to draw the logical conclusions from these convictions.

—As for the future, his parting words were that, in his opinion, the Soviets would stonewall all our proposals this fall and would have to react in some fashion to INF

deployments, which would require a stonewall well into 1984. However, “about six months into the next year” they might be willing—since the domestic economy remains the priority issue for them—to reassess their stance.

Matlock Comments: Vishnevsky did most of the talking during lunch, but I pointed out repeatedly that the Soviet predicament, as he described it, was the direct result of their own actions and their own aggressive policies, and not of propaganda manipulation on our part. (He did not disagree.) I told him they could not have handled the KAL massacre worse. (He agreed.) I stressed that, despite everything, we were still prepared to negotiate seriously to lower arms levels and had made proposals which should interest them, if they indeed do desire a reduction of tension. (This elicited his comments implying that the Soviet leadership, at the moment at least, is incapable of considering them rationally.)

In response to his comment that the Soviet leaders are convinced that they could not deal with this Administration, I told him that Soviet actions across the board created grave doubts that we could deal with the Soviets. All Soviet actions and their propagandistic and one-sided “proposals” seemed designed to acquire or perpetuate Soviet military superiority. There could obviously be no agreements on this basis, and so long as these Soviet policies persisted, we could not take seriously Soviet professions of a desire to improve relations.

Comment: Vishnevsky has held key positions with *Pravda* for many years, so he clearly has sound Party and (almost certainly) KGB credentials. His trade is propaganda and his specialty the U.S. We must assume that, in general, he was conveying a series of messages someone in the regime wants us to hear. He was so intent on getting his comments

off his chest that he carefully avoided debating any points I made, either agreeing with them or letting them pass. There is obviously a heavy potential here for disinformation, and his comments must be treated with caution. Nevertheless, I would summarize the real messages he tried to convey as the following:

—Expect a Soviet stonewall for about nine months, but do not conclude from this that we cannot do business at all in 1984.

—There are still powerful incentives in Moscow to deal realistically with us, but these may not be evident in the months ahead because of the psychological and prestige factors cited.

—Andropov is not in complete control: he shares power with Ustinov (the military) and Gromyko (a stalwart of traditional Soviet foreign policy with a large personal stake in it). Changing policies will not come easy.

If this was the intended message, then it may well be essentially accurate, since there is much corroborative evidence. And if this is the case, it means that we are on the right track and must make sure we stay the course, while keeping channels of communication open.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron October 1983 [10/11/1983-10/24/1983]. Secret. According to a typed notation from Matlock, the meeting took place at “The Buck Stops Here” cafeteria. A covering memorandum from Matlock to Clark on October 14, is stamped “RCM has seen,” indicating that McFarlane saw the memorandum of conversation.

² See [Document 120](#).

126. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, October 12, 1983

SUBJECT

Soviet Active Measures

The attached special unclassified report, published by State, depicts the boldness and intensity by which the Soviets pursue a broad range of deception (“active measures”) against us.

Significant examples include:

—Fabrication of two US Embassy Rome telegrams portraying press coverage of the possible “Bulgarian connection” in the assassination attempt against the Pope as a US-orchestrated campaign.

—Implicating Ambassador Thomas Pickering, by means of a forged US Embassy Lagos document, as ordering the assassination of a principal Nigerian presidential candidate.

—A forged West German document by which Ghana accuses the US of plotting to overthrow the Rawlings government.

—A fabricated audiotape of an alleged transatlantic conversation between you and Prime Minister Thatcher.

We continue to closely monitor Soviet active measures and employ appropriate counterintelligence to lessen their

impact and expose their deceptive techniques.²

Recommendation

That you read the enclosed Department of State special report.³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Kenneth deGraffenreid Files, Subject File, [Active Measures: 1983–1985]. Confidential. Sent for action. Prepared by deGraffenreid. Reagan wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “Could I have the attached for possible use in Sat. Radio broadcasts? RR.” On an attached routing slip, Poindexter wrote to Linhard: “Bob, See President’s note. Judge would like to have a radio address prepared for Pres that talks about Soviet active measures in a general way. JP.”

² In an October 19 memorandum to McFarlane from Sims, Lehman, and Fortier, they commented that with pending INF deployments and European demonstrations, a more appropriate focus for Reagan’s Saturday address would be arms control. They suggested that “deGraffenreid’s ‘active measures’ theme should be saved for another talk, when it could be fully developed as the main theme.” (Ibid.) Reagan did not give a Saturday radio address on active measures and counterintelligence activities until June 29, 1985. For the text, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book II, page 885–886.

³ Reagan initialed the “ok” option. Department of State Special Report No. 110, “Soviet Active Measures, September 1983,” is attached but not printed. For the text, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1983, pp. 60–67.

127. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, October 19, 1983, 1245Z

13169. For the Secretary. Please Pass to Under Secretary Eagleburger and Assistant Secretary Burt. Subject: Ambassador's Call on Gromyko October 19.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary: I called on Gromyko today to get a reading of his views of the bilateral relationship prior to my departure tomorrow. The discussion very quickly became a philosophical one; in fact, he had nothing new to say on the one specific issue—INF—that we touched on. But he did go to great lengths in arguing that the major problem the Soviets have with the Reagan administration is that they believe we are not prepared to accept their legitimacy and therefore that we constantly intrude ideological considerations into issues of war and peace.² Even allowing for his well-known thespian qualities, Gromyko was passionate on the subject, frequently correcting his interpreter to make sure that exact nuances were being conveyed and even keeping me fifteen minutes beyond our allotted hour to emphasize his points. While a lot of this is obviously self-serving, at least it's a problem we should talk about in-house; I hope we can discuss the issue when I see you next week.³ End summary.

3. Gromyko received me in his MFA office. He looked none the worse for wear following his rigorous travels and conversations. Gromyko was accompanied by USA Department Chief Bessmertnykh; I brought with me my

DCM, Zimmermann. While Gromyko had some hard things to say, his tone was more reflective than polemical—a striking contrast from the pyrotechnics at Madrid.⁴

4. I began by saying that I had come primarily to listen, and wanted to get his sense of the state of relations before my consultations in Washington. Beginning with INF, I wondered what the Soviet objective has been. If it has been to stop deployment, it won't succeed. If it has been to limit our deployments, our negotiations should be more serious. I told Gromyko I was puzzled.

5. Gromyko responded by noting the low depth to which our relations have sunk and saying that this was the product of the policy of the U.S. administration. He claimed that in INF the administration's negotiating position was not serious and that we were just killing time in order to mislead people and use the negotiations as a sort of smoke screen for deployment. He said the Soviet Union does not seek dominance, but will take measures to assure that its position is not weakened. The Soviet Government is in favor of parity and equality. It has made proposals based on parity. But parity can be on various levels; it is one thing to have parity at a lower level but another thing to have parity at a higher level leading to major nuclear arsenals.

6. An unproductive discussion ensued regarding the British and French forces. Gromyko called our assertions that they are not part of NATO systems a "fairytale". If we wanted someone to believe such a fairytale, then we'll have to look for someone other than the Soviet Union. I tried to pull Gromyko back to the situation he envisages following our deployments. He refused to be drawn asserting simply that our action would lead to new twists in the arms spiral. I stressed the President's willingness to continue negotiations, but added that in doing so we had to take

account of the interests of such non-nuclear powers as the FRG. Gromyko said that our latest proposal was a mockery of common sense and that neither in INF nor in START had our recent proposals moved even one small step in the direction of agreements.

7. Gromyko then moved on to his primary message. He said that U.S. policies and statements are based on deception and are unworthy of trust. Our ways of dealing with the Soviet Union showed no vestige of elementary propriety. Ideology was being mixed into policies involving world security and issues of war and peace.

8. I argued that Soviets, of all people, should not be surprised at ideological combat. I myself had heard Brezhnev, at the height of détente, say that the ideological competition would continue. And I heard Andropov less than a year ago—in a speech in the Kremlin—devote the first half to ideological considerations and the second half to a discussion of arms control.⁵ The Soviet Union has a party apparatus and newspapers that can make the ideological case while the government leaders can concentrate on state policy; the President of the United States does not have such possibilities. President Reagan has strong ideological beliefs; the fact that he holds them does not mean that he does not desire to pursue arms control or to discuss regional problems seriously with the Soviet Union.

9. Gromyko claimed that, in negotiating with three U.S. Presidents, Brezhnev had never put ideology on the negotiating table. He said it would be one thing if President Reagan went to a club and gave a lecture on the differences between socialist and capitalist ideology. He could outline the advantages of capitalist ideology; he could argue the virtues of idealist philosophy over material

philosophy; and, in the field of political economy, he could note his preference for Adam Smith over Karl Marx. But it's something else when he attacks the legitimacy of our social system, our constitution, our party and government, and our leadership. With such rhetoric being used, Gromyko continued, it is difficult to discuss political issues, indeed to discuss anything at all.

10. I countered that there was no way to define our competition purely in terms of philosophical debates. The competition goes on in many areas, in part because both of us are free to promote our competing ideologies and this is bound to bring us into conflict. We have to maintain a state-to-state relationship, exercise restraint, and talk more. I denied that our major problem with the Soviets was the existence of their system; our major problem was that our security interests and those of our friends were affected by Soviet activities. I recalled for Gromyko that our current problems with the Soviet Union took root at the time of a Democratic President and a Democratic Congress.

11. Gromyko then launched into a long plea for the separation of ideological and security problems, arguing that ideology should not be a factor when issues of war and peace are being discussed. Saying in speeches on nuclear armaments and security that socialist representatives don't believe in God or in life after death and have different moral values is not a correct approach to security problems. Whether this is a conscious approach on your part or a careless approach, it's equally bad in either case. Gromyko cited three examples of the "correct" approach: the overcoming of ideological differences to establish diplomatic relations 50 years ago; the collaboration in World War II; and the SALT I and II agreements.

12. I told Gromyko that the ideological approach of which he complained had not been present on our side in the high-level exchanges we have had with the Soviet leadership. Gromyko, somewhat oddly, said he found this remark very interesting. I followed up by telling him to take these private exchanges extremely seriously because they show what the President hopes to accomplish in the relationship.

Hartman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830010-0138. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

² In a memorandum to McFarlane, October 28, forwarding him a copy of the telegram, Matlock wrote: "The major thrust of Gromyko's comment was that the Soviet leaders are convinced that the Reagan administration does not accept their legitimacy, and that therefore it is not prepared to negotiate seriously with the USSR, but is actually dedicated to bringing down the system. There is a large self-serving element in such argumentation, but I believe that it is an argument used in policy debates among the Soviet leadership. Given the present signs of uncertainty in the Soviet leadership, and the indirect evidence of debate, it probably serves our interest to do what we can (without changing our policies) to undercut the force of this argument." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, US-Soviet-Diplomatic Contacts (6/8))

³ Hartman was in Washington and met with Reagan on October 24. In his diary, Reagan wrote: "Ambas. Hartman (Russia) came by. He confirms what I believe: the Soviets wont really negotiate on arms reductions until we deploy

the Pershing II's & go forward with MX. He also confirms that Andropov is very much out of sight these days.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 279)

⁴ See [Documents 104](#) and [105](#).

⁵ This is possibly a reference to Andropov's June 15 speech to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum and Supreme Soviet. See [footnote 4](#), [Document 65](#).

128. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 25, 1983

SUBJECT

Soviet Reactions to U.S. Protective Actions in Grenada

While Soviet reactions to today's events on Grenada are still in an early stage and will doubtless be further shaped as the situation on the island becomes clearer, we would offer the following preliminary thoughts on the outlines of the Soviet Union's likely response.²

A Sharply Critical Public Line: Not surprisingly, Moscow will see this as an opportunity to reinforce their current public diplomacy campaign attacking the U.S. policies as militaristic and an increasing threat to peace. This afternoon's TASS commentary sets their general theme —“an act of direct, unprovoked aggression . . . taking advantage of a complicated situation that had taken shape within the country . . . and with the fig-leaf of involvement by pro-American puppet regimes.” We can expect a high volume of this over the coming days with the Soviets particularly trying to tarnish our image in Europe as the INF deployment debate reaches its peak and to divert attention from their own post-KAL image problems. Our Embassy in Moscow notes that we may also see “protest” demonstrations in the coming days.

. . . But More Realistic in Private?: Despite this public outcry, however, the Grenadan revolutionary movement

does not represent either a Soviet vital interest or high investment (Perhaps characteristic of Soviet unhappiness and ambivalence about the local factional infighting, Arbatov is reported as saying in London that the Grenadans had not been blameless in letting the situation so develop as to enable to the U.S. to intervene). In his meeting with Chargé Zimmermann this morning, Bessmertnykh of the Soviet MOFA was critical of our actions, but used the phrase “in your backyard”—suggestive of a long-standing Soviet tendency to view such matters in “super-power spheres of influence” terms.³ The Embassy’s Acting DCM Isakov did not even feel the need to make a *pro forma* complaint with me this afternoon. While unwelcome, the U.S. protective actions in the Caribbean were perhaps not that unexpected in the Soviet *realpolitik* consciousness.

For that reason, we doubt at this time that the Soviets will take any major and dramatic counter-action beyond intensifying particular anti-U.S. propaganda themes. At the same time, however, there are potential problem areas which could influence their response.

—The fate of Soviet personnel on Grenada was a primary concern of both Bessmertnykh and Isakov. (We estimate there are perhaps 10 Soviet diplomats and 35 economic technicians on Grenada along with 15 Eastern European advisors). Initial reports suggest that our forces have over thirty Soviets “safe under protection” on Grenada. Repatriating these Soviets could become an issue in coming days.

—Should an incident develop in which it appeared that Soviet lives were lost or Soviet national dignity flouted by deliberate US actions, we could expect a much sharper Soviet reaction and perhaps even retaliation in specific cases. In this latter regard, we should be sensitive to the

anomalous situation in which our Embassy in Kabul must operate.

—While the Grenadan revolutionary movement may not be a major loss to the Soviets, the loss of life and prestige by Cuba, its surrogate in the region, could become another matter. Apart from republishing Cuban communiqués about “heroic Cuban fighters resisting US imperialism”, the Soviets have thus far avoided comment on the Cuban role in Grenada. In addition, both Bessmertnykh and Isakov avoided any mention of the Cubans (We would also note in this regard the apparent differences between Soviet and Cuban approaches to the past week’s political infighting on the island; the Cubans supported Bishop while the Soviets apparently assumed a more distant posture). When the Cubans ultimately tally their losses, however, wounded pride may yet prompt them to press for a sharper Soviet response.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 10, Executive Secretariat Sensitive Chronology (10/22/1983–10/31/1983); NLR-775-10-25-5-8. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley and Tefft; cleared by Pascoe and Niles. A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. McKinley’s handwritten initials are in the upper-right corner, indicating he saw it on October 26. In the upper right-hand margin is a typed note to Burt from Shultz: “An excellent memo. Pls turn into a Sec-Pres, undated, to send over on Friday. G.” An undated, unsigned copy of a memorandum from Shultz to Reagan is *ibid*.

² On October 25, President Reagan made the following statement on Grenada: “On Sunday, October 23rd, the United States received an urgent, formal request from the

five member nations of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) to assist in a joint effort to restore order and democracy on the island of Grenada. We acceded to the request to become part of a multinational effort.” He continued: “Early this morning, forces from six Caribbean democracies and the United States began a landing or landings on the island of Grenada in the eastern Caribbean.” He explained that the “U.S. objectives are clear: to protect our own citizens, to facilitate the evacuation of those who want to leave, and to help in the restoration of democratic institutions in Grenada.”

(Department of State *Bulletin*, December 1983, p. 67)

³ Telegram 13462 from Moscow, October 25, reported: “Acting DCM Kamman presented text of a non-paper on Grenada (as transmitted reftel) to Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, Chief of MFA USA Department, at 1500 local time.”

(Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830010-0333)

129. Note From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Mr. Secretary:

Washington, October 28, 1983

Attached is a “point paper” for use during your lunch with Dobrynin today.² It gives you a brief background on the likely topics that could arise in your discussion—Grenada, Lebanon, INF, etc.—and suggests some points you might make.

As you know, Larry has suggested an “unbuttoned” approach to the lunch, with you beginning by simply noting that in difficult periods it is important to talk and then letting the conversation proceed in an unstructured manner. Art, on the other hand, favors a more formal probing approach in which you would initiate the conversation by saying that we are genuinely perplexed by recent Soviet behavior—KAL, reneging on human rights commitments, etc.—and wonder whether Dobrynin can shed some light on Moscow’s thinking.

I tend to favor Larry’s approach, although I do not believe the conversation should be a completely unstructured bull session. I think that if you adopt Art’s approach it would invite Dobrynin to launch into a diatribe against the Reagan Administration. In this case, it could be hard for you to get a word in edgewise.

My recommendation is that you begin the lunch with a very simple statement along the following lines:

In the last two years, we have not made a great deal of progress and have been quite critical of one another. At the same time, we have not been involved in any grave confrontations. In fact, in some areas we have accomplished a few things. Unfortunately, the trend now appears to be running in such a way that we could be moving into a dangerous period. From our point of view, we are concerned about your lack of military restraint, your actions in Syria, and your threats to respond to the deployment of INF in Europe. Furthermore, there are regional conflicts such as Iran-Iraq war which pose great dangers. In times such as these, it is critically important that we talk to one another and exercise restraint.

This kind of presentation is designed to avoid an extended Dobrynin diatribe. We can, of course, expect him to be quite critical of our policies. He will blast us on Grenada,³ the President's discussion of the Soviet role behind events in the Caribbean and the Middle East, and—his favorite theme—on the Reagan Administration's supposed lack of interest in "real communication" with the Soviets.

You should respond calmly to these criticisms, reminding Dobrynin of their performance during the KAL episode, the discovery of huge amounts of Soviet/Cuban arms in Grenada, their dangerous actions with Syria, their threatening behavior on INF, and the problems their lack of compliance on arms control issues causes for ongoing negotiations. The point to emphasize is that although we may not be able to make great progress at present—though, of course, the U.S. stands ready for progress—the United States and the Soviet Union have an overwhelming responsibility to ensure that things do not get out of control.

The atmosphere you should try to create is one that encourages an informal, candid exchange about real concerns, not one in which the exchange will be set-piece restatements of current policies. In such an atmosphere, you will want to see whether Dobrynin provides any real openings worth exploring. If he engages in his familiar tactic of filibustering, you might tell him bluntly that time is short, that you want to engage in a real dialogue not speeches, and then ask directly what message he has from the Soviet leadership that he wants to convey to the United States.

Rick⁴

Attachment

Point Paper Prepared in the Department of State for Secretary of State Shultz⁵

Washington, undated

CHECKLIST ON US-SOVIET ISSUES

Grenada: The Soviets have taken an extremely critical public line of U.S. protective actions in Grenada and formally protested our action. However, the Soviets have been fairly perfunctory in their private criticism—suggesting a tendency to view this episode in “spheres of influence” realpolitik terms—concentrating instead on the safety of their personnel.

—Our objectives in Grenada are clear—protection of U.S. lives, restoration of peace, stability and democratic process on island. U.S. troops will be out as soon as objectives accomplished.

—We have made quite clear we will take every effort to ensure safety of Soviet personnel. We remain prepared to assist their safe evacuation.

Korean Airliner: While continuing their basic line, the Soviets have invited the ICAO Secretary General to visit Moscow in early November and outside representatives to “observe” their investigation. We have protested maneuvers by Soviet vessels that endanger our search efforts. We are considering ending our naval search effort shortly.

—Must understand the intense and understandable feelings generated within the U.S. by the shooting down of unarmed civilian airliner. Soviet handling of the issue only intensified the adverse reaction.

—Want positive Soviet action on claims and a full and honest explanation of the shootdown. Important step in this direction would be positive Soviet cooperation with ICAO investigation. Hope Soviet invitation to ICAO Secretary General is in this vein. Noted Soviet invitation for U.S., Japan and South Korea to observe Soviet investigation and are considering our reply.

—Both nations share interest in avoiding frictions during naval search operations in Sea of Japan. We have instructed our commanders to exercise great care; Soviet side must do the same.

INF: After dismissing all three of our new proposals, the Soviets launched their own new initiative on October 26.⁶ New Soviet position offers some forward movement on geographic scope and aircraft, but still provides no basis for agreement on the questions of non-deployment of U.S. missiles and compensation for UK/French forces. Making a

strong pitch for deferral of the U.S. deployment dates, Andropov on October 26 flatly ruled out continuation of INF negotiations after the NATO deployments.

—Time has come for serious negotiation, not political posturing or intimidation. In September, we made major new U.S. moves responsive to Soviet concerns, which Soviet Union has chosen to dismiss out of hand.⁷

—Latest Andropov proposal holds out promise of some movement forward which we hope will be seriously followed up with specifics at negotiating table. It does not, however, address central U.S. concerns.

—It also sets unacceptable deadline for Soviet walk-out from negotiations. Soviet responsibility for such an interruption of talks would be clearcut. As for any postponement of deployment, would note U.S. has been negotiating for two years while Soviets continue to deploy.

—If Soviet Union really wants agreement, must drop insistence on direct compensation for British and French forces which ignores fundamental difference in role of U.S. and UK/French forces. This is issue of principle for Western alliance.

START: The situation in START is colored by impending showdown over INF. Soviets remain unwilling to acknowledge the flexibility we have displayed in response to their concerns, criticizing the “build-down” concept both publicly and in Geneva. [Dobrynin has complained that our public release of build-down before giving them a “heads up” demonstrated our “lack of seriousness.”] The Soviets

continue to see U.S. position as attempt to gut their existing ICBM force structure.

—As in INF, U.S. has made substantial modifications to its position that respond to expressed Soviet concerns.

—We will continue to seek an agreement for real reductions in the most destabilizing categories of ballistic missile systems, as measured by their warheads, and in the overall destructive power of strategic forces.

—We do not, however, insist on identical force structures and are willing limit forces where U.S. has advantage. If Soviets agree to meaningful reductions in ballistic missile destructive power, U.S. is prepared to accept more stringent limits on heavy bombers and ALCMs. Build-down proposal should be seen in this light.

—If USSR is seriously interested in such a trade-off, we can be flexible in developing common framework to carry out reductions.

Compliance: The McFarlane Group is still developing a gameplan for handling the cases of possible Soviet non-compliance with SALT II, the ABM Treaty, and other agreements. We have raised both the new Soviet radar and the SS-X-25 [a.k.a. PL-5] ICBM in the current SCC round, but have received little satisfaction from Soviets.

—Soviets should not underestimate the gravity of our concerns over possible Soviet non-compliance with the ABM/SALT II.

—More is at stake than whether SCC has competency to consider non-ratified agreement. Failure to resolve uncertainties created by ambiguous Soviet actions will have corrosive effect on efforts to negotiate new agreements.

—Detailed diplomatic exchanges on the subject of the ICBM first flight tested on February 8 and initial exchanges on the new radar near Krasnoyarsk have not in any way alleviated our concerns.

—Our ability to assess information you provided on the new missile is severely impeded by your expanding practice of encrypting telemetry on missile test flights.

—Hope you will be more forthcoming in the current session of the SCC. Not encouraged by initial weeks' discussions.

CBMs: We held constructive exchanges in Moscow in August, but the Soviets have yet to agree to discuss anything other than Hotline upgrade.⁸ We are now preparing for a second round of talks in Washington in December. The White House has yet to approve the details of our initiative for a multilateral convention on nuclear terrorism.

—August discussions in Moscow on ways to enhance communications were useful. Pleased we will be working together to improve "Hotline." Urge Soviet government to reconsider position on our other ideas for improved and expanded communications.

—We are considering another round of such bilateral discussions of communications measures in

Washington this early December. Would hope to see broader participation on Soviet side than just technical experts.

CDE: The CDE opens in Stockholm on January 17; preparatory conference is underway in Helsinki. We are now coordinating a Western position and have little to say to the Soviets on substance.

—U.S. attaches great significance to businesslike CDE. We hope early progress can be reached on meaningful measures.

MBFR: No recent progress on our verification probe; the Soviets have said they would be prepared to continue the bilateral exploratory talks if we agreed to discuss all issues and not just verification.

—We are seriously interested in making progress toward an agreement to achieve more stable conventional balance in Central Europe at reduced levels.

Non-Proliferation: We have had two rounds of productive exchanges with the Soviets; in general, this has been a fruitful area of dialogue, insulated from the broader strains in the relationship.

—We value highly exchanges we have had on nuclear non-proliferation and hope for continued cooperation. Will soon propose next round of exchanges in Washington in mid-December.

Soviet Arms Control Proposals: The Soviets may press us to provide a more considered response to their Outer Space Treaty proposal and laundry list of propagandistic proposals presented at the UNGA. They may also complain

about our unwillingness to reestablish negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban [CTB].

—Still studying your Outer Space Treaty proposal. We remain concerned about serious problems in verifying any meaningful limits on military activities in space. Would welcome specific Soviet ideas—as opposed to general assertions—on outer space verification.

—Have your other various proposals presented at the UNGA under review. Generally believe it is far preferable to concentrate on the specifics of arms reduction in the Geneva and Vienna talks, rather than wasting time on essentially declaratory approaches.

—On nuclear testing, regret your repeated refusal to engage in discussions on ways to improve verification provisions of TTBT/PNET that would have permitted us to ratify the treaties.

Human Rights: The human rights situation continues to worsen. Since Madrid, Soviets have put on trial three prominent dissidents and peace activists; virtual cut-off of Jewish and Armenian emigration continues. Moreover, the Soviets have reinforced unequivocal “nyet” Gromyko gave on Shcharanskiy, insisting that there was never any deal. On a trade involving Shcharanskiy, Vogel told us last week that the Soviet response was “not yet.”

—Human rights will remain central issue in 1980 as it was in 1970s. Need to find a way to take practical steps.

—Gromyko said in Madrid we had no deal on Shcharanskiy. We cannot accept this, as both Kampelman and Kondrashev are responsible men, who had done business on a number of cases.

—You must understand our concerns and feeling that question of good faith involved. Not asking you to contradict yourselves, but to explore other ways this issue can be resolved.

Third World Regional Tensions: Although the Soviets have expressed support for the cease-fire in Lebanon, their overall policy, particularly unqualified support for the Syrians, promotes continued instability in the Middle East. The Iran-Iraq conflict may be moving into dangerous stage. In a period of extreme turbulence in Asia—including the KAL massacre and the Rangoon bombing—the Soviets have thus far been unhelpful.

—On the Middle East, we remain convinced that the reconciliation process is the only alternative to a dangerous and unpredictable escalation of tensions. Recent Beirut tragedy has not diminished our determination to support such a solution.⁹

—We note your statement of support for the ceasefire. You must urge Syria to exercise greater restraint. Return to direct Israeli-Syrian confrontation is in neither of our interests.

—On Iran-Iraq, you understand the West's interests in continued flow of oil. We will protect those interests if necessary, but far prefer a peaceful solution of this dispute. We do not want a conflict in the Gulf and are working to avoid it. We trust Soviet Union will take no actions to exacerbate situation.

—Are particularly concerned that you understand the need for restraint on the Korean peninsula after the Rangoon assassination attempt.

Bilateral Issues: In the wake of the KAL shoot-down, most elements of our “small steps” strategy [consulates, exchanges agreement] are now on hold. Dobrynin has stressed the need for more high-level dialogue. Gromyko told Hartman that key problem is U.S. insertion of ideology into our statements, raising questions about whether we accept legitimacy of Soviet Union.¹⁰

—Soviet actions, not American words, are responsible for the downturn in relations and our inability to pursue at this time some of the steps initiated earlier this year.

—Soviet leaders, including Andropov, always have stressed that ideological competition is essential and consistent with peaceful coexistence. Soviets can't have it both ways.

—This Administration has not injected ideology into our diplomatic discussions. We are prepared to deal with the Soviet Union as a major power and to strive for agreements based on equality and mutual interest.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 1, Executive Secretariat Super Sensitive Chronology (10/28/1983-11/14/1983); NLR-775-1-58-3-4. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe on October 25. McKinley's handwritten initials are in the upper-right corner, indicating he saw it on October 29.

² See [Document 130](#). Attached with the point paper, but not printed, are talking points on the “Soviets in Grenada” and a memorandum drafted by Pascoe on “Dobrynin's Comments to FRG Ambassador Hermes.”

³ See [Document 128](#).

⁴ Burt initialed “RB” above his typed signature.


⁵ Secret; Sensitive. Brackets are in the original.

⁶ On October 26, Andropov gave an interview in *Pravda* and discussed new INF initiatives. In telegram 9901 from the Mission in Geneva, October 27, the Mission reported on Nitze’s dinner conversation on October 26 with Kvitsinskiy: “Kvitsinskiy asked Nitze whether he had heard the reports of Secretary General Andropov’s press interview. Nitze said he had not and asked Kvitsinskiy what Andropov had said. Kvitsinskiy said that Andropov had said the Soviet side was prepared to talk about aircraft limits, was prepared to reduce its SS-20s in Europe to 140, was prepared to freeze its SS-20 deployments in the eastern Soviet Union as of the time that an agreement might go into effect. He further said that Andropov had said that the Soviet side would break off the talks if U.S. deployed.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830626-0553) The INF delegation in Geneva reported further on the proposal and the statement by the Soviet delegation in telegram 9922 from the Mission in Geneva, October 27. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830627-0272) For the text of Andropov’s interview, which was published in the October 27 edition of *Pravda*, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 910-914.

⁷ NSDD 104, “U.S. Approach to INF Negotiations—II, was issued on September 21 and provided instruction to the INF negotiating team. It is scheduled for publication in [Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. V, European Security, 1977-1983](#).

⁸ Discussions were held in Moscow on the Hotline and other confidence-building measures on August 9 and 10.

⁹ On October 23, a vehicle loaded with explosives destroyed the U.S. Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, killing over 200 Marines. For documentation on the barracks bombing,

see [*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. XVIII, Part 2, Lebanon, September 1982-March 1984*](#) .

¹⁰ See [Document 127](#).

130. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, October 28, 1983

SUBJECT

My Lunch Today with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin

I had a wide-ranging discussion at a private lunch with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on the state of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Rather than dwell on details, I focused the conversation on the nature of our dialogue and whether, in fact, discussions at a high level serve a useful function for the two countries.

Dobrynin said that it appeared to Moscow that the U.S. wants confrontation rather than to solve problems. He claimed we had handled the KAL incident in a provocative way and complained about your blaming the Soviets for everything, including Bishop's death in Grenada² and the Beirut tragedy.³ I told him that, from our perspective, our response on KAL had been restrained. Furthermore, I emphasized our shock over the apparent Soviet decision to renege on its commitment to Max Kampelman on Shcharanskiy. I added that the two sides clearly differed substantially on ideological issues and that we were prepared to compete in that area. I also said that we are ready for real discussions, but these had to focus not only on arms control but also on issues of importance to us such as Soviet regional misbehavior and human rights. Dobrynin did not really argue with my points, but he did grouse that on some issues such as the Middle East we had been reluctant to talk.

Dobrynin seemed to have explicit instructions only on INF. He went through Andropov's latest proposal in familiar terms, adding a complaint about the "double standard" in which the U.S. asserted its right to deploy missiles in the FRG "only eight minutes from the USSR" while insisting that the Soviets have no missiles in Cuba. This was said matter-of-factly rather than as a threat.

I summed up with Dobrynin by suggesting that we think about our conversation and meet again after the Asian trip.⁴ I said we both needed to consider whether it was useful to continue a high-level dialogue and how we should go about it, adding that the past experience of several American administrations has been that efforts at a U.S.-Soviet dialogue always seem to be derailed by Soviet actions.

I hope the session will give the Kremlin food for thought. Incidentally, Dobrynin told me he had been reporting to Moscow that you will stand for reelection and win and that the Soviet government must be prepared to deal with the Administration for the next five years.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (10/26/83-10/31/83); NLR-748-24-38-10-9. Secret.

² Prime Minister Maurice Bishop was overthrown and executed during a coup on October 19.

³ See [footnote 9, Document 129](#).

⁴ Shultz accompanied the President on State visits to Japan from November 9 to 12 and to South Korea from November 12 to 14.

**131. Memorandum From the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane) to President Reagan¹**

Washington, November 1, 1983

SUBJECT

Secretary Shultz's Meeting with Dobrynin, October 28

George Shultz has sent you the memorandum at Tab A regarding his luncheon meeting with Dobrynin last Friday, at which only the two of them were present.²

When he briefed Jack Matlock and some members of his senior staff after the lunch, he made the following additional points, which were not included in the memorandum because of their sensitivity:

—In response to George's mention of their assurances on Shcharansky, Dobrynin said that there had been a misunderstanding, since Kondrashev (Max Kampelman's KGB interlocutor in Madrid) had never been authorized to give assurances on Shcharansky's release.³

—Dobrynin asked specifically what you had in mind in your reference to "confidential contacts" in your handwritten letter to Andropov.⁴ Shultz said that you meant restricted contacts through normal diplomatic channels to which only a very few officials would be privy, in order to maintain strict confidentiality.

—When George suggested that communication had to be a two-way street, and that more regular contact must be provided to Art Hartman in Moscow, Dobrynin merely shrugged.

Even though Dobrynin was unresponsive on the matter of Hartman's access, you should note that Gromyko did in fact receive Hartman on October 19, just before Hartman's departure for the U.S., and spent an hour and fifteen minutes with him. In that conversation, Gromyko argued that the Soviet leadership is convinced that you are not serious in your efforts to negotiate since you do not recognize the legitimacy of the Soviet Government and seek only to bring it down. Hartman responded vigorously to these allegations. While self-serving (in the sense that they are advanced to "explain" Soviet truculence), such ideas may in fact be held by some members of the Soviet leadership.⁵

Whether or not that is the case, however, I believe it is important to continue efforts to activate the dialogue, since our public diplomacy will be undermined if the Soviets can argue plausibly that we are unwilling to communicate with them.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (10/26/83-10/31/83). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Prepared by Matlock. A copy was sent to Bush. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. With the resignation of Clark, Reagan appointed his deputy, Robert "Bud" McFarlane to the position of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs on October 17.

² Tab A is printed as [Document 130](#). This meeting was on Friday, October 28.

³ See [footnote 2, Document 104](#). Telegram 291811 to Moscow, October 13, summarized a meeting between Dobrynin and Eagleburger in which they discussed this misunderstanding between Kampelman and Kondrashev.

(Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, US-Soviet-Diplomatic Contacts, (6/8))

⁴ See [Document 70](#).

⁵ See [Document 127](#).

132. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Soviet Efforts to Establish Contacts

I have been struck by the accumulating evidence that the Soviets may be attempting to establish an unofficial, confidential means of communicating with the White House. In recent weeks, several apparent attempts to send "messages" indirectly have occurred, and although all are possibly explicable in other ways (including attempts to sow deceptive information), I believe we should view them as possible parts of a pattern. The approaches known to me include:

—[1 line not declassified] (TAB A)²

—The two approaches last week by Soviet and Hungarian intelligence officers to a private American citizen (reports at TAB B).³

—The contact I had earlier this month with *Pravda* correspondent Sergei Vishnevsky (memcon supplied earlier).⁴

—An invitation to me for lunch by Soviet Minister-Counselor Isakov over two weeks ago (I told him I was too busy at the time, but would call if I could find time).

—The renewal of a long-standing invitation to Ty Cobb to visit Moscow as the guest of the USA Institute (repeated to an American visitor to Moscow following the KAL shoot-down).

—Repeated comments by Soviet officials to recent American visitors (e.g. Suzanne Massie)⁵ regarding the need for a better dialogue.

—Dobrynin's question to Shultz last Friday as to what the President meant when he proposed "confidential contacts" in his letter.⁶

Only the first of these probes included a specific appeal for an unofficial channel, but all would be typical of Soviet behavior if they were groping for one. [*1 ½ lines not declassified*], but the report indicates that the request was for a channel "between our two sides," which could imply one between governments. Indeed, unless there were further indications not mentioned in the report, I consider this the most likely interpretation.

I believe that, from the very beginning of the Reagan Administration, the Soviets have sought some means of communicating directly with the White House. There were several such probes when I was Chargé in Moscow in 1981, but they came to nothing—in some instances because we turned them off explicitly, on Secretary Haig's instructions. Later, of course, we had something of a dialogue going by the Kampelman-Kondrashev channel, but we blew the channel by discussing it elsewhere (Shultz to Dobrynin and Palmer to MFA in Moscow, along with briefings of Allies) so that its failure to achieve an arrangement regarding Shcharansky may have been, at least in part, our fault.⁷ (An implicit "ground rule" of these dialogues is that matters discussed in special channels are confined entirely to that

channel, unless there is mutual agreement to go elsewhere.)

The result of all of this is that the Soviets probably continue to feel the need of some means of totally frank and non-committal discussion of issues, but are frustrated over how to do it. All their attempts up to now have, in effect, blown up in their face, and sometimes become public knowledge. If this hunch is correct, then it may explain why they are confining most of their current probes to ambiguous and vague "messages." In addition, Shultz's answer to Dobrynin's direct question would not encourage them to think that we are amenable to establishing a private channel.

Can a Private Channel be Useful?

If it is handled properly, I believe it can. Principally because it permits a more direct input into and feedback from the Soviet decision-making process than are possible in formal exchanges. This flows from the nature of Soviet bureaucratic politics and the psychological mindset of the Soviet leaders.

—Though largely shielded from outside view, Soviet bureaucratic politics are enmeshed in a truly Byzantine maze. If a political leader wants to chart a new course on a key issue, he needs to have the ability to maneuver in the system which is denied him if proposals come through formal channels and evoke strong resistance from the outset from a powerful interest group.

—The Soviets are conditioned to disbelieve what is said publicly (*their* public statements are largely propagandistic, so they assume those of other countries are as well). They assume that we, like they, speak strictly in

private when we are really serious. And they are most likely to believe statements they receive through intelligence channels. [*3 lines not declassified*]

—We ourselves have great difficulty conducting a formal dialogue completely in private, because of leaks. And we face at least some of the same bureaucratic problems as they do in dealing with formal Soviet proposals.

Handling it Properly

There are of course dangers in such private and unofficial communication:

—They can be used as a weapon in bureaucratic in-fighting, to the detriment of policy cohesion and with the danger of creating damaging fissures in the Administration; and

—They can be misleading if relied upon for binding agreements.

However, I believe these dangers can be avoided if we make sure that those cabinet officers with direct responsibility for the matters discussed (that is, the Secretaries of State and Defense) are kept in the loop, and if we use such a channel to clarify attitudes in advance of formal agreements in regular channels, and not as a substitute for the latter.

The mechanics are important. Ideally, such a channel should not be maintained by the most senior officials, since what they say is hardly separable from the US official view, and it is important to be able to float, without attribution, ideas to obtain a reaction. Essentially, the interlocutors are instructed to tag the “messages” to indicate the degree of authority. If he presents something as his “personal idea,”

then this is a signal that we are willing to think about it but not yet willing to commit ourselves to it. If he says that he can convey something on specific authority, then—if the channel is working right—it means you've got a deal, and the question to be nailed down is how it is handled formally. (Unless it is self-executing—"when you do x, we will do y"—no deal should be considered definitive until it is in fact negotiated formally. But even then, the unofficial channel can be helpful in specifying procedures which minimize bureaucratic problems on both sides.)

From our point of view, it would be preferable to conduct the exchanges in Moscow, since we would probably get a more direct feel for Soviet attitudes that way. And it might be easier to control dissemination on our end. I did some thinking on the subject for Bill last August and attach (TAB C)⁸ my memo which describes one possible modality.

Is This the Time?

I think it is, since we need informal communication most during periods of tension. And unless we establish a channel and work it a bit, we cannot be confident of the status of "messages" when we really need frank communication (as during a possible crisis). The Kennedy Administration had great difficulty, for example, in assessing the value of the messages they were receiving through John Scali during the Cuban missile crisis.⁹ It turned out, of course, that they were in fact more accurate than the formal messages received from Khrushchev.

If the President decides he would like to have an unofficial channel, we should discuss the precise modalities and also how we go about setting it up. I suspect the Soviets feel that the ball is in our court at this point.

But whatever the decision is on this particular point, I believe we should take steps to activate the diplomatic dialogue in general. We lose nothing from talking privately (so long as we are reasonably careful about what we say), and refusal to do so only encourages a Soviet stonewall—and perhaps worse.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1983 (10/20/1983–11/07–1983); NLR-362-3-14-1-0. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Although undated, the memorandum was likely sent on November 3 or 4.

² Not printed. [*text not declassified*]

³ Not found attached.

⁴ See [Document 125](#).

⁵ Suzanne Massie, author of *Land of the Firebird: The Beauty of Old Russia*, a cultural history of tsarist Russia, traveled fairly regularly to the Soviet Union during the 1980s and had contact with various Soviet officials and Russians.

⁶ Dobrynin and Shultz met on October 28. See [Documents 130](#) and [131](#).

⁷ See [Document 75](#) and [footnote 3, Document 131](#).

⁸ Not found attached.

⁹ John Scali, an ABC News reporter, was used as a back channel during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. See [Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Documents 80](#) [85](#) [137](#) [195](#), and [197](#).

133. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, November 9, 1983, 1744Z

14070. Geneva for USINF, USSTART. Subject: Soviet Foreign Policy After a Year of Andropov. Ref: Moscow 12501.²

1. (C—Entire text).

2. This is one of two cables assessing Andropov's first year in office. A second examines his record on internal affairs.³

3. Summary: A year after Yuri Andropov's succession to the leadership of the USSR, expectations that Soviet foreign policy would be more moderate, dynamic or competent under his tutelage remain unfulfilled. The substance of Moscow's approach to the major issues today is not significantly different than during the last months of Brezhnev. But there have been differences of emphasis and style which, if Andropov remains in office, could have significant implications for his leadership, for the international situation in general, and for US-Soviet relations in particular.

4. Unlike Brezhnev, Andropov has limited his personal involvement in foreign policy almost exclusively to arms control. Even a purported "special interest" in Eastern Europe has failed to manifest itself in his first year. Andropov has proven to be a competent, sometimes original, spokesman on arms control issues, with a special flair for public relations. There is no evidence, however,

that he has sought to put his own stamp on Soviet arms control policy thus far.

5. Andropov's preoccupation with arms control has largely determined his approach to US-Soviet relations. He has shown no interest in improvements for their own sake and has resisted a dialogue on non-arms control issues. Instead he has sought to bring the US around to his arms control agenda by direct appeals to Western audiences and by encouraging perceptions in the West that the Kremlin has "written off" a Reagan administration unwilling to accept Soviet "legitimacy." Such complaints may reflect high-level preferences here to wait out the administration. But they are best viewed as tactical devices and do not in our view represent Andropov's last word. Once the INF drama is played out,⁴ the Soviets will have less reason than they have had over the last year to play hard to get, and sound reasons for moving toward engagement.

6. Andropov's focus on arms control has left Gromyko, with the help of a few experienced lieutenants, the Soviets' point man on regional issues. A major reorganization of the Soviet foreign policy apparatus, the subject of rumors last spring, has failed to materialize. The result has been drift and stagnation in Moscow's approach to the major international issues, and a year of few successes abroad.

7. The regional balance sheet shows genuine gains for Moscow only in the Middle East, but even these are qualified and tenuous. The Caribbean and Latin America are a decidedly mixed picture, particularly after Grenada. Sino-Soviet relations have not developed at the rate Moscow appears initially to have expected. The past year has brought a series of political reverses in Western Europe, which will culminate in the INF deployment. Ties with Japan and Iran are at recent lows. Moscow's approach

to the developing world has been timid and resource-constrained. Worst of all, Andropov in the KAL affair has conspicuously muffed his first major foreign policy crisis.

8. Such a record cannot be expected to put Andropov in political trouble (his health, of course, is another matter). The policies he has followed have been consensus policies. A victory on INF would put everything right. A Soviet defeat on INF deployments, however, cannot help but be a personal one for Andropov, given his personal involvement in the issue. While Andropov will not stand or fall on the outcome of the INF battle, in its wake the leadership may feel a need to improve upon what may by then be perceived as a lackluster foreign policy record. This could result in a more pragmatic and innovative approach than we have seen during Andropov's first year. Should Andropov's health continue to worsen, however, the months ahead could produce more of the "caretaker" approach we have seen thus far. Part of the reason for the unimaginative and essentially unsuccessful foreign policy year—in addition to personal health weakness—is more than likely that Andropov spent most of his energy on structural party matters and domestic policy. End summary.

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

Hartman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830658-0555. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to the Consulate in Leningrad, Beijing, Bonn, London, Paris, USNATO, USUN, Belgrade, Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Munich, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, Tokyo, and the Mission in Geneva.

² See [Document 122](#).

³ In telegram 14266 from Moscow, November 15, the Embassy provided an analysis of Soviet domestic politics, attempts at economic reforms, and ideological considerations. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830666-0872)

⁴ INF deployments to Western Europe were scheduled to begin on November 23, assuming an agreement could not be reached beforehand.

134. Article in the National Intelligence Daily¹

Washington, November 10, 1983

USSR-EAST GERMANY: Air Units Alerted *The Soviets have increased the alert level of their air units—including their strike forces in East Germany—in response to “Able Archer-83,” a NATO command post exercise.*² [*portion marking not declassified*]

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] the alert began on 2 November and is to continue through tomorrow, when the NATO exercise enters its concluding phase. Unit commanders were told that all measures were to be taken quietly under the guise of routine training. In line with this, command personnel have attended scheduled meetings and took part in the Bolshevik Revolution anniversary celebrations. [*portion marking not declassified*]

[*1 paragraph (8½ lines) not declassified*]

[*1 paragraph (2½ lines) not declassified*]

Comment: Soviet fighter units in East Germany have gone on increased alert in the past, both in response to NATO exercises and during Soviet holidays. This alert, however, is unusual in breadth and in involvement of strike units. The alert apparently has been confined primarily to Soviet air units, suggesting that the Soviets are using the NATO exercise to train these forces in achieving increased readiness and not because of an anticipated military move by the West [*portion marking not declassified*]

[*1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified*]

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 88T00528R: Policy Files (1982-1984), Box 1, Folder 1: VC/NIC Chron January-March 1984. Top Secret; [*codeword not declassified*].

² See [Document 135](#).

135. Editorial Note

In early November 1983, NATO forces in Europe conducted an annual, planned command and control exercise, codenamed Able Archer 83. During that fall, tensions in the U.S.-Soviet relationship had mounted, in particular after the downing of the KAL 007 airliner by the Soviet Union on August 31 and the NATO INF deployments to Western Europe loomed for the end of November. The Kremlin continued to protest the planned INF deployments by waging a propaganda war both in Western Europe and within the Soviet Union, as they covertly promoted the peace movement in Western Europe. This Soviet propaganda fostered a “war scare” mentality by claiming that a conflict might erupt if the missiles were installed in NATO countries. The bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut and the U.S. invasion of Grenada further heightened international tensions in late October.

Amidst the tense situation, the NATO Able Archer exercise began as planned on November 2. In a March 1984 report, the British Head Office summarized the exercise as follows: “Able Archer 83 which took place from 2-11 November was an annual command post exercise designed to practice NATO nuclear release procedures. It differed from previous exercises in the series in a number of ways which made it of considerable interest to the Soviet authorities. In 1983, the detailed NATO procedures and message formats used for the transition from conventional to nuclear war were substantially changed. The 1983 exercise featured increased emphasis on headquarters-to-subordinate-echelon messages. Unlike previous Able Archer scenarios, in which NATO forces remained at General Alert from the beginning of exercise play throughout the exercise, in 1983 there were pre-exercise communications which notionally

moved forces from normal readiness through various alert phases to General Alert. [*1 line not declassified*] The exercise also took place at a time when there was actually considerable political strain between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, shortly before the start of INF deployment in Western Europe. Able Archer 83 nevertheless remained entirely a Command Post Exercise, as in previous years.” (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Intelligence Reports [pre-1980, May 85–Jan 86])

While Soviet reactions to Able Archer later caused great debate, at the time of the exercise in early November, the Intelligence Community (IC) in the United States did not have a complete picture of the Soviet responses. After some reporting on Soviet anxieties began to emerge, which were more specifically related to the war scare and INF deployments, intelligence analysts and policymakers began contemplating how Soviet leadership perceived and reacted to Able Archer. As a result, in February 1990, during the George H.W. Bush administration, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) completed a study on “The Soviet ‘War Scare.’” (George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Subject Files; Reports to the President—War Scare Report 1990 [OA/ID CF01830–020]) The PFIAB reviewed intelligence, analysis, and information related to Able Archer and the Soviet war scare, examining what was known at the time and after the fact, and then wrote the following summary of Soviet responses to Able Archer in November 1983:

“Able Archer 83

“From 7–11 November, NATO conducted its annual command post exercise [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. This is a recurring event that includes NATO forces from

Turkey to England, and is routinely monitored by Soviet intelligence. Typical Soviet responses in the past have included increased intelligence collection and increased readiness levels at select military garrisons.

“The 1983 version of Able Archer, however, had some special wrinkles, which we believe probably fueled Soviet anxieties. NATO tested new procedures [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that emphasized command communications from headquarters to subordinate units. In addition, unlike previous scenarios wherein NATO forces remained at General Alert throughout, the 1983 plan featured pre-exercise communications that notionally moved forces from normal readiness, through various alert phases, to a General Alert.

“Soviet intelligence clearly had tip-offs to the exercise, and HUMINT elements underwent a major mobilization to collect against it. On 8 or 9 November, Moscow sent a circular telegram to KGB Residencies in Western Europe ordering them to report on the increased alert status of US military bases in Europe. Residencies were also instructed to check for indications [*less than 1 line not declassified*]; the London KGB Residency interpreted this as a sign of Moscow’s VRYAN concern. Similar messages to search for US military activity were received by GRU Residencies. [*footnote text not declassified*]

“Other Warsaw Pact intelligences services reacted strongly as well. [*1½ lines not declassified*] during the Able Archer time frame he had been, ‘particularly occupied trying to obtain information on a major NATO exercise . . .’ [*less than 1 line not declassified*] efforts were in response to a year-old, high-priority requirement from Moscow ‘to look for any indication that the United States was about to launch a

preemptive nuclear strike against the countries of the Warsaw Pact.’

“The Pact also launched an unprecedented technical collection foray against Able Archer 83. Beginning on November 1, Soviet, East German, Czechoslovak, and Polish [*less than 1 line not declassified*] units were tasked to concentrate on the exercise. [*1½ lines not declassified*] The Soviets also conducted over 36 intelligence flights, significantly more than in previous Able Archers. These included Soviet strategic and naval aviation missions over the Norwegian, North, Baltic, and Barents Sea—probably to determine whether US naval forces were deploying forward in support of Able Archer.

“Warsaw Pact military reactions to this particular exercise were also unparalleled in scale. This fact, together with the timing of their response, strongly suggests to us that Soviet military leaders may have been seriously concerned that the US would use Able Archer 83 as a cover for launching a real attack.

“The Soviets evidently believed the exercise would take place sometime between 3 and 11 November, but they initiated significant military preparations well in advance. [*7 lines not declassified*] Several days before the exercise actually began, the Soviets placed elements of at least two forward-based air armies on alert: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

“These alerts were highly unusual. Most notably, they probably involved [*less than 1 line not declassified*]—activity seen only during crisis periods in the past. Moreover, [*3½ lines not declassified*]

- Transporting nuclear weapons from storage sites to delivery units by helicopter.
- A ‘standdown,’ or suspension of all flight operations, from 4 to 10 November—with the exception of intelligence collection flights—probably to have available as many aircraft as possible for combat.
- Invoking a 30-minute, around-the-clock readiness time and assigning priority targets [*3½ lines not declassified*]
- [*1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified*]
- [*1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified*]

“Similar measures were taken by about a third of the Soviet Air Force units [*3½ lines not declassified*].

- [*1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified*]

[*4 paragraphs (17 lines) not declassified*]

“There were a number of other unusual Soviet military moves that, taken in the aggregate, also strongly suggest heightened concern:

[*7 paragraphs (19 lines) not declassified*]

“By November 11, the Soviet alert evidently was withdrawn. Flight training by Soviet Air Force units in East Germany returned to normal on the 11th [*1½ lines not declassified*].

“On the same day that Soviet forces returned to normal status, Marshal Ustinov delivered a speech in Moscow to a

group of high-ranking military officers that, in our view, offers a plausible explanation for the unusual Soviet reactions to Able Archer 83. Calling the US ‘reckless’ and ‘adventurist,’ and charging it was pushing the world toward ‘nuclear catastrophe,’ Ustinov implied that the Kremlin saw US military actions as sufficiently real to order an increase in Soviet combat readiness. Finally, possibly referring to the use of an exercise to launch a surprise attack, he warned that ‘no enemy intrigues will catch us unawares.’

“Ustinov also voiced his apparent conviction that the threat of war loomed heavy. Exhorting his forces, he declared that the international situation—‘the increased danger of an outbreak of a new world war’—called for extraordinary measures:

We must actively and persistently foster high vigilance and mobilize all servicemen both to increase combat readiness . . . and to strengthen military discipline.

“There is little doubt in our minds that the Soviets were originally worried by Able Archer; however, the depth of that concern is difficult to gauge. On one hand, it appears that at least some Soviet forces were preparing to preempt or counterattack a NATO strike launched under cover of Able Archer. Such apprehensions stemmed, in our view, from several factors:

- US-Soviet relations at the time were probably at their lowest ebb in 20 years. Indeed, the threat of war with the US was an ever-present media theme throughout the USSR, especially the armed forces.
- Yuriy Andropov, probably the only man in the Soviet Union who could authorize the use of nuclear

weapons at a moment's notice, was seriously ill and, in fact, may have been incapacitated.

- [*1½ lines not declassified*] Pact exercises to counter a NATO surprise attack always portrayed NATO 'jumping off' from a large training maneuver before reaching full combat readiness. Soviet doctrine and war plans have long posited such a scenario for a Warsaw Pact preemptive attack on NATO.

"On the other hand, the US intelligence community detected no evidence of large-scale Warsaw Pact preparations. Conventional thinking assumes that the Soviets would probably undertake such a mobilization and force buildup prior to a massive attack on NATO. The Board questions, however, whether we would indeed detect as many 'indicators' as we might expect, given, for example, Soviet improvements in communications security and procedures for secret mobilization.

"The 'mixed' Soviet reaction may, in fact, directly reflect the degree of uncertainty within the Soviet military and the Kremlin over US intentions. Although the Soviets usually have been able to make correct evaluations of US alerts, their increased number of intelligence reconnaissance flights and special telegrams to intelligence Residencies regarding possible US force mobilization, for example, suggests to us serious doubts about the true intent of Able Archer. To us, Soviet actions preceding and during the exercise appear to have been the logical steps to be taken in a period when suspicions were running high. Moreover, many of these steps were ordered to be made secretly to avoid detection by US intelligence. This suggests that Soviet forces were either preparing to launch a surprise preemptive attack (which never occurred) or making preparations that would allow them a minimum capability

to retaliate, but at the same time not provoke the attack they apparently feared. This situation could have been extremely dangerous if during the exercise—perhaps through a series of ill-timed coincidences or because of faulty intelligence—the Soviets had misperceived US actions as preparations for a real attack.” (PFIAB, pages 69-76)

Unlike the drafters of the 1990 PFIAB report, in November 1983 the IC did not have the benefit of hindsight, let alone the full range of evidence eventually collected through various sources and methods. While intelligence on the Soviet air alerts existed concurrent to and shortly after Able Archer 83 (see [Document 134](#)), it remains unclear who received this information and when. In reviewing the intelligence collected and reported during the exercise, the PFIAB paper stated: “This abnormal Soviet behavior to the annual, announced Able Archer 83 exercise sounded no alarm bells in the US Indications and Warning system. United States commanders on the scene were not aware of any pronounced superpower tension, and the Soviet activities were not seen in their totality until long after the exercise was over. For example, while the US detected a ‘heightened readiness’ among some Soviet air force divisions, the extent of the alert [*less than 1 line not declassified*] was not known until two weeks had passed after the completion of the exercise. The Soviet air force standdown had been in effect for nearly a week before [*less than 1 line not declassified*] aircraft were noted on air defense alert in East Germany.”

The PFIAB report continued: “There were plenty of reasons why the Soviet military response to Able Archer was missed; there was no context by which to judge behavior. First, Moscow’s ‘war scare’ activity was not yet the focus of intelligence or policy attention. Additionally, Soviet

intelligence requirements against the exercise, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] learned until long after the fact. Moreover, the air standdown was not at first perceived abnormally because it occurred during the Soviet Revolution holiday; about midway through the exercise, [*2½ lines not declassified*]. Despite late-developing information, the intelligence community evaluated the Soviet response as unusual but not militarily significant. Analysts reasoned that more indicators should have been detected if the Soviets were seriously concerned about a NATO attack.” (PFIAB, pages 8–9) Aside from the November 10 National Intelligence Daily, no documentation was found in the President’s Daily Briefs or other sources relaying to Reagan or other high-level policymakers information about this heightened Soviet alert status or possible Soviet anxieties over a first strike nuclear attack.

Reagan’s November 18 diary entry demonstrates some awareness of Soviet apprehensions, perhaps coincidentally or perhaps as the result of some verbal reporting or documentation that was not found. He met with George Shultz on both November 16 and November 18 to discuss “establishing a pipe line outside the bureaucracy for direct contact with Soviets.” On November 18, he wrote: “I feel the Soviets are so defense minded, so paranoid about being attacked that without being in any way soft on them we ought to tell them no one here has any intention of doing anything like that. What the h--l have they got that anyone would want.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 290)

What prompted Reagan to make these comments remains unclear.

For further discussion of Able Archer and the PFIAB report, see [Appendix A](#).

**136. Memorandum From the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane) to President Reagan¹**

Washington, November 16, 1983

SUBJECT

Discussion of Channels to the Soviets

Secretary Shultz has advised me that he intends to discuss alternative approaches for dealing with the Soviets during his meeting with you today at 1:30.²

This is an extremely complex, important and timely issue. Numerous analysts and observers returning from the Soviet Union in recent weeks have reported uniformly a high level of anxiety among Soviet leaders, and apparently sincere interest in communication, but a frustration at not knowing how to make it happen.³

You have persistently tried to arrange such an authoritative discreet channel. For various reasons the Soviets have not responded. Having observed successful⁴ efforts by three Administrations, I believe I may have something useful to offer both on the substance and mechanics of doing business with the Russians. Subject to your approval I would like to attend your session today with George.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Chronological File, Chron (Official) November 1983; NLR-362-6-10-5-7. Secret.

² According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan held a private afternoon meeting with Shultz on November 16

before an NSPG meeting. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) Reagan wrote in his diary: "Met with Geo. S. about establishing a pipe line outside the bureaucracy for direct contact with Soviets." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 198) ³ See [Document 132](#).

⁴ McFarlane inserted "and unsuccessful" in the margin.

137. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 18, 1983, 3-4:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

USSR Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Isakov, Minister-Counselor, USSR Embassy
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Lawrence S. Eagleburger

The Secretary began by indicating he wished to discuss several items of substance—items which would illustrate a problem which the Ambassador and the Secretary had talked about earlier, i.e. how we talk to each other.² *First* was the question of START. All arms control efforts are important, but START remains the centerpiece. For the United States, the underlying message in our build-down proposal is that we see, as do the Soviets, that if our negotiations are to go anywhere, we will have to come to grips with the fact that our systems are not identical; they are, in fact, of very unlike characteristics. If we are to get anywhere in our START negotiations it will be on the basis of a mutual recognition that a negotiated settlement will require agreement on appropriate tradeoffs between systems.

A START agreement, said the Secretary, must be comprehensive; if both sides are striving for equality, as we are, then we must arrive at a formula which will set forth “what equals what.” If the Soviets wish to discuss this issue with us in a conceptual framework, then the U.S. is prepared to enter into direct and private discussions free of the glare of publicity.

The *second* area the Secretary wished to discuss was the Middle East. This topic had been the subject of earlier

talks, including with Foreign Secretary Gromyko.

The Secretary said that as we survey the world situation, the most dangerous "flash point" is the Middle East. In particular, we must focus on Lebanon, plus the potential "offshoots" of the Iran-Iraq war.

With regard to Lebanon, the issues are extremely complex. The United States wishes to see Lebanon at peace internally, with all foreign forces out. Syrian interests in Lebanon are obvious; one only has to look at the map and be aware of history. The United States does not dispute that fact. If Lebanon is to be stable, it will have to find a political balance among warring groups. It is interesting to note that the recent reconciliation meeting which took place in Geneva is the first time that the various Lebanese groups have met together in many years; in fact, either the representatives who met in Geneva or their fathers (with the exception of Barri) are the people who put Lebanon together in the first place.

Continuing, the Secretary said that the warring parties must, as he had indicated, find a new balance of forces; through that balance Syrian influence will find its place. The U.S. objective is to see an independent Lebanon; we have no desire for a permanent U.S. presence in that country. At the same time, we do not believe Lebanon should be a base for attack on Israel; we do believe that Israeli interests in Lebanon will also have to be recognized. With that said, however, we believe strongly that Israel cannot, amongst outside powers, exercise exclusive influence on the Government of Lebanon.

With regard to the PLO, the Secretary frankly admitted that we do not at this point know precisely what is going on, but the situation is certainly a tense and dangerous one. King

Hussein has been very outspoken in his comments about the difficulty—of the PLO founders—of deciding who represents the interests of the Palestinian people. Many of our European friends are greatly concerned that Arafat will be “eliminated,” since he alone can speak for the Palestinian people.

Syria has developed substantial power, in great part thanks to the Soviets. This fact is now bringing about an Israeli counter reaction which can be dangerous. The Secretary said that he had absolutely no doubt that Israel is prepared to withdraw from Lebanon, and will do so under previously agreed conditions. But it is to be noted that there remain large numbers of Syrians and Palestinians in Lebanon, and the Israeli pendulum is now swinging back toward a more active role in the area. “Israeli passivity,” said the Secretary, “is ending.” It is important for both the Soviet Union and the United States to recognize that an aggressive Syria and an increasingly less passive Israel can create real dangers in the Middle East, an area where both the U.S. and the USSR have interests. This situation is, therefore, doubly dangerous.

The Secretary indicated that in these circumstances it is important that the reconciliation talks be encouraged, that all foreign forces withdraw from Lebanon as soon as possible, that Lebanon be rapidly removed as a potential source of conflict between East and West, and that the Soviets do what they can to influence the Syrians in the direction of caution. (The Secretary added that perhaps this was an effort the Soviets already had underway).

Item *three* on the Secretary’s agenda was to follow-up on the KAL 007 tragedy. We and the Soviets, said the Secretary, had a great deal to disagree about with regard to this issue. But the Secretary wished to highlight the fact

that there are steps available which would make it possible to avoid a repetition of this terrible event. Most important, would be if the Soviets were prepared to engage in an information exchange covering the area that Pacific flights now have to traverse between Alaska and Japan without those facilities so common on most other international routes. Technical solutions to this problem are available, solutions which would ensure greater safety of flight for international aircraft. The Secretary said he wished to call these facts to Ambassador Dobrynin's attention in the hope that perhaps the Soviet Union would be prepared to propose constructive solutions.

The Secretary then turned to the *fourth* item on his agenda, i.e., dialogue between the U.S. and the USSR. We have encountered problems in discussing a number of issues with the Soviet Union; gross misunderstandings on several questions have been extremely bothersome. The conversations in Madrid between Ambassador Kampelman and Mr. Kondrashov are an example. We thought an understanding had been reached between those two gentlemen on how to deal with a number of Soviet dissidents. Certainly it had been our opinion that we were in consultations with an authorized contact when we dealt with Mr. Kondrashov. Ambassador Dobrynin interrupted to say that the Soviets were not at fault, since Kampelman had been talking with the wrong man. The Secretary responded that, nevertheless, the Kampelman-Kondrashov conversations were representative of a problem which concerned us greatly.

The Secretary went on to say that we are now faced with a similar problem regarding INF. Ambassador Kvitziński had told Ambassador Nitze some days ago that if the U.S. were to make a proposal calling for the reduction of 572 Soviet missiles, to be matched by a decision on the part of the U.S.

not to deploy its INF missiles, it would be accepted by the Soviet Union. We have now learned that the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn has described this proposal to officials in the Bonn Government as a proposal emanating from Ambassador Nitze. We have been forced to comment publicly on this claim, emphasizing that Ambassador Nitze has made no such proposal. (At this point the Secretary gave Ambassador Dobrynin several documents, including a document handed over to the FRG by the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn).

In our view, said the Secretary, what the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn had done is a gross misuse of the so-called private channel. "How is it possible," the Secretary asked, "for us to conduct a dialogue with the Soviet Union if it acts in this manner?"

There are many other subjects we might discuss, the Secretary said, but he emphasized that he wished to stay with this narrow agenda because the issues are critical. The Secretary concluded by saying that he wished Ambassador Dobrynin to know that, on the basis of a Presidential decision, the USG was prepared to undertake with the Soviet Union a "no holds barred" discussion. The United States wishes the Soviets to understand that we are willing to talk together both through Ambassador Dobrynin here in Washington and through a dialogue with appropriate officials in Moscow. We want to talk to Foreign Secretary Gromyko, but there are also others in Moscow that we will want to talk with as well. Our access to appropriate people in Moscow must be assured. Ambassador Hartman must, of course, be fully involved. We will await suggestions from the Soviet side as to how these private discussions might be arranged and carried forward.

Ambassador Dobrynin asked whether there are any specific ideas that we believed should be discussed with the Soviets. This, said the Ambassador, will be important in deciding who should be involved in the discussions, since on specific issues it is often necessary to engage particular experts with knowledge of the subject.

The Secretary said that at the moment what we are interested in is the establishment of a process for dialogue which would make it possible for both sides to try to move our relationship forward. The Secretary indicated that for our part we would have a small group of people here in Washington prepared to work on the form and content of our private dialogue with the Soviets.

Dobrynin noted the Secretary's earlier comments on the Middle East and said "You are focusing on Lebanon, but why limit our talks exclusively to Lebanon?" Dobrynin indicated that the focus of such talks should be broadened to include the Middle East as a whole, a point to which the Secretary did not respond.

Dobrynin said that the Soviet position on the Middle East was well known, while that of the U.S. was less clear. Therefore, it would be wise to talk about the over-all Middle East picture. The Secretary indicated general agreement with this point, and then said that another issue worthy of discussion would be the Iran-Iraq war. Our views, he said, are not necessarily widely different from those of the Soviet Union.

Dobrynin agreed that Iran-Iraq was a possible subject for discussion and then said that the Soviet Union was, indeed, concerned about greater U.S. military involvement in Lebanon. "We appeal to you to use judgment and constraint on this question," said Dobrynin.

Turning to other subjects earlier discussed by the Secretary, Dobrynin said that with regard to remarks on the KAL issue, he would pass those comments to Moscow. At this point, he said, he had no knowledge of what the reaction there would be.

With regard to the Kampelman-Kondrashov conversations, as Dobrynin had earlier indicated, he was surprised when he heard some months ago what we believed had come from those talks. He sent a cable to Moscow, returned to Moscow himself shortly thereafter, and met with Kondrashov personally. Kondrashov gave a different story from that claimed by the Americans.

The Secretary said that after his earlier conversation with Dobrynin, when the Ambassador had indicated doubt about what had come from the Kampelman-Kondrashov talks,³ he had talked personally with Ambassador Kampelman. Kampelman then returned to Madrid and met with Kondrashov, who reaffirmed to him that he (Kondrashov) was speaking on "instructions from the highest authority."

Dobrynin said that Kondrashov told a different story in Moscow. According to Kondrashov, Kampelman came to him and indicated that Shcharanskiy, under Soviet law, would soon have the right to a pardon. Under these circumstances, Kampelman asked, would it be possible to expect a release of Shcharanskiy soon? According to Dobrynin, Kondrashov then checked with Moscow and told Kampelman that indeed it was correct that Shcharanskiy would soon be eligible for pardon. But, said Dobrynin, Kondrashov made no promise to Kampelman that Shcharanskiy would, in fact, be released. Dobrynin added that we must understand that someone of Kondrashov's rank in the Madrid Delegation would not be authorized to deal on issues of this sort without the involvement of the

head of the Delegation. We should have kept the Delegation chief informed of our conversations with Kondrashov.

Turning to the Nitze-Kvitzinski conversations, Dobrynin said that on November 3 Ambassador Nitze had approached Kvitzinski with a “Nitze idea.”⁴ Conversations had then taken place over a number of days between the two Ambassadors, with Nitze asking a number of questions of Kvitzinski. The Soviet Ambassador finally said to Nitze that were Nitze to put his proposal forward, with the authorization of the USG, the Soviet Union would be prepared in principle to accept it.

In fairness, Dobrynin said, Nitze had indicated when he initiated these conversations that he was not certain that the U.S. Government would accept his ideas. Nevertheless, the conversations continued over a number of days and Nitze asked a number of questions which led the Soviets to believe that he was acting under instructions from the U.S. Government. Dobrynin emphasized that he agreed that Nitze had never claimed that the U.S. Government endorsed his ideas, but nevertheless the Soviet Delegation believed that the U.S. Government must know what Nitze was doing because of the various questions he asked over a period of time. Each time, said Dobrynin, Nitze told Kvitzinski that he was reporting his conversations to Washington. Because of this, “over time we came to the impression that the exploration was going on on an official, instructed basis.” The Secretary again reminded Ambassador Dobrynin that the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn had handed over a document which represented the ideas put forward by Kvitzinski as proposals of the U.S. Government. The Secretary said you should be clear that this is *not* the position of the United States Government.

Ambassador Dobrynin said that might be true, but that he understood how Soviet authorities could come to the conclusion that this was a U.S. Government proposal. Nitze had told Kvitziński on several occasions that he had no answers from Washington, but he did say "I have received questions I would like you to answer." After a period of time Kvitziński had finally said to Nitze, "Look, I have answered your questions; it is now time for you to put the proposal forward as an official U.S. position. Under those circumstances I can tell you it will be acceptable to us."

The Secretary replied that Dobrynin's statement made it clear that the Soviet Government did not believe the proposal was an official U.S. position since Kvitziński had said that it was now time for Nitze to put it on the table as a U.S. proposal. "Our concern," said the Secretary, "is that your Ambassador has claimed this is an official U.S. Government proposal. It is not our proposal; we do not believe it is a good proposal."

The Secretary went on to say that his underlying message was that the United States is ready to have a dialogue with the Soviets on anything it might wish to discuss, so long as the U.S. is free to introduce anything into these discussions that it might wish. We should think about how to manage such a dialogue so that further misunderstandings do not take place.

Dobrynin asked whether Ambassador Nitze had reported to the Secretary that he was asking questions of the Soviets on the new proposal. The Secretary replied that Ambassador Nitze had reported that a new Soviet offer was emerging and finally reported that the Soviets had described their proposal and said that if it was put forward by the United States the Soviet Union would accept it. The Secretary added that it was not relevant at this point to

argue about who had introduced what; rather we were not happy about the claims the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn had made about U.S. responsibility for the proposal.

Dobrynin asked whether Nitze would receive instructions soon on how to reply to Kvitzinski. The Secretary replied that he would be receiving such instructions, but that the comments made today should give the Soviets a good idea of what our response will be.

Dobrynin then said that with regard to INF the U.S. had clearly made its choice; the Soviet Union now will have to make its decision in light of what the U.S. has decided to do.

The Secretary closed by saying that he would like to hear from Ambassador Dobrynin after his return from Moscow on whether the Soviet Union wishes to establish a channel for dialogue. We are prepared to proceed and await word from the Soviet Union. Dobrynin said he would put the proposal to his authorities in Moscow, but emphasized again that from the Soviet point of view INF was the most critical issue between our two countries.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, November 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Eagleburger; approved by Shultz on December 6. Shultz's approval is noted on another copy. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1983 Soviet Union Nov) A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. The surnames for Kondrashev and Kvitsinskiy are misspelled throughout the document. On the cover note from Eagleburger, Shultz wrote: "LSE, excellent summary."

² In his personal note for November 18, Dam wrote: “I also had a meeting with the Secretary in preparation for his meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin. The Soviets are going around town and in fact around the world saying that we don’t want to talk to them, but we are having difficulty getting them to talk in any serious way with us. They prefer to blame us for the lack of progress in the INF talks and pretend that this is some kind of a Reagan plot to refuse to talk to them. But the fact of the matter is that they continue to adhere to the proposition that they should have SS-20s in Europe and Asia, whereas there should be no NATO deployments whatever of medium-range weapons.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983)

³ See [Documents 130](#) and [131](#).

⁴ The only record found of a conversation between Nitze and Kvitsinskiy on November 3 was at a Soviet reception for the INF delegations in Geneva. Nitze recounted the discussion: “Was the emphasis in Kvitsinskiy’s proposal merely on the proposition that the reductions be equal or on a specific reduction on the U.S. side by 572 to zero, balanced by a reduction of 572 on the Soviet side? To give an example, supposing hypothetically that the U.S. was prepared to reduce by 472, would the Soviet side be prepared to reduce by 472? Kvitsinskiy thought about it for a minute and then said, ‘I don’t think so.’ Nitze responded that he did not mean to give Kvitsinskiy any false hopes. He did not think it would be satisfactory in Washington, either.” (Telegram 10230 from the Mission in Geneva, November 4; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830647-0676)

138. Notes of a Meeting¹

Washington, November 19, 1983, 7:30 a.m.

SMALL GROUP

Meeting of November 19, 1983

Present: The Vice President, The Secretary of State, Mr. Meese, Mr. McFarlane, and the following representatives of agencies: NSC: Matlock, Fortier; State: Dam, Eagleburger, Burt, Azrael; DOD: Thayer; CIA: Gates. (Gen. Scowcroft and Amb. Hartman were not in Washington.)

Two preliminary papers, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Next Twelve Months," and "Suggested Policy Framework" were distributed before and during breakfast.²

Secretary Shultz opened the meeting by going over the following topics:

Ground Rules: During a meeting with Shultz and McFarlane November 16, the President had directed that a small group be formed to work in complete confidentiality to review the state of our relations with the Soviet Union and to consider appropriate policy.³ Members had been chosen either because of their overall responsibility for developing U.S. policy, or their expertise and positions enabling them to request studies and information from their organizational units in the normal course of their duties. The group should not be mentioned to persons not members, although discussion among members is encouraged. Matlock would serve as executive secretary and would keep the sole copy of any papers developed by the group.

Related Study: Secretary Shultz had earlier requested Eagleburger and Bosworth to do a special study relevant to the group's interests. It seemed in pretty good shape and would be distributed to members soon for their consideration.⁴

Pattern of Relations with Soviets: In the spring we initiated a pattern of meetings: Shultz with Dobrynin and Hartman with Gromyko, and the President had met with Dobrynin once for two hours.⁵ He stressed his interest in the Pentecostals at that time, and their subsequent release was probably a result, although we are careful not to claim credit publicly. We went on to negotiate a grain agreement (which the Soviets are unlikely to give us credit for since they understand the domestic pressures here) and to start negotiations on bilateral matters such as consulates and an exchanges agreement. We had intended that the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Madrid would be the first in a series, with Gromyko coming here for meetings in New York and perhaps with the President in Washington, followed perhaps by a Shultz visit to Moscow. KAL had derailed these plans, and furthermore the Soviets seemed to have welched on a deal we thought we had for Shcharanskiy's release.

Recent meetings with Dobrynin: Shultz resumed meeting Dobrynin a couple of weeks ago,⁶ but the latter seemed uninstructed on any subject except INF. Two recent meetings by Hartman and Gromyko also seemed unproductive.⁷ At the meeting with Dobrynin yesterday (Nov. 18), attended by Eagleburger, Dobrynin seemed totally uninstructed.⁸

At that meeting, Shultz had told Dobrynin that we were willing to have a totally private dialogue. He mentioned our dismay in our experience with the Shcharanskiy deal and

also with the Soviet misrepresentation of our INF position to our allies. He asked if the Soviets were interested in discussing START conceptually, and stressed the explosiveness of the situation in the Middle East and the dangers of their involvement with the Syrians. Overall, his presentation was an attempt to stick to our agenda, by making it clear that arms control cannot be dealt with in isolation.

Mr. McFarlane pointed out that we can proceed on the foundation of three years of work by the Administration, during which we have been able to mend the disrepair in our defenses, get our economy moving again, and shore up the Alliance. Now we are in a position of strength in dealing with the Soviets.

Regarding the items on the agenda for the meeting, *Matlock* observed (1) that we probably cannot expect major adjustments in Soviet policy over the next 12 months because of the leadership situation in the Soviet Union and other factors such as INF deployments and the U.S. Presidential election; (2) that it is nevertheless important to convey, both publicly and privately, a clear message to the Soviets, since this could be a factor in the leadership struggle and could prepare for significant changes in 1985; and (3) that we must have a credible and consistent negotiating stance to ensure the sustainability of our policies with our public and with our allies. He noted the paper headed "Suggested Policy Framework" as an initial attempt to articulate our policy.

The Vice President observed that there is a public perception that we are not communicating with the Soviets, and this makes the public uneasy. There is a need to convince the public that we are in fact in communication.

Eagleburger observed that our dialogue is like ships passing in the night. We must get into more discussion of fundamental questions. We should structure the discussions so that we are conveying to them clearly our views on various important issues such as the Middle East and Cuba in some detail. He recalled that studies had been done sometime back of the view from Moscow and the view from Washington, in order to get a feel for the difference in perspectives, and wondered whether it might not be useful to commission updated studies on these topics at this time.

Secretary Shultz agreed on the need for discussing regional issues with the Soviets and noted that this does not mean formal negotiations or formal consultation.

McFarlane observed that the Soviets are facing an abrupt change in their expectations. Their expectation of a decline in the West has been dashed. They have not decided how to react to this and are uncertain regarding our global intentions.

Burt noted that the past year has been a difficult one for the Soviets. The INF deployments will put great strain on the relationship, but further out there may be opportunities. The Soviets have painted themselves in a corner to a degree that it may be impossible for them to do business for a while.

Secretary Shultz observed that we should turn around the Soviet charge that they cannot do business with the Reagan Administration, by pointing out that in fact we cannot do business with them.

Burt suggested that we (a) state a willingness to engage in a dialogue on the issues; (b) point out to them that START has the greatest potential if the Soviets are willing to bite;

(c) consider discussions of regional issues as a form of pre-crisis management; and (d) examine the possibilities of trade-offs, since the Soviets have more interest in some issues and we in others.

Dam agreed that we should look for tradeoffs in the bilateral area.

Matlock pointed out that we need to make a basic decision whether to continue the suspension of negotiations on bilateral issues because of KAL or whether to proceed at some point, and under what conditions.

Secretary Shultz noted that he had suggested to Dobrynin yesterday that, even if the Soviets were unwilling to pay compensation, they could easily cooperate in providing navigation assistance to planes flying the route in order to avert tragedies in the future.

Gates observed that the prospects for an improvement in US-Soviet relations are dismal over the next 12 months. The Soviets must turn inward and look at their succession problem. It will be hard for them to react to new initiatives. Furthermore, any initiatives from us will be seen in the context of election-year politics. The question is really how to use the next year to put down building blocks for the second term. Indeed, the election of the President to a second term will convey an important message, that the U.S. has recovered from the vacillations of the recent past and is on a steady course. Thus, we need to convey our views for the role they can plan in the Soviet succession and in order to establish a basis for 1985.

Meese pointed out some of the political factors involved: many are criticizing the President for excessive rhetoric and for not being serious about negotiation, while the right

feels he has not taken enough punitive action, and indeed would like a policy based on the “missing elements” in the paper suggesting a policy framework. We thus need to articulate our policy more clearly and develop a unique Reagan Administration view.

Azrael observed (1) that there were some areas where we might desire to “push” the Soviets, and that this could cause complications in relations, and (2) that at some point we must come to grips with the fact that some proposals are non-negotiable from the Soviet point of view.

Burt predicted that the Soviets would not come back to the INF talks as such. A continuation will have to take another form. We must consider what sort of forum we should seek.

Secretary Shultz noted that we need an authoritative statement, and that work had been done on a speech. It could be by the President, or he could make it. But we need a clear public statement of our policy to build on.

Eagleburger pointed out that the Soviets could be dangerous when they are in trouble and there is uncertainty in their leadership. We must keep that in mind and take steps to reduce the potential for miscalculation.

The meeting ended at approximately 9:30.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, [Saturday Group Notes] (November–December 1983). No classification marking. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s Dining Room at the Department of State. In his book, Matlock explained the origin of the small group meetings: “Despite his impatience to get relations with Moscow on a constructive track, Reagan did not seem to be

focusing on the substantive issues. Decisions were stalled by squabbles among the various agencies. Shultz noticed this, of course, and tried to break the logjam within the administration by starting a series of Saturday breakfasts for senior officials. Shultz and McFarlane asked me to organize the meetings and act as executive secretary. They wanted to make sure that all the participants could be seated around a single table in a dining room on the eighth floor of the State Department. They also insisted that the fact of the meetings, as well as the content of the discussions, be kept confidential.” (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, p. 75)

² Attached but not printed.

³ See [Document 136](#). Reagan also met with Shultz on November 18 before that morning’s NSPG meeting. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) In his diary entry, Reagan wrote: “George Shultz & I had a talk mainly about setting up a little in house group of experts on the Soviet U. to help us in setting up some channels. I feel the Soviets are so defense minded, so paranoid about being attacked that without being in any way soft on them we ought to tell them no one here has any intention of doing anything like that. What the h--l have they got that anyone would want.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 290)

⁴ See [Document 139](#). It is unclear when it was distributed to the group members.

⁵ See [Documents 10](#) and [11](#).

⁶ See [Documents 129](#), [130](#), and [131](#).

⁷ See [Document 127](#).

⁸ See [Document 137](#).

139. Action Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, November 22, 1983

SUBJECT

Soviet Client Relationships

It has become very clear that Soviet ties with some key Third World clients are creating potential US policy opportunities. The dissatisfaction that frequently marks both sides of such relationships is the result not only of Soviet resource constraints, but of increased respect for our military strength, political resolve, and readiness to compete. Grenada reinforced this trend,² but it has been evident as well in the Soviet approach to a series of other involvements—toward Syria and the PLO, toward Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Salvadoran rebels.

This combination of Soviet hesitation and US activism could set the stage for real breakthroughs, indeed for some of the most important diplomatic accomplishments of this Administration. Because clients play such a crucial role in Moscow's global policy, loosening their connections with the Soviet bloc would help us to deal with specific regional crises. More importantly, progress in even one or two cases could reinforce the perceptions of a marked shift in what the Soviets call the global "correlation of forces." The snowball effect on both allies and our adversaries, in many regions, could be highly beneficial to our interests.

Given these stakes, US policy should give high priority to weakening Soviet client relationships in the Third World, particularly to those supported by a Cuban military

presence. Not all such ties are in equal jeopardy, and no all-out US offensive would be likely to succeed. But we believe almost all such relationships deserve close monitoring and some deserve a significantly greater effort than we have made to date. With your approval, an *ad hoc* interagency task force will begin immediately to explore possible next steps.

I. *Overview*

Our informal review of this problem suggests a series of general conclusions, followed by analyses of specific openings:

1. While Soviet clients should be a collective focus of US strategy, we clearly need individual approaches tailored to each client. Our prospects for success will be best where we have carefully prepared the ground beforehand.
2. Our near-term opportunities are likely to call for a mix of political and economic rather than military measures. The states on which we focus should understand both the potential benefits of cooperation, as well as the likely costs of continuing to challenge us.
3. Our policy should aim to exacerbate disagreements and suspicions among the Soviets, Cubans, and other clients. Communication with all three should be managed with an eye to setting them against each other where possible, thereby increasing our own leverage. Because we now lack a channel to (not to speak of full diplomatic relations with) some of these actors, we may be able to find—or create—openings merely by resuming communication.
4. Progress in relations should usually depend on tangible movement away from Moscow or Havana, with particular

emphasis on reductions in the Cuban presence. If “improved” US relations with Soviet clients don’t bring changes in their behavior, then our policies may only alarm friendly neighboring states, drain our resources and leave us vulnerable to the charge that our approach is purely atmospheric. With many *real* friends in trouble, we can’t afford such “successes.”

5. We and our allies will often disagree on how to exploit openings with Soviet clients. Our allies tend to see “improved relations” with these states as intrinsically good and this can help Soviet clients to avoid the stricter criteria we would apply. An allied presence in a country with which we have poor relations can sometimes help to keep a Western option alive. But in general we should try to hold our allies to a standard of concrete “results”, to keep them from playing all our trump cards (such as aid and trade concessions) too soon.

6. The harm done by unsuccessful initiatives toward Soviet clients could be just as great as the gains. An effort that misfires, for example, could squander the new momentum of our policy. If a US effort merely alerts the Soviets or Cubans to a challenge without limiting their options, we are likely to fail. An approach that targets Soviet clients also risks stimulating retaliation against our own allies. Finally, if we alarm a Soviet client state without showing it an alternative, it may simply move closer to Moscow.

II. *Cases*

What follows is not an action plan but a general policy approach toward specific Soviet clients where we see accelerating movement and some rethinking about the value of Soviet bloc connections:

—Mozambique and Ethiopia appear to present the most serious opportunities for progress; of the two, Mozambique seems ready to move, while Ethiopia is the bigger strategic prize.

—Angola and Nicaragua, each embroiled in a major regional crisis, are harder nuts to crack; yet both show concern over US intentions, which we may be able to exploit.

—Initiatives in some lesser cases are considered for the extra weight they could lend to a US offensive.

—Hard-core cases like Afghanistan and Vietnam are also reviewed; here, increased leverage may be called for. (We do not examine Syria, while recognizing that it may present the most dangerous dilemmas—for both superpowers—of any Soviet client.)

—Finally, the paper discusses how to incorporate US policy toward Soviet clients into our dialogue with Moscow.

1. *Southern Africa*

We should consider an intensified US policy effort in Mozambique and Angola. New progress with Mozambique at this time could eventually help us gain a breakthrough on Angola and Namibia. Even without a Namibia settlement, we may be able to draw Mozambique out of the Soviet orbit at low cost.

Mozambique

In a very successful meeting this month with US officials, Machel³ indicated 1) interest in a mutual stand-down with

South Africa, 2) readiness to push Angola to address our concerns in the Namibia process, and 3) a need for both economic and—notably—security assistance. He has also sought aid in travels to Western Europe, but so far only a little British and Portuguese help seems likely. Machel's hopes for broader Western economic help include bids for IMF and IBRD membership.

Given this background, we would like to move relations forward, but the legal and congressional obstacles are great. Mozambique is ineligible for aid under the 1980 Foreign Assistance Act and probably can't pay for weapons. We will offer some food aid, but legal restrictions bar the use of ESF already budgeted for the southern African region.

Only a reduced Cuban connection would enable us to surmount these obstacles for long and we should begin addressing this more explicitly with Machel. (The feasibility of non-interference understandings with the SAG could depend on such progress in any event.) If he acts on Cuba, we can also press for significantly increased Allied involvement. The main point, even if resources are available, is that continuing US support depends on concrete steps by Maputo; reversals, particularly after we have made the effort to get aid, would undercut our broader effort. (The Portuguese attitude is promising here: Soares⁴ has told Machel that Portuguese advisers cannot train his army in Mozambique alongside Soviet bloc personnel.)

Angola

Our communication with Angola has been interrupted of late, and the Namibia effort is stalled. The civil war has

also entered a new, more active phase: Savimbi⁵ remains unable to take Luanda, but there have been steady UNITA successes, an MPLA counteroffensive, and now a new UNITA front in response. Soviet military aid is increasing, and some Cuban troops may be moving from Ethiopia to Angola. Despite acute Angolan needs, Soviet economic aid has *not* increased.

As the situation on the ground worsens, Angolan dependence on the Cubans (and on Moscow) increases. Yet Soviet bloc help has not solved the MPLA's problems and it probably now fears that a breakdown in the Namibia process would significantly widen the civil war with UNITA and increase SAG involvement. For the MPLA, the prospect of a second Reagan term only makes this picture more ominous. This may then be the moment to increase our pressure—indicating, if we are prepared to follow through, that our patience is thin. For maximum effect, we would want all our inducements on the table too. Recognition, as we have always understood, is one card that could move the process forward; until we see whether movement is possible, however, it should be held in reserve. (Section VI below discusses the Soviet side of this problem.)

In sum, toward both Mozambique and Angola we are working with largely the same tools as in the past, although they are made more weighty by each state's growing security and economic problems. It may be that our instruments can now best be brought together at a higher level than we have been using (i.e., perhaps an under secretary level mission). The extensive preparation that has gone into both these efforts has produced real results, but more difficult decisions lie ahead on all sides and higher-level involvement may be needed.

2. *Central America*

No state feels more directly jeopardized after Grenada than Nicaragua, which has itself been explicitly menaced this year by the presence of nearby US forces. To be sure, Sandinista anxiety could lead to increased dependence on the Soviet bloc and even to retaliation against neighbors friendly to us. But for now the evidence suggests that the Grenada effect has made Nicaragua more, not less cautious and perhaps also more receptive to an understanding with the US. Both recent intelligence and Castro's own statements further indicate the limits of Cuban willingness to assist them; this should deepen internal divisions within the leadership, a trend that is the most plausible route to the internal changes we desire.

To this end, we could augment our current strategy of support for the *contras* and regional negotiations by creating the appearance of a separate channel with Cuba. This would arouse fears in Managua of an accommodation at its expense: we want the Nicaraguans to think that if the Cubans are going to leave, they—not Castro—should gain the key concessions from us. (This channel would be largely cosmetic; we would avoid publicity, but ensure that the Sandinistas find out. It would be most effective if Castro initiated the talks but this is not essential: Grenada allows us to talk to him at little risk to our credibility with our friends in the region. And, as noted later, it can be used against Castro himself by opening discussions at the next level up, with Moscow.)

Even if Grenada strengthens our hand, this will be a tortuous process. Nicaragua will certainly increase its own efforts to deflate pressures on them before committing themselves to any of our conditions, such as withdrawal of a Cuban presence. One Cuban and Nicaraguan gambit

(which may already be in use) to get us to ease up will be to disseminate claims that their activities in Central America are being phased out. To the extent this is just a tactic, our own rhetorical emphasis may have to shift, from the (hard to verify) aid flow to other insurgencies, to internal repression and the continuing Cuban presence in Nicaragua. In particular, the issue of repression should be more prominent on the regional negotiating agenda; this issue has cost the Sandinistas some European support and may do the same in Mexico.

As for carrots, the Kissinger Commission will soon make public a set of ideas for economic assistance to the region after a settlement.⁶ The Commission's report should create a real prospect that the Sandinistas, by meeting our concerns, can tap a large pool of Western resources.

To increase the credibility of this aid, we want to show that changes of course are rewarded. Given Suriname's new (if tentative) direction, a small effort—probably in the economic area—is advisable. If Bouterse⁷ holds to his course, we should expect to follow up next year with a comparable step. Coordination with the Dutch and Brazilians is essential here.

3. The Horn and South Arabia

Ethiopia's strategic significance—based on location, cooperation with South Yemen and Libya, the Cuban troop presence—makes it an extremely large prize. Yet we have given Ethiopia and South Yemen much less priority than other states with a Cuban presence. There is now plainly some flux in each one's relations with both Cuba and the Soviet Union, reflecting internal strains and leadership divisions; we want to exploit these if possible. Progress

with either Ethiopia or PDRY can help with the other and with weakening Libya's capacity for mischief.

Ethiopia

In the past year Mengistu⁸ has followed a confusing course. First, apparent probes toward the West were suddenly aborted in favor of renewed Soviet ties. Then his cancelled trip to Moscow preceded the most interesting development of all: the recent departure of Cuban troops, reportedly at Ethiopian initiative.

Exploiting this opportunity involves major uncertainties. We are not sure how strong the ideological orientation of Mengistu and the top leaders is, and whether US efforts to improve relations have a chance while they are in place. Nor do we know how influential a residual Cuban presence would be, even if the bulk of the force departs for Angola or home.

Nevertheless the potential opening here is too large to ignore. We need to examine steps that can build on evident Ethiopian interest in reviving economic, cultural, and other contacts, while opening a channel in which to push for complete Cuban withdrawal. We would hardly come to such a dialogue without cards. Our ties with Somalia will, for example, be of extreme interest in Addis now, as Cuban forces begin to withdraw. And, although there are powerful reasons not to use it, we have potential leverage in the possibility of assistance to the Eritrean and Tigrean insurgencies (and perhaps more importantly, in our influence with their regional patrons, like the Sudan).

Outside the UNGA, we have had only middle-level contact with Ethiopia. At the right moment, a mission, even at

Assistant Secretary level would have more than the usual impact. It would also provide us with a sense of the real possibilities that we can get in no other way.

South Yemen

Despite his treaty ties with Ethiopia and Libya, and despite a Soviet base and Cuban troops, PDRY's President has been pursuing a Western opening for over a year. He is improving relations with pro-Western neighbors (e.g., ending PDRY's support of insurgents in Oman, reducing it in North Yemen). Yet his position remains vulnerable, since his predecessor now lives in waiting in Moscow. As a result, he would have to weigh carefully any Western initiative for its effect on his personal safety. The Saudis have the principal immediate stake here; and, coordinating closely with them, we might explore what could be achieved by resuming diplomatic relations and offering some (small) amount of aid. Given the importance to the Soviets of the Aden naval base, they are likely to make a major effort to preserve their access. Our best hope, therefore, may be in starting smaller, with the withdrawal of Cuban technical and military support as our first target. The Saudis in particular should have great interest in removing this presence as tensions around the Gulf keep rising.

4. The Hard Core

Despite its softness at the edges, we cannot forget that the Soviet empire has a hard core of states with whom we will not be able to do business. The reasons may vary from unbreakable Soviet control to irreconcilable hostility toward us, but we should be very clear to ourselves, our friends, and our public that an intense focus on Soviet clients does not mean that we expect to improve relations

with all of them. On the contrary, our policy toward the hard cases will continue to be built primarily around “sticks” and other pressures. This is what we mean, in another context, by differentiation. Globally, just as in Eastern Europe, our policy will gain clarity—and support—on the basis of whom it *excludes*, as well as for whom it includes.

Insisting on differentiation will be particularly important in two respects to the broad policy we are outlining here.

—First, those clients over whom the Soviets have most control (or whose conflicts with us are greatest) will be the ones from whom we are most likely to see efforts at retaliation, to knock us off our stride. Libya in Chad is one such possibility; and Cuba in Central America and the Caribbean is another. (East Germany and Czechoslovakia, in a very different sense, will have such a role in INF.)

—Second, working with allies is difficult enough without seeming to revise our policy toward Soviet clients across the board. Pakistan and ASEAN, for example, should have no doubt of our support for them on Afghanistan and Kampuchea. In general, as we focus on drawing Soviet clients toward us, we should also take a reading of our pressures on the hard core.

With these cautions in mind, we may find that some extremely limited steps with the hard cases can serve our interests. Upgraded diplomatic contacts, for example, can be considered in two cases where little immediate payoff is foreseeable. Apart from symbolically broadening the scope of a US offensive, they are of interest for their place on the Sino-Soviet agenda:

—*Mongolia*. Diplomatic recognition of Mongolia was last discussed with Ulan Bator in the Carter years; though it might well be vetoed again by the Soviet Union, a renewed effort has some advantages. Even if unsuccessful, it would demonstrate (once leaked) Soviet rigidity and defensiveness. If successful, we would gain a valuable observation post in the Soviet Far East, important given Mongolia's place in Sino-Soviet security talks.

—*Laos*. Here, despite Vietnamese dominion, we already have a diplomatic mission in place. If the Lao are ready to cooperate with us on issues like locating MIA remains, etc., we could install a resident Ambassador—like Mongolia, a valuable observation post in a key area where our information is scanty now.

III. *Communicating with Our Adversaries*

The strategy described in this paper deals *indirectly* with problems created by the expanded Soviet and Cuban global presence of the past decade. We believe a channel to both Moscow and Havana could strengthen the approach.

The Soviet Union

Unlike the Middle East, a US offensive that focuses above all on getting new movement in southern Africa, or even in Central America, poses little danger of US-Soviet military confrontation. Communication with the Soviets—if only to clarify each side's "red lines"—is not therefore critical to such an effort. It can even have certain drawbacks, for our diplomatic opportunities often stem from the desires of states in a region precisely to *distance* themselves from the Soviets and Cubans.

Nevertheless, structuring a dialogue with the Soviets around geopolitical themes would have these advantages:

—Although early progress on other issues, especially arms control, is unlikely, we could hope to remove some important obstacles that might bar broader progress later, when opportunities reappear. We want the Soviets, in particular, to understand the large long-term problem that Soviet-Cuban activities represent.

—Several key clients will worry that a Soviet-American dialogue is likely to be at their expense; this worry could advance our own efforts.

—Finally, the Soviet ability to undercut US efforts has to be respected, and a dialogue may have use in limiting Soviet efforts to thwart us—by creating the illusion of participation, and preventing worst-case Soviet assessments of our goals. Our southern African strategy has, for example, assumed from the start that we had to manage the Soviet angle; we have, therefore, envisioned *some* participation by Moscow, hopefully too late to do much damage. Actively exploiting Soviet difficulties with clients will not undo this requirement.

Cuba

A channel to Cuba would have less long-term utility than discussions with the Soviets. Given Cuban anxieties at this time, however, and the obvious Nicaraguan fear of abandonment by all patrons, a limited dialogue with Castro might pay real tactical benefits.

If you agree with this general approach, I believe the next step would be to assemble a small *ad hoc* task force under Larry's direction, to elaborate whether and how to proceed

on specific countries. With your approval, the group would be led by S/P and modeled after the interagency group of officials that worked on the “global instability” paper. The task force would be supported, as appropriate, by expertise from State regional bureaus.

Recommendation

That you authorize S/P to assemble a small *ad hoc* interagency task force under Larry’s supervision to follow up on this paper with specific recommendations for initiatives toward the countries discussed above.⁹

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 11/16-30/83. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Sestanovich; cleared by Azrael and Kaplan. Forwarded through Eagleburger, who wrote in the margin: “G.S.: This is very much worth reading. LSE.” A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. McKinley’s handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on November 22, and Hill’s handwritten initials are in the upper-right corner, indicating he saw it on November 28.

² See [Document 128](#).

³ Samora Machel, President of Mozambique.

⁴ Mario Soares, Prime Minister of Portugal.

⁵ Jonas Savimbi, President of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

⁶ The Kissinger Commission, formally the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, was a 12-member group established by President Reagan in 1983 to

review the administration's approach to Central America. See [footnote 15, Document 159](#).

⁷ Dési Bouterse, leader of the Revolutionary Front and de facto military dictator in Suriname.

⁸ Mengistu Haile Mariam, Ethiopian Head of State.

⁹ Shultz initialed his approval of the recommendation for this task force and wrote: "but I'd like to discuss with you and Larry at outset. G."

140. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, November 22, 1983

SUBJECT

Soviet Leadership Uncertainties and U.S. Soviet Policy

Whether or not Andropov reappears in the next few weeks, the leadership context in Moscow will be different from what it was before the Revolution Day festivities he missed.² At a minimum, he is politically weakened. At a maximum, a new leadership could be announced at an early Central Committee special plenum—conceivably the reason for Dobrynin's trip to Moscow. This paper looks at the various leadership configurations which could emerge. And, in the knowledge that we cannot completely understand political developments within the Kremlin, we recommend a policy approach designed to get our message across to whomever is in power there.

The Political Cost of Physical Weakness

Andropov may return soon to public view, as *Izvestiya* editor Tolkunov and others have predicted. The snap Central Committee meeting Dobrynin and other CC members posted as ambassador abroad evidently have been called back for could provide the stage for his reemergence. Or it could register the emergence of a new leadership.

If Andropov is physically able, he has the political capacity to recoup some of the cost he has paid by visibly taking charge and imparting new vigor to the conduct of affairs. But by showing unmistakably that he is gravely ill, he has made it impossible to recoup the whole cost. Given the enormous inertia of the Soviet system, it takes a powerful and feared political leader to generate change among the thousands within the Soviet elite. Those thousands will now be hanging back, watching for the next leadership phase, before taking any risks.

Speeding Up the Succession Timetable

Renewed maneuvering for the succession is practically certain, if it has not already begun. Up to now, we have been projecting something like a two-stage succession. In the first stage, oldsters of the Brezhnev generation gathered around Andropov would be in charge for 3-5 years, and would gradually bring men in their 60's and 50's into the leadership. In the second stage, the younger people would take over. We need to revise that projection. Oldsters and "youngsters" are mixed together in leadership positions, as individuals with their own clienteles, right now. It is no longer clear that the younger generation will have to wait 3-5 years to take over completely.

The Players

When Brezhnev died a year ago, there were enough members of the Brezhnev generation available in the leadership for us to predict very substantial policy continuity. This is no longer so true. While Defense Minister Ustinov (75) and ex-Brezhnev protégé Chernenko (72) are still around, potentially strong candidates for the top spot now also include such "younger" figures as Romanov (60)

and Gorbachev (52). As dark horses, in addition to Moscow party boss Grishin (69), we now have First Deputy Premier Aliyev (60). And, as a “possible” somewhere between generations, there is Ukrainian party boss Shcherbitskiy, at 65.

In terms of the system’s traditions, the inside tracks must go to the only three men beside Andropov who are party secretaries as well as full (voting) Politburo members: Chernenko, Gorbachev and Romanov. Each has a chance, but each also has liabilities as a contender for the top spot.

—*Gorbachev* has been clearly favored by Andropov and has been steadily accumulating new portfolios. The fact that he has twenty political years ahead of him could be a positive asset after recent experience with a slowly declining Brezhnev and a sick Andropov. But the prospect of two whole decades of Gorbachev could also make his colleagues wary. He is junior in both age and experience, and his strong suit has been in agriculture rather than the key military-industrial management sector.

—*Romanov* earned a good reputation in that sector in Leningrad, but has not been in Moscow long, and he brought with him a harmful reputation for roughness, naked ambition and shifting cadres around.

—*Chernenko*, finally, could be a relatively nonthreatening, temporary candidate, but he is ill, and has not succeeded in building a political base of his own, especially in the military-industrial apparatus, from his starting point as Brezhnev’s bag-man and paper-pusher.

The dark horses also have liabilities as well as strengths. Given his base in the military and his competence, *Ustinov* is an attractive caretaker candidate. But although he is no

more a career military man than Andropov was a career KGB man, picking Ustinov as head of the party could create the unwelcome appearance of another Jaruzelski-type military takeover of the party, this time in the “first country of socialism.” Furthermore, Ustinov’s health is not good. Neither is *Grishin’s*, and despite his strong Moscow base, Grishin is apparently not part of the “Andropov coalition.” *Shcherbitskiy* has not been strong enough to parlay his late support for Andropov in 1982 into the move from Kiev to Moscow which he has long sought; he remains a provincial. *Aliyev* has moved to Moscow, but his comparable switches over the years may have encouraged positive mistrust which counterbalances his recognized managerial abilities. In any case, his non-Slavic origin and reputation for ruthlessness are disabilities from the outset.

Thus, the data we have do not allow us to identify a frontrunner. Similarly, positive intelligence has not been—and will not be—much help in predicting personnel and policy outcomes in specific terms. Yet we must still try to shape a policy that fits whatever the Soviets serve up. We must therefore engage in some informed speculation, using the best data we have, on what is old and what is new on the Soviet leadership scene, and where we should be.

Two Possible Patterns

In general terms there are two different leadership patterns which could emerge.

1. *An Amalgam of Old and New.* We already are facing a composite leadership, with both the Brezhnev generation and the “younger” men influential, and a gradual transition taking place. This could continue for some years with or without Andropov. Ustinov and Gromyko provide ample

experience and continuity in the national security/foreign affairs area even if Andropov leaves the scene.

2. *A Clean Generational Break.* It is also possible that the leadership will decide that it was a mistake to have chosen such an old and weak-from-the-start Andropov, especially after years of a declining Brezhnev. They may conclude that the Soviet Union has been seriously handicapped by a leader unable to play a vigorous role domestically or to travel and act strongly on the international scene. This could lead to selection of a younger General Secretary of the Party like Gorbachev or Romanov, perhaps constraining him initially by withholding the other two key titles— President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and Chairman of the Defense Council. It is striking that none of the leading contenders in this next generation has any direct experience in the foreign and security affairs field. On the other hand they will inherit staffs in the Central Committee, General Staff, KGB and Foreign Ministry which are increasingly sophisticated and skilled in this area.

Under either of these scenarios, there is likely to be substantial continuity in Soviet policy over the next 6–12 months. With Andropov weakened or gone, there will be increased preoccupation with the internal struggle for power. Even if a “younger” leadership should emerge, their inexperience in foreign and national security affairs is likely to make them less confident and more cautious at least initially. They also may decide to wait until the U.S. elections before taking new initiatives or engaging in new adventures.

While we believe it is less likely, we cannot rule out a more activist approach. Andropov focussed heavily on the domestic scene because that was where his power base needed building and because the problems were greatest

there. But the industrial and agricultural upturn in 1983 eases the internal situation somewhat. The external setbacks the Soviets have suffered recently, particularly INF deployments, could argue for greater leadership focus on national security and foreign affairs.

Moreover, the newer, younger contenders for the top slot will be tempted to put their own stamp on policy, to use their (relative) vigor to prove their prowess; and they may be less willing to let the USSR roll with punches at home and abroad. After all, they are less able politically to bear the discredit of fresh "defeat" on their watch than the better established oldsters they are competing with. In addition, there is evidence the voice and role of the Soviet military may be increasing.

Hence, we cannot say how the Soviets will act on given issues; what we can say is they will be more unpredictable than before.

The Role of U.S.-Soviet Relations

That is about the best we can do for now: it would probably be a mistake to carry informed speculation much farther. If the second pattern—the clean generational break—emerges, we will need to think our current policy approach through carefully, to see if there are significant new things we need to be doing. Even in that case, however, the tripartite policy of realism, strength and negotiation, which has been designed as a policy for all seasons, should equip us to deal effectively with the Soviets under any leadership that can now be realistically envisaged.

Provided we remember one thing: that U.S.-Soviet relations will be an issue in the internal struggle for succession within the Kremlin. It will cut in a variety of directions

which we can neither discern nor predict when it comes to individuals. But it is certain that relations with us will be a critical foreign policy variable for everyone. Contenders will be tempted to take stands on the question of whether or not it is possible to do productive business with the United States. We cannot tell who the winners will be, but we can say that it is not in our interest that those who emerge victorious from the struggle do so on the basis of anti-American postures. Hence, although we cannot determine the outcome, we have the capacity to influence the struggle by adopting a posture that makes it harder to claim that the USSR cannot do business with us.

Getting our Message Across: Three Levels

To use that capacity, we need to act over the next 6-12 months on three levels:

—*Overall*, with power more diffuse in Moscow and a proliferation of leadership candidates underway, we need to make our policy approach absolutely clear and consistent to the Soviet leadership. We will be even less certain than we were about whom we are dealing with, but whoever they are they must understand that we will sustain our strength and that we are prepared to negotiate with the USSR in earnest.

At this level, the best device for registering U.S. policy consistency with absolute clarity as the Soviets enter a more uncertain time would be a speech by the President devoted exclusively to U.S.-Soviet relations. The opening of the INF deployment winter, when Western publics will be susceptible to Soviet scare propaganda, is in any case an opportune moment for a forward-looking explanation of our own negotiating agenda. But until now, the idea of a

Presidential speech has lacked a persuasive rationale within U.S.-Soviet relations (as distinguished from U.S. and Alliance politics). Andropov's absence November 5 and 7 has filled that gap. We are working on a draft for your consideration.³

—*Diplomatically*, we need to take steps to keep established channels of communication in good working order. To demonstrate that they are in fact in good order, there must be substance passing through them. We have already done a great deal to provide such substance in the arms control field. However, the Soviets themselves may well clog this channel for some time after initial INF deployments. In our own interest, we should be working to unclog it. But we will also need to explore ways to put more content into discussions of our other agenda areas: regional issues, human rights, bilateral topics.

Here I think you will have to take the lead. Increasing the pace and thickening the substance of your talks with Dobrynin is an obvious place to start. We should be giving Art Hartman as much to do as we can, but Dobrynin remains an indispensable vehicle, just as Gromyko remains an indispensable interlocutor at the Moscow end.

In fact, Andropov's ailments make Gromyko and Ustinov more indispensable than ever, as long as they are there. They are fellow-members of the Brezhnev generation cohort, they are Andropov's strongest supporters, and they constitute the rest of the national security "troika" whose clienteles have provided the basis for Andropov's power. For that reason, it would also be helpful in this context for you to meet with Gromyko at Stockholm in January.

We should also be thinking about a visit by you to Moscow, either following on a Stockholm meeting or without it. For

other men are now coming into the leadership picture too. More indispensable than ever for now, Gromyko is also one of those who will be leaving the scene in fairly short order. And for years many have seen Gromyko as more of a hindrance than a help to creative diplomacy. If you decide to go to Moscow to meet him, it will be important to make clear that you would also like to meet not only with Andropov but with others of his colleagues in the leadership. We need to get our message to a broader spectrum of people, even if we cannot predict who we will be dealing with in five years' time.

—*In terms of contacts*, we need to get our message across to more people in the Soviet elite outside the narrow group of top leaders and potential candidates. The Soviet political constituency is smaller than ours by far, but it still numbers in the thousands, and provides the clientele that top leaders must have to gain and maintain power. As it rejuvenates, it will also become even more insular and more provincial than it is now. As a long-term project, we will need to think and act creatively about how to reach it with the American message. Improving and strengthening access through the radios is one obvious means that we are already working on. But expanding exchanges between the two countries—official and unofficial, professional and cultural—is another. Finally, the growing power of such regional bosses and ex-bosses as Leningrad's Romanov, Kiev's Shcherbitskiy and Baku's Aliyev points to the importance of strengthening and expanding our presence outside Moscow.

Conclusion

This is not a prescription for public diplomacy. Public diplomacy will play a key role in our overall diplomacy vis-

a-vis the Soviets in the upcoming period. But if we are to make our policy work with the vigor and effect required by increasing uncertainty in Moscow, we must go beyond public diplomacy, and put content into our approaches. As you have agreed, enriching our dialogue with the Soviets should be an important priority for us. And in his discussion with Larry and me last Monday, Dobrynin had it right as far as he went: dialogue yes, but not dialogue for dialogue; dialogue for understanding.⁴ But I would go further and say dialogue for results.

START is the obvious place to begin. Exploring tradeoffs and a mutually acceptable framework should be the centerpiece of your discussions with Dobrynin. But we should also be looking for ways to engage the Soviets on regional issues. That includes potential flashpoints where neither side wants confrontation but where confrontation is nevertheless a risk, and where we need to understand each other's intentions better.

We do not need a new strategy for dealing with Moscow; we need to be more creative and active with the one we have.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 1D, 1983—Soviet Union—November. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons and Palmer on November 16. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Simons initialed for Palmer. McKinley's handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on November 22.

² The Embassy in Moscow reported: "Yuriy Andropov failed to take his place at the October Revolution Anniversary Assembly in the Kremlin on the evening on November 5. Beyond any shadow of a doubt an appearance at this most

important of Soviet holidays is obligatory for a CPSU General Secretary—none has missed the event in at least the last two decades—and Andropov’s absence is unequivocal evidence that he is very seriously ill.” (Telegram 14010 from Moscow, November 5; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830650-0287) Another telegram reporting on the November 7 parade and events also noted his absence. (Telegram 14072 from Moscow, November 9; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830658-0646) A November 5 INR report also noted that Andropov had not appeared in public since his August 18 meeting with Senator Pell. (Telegram 318844 to USNATO, November 8; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830653-0631)

³ After several weeks of effort and coordination with the NSC Staff, this culminated as Reagan’s January 16, 1984, speech on U.S.-Soviet relations. See [Document 158](#). The address is also in [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 182](#).

⁴ There is no record of Eagleburger and Burt meeting with Dobrynin on Monday, November 7. However, Eagleburger did meet with Dobrynin on November 9 and prepared for Shultz, who was in Tokyo, a brief report found in a draft telegram that Eagleburger drafted on November 9. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Lawrence Eagleburger Files, 1967-1984, Lot 84D204, Chron, November, 1984)

141. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, November 23, 1983

SUBJECT

Revised Presidential Letter to Andropov

Issue for Decision

Whether to forward the attached draft letter to Andropov under cover of a memorandum to the President.

Background

As you will recall, we owe a response to Andropov's August 27 letter to the President on INF.² You decided to defer a reply until after the trip to Japan and Korea.³ We have now prepared a revised version, updated to cover more recent developments, in particular the Soviet suspension of the talks (Tab 2).⁴

Given the current strains and uncertainties surrounding our relationship with Moscow, we believe that a Presidential letter to Andropov at this time could be quite useful. The Soviet interruption of the INF talks in Geneva—coming at a time of sharpened Soviet polemics, political uncertainties within the Kremlin itself, and increased popular concern within the West over U.S.-Soviet tensions—makes it important that the President directly reaffirm his interest in developing a more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship. The timing is particularly important with the

Soviet leadership faced with reacting to a major foreign policy defeat and, perhaps, caught up in a difficult political transition. These considerations, in my view, also argue for a Presidential speech on U.S.-Soviet relations (which is the subject of a separate memo.)⁵

The draft message to Andropov, and through him to the rest of the senior leadership, reiterates our basic stance, yet makes it clear that we are not seeking to exacerbate existing differences with the Soviet Union. Consistent with our earlier public and private statements, it stresses our readiness to pursue a pragmatic, problem-solving approach to questions now before the two nations, and cites particular areas where progress might be possible. Without minimizing such current problems as the INF impasse, it notes that while we will continue to resist unacceptable Soviet actions, we are nonetheless willing to explore mutually-acceptable solutions to specific issues on a case-by-case basis. To that end, the letter expresses a readiness to pursue a “problem-solving” dialogue through private and candid exchanges with the Soviet leadership.

We have prepared the letter for transmission to the White House on the assumption that Andropov’s health and political situation will be clarified before too long.⁶ Should events in Moscow warrant otherwise, we can revise the address on the letter as appropriate.

Recommendation

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President (Tab 1)⁷ transmitting the draft letter to Andropov (Tab 2).⁸

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 1D, 1983—Soviet Union—November. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley; cleared by Simons and Palmer. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Simons initialed for Palmer. A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. Two handwritten notes in the upper right-hand corner read: “Given direct to McFarlane by GPS 12/3” and “done & given to Bud.” McKinley’s handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it, and Hill’s handwritten initials are in the upper-right corner, indicating he saw it on December 3.

² See [Document 81](#).

³ The President went on State visits to Japan from November 9 to 12 and to South Korea from November 12 to 14.

⁴ The draft is attached but not printed. The Soviet delegation walked out of the INF negotiations in Geneva on November 23 after the West German Bundestag voted to approve INF deployment. For Reagan’s statement on the suspension of the talks, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book II, pp. 1624–1625. For Nitze’s statement, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 1000–1001. Andropov issued a statement on November 24 explaining the Soviet decision and cancelling the Soviet moratorium on deployment of medium-range missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union; see *ibid.*, pp. 1005–1009.

⁵ See [footnote 3, Document 140](#) and [Document 158](#).

⁶ See [footnote 2, Document 140](#).

⁷ The memorandum is attached but not printed.

⁸ Shultz wrote in the margin: “do *not* send. Put in as item for the Sat. meeting of the Soviet group.” A note written by an unknown hand in the margin reads: “S/S—Secretary passed original signed Sec/Pres to McFarlane on 12/3 AM.”

142. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, December 7, 1983, 1607Z

15284. For the Secretary, Eagleburger and Burt. Dept. Pass Urgently to Secretary and Burt. Subject: Soviet Posture Towards US Likely To Harden.

1. (Secret—Entire text.)

2. The Soviets have announced their military countermeasures to the INF decision and have walked out of the talks.² The attitude they will assume towards other arms control negotiations and, more specifically, towards the U.S., is just beginning to develop. Our guess is that the Soviet tactics, which Dobrynin, Bessmertnykh and colleagues from the Central Committee have probably been busy devising, will be aimed at denying the U.S. either the actuality or even the appearance of being able to conduct a fruitful relationship with Moscow. Their hope is to improve their bargaining position by stepping up European pressures on us, reinforced by American public pressures as the 1984 election campaign gets into full swing.

3. A Soviet move to enforce a pause in the START and perhaps even the MBFR talks would be part of this tactical effort.³ We have already been informed of the Soviet unwillingness to hold a bilateral round of discussions in Washington on non-proliferation, and the response has been temporizing on scheduling the next round of talks on upgrading crisis communication facilities. Attendance at our official functions in Moscow is dwindling and we are being turned down for appointments with many of the

foreign policy specialists we can usually see (an exception is the MFA, which still receives us).

4. We had all anticipated that this would be the winter of Soviet discontent, and that we'd have to get through some turbulence before drawing on the new assets in our military and political situation in Europe to achieve a better balance in US-Soviet relations. One way to exacerbate the difficult period we face is to rub the Soviets' face in their defeat; another is to stress that they have no choice but to swallow it and come back to the table. That will just stiffen their determination to show us and the Europeans that real business is indeed impossible with the Reagan administration and that they must be taken seriously. Moreover, if we attempt to predict Soviet behavior in our public statements, we increase the incentive for them to undermine our credibility by ensuring that the predictions don't come to pass.

5. Our general approach to the Soviets at this juncture should be focused on our own responsible and sober assessment of the issues, coupled with a willingness to engage in a dialogue with Moscow on these issues. The tone set by the President in reacting to the end of the INF talks is the one we want to maintain, even if the Soviets freeze several other areas of relations. To keep the initiative there are several things we might consider:

A. The Secretary's attendance at Stockholm is valuable for us tactically, since Gromyko will either have to pass up attending the opening or will be at a loss to explain things if the Soviets turn down the U.S. offer of a bilateral meeting. The fact of a meeting, if it takes place, will speak loudly—and we need not claim more for it than can be sustained by subsequent events. We can take quiet

satisfaction in holding the meeting without forcing the Soviets to rebut premature optimism about its outcome.

B. The uncertainties about resumption of various arms control negotiations should not deter us from developing new approaches and letting it be known that we have serious contributions to make whenever the Soviets are willing to sit down again in a genuine effort to reach agreement.

C. The Soviets may be proceeding from the assumption that they have nothing to lose by turning their backs on us for a while. Small gestures are unlikely to tempt them, but they might find it hard to resist an approach on the Middle East. Our reading of their current position is that they are worried about where their Syrian client might lead them, that they have no coherent strategy, and that they would dearly like to restore the appearance of being taken seriously somewhere in the world, and not least the Middle East. At relatively low cost, we could consult with them formally and visibly, seeking common denominators but yielding none of our vital interests. The offer of a Shultz-Gromyko meeting on the Middle East in a third country setting (e.g., Geneva) could serve these purposes.

D. The China card can help whet Moscow's interest in reviving a balanced U.S.-Soviet relationship, but only if it is played subtly, avoiding public challenges to which Soviet leaders will have to reply out of pride or anger. We would think Beijing shares this concept of how to handle its relations with the U.S.

6. Most of all, we have to combine patience with willingness to talk. The Soviets have fundamental interests that can best be advanced at the negotiating table with us. Our task in the next few months is not to let them place us

in the position of coaxing them back, thereby weakening our position at the table; not to bypass possible opportunities to talk, thereby [garble—heightening] the nervousness of our allies; and not to gloat at their discomfort, thereby allowing them to make us, not them, the issue.

Hartman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis.

² See [footnote 4, Document 141](#).

³ When the current session of START talks ended on December 8, the Soviets refused to set a date to reconvene the talks. In his diary entry for December 8, Reagan wrote: “The Soviets have walked out of the START talks but not so definitely as in the I.N.F. talks. This is regular time for holiday break and they didn’t say they wouldn’t be back. They just said they were unable at this time to set a date for their return.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 296)

143. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, December 12, 1983, 1531Z

15443. Subject: Soviet Decision To Shut Down US-Soviet Dialogue? Ref: A. Ottawa 08998, B. Moscow 015409.

1. (S—Entire text).

2. Summary: There is mounting evidence that the Soviets have recently undertaken a major review of their approach to US-Soviet relations between now and the US Presidential elections. One outcome of that review appears to have been a decision to do everything possible to create the impression that the US-Soviet dialogue has broken down and the relationship is worsening. In pursuit of that end, the Soviets appear willing to shut down or deemphasize channels of communication through use of which the US has in the past been able to demonstrate a continuing dialogue. This implies Gromyko may either refuse to meet with the Secretary in Stockholm, or use the meeting for a sharp attack on the administration. We should be prepared for either contingency. End summary.

3. Ref A's report of Arbatov's suggestion that a major Soviet review of East-West policy was underway at the time of the Pearson visit fits with a number of hints here that such a reassessment has recently been completed.²

—The first was Dobrynin's return to Moscow on November 20, well in advance, it is now clear, of this year's second Party Plenum, and in contrast to his usual practice of returning to the USSR closer to the year's end holiday. We

understand that Sokolov, one of the two Minister-Counselors in the Soviet Embassy, was also in Moscow during this period.

—A second was the disappearance shortly after Dobrynin's return of USA Department Chief Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, ostensibly "on leave." Bessmertnykh returned to work December 5, according to USA Department staffers.

—A third was USA Institute Director Georgiy Arbatov's absence from Moscow during the same general period. Embassy officers working on arrangements for the recent Dartmouth Group visit to Moscow were told November 21 by the Institute's Deputy Director that Arbatov was "out of town" and "unreachable." We know Arbatov was in Tokyo as of November 16 and resurfaced in Moscow December 2.

4. It seems unlikely to us that so many of the Soviets' top USA experts should be away from their posts by coincidence at so critical a moment in US-Soviet relations. We think it virtually certain that some kind of review has, in fact, taken place since the Bundestag vote and the introduction of the first components for US LRINF in Europe.³ Such high level examinations have occurred in the past at important junctures in East-West relations; we recall that Dobrynin was in Moscow for a similar session in December 1979—before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It is possible that the results of such a session could be released at the forthcoming CPSU Plenum.

5. Our guess is that the most recent review has been devoted to plotting Soviet strategy toward the US between now and the Presidential elections. As we reported Ref B, a US academic with excellent access has gained the strong impression during a recent visit that the outcome of the US elections had become the primary determinant of Soviet

policy.⁴ While we have no way of knowing what decisions may have been taken during the review, we suspect we are already seeing its first results. These point to a decision to create the impression of a complete break-down in the US-Soviet dialogue.

—The first evidence of such an approach was Moscow's breaking off of the INF talks, although that decision appears to have been made before any formal review.

—A second sign, which may well have been approved during the reassessment, was the Soviets' terminating of the current START round without setting a resumption date.

—Moscow's reluctance to schedule NPT talks for December seems of a piece with the START decision, and Soviet ambiguity about continuing the MBFR talks suggests a similar scenario may be contemplated in Vienna.

—Soviet authorities have meanwhile told a visiting US academic here that recent exchanges between the Secretary and Dobrynin in Washington seem designed simply to sustain the appearance of an on-going dialogue, while Washington stands pat on matters of substance.

—The Turkish Embassy here has informed us that during farewell calls last week by former Ambassador Halefoglu, Korniyenko made the same complaints about recent exchanges with Ambassador Hartman in Moscow.

6. These actions suggest a Soviet perception that the Reagan administration may be vulnerable in Europe and the US on the issue of its handling of the USSR, and a determination to do everything possible to fuel fears that the relationship is dangerously out of control. The Soviets

presumably calculate that such tactics will reinvigorate peace movements on both sides of the Atlantic, lead to greater pressure on NATO governments to accept a pause in INF deployments, widen differences within NATO, and ultimately redound to the President's disadvantage next November.

7. Such an approach, as we noted at the time, was foreshadowed in Andropov's September 28 remarks on the US.⁵ Nor is there anything new in the tactic of charging the US with breaking off the bilateral dialogue; it was used after both Afghanistan and Poland. What is new is an apparent Soviet determination this time around to put on ice or degrade those channels through the use of which we have in the past been able to deny claims that we were not talking. In so doing, of course, the Soviets are running a risk that they themselves will be blamed for obstructing a dialogue. (Our own efforts will presumably be directed toward precisely this end.) They will also be constrained by a desire to avoid unduly alarming their own populace. Moscow appears to have concluded, however, that these risks are outweighed by the need to deny the administration any hope of pointing to on-going discussions as a means of calming domestic and European concerns over East-West tensions.

8. An early test of this hypothesis will, of course, come at the forthcoming Stockholm meeting. If the Soviets have in fact made a decision to portray the US-Soviet relationship as having broken down, Gromyko may well refuse to meet with Secretary Shultz. Even if he is prepared to meet, there will be a strong probability that his purpose will be to expose strains in the relationship. While Moscow may simply choose not to send Gromyko to Stockholm, our guess is that the event provides too effective a propaganda platform for him to pass up. Whichever scenario he follows,

we should anticipate an effort to deny us any benefit from our willingness to meet.⁶

Hartman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830731-0263. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Bonn, London, Paris, USNATO, USUN, Brussels, Copenhagen, Ottawa, and Rome.

² In telegram 8998 from Ottawa, December 8, the Embassy reported: "the Soviets said they were undertaking a basic policy review on East-West relations over next two to three weeks; blamed the U.S. for the breakdown of INF; were pessimistic that any constructive dialogue was possible with the present administration; and even hinted they might not return to START." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830724-0759)

³ The Bundestag vote was on November 22.

⁴ In telegram 15409 from Moscow, December 10, the Embassy reported that an unnamed American academic said that "a significant shift has taken place in Soviet thinking and attitudes, especially towards the U.S., over the past six months. Where earlier Soviet decision-making was founded almost exclusively on pragmatism and reasoned calculation of Soviet interests, emotionalism and even irrationality are now entering into play. The academic perceives a growing paranoia among Soviet officials, and sees them literally obsessed by fear of war. He believes that the U.S. Presidential elections have become the central determining factor in Soviet foreign policy." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830728-0711) See also Matlock's analysis in [Document 144](#).

⁵ See [Document 120](#).

⁶ Shultz and Gromyko met on January 18, 1984, in Stockholm. See [Document 159](#).

144. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, December 13, 1983

SUBJECT

American Academic on Soviet Policy

The telegram from Moscow I mentioned this morning is attached at Tab I.² It reports on the observations of an experienced American academic who spent about ten days in discussions with senior Soviet officials, including Boris Ponomarev, candidate member of the Politburo and head of the Central Committee's International Department, and several other Party and Institute officials not often seen by Americans.

Among the source's conclusions were:

—Fear of war seemed to affect the elite as well as the man on the street.

—A degree of paranoia seemed rampant among high officials, and the danger of irrational elements in Soviet decision making seems higher.

—The election next year seems to have become a key determinant in Soviet foreign policy making, with the aim not to permit the President to assume the role of peacemaker.

—There seems to be a growing climate of neo-Stalinism and outright chauvinism on the lower levels of the bureaucracy.

The scholar also was told that Andropov had directed a more activist role in the Middle East, and that Andropov is increasingly seeking to take control over foreign policy and to undermine Gromyko.

Paragraphs 2-11 are the most relevant ones in the long cable.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (12/13/83); NLR-748-24-43-1-3. Confidential. Sent for information. A handwritten note at the top of the page by McFarlane reads: "This just doesn't seem plausible to me (i.e. severe anxiety & fear of war). M."

² Attached but not printed is telegram 15409 from Moscow, December 10. See [footnote 4, Document 143](#).

145. Memorandum From the Chief U.S. Arms Negotiator, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations (Nitze) and the Chief U.S. Arms Negotiator, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Rowny) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, December 15, 1983

SUBJECT

Combining INF and START

With the Soviets having “discontinued” INF negotiations, the question of combining INF/START into a single negotiating forum may assume greater currency. Over the past months a number of allied figures have, on a variety of occasions, argued in favor of combining START and INF. It is also possible that the Soviets will propose to combine INF and START issues in some fashion. This memo examines this question in some detail, and also discusses possible Soviet approaches to the issue. On balance, we do not believe that combining START and INF would be in the U.S. interest. However, we need to study how we would respond to Soviet proposals for some type of merger.

It is an historical accident that INF and START are two separate negotiations. Had SALT II been ratified, it is possible that INF systems would have been negotiated directly in SALT III. The 1979 dual track decision states that INF would be addressed “within the SALT framework.” However, even in the Carter Administration there was considerable nervousness about the impact of strategic-theater negotiating linkages. Specific commitments to such linkage were avoided in the SALT II Joint Statement of Principles.²

Over the past months arguments have surfaced that it would make sense to combine the START and INF negotiations. Statements in favor of such a merger have, for example, been adopted by the Danish and Dutch Parliaments. We see the genesis of such sentiment as a way of avoiding U.S. deployments. Now that deployments have begun and the Soviets have “discontinued” the INF negotiations we can expect further pressure for a merger from those sensitive to public pressure against deployments.

There are a number of arguments against a merger. From our point of view the most compelling argument is that, in a combined INF and START negotiation, the Soviets can be expected to exploit the blurred distinctions between INF and strategic systems. The Soviets would, for example, seek to include U.S. “FBS” and third country medium-range systems in the merged forum because these systems can strike the USSR and hence meet the Soviet definition of “strategic.”³ At the same time, the Soviets would seek to exclude their “medium-range” systems on grounds that they cannot strike the U.S.

Combining INF and START would considerably complicate both sets of negotiations and could risk the loss of what progress we have made in separate INF and START talks during the last two years. While the U.S. and the Soviets remain far apart on central issues in both negotiations, there has been some narrowing of differences on some issues, for example, treatment of aircraft and geographic scope in INF. Such gains could be lost if the two talks were merged. A combined forum, from the U.S. perspective, would have to cover a range of Soviet missile systems from the SS-18 down to the SS-23. Two separate fora are simpler to manage and permit each negotiation to progress at its own pace.

Next, merging INF and START would also increase the potential for intra-Alliance problems. Separate INF and START fora allow separate Alliance consultative mechanisms. In INF the Allies play an active role while in START the United States, for the most part, informs its Allies of unilateral U.S. policy decisions. This separation is very much in the U.S. interest. NATO consultations on INF have proved effective, and have allowed Allies to play an active role in the formulation of U.S. INF policy. The Allies have become accustomed to such a role, and it would be unrealistic not to expect them to want to continue it in combined INF/START negotiations. The more that INF issues lost their separate character in such a negotiation, the harder it would be to keep our commitment to consultations focused only on such issues. We do not believe it would be in the U.S. interest to involve Allies directly in the decision-making process on U.S. strategic arms control policy. To do so would greatly complicate that process and would lead to the Allies wanting to have a say with regard to purely strategic issues, such as modernization of U.S. strategic nuclear forces.

Combining INF and START would also cause difficulties in reconciling different U.S. approaches to the two sets of talks, particularly with respect to units of account. For example, the U.S. has made a concerted effort in START to reduce Soviet throw-weight. There is no parallel concern in INF, and therefore we have made no corresponding effort to address the throw-weight of Soviet INF missiles. The Soviets could be expected to exploit a merged negotiation by arguing for adoption of INF's "simpler" unit of account—warheads only. Their objective would be to move us away from the emphasis on reducing the destructive capability of ballistic missiles that we have expressed in START. Application of "build-down" to INF would also raise

problems because the U.S. would have to begin such a build-down from a base of fewer LRINF missiles.

If INF and START were to be combined, we would also face potential Allied concerns that the U.S. was more interested in limiting strategic systems that threaten the U.S. directly than in limiting INF systems which threaten Western Europe. The active consultative process on INF has to date allayed such Allied fears. It is not clear we could reassure the Allies in a like manner if INF and START were merged. Certainly any efforts at INF/START trade-offs—a major interest of many merger proponents—would be carefully and critically scrutinized by our Allies.

Moreover, we have argued in INF that a Soviet effort to seek compensation for U.K. and French forces is not based on a substantive concern but is merely a pretext to rationalize unequal limits on U.S. and Soviet INF systems. This argument has proven effective in rebutting Soviet claims for compensation. We could lose the argument if INF and START were combined. On the other hand, some would argue that combining the two talks might actually make it easier to deal with the compensation issue, since the inability of even modernized British and French forces to present any credible offensive threat to the USSR would become even more self-evident when measured against the entire panoply of Soviet strategic and INF forces. Such an argument could, however, be undermined should a combined negotiation lead to substantial reductions in Soviet strategic forces while the U.K. and French proceed with plans to increase substantially the number of their own warheads.

In sum, we do not believe there is a compelling rationale for combining INF and START and that doing so could pose dangerous pitfalls for the U.S.

Nevertheless, we will need a strategy for rebutting public arguments for combining INF and START. In doing so we believe the U.S. could best draw upon the following themes, at least until final decisions are made about how to proceed on the INF/START relationship:

—Responsibility for the interruption of INF lies with the Soviets alone and we must not appear to let them off the hook by offering an alternative negotiating forum.

—Separate fora have already been established for negotiating limits on INF and on START systems. Although it is less than we would have hoped, definite progress has been made in both these negotiations. A merger could undermine this progress.

—Problems in both negotiations cannot be solved merely by transferring them from one to another forum.

—A combined INF/START negotiation would be extremely complex.

—Separate fora have allowed each negotiation to progress at its own rate. If the talks were combined, differences over issues in either the INF or the strategic context could bring the entire dialogue to a stalemate.

—The Soviets would attempt to exploit a merged negotiation to U.S./NATO disadvantage. For example, they would try to focus it on those systems they call strategic, including so-called U.S. “forward-based systems,” by excluding their own medium-range systems, such as SS-20s.

Regardless of the U.S. position on merger, the Soviets may seek to accomplish their ends without proposing a merger. They could simply move U.S./INF systems into START.

The Soviets have already laid the necessary groundwork for including P-II and GLCM in START. The Soviets might also seek to include all U.S. "FBS" in combined START and INF talks. They may well seek compensation for British and French forces as well. Under such an approach the Soviets would, however, face some difficult decisions on what to do with their own medium-range systems. The Soviets might attempt to exclude their own medium-range systems from combined talks on grounds that their systems cannot strike the U.S. and hence are not comparable to U.S. "FBS." But such a position would appear extremely one-sided and hence could undermine Soviet efforts to portray themselves to European audiences as sincerely interested in arms control.

Another possible Soviet approach might be to propose formal combination of the talks, but seek to maintain more or less separate strategic and medium-range negotiating positions which would, however, be linked at the top in some general fashion. For example, a combined negotiating team could be established, or an agreement in one forum could be explicitly tied to an agreement in the other. This approach would allow the Soviets the option of negotiating their own "counter-deployments" against U.S. P-II and GLCM deployments, with the least disruption to negotiating positions previously established in both START and INF.

Accordingly we recommend that the work currently underway on how to respond to the various possible Soviet actions re resumption of START, including the possibility that the Soviets may propose including certain INF systems in the resumed START talks, be focused on developing a fully analyzed and coordinated position prior to your possible meeting with Gromyko in Stockholm.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive December 1983. Secret.

Forwarded through Adelman. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.

² For the text of the SALT II Joint Statement of Principles, signed by Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna on June 18, 1979, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, pp. 1078-1079.

³ During the INF negotiations, the Soviet delegates argued that British and French systems should factor into reduction totals. U.S. forward-based systems (FBS), which could strike the Soviet Union, were also a contentious issue.

146. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)¹

Washington, December 16, 1983

SUBJECT

Moscow Tea Leaves—The Role of the Military in Soviet Policy toward the U.S.

With their moves to create uncertainty over the future of East-West dialogue in not only INF but now START, MBFR and possibly CDE as well, the Soviets have chosen a tough approach as a way of stepping up European and American public anxieties and, ultimately, pressures for a weakening of particular U.S. policies. While this tactic tracks with the general line set down in Andropov's September 28 statement,² we also have indications that they have been conducting a general policy review on East-West relations over the past month.³

The problems inherent in speculation about Kremlin leadership dynamics behind such a decision are well-known; reliable information is simply too sketchy to allow for overly ambitious interpretation. Nonetheless—while reaffirming the familiar caveats that senior Soviet civil and military leaders share much the same experience and world-view and that their interaction takes place within a strong tradition of party control over the military—we would call your attention to several recent items which cumulatively suggest the possibility of an increasing (and perhaps parochially hawkish) voice for the senior Soviet

military precisely at this time when major decisions vis-a-vis relations with the U.S. are being made.

—The spate of background-noise rumors that our Embassies in Moscow and Eastern Europe are picking up on the theme that, in the midst of uncertainties surrounding Andropov's physical and political health,⁴ "the Soviet military now enjoys a degree of autonomy in the military sphere unprecedented in the post-war Soviet Union," and that "its power is growing." Yugoslavs and Romanians could be expected to highlight this danger, but we are now getting it from other East Europeans and Soviets as well. (On the other hand, we note that Bulgaria's Zhivkov is taking pains to deny to recent U.S. visitors "that the military could have a decisive influence in any communist country".)⁵ Such speculation about the military might well be considered as par for the course under the circumstances, but that does not mean there may not be some substance to it.

—The curious intimations in the Nitze-Kvitsinskiy contretemps which suggested not just Soviet clumsiness in attempting to embarrass us (or Nitze) with the Allies, but also some sort of disconnect or disagreement within Moscow.⁶ Nitze has suggested it was a failed bureaucratic end-run by part of the MFA around elements of the military establishment over the substance of the "Equal Reductions" ploy, though others seriously question this interpretation given the composition of those on the Soviet Delegation who reportedly were in the know on this.

—An intriguing article by Fëdor Burlatskiy in the November 23 *Literaturnaya Gazeta* which, in the ostensible guise of recreating JFK's Oval Office deliberations with the NSC during the Cuban Missile Crisis, takes great pains to make the point that "the most terrible thing there can be is to

allow the military to take part in political decisions.” Burlatskiy, drawing an implicit parallel to the current INF situation, describes the problems of political leaders in curbing “military hawks” who were pressing for rash responses to the emplacement of threatening missiles in nearby Cuba. (Burlatskiy has had special ties with Andropov in the past, and in 1982 wrote a somewhat similar piece analyzing the political stagnation of Maoist China that was widely seen as an indictment of the Brezhnev system within the Soviet Union;⁷ he himself made sure that Westerners realized it was a parable about the USSR.)

There is, of course, a temptation to read too much into all of this. We do not intend to suggest any sudden shift in power nor dramatic divergence of policy view within Moscow. Whatever hints of sharp internal differences someone like Burlatskiy might coyly drop, we do not doubt that there continues to be a basic consensus within the Soviet leadership élite on the fundamentals of Soviet foreign and defense policy. Similarly, it is not that surprising that, after a decade during which the institutional influence of military professionals has been on the rise, the senior military should now be playing a central role when such national security matters as arms control are high on the agenda. Particular tales for foreign audiences of beleaguered “liberals” within the leadership, moreover, can have obvious and self-serving purposes.

Nonetheless, the evidence—tenuous but accumulating—is worthy of our note. That the Soviet military is a critical actor today in Soviet succession questions and decision-making is perhaps a truism; what the military’s precise effect on specific Soviet policy choices might be, however, remains quite unclear. Our very uncertainty in this regard, however, only underscores the special need for consistency

and coherence in our own policies and statements during this difficult period.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive December 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley on December 9; cleared by Simons, Palmer, Haass in substance, Kelly, and Baraz for information. An unknown hand initialed for Dunkerley. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on December 16. A stamped notation indicates Eagleburger saw the memorandum on December 19. He wrote in the margin: "Very good piece! LSE."

² See [Document 120](#).

³ See [Document 143](#).

⁴ Andropov's public appearances were greatly limited, which led to much speculation about his health. See [footnote 2, Document 140](#). In telegram 14870 from Moscow, November 29, the Embassy relayed an unconfirmed report from a Soviet physician that Andropov was in "'grave' condition" and "cannot be expected to return to a full schedule or to remain in office for much more than a year." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830701-0028) For a subsequent report on Andropov's condition, see [Document 151](#).

⁵ From December 10 to 12, a delegation led by Congressman Sam Gibbons (D-Florida) visited Bulgaria and met with various members of the leadership, including President Zhivkov. The main purpose of this visit was to explore possible openings in trade relations with Bulgaria. During the meeting, the following exchange occurred: "Congressman Conable said there was much uncertainty in the U.S. about who was in charge in Moscow. In view of

Andropov's evidently serious illness, many thought the Soviet military were in the saddle. Zhivkov denied that the military could have decisive policy influence in any Communist country." They "had their tasks to fulfill, but they were under the control of the Communist Party." (Telegram 4650 from Sofia, December 13; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830734-0166)

⁶ Shultz and Dobrynin discussed this on November 18. See [Document 137](#). Documents on this are also scheduled for publication in [Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. V, European Security 1977-1983](#).

⁷ Burlatsky's *Novy Mir* article on China's economic reforms as a possible example for the Soviet Union was discussed in telegram 5861 from Moscow, May 13, 1982. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820251-0640)

147. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, December 19, 1983

SUBJECT

Letter to Andropov

Attached at Tab I is a clean draft of the letter to Andropov.² It is essentially the revised draft submitted earlier,³ except that it takes account of the fact that the President will not be making the speech until January. I think it best not to refer to the speech specifically this far in advance, but have included a sentence at the end of the first paragraph to foreshadow it.

The language in brackets on page three should be used only if Hartman is able to deliver it to one of Andropov's aides (or, of course to Andropov himself—but this is most unlikely). That point could be covered in the instructions to Hartman, and the actual letter could be signed after we learn how delivery was made.

You will want to examine with particular care the language on the Middle East and Lebanon at the bottom of page three. Secretary Shultz may feel that this opens us up to inviting the Soviets into the ME peace process. I do not believe it does, in fact. The reason I suggest it is that I believe the Soviets have a strong desire to discuss the Middle East with us, and I believe it can be done without opening the door to their greater involvement in the area. At some point, we may wish to discuss such matters as

expanding the UNIFIL mandate, and this can be done more effectively if we have some general discussions behind us. (Hartman's recent discussion with Gromyko was, I believe, useful.)⁴

In any event, the letter needs some "bait" if we are to expect the Soviets to bite. We must recognize that they look at consultations in general as furthering *our* political purposes and will be reluctant to grant them unless they are convinced that something may come out of them and that the agenda will include, at least in part, matters of interest to them.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you coordinate the attached text with Secretary Shultz.⁵

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) December 1983. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action. A handwritten notation in the upper right-hand corner, likely by McFarlane, reads: "Return by courier."

² The draft letter is not attached to this copy of the memorandum, but a copy is attached to a December 18 covering memorandum from Burt to Shultz. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive December 1983) See [Documents 149](#) and [150](#) regarding the final letter.

³ See [Document 141](#). In his December 18 covering memorandum to Shultz, Burt wrote: "Mr. Secretary: As I mentioned to you yesterday, Jack Matlock and I have taken another look at the draft Presidential letter to Andropov,

which we think should be sent immediately before a Presidential speech on US-Soviet relations. We have agreed on a revised text of the letter, which is attached. It mainly reflects new developments since the original draft was sent over to the White House. If you have any comments or suggestions, I am standing by." Shultz wrote in the margin: "RB Good ltr. No comments. G." (Ibid.)

⁴ Hartman and Gromyko met on December 10 in Moscow to discuss the Middle East. (Telegram 350505 from Moscow, December 10; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830012-0432)

⁵ McFarlane did not initial his approval or disapproval of the recommendation. However, it is clear that the letter was coordinated with Shultz. In a December 19 memorandum to Shultz, Burt wrote: "Mr. Secretary: Attached is an updated version of the draft Presidential letter to Andropov, reworked by Jack Matlock and me. The only changes from the draft you saw earlier today [see [footnote 3, above](#)] are contained in the first paragraph omitting reference to the Presidential speech on US-Soviet relations." McKinley wrote in the margin: "The Secretary approves." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive December 1983)

148. Talking Points Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, December 19, 1983

TALKING POINTS ON SPY WAR

—There is a continuing espionage war. The Soviets are taking quite a beating over the last year or so.

—[1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]

—[1 paragraph (6½ lines) not declassified]

—At that time the Tokyo press was publishing the names and pictures of over 25 Japanese who had been disclosed in the *Reader's Digest* by the KGB Levchenko to have worked for the Soviets in previous years. This was probably the Soviet response to these disclosures in Japan which the KGB attributed to the CIA because we were sending the KGB defector Levchenko around the world briefing [*less than 1 line not declassified*] friendly countries on how the Soviets operate in active measures and espionage.

—The more recent approach probably comes from the punishment the Soviets have been taking in the espionage game around the world over the past year [*3½ lines not declassified*].

—During the last year, close to 150 Soviets have been expelled mostly in Europe and Asia. This is more than triple the yearly average for 1975-1980. This action has been taken by virtually every Western power, every one of our close allies, neutral countries [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and Third World countries, [*less than 1 line*

not declassified]. Since Soviet retaliation has thus far been weak, other states are encouraged to take similar action [*1 line not declassified*].

—In addition to expulsions, Soviets have sustained major defections. [*7 lines not declassified*]

—[*1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified*]

—[*1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified*]

—[*1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified*]

—An increasing number of countries, now including the ASEAN states, deny visas to Soviets expelled from other nations, thus compounding the negative impact.

—Allegations of Soviet/Bulgarian involvement in the shooting of the Pope have damaged the Soviets, and their efforts to counter them have been ineffectual.

—[*1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified*]

—Soviet intelligence, with the traditional paranoia of a police state society, undoubtedly overestimates both their vulnerability and our intentions. It's unlikely that any discussion of rules for the spy war will go anywhere. It may be that they merely want to see how we react, whether they can learn anything about us and, perhaps more important, about some defectors whose whereabouts must mystify them. We would hope to get further insights into their purposes, their state of mind and the state of the KGB.

—There is a more serious side to this. Operational guidance to overseas agents from both the KGB and the military intelligence, GRU, seem to show a high state of

nervousness about and some aggressive reactions to what they see as a new western aggressiveness.

—[1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]

—Obtain early warning of enemy military preparations so that the Soviet Union will not be surprised by an actual threat of war or preparations for a nuclear attack; determine the enemy's intentions and actions, primarily in the field of strategic armaments, and acquire information concerning production and deployment programs for the MX, Trident, and Pershing II missiles, cruise missiles, western space weapons, and other fundamentally new methods of warfare; collect technical information, materials, and samples of benefit to the Soviet domestic economy, and to the implementation of the food program; acquire current information on basic research and discoveries in the most important areas of western science and technology; recruit new and valuable sources who can be used to collect intelligence or as channels for active measures, and improve work with agents of influence who can be used to influence the adversary to our benefit, particularly those agents through whom hostile intelligence services can be discredited.

—[1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

—[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

—A final message was brought from a November 27-December 3 conference in Moscow by Bob Neuman (former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia) and Hal Saunders (former Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East). A Deputy Director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the USSR Communist Party gave them each a

message, delivered seriously and, they believe, under instruction. The message was:

At the same time, there are signs that the Soviets have developed a new respect and accorded new credibility to US policy. A Soviet officer returning to Moscow reported that among officers at significant Soviet headquarters with whom his duties brought him in contact had formed the opinion that "President Reagan surrounded himself with a good, capable team of advisors and organized his Administration professionally. This done, he tackled the economy, a subject that was foremost on the minds of Americans, and he straightened out the economic situation of the country by taking a strong and clear-cut position."

"Having gained the confidence of the American people by dealing effectively with economic matters, President Reagan's hands are not tied with respect to foreign policy and, specifically, with respect to his attitude toward the Soviet Union. GRU officials believe that Mr. Reagan's tough stance toward the Soviet Union is highly beneficial to the military-industrial complex."

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 88B00443R: Policy Files (1980-1986), Box 14, Folder: DCI Memo Chron (1-31 Dec '83). Secret. The talking points were likely drafted by Gates for Casey's discussion with Reagan on the "Spy War" and the general reporting on the increased Soviet intelligence activities related to the "war scare." (See [Document 135](#).) In his memoir, Gates recalled: "Casey met with Reagan on December 22 and advised him that we had learned that in November there had been a GRU (Soviet military intelligence) instruction to all posts to obtain early warning of enemy military preparations so that the Soviet Union

would not be surprised by the actual threat of war. All posts were to try to determine 'the enemy's' intentions and actions. Finally, the GRU elements were to create new agent groups abroad with the capability of communicating independently with GRU headquarters. The DCI told the President on that December day that the KGB and GRU information 'seems to reflect a Soviet perception of an increased threat of war and a realization of the necessity to keep intelligence flowing to Moscow during wartime or after a rupture in diplomatic relations.'" (Gates, *From the Shadows*, pp. 271-272) No record of a meeting with Casey on December 22 appears in the President's schedule. However, a telephone call from Reagan to Casey at 5:15 p.m. was noted. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

On December 23, Casey sent the President a memorandum dated December 22 on "the Spy War and Doomsday Talk," which directly correlates to these talking points; however, the memorandum was a short summary and did not include as much detail on Soviet collection activities. In the covering memorandum to Reagan, Casey wrote: "In line with our telephone conversation, I am sending a little reading for your trip west: First, is a memo reporting on the latest development in the ongoing espionage war. Together with the report I sent to you a few weeks ago, it may say a lot about the Soviet state of mind today. There are other reports indicating a range of reaction from prevailing nervousness to fear and grudging respect for our policies in the Soviet view of the state of our relationship today. Whether this represents a threat or an opportunity is the continuing question." (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 88B00443R: Policy Files (1980-1986), Box 1, Folder: Meeting w/the President (Backup) (10 Jan '84))

149. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, December 23, 1983, 2239Z

Tosec 160014/363464. Special Encryption—Nodis/Alpha. Amb. Hartman only. Subject: Letter to Andropov.

1. Secret—Entire text.
2. You should arrange to deliver the following letter from the President to Andropov. Note that the bracketed paragraph (“If you would find it helpful . . . and unofficial basis”) is to be included in the text of the letter handed over only rpt only if you are able to give the letter directly to Andropov or to one of his immediate aides, such as Alexandrov. If you are compelled to deliver the letter via the Foreign Ministry, the bracketed language should not rpt not be included in the text. Please let us know immediately (by Nodis Alpha cable) to whom the letter was given and whether the bracketed language was included.²
3. Begin text: Dear Mr. Chairman:

On his recent return to Moscow, Ambassador Hartman conveyed to Foreign Minister Gromyko some of my thoughts on the current direction of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. I continue to believe that despite the profound differences between our two nations, there are opportunities—indeed a necessity—for us to work together to prevent conflicts, to expand our dialogue, and to place our relationship on a more stable and constructive footing. Though we will be vigorous in protecting our interests and those of our friends and allies

we do not seek to challenge the security of the Soviet Union and its people. We are ready to deal seriously and positively with you and your government in an effort to reach mutually acceptable and beneficial solutions to the problems in our relationship. I will be stressing these themes in my public statements over the coming weeks, and hope that my desire to build a more stable relationship will be reciprocated on your part.

In considering the issues now confronting our nations. I especially regret the decision of the Soviet Union not to continue negotiations for the reduction and elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces. Since your August 27 letter to me,³ both our governments made new proposals. For our part, we have sought to address particular Soviet concerns, but have not yet seen a comparable readiness on the Soviet side. The negotiations have reached a stage which suggests the potential for forward movement in some areas; clearly, however, much more needs to be done. Thus, I see no justification for an interruption of these talks, particularly since for two years we were willing to negotiate while you deployed new missiles.

As I have pledged, both publicly and privately, the United States seeks and will accept any equitable, verifiable agreement that stabilizes forces at equal, but much lower levels than now exist. I still feel that zero on both sides is the best solution. We are, of course, prepared to continue the search for an agreement. It is only through serious negotiations that the reduction and eventual elimination of the weapons over which the Soviet Union has voiced such public concern can be achieved.

This also is true as regards reductions in our respective strategic nuclear arsenals. As you are aware, over recent months we have made significant modifications to our

position in the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks. We will continue to insist that any START agreement be meaningful—that it lead to real reductions in the most destabilizing categories of ballistic missile systems, as measured by their warheads, and in the overall destructive power of our two strategic forces. In seeking a lower and more stable strategic balance, however, we do not insist on identical force structures.

Any successful negotiation must eventually embody a balance between the interests and advantages of both sides. If the Soviet Union is prepared to agree to meaningful reductions in ballistic missile warheads and destructive power, where it holds the advantage, the United States is prepared to accept more stringent limits on heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles, where it possesses certain advantages. If we could achieve a balance of capabilities in this manner, we would be able to develop a common framework for carrying out strategic arms reductions. Thus far, however, our efforts to explore what types of reciprocal concessions might bring our interests into balance have been rebuffed. I urge you to reconsider carefully our latest proposals, for I believe they offer an approach which could be fruitful. I would welcome your own thoughts in this regard. We are prepared for a serious and confidential dialogue on this issue.

(If you would find it helpful, I am prepared to send to Moscow a personal emissary who is thoroughly familiar with my thinking on this issue to deal with you or your designee directly. He could explore the possibilities of this approach—or others you might wish to suggest—with you and your advisers in private, on a totally confidential and unofficial basis.)⁴

Efforts to achieve bilateral arms control, however, constitute only one part of our relationship, and their benefits can be undercut by actions and events in other areas. I must particularly note the dangers posed by an escalation of tensions in any of the world's troubled regions. The Middle East is one of these, and I am sure you appreciate the dangers inherent in the turmoil in Lebanon. Though we may not be able to agree on the causes of this tragic situation, or on the steps necessary to restore peace to the region, I believe it is incumbent on both our governments to use our influence to urge restraint on all the parties and to curb the resort to violence. This, also, is one of the topics which might benefit from a more detailed private discussion.

These are only a few of the issues that divide us, but all of them underscore the need for a meaningful dialogue between us. Events seem to have forced us both to communicate largely through the public media, which obviously undermines our ability to reach practical solutions. While I am under no illusions as to the difficulty of the problems we now face, I nonetheless believe that serious and forthright exchanges could open up avenues to mutually beneficial arrangements. In this connection, I hope that Foreign Minister Gromyko will be able to meet with Secretary Shultz in Stockholm in January, and that we can establish a pattern of regular high-level consultations, along with confidential exchanges of views at other levels.

You have pledged to me your commitment to peace and I have made a similar and heartfelt pledge to you. In your letter of August 27, you wrote of "the need for a broad, considered approach and for taking bold political decisions looking to the future." If you are indeed prepared to take such an approach and to make far-reaching decisions and, by doing so, to address in a tangible way some of the basic

causes for divisions between our two nations, then you will not find the United States lacking for a positive response comparable in scope.

I await your thoughts on these matters, and on any others which you feel we should address in a joint search for ways to move relations between our countries in a more positive direction.

Sincerely, Ronald Reagan

End text.

Dam

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, E.4, President/Andropov Correspondence. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Hill; cleared in S/S-O and by McFarlane; approved by Dam. Sent for information Immediate to Shultz. A handwritten note reads: "Letter delivered to Gromyko on 12/24—no cable (reported by phone)."

² In a note to Shultz on December 20, Poindexter wrote: "Mr. Secretary, The President has approved the attached draft. The bracketed language on page 3 should be included only if Amb. Hartman is permitted to deliver the letter directly to Andropov." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) December 1983) A handwritten note on the attached copy of the telegram reads: "Bracketed information was *not* included." See [footnote 4, below](#).

³ See [Document 81](#).

⁴ This paragraph, the bracketed text referenced in [footnote 2, above](#), was not included in the text given to Gromyko, See [Document 150](#).

150. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, December 26, 1983, 1448Z

15915. Subject: Letter to Andropov. Ref: State 363464.²

1. Secret—Entire text.
2. Upon receipt reftel December 24, I immediately requested through MFA an appointment with Andropov or an assistant such as Aleksandrov. On December 26 I was given an appointment with Gromyko at 3:00 p.m. local, and delivered to him the version of the message without repeat without paragraph regarding special emissary. Gromyko was accompanied by USA Division Chief Bessmertnykh and an interpreter. I was alone.
3. Gromyko explained that Andropov was busy with the preparations for this week's activities (a Supreme Soviet session, presumably preceded by a Party Plenum), and Andropov had thus asked him to receive the message on his behalf. Gromyko opened the message and read through it.
4. Gromyko said he would not attempt to respond on the spot, but he did seek clarification whether the paragraph concerning ballistic missiles pertained to START. I indicated that it did.
5. He said he could react to the paragraph concerning a meeting with the Secretary in Stockholm. It had been decided that he would attend the opening of CDE, and he would be prepared to meet with the Secretary.

6. As for the remainder of the message, he thought we would receive a Soviet response soon. It was not clear whether he meant at Stockholm or before.

7. Gromyko said Andropov and he had received New Year's greeting cards from the President and asked me to convey their thanks. The President would be receiving New Year's greetings from the Soviet leaders in the near future.

8. I told Gromyko I planned to say nothing public about this meeting. Gromyko interjected that it was always Washington that had something to say about such meetings. I reiterated that I did not plan to comment on it, nor on the information Gromyko had provided about his intentions for Stockholm. Obviously, the two sides would have to have some further contact on the timing of a Stockholm meeting.

9. Comment: All my previous meetings with Gromyko have been announced by TASS. I do not know how they will treat this one, but if announced I do not plan to offer any comment on the purpose of the meeting.

Hartman

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (12/20/83-12/28/83); NLR-748-24-46-6-5. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Reagan initialed this copy of the telegram, indicating that he saw it.

² See [Document 149](#).

151. Report Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, December 28, 1983

SPOT COMMENTARY: Andropov's Status

UPI reports this morning that a member of the party Central Committee said that Andropov had been hospitalized and would not attend the Supreme Soviet session today.² This source said that Andropov had planned to attend but was told by his doctors to remain in bed. The Central Committee member said that Andropov's specific medical problem was a state secret, but said the problem was not related to his kidneys, and would not normally be a problem for a younger man. He said that Andropov was alert and following the proceedings of the Supreme Soviet closely. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Comment: Although Andropov has been out of public view since August, we do not believe he has been ill the whole time. It is likely that since about mid-October he has had more than one setback to his health, and a partial recovery that allowed him to conduct some official activities behind the scenes. [*2 lines not declassified*] The above report is the first authoritative flat denial that his current absence is related to his kidneys, but this does not mean that he has no kidney problems at all. In fact, the Kohl delegation was told last July that he had missed an appointment due to the pain of passing a kidney stone.³ [*portion marking not declassified*]

Soviet secrecy may have added to Andropov's political problem, making it seem that his long absence might be

due to a single prolonged medical crisis. [*1 line not declassified*].

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (12/20/83-12/28/83); NLR-748-24-46-8-3. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Prepared by [*3 names not declassified*]. Reagan initialed this copy of the report, indicating that he saw it.

² The Supreme Soviet met in Moscow on December 28.

³ See [footnote 4, Document 60](#).

152. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 4, 1984

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Dobrynin, January 3, 1984

Dobrynin came in to see me on my first day in the office following his return from Moscow December 23. He had instructions responding to questions I had asked him before he left for Moscow,² and he appeared to be in a businesslike mood.

My questions essentially asked whether the Soviets are ready for serious private dialogue with us. Dobrynin said he had been instructed by his government to say that they are ready for such a dialogue. He was authorized to conduct personally whatever such discussion we desire. However, he added, they also consider that Art Hartman in Moscow is an appropriate channel for this private dialogue.

Recognizing that Gromyko and I are to meet for some three hours later in the month,³ Dobrynin stressed that the Soviets are not interested in dialogue for the sake of dialogue; dialogue must have content. He asked me what I thought should be discussed in Stockholm.

I agreed that content would be the key to any constructive dialogue, and made the point that each side should be free to bring any issue to the table. On the Stockholm meeting, I said I thought we should review our relationship and how it should be conducted, including mechanisms. On substance, I thought we should discuss arms control (principally START, INF and compliance, but also CDE, MBFR and

confidence-building measures) and regional issues (principally the Middle East, but southern Africa and Afghanistan as well). I told Dobrynin I would also want to discuss human rights. Characteristically he asked why; I replied because of the importance of human rights issues to you and to Americans generally. I said I saw no big bilateral problems on which Gromyko and I needed to spend much time in Stockholm, but added that there might be bilateral issues for others to discuss.

I told Dobrynin that if the Soviets want further discussion of the Stockholm agenda I am ready for it, but it could also be conducted by Rick Burt and his deputy Sokolov.

Dobrynin then referred to your letter to Andropov delivered December 24,⁴ and asked specifically what the language on START meant when it spoke of a common framework embodying a balance between the interests and advantages of both sides. I replied that we are prepared to look for a common framework that accommodates the different force structures of the two sides.

Dobrynin also asked about the language concerning “confidential exchanges of views at other levels” besides me and Gromyko. On this, I said that there might be certain issues on which we could designate others if this seemed appropriate.

In general, we agreed that the next step should be for both sides to begin setting out content for productive dialogue. At the same time, we also agreed that as that process moves along, it would be worthwhile to step back from time to time and have a more philosophical exchange on how different systems can relate to one another. I recalled talks I had had with then-Premier Kosygin about how free-market and centrally-planned economies can deal with

each other.⁵ Dobrynin's examples, such as the Kennedy-Khrushchev understandings on Cuba, had less to do with differences between systems than with the advantages of private channels like this one for handling sensitive issues between the two countries.

Dobrynin then asked how I saw U.S.-Soviet relations shaping up in 1984. I replied that I saw a question mark here: we want dialogue, but also recognize that things can get out of hand, particularly over differences concerning regional issues like the Middle East. I said I expected the world economy to improve this year, and also noted it would be an election year for us. In this respect, however, I said that although political pundits disagree on how this would affect U.S.-Soviet relations, I expect you will play it straight and determine your policy on the basis of what is good for the country, without reference to partisan politics.

Dobrynin responded that the Soviets would respond to anything constructive from Washington even though it is an election year. I could not tell whether he was expressing an official view or only speaking for himself, but this could mean that the Soviets will not intervene in U.S. domestic politics during the coming months.

Mention of our election gave me the opening to ask Dobrynin about what is going on in Moscow. I said we had some sense of a transitional atmosphere there and invited him to comment.

Dobrynin replied that while in Moscow he had visited Andropov at home, and Andropov had asked him questions about what is going on here. Andropov seems to be conducting business at home, and Politburo members see him regularly there. Dobrynin said he had tried to get Armand Hammer⁶ in to see Andropov at home, but the

basic decision had been taken not to receive visitors other than insiders. When I asked about Andropov's illness, Dobrynin replied that he did not know, and had not asked, noting that such matters are more sensitive in the Soviet Union than here. But he did say that during his own visit with Andropov, he (Dobrynin) reached for something Andropov wanted, implying that Andropov has some incapacity in arm movements at least. Politically, however, the agenda for the Politburo's regular Thursday sessions was set by Andropov, and his decisions on issues are final. I am passing these observations to Bill Casey.

Overall, Dobrynin's comments left the impression that Andropov is operating the government from his residence, but is acting as a decisive leader at that distance. For my part I commented that as far as we are concerned there is a functioning Soviet government and we are prepared to deal with it.

In conclusion, Dobrynin said he had to raise one "unpleasant matter" and handed me the text of an "oral statement" protesting our declaration of areas of the Mediterranean as a "zone of dangerous activities of the U.S. Navy."¹ I said we would study the démarche and respond appropriately. The text of the démarche is being transmitted to the NSC staff by a Hill-McFarlane memorandum.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/03/84-01/04/84). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt on January 3. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. A handwritten note on a Department of State copy of this memorandum reads: "Original Sec/Pres hand carried by GPS to WH." A telegram was drafted for Hartman in

Moscow on January 4 reporting on this meeting. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 2C, 1984—Soviet Union—January)

² The last meeting between Shultz and Dobrynin before the holiday break was on November 18. See [Document 137](#).

³ Shultz and Gromyko were scheduled to meet in Stockholm on January 18. See [Document 159](#).

⁴ See [Document 149](#).

⁵ During Shultz's tenure as Secretary of the Treasury, he met with Soviet Premier Kosygin in October 1973. See [Document 191, footnote 2 in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXI, *Foreign Economic Policy, 1973-1976*](#).

⁶ Armand Hammer, President of Occidental Petroleum

⁷ The translated text of the Soviet oral statement reads: "The United States of America, in violation of generally recognized standards of international law and the principles of freedom of seafaring, has declared a vast area of the Mediterranean adjacent to the coast of Lebanon 'a zone of dangerous activities of the U.S. Navy' and established in that zone a special regime for international navigation.

"Introducing these arbitrary restrictions, the American side, in fact, lays claim to having a part of the high seas under its sovereignty, which is in flagrant conflict with the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1958 to which the U.S. is a party, too.

"The Soviet side declares a resolute protest in connection with this arbitrary and unlawful act of the U.S., does not recognize the restrictions introduced by the United States, and warns that the entire responsibility for the consequences of that act will be borne by the American side.

“At the same time, we call the attention of the U.S. Government to the fact that its actions near the coast of Lebanon cannot fail to aggravate even further the already extremely tense situation in the entire region. The American side should realize what such a dangerous policy can lead to in terms of developments in the Middle East and even beyond that region.” (Telegram 998 to Moscow, January 4; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840030-0732)

153. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 5, 1984

SUBJECT

Soviet Gameplan—The Near Term

Looking back on 1983, we can point to some signal successes in the superpower competition. INF deployment is merely the most notable in a list of achievements that also includes the continued implementation of other major defense programs, the liberation of Grenada, a stronger position in Central America, and improved relations with the PRC. Looking ahead to 1984, we foresee significant opportunities for further progress, including some that could crystallize a shift in what the Soviets call the global correlation of forces. If we can capitalize on these opportunities (which were discussed in our previous memorandum on Soviet client relationships),² the Soviets may become substantially more responsive to our counsels of self-restraint and our proposals for constructive dialogue.

In the near term, however, we will have to contend with a strong Soviet impulse to challenge and defy us. Although the Soviets doubtless recognize that their scare tactics might backfire, they seem to have concluded that a freeze in US-Soviet relations offers the best hope for undermining domestic and allied support for the Administration's policies. This is clearly their direction at present, and they will be extremely reluctant to change course before the US elections. Although there are undoubtedly hypothetical

offers that they could not refuse, we have no intention of making unilateral concessions that would vindicate Soviet tactics and jeopardize our basic strategy. At the same time, Moscow is not at all likely to evince much interest in “small steps” like those that figured so prominently in our earlier gameplan (e.g., cultural exchanges, consular agreements, or merely cosmetic changes in arms control positions). Efforts to stimulate a dialogue in this way will almost certainly fail.

In this situation, our only responsible choice may be to keep our powder dry and wait the Soviets out. In the interim we can count on adroit public diplomacy to ensure that Moscow bears full responsibility for our deadlocked relations. And we can rely on our continued efforts to strengthen ourselves and our allies to deter Soviet attempts to “retaliate” for our recent successes and inflict a humiliating defeat. Since the present Soviet leadership is not particularly dexterous in public diplomacy, nor prone to reckless adventurism, such a steady-as-you-go strategy has much to recommend it.

This prescription, however, does not address, much less resolve a number of dangerous problems around which Soviet-American confrontation could grow. It may also foster an impression of an inactive, even failed foreign policy, and may not dispel the public anxieties that a freeze aims to arouse. Before settling on it, therefore, we should canvass prudent but substantive overtures that might revive high-level dialogue, and interest the Soviets enough to moderate their course.

No initiative would have greater weight, both with Western publics and with a skeptical Soviet leadership, than a reshaped, and much less ambitious, START package. It would ease our alliance management tasks and might

encourage a Soviet policy review as well. At the same time, no other step would look as much like weakness under pressure. Whether to move on this front is the key issue facing the President in the short term.

A second arms control initiative that could be a useful signal to the Soviets is a revised MBFR proposal. Yet despite the responsiveness of such a step both to European concerns and to Soviet claims that we “owe” them a new offer, it would be unlikely to affect Moscow’s overall assessment and might not even bring them back to the table in Vienna.

We have also identified three other candidate initiatives that may deserve consideration, especially in the absence of movement on START. These include opening a more operational discussion of Lebanon and Nicaragua, and an exchange on fundamental issues of European security. Early results are unlikely, but merely launching such initiatives may help to reduce misunderstandings that could lead to crisis. None of these steps is completely risk-free, but we believe the risks can be made manageable and must in any event be weighed against the risks of a deepening US-Soviet freeze.

1. *A Lebanon initiative:* As you know, the Soviets have shown some interest recently in discussing the situation in Lebanon—the only case where US and Soviet forces could be directly embroiled. Picking up on their all-but-official hints, we might indicate our willingness to discuss US policy and presence in Lebanon in conjunction with Soviet policy and presence in Syria. Plainly we have to avoid making our Mideast policy as a whole hostage to Moscow, or granting the Soviets an institutionalized role in the security management of the region. There may, however, be a workable match between our interest in a Lebanese

reconciliation and an orderly withdrawal of US troops, on the one hand, and Soviet interest in avoiding a superpower confrontation through Syrian actions, on the other.

In such exchanges, we could explore what might be necessary to gain Soviet pressure on Syria and her Lebanese allies, support for the process of Lebanese reconciliation, and agreement to a broader role for UNIFIL. Although growing domestic pressure to withdraw our MNF contingent will weaken our bargaining position, the Soviets probably tend to overestimate our staying power and may be ready to pay at least a small price to reduce their own exposure and gain some credibility as a regional problem-solver. The limits on Moscow's leverage with Syria may be a further obstacle, but from the Soviet point of view they are also a reason to seek an accommodation with us.

2. *A Nicaragua initiative:* Central America is the other region in which Moscow may perceive the prospect of a significant near-term reverse, involving not only the loss of another client regime (through overthrow or apostasy under pressure) but possible collateral US action against Cuba as well. In this situation, the Soviets may be more willing than in the past to distance themselves from their regional clients, both militarily (by curtailing weapons supplies) and politically (by pressuring Nicaragua to cut off the Salvadoran insurgents and ending their own, Soviet, support for the FMLN). Without launching a real negotiation with Moscow, we would for our part need to demonstrate that in promoting a process of internal reconciliation in Nicaragua we are not determined to bring down the regime in Managua. Admittedly, we might thereby help the Soviets to claim that they had gained US respect for Nicaraguan and Cuban security and legitimacy. This would be only a claim, however: we would do and say nothing even remotely implying a guarantee of the

Sandinistas' survival, much less sanctioning a Soviet role in perpetuating the regime.

3. *European security initiative*: Although the Soviets may continue to boycott all other East-West arms talks, they will participate actively in CDE and seek to broaden its agenda. While we must insist on a narrower agenda in this forum, Moscow's interest in an across-the-board discussion of European security could offer an opportunity for constructive conversations outside the CDE framework. You may want to raise with Gromyko the idea of bilateral discussions to explore each side's views on the military threat in Europe.

In addressing this issue, we would focus on the military problem that underlies NATO's sense of insecurity but that we have almost never raised directly with the Soviets—i.e., the massive Soviet offensive threat on the central front. At the same time, we would want the Soviets to see how their interest would be served as well as ours. Agreements that addressed the basic military sources of insecurity in Europe in a meaningful way would also make many other East-West issues look quite different. Many of our arms control positions, for example, would be subject to re-examination. With enough Soviet interest in meeting our concerns, we would have more flexibility in meeting theirs. Although these discussions will not lead to a real meeting of minds, they could help to clarify some of our policies and purposes for a highly insular Soviet leadership.

Channels

If convincingly briefed to the Soviets before Stockholm, these initiatives might go some distance to producing a less sterile and confrontational meeting there with Gromyko.

These preliminary talks, which might be fuller than the usual pre-ministerial exchanges, are probably best conducted in existing ambassadorial channels. Except for a new START proposal they are unsuitable for inclusion in a Presidential speech, but could and should be part of a letter to Andropov following the speech.

If your meeting with Gromyko suggests any Soviet interest in initiatives apart from START, we will have to consider what channels to propose by way of follow up. The possibilities include both old and new channels. For example, discussions of the Middle East and Central America (which might be less artificial if conducted separately) could be led either by ambassadors, Assistant Secretary-level contacts *a la* Crocker-Ilichev, or perhaps by special emissaries.

The more novel perspective on European security might fruitfully be put forward in informal consultations led by the Department of Defense, or at least with high-level DoD participation. Alternatively, the President might designate a distinguished outsider or two (Brent Scowcroft, for example) to conduct a round of talks. We have long advocated military-to-military contacts; informal discussions might be a good start.

Beyond these more focused exchanges, S/P, EUR and NSC staff have discussed the idea of "policy planning talks" as a flexible medium for exploring the long-term perspectives of each side. Such talks would seem to meet our current interest in broadening the bilateral discussion in a realistic way that takes up the most important questions. You might want to propose to Gromyko that he consider a trip to Moscow by some members of the Policy Planning Council, perhaps joined by a high-level NSC representative to add Presidential weight.

Conclusion

As argued earlier, US initiatives in START would do more than any other steps to revive a Soviet-American dialogue, and to create the impression that relations had turned a corner. For the other initiatives described above, including a new offer in MBFR, the forecast must be much more cautious. Even if the Soviets were intrigued by them, they would be unlikely to return to the INF bargaining table and might well continue to boycott other arms talks. Furthermore, because the channels we have in mind would be largely confidential, they would not do much in the short term to relieve public concern about a breakdown of East-West communication. We would in fact have to expect continuing Soviet exploitation of this concern even as we talked in private.

Nevertheless, on-going consultations and exchanges could make the Soviets more cautious about waging the sort of all-out competition that would exacerbate public anxieties about the risk of war. And over the longer term, if these exchanges began to make progress, they would have an increasingly open impact on the relationship and on concrete problems dividing us. This could further increase Soviet caution and ease public fears. And even if they do not make progress, we will be free to let the story out as we desire; a failed effort could still pay a political return, by strengthening our efforts to increase public understanding of why our relations are deadlocked and what conclusions should be drawn as a result.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 1/1-15/83. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Forwarded

through Eagleburger. Eagleburger's Executive Assistant, William Montgomery, initialed for Eagleburger. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. McKinley's handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on January 5. In a covering memorandum to Shultz, Bosworth wrote: "The attached memorandum is an effort by Jeremy Azrael and Steve Sestanovich to identify some US initiatives that may deserve consideration as you prepare for your meeting with Gromyko. We are aware that each of these initiatives raises serious bureaucratic, political, and strategic problems. However, we are also conscious of the problems that could arise from a continued stalemate in US-Soviet relations and believe that this is the almost certain outcome of our standing pat on attempting to revive our former 'small step' gameplan." See [footnote 4](#), [Document 31](#).

² See [Document 139](#).

154. Memorandum From the Deputy White House Chief of Staff (Deaver) and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 5, 1984

SUBJECT

Your Speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations

We have considered carefully your initial reactions to the State draft of your speech on U.S.-Soviet relations: that it seemed to put too much into one speech, that it contained nothing newsworthy and covered no new ground, and that it was pedestrian.² We agree on all points, and the speech writers have worked on the text to compress it and make the language less pedestrian. However, we believe that there are good reasons for making it comprehensive and leaving out startling new initiatives.

Objective

We believe the principal reason you need to make the speech at this time is to *articulate clearly and comprehensively your policy toward the Soviet Union.*

You have of course done so in the past, but the coherent view you are following has not gotten through to all segments of our public or to Allied publics. There is unfounded fear that your policies are leading to confrontation and raising rather than lowering the risks of nuclear war. There is confusion in some quarters as to how you square a realistic view of the Soviet system and opposition to their ideology with a readiness to negotiate.

There are charges that past rhetoric has impeded accommodation. And in Europe particularly there is a perception among many elite groups that your thinking is dominated by militarism and that you are too quick on the trigger.

To clear up these serious and fundamental misconceptions, we need an authoritative statement which puts your approach in a comprehensive framework. This can provide a firm basis for our public and private diplomacy for the balance of the year and beyond.

Audience

You will be, in effect, addressing four important audiences simultaneously:

- U.S. opinion makers;
- West European governments and publics;
- Soviet leaders; and
- The Soviet people.

The principal message we need to get across to each is:

U.S.: The world is not more dangerous, but safer as the result of your policies and we are strong enough to negotiate.

Europe: You have a coherent, responsible strategy for dealing with the Soviets and are serious in the desire to negotiate.

Soviet leaders: You are willing to deal with them as valid negotiating partners, on a basis of equality, whatever you

think of their system, but will insist that negotiations be directed to real problems and that solutions be fair and verifiable.

Soviet people: You wish them well and are not threatening them. You recognize and reciprocate their desire for peace.

We believe that the draft works in each of these messages and puts them into a coherent overall framework. While you have said all this before, it is important to put it together to demonstrate the inner consistency of your policy.

Newsworthiness

Even if the speech covers no new ground, we believe it will attract major attention. The overall tone and approach will be considered news—even if it shouldn't be. This will be particularly true in Europe, and European perceptions will play back here as well.

The speech as written is obviously too detailed and complex to be fully appreciated by the average citizen. But we do not consider this a defect, given its primary objective. To make it simpler and less detailed, and thus enhance its mass appeal, would militate against achieving its objective with influential elites. Their attitude seeps gradually to the public at large, especially in Europe.

It is possible, of course, to introduce a new initiative into the speech—such as, for example, a proposal for cooperation in space. However, this has certain dangers: (1) headline writers are likely to concentrate on the new initiative rather than the overall policy enunciated; (2) the Soviets would consider a proposal made first in a public speech as merely a propaganda ploy; and (3) some

Americans and West Europeans might also consider it a sort of grandstanding unlikely to bear real fruit. We believe it is preferable to devote this speech to a sober exposition of our overall policy and save specific policy initiatives for later speeches, following some consultation with the Soviets.³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR, President's Soviet Speech (01/16/84) (2). Secret. Sent for information. Prepared by Matlock. A copy was sent to the Vice President. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. Additionally, a stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner indicates that he saw it.

² Reagan wrote in his diary on January 6: "Met with speechwriters re the Soviet speech. We want it to be a level headed approach to peace to reassure the eggheads & our European friends I dont plan to blow up the world." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 305) As Matlock later recalled the evolution of the speech: "I sent my preliminary draft to Mark Palmer in the State Department for amplification, correction, and general vetting, then obtained approval from both Shultz and McFarlane before it went to the president for his review. After reading it, he asked Michael Deaver, deputy chief of staff—and close personal friend of the Reagans—and Richard Darman, Chief of Staff James Baker's assistant, to meet with us to discuss it. Both were associated with the faction in the White House that encouraged the president to establish an active dialogue with the Soviet Union.

“Deaver began the meeting by commenting that the president thought the speech had too much material, covered no new ground, and was pedestrian. Darman asked who had drafted the text. With some trepidation, I admitted that I was the main culprit, though I had help from the State Department. Darman then relieved the tension by remarking, ‘I wondered, because it is the most coherent and reasoned speech draft I have seen in this administration.’ He went on to say that he could not understand the president’s reaction, because if the president found nothing new in it, most people who heard him would, and he was sure it would be eminently newsworthy.

“Of course, I was disappointed that Reagan found my text pedestrian, since I had tried to make it as appealing as the subject would allow. But it was more important to me to hear that he found ‘nothing new’ in the text. This meant that I had correctly guessed what he wanted his policy to be. In Reagan’s mind, the draft contained nothing more than what he had been saying all along. What he didn’t understand was the degree to which his intentions had been misinterpreted and misunderstood by much of the public.” (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, pp. 80-81)

³ According to Matlock’s subsequent account: “Reagan accepted the explanations in my memorandum and we proceeded to work on the text without adding anything of substance.” (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, p. 82)

155. Memorandum From Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, January 7, 1984

SUBJECT
Soviet Speech

In preparing for my trip to Turkey I have not had as much time as I would have liked to devote to the Soviet speech. I am concerned about the present draft, however, and wanted to pass on my basic thoughts to you.²

All of us agree that the time has come to demonstrate to a broader Western audience that we are not guided by a blind and uncomprehending form of anti-Sovietism. We have to send a message of reassurance, in part to resolidify support for the inevitable competition that we will continue to face and in part to rebut the Soviet argument that the world is becoming a more dangerous place.

The speech does convey a sense of reassurance, but it does so in a rather simple way. The speech will not impress either domestic or foreign audiences with its thoughtfulness, and it fails to send a very concrete message to the Soviets—a fact that will only help to contribute to the impression that we are aiming at an electoral audience rather than trying to achieve more durable substantive gains.

The emptiness of the message to the Soviets is particularly apparent, I think, in the presentation of “our goals” in the first half of the speech. Instead of anything concrete, these

include vague appeals to let the Third World focus on economic development, or to abolish nuclear weapons, or to stop stealing Western industrial secrets. I doubt these are appeals with much meaning for the Soviets, who speak a more sober language of power, security, and interest.

Just to take two obvious examples, the point about the Third World that Moscow would *best* understand (but which is not made in the current draft) is a statement that we are concerned about the risk of confrontations that are in neither side's interest. Similarly, the Soviets will not know what to make of the off-handed way compliance is treated in the section of the speech on establishing a better working relationship. They know this problem is coming and want to see how the President deals with it. In light of where we're likely to be by the time of the speech, we run a major risk of being misunderstood if we don't say more to indicate the gravity of our concern on this issue.

The speech, in my view, also needs to be more direct and candid about some of the difficulties that we face in trying to solve problems between us. If the President discusses these difficulties, his main message—the expression of a forthcoming desire to work on disagreements or conflicts—may in fact be taken even more seriously.

Having said this, I don't think that improving the speech requires starting over. One small change that might begin to move it in the right direction is to build on the important claim made at the beginning that we see some important potential "opportunities for peace" at this time. The President should then ask the question—what do we *and the Soviets* have to do to seize these opportunities?—and give concrete, thoughtful answers. In this way, the "goals" of the present draft would become "tasks," or "challenges," or problems to be solved.

By focusing on key immediate tasks rather than long-term goals the President would sound more programmatic and purposeful than he is likely to now. *He needs to sound as though his policy is designed to reach more than just distant and possibly unattainable goals.* (Each of these “tasks” or “challenges,” I might add, could usefully include some historical comparisons, indicating how the nature of the task is different or harder than in the past but also why the opportunity for progress now exists—after three years of trying to get our message across to Moscow.)

This change from “goals” to “tasks” would, with some significant re-drafting, send a different message in the entire first half of the speech. The talk about our desire to reduce the use of force would, for example, be made much less airy, focusing more on what each side has to do (and not do) to limit the risk of superpower conflict. This can sound tough but it has a constructive side. For example:

“We believe that the situation in the Middle East has been made more dangerous for all concerned by the introduction of thousands of additional Soviet military personnel into Syria in the past year. Our efforts in that region are aimed at limiting these dangers. This is just one of many situations around the world in which the Soviet Union could bring its influence to bear to reduce risks for both sides. The confidence created by such progress would be valuable in trying to deal with other aspects of our competition.”

Similarly, using the three tasks of U.S.-Soviet relations in the present draft, the President could say that the second task—reducing armaments—requires some serious thinking about how to increase strategic stability. Rather than simply try to top the Soviets in a vague commitment to a

non-nuclear world, we can challenge them with our commitment to specific negotiating measures. For example:

“Our thinking in the area of arms control has led us to embrace the build-down approach to reducing strategic weapons. [One sentence explaining build-down.] We wish the Soviet Union would do the same, and call on its leaders to do so. This is a time when we need more, not less discussion of this approach, for it is a formula that could make it possible for *both* sides to rethink many of their strategic programs.”

The Soviets would be greatly intrigued to hear a hint that we might not have to build everything we plan, and would begin to ask what systems this could mean. In short, we would have their interest.

As for the final task—developing a constructive working relationship—the President could again make hard points and soft—hard on issues like the need for compliance with past agreements, soft-sounding on the obvious fact that we are willing to work even for small improvements in the relationship.

I have gone over this first half of the speech at some length because once it is recast, the remainder can be devoted to elaborating our approach. I have fewer difficulties with the rest of the text as it now stands, but it too could be strengthened by more concreteness. (And by less rhetoric that could open us to ridicule. For example, the President can't say that “ignorance” is a common enemy of the U.S. and the USSR. The country with the world's largest censorship apparatus is *not* an enemy of ignorance!)

Finally, the concluding quote from JFK's American University speech is a useful reminder of how different our

job is from Kennedy's. He was lucky enough to be able to produce an agreement on a comparatively simple question—the test ban—in six weeks. Because we have much less chance of such breakthroughs, we have to give a more convincing proof that we are doing everything prudent to achieve them and that if we fail it will not be our fault. It just won't be enough to say "we all breathe the same air."³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR, President's Soviet Speech (01/16/84) (2). Confidential. Sent for information. Sestanovich wrote next to Fortier's name and initials: "(dictated and signed in his absence) S.S." Brackets are in the original.

² See [Document 154](#).

³ In a January 11 memorandum to McFarlane, Matlock informed him: "I am working on some more fundamental revisions in accord with Don Fortier's suggestions and should have these ready late today. Meanwhile, I recommend that you convey these suggested changes to the speechwriters." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/05/84) (2))

156. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, January 10, 1984

SUBJECT

The Situation in the Soviet Union and Recent Disinformation

You may have already seen the attached cable from Moscow citing the report of an "academic" who recently visited there (Tab I).² If you have not, I call it to your attention, because it is being widely circulated and may be influencing the thought of many of our analysts and, perhaps, policy makers. There is concern, however, that the report represents an attempt at disinformation by the Soviets and a possible agent of theirs.

Two factors contribute to this possibility. The first is the substance of the academic's report. It reflects one of the principal Soviet propaganda messages of recent months—namely that American "militarism" and "bellicosity" are fueling Soviet "paranoia." The second is the apparent source of the report—a certain East European emigre, who was once a member of the Communist Party in his native land. Everything, from the circumstances surrounding his immigration to this country, to his decade-long establishment of academic *bona fides* at a prominent university, to his subsequent policy recommendations and analytical pronouncements, to the very high-level entree he enjoys whenever he visits Moscow, contributes to the possibility that he may be a classic disinformation agent, perhaps one of the most effective of his kind in the U.S.A.

This report is only the latest bit of evidence pointing to this possibility.

Are the Soviets "Paranoid"?

The "academic" has reported that Soviet officials are growing increasingly "paranoid" and obsessed by fear of war—so much so that emotionalism and irrationality are now entering into play. As evidence for this, the source cites a "straight-faced claim" made to him by one official that the KAL flight was a deliberate provocation staged by the U.S.

Not only is this report of Soviet war "paranoia" preposterous, but, given the manner in which it and its supporting evidence are presented, it reflects either ignorance about the USSR or, more likely, deliberate disinformation. First of all, the Soviets are not, and in the post-war period never have been, "paranoid" about the United States. If paranoia signifies rational fear, the Soviets have had no cause to see any military or geopolitical threat from this country. They know very well that when we had nuclear monopoly and superiority, we refrained from using it to threaten the USSR. They know that when anticommunism was at its peak here in the 1950s, we did not even help the Hungarian resistance. The Soviets know that today there is even less of a political constituency for rendering such help. The idea that the Soviets could possibly have a rational fear of war instigated by the U.S. is simply implausible. The principal rational fear the Soviets have is of their own people and the possibility that foreign influences may spark a severe internal security problem. Given the degree to which they have sealed their society from most such influences and the means by which they are

conveyed, the Soviets have little cause to fear foreign instigation of this threat.

If paranoia signifies irrational fear—i.e., a form of insanity where actions taken are beyond the personal responsibility of the actors, this possibility is equally misleading. The only conditions under which this could be the case in the USSR would be if the leadership fell into the hands of an all-powerful dictator of the Stalin type whose personality and its aberrations would become de facto policy. This would require the end of collective leadership in the USSR—a condition that is nowhere in sight.

So long as collective, institutional leadership remains, Soviet policy will be formulated as it has been for years: decisions to advance or retreat (“two steps forward, one step back”) are made according to “scientific” assessments of the correlation of forces. Just because the U.S. is rebuilding its strength these days is no cause for Soviet strategists to entertain apocalyptic fears.³ It is a fundamental misinterpretation of the way the Soviets assess the correlation of forces to assert, as some are doing within the Administration, that we have handed the Soviet so many defeats recently that we have sent them reeling.

The Soviets see weaknesses in the West—from political polarization and “peace” movements to interests that compete with defense priorities for scarce resources—all of which mitigate any tendencies perceived to threaten their rule. Their failure to stop our deployments and split our alliance may give them cause for a little frustration—but only on account of their failure to move history forward as fast as they would like. To the contrary, in spite of their recent setbacks in Grenada and INF, the Soviets still are sanguine that the correlation of forces is in their favor. Their attempt last year to intervene so blatantly in the

German elections was indicative of an excessive optimism on their part—but was based nevertheless on a calculated risk that perhaps the correlation of forces was configured even more in their favor than they had been calculating. When it actually shifts to our favor is when we can expect them, as part of a strategic retreat, to abandon their intimidation strategy, renew their peace offensive and make those cosmetic concessions which kindle the hopes of many in the West that true accommodation with the USSR is possible.

Soviet “Paranoia” as a Disinformation Theme

The Soviets have used the paranoia idea as one of their key disinformation themes for decades. Notwithstanding accounts by Soviet military historians themselves that most military engagements conducted by Tsarist Russia were in fact aggressive Russian actions, the Soviet disinformation machine continues to repeat the myth about “traditional Russian insecurity”—as if the Russians had more cause to be insecure than anyone else.

As a disinformation theme, the Soviet paranoia and insecurity argument fulfills many useful purposes. Construed as a “self-defense plea” or an “insanity plea” it serves to legitimize aggressive Soviet acts—from the KAL shootdown to the invasion of Afghanistan. It also serves to obscure the nature of Soviet intentions—by attributing traditional great power security concerns to the Soviets while disguising their uniquely communist concerns and motivations. Finally, in the present context, it serves as part of the Soviets’ overall strategy of intimidation and deception. *By convincing the West that they are paranoid and perhaps even irrational, the Soviets encourage us to be*

wary of them and to treat them with kid gloves lest they lash out with irrational behavior.

That the source of this report should cite as evidence of irrationality a “straight-faced claim” by a Soviet official that KAL was a U.S. provocation reflects either ignorance or disingenuousness. The Soviets have made lying with a straight face standard operating procedure. Because of the nature of Soviet indoctrination, and the normal prescribed behavior for spouting the Party line, Soviet officials are capable of lying with extraordinary expressions of emotion and sincerity. The psychology of this ability may incorporate both genuine belief in the lie or, more often, simple, advanced, Soviet-style cynicism. The source’s personal background in Soviet bloc Communist Party politics suggests that his failure to raise the likelihood that cynical mendacity may be involved here (as distinct from genuine irrationality) is a disingenuous attempt to disinform Americans less trained in Soviet affairs. It is also important to note that the academic’s contacts in Moscow, Ponomarev, Zagladin, Arbatov, et al., make up the “A” Team of the Soviet disinformation apparatus. So, even if the source is not a witting disinformation agent, he could be serving as an unwitting conduit.

The Soviets and Our Presidential Elections

One other significant point of dubious reliability in this cable is the source’s assertion that “in their efforts to prevent the President’s reelection, the Soviets are determined not to allow him to assume the mantle of peacemaker.” It is possible that this is indeed the Soviet position. But it is equally possible, and even quite probable, that this assertion represents more disinformation.

It is by no means clear that the Soviets are certain of the best means by which to harm the President's reelection chances. And even if they were to hire America's finest political consulting firm to advise them on this, it is unlikely that such a firm could give them any sure-fire advice. By playing their current intimidation game and denying the President a START or INF agreement, they do not necessarily deny him the mantle of peacemaker. Rather, they supply him with further evidence that the President's peace-through-strength policy is what ultimately keeps the peace whatever the vagaries of treaty negotiations. In short, it is not easy to deny the President that mantle of peacemaker when the truth is on the President's side.

The Soviets, however, do have a motive in equating treaties and summitry with peacemaking and impressing this equation on the Western public mind. They hope that the public will brand the absence of treaties and summits as an absence of peaceableness. Further, they hope U.S. policy makers will swallow the same equation or at least be influenced by the public's ingestion of it. This, the Soviets hope, will spur the President to make negotiating concessions and create treaty loopholes through hasty treaty-drafting in the interest of reaching election year agreements.

RECOMMENDATION

That you share this memorandum with the President.⁴

¹ Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1984, 400010. Secret. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Matlock, deGraffenreid, Lehman, and Raymond. McFarlane's stamp appears on the memorandum,

indicating he saw it. McFarlane wrote in the margin: “John —Don’t you expect this was Seweryn Bialer? He has left a lot of people very nervous in Eur.” Seweryn Bialer was a professor of Political Science at Columbia University who focused on Soviet and contemporary Russian studies.

² Reference is to telegram 15409 from Moscow, December 10, not found attached. See [footnote 4](#), [Document 143](#) and [Document 144](#).

³ A checkmark was placed in the right margin next to this sentence, presumably by McFarlane.

⁴ McFarlane checked the Approve option.

157. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, January 11, 1984

SUBJECT

CIA Study on Soviet Thinking on the Possibility of Armed Confrontation with the United States

I believe the attached study (Tab I) is right on target as regards all its major judgments.² Specifically:

—The Soviet leadership is not overly nervous about the immediate prospect of armed confrontation with the U.S.;

—They are however very nervous about the prospects five to ten years down the road—not so much of a confrontation as such, as of a decisive shift in the balance of military power which would require them either to back down or accept the risk of confrontation. They genuinely fear our technological capacity and probably doubt that they could keep up if we went flat out. And just trying to keep up will put enormous pressures on their shaky system.

—Of all the regional disputes, they are probably most nervous about the Middle East, primarily because of the proximity of our forces there. In their eyes, they have acted prudently by not challenging directly our military actions in Lebanon. Israeli or (worse in their eyes) U.S. strikes on Syrian territory would be harder for them to tolerate—but they would probably do so. Still, they do not want to be faced with the choice.

One element which is not elaborated in the paper deserves attention. That is, the nature of Andropov's internal rule, as it is shaping up. I see increasing signs that it is in fact a sort of neo-Stalinism, with the emphasis on discipline and police controls, combined with pronounced Russian nationalism. These trends stem primarily from internal factors and Andropov's own personality, but have implications for foreign policy. In fact, we may have, in Andropov, a Soviet leader who has a policy stake in the appearance of tension, since it makes it easier to mobilize the population if the latter is convinced that there is an external threat. Therefore, while Andropov may be very careful not to provoke a real confrontation, he may see little merit in relaxed tensions for their own sake (as Brezhnev clearly did).

Tab I

**Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency³**

Washington, December 30, 1983

SOVIET THINKING ON THE POSSIBILITY OF ARMED CONFRONTATION WITH THE UNITED STATES

Summary

Contrary to the impression conveyed by Soviet propaganda, Moscow does not appear to anticipate a near-term military confrontation with the United States. With the major exception of the Middle East, there appears to be no region in which the Soviets are now apprehensive that action in support of clients could lead to Soviet-American armed collision. By playing up the "war danger," Moscow hopes to encourage resistance to INF deployment in Western

Europe, deepen cleavages within the Atlantic alliance, and increase public pressure in the United States for a more conciliatory posture toward the USSR. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Soviet policymakers, however, almost certainly are very concerned that trends they foresee in long-term US military programs could in time erode the USSR's military gains of the past fifteen years, heighten US political leverage, and perhaps increase the chances of confrontation. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Moscow's sense of pressure and challenge from the United States is probably magnified by difficult near-term policy dilemmas which US actions pose. The Kremlin must consider painful any increases in the rate of military spending; it must provide or deny additional assistance to client regimes under serious insurgent attack; and it must react to a sharp ideological offensive against communist rule at a time of growing public demoralization arising from stagnation in living standards in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Not surprisingly, Moscow is frustrated by and angry at the Reagan Administration. [*portion marking not declassified*]

1. Soviet rhetoric would suggest that Moscow believes the Reagan Administration has sharply increased the likelihood of armed confrontation between the United States and the USSR. Soviet spokesmen have accused the President and his advisers of "madness," "extremism" and "criminality" in the conduct of relations with the USSR. They have charged that the United States is pursuing a nuclear first strike capability and preparing to unleash nuclear war as a means of crushing communism. The Soviets maintain that the Reagan Administration is eager to apply military force in the Third World and has no intention of resolving its

differences with Moscow through negotiation. One Western visitor to Moscow was recently told that Andropov had sent a letter to all party organizations in October forcefully declaring that the fatherland was truly in danger. [*portion marking not declassified*]

2. Conversations by Westerners with Soviet citizens indicate that the “war danger” propaganda line is probably widely believed by the public at large, and that various elements of this line are accepted within the foreign policy advisory community. [*2 lines not declassified*] there was an obsessive fear of war, an emotionalism, and a paranoia [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that had not been present earlier.⁴ [*portion marking not declassified*]

3. The question of whether Soviet leaders actually believe that war could break out, and whether they are basing policy on such a judgment, is critical. If the answer to this question were positive, then Moscow would have a strong incentive to pre-empt the United States and might be so hypersensitive to US moves that the chances of accidental conflict would be greatly increased. In our view, however, Soviet leaders do not believe their own war danger propoganda and are not likely to base policy on it. Rather, they have a fundamental and transparent policy interest in making it appear to the world public that the USSR is dedicated to preserving the positive elements of the bilateral relationship, that the United States has been intransigent and irresponsible, and that the Soviet side is rightfully angry. Their purpose is to:

- Encourage continuing resistance to INF deployment by the “peace movement” in Western Europe.
- Create support for a restructuring of arms control talks on a basis more acceptable to Moscow.

- Foster a long-term shift in Western Europe toward neutralism.
- Deepen suspicions in West European governments of the motives and competence of the Reagan Administration.
- Increase public pressure in the United States for concessions to the USSR in future arms control negotiations.
- Undercut the President's reelection prospects.
[*portion marking not declassified*]

4. [1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]

5. Apart from the basic Soviet interest in fostering the appearance that confrontation with the United States could erupt at any moment, there are other strong reasons for skepticism that Soviet policymakers either believe this proposition or base policy on it:

- Moscow's inflexibility in its INF tactics, its suspension of arms negotiations, and its reduction of contacts with the United States, are not moves the Kremlin would have taken if it genuinely feared confrontation. Rather, it would have tried to keep the dialogue open in order to keep closely in touch with US intentions and lessen the chances of miscalculation.
- Soviet policymakers almost certainly realize that the developments most disturbing to them—full US INF deployment, the broad US strategic buildup, and strengthening of US general purpose forces—could influence the military balance only gradually, would

not affect the near-term US calculus of risks, and are still subject to substantial political uncertainty.

- Historically, Soviet policy has generally been driven by prudent calculation of interests and dogged pursuit of long-term objectives, even in the face of great adversity rather than by sudden swells of fear or anger.
- However disturbed Soviet policymakers might be by the Reagan Administration, they also have a sense of the USSR's strengths and of potential domestic and international vulnerabilities of the United States. They typically take a longer view of Soviet prospects, and the perception from the Kremlin is by no means one of unrelieved gloom. [*portion marking not declassified*]

6. These considerations imply that any anticipations of near-term confrontation that may exist in Moscow are likely to affect policy more at the margin than at the core. We believe this generalization is supported by how the Soviets probably assess the risk of conflict with the United States arising from two most likely quarters: nuclear-strategic rivalry, and competition in the Third World. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The Nuclear-Strategic Rivalry

7. Despite their impassioned rhetoric about the “nuclear danger,” we strongly believe that the Soviets are fundamentally concerned not about any hypothetical near-term US nuclear attack, but about possible five-to-ten year shifts in the strategic balance. In a TV interview on 5 December, the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Ogarkov, pointed to the factors that would presumably now deter

even the most hostile US administration from a deliberate first strike attempt—the large Soviet stockpile of nuclear weapons, diverse delivery systems, “repeatedly redundant systems of controlling them,” and the vulnerability of the United States to retaliation. And, in a speech on 18 December, Minister of Defense Ustinov stated there was no need to “dramatize” the current tense situation. [*portion marking not declassified*]

8. The Soviets probably do believe that US INF missiles, when fully deployed, would significantly affect their plans for conducting nuclear war. They think that the Pershing II is part of a broader US strategic plan to acquire forces to fight a limited nuclear war in the European theater, and that it would be able to strike critical strategic targets—particularly the Soviet command and control system—in the Western USSR, reducing Moscow’s confidence in its launch-on-tactical warning option. They probably believe their public assertion that the range of the Pershing II is 2,500 km rather than the 1,800 km claimed by NATO, which would—as they assert—substantially increase the vulnerability to a sudden disabling nuclear attack of the Soviet leadership and strategic command and control facilities located in the Moscow region. But they apparently were willing to run the risk of passing up a possible INF deal involving no Pershing II deployments, in order to pursue their maximum objective of no US INF deployment at all. They are aware that full INF deployment is not scheduled to be completed until 1988, that it will be attended by heavy political opposition in Western Europe, and that it could be aborted or limited. Their likely near-term countermeasures to INF deployment are not provocative, and do not appear to be emotionally inspired. In Europe, in fact, there has been no serious Soviet threatening, and efforts to woo the democratic Left and

maintain economic ties continue. [*portion marking not declassified*]

9. As INF deployment is completed about the same time new US strategic systems are being fielded, the Soviets could see a greater possibility of confrontation with the United States. We do not believe the Soviets think that deployment will decisively alter the strategic balance, but they could think it would embolden the United States to take more risks and increase the chance of accidental war. With the sharp reduction in warning time accompanying deployment of the Pershing IIs, the Soviets could also well fear—as some spokesmen have obliquely implied—that they themselves might mistakenly trigger a nuclear exchange. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Competition in the Third World

10. Despite the truculent mood in Moscow, we see no signs of any emerging general pattern of Soviet behavior risking armed confrontation with the United States in the Third World. Nor, by the same token, do we detect much fear that US actions in most parts of the Third World might precipitate an armed clash with Soviet forces that Moscow could not avoid. [*portion marking not declassified*]

11. The single case today in which Moscow clearly does foresee a heightened threat of armed confrontation with the United States is Syria-Lebanon. The Soviets almost certainly are apprehensive that the proximity of US and Soviet combat units could spark a direct conflict. They may also fear that the recent US-Israeli security agreement could increase the risk of a US-Soviet clash in the event of renewed major hostilities between Israel and Syria. The Soviets have given no sign of interest in attempting actively

to use their military resources in Syria and Lebanon to provoke Washington. And Moscow's public response to recent Syrian-US hostilities has been quite cautious. Yet, the Soviets have not been moved by fear of confrontation with the United States to qualify their support of Assad. Thus, in attempting to protect their equities in relations with Syria, they have assumed a posture toward a possible clash with the US that remains basically reactive. [*8½ lines not declassified*]

12. In attempting to make good on their threats, the Soviets might face choices that could lead directly to confrontation with the United States. But Moscow's capability to act militarily in the Lebanese-Syrian theater itself in ways that threatened armed confrontation with the United States is limited physically by severe constraints on the Soviet ability to project force rapidly into the region during hostilities, and would be influenced psychologically by considerable uncertainty about reactions that might be anticipated from the White House. The Soviets might agree to expand the number of Soviet advisers in Lebanon if the Syrians demanded this, but would strive hard to limit their combat exposure. They would probably prefer to ignore US-caused casualties among their advisers in Lebanon. At higher escalation levels, they might choose to increase their naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean if they had not already done so, dispatch some fighter aircraft to Syria, and deploy small numbers of airborne or naval infantry troops to rear areas in Syria—with the intention of showing the flag more and raising the deterrent tripwire. They would continue to provide warning data from their ships offshore to air defense units in Syria, would allow Soviet advisers with Syrian air defense units in Syria to participate in combat operations, and probably would authorize Soviet pilots already in Syria to fly combat missions within Syrian air space. They would try to use the

SA-5s only in defense of Syrian territory, and even then might restrain themselves if US attacks on Syrian targets were not extensive. They would certainly attempt to defend SA-5 sites against US strikes. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Soviet Concerns

13. Having asserted that the Soviets basically are not acting on the belief that war is likely to “break out” soon, we must add that in Moscow the Reagan Administration is nevertheless the least loved of any US administration since that of President Truman; that some Soviet officials may have talked themselves into believing their own war scare propaganda; and that the general level of frustration and anxiety surrounding relations with the United States is substantially higher than it was in the 1970s. [*portion marking not declassified*]

14. Soviet officials have perceived a hardening of US policy beginning in the latter part of the Carter Administration. But US actions since President Reagan’s election have heightened Soviet anxieties. The major foreign policy defeat represented by the initiation of INF deployment, the perceived unyielding current US posture in the START talks, the US action in Grenada, the deployment of marines in Lebanon, US aid to insurgencies against Soviet client regimes, the Reagan Administration’s perceived political “exploitation” of the KAL shootdown, and in general the Administration’s perceived unwillingness to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Soviet regime or to treat the Kremlin with the “superpower” deference it desires, appear to have combined to generate a sense of anger toward the United States among Soviet officials and a belligerent mood. [*portion marking not declassified*]

15. Moscow, moreover, is probably genuinely concerned or uncertain about several developments that seem to have changed the terms of reference in bilateral relations and could potentially increase the likelihood of hostilities between the United States and the USSR or constrain opportunities for Soviet political gains abroad. These include:

—A possible adverse shift downstream in the overall military balance with the United States arising from the acceleration of US defense spending, support in America for a broad range of new strategic force programs, and increased momentum behind development of US general purpose forces.

—The perceived lower priority accorded by the Reagan Administration to arms control negotiations with Moscow, its unwillingness to accommodate Soviet interests in arms talks, and its apparent intention of developing weapons systems that Moscow may have thought were blocked simply by the fact that arms talks were ongoing.

—The end of the “Vietnam syndrome” and readiness of Washington to use force once again in the Third World, either by supporting insurgencies against Soviet client regimes—as in Nicaragua, or acting directly—as in Lebanon and Grenada. [*portion marking not declassified*]

16. The immediate psychological and political impact of these developments—the enlivened sense of US pressure and “imperialist encirclement”—is probably greatly magnified by the difficult near-term policy dilemmas they pose for the Kremlin. In the defense area, US plans to deploy the Peacekeeper, R&D on the “Midgetman,”

development of the B1 and Stealth bomber, the beginning of deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs, development of precision guided munitions to attack armored forces, and announcement of a program to develop space-based defense systems confront Soviet leaders with a painful and possibly contentious choice of accelerating the growth of defense spending in the 1986-90 five-year plan. Decisions on the plan must be made over the next 12-18 months, and even the costs at the margin of slighting either investment or some improvement of living standards are clearly viewed by the Soviet leadership as very high indeed. [*portion marking not declassified*]

17. Insurgencies against client regimes also create unpleasant near-term policy choices which probably reinforce a certain siege mentality on Moscow's part. Instead of being on the attack, the USSR has been placed on the defensive. It is constrained either to up the ante of military and economic aid, or pay the price of loss of political influence. Increases in Soviet assistance carry with it possible indirect costs in relations with third parties. Not least, the existence of insurgencies casts an unwanted propaganda spotlight on the repressiveness of allies of the USSR. [*portion marking not declassified*]

18. While the Soviets have an obvious interest in portraying their own side as deeply offended by the militancy of the Reagan Administration's ideological offensive against communism, they probably do in fact find it quite unsettling. On a purely personal level, the top Soviet leadership undoubtedly does resent being challenged publicly by the President of the United States. More importantly, perhaps, Moscow is no longer inclined to treat the Administration's words as "rhetoric," but sees them as reflecting a serious policy aimed at actively exploiting political vulnerabilities across the board in the USSR and

the Soviet bloc. The Soviets are well aware of public malaise generated by stagnating consumption and corruption, and of repressed nationalism throughout their empire; and they do not discount the power of ideas to weaken compliance or—as in Poland—spark actual resistance. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Prospects

19. The Soviets have a number of options for dealing with the situation as they perceive it. They are probably still counting on the Reagan Administration overreaching itself and

- Revitalizing the “peace movement” in Western Europe.
- Fanning anti-Americanism in the Middle East, Central America and elsewhere in the Third World.
- Losing support among American voters.

Their response to INF deployment provides evidence that they have not abandoned hope of capitalizing upon such developments. [*portion marking not declassified*]

20. They could attempt to heighten the war of nerves by engaging in threatening military operations, conducting menacing military exercises or the like. Their approach here would have to be selective in order to avoid counteracting the attempt to depict the United States as the major threat to peace. So far they have not systematically engaged in such activities. To some extent their war scare propaganda has already backfired on them in Eastern Europe, where there has been considerable resistance to the emplacement of new Soviet missiles as a

“countermeasure” to NATO INF deployment. [*portion marking not declassified*]

21. They could also attempt through proxies to step up the pace of ongoing leftist insurgencies (for example, in Central America) or to provoke new armed conflicts that would, by forcing either US engagement or abstention, damage American interests. Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan, or Zaire, perhaps, might be candidates for such attention. However, there are important obstacles or disincentives in most instances to pressing destabilization too hard and too openly, and thus the attractiveness of currently available options along such lines is arguable. [*portion marking not declassified*]

22. If Soviet security concerns are basically long-term, as we believe, and are seriously felt, as is likely, we would expect that anxieties here would be expressed in an acceleration of the pace of military spending in the 1986–90 five-year plan. The current tense superpower environment will probably increase the pressures on the Politburo to accept “worst-case” threat assessments and stipulations of requirements from military planners—despite the further strain this would place on an already taut economy. The extent of such a response, however, might not be visible to us for several years. [*portion marking not declassified*]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, System II Intelligence Files—INT #2, Folder #2, 8490035–8890278. Secret. Sent for information. McFarlane’s stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it. He also wrote in the margin: “Jack—I have sent this to Shultz & Casey asking their views on” and drew an arrow to the final paragraph of the memorandum.

² In a covering memorandum forwarding Matlock's memorandum and the CIA intelligence report to Shultz and Casey on January 21, McFarlane commented: "I have read Bill Casey's analysis (Tab B) of Soviet thinking about the prospect of conflict with the U.S. and believe it reflects an accurate portrayal of the strategic realities which are tending in a more stable direction. Jack Matlock has done a one-page commentary which I also concur in (Tab A). I was especially drawn to Jack's last paragraph in which he characterizes the regime's style and strategy. I would welcome any reactions you might have to Jack's characterization." Shultz replied on January 23: "Bud: Thanks for your note enclosing Jack Matlock's comment on the 'Soviet Thinking' memo. Jack's view is insightful. This interplay (Gates-Matlock) could be useful in our Saturday a.m. sessions." (Ibid.) Tab B is the December 30 Intelligence Memorandum printed below. Tab A is Matlock's January 11 memorandum printed here.


³ Secret; NoFORN; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Prepared in the Foreign Policy Issues Branch, Policy Analysis Division, Office of Soviet Analysis. McFarlane wrote in the margin: "Jack Matlock, This is almost congruent to my analysis. What do you think? Bud 1-10-84."

⁴ The Embassy reported this in telegram 15409 from Moscow, December 10. See [footnote 4](#), [Document 143](#) and [Documents 144](#) and [156](#).

158. Editorial Note

On January 16, 1984, President Ronald Reagan delivered a televised address at 10 a.m. from the East Room of the White House, titled an “Address to the Nation and Other Countries on United States-Soviet Relations.” In the November 19 Small Group meeting, (see [Document 138](#)), the participants discussed the need for a speech to clarify U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union. Jack Matlock, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs on the NSC Staff, started drafting the speech in November, anticipating it would be delivered some time in December. Matlock had a draft completed in mid-December but the speech was postponed until January. See [Documents 154](#) and [155](#).

Reagan began the address, which became known as the “Ivan and Anya” speech for its appeal to common Soviet citizens: “During these first days of 1984, I would like to share with you and the people of the world my thoughts on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace—relations between the United States and Soviet Union.” He continued: “Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialog as serious and constructive as possible—a dialog that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive working relationship.” After saying that the United States “must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals, provide greater stability, and build confidence,” Reagan stated: “Our policy toward the Soviet Union—a policy of credible deterrence, peaceful competition, and constructive cooperation—will serve our

two nations and people everywhere. It is a policy not just for this year, but for the long term. It's a challenge for Americans; it is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us halfway, we will be prepared to protect our interests and those of our friends and allies. But we want more than deterrence. We seek genuine cooperation. We seek progress for peace. Cooperation begins with communication. And, as I've said, we'll stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting this week with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations. Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best in the Soviet Union." Reagan concluded by stressing: "If the Soviet government wants peace, then there will be peace. Together we can strengthen peace, reduce the level of arms, and know in doing so that we have helped fulfill the hopes and dreams of those we represent and, indeed, of people everywhere. Let us begin now." For the full text, see [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 182](#) .

Reagan wrote in his diary that evening: "the day really began in the East room at 10:00 A.M. when I went live on T.V. worldwide with address on Soviet-U.S. relations. The press, especially T.V. is now trying to explain the speech as pol. etc. The speech was carefully crafted by all of us to counter Soviet propoganda that we are not sincere in wanting arms reductions or peace. It {therefore} was low key & held the door open to the Soviets if they mean what they say about loving peace to walk in." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 308; curly brackets are in the original)

According to Matlock's subsequent account, reactions to the speech were mixed. "It was generally welcomed in the United States even though some dismissed it as a political maneuver to gain reelection. Its impact in Europe, particularly on allied governments, was greater. German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher went out of his way to compliment it when he met with Shultz in Stockholm on January 18. His aides said that he actually danced for joy as he read the text. The view among U.S. allies in Europe was that, finally, Reagan had the right balance between firmness and negotiability. The impact on the Soviet government was, however, less than that intended. The White House had gone out of its way to call attention to the speech in advance, alerting Ambassador Dobrynin to it and supplying an advance text to the Soviet foreign ministry in Moscow." Matlock continued: "Soviet media were directed to treat the speech as nothing new. In a brief statement the official new agency, TASS, labeled it nothing more than propaganda: 'Behind the loquacious rhetoric about adherence to limiting the arms race and love of peace, was, in effect, the known position of the U.S. administration . . . [T]here is no indication of any positive changes in the Reagan administration's approach.'" (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, page 86; brackets are in the original)

159. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Stockholm, January 18, 1984, 3-8:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting between Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko

U.S. PARTICIPANTS

The Honorable George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
The Honorable Arthur A. Hartman, U.S. Ambassador, Moscow
The Honorable Jack F. Matlock, Senior Advisor, NSC Staff
The Honorable Richard R. Burt, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
William Krimer, Interpreter (Notetaker)

SOVIET PARTICIPANTS

A.A. Gromyko, First Deputy Premier, Minister of Foreign Affairs
G.M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
V.G. Makarov, Ambassador, Personal Aide to Gromyko, MFA
S.P. Tarasenko, Counselor, Deputy Chief, USA Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
V. Sukhodrev, Counselor, 2nd European Department, MFA, Interpreter (Notetaker)

Foreign Minister Gromyko thought it would probably be advisable to agree at the outset of today's talk that the subject matter of discussions will cover two main areas: (1) the current international situation, i.e. questions of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the United States; and (2) the bilateral relations between the two countries. Of course, these two areas were extremely broad and included a variety of elements. If some element or other were considered by one of the sides to be unsuitable for discussion, it would of course be senseless to discuss it. Thus, the discussions should cover those questions where both sides agree there was room for discussions, taking into account past experience.

Secretary Shultz said that prior to leaving Washington he had discussed this and other matters with Ambassador Dobrynin.² They had touched on the question of the agenda for this meeting. The Secretary took it that Dobrynin had received some response from Gromyko with regard to the general outline of the agenda. Depending on how broadly the two items named by Gromyko were viewed, he would think that their views should be compatible. We had identified arms control as one item for discussion; regional issues, such as the Middle East, as a second item; and human rights as a third item. Then there were a variety of strictly bilateral issues, such as trade, as a fourth item. Of course in each of these items there were various categories and, while the words were perhaps different, generally he felt that both sides meant the same thing.

Gromyko said that he had not consented to all the specific issues mentioned by the Secretary, but, as he had said, the two broad areas for discussion would be the international situation and bilateral relations. He thought that, as he had told Dobrynin, this was the direction in which the discussions should go. He noted that the Secretary had named a number of other items, among them, for example, human rights. Since the Secretary had named this matter, he would tell him at the very outset of their discussion that he did not intend to discuss any such topic. Of course, the Secretary could talk about it if he insisted, but Gromyko would not enter into discussion of this item.

The Secretary said that of course it would be up to Gromyko whether he would wish to respond to something the Secretary would say. That was Gromyko's privilege. But the Secretary said that he must make some comments.

Gromyko repeated that he would tell the Secretary at the very outset that he would not enter into discussion of this

topic. The two of them already had some experience when one side does not wish to discuss some specific issue. He would only say again that he would not discuss this item because the Soviet Union would not allow anyone to interfere in its internal affairs. To raise this issue would therefore be an evident waste of time. Surely it would be too much of a luxury for foreign ministers to lose time on that sort of item. As for himself he had no wish to lose time. As for the Secretary, he could of course do so, but without Gromyko's participation. He would suggest that the Secretary feel free to speak on the two items named, i.e. the international situation and bilateral issues. Or, if the Secretary preferred, Gromyko would lead off and talk on our bilateral relations. He thought that neither of them would feel constrained and they would have enough room to exchange views, particularly about the Stockholm Conference. At the Conference the Secretary had expressed the views of the U.S. Administration and today Gromyko had expressed the views of the Soviet Government and the Soviet leadership.³ He thought it would not be superfluous if he said something in addition to what he had stated publicly.

The Secretary thanked Gromyko and said he would proceed to some items. The first thing he would say was that he had come to listen to Gromyko's speech and had been disappointed. He entirely disagreed with some, in fact most, of Gromyko's statements, and found many of them unacceptable. However, he did not want to take the time to go through that speech now, but would instead address the nature of our relationship and its content.

As the Secretary had told Dobrynin upon the latter's departure from Moscow at the end of last November,⁴ the President wanted to see our relations in a more constructive state. Therefore he would speak not only in

the context of the various issues we had been discussing with Gromyko in one forum or another, but also address the mechanisms for achieving a more constructive relationship. He would note that contacts between himself and Gromyko had been greatest in well-publicized forums, generating a great deal of public attention. On the other hand, it seemed to President Reagan—and the Secretary had the impression that Dobrynin had agreed with this—that it would be useful to establish a private channel for discussions which would be out of the limelight and not open to public commentary. The President had said that he would like to see something like that take place.

For that to be effective he thought it would be necessary to manage things carefully so that it would be clear that an individual speaking in such private discussions was speaking for his country and that this would be known to each side. For the United States, the President had asked the Secretary to help him manage this process. We would expect the people on our side of this table to take part in such discussions as well as other designated people at times. He believed it would be appropriate for such discussions to be held between Ambassador Dobrynin and himself or whomever he would designate. Ambassador Hartman would be the appropriate interlocutor in Moscow, and the President would expect him to be used in this capacity. Whenever he and Gromyko met it was a public event, but beyond this sometimes experts on a specific subject would have to be designated and it should be clear to both sides that they spoke for their country.

The Secretary had one further point. When Dobrynin had returned from Moscow he had discussed this with the Secretary and told him that Gromyko had authorized this process. Both he and Dobrynin had emphasized to each other the importance of such discussions carrying real

content, so as to make progress, and not just be dialogue for the sake of dialogue. To sum up, beyond the publicly known meetings between officials of the two countries there was room for private discussions. Dobrynin had said that Gromyko had approved of this and, if that was indeed the case, one should reflect on how to proceed from here.

Gromyko said he first wanted to address the Secretary's comments about his speech at the Conference. In that speech he had outlined in some detail the Soviet attitude to some of the questions that were within the context of the task facing the Stockholm Conference. He had focused attention on some specific matters and saw no need to expand on this now. On the other hand, it was absolutely impossible to regard the issues before the Stockholm Conference in isolation from what happened beyond the Conference hall. From this standpoint, he naturally had to touch on U.S. foreign policy. In his speech in Washington President Reagan had talked about the international situation as a whole and commented on Soviet foreign policy. As is his custom, he had not minced words or spared words in choosing expressions to depict Soviet foreign policy from a very broad perspective. The Secretary had said that a number of statements in Gromyko's speech today—in fact almost all of them—were unacceptable to him. He had to tell the Secretary that he regarded this statement as praise for his speech. This was precisely the reaction he had expected. Indeed, he would have been put on his guard if the Secretary had said that the Soviets were quite right in saying what they had.

The Secretary interjected that he was glad to hear that Gromyko was not on his guard.

Gromyko continued by saying that he had pointed to U.S. policy as the principal cause of the increase in tensions in

the world today and of the dangerous situation currently existing. He also had to tell the Secretary that the speech he had delivered yesterday, as well as the President's speech, were unacceptable to the Soviet side in many respects, in fact with regard to most of their elements.

Of course, the Secretary's speech⁵ and the President's speech⁶ had contained some individual words or phrases which, taken separately, had not generated any Soviet doubts. But the entire structure of the two speeches was hostile to the Soviet Union, to the Soviet policy of peace; and that was the only assessment of the two speeches that he could arrive at. He would point out that what was important for the Soviet leadership were not individual phrases or words, not the music, so to speak, but the actual content of those statements.

He would ask the Secretary what sort of a thesis it was to speak of the "artificial division of Europe," Gromyko continued. What kind of a proposition was that? Obviously the Secretary and the President did not like the fact that there were some socialist states in Europe and, obviously, the Soviet side did not like the fact that there were some capitalist states on the other side. He would put it even more broadly. The U.S. did not like the fact that there were socialist states in the world and, of course, the Soviets did not like it that there were imperialist states in the world. But, he would ask, what were they then to do? If both sides stood on such a position, there would be a wall between them, a blank wall built of steel or concrete or whatever. In that case it would of course be impossible to find any points of contact in any of the discussions. He would recall that after arriving in Stockholm, just as previously in Madrid and in Belgrade and Helsinki before that, he had believed it important to find the points of contact between various positions. Such contacts were sought consistently by all the

35 participants in the Conference. If points of contact were found, this would indeed be tremendously important for the international situation as a whole.

Gromyko said this was his response to the Secretary's comments regarding the unacceptability of Gromyko's speech. He would point out that the essence of his speech today consisted of trying to seek and find common language between the socialist states and the capitalist states, as well as between the Warsaw Treaty Organization states and the NATO states. This was the main objective the Soviet delegation would strive for at the Stockholm Conference.

The Secretary interrupted at this point to say that before Gromyko proceeded further, he wanted to clarify something that was evidently based on a misunderstanding. Our position was that if any country wanted to have a socialist system, that would be up to the people of that country to decide; we believed it would be up to them. Based on his observation, socialist systems did not work very well, but that was a separate question. It was not the cause of the wall between us. The main problems were those of free movement across the wall, free interchange of people and ideas. Both the President and he had tried to say as clearly as possible that we recognized that our two systems were very different and that we did not care if any country chose either system of its own free will. If indeed a country chose socialism, so be it. However, we did not believe that the difference between our systems should preclude a constructive relationship between us. These were two different things.

Gromyko continued by noting that the Secretary had touched on a question of procedure. He thought we had agreed that certain specific matters could be discussed

in private discussions out of the limelight of the media and public. It was clearly agreed that on the U.S. side the Secretary would speak for the President, as would whomever he designated, for example Ambassador Hartman. But this was purely a matter of procedure, an organizational matter. It was high time for such private discussions to take place. Today it seemed useful to talk about international politics because the world situation was very acute, relations between our two countries were bad, and the general situation throughout the world was very tense. He had intended today to touch on some of these matters, but had not felt that the Secretary was prepared to discuss them. On the other hand, where else should these most acute and timely matters be discussed if not at meetings such as the present one?

Gromyko noted that in his interjection the Secretary had ended by stating the correct proposition that, if a country wanted to have a socialist system, it should be allowed to live; and if a country wanted its people to live under a capitalist system, it should equally be allowed to live. This was basically a correct conclusion. However, the trouble was that the actual policy of the United States was not in line with that conclusion. Why was it necessary to consider that the evil or the cause of the present tensions was the division of Europe into socialist and capitalist countries? This statement by the Secretary was in conflict with what he had said just now. Somehow he was not making ends meet.

Further, if the Secretary's last comment was correct, that meant people must have the right to live under whatever system they preferred, why then declare a crusade against socialism? This false—and he would even say illiterate—slogan concealed efforts to motivate people to fight against the socialist system even in the countries that had chosen

that route. The Soviet side categorically objected to anything of the sort. Furthermore, this was a clearly unscientific primitive concept, but it was precisely this that made it impossible to reach agreement on the questions facing the forum in Stockholm today.

The Secretary said that he would try once again to explain his views. Socialism as a system of organizing economic activity had been advocated by many people. In his opinion it did not work well for people, but, as he had said, if people wanted to organize their activities that way, that was their privilege. It was not this that he objected to in Gromyko's comments on what Gromyko had picked out of the Secretary's speech. It was not economic activity, but the lack of freedom of people that had led to the division as represented by the Berlin Wall, not socialism as such, but the restrictions on interaction between the people on both sides. Taking the Soviet Union and the United States as two countries existing in this world, we believed, and Gromyko had said that he believed, that it should be possible to find areas where we can reach mutually satisfactory conclusions. Indeed, we would not be engaged in discussions if this were not so. We were not trying to reform the socialist countries and did not think the Soviet side would attempt to reform capitalist countries, but these were different issues.

The Secretary certainly agreed with Gromyko that the present forum right here was the one in which the two sides should discuss the main questions troubling the world today and troubling our two countries. In his speech today and earlier, in Madrid, Gromyko had emphasized that one of these issues concerned arms, and particularly nuclear arms and our mutual desire to reduce their numbers. In this light the Secretary would comment on various areas of arms talks and would express our views.

First, the Secretary would comment on strategic arms reductions. We have held five rounds of talks in that area,⁷ and while it was fair to say that some progress had been achieved, we were still far from resolving the issues. Reflecting on that, it seemed to him that what we were seeing was that Soviet strategic forces and our strategic forces, both very impressive and large, were structured very differently from each other. The decisions of the two countries on which road to follow in the development of arms produced a great asymmetry between the forces of each side.

On the one hand, as we looked at the situation, we saw Soviet heavy MIRVed ICBMs with tremendous throw-weight and great destructive potential, which appear to us to be a destabilizing factor; we wanted to see them reduced. Reading their account of the negotiations, it seemed that the Soviets had expressed concern over U.S. heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles. In the Soviet view these were considered a threat. Thus, in the negotiations we have talked of various forces and each side had offered proposals, but he and the President wondered whether we would not get further if we could find a common framework that would encompass these problems.

If we could agree on such a framework, then it would be possible to tell our negotiators to go back to the negotiating table and work out the details. In such a framework neither side would try drastically to restructure each other's forces, but would identify in the negotiations many different items and would establish a relationship between them. Therefore, we thought it would be worthwhile in private discussions to seek a framework that would include heavy ICBMs on the Soviet side and heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles on the U.S. side.

We thought that through such a framework it might be possible to make the negotiations fruitful.

Thus, on START it would be well to set a date for resumption of the talks, the Secretary said, but that was not his point. He simply wanted to raise with Gromyko the possibility of establishing a framework in private discussions that could lead to progress. If that was of interest to Gromyko we were prepared to explore this matter in greater detail.

With reference to so-called INF, the Secretary said he would not have much to say. As we reviewed the negotiations, we noted that there had been progress in some areas, such as aircraft, but on the main issues there had been no agreement. Now deployments were taking place, and the Soviet side had chosen to leave the negotiations.⁸ If Gromyko had any suggestions as to how to proceed in the discussion of this subject, the Secretary would be very pleased to hear them.

On the subject of the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, the Secretary continued, we believed that the Soviet side should agree to a date for resumption and return to the talks, to which we give a high priority. We recognize that in the Eastern proposals of February and June, with some subsequent clarifications, the East had taken positive steps on the subject of verification and specification of reductions. We were studying ways to build on these positive steps. On the President's instructions, the Secretary had made the point to Dobrynin that progress on verification would lead to flexibility on our side on the so-called data issue. Thus, in MBFR, we believed it would be well to set a date and resume in Vienna. We were also prepared to move in the form of a private dialogue between

us and the Soviet Union; undoubtedly our Ambassador Abramowitz would be an important person in this regard.

On the subject of the CDE meetings here, the Secretary noted that of course discussions were just starting. As he had indicated in his speech, we would be tabling proposals soon. Here he would also make a procedural comment: our delegation chiefs had worked well together during the preparatory talks. We had also taken the point the Soviets had made in diplomatic channels that we should work together in a businesslike fashion for genuine progress, and he agreed. Ambassador Goodby, he thought, was well known to people in that field in the Soviet Union, so Gromyko would recognize that he was a capable and competent person.

On the subject of chemical weapons, which Gromyko had raised this morning and earlier, it was our view that since they were easily transportable, it would be more appropriate to find a global rather than a regional solution. For this reason our emphasis was on the proposal the U.S. had made in Geneva. As he had said earlier, here we will be able to table a draft treaty in Geneva, emphasizing verification in this connection. Verifiability was a difficult but very important matter.

These were some of the comments the Secretary wanted to make with reference to the various forums in which the topics Gromyko had properly identified as matters of concern in our country and in the world would be discussed.

Gromyko said that first of all, he wanted to reply to one of the questions the Secretary had touched on at the beginning of their talk today. The Secretary had raised the question of human rights, blowing it out of all proportion.

He would say that the Secretary was probably well aware of the Soviet appraisal of his entire position on this question. Gromyko was convinced that the U.S. position on this subject was entirely pervaded by falsehood, and that the U.S. was exploiting this matter for propaganda purposes. In essence, the Soviet position was more or less generally shared in the world, and it was that nowhere else were human rights violated so much as in some of the places in the Western hemisphere that were so dear to U.S. hearts, not to mention in the U.S. itself.

Gromyko said he would ask the Secretary not to ask him to be more precise; he could of course be more precise, but he did not believe he should waste time on this matter. If he were to talk on this subject he would only restate his assessment of the human rights situation as it existed in the United States. The Secretary had spoken of the importance of people moving across borders, the importance of reunifying families, etc., but he would simply point out that he did not know of a single instance where these matters had caused wars to break out. The Soviet Union was unshakeable in that position. He would not want to devote any time to the details of these matters.

The Secretary said he was surprised that it was Gromyko who had raised the subject of human rights. He was ready to discuss this topic and there were a few comments he wanted to make:

—First, the Secretary wanted to express his admiration for the Soviet Union for taking a decision on the Pentecostal families.⁹ The decision had been up to the Soviet Union, and it had been made. It showed that progress was possible.

—Second, he wanted to say that with reference to individual issues, President Reagan preferred a process of quiet diplomacy in this area.

—Third, he wanted to mention the cases of Shcharanskiy, Sakharov and Begun, as people of great interest to the United States.

—Further, he would also mention a subject we had discussed with the Soviets many times: the question of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union and its radical decline in recent years.

—He also wanted to note that Edgar Bronfman, President of the World Jewish Congress, had made an arrangement to come to Moscow to discuss issues concerning Jews in the Soviet Union. The Secretary hoped that Gromyko would receive him and work with him.

—On a more traditional note, the Secretary recalled that at their earlier meeting in New York¹⁰ he, in the usual practice, had given the Soviet side a list of people who claimed U.S. citizenship under our laws, but had been refused permission to leave the Soviet Union. He would like Ambassador Hartman to provide Minister Korniyenko with an updated list of such cases, and also lists of persons seeking to join members of their families in the U.S. and of binational divided spouses. (Ambassador Hartman passed these lists to Korniyenko following the meeting.)

Gromyko then referred to another subject touched on earlier by the Secretary, negotiations on strategic arms. He had to tell the Secretary that the Soviet side was very disappointed by the state of affairs in connection with these negotiations. On the question of strategic arms no headway had been made at all. The proposals made by the U.S. side

clearly indicated that there was not the slightest desire on the U.S. side to reach agreement with the Soviet Union. In fact, the Soviet side believed that this was the very reason the U.S. advanced such proposals, i.e. so that there should be no agreement. The reasons why the Soviet side had come to that conclusion had been explained to U.S. representatives, to the Secretary personally, and to his predecessor on numerous occasions.

Today, our respective representatives were not engaged in negotiations, Gromyko continued. He had understood the Secretary to say that he was very interested in progress and could say something additional on that subject. Well, that of course would be up to him; the Secretary could say anything he wished, Gromyko said. But he had to tell the Secretary now that once the U.S. had proceeded with deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe, the situation had changed radically. Following the beginning of that deployment it had become completely impossible to consider further discussions of strategic arms other than by linking them to the medium-range weapons.

Once they were deployed in Western Europe, all such weapons—and all those additional medium-range weapons that the U.S. was planning to deploy in Europe—were, from the Soviet standpoint, arms of strategic significance. After all, what was the difference from the Soviet standpoint between nuclear weapons that were deployed many thousands of kilometers away from Soviet territory and those that were deployed much closer: one thousand, fifteen hundred or perhaps only several hundred kilometers away? While these were medium-range weapons from the standpoint of their characteristics and parameters, from the standpoint of their capacity to reach Soviet territory they were strategic arms.

Gromyko asked the Secretary to consider the situation that would arise if the Soviets were to agree to continue talks on strategic arms under conditions when there can be no discussion of medium-range weapons. It would be completely unnatural and would deceive people about the true situation. This was one aspect of this issue. Thus, through deployment of medium-range weapons in Western Europe, the United States had obtained an additional strategic potential against the Soviet Union. Should this not be taken into account at the negotiations on strategic arms?

Quite apart from that, Gromyko said, during the negotiations on the SALT II Treaty, the Soviet Union had stated that it was absolutely necessary to discuss the question of nuclear weapons, taking account of U.S. forward-based systems. He would ask the Secretary to follow his step-by-step analysis, for otherwise there could be no meaningful discussion. At that time, during the SALT II negotiations, the U.S. side had said that it would very much complicate the problem of reaching an agreement on a SALT II treaty if FBS were linked to the SALT II negotiations. At that time a sort of compromise had been reached—as Gromyko had on a number of occasions been obliged to remind some U.S. officials who had not been engaged in those negotiations and perhaps were not aware of this matter. As for himself, he had had the pleasure to be engaged in negotiating these matters, and he recalled that by way of a compromise the two sides had achieved what was recorded in the SALT II Treaty, including agreement on the heavy ICBMs of the Soviet Union. As a result the Soviet Union had agreed not to seek resolution of the question of FBS in the SALT II Treaty. But then, of course, the Soviet side had stated that in the follow-on negotiations in the future, after SALT II, this question—FBS—would have to be

resolved. Meanwhile, SALT II was to be “delinked” from U.S. FBS, as the Americans called it.

Now Gromyko asked, did not the question of U.S. FBS arise in connection with consideration of medium-range systems, and does it not have a direct bearing on all future negotiations on strategic arms? This followed clearly from the SALT II negotiations. Even if there had been no deployment of U.S. medium-range arms, this question would have arisen in any event.

These are the two main watertight arguments in favor of not ignoring the deployment of U.S. medium-range arms in Europe, Gromyko said. This might perhaps be entirely new for some people on the U.S. side, but he would think that even the new people on the U.S. side engaged in these matters must be informed of it. After all, the generation of people who have been actively engaged in those negotiations was still alive and well. Moreover, the records of those negotiations were also very much alive.

Taking into account all those circumstances, and also the fact that the policy of the United States with respect to arms, especially strategic arms, was clearly aimed at achieving a dominating position come what may, the Soviet side had to engage in thorough reconsideration of the new situation which had arisen after U.S. deployment of new weapons in Western Europe. The Soviet side would have to do a lot of thinking before reaching decisions on where to go from here.

If the Secretary were to assume that strategic arms negotiations could continue as if nothing had happened, while negotiations on medium-range nuclear arms were in abeyance, he would be very much mistaken. The Soviet side would have to reflect on all of these matters before

deciding on how to proceed. With respect to the Geneva negotiations on medium-range arms, the Soviet position was crystal clear. He was convinced that to continue those talks, given the present policy of the United States, would mean to participate in U.S. attempts to deceive people. He believed that Washington's present position was not intended to lead to agreement with the Soviet Union.

Thus, all the statements the Soviet side had made on this subject remained fully in force, Gromyko went on. His discussions of these matters with the Secretary in no way constituted continuation of the Geneva negotiations, and should in no way be seen as steps toward continuation of those negotiations or toward new negotiations. He repeated that it was not to be construed as continuing the old talks or starting new ones. In order for negotiations to resume, the U.S. would have to change its positions and, as he had already said, express willingness to return to the situation existing before deployment of new U.S. missiles in Western Europe had begun. Under those conditions the talks could be resumed, but otherwise the Soviet side would simply be helping the U.S. to hold up a screen concealing the true state of affairs.

Gromyko said he knew that from time to time the U.S. had made statements to the effect that things in Geneva had been proceeding well. But in fact the U.S. side had been engaged in erecting an impenetrable wall in the path of any progress at the talks. If, upon returning to Washington, the Secretary were to report to the President and others that the Soviet position was such as Gromyko had just stated it and as it had been stated by Yuri Andropov and in other official statements of the Soviet side, he would be correct. However, should the Secretary report differently, Gromyko would have to correct any misstatement, and possibly in public.

Gromyko said that the Soviet Union would like to have all those problems resolved, but in that case the United States would have to abandon its present policy, which was aimed at securing a dominating position for itself, and be guided in its conduct of relations with the Soviet Union by the principles of equality and equal security. As for the Soviet side, it had no desire to achieve a dominating position, and this was clear from the entire policy conducted by the Soviet Union and from its moral stand. The Soviet Union wants to be on an equal footing with the United States. If this will be what the Secretary reports in Washington, he will be correct.

If such a policy were adopted, Gromyko said, it would not be difficult to find common language in Geneva, as well as outside Geneva, and at this meeting in Stockholm. He alleged that what the Soviet side had witnessed was an endless series of insulting statements about the Soviet Union, building an additional solid fence preventing good relations. However, if one were to reflect on matters objectively, he would say that he did not believe that the United States was desirous of having a collision with the Soviet Union. There were surely some rather primitive people in the U.S. who considered the possibility of such a collision, but those were people who could not see beyond the four walls of their rooms. He would note, however, that one met with such talk in the U.S. Sometimes there was talk of nuclear war, of a clash with the Soviet Union, as if this were some sort of picnic. This surely could not produce any positive results.

The Secretary interjected that his mother had told him when learning to drive to avoid collisions with Mack trucks. As far as he was concerned, in the field of international diplomacy, the Soviet Union was a Mack truck.

Gromyko said he now wanted to say a few words about chemical weapons. As he understood it, the Secretary was emphasizing the importance of that question and that was good. The Soviet side too believed this matter to be important. It was not a new issue: for a number of years it had been discussed in various forums, including such a broad forum as the United Nations. Negotiations had also been conducted between our two countries on chemical weapons. But neither the wider nor the narrower negotiation had led to any progress in resolving this matter.

Speaking frankly, Gromyko said, he would tell the Secretary how the Soviet side viewed the frequent attacks against the Soviet Union now current in the United States, as if the Soviet Union had been using chemical weapons somewhere in Asia or elsewhere. As he saw it, the U.S. was simply trying to divert public attention away from this entire issue and from the need to resolve it and achieve a ban on chemical weapons. He certainly did not believe that U.S. officials were so ignorant as not to know that the Soviet Union has not been doing anything of the kind. Thus, if the Secretary were interested in knowing the Soviet position, Gromyko could state to him officially that the Soviet Union wanted to see this problem resolved in an international accord on chemical weapons. The Soviet side was prepared to discuss such a ban in a broad forum or in bilateral negotiations with the U.S. Either way, the Soviet Union was prepared to go ahead, and it was his belief that agreement on this problem would generate a more favorable atmosphere for resolution of other matters as well.

He would suggest that they both see whether the U.N. Disarmament Committee in Geneva had broad enough shoulders to bear up under an attempt to resolve this matter. Personally, it was his hope that it will be able to bear up, and he would continue to issue appropriate

instructions to the Soviet Delegation in Geneva. The Soviet Union wanted to reach such an agreement and called upon the United States to join it in an effort to reach it. Such an agreement would really cast a ray of light in the present gloomy international atmosphere and would have beneficial effects in other areas, too. Furthermore, it would also be beneficial to our own bilateral relations.

Gromyko said that this was basically what he wanted to convey to the Secretary with reference to the Secretary's statements. He would conclude his remarks by expressing his wish that the Stockholm Conference contribute to an improvement of the international atmosphere. If so, it would also help with a number of problems, particularly the adoption of confidence-building measures. The Soviet Union was prepared to act constructively, provided the United States was similarly disposed. The Soviet Union was not at all opposed to some measures, but it would favor adopting such measures as were fully justified by the facts. He would point out quite frankly that with reference to any issue requiring solution one could formulate proposals in such a way as to be clearly unacceptable. On the other hand, they could also be formulated in a way to be acceptable to all. He repeated that the Soviet Union was not opposed to confidence-building measures with reference to maneuvers and other matters at the Stockholm Conference. All this can come about if no one sets himself the goal of undercutting the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries in order to secure for himself the commanding heights, so to speak. Should such a position be taken, there would be no positive outcome at the Stockholm Conference. There would not be the result he believed was desired by the majority of the countries here. He would urge the Secretary to reflect on that matter in terms of perhaps finding common language for our two sides.

Referring to the Vienna negotiation mentioned by the Secretary, Gromyko said that it should not be thought that the process of the Vienna negotiations had been interrupted. That forum was still in being. The two sides had declared a recess and had simply not yet agreed on a resumption date, but the process itself was still alive. He thought that if it were acceptable to the U.S. side, some date in mid-March could be agreed upon for resumption, perhaps the 16th of March or thereabouts. He would only want to express one reservation. If these negotiations were only used once again to throw dust into people's eyes, then the Soviet side might be forced to take steps somewhat similar to those it had been compelled to take with respect to the negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. He would hope that the Vienna negotiations would not enter upon such a path. It was sad, very sad, that there was no progress at those negotiations, and he believed that perhaps the reductions discussed in Vienna also did not fit in with the plans of the Western participants. He said, "Well, we will see."

In addition, he wanted to tell the Secretary that should the Secretary present matters on MBFR or the other negotiations to public media in such a way as to imply that this, in fact, meant that the Soviet Union was abandoning the position it had stated with respect to nuclear arms, that would distort the Soviet position, and in that case, he would be forced to state publicly that these kinds of generalizations were far from reality, and he would be forced to put things in their proper place. He therefore hoped that this would not be necessary.

The Secretary said he had a few comments on the points made by Gromyko. First of all, he noted Gromyko's statement that the Soviet Union sought equality with the United States and did not wish to have a collision with the

U.S. He could state that the avoidance of such a collision and equality with the Soviet Union were also our aims. Thus he could agree with both formulations.

Secondly, turning to the talks on nuclear missiles which have now stopped, the Secretary said he had understood Gromyko to say that deployment of our medium-range missiles in Europe was regarded by the Soviet side as a strategic matter even though these missiles were medium in range, and that therefore they had a bearing on the strategic arms talks. It was his impression that Gromyko thus appeared to be in the process of reflecting on how such talks could be structured if they began again. He would say that we would consider any suggestion Gromyko might make regarding these forums.

But the forums would not change the fact that there are problems involved, the Secretary said. He felt he had to make the point that we could not consider talks where U.S. medium-range missiles were involved, but Soviet medium-range missiles were not. This was because SS-20s were deployed and could strike our allies. If Soviet missiles should hit them they would be hitting us, because we were bound together with our allies. He was not asking Gromyko to agree to this formulation, but was only telling him how we saw things. Therefore, if Gromyko had a suggestion concerning renewed or new negotiations, we would listen with interest, but they would have to include negotiations on SS-20s if Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles were included.

Next, the Secretary noted that Gromyko had taken up the subject of chemical weapons and had expressed readiness to try to reach agreement. The Secretary welcomed that statement. For its part, the U.S. was ready to work hard on this subject.

He also noted Gromyko's comments regarding the old problem of compliance. In the past Gromyko had raised this matter as an important one. We believed it of crucial importance to arms control and other agreements. In this connection, some questions had arisen, and he informed Gromyko that the President, as directed by Congress, was in the process of submitting a report to Congress.¹¹ He was sure that Gromyko had been informed of the extensive briefing we had given the Soviet Embassy in Washington on the contents of that report, and he would therefore not repeat the details. But he could tell Gromyko that the President's report was classified. Compliance was an important matter, and questions needed to be resolved through careful exploration.

Returning to the question of chemical weapons, the Secretary welcomed Gromyko's positive statement here. As he had said, we would be ready to table a draft treaty soon. This was an important issue; like the Soviet side, we wanted to see progress. He might add that in the minds of many people the matter of biological weapons should be resolved as well, but that was a separate subject.

Regarding Gromyko's statement about the CDE in Stockholm, he agreed that it was important to structure any idea in such a way that it would be useful to Warsaw Pact as well as NATO countries. If we wanted to reach agreement it would be well for the heads of our respective delegations, who are both professionals in this field, to maintain liaison and avoid problems that might arise as a result of failure to exchange views. We were prepared to do that.

With reference to Gromyko's comments about MBFR, the Secretary welcomed his idea of reconvening the negotiations in March. The 16th seemed to be an

acceptable date for us, and he would suggest that this be put into diplomatic channels. The date appeared to be O.K. He believed that we could arrive at agreement in Vienna. The U.S. had no wish to put dust in anyone's eyes on this subject or any other.

In reply, Gromyko referred to the question of so-called violations of agreements and obligations. He noted that the Secretary had not been able to resist the temptation of bringing up something in that area. Gromyko said that he was not familiar with the details of the President's report to which the Secretary had referred, but when he learned the details he would respond in kind. The Soviet side can show how the U.S. treats its obligations, and point to some things about its conduct.

The Secretary said as a point of information that Mr. Burt had given a briefing to Mr. Sokolov of the Soviet Embassy in Washington and had informed him of the details of the report in question.¹² Gromyko noted that this had been done in general terms and repeated that, taking into account all the circumstances, the Soviets would respond in kind.

Gromyko asked the Secretary if he had anything to say on our bilateral relations. He noted that they have been in a state of disarray for some time. These matters had been discussed on many occasions with representatives of the present U.S. Administration, with the Secretary personally as well as with his predecessor and other U.S. political leaders. As he had said in his speech today, the U.S. Administration had done a great deal with "an easy hand" to destroy what had been built up in the 1970s. In a word, it had proved the truth of the thesis that it is much easier to destroy than to build. The United States has been engaged in destroying, with a big stick as it were, what had

been built up by others. He did not know what the U.S. had in mind now, whether the Administration still adhered to the same views it had expressed immediately after coming into office. If the Secretary had something new he could tell Gromyko that might help to improve our relations, he would be interested to hear it.

The Secretary replied that he did not believe that what he had to say was new, but he would comment briefly on our bilateral relations. He knew that the Hotline talks had been going forward and promised to produce good results. On non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, he knew that another round of discussions is scheduled and this was an area where our interests were parallel, so that was worthwhile. On depiction of our Pacific maritime boundary, we were glad to have received a positive response from the Soviet side. Further, we continue to believe that trade can go forward as long as it is mutually beneficial, conducted on commercially sound terms, and not militarily related. Agribusiness is a good example of mutually beneficial, non-strategic trade. The Secretary also wanted to make a comment about a vast stretch of the Pacific where the Korean airliner had been lost. He understood that various questions were under discussion within ICAO, such matters as fixed navigation aids, radio beacons, and communications links between responsible civil aviation officials. These can help avoid a situation where an airliner is unable to determine its position from outside sources. This could be worked out constructively, if the Soviet side agreed.

On opening consulates in Kiev and New York and beginning negotiations on a new cultural agreement, the Secretary said the agreement in principle made last summer to go forward still stands. However, the timing needed to be

right. It was difficult to move forward in the atmosphere of recent months.

The Secretary noted that there were many other issues of great importance. They were not necessarily bilateral issues, but they were nevertheless of interest to both of our countries. Gromyko had mentioned Lebanon in his speech. This was a matter of major interest to both of us, and it was of tremendous significance to other Middle East issues.¹³ The Secretary was interested in hearing Soviet views and would be glad to present ours. He would say that there were also some interesting developments in southern Africa. He had long thought this was an area where our two countries should both be interested in achieving constructive progress. We have people directly involved in these matters on our side, such as Assistant Secretary Crocker, who are available to engage in discussion on this subject.

There was a wide range of regional issues of very great importance. Expressing his personal opinion, the Secretary thought that if one talked about tensions in the world today, we should realize that the place generating the worst tensions was clearly the Middle East—not just Lebanon and the Palestinian issues, but also the war between Iran and Iraq, as well as developments inside Iran itself, which he found very disturbing. Although these are not bilateral issues, they were issues of mutual concern which might be discussed.

Gromyko said that to a certain extent the Secretary had helped him. He had intended to touch upon some purely bilateral issues and then go on to regional matters. Now he would change the order so as to discuss the regional matters first and then proceed to bilateral issues. After all, the two categories touched one another.

Gromyko said he could agree with the Secretary that the Middle East area was an area that almost daily generated very acute problems. He was convinced that these acute problems are generated as a result of the policy pursued by the U.S. and Israel which, of course, is constantly buttressed by the U.S. He was certain that if the U.S. wanted to act in a manner to prevent many of these problems from arising, with its influence upon Israel, it could prevail on Israel to change its aggressive policy. After all, Israel occupied Arab lands, the Golan Heights, and it retained them to this day as if it were master of these territories. In fact, what Israel did in wresting these territories from their rightful owners were aggressive and bandit-like acts. Since the U.S. invariably supported Israel, it had to share responsibility for this situation. Very often, particularly in Washington, it was frequently said, "What about Syria, Syria, Syria?" Earlier it was asked, "What about the Palestinians, Palestinians, Palestinians?" One or the other or both were blamed for the tensions in that area. In actual fact, Syria is a victim of aggression by Israel. Israel tore off a slice of Syrian territory and is now taking completely illegal steps to formalize this act of aggression. The Palestinians remain without a homeland of their own; that is, they had a homeland in the past, but not today. This is the main reason for the dangerous tensions in the Middle East. In the past the U.S. supported Israel politically for many years in discussions in the United Nations, in our bilateral discussions and in other forums. Now direct U.S. military support for Israel was growing.

Also, today the U.S. has intruded into the Middle East with its own military forces, setting up military bases wherever it considers this possible. U.S. troops are actually in Lebanon. The question arises: on what grounds? The Secretary might answer that Gemayel had requested U.S. military forces to come in, but surely it was a fact that

Gemayel had done so virtually with a gun pointed at his head. Can that agreement be taken seriously? Obviously not. U.S. forces are present in the Middle East and particularly in Lebanon as occupation troops, as interventionists. The Soviet Union believes that U.S. troops should not be in the Middle East as a whole.

The U.S. would be acting rationally if it were to withdraw its troops from that area. It was a real shame that the U.S. was not sparing the blood of its soldiers, its young men there. They should be taken out of there, removing this additional cause of tensions in the Middle East—a step which would promote an easing of the situation. Of course, British, Italian and French forces must also leave. One hears, of course, such arguments as, “What will then happen to the inhabitants of Lebanon? After all, they will slaughter each other.”

In this connection, Gromyko said he wished to recall a bit of history, going back to the years 1917 and 1918 when the socialist revolution had taken place in Russia. A great many foreign people, including U.S. troops commanded by General Greyson, came to Russia. This is well described in a book entitled “American Adventure in Siberia” which, he thought, Ambassador Hartman might have read.¹⁴ At that time it was also said that, after all, the Russians were fighting each other there, and it was necessary to intervene and help one side to win. First, he would note that nothing came of this intervention in Russia. Secondly, he asked, what sort of reasoning is that? Is it reasonable to believe that foreigners must support one side against the other in a civil war? After all, you had your own Civil War too. (At this point the Secretary interjected that, on this point, at least, Gromyko was stating a fact.) You know, if such actions were to be legalized, one would have to find a large furnace and

immediately burn all the documents of international law, all treaties and agreements.

Thus, it is not what will happen in Lebanon when foreign forces are withdrawn that one should worry about. If you were to ask about Syria, it has repeatedly stated that if Israel and the other occupants withdraw, it will withdraw its forces as well. The Soviet Union has good relations with Syria, Gromyko said, and he was in a position to reaffirm once again that the Syrians will pull out their forces if other foreign forces are withdrawn.

Thus, retaining U.S. forces in Lebanon is not going to improve the reputation of the U.S., which has already been undermined. The Soviet Union's position with respect to Israel is crystal clear. The Soviet Union has never agreed with extremist demands from extremist groups to throw Israel into the sea. He would remind the Secretary that, jointly with the U.S., the Soviet Union had stood at the cradle of the state of Israel. At that time he was leading the Soviet delegation in the UN and had raised his hand in voting for the establishment of an independent state of Israel. At that time the decision had been taken to set up both a Jewish and an Arab state in Palestine. The Soviet Union believed that Israel was entitled to independent existence, but this did not mean that it was entitled to commit aggression.

Thus, it was necessary for the U.S. to withdraw its troops from the Middle East in general, and from Lebanon in particular. It was necessary for Israel to withdraw as well. These troops were the main reason for tensions in the Middle East, along with other foreign troops. No matter what one might call them—an international or multinational or peacekeeping force—that did not change anything at all.

Gromyko recalled that in the past the U.S. had frequently asked the Soviet Union to bring its influence to bear upon Syria to act in a more restrained manner. He had to point out that the Soviet Union had done so on quite a few occasions, and that the Syrians had accepted such approaches with understanding. It was therefore not the Syrians who were now at fault in the situation in Lebanon, but the aggression that had been committed there. This was the Soviet assessment of the situation in Lebanon and in the Middle East.

Of course, it is hardly possible to resolve all the troubles there in one fell swoop. But just the same, if the U.S. and other countries were to withdraw their troops, the situation would be defused, and once all factions felt that they did not enjoy foreign support, the Lebanese themselves would come together and agree. Ultimately this would mean less bloodshed and less terrorism. This was what the Soviet Union advocated.

Gromyko noted that for some reason in recent years there were no contacts with Washington concerning the Middle East. He would not want to appear as a supplicant with outstretched hand, but he was sure that without withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, one could not promote a general settlement in the Middle East. The Soviet Union was not interested in seeing a conflagration in that area, and he did not believe that the U.S. was interested in seeing such a conflagration either.

The Secretary thought Gromyko would not be surprised to learn that he could not agree with many aspects of his analysis. However, there were some things in Gromyko's statement with which he did agree. Perhaps that could lead to some constructive developments.

First, the Secretary noted, Gromyko had said that the Soviet Union did not wish to see an explosion in the Middle East. Neither do we. Second, he agreed that if all foreign forces were out of Lebanon there would be a better chance for the Lebanese to be able to construct their country. We agreed on this as an objective. He wanted to assure Gromyko that the U.S. had no wish to keep forces in that country. The question was how to bring about the withdrawal of all foreign troops, and that was a hard question. We knew that good first steps had almost been achieved in the so-called Security Plan. We believe it could bring a better reconciliation between the various forces there. But once again, something broke down between Jumblatt and Gemayel.

Nevertheless, if such steps were taken, they could be precursors of a further withdrawal of Israeli forces. If discussions emerged in which Syria made a statement about its intent to withdraw, we could see a whole process taking shape fairly promptly. We were working toward law and order there as foreign forces left the area. We would like to see programs of that kind succeed.

In thinking about this problem, it was also necessary to consider the existence of Palestinian camps in various parts of Lebanon. This is because many Lebanese do not like the Palestinians. We thought that U.N. forces could play a constructive role in providing security in those camps. Obviously this has to be a Lebanese effort as well, and it would be good if this kind of process could come about. But it too often breaks down. We do believe that a positive move from Syria could accomplish a great deal. We had many discussions with Israel; for example, they were successful in obtaining a relief of the siege of Deyr-al-Qamr. At any rate, we are working on this line of action, and it could be a way toward withdrawal of all foreign forces,

including our own in Lebanon and Soviet troops in Syria, if the Soviets supported it.

Gromyko said the Soviet side believed that if the U.S. and its pals in the area withdrew their forces from Lebanon, it would compel the Lebanese themselves to find solutions faster. He hoped the Secretary would agree that it now appeared as though the U.S. was simply acting out of fear of some negative consequences if it should withdraw its troops. He also hoped the Secretary would agree that this does not sound very convincing. He believed that the U.S. had very often provided all-out support to Israel, even in those cases where the U.S. could have avoided departing from a position of principle. And yet, each time that Israel merely expresses a desire for the U.S. to provide its shoulder for support, the U.S. does so. Whether or not the U.S. now has a treaty of strategic alliance with Israel, it is in fact constantly providing support. He doubted that people in the Middle East have such a weak memory as to forget these facts quickly. He had nothing further to add on this regional problem.

Gromyko said he wanted to comment briefly on regional problems in the Caribbean and Latin America. Of course, for a long time the Soviets had been observing what was happening in that Caribbean region. This was especially true for the last few months. The Secretary would understand why he spoke of the last few months, because it is precisely in that period that the situation became especially aggravated and tensions increased. He believed this was entirely the fault of U.S. policy. The U.S. did not like the internal systems of Cuba or Nicaragua. He would point out that he did not know very much about Nicaragua, except that it was a small nation and that it had not wished to live under the hated dictatorship of Somoza, which the people of Nicaragua had overthrown. They wanted to live

as they wished, and they were entitled to do so, as any other people. Washington claimed that their internal system was a threat to the vital interests of the U.S. How could that be possible?

To provide even a shadow of credibility to this Washington position, it was said that Nicaragua probably acted at the direction of the Soviet Union and with the help of the Soviet Union. He would only point out that the Soviets did not know these people. They saw them for the first time during an official visit to the Soviet Union. Gromyko had met their foreign minister twice when he had come to Moscow. He would note that he had met more often with the Secretary than with the Nicaraguans. The situation with respect to Cuba was somewhat similar, although the Cuban socialist state had been in existence much longer. But now the U.S. was ceaselessly arranging all sorts of attacks against both Nicaragua and Cuba. Gromyko emphasized Nicaragua because of allegations in Washington to the effect that the Nicaraguans posed a threat to the vital interests of the U.S. Surely, the Secretary realized full well that no one would believe this to be at all possible. The U.S. had even gone so far as to state officially in Washington that unless Nicaragua changed its internal system to please Washington, the U.S. might take some military action there. Naturally, this was something that had aroused indignation throughout the world.

Gromyko pointed out that he had not mentioned Grenada. The Secretary probably knew how this was perceived throughout the world and in the Soviet Union. This was simply something that had aroused amazement. Here was a good example of the “transparency” about which so much had been said here in Stockholm. Just 24 hours before the U.S. invasion, Washington had assured the world that it had no plans for an invasion of Grenada. “There’s transparency

for you,” Gromyko exclaimed. The Secretary probably did not expect anything but condemnation from the Soviet Union as a result of U.S. acts in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada. This area was very remote from the Soviet Union. But he was mentioning it and talking about it because it concerned a matter of principle.

South Africa was also remote from the Soviet Union. Had the U.S. ever tried to do anything to put an end to South Africa’s aggression toward Angola? The answer was that it had done nothing at all. If for some reason the Soviet Union’s position was not well known to the Secretary, Gromyko was sure that it should be quite clear now. The Soviet Union believed that every nation, large and small, had the right to its own independent development. Washington sometimes pronounced the same principle—the right of any people to its own independent development. But all these pronouncements were forgotten as soon as they conflicted with U.S. actions.

Gromyko said that he had spoken at great length on some of these matters, and had done so to be sure that the Secretary was completely aware of Soviet policy in this regard. The Soviet Union was resolutely against any country dictating to any other country the internal order that should exist there. In response, the Secretary might say, “What about Soviet forces in Afghanistan?” It was true that Soviet forces were still there, but did the Secretary know that the previous leadership of Afghanistan as well as the present one had asked the Soviet Union eleven times for help in repelling the daily intervention against Afghanistan from Iran and from Pakistan? He might ask “Has the Nicaraguan government ever appealed to the U.S. for help?” The answer, of course, was—never. But the Afghan Government had appealed for help against the intervention, and the Soviet Union had provided it in

accordance with the U.N. charter. He would now state officially to the Secretary that the Soviet Union wanted to see Afghanistan as an independent and non-aligned state which would maintain good relations with the U.S., with the Soviet Union and all other countries of the world. And yet, at the U.N. General Assembly, the U.S. was trying by hook or by crook to pass a resolution aimed at stepping on Soviet toes, so to speak. He would add that the U.S. keeps on feeding the intervention against Afghanistan from Pakistan and from that good friend of the U.S., Iran, and all this for the only reason that the internal regime in Afghanistan is not to the liking of the U.S. The U.S. is providing arms to the interventionists, and the Soviet Union knows this very well because of serial numbers and the like on arms that wind up in Soviet hands.

Further, just as in the case of the Caribbean region, the U.S. is in effect protecting the racist regime in South Africa, which has committed many aggressive acts against other African countries. If the Soviet Union and the U.S. were to act justly in that area, they would jointly put South Africa in its place. The Soviet Union wants nothing in Angola, but it is certainly opposed to South African aggression against Angola. South Africa has been throwing U.N. resolution after U.N. resolution into the wastebasket—resolutions for which both our countries have voted regarding independence for Namibia. He was certain that the U.S. too should be opposed to South African actions, as was the Soviet Union. He thought that not only the Soviet Union, but the U.S. too would be interested in preventing a spread of the racist contagion beyond the borders of South Africa. By the way, the situation there too was such that some day the majority of the people of South Africa will have their say—their time will surely come.

Gromyko repeated again that he had spoken at great length, but noted that these were the kinds of questions that poisoned relations between our two countries. He had wanted to set them forth in detail. After all, he and the Secretary had sat down at this table in order to make clear to each other one another's policies with respect to each issue discussed. He felt he had done that, and had pointed out that the Soviet Union wanted nothing in Nicaragua, nothing in Angola, and nothing in Afghanistan except that the people of these countries themselves have the possibility to decide their own affairs. The Soviet Union wanted to see Namibia independent and Afghanistan independent and non-aligned. He believed that the U.S. too should be interested in these same objectives.

The Secretary said that he did not want to go through the details in each of these areas, but he did have a few comments.

First, on Central America, one of the key problems was interference by the Nicaraguans in the internal affairs of other countries by providing arms to insurgents; they often came through Cuba, often originating from the Soviet Union and sometimes from others. There were many other problems in that area. It was a poor area, and people there needed help. It was for this reason that President Reagan had persuaded Gromyko's friend, Henry Kissinger, to investigate the situation there. Kissinger had produced a good report, and the Secretary would be glad to give a copy to Gromyko.¹⁵ He would arrange to have a copy given to Gromyko, and it would be well worth reading.

A great deal had been written about Grenada, and a White Paper had been issued which was at variance with much of what Gromyko had to say. The Soviet Embassy had received

a copy and he would suggest that Gromyko's people look it over.¹⁶

On South Africa, the Secretary said, we hold no brief for the racist policies of South Africa, and we have criticized them. It was an area that suffers from conflict and tension. It was an area also a long way from our home, but we are trying to help. The Secretary also believed that this was an area where we could jointly do something useful. As he had already pointed out, there were some recent events in the area that were interesting, and he thought that consultations between us might have a direct positive influence there. As for Afghanistan, we too would welcome a free, independent and non-aligned country; we thus share this objective with the Soviet Union. The United Nations has initiated negotiations; we wish them well because it is clear that we cannot have a free, independent and non-aligned Afghanistan unless Soviet forces are withdrawn from the country.

Gromyko interjected that the Soviet Union would withdraw its forces just as soon as intervention in Afghanistan ceases. The Secretary said that there was a hopeful process of negotiations underway.

Our combat forces had already been withdrawn from Grenada and he was sure we would withdraw our forces from Lebanon, the Secretary said, before the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistan. In Grenada all that is left is a small support contingent. These three areas represent different cases, and they provide examples of situations where we could hope that if we had better relations with the Soviet Union, with more discussions between us, we could get beyond accusing each other and could carefully explore why things take place, perhaps achieving constructive results.

At this late hour, he wanted to say to Gromyko that more constructive relations were what we wanted. He believed that more frequent private discussions would help this process along. As he had said earlier, we would like to engage in such discussions. He felt that he had to look at Gromyko not only as the Foreign Minister of a great power but also as a human being. As Foreign Minister, Gromyko had without a doubt more diplomatic experience than any other person in the world.¹⁷ He had seen a great many and a great variety of achievements. He would now ask Gromyko to look at the situation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, to think about the possibility of establishing more constructive relations between us and to think that he and the Secretary (with guidance from the President), might see a better day. We are ready to work on that.

Gromyko said that if he understood the Secretary correctly, he had spoken in favor of more frequent exchanges of views between the two of them; he shared this wish. He noted that some U.S. officials (here he was not blaming the Secretary personally) believed it to be to their credit that they exchanged views with whomever one wished, but not with the Soviet Union. That was surely a primitive approach. Thus, this was a constructive wish, if indeed it reflected the Secretary's true intentions. He was in favor of such exchanges.

Gromyko also noted the Secretary's enumeration of several specific bilateral matters and took satisfaction in the fact that these were proceeding, albeit slowly. With respect to depiction of our Pacific maritime boundary, the Soviet Union had advanced a specific proposal which, in fact, was an alloy of the proposals of each country. He would urge the Secretary to devote some attention to this matter.

With respect to certain aviation problems the Secretary had mentioned, he would note that both countries had representatives in ICAO, and he would suggest letting them work out some positions that might be acceptable to both our countries and to others. He believed this should be possible so long as no attempt is made to impose a solution on any of the sides.

As for the opening of consulates and cultural relations, he believed that some progress could be made and would like to know the Secretary's specific considerations. Whenever he felt it would be possible to set them out for the Soviet side, they could be examined carefully. As for opening consulates, he would ask how many years this matter had already dragged on? Here were two major powers that were unable to resolve such a pigmy question. Now that pigmy begins to look like a huge monster in the eyes of some people. As for cultural relations, it would be good to arrange them to the mutual satisfaction of both sides.

Gromyko then noted that some difficulties had arisen in connection with some other agreements between our two countries in terms of understanding what state they were in. Some of them were evidently in a state of hibernation. Some people evidently thought that these agreements should die; for his part, he believed that they should be brought back to life. He would ask the Secretary to take a look at them, and if something did not suit him, to let the Soviet side know.

Gromyko noted that they had discussed a number of issues today, and felt that such a discussion had indeed been necessary. It would be good if the Secretary were to take into account the observations he had expressed today. This could help to elicit points of contact between the sides.

As for the Stockholm Conference, Gromyko thought that he probably could not promise that some arguments would not arise at the Conference between our two countries; they would. But he would be very much in favor of maintaining consultations in order to have such arguments eventually result in joint positions. Soviet representatives at the Conference will be prepared to consult with U.S. representatives and not only regard each other with suspicion. If the Secretary would instruct his delegation to take a confrontational attitude only, obviously this would produce no results. Gromyko was in favor of searching for all possibilities of achieving results and his delegation would be instructed accordingly.

The Secretary said that those would be the instructions he gave to our delegation as well.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/24/84-01/25/84). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Krimer. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm. In a covering memorandum to McFarlane, Matlock noted: "Although it is an advance, unofficial copy which has not yet been reviewed by Secretary Shultz, you may wish to review it. It is being handled on very close hold in State, and Shultz has given orders that only one file copy be held in the Executive Secretariat." Although several copies of this text were found, no final version with Shultz's clearance was located. McFarlane's stamp appears on the covering memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² See [Document 152](#).

³ For the text of Gromyko's January 18 speech to the CDE, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 24-32. In telegram Secto 1025, January 18, the Secretary's

delegation forwarded an English translation of Gromyko's statement in Stockholm to the CDE. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840080-0219) In a separate telegram, the delegation commented: "In the CDE plenary of January 18, Gromyko took twice his allotted time to deliver a hard-hitting attack on the administration, reiterating in detail the Soviet thesis that the U.S. has used arms control negotiations as a cover for an arms race designed to reestablish U.S. military superiority; that initial INF deployments had in fact undermined European security; that an aggressive U.S. foreign policy remained the 'main threat to peace' in not only Europe but the Mideast and Central America as well; and finally, that recent U.S. statements alleging an interest in dialogue were a tactical sham. As a contrast to this pattern of U.S. 'militarism,' Gromyko also reviewed a familiar litany of past Soviet arms control and confidence-building proposals, concentrating on those put forward in the 1983 Prague Declaration and at the 38th UNGA." (Telegram Secto 1023 from Secretary's Delegation in Stockholm, January 18; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840048-0543, D840036-0048)

⁴ See [Document 137](#).

⁵ Shultz gave a speech at the CDE on January 17, in which he stated: "an artificial barrier has cruelly divided this continent—and, indeed, heartlessly divided one of its great nations.

"This barrier was not placed there by the West. It is not maintained by the West. It is not the West that prevents its citizens free movement or cuts them off from competing ideas.

“Let me be very clear: the United States does not recognize the legitimacy of the artificially imposed division of Europe. This division is the essence of Europe’s security and human rights problem, and we all know it.


“Human rights remain central to any discussion of European security. As the Helsinki Final Act declares, respect for human rights and fundamental freedom is ‘an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and cooperation.’ The attempt to impose division on Europe is inevitably a source of instability and tension.” (Telegram Secto 1019 from the Secretary’s delegation, January 18; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840034-0830) For the full-text, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, March 1984, pp. 34-36.

⁶ See [Document 158](#).

⁷ START negotiations began in Geneva on June 29, 1982. They were suspended without a set resumption date on December 8, 1983, a Soviet decision related to U.S. INF deployments to Europe. See [footnote 3, Document 142](#).

⁸ See [footnote 4, Document 141](#).

⁹ See [Document 74](#).

¹⁰ See [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 221](#) .

¹¹ On January 23, the President sent a message to Congress on Soviet noncompliance, along with a fact sheet and a classified report. For the text of the message and the fact sheet, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book I, pp. 72-76. Reagan wrote in his diary on January 9: “An NSC meeting—this one on how to handle report to Congress on Soviet violations of weapons treaties—which are numerous. We’re going to low key it in the report but deal directly with the Soviets on what do they intend to do about them.”

(Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 306) On January 13, Reagan continued in his diary: “An N.S.C. meeting on our approach to the Soviets re arms negotiations. We’ve notified them of our report to Cong. on their violation of various treaties & agreements. They do just plain cheat.” (Ibid., p. 308)

¹² Burt and Sokolov met on January 13 to discuss the report to Congress on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. Instead of providing Sokolov with a written statement, Burt went through a series of points covered in the report. (Telegram 12804 to Moscow, January 15; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840001-0338)

¹³ Hartman and Gromyko had held a series of meeting related to Lebanon and the situation in the Middle East. The most recent had been in mid-December 1983. See [footnote 4, Document 147](#).

¹⁴ Gromyko seems to be referring to the book *America’s Siberian Adventure* by William S. Graves, published in 1931.

¹⁵ The Kissinger Commission Report was issued publicly on January 11. The full text is available in the journal, *Population and Development Review*, vol. 10, No. 2, June 1984, pp. 381–389. A summary and guidance on the report was transmitted in telegram 6714 to multiple American Republic diplomatic posts, January 10. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840016-0724)

¹⁶ Not found.

¹⁷ Gromyko had served as Soviet Foreign Minister since 1957.

160. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the White House¹

Stockholm, January 19, 1984, 0103Z

Secto 1032. White House Eyes Only for the President and McFarlane. SecState for S/S (Hill) (Only). Subject: Memorandum for the President: My Meeting With Gromyko in Stockholm, January 18, 1984.²

1. (S—Entire text)

2. As you know, Gromyko gave a very tough speech in Stockholm this morning,³ and as I expected I found him in a sour mood when our talks opened this afternoon. Nevertheless, the talks went two hours longer than anticipated, and during these five hours I inserted all the points I wanted to make into the record Gromyko will pass to the Soviet Politburo. For his part, Gromyko demonstrated that while there are basic differences between us, the Soviets see a need to be talking to us, and there may be some issues where they want to make progress. They are extremely sensitive about publicity, and if we publicize progress they will certainly retaliate by denying it and may well pull back on individual issues. But I am mildly encouraged by the meeting, assuming we can manage the follow-up wisely both within the government and publicly.

3. I began by restating your desire for a more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship, based on private discussions that will be kept out of the limelight. Gromyko responded by criticizing both your speech of Monday and my speech here yesterday.⁴ There may be “some words” in both speeches

that the Soviets can agree to, he said, but the basic problem is that we do not like socialist systems and want to change them. He said they feel the same way about capitalist systems, but if we base relations on these dislikes, we will be building a blank wall between us, and the Soviets prefer to look for points of contact. As concerns socialist systems, I replied, the problem of whether they are efficient—which I doubted—is different from the problem of whether peoples have the right to choose them, but I also reminded him that it is the differences in values and freedom that have created the tensions of postwar Europe. After all, they had built the only wall in Europe.

4. Gromyko then turned to specific issues, and made it very clear that if the Soviets are willing to talk, the conspicuous exception at this point is nuclear arms control, the Geneva negotiations. On arms control in general, he said the Soviets seek equality and want to avoid collision, and I told him we agree with both points. On INF and START in particular, however, he insisted that U.S. INF deployments have changed the situation, and that the Soviets are neither willing to return to the previous situation nor willing to engage in new talks on the subject matter right now. At the same time, the specific points he made concentrated on the history of U.S. forward-based systems (FBS) both in SALT II and subsequently, and his clear message was that if negotiations resume the Soviets will want to treat U.S. intermediate-range systems as FBS.

5. I responded that if ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II's are to be treated in negotiations, we will also have to address Soviet SS-20's, because we and our allies are bound together, and if the Soviets hit them it is the same as hitting us. With regard to START, I conveyed your desire to move forward, and to explore the possibilities of trade-offs among systems where each side had advantages

given the asymmetries in force structures. But I did not enter into any details, given Gromyko's unwillingness to address the Geneva negotiations.

6. On other arms control topics, Gromyko took a more constructive tack:

—On MBFR, as Dobrynin had predicted he said the Soviets are willing to resume the Vienna negotiations on or about March 16, warning against exploitation of this proposal to prove that there is business-as-usual. I replied that although this sounded acceptable, we should work it out in diplomatic channels.

—On chemical weapons, Gromyko expressed what appeared to be genuine interest in moving forward, and especially in our plan to table a treaty draft in Geneva. He noted that the Soviets have made a regional proposal while we have a global approach, but said they are willing to discuss both, and focussed more on overcoming difficulties than on debating the merits of the two approaches.

—On the Stockholm Conference measures, he recognized the differences in approach but stressed several times that our negotiators should keep in touch and work together in businesslike fashion.

7. In our exchanges on arms control, I stressed the importance we attach to the compliance issue, its corrosive effect on the confidence needed to move forward in arms control and our desire to resolve compliance questions rather than use them as sticks to beat the Soviets. Although I expected an indignant rebuttal, Gromyko responded only that if we give heavy publicity to our charges the Soviets will retaliate with charges that the U.S. has violated arms control commitments.

8. Referring back to the emphasis I had put on human rights in my CDE speech yesterday, Gromyko then raised human rights as another alleged U.S. propaganda device, and this gave me the opening to make the points I had planned to make: your personal interest in these issues and commitment to quiet diplomacy as the best way to resolve individual cases; the cases of Shcharanskiy, Sakharov and Iosif Begun; the drastic decline in Jewish emigration from the USSR; and the upcoming visit to Moscow of World Jewish Congress President Edgar Bronfman to discuss Jewish issues, which I supported. Finally, I notified him that Ambassador Art Hartman would give his deputy our traditional lists of cases of (1) long-standing applicants for emigration with a claim to U.S. citizenship under our law; (2) people seeking reunification with family members in the U.S.; and (3) Soviet spouses of U.S. citizens seeking to join them in the U.S. (Gromyko's deputy accepted the lists after the meeting.)

9. Gromyko then invited comments on bilateral issues with the familiar claim that our bilateral relations are in disarray because we have purposely torn down the structure of agreements built up in the 1970's. I responded by pointing out certain topics on which we were making or hoping for progress: Hotline upgrade and other communications measures; nuclear non-proliferation, where we have scheduled another bilateral session in Vienna next month; the Pacific maritime boundary, where the Soviets have agreed to negotiations in Washington at the end of this month; and trade, where agribusiness is a good example of mutually beneficial exchange without military spinoffs. I pointed out that they could take some very useful technical steps, navigation aids and the like, to avoid a recurrence of the KAL tragedy, and that we stand by last summer's agreement in principle to move forward on consulates in Kiev and New York and negotiation of a new cultural

agreement, but that the timing must be right in terms of the overall relationship.

10. Gromyko then moved into regional issues, and delivered himself of an extended tirade on the theme of U.S. militarism and interference in the internal affairs of others, which swung from the Middle East through Southern Africa to Central America/the Caribbean:

—On the Middle East, he stressed Israeli aggressiveness and our responsibility for it, given our “great influence” on Israel; and the familiar charge that we wish to emplace military forces in a region on the USSR’s southern borders;

—On Southern Africa, he stressed our support for “racist” South Africa, and our alleged withdrawal of support from UN Resolution 435 that we had both voted for;⁵

—On Central America/the Caribbean, he hammered on the familiar line that Nicaragua is no threat to us and that what we really object to is “socialism.”

11. Probably because he sensed just how weak his case was, he concluded with a discussion on Afghanistan in which he reiterated the well-worn claim that the Afghan Government had invited the Soviets in many times to defend its integrity before the Soviets agreed, and that we are egging on external interference from Pakistan and Iran, “your friends.”

12. On the specifics, I made a standard presentation on the theme that we should be talking more about issues whose destructive potential was very clear and present in our relationship, but could not resist saying that I expected we would have our forces out of Grenada and Lebanon before theirs were out of Afghanistan.

13. From that launch pad, I summed up by expressing the hope that we want a more constructive relationship and think it may be possible to fashion one if we can only get away from accusations and talk quietly about the issues. I then appealed directly to Gromyko, not only as the world's most experienced diplomat but also as a human being, to review the current situation in our relationship carefully and see whether he did not see some way of moving forward toward a better day.

14. Gromyko's response was somewhat disjointed, but also perhaps the most interesting part of the discussion:

—If I were suggesting the need for more frequent exchanges, he said, the Soviets support it, and are ready to talk on any issue except the Geneva negotiations;

—The Middle East is the regional issue we most need to talk about;

—Their proposal for Pacific maritime boundary talks is really an “alloy” (i.e. an amalgam) of the proposals of both sides.

—Proposals in the civil aviation field would be under discussion in ICAO; we should consider them, and our representatives should talk; and we should be able to make headway so long as U.S. representatives do not put forward “unacceptable” solutions (which I took to mean measures fingering the Soviets for KAL responsibility);

—The Soviets are awaiting concrete proposals on consulates and the cultural agreement;

—There are other bilateral topics which the U.S. has put into “hibernation,” and which should be looked at;

—This has been a “necessary” discussion, and it would be good if we took Soviet views into account in the future.

16. On balance, I think the meeting showed some modest forward progress on the course you have charted for U.S.-Soviet relations. It could scarcely have been worse than the Madrid session,⁶ and in fact it was better. At the same time, the prospect is very clouded. The Soviets clearly have not yet figured out how they wish to handle a resurgent U.S. For the time being, they wish to keep nuclear negotiations in a deep freeze. But they also seem prepared to embark on discussions concerning a whole range of other issues. However, even that inclination is very tentative. They have been impressed, as they should be, by our skill in conveying your tripartite approach of realism, strength and negotiations. By the same token, they are genuinely fearful that we will exploit any genuine dialogue to dismiss their concerns over rising tensions, and claim that life goes on as usual.

17. Much will therefore depend on how we manage the small openings toward dialogue Gromyko was holding it [*out?*] If we trumpet them as proof we have the Soviets where we want them, they will do what they have to do in order to prove we are wrong. That would be a pity, since progress on the substance of the issues will be the best gauge of whether our policy has been right all along. We should therefore be very close-mouthed about today’s meeting, and above all avoid any predictions about future results. That is the approach we are taking here, and I hope it will be the approach taken in Washington too.

Shultz

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840037-0071. Secret; Niact Immediate. Sent for information to the Department of State.

² See [Document 159](#). In his memoir, Shultz wrote that this meeting with Gromyko “had provided a way to reengage the Soviets on what amounted to our four-part agenda and provide a quiet forward thrust to U.S.-Soviet relations.

“This had been my best meeting with Gromyko by miles. In spite of the posturing, we had some real exchanges. He could sense that too, I was sure. About halfway through the meeting, I felt that I was in charge: the talk was about our agenda and our initiatives. ‘The Soviets feel the heat,’ I told my team on the aircraft going home. ‘No one is in their corner. But it would be a mistake to push too hard right now. They’re too tentative.’” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 470-471)

³ See [footnote 3, Document 159](#).

⁴ See [Document 158](#) and [footnote 5, Document 159](#).

⁵ See [Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. XVI, Southern Africa, Document 96, footnote 4](#).

⁶ See [Documents 104](#) and [105](#).

161. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Mr. Secretary:

Washington, January 25, 1984

Gromyko's approach to START and INF in Stockholm—refusing to enter into substantive discussions but emphasizing that US “forward-based” systems would have to be addressed were START resumed²—suggests that the future of nuclear arms negotiations lies in some form of START-INF merger. In this regard, it is interesting that Gromyko did not dispute your rejoinder that we could not discuss our LRINF missiles without addressing the SS-20 as well. While silence does not connote acceptance, the Soviets surely understand that a “partial merger” on their terms, involving only US systems and excluding the SS-20, is not acceptable either to the US or the Allies.

Since a return to the *status quo ante deployment* is not acceptable, the policy question at present is what kind of merger would be most advantageous for us, in terms of our strategic interests, Alliance management and consultation, and negotiability with the Soviets, and what kind of approach could win approval in Washington—where other agencies and the NSC staff have been strongly opposed to any form of merger. There are essentially two alternatives:

—A full substantive merger of the START and INF agendas, in which SS-20s, Pershing IIs, and GLCMs are included within the appropriate overall START aggregates for missiles and warheads, with or

without sub-ceilings and constraints on freedom to mix;

—A compartmentalized merger, in which the present START and INF agendas maintain their separate identity, and are dealt with as distinct sections under one umbrella negotiation.

Pros and Cons of Full Merger:

The first approach has significant conceptual advantages. Putting US and Soviet strategic and INF systems in overall aggregates would underscore the strategic unity of the Alliance, counteracting to some degree the notion of a separate European balance which has arisen in some quarters in the context of a distinct INF negotiation. Such an approach would facilitate an effort to secure global limits on SS-20s. Were the Soviets to accept this concept—as opposed to their own narrower demand for the one-sided inclusion of US forward based systems—they would have implicitly agreed that the Soviet threat to US allies was a legitimate subject of US-Soviet negotiations on strategic forces. At the same time, this approach would not necessarily preclude our introducing regional elements, such as the offer not to deploy the entirety of our global entitlement of INF missiles in Europe which we considered last fall for the INF talks.

From the Soviet viewpoint, a fully merged negotiation would allow them to claim persuasively that they had not, after all, returned to the INF negotiations, unlike a compartmentalized approach—in which the INF portion would strongly resemble the INF talks in Geneva. The prospects for reaching an agreement with the Soviets on limitations covering INF could also be improved by the

expansion of the agenda beyond the intractable political issues confronted in INF. Full merger would create a wider range of potential tradeoffs between differing US and Soviet advantages and perspectives, and between strategic and INF systems. At a technical level, it also would have the advantage of rendering more tractable such questions as whether particular cruise missiles and Backfire bombers are strategic or theater systems, since a place could be found for all systems within the overall aggregates.

A full merger would, however, have certain disadvantages. Consultations with the Allies would become more complicated, since it would be difficult to establish any clear break between INF issues—on which they would continue to insist on a major say, and strategic forces issues—where we would want to continue our past practice of only keeping them generally informed. Tension could develop between the U.S. and the allies over the bounds of consultations, which is one of the arguments in Washington against merger. Substantively, the availability of trade-offs could prove a two-edged sword, raising the possibility of competing US and allied interests or perceptions, which might be exploited by the Soviets to drive wedges in the Alliance. On the one hand, the allies could fear that the US might be tempted to accept imbalances vis-a-vis Europe in return for Soviet agreement to US positions on intercontinental systems. Conversely, some in Washington are concerned that the allies could press us to sacrifice our interest in reducing and limiting Soviet strategic forces, for example heavy ICBMs, and to concentrate our bargaining efforts on INF issues. This concern has been another of the principal arguments against a merger in the Washington community. The obverse of this is that the Soviets would also face difficult choices on trade-offs, as for example between numbers of ICBMs and numbers of SS-20s under a common aggregate. The dilemma for the Soviets is in

some way crueller, for whereas US INF and intercontinental systems can both hit targets in the USSR, Soviet INF cannot reach US targets. Thus for the West INF and intercontinental systems are militarily, although not politically, largely interchangeable, whereas for the Soviets they are not.

A full merger would also make explicit the dependence of an agreement on strategic forces, which has heretofore been relatively unpoliticized, on the resolution of INF issues, which have become extremely political. A merger could thus be seen to delay prospects for a START agreement as long as the Soviets remain adamant in refusing any US INF deployments in Europe.

A chart setting forth an illustrative package of limitations under a full substantive merger of START and INF is attached at TAB 2.³

Pros and Cons of a Compartmentalized Merger

The principal advantage of a compartmentalized approach (a "negotiation within a negotiation") is that by dividing subject matter between INF and strategic forces, it would minimize opportunities for Soviet wedge-driving between the US and the allies, and would facilitate an orderly structure of alliance consultations. In effect, the allies would continue to be closely involved in work on the INF portion of the negotiation, while we would simply keep them briefed on the strategic forces issues. There would be no change in the procedures or the relative importance of the INF issues.

A compartmentalized approach would also be more attractive in Washington, since it would come closest to a

continuation of the negotiating pattern we have been accustomed to and would not require any reordering of substantive positions, as a full substantive merger would. For just these reasons, however, the Soviets might find it more difficult to return to a compartmentalized START/INF negotiation than to a fully merged one.

Substantively, a compartmentalized approach would lessen negotiating flexibility on both strategic and INF issues. The separate agendas and problems as they had developed through the negotiations to date would remain largely unmodified. There would be limited opportunity for trade-offs between strategic and INF systems, although a compartmentalized approach could evolve toward a full merger over time. Conceptually, the compartmentalized approach would entail a greater risk of returning to the concept of a distinct European nuclear balance, separate from the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance, which would be potentially divisive of Alliance strategic unity.

The Soviet Attitude Toward Merger

If the Soviets eventually agree to a merger of START and INF, they will want to change the parameters of the negotiation to protect their position. Up to now, the START negotiations have been focused on global limitations on US and Soviet launchers and warheads—precisely the principles which the Soviets have rejected in INF. The existence of such potential inconsistencies may cause the Soviets to hesitate on the merger idea. At the same time, the Soviets may appreciate the greater negotiating flexibility and range of tradeoffs which a merger would offer, and could find in some form of merger a face-saving escape from the impasse they created by walking out of the START and INF talks.

At Tab 1 is a summary of the Soviet efforts to bring US forward based systems into the negotiations on SALT I and SALT II.⁴ This is a continuing issue, where the negotiating record is subject to sharply varying interpretations. In SALT I the Soviets claimed that the larger launcher aggregate which they were allowed represented compensation for US FBS—as well as for UK and French systems. We denied this, pointing out that the Soviet launcher numbers were offset by larger US warhead and bomber numbers. In SALT II, the Soviets argued that their right to a monopoly of 308 heavy missiles was compensation for UK and French systems. We have noted that this is not the case, and that the US in any event had no plan to build heavy missiles.

UK and French Forces

No form of merger will resolve the issue of UK and French forces. The Soviets will continue to advance the demands for compensation which they made in INF, and we will continue to insist that we cannot include third country forces in our aggregates. At the same time, it is possible that in the context of a broader merged agenda, there would be more possibility for the issue of UK and French forces to be resolved in the same manner that it was in SALT I and SALT II. That is, as noted above, the existence of asymmetries between US and Soviet forces under an agreement could be interpreted in different ways by the US and the Soviet Union.

Next Steps

If we and the Soviets reach agreement that START and INF should resume on a merged basis, the initial form of that

merger should most logically be a compartmentalized structure. This approach would most easily win approval in Washington and with the Allies, in that it is the closest to the pre-deployment negotiating pattern and presents the fewest new issues to be digested. It is also likely that the Soviets, with their cautious and conservative approach to arms control, will want to take an approach which, while enabling them to say that they are not returning to the INF talks, does not force them to make major decisions at the outset concerning the shape of a fully merged negotiation. This being the case, we do not need to make decisions now on the the desirability or structure of a fully merged negotiation ourselves, but it is clearly a subject that deserves careful thought.

Richard Burt⁵

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984-1989, January 16-31, 1984. Secret; Sensitive. In a covering note to Seitz, Burt wrote: "Ray—I have done the attached memo in its present form because of the extreme sensitivity of the subject matter, given that we are not yet even back into negotiations with the Soviets. However, given that the Secretary now is clearly interested in the topic, I think he will find this memo of interest. I hope he will find the time in the next few weeks to read it. Rick." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 22, Arms Control (01/24/1984-03/25/1984)) In a covering memorandum to Shultz on January 25, Eagleburger wrote: "Rick has done an excellent analysis of two approaches to a merger of the INF and START negotiations and of the advantages and disadvantages of each.

“Rick suggests that we consider first the more modest alternative of a ‘compartmentalized merger.’ That approach will be easier to sell in Washington and may be more appealing to Moscow but is likely to result in little more than a return to stalemated nuclear arms control talks in a slightly different package. As Rick suggests, the ‘full merger’ approach promises more benefits but also poses greater risks. In the end, we may not want to make that leap, but I suggest you discuss the full merger idea with Ken, Rick and Jon before ruling it out.” A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on Eagleburger’s memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984-1989, January 16-31, 1984)

² See [Documents 159](#) and [160](#).

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ Attached but not printed.

⁵ Burt signed “Rick” above his typed name.

162. Memorandum From Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, January 27, 1984

SUBJECT

Increased Danger of US-Soviet Conflict

Attached is a quick paper on the subject of the increased danger of US-Soviet conflict. If there is time, I would like to develop one additional point upon which I need to secure additional information. That has to do with Soviet efforts to improve flight control procedures in the Far East, in the aftermath of our rhetorical censure of their behavior.

Tab I

Paper Prepared by Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff²

Washington, undated

INCREASED DANGER OF WAR FACT OR FICTION?

During the last few months, a feeling has emerged in both the United States and in West Europe that the danger of a war has increased. The shutdown of the Korean Air Lines passenger jet, the bombing attack on our peacekeeping forces in Lebanon, the terrorist bombing of the leaders of the Republic of Korea in Rangoon, and the suspension, which we hope is temporary, of the START and INF arms control discussions have all contributed to the feeling that

the world has become a more dangerous place, and that the superpowers may be edging toward a conflict.

These events, of course, have had some effect, a negative effect, on the state of US-Soviet relations. It is curious, however, that the government of the United States is being held responsible by some people for the present state of affairs. It was not the United States that was the perpetrator of these acts, but the Soviet Union, its allies and proteges who have attacked civilians and walked out of negotiations.

Did the United States, by its actions, create an environment in which clashes between the superpowers became more likely? What, in fact, has the United States done over the last three years? We have made substantial progress toward rebuilding our armed forces to repair the damage that they suffered during the 1970s as a result of reduced budgets. While there is some debate about exactly how large the increases in our defense budget should be, no one that we know of, aside from George McGovern, has denied the need for those increases. It is interesting to notice that the chief defense analyst of the Carter administration Defense Department, Russell Murray, has now publicly stated that his office completed a study back in 1980 that showed that US defense spending increases of the size we have recommended were in fact necessary to restore the forces needed for our security (*Washington Times*, 19 January 1984; *Armed Forces Journal International*, June 1982, p. 57).

We have carried through on the policy chosen by NATO more than five years ago to deploy cruise and ballistic missiles in Europe to respond to the Soviet deployment of SS-20s. We remain ready to return to a world in which no

such missiles are deployed, or limited, equal numbers are deployed.

We defended our citizens in Grenada and defeated a coup d'état led by pro-Soviet would-be dictators. And, unlike some other unfortunate recent episodes, we acted effectively and *in time*.

Part of what we are seeing, of course, is a self-conscious effort on the part of the Soviet Union to use rhetoric to fan the belief that the world is becoming more dangerous. They know that, to the extent they succeed in convincing world opinion this is so, the onus will increasingly be on us, rather than them, to make new concessions. Precedents for this kind of behavior can be found both in Khrushchev's effort in 1960 to abort the summit with President Eisenhower and also in subsequent Soviet provocations over Berlin, which were intended to try to prevent President Kennedy's defense buildup.

The real question, of course, is whether the chances of war have been increased by our programs to rebuild American military strength and support our commitments around the world. The Soviet Union, by means of its recent, angry statements, says that we have. History tells us something quite different.³ World War II became unavoidable when the democratic powers of West Europe surrendered first part, then all of Czechoslovakia to Adolf Hitler. This capitulation only reinforced Hitler's belief that it was safe to attack Poland, because the great democracies were too weak and timid to fight.⁴ It reinforced the feeling of other nations that France and Britain were not reliable allies. The North Korean attack on South Korea became more likely when the Truman administration in 1950 mistakenly and inadvertently backed away from its public commitment to defend South Korea.

The record is clear. War is not made more likely when the military power of democracies is restored. It becomes more likely when the strength or will of those nations comes into question. No one has accused our Administration of allowing that to happen. We intend to keep it that way, and by doing so, and by remaining willing to engage in productive negotiations with the Soviet Union, we will keep the world as safe a place as a strong, prudent, United States can make it.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/27/84-01/31/84). Confidential. Sent for information. In a handwritten note to McFarlane at the bottom of the page, Poindexter explained: "Bud, This is in response to Jim Baker's question to me earlier in the week. Bob Sims has provided copy to Jim. Jim and Paul Laxalt appear on Sunday talk shows and they may use the points made here. John."

² No classification marking.

³ From this sentence forward, the text was circled. It is unclear whether Poindexter or McFarlane made the markings.

⁴ "to fight" is struck through.

163. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 26, 1984

SUBJECT

Horowitz Conversations in Moscow

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Lawrence Horowitz, Administrative Assistant to Senator Edward Kennedy
Admiral Poindexter
Jack Matlock

Horowitz said that he had come over to deliver a message from Zagladin, with whom he had a long conversation in Moscow on Thursday, January 19² —that is, after the President's speech on U.S.-Soviet relations³ and the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Stockholm⁴ (although it was not certain that Zagladin had yet received a report of the meeting).

Horowitz said that his meeting with Zagladin began with Zagladin delivering a lengthy and vitriolic polemic against U.S. policy and the President personally. He even compared the present situation to the thirties and the President to Hitler, in the sense that he seemed to be preparing for war. He said the Soviets could not figure out what our aims were. He asked rhetorically if we were trying to frighten them, and observed that our policies had forced Soviet decisions on new weapons which had already been taken and the results of which would be apparent in two to three years. He observed that the Soviets will sacrifice whatever is necessary not to fall behind the U.S.

Zagladin then asked, again rhetorically, if the U.S. was trying to isolate them in the world, and answered that this

would not work either. Then he observed that great powers have to allow each other to save face in a difficult situation, and noted, for example, that if oil supplies from the Persian Gulf were cut off, the Soviets would understand if the U.S. considered it necessary to take action to restore the flow. But then he complained about what he called a U.S. “propaganda campaign” directed at the Soviet people. He claimed that the Soviet people fear war, but that “Our greatest fear is what if—God forbid—Reagan is reelected. Every door in every negotiation would be closed.”

At this point, according to Horowitz, there was a total change in Zagladin’s tone. He asked if it would be possible for Horowitz to deliver a message to the White House, and alluded to the fact that the request might appear strange, given the fact that Horowitz works for a Senator on the other side of the aisle. Horowitz assured him that, nevertheless, he was sure he could deliver a message if this was desired.

Zagladin then said that the situation between our two countries is serious, but that Soviet decision-makers have analyzed it and have found one area where progress might be possible. The only realistic first step seems to them to lie in the area of chemical weapons. If we could work jointly on a treaty in this area and bring it to a successful conclusion, then that would “start us on the right road.”

Once this “message” was delivered, the rest of the discussion went back and forth on a variety of subjects, during which Zagladin told Horowitz that Andropov was on the mend and, indeed, that he had seen Andropov that very morning.

Other Conversations: Horowitz is a physician and had some contact with Soviet doctors. One told him that Andropov is

suffering from instage [*end-stage*] renal disease, combined with hypertension. He had responded well to treatment, but had an unexpected downturn in December, from which he is recovering, is now working about three hours a day, and is likely to appear in public before the March 4 local elections. Horowitz was questioned at length, without direct reference to Andropov but clearly with the latter in mind, regarding how to deal with anesthesia during an operation on a patient who had recently undergone surgery. There was also discussion of possible new drugs which suppress the immune reaction, which suggested that consideration was being given to a kidney transplant.

During a conversation with Academician Velikhov, the latter expressed grave concern over U.S. BMD research. He said that the Soviets had researched the field and were convinced that BMD is in fact feasible, although enormously expensive, and commented that the Soviets considered it potentially supportive of first strike intentions. When questioned on the logic of this, Velikhov responded that no defensive system could be a hundred percent effective, but if a nation built one it could launch a first strike confident that the BMD would limit damage from a retaliatory strike to acceptable proportions.

Horowitz said that his principal contact in Moscow was Andrei Pavlov of the State Committee for Science and Technology, with whom he had worked during the 1978 visit of Senator Kennedy and that Pavlov's deputy, Valery Antonov, accompanied him at all times. (Pavlov had been instrumental in 1978 in arranging a meeting between Kennedy and Brezhnev after the meeting was initially refused.)⁵ He also noted that, before leaving, he received a call from a person named "Latva," who was identified as a personal assistant to Andropov, and who thanked him for

coming. He took this as a signal that Andropov was aware of his visit and wished that fact to be known.

At various times during the visit Pavlov, Velikhov and Antonov indicated they thought the President would be re-elected which would make arms control agreements nearly impossible to achieve in the second term.

Horowitz said that he had also discussed some "private matters" and expected to have further contacts if he could be of use to us. He said that Senator Kennedy considered the matter beyond politics and was ready to be of assistance if we desired, but would not be at all offended if we did not desire. He asked that his report not be disseminated widely and was assured that access to it would be confined to the West Wing.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/27/84-01/31/84). Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. The meeting took place in Poindexter's office. Reagan initialed the memorandum of conversation, indicating he saw it.

² Telegram 12229 to Moscow, January 14, reported that the primary purpose of Horowitz's mission was to discuss the "Fallout from 'Consequences of Nuclear War' Forum: Mark Palmer has learned from his sources in Ted Kennedy's office that the Senator's AA, Larry Horowitz, will be in Moscow January 16-19 to meet with Velikhov of Academy of Sciences to discuss the possibility of setting up an event in the USSR similar to that held in the US in December on the consequences of nuclear war. No decision has been made yet on whether the US side would actually go ahead or whether the Senator would participate. Kennedy's office provides this strictly FYI. They do not repeat do not want

the Embassy to make any contact with the Soviets on this.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840027-0835) The December 1983 Forum on the “Consequences of Nuclear War,” which was called by Senators Kennedy and Hatfield and held in the Senate Caucus Room, brought together Soviet and American scientists to discuss the effects of a nuclear war. (Philip Shabecoff, “US-Soviet Panel Sees No Hope in an Atomic War,” *New York Times*, December 9, 1983, p. A13; Tom Wicker, “A Grim Agreement,” *New York Times*, December 12, 1983, p. A27)

³ See [Document 158](#).

⁴ See [Document 159](#).

⁵ Senator Kennedy traveled to Moscow in September 1978 and met with Brezhnev on September 9. (Telegram 21718 from Moscow, September 11, 1978; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D780369-1165)

164. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Andropov to President Reagan¹

Dear Mr. President:

Moscow, January 28, 1984

I have given a careful thought to your letter of December 23.² I am answering it with account taken of the subsequent development of the situation and the recent meeting between A.A. Gromyko and Secretary of State G. Shultz in Stockholm.³

I already expressed, also in my correspondence with you, our view as to what the Soviet-American relationship should be. I can reaffirm with all due emphasis our principled stand in this regard.

If one must state today that the affairs between our two countries are taking on, to put it frankly, an extremely unfavorable shape, then the reason for it is not our policy. We did not and do not want it to be so. On the contrary, we have been trying persistently not only to straighten up our relations but also to act in such a way that they develop constructively and in a stable manner. We suggested concrete paths which could be followed in order to achieve this objective.

The Soviet Union conducted serious and meaningful negotiations on the nuclear arms, doing the maximum to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. Unfortunately our efforts continued to run against a stonewall. In no way were we able to feel a desire on the part of the U.S. side to reach agreements. I will even add that while assessing the

U.S. negotiating posture and practical actions, one cannot fail to draw a conclusion that the U.S. pursued a goal of a different nature—to challenge the security of our country and its allies. There has been nothing so far that convinces us otherwise.

On more than one occasion we have candidly told the United States that there is a limit in the relations between our countries which one cannot go beyond. It is determined by the genuine security interests.

We were prepared to accept very deep reductions both of the strategic and the European nuclear weapons. With regard to the latter—even to the point of ridding Europe entirely of medium range and tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union continues to be in favor of this. Having started the deployment of its new missiles which are strategic systems, as far as the USSR is concerned, the U.S. side destroyed the very basis on which it was possible to seek an agreement, we have only one view of this step—it is an attempt to upset both the regional and the global balance. So we are reacting accordingly. It appears that the U.S. side has underestimated our resolve to preserve the military and strategic equilibrium, nothing short of equilibrium.

Let us be frank, Mr. President, there is no way of making things look as if nothing has happened. There has been a disruption of the dialogue on the most important questions, a heavy blow has been dealt to the very process of nuclear arms limitation. The tension has grown dangerously. We know this, and you know this, too. In order to correct the situation, practical steps are required on the part of the U.S. side. This is not a matter of some sort of favors or concessions. It is necessary to return to the fundamentals which made it possible in the past to reach agreements, to

find mutually acceptable solutions to questions the sides were interested in, in other words,—to follow the principle of equality and equal security.

We see, so far, no signs that the U.S. is prepared to do so. What was said by the Secretary of State in Stockholm confirms that it is the case.

If the United States has an interest to continue an effective process of nuclear arms limitation and reduction, it should seriously weigh the situation and come to proper conclusions. Practical positive steps in this direction would find us duly responsive.

I am convinced that this would considerably facilitate putting the totality of our relations on a more stable and constructive basis, which you speak in favor of in your letter.

I repeat, we are all for it. By the same token, we are for a dialogue—a serious, meaningful dialogue aimed at searching for points of contact and finding concrete solutions to concrete issues, which are numerous.

However, the stumbling block has been, so far, in the fact that we, for the time being, hear only calls in favor of a dialogue. If you, however, review the situation of the past years, you can see that with regard to our proposals to discuss important and acute problems we either have not received a substantive answer, or the reply has been a negative one. The question is, therefore, who stands for a genuine dialogue?

One cannot, we are convinced, speak of a desire to work for restraining the arms race and at the same time refuse to seek an agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Such a measure, large as it is,

would effectively help slow down the qualitative and quantitative build-up of nuclear arms. This has long been a ripe issue. Many states speak in favor of having it solved.

A definite step in this regard could also be the ratification of the Soviet-American treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests and on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes signed a decade ago.⁴ We have not seen and cannot see now any convincing reasons why the United States does not do just that.

And why not try to look for a mutually acceptable solution to the problem of preventing militarization of outer space, while it is not too late to close this extremely dangerous channel of the arms race? We raise this issue as an urgent one which brooks no delay. In this context it is necessary also to solve the issue of banning and abolishing anti-satellite weapons. We have put forward our proposals. We would like you to read them once again and with more attention. They are based on the premise that the United States must have no less interest in solving this problem than the Soviet Union has. Is it, that the objective necessity has disappeared to exchange views, for instance, on such questions as reducing the military activities in the Indian Ocean and limiting conventional arms sales and transfers?

At the Stockholm meeting the Secretary of State spoke in the sense that the U.S. side understood the significance of the Socialist countries' proposals put forward at the Vienna negotiations and that those proposals were under study. Well, there has been enough time to carry out such a study. We are awaiting a concrete answer, so as to make it possible to reach agreement on this important matter.

Even from this list, it is evident that there is subject matter both for a dialogue and for straightening our relations step-

by-step, given the will to do so.

It is important at the same time that the readiness for a dialogue be also matched by practical deeds. The latter point, by the way, has a direct bearing on the regional problems, too, be it in Central America, Southern Africa or the situation in the Middle East, that you mentioned. You point out correctly that that region is in a state of a dangerously high tension now because of the situation in Lebanon. Of course, no one would disagree, exercising restraint in this regard is in order. But it is precisely the United States who is directly involved there with its armed forces, that can and should exercise such restraint. Above all, it must withdraw all the troops from there and the Navy forces from the adjacent waters.⁵ We are convinced that this would to a substantial degree diffuse the situation in and around Lebanon. This, in turn, would help galvanize the efforts in search of ways to a political settlement in the entire Middle East, which the Soviet Union has been consistently calling for. In other words, the United States can and must, if it wishes to do so, take real steps for the sake of peace in that region.

Briefly, one more matter. It would be only natural if the desire to improve relations and establish a productive dialogue were accompanied by the creation of an appropriate atmosphere. At any rate, the inflation of animosity is not helpful.

Mr. President, I will be ready to listen to what you think with regard to the thoughts and specific points expressed in the present letter, which have occurred to me in connection with your letter.

Sincerely,

Y. Andropov

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8291507, 8490115). No classification marking. In a covering memorandum to Reagan, Shultz explained that Dobrynin delivered this letter from Andropov during their meeting on January 30. (See [Document 165](#).) The Soviet Embassy provided the translation of this letter. A routing slip indicates McFarlane sent the memorandum to Reagan for information on February 1.

² See [Document 149](#).

³ See [Document 159](#).

⁴ See [footnote 6, Document 31](#).

⁵ See [footnote 7, Document 152](#).

165. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 30, 1984

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Dobrynin, January 30

I met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin for a little over an hour this afternoon to follow up on my meeting with Gromyko in Stockholm and reestablish contact with him before I left for Latin America.² Dobrynin had read a transcript of the Stockholm session, and we generally agreed in our assessment of it:

—We agreed that, as Gromyko had said, the meeting was “necessary,” and that it had produced a real exchange of views.

—Establishing a private channel for confidential communications, with Dobrynin the key interlocutor for the Soviets in Washington, was especially useful, and we should make a real effort to get something accomplished.

—Nuclear arms negotiations are on hold for now, so that the immediate future would see us concentrating on negotiations in the non-nuclear field and other issues.

On the nuclear talks, I said we are ready to talk and waiting for their ideas. He responded by suggesting that while they were not prepared to negotiate now, they want our thoughts on relating INF and START, and more generally any ideas we have for making progress on strategic arms. He hinted that our views could influence their internal arms control debate.

I raised human rights as a category we need to talk about, and expressed our particular concern about rising anti-semitism in the USSR. He gave the pro forma answer that anti-semitism is not and has never been Soviet policy.

We touched briefly on the Mideast, and I said that if regional tensions explode anywhere it is likely to be there.

I also brought up KAL. As I had with Gromyko, I said we hoped our representatives in Montreal could make progress toward agreement on technical steps to ensure that nothing like it ever happened again.³ Dobrynin confirmed Soviet willingness to listen to our ideas on this.

We concluded with a one-on-one session. Here I mentioned that we would be getting back to them on our idea for a joint space rescue project, and noted we hope for progress when MBFR talks resume. Dobrynin gave me the text of a letter from Andropov in response to your last letter to him, delivered in Moscow December 24.⁴ We will be transmitting this separately together with an analysis.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 11, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (01/29/1984-01/31/1984); NLR-775-11-13-3-2. Secret; Sensitive. A cover memorandum shows that it was drafted by Burt.

² See [Document 159](#). Shultz was on official travel to El Salvador, Venezuela, Brazil, Grenada, and Barbados from January 31 to February 8.

³ In early 1984, the ICAO Council considered the report of the ICAO Secretary General requested by the resolution adopted at the September 1983 session (see [footnote 2](#), [Document 112](#)).

⁴ See [Documents 149](#) and [164](#).

166. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Letter from Andropov and Shultz Meeting with Dobrynin

Ambassador Dobrynin gave George Shultz a letter from Andropov to you during their meeting January 30 (TAB A).² It is in reply to your letter of December 23.³ While it reiterates standard Soviet positions on most substantive issues, it does accept the necessity for an improved dialogue. In particular, it provides a broader formulation of what it would take to get the nuclear arms control process back in motion, thus creating more maneuver room on that issue.

There was little additional substance in the Shultz-Dobrynin conversation (TAB B).⁴ However, Dobrynin seemed eager to elicit more of our ideas on START and hinted that our views could influence their internal arms control debate. Shultz refrained from going further than we already have on this subject. Dobrynin also confirmed Soviet willingness to listen to our ideas about improving navigation aids on the Pacific route where the KAL flight went off course.

I will shortly provide a more detailed analysis of the Andropov letter and recommendations on where we go from here, but thought that you would want to take a look at the letter and Shultz's preliminary report immediately.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—(1/26/84-2/13/84). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Prepared by Matlock. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it, and wrote at the bottom, “P.2 of Andropov’s letter—he suggests that *they* want an elimination of nuclear weapons? In Europe that is. Let’s take him up on that.” See [Document 164](#).

² See [Document 164](#).

³ See [Document 149](#).

⁴ See [Document 165](#).

167. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, February 6, 1984

SUBJECT

What If Andropov Dies?

The sudden cancellation of Ustinov's visit to India suggests some major development on the Soviet internal scene,² and the possibility which comes most readily to mind is that Andropov's condition has taken a turn for the worse. Without trying to make a prediction regarding what may in fact be happening, I believe we should give some preliminary thought to how we would react to Andropov's demise.

I believe that Andropov's passing should not be used as an argument for changing our basic policy: it is sound and should be pursued regardless of the identity of the Soviet leader. However, the President will have to make a quick decision as to whether to attend the funeral, and the decision could have an effect both on our public diplomacy and on our dialogue with Andropov's successor.

Most of the pros and cons regarding Presidential attendance at the funeral are readily apparent. On the "pro" side, it would relieve pressures for unplanned summitry and strengthen our stance in favor of dialogue. Among the "cons" are that it would be paying homage to a man even more inimical to U.S.-Soviet relations than

Brezhnev, who was a secret policeman to boot, and in an election year it might smack of grandstanding.

My initial view is that the “pros” would slightly outweigh the “cons” if a successor has been named as General Secretary, since pressures for premature summitry could be relieved by a 30-minute meeting, and direct understandings reached regarding channels of communication. On the other hand, I would see no point in the President’s going if a successor has not been named.

You may wish to ask George Shultz to give some thought to this question when he returns Wednesday.³ I have asked Rick Burt to have his people put together the relevant material on a very close-hold basis. I don’t believe we need interagency tasking, which would risk press leaks, although Weinberger and Casey should presumably be consulted before a recommendation is made to the President.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/04/84-2/11/84). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. McFarlane’s stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² In telegram 1455 from Moscow, February 8, Hartman reported: “The sudden postponement of a trip already announced, which was seen by both the Soviets and Indians as a substitute for an Andropov visit, cannot have been a decision taken lightly. It is possible that Ustinov’s health was the cause, given the heavy program prepared for him in India. It is also possible that a new turn in Andropov’s condition led the leadership to exercise caution about having such a key figure out of the country. At this moment we believe the evidence is too scanty to draw firm

conclusions about this virtually unprecedented last-minute cancellation.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840078-0581) ³ Shultz was on official travel to El Salvador, Venezuela, Brazil, Grenada, and Barbados from January 31. He returned to Washington on Wednesday, February 8.

168. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, February 7, 1984, 1201Z

1487. For Under Secretary Eagleburger Only From Hartman. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With Dobrynin.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Just back last weekend, and am naturally anxious for a read-out on the Secretary's last meeting with Dobrynin,² part of which I understand was one-on-one. I would also appreciate the text of the high-level message that Dobrynin gave the Secretary.³

3. When the Secretary returns, it will be important to pick up on some of the things which were discussed at Stockholm—in particular, the strategic arms framework, the consulates agreement, and the exchanges agreement. I will send some thoughts on the exchanges agreement in a few days.

4. We all had a feeling there was a little bit of movement and we should be sure it doesn't stop for lack of imagination on our side. Important point to keep remembering these days is that any visible movement in the relation toward more constructive directions is in our interest and helps to knock down Soviet public campaign that things have never been worse. Therefore, we should let loose a few initiatives.

Hartman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840003-0057. Confidential; Nodis.

² See [Document 165](#).

³ See [Document 164](#).

169. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, February 8, 1984

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations in 1984

Ustinov's surprise cancellation of his visit to India once again highlights the Andropov health problem and the need for sobriety and caution in US-Soviet relations this year.² I would like to follow up my brief comments on Bill Casey's paper³ by some more extended analysis of (1) the Soviet leadership's situation at home and abroad; (2) Soviet options vis-à-vis the U.S. this year; and (3) our posture toward the Soviets in 1984.

The Soviet Situation

We have a policy framework that lets us move forward or back as the situation requires. The issue we will be confronting here in Washington is whether the Soviet internal situation makes it impossible to move forward in US-Soviet relations this year, if that is what we want to do.

There is no doubt that the Moscow leadership feels hemmed in at home and abroad, and is having difficulty making major decisions:

At home, even if Andropov continues in office, his physical condition will never let him establish the primacy previous leaders have had. He will be forced to fashion Politburo

majorities issue-by-issue from his sickbed. New departures are very difficult, and the pace of change will be painfully slow. Andropov began by proclaiming that he would use increased discipline on labor, management and dissent as one means to get the economy and country going again after the late Brezhnev drift. Discipline and repression have been hallmarks of his year-plus in office.

Some argue that we are witnessing a regression into neo-Stalinism and paralysis, but this picture is probably overdrawn. Discipline and repression there are, and they bear a cost in terms of initiative. But they have also helped justify the replacement of large numbers of senior and mid-level officials across the country with younger and at least in some cases abler people, and they have probably contributed to the significant upturn in industrial productivity and output in 1983 (agricultural output also rose for the first time in five years, but because of better weather).

Thus, there is new blood in the system, including the Politburo, a heftier economic cushion, and even some tentative, gingerly reforms. Everything is slow, but things do move. The evidence points less to paralysis than to uncertainty and maneuvering for and against change. Succession is certain to come sometime, and may already have started.

We do not know all the issues around which succession maneuvering will crystallize. But we do know our policy will be a factor in the debate and in the decisions.

For the Soviets themselves, the economy rather than the U.S. is the top priority problem. Recent visitors to Moscow find them even more preoccupied with their economic problems, and with the outlines of the 1986-1990 plan that

must be decided soon, than with INF. But there is a functional link. While the 1983 economic results were encouraging, the Soviets face a resumption of declining economic growth rates unless they take serious measures. In particular they need to increase investment and consumer spending. But this comes at a time when the pressure to increase defense spending also has grown. In recent years the Soviets have cut the rate of growth in defense spending from four to two percent, and increases for military procurement to zero. Even with decelerating defense outlays, however, the economy has continued to slow down. There is now a painful choice between accelerating defense spending to meet the enhanced security problem they face and concentrating on their economic needs—on which their long-term security equally depends.

The Soviets see themselves faced with a resurgent “Imperialist Camp” led by the U.S. For them this is a trend, rather than a fait accompli, and they hope it is still reversible. But if the trend continues, the prospect for them is not simply difficult but dangerous. They have spent the last year trying to reverse the trend by extrapolating from accepted policy lines. This has failed: the Soviet Union has lost rather than gained ground. Our rearmament program and alliance systems are intact; leaders with very robust approaches to the Soviet Union are in place for an extended period in the major allied capitals; and Soviet analysis points toward a Reagan reelection. So they must begin to think in terms of the next five years, and they must ask themselves what strategy is needed to defuse the growing western threat to their security and thereby free resources for the economy.

Soviet Options in a U.S. Election Year

For all the expertise and experience they have accumulated in Western Europe and the Third World, the Soviets continue to see the U.S. as their number one problem, and they know that the U.S. election is a crossroads. Barring Andropov's sudden disappearance, our election will be the largest single factor, foreign or domestic, forcing the Soviet leaders to make rather than defer decisions.

They would probably prefer to wait us out:

—They are genuinely angry at the President. From their point of view he has delivered some telling blows; they do not wish to help him get reelected; and they especially do not wish to be seen as crawling back to business-as-usual after these humiliations.

—Recent U.S. politics have been volatile, and it does not seem farfetched to Soviet leaders to hope that the President will stumble between now and November.

—The Soviets have the means to maintain a general level of anxiety which keeps pressure on us; to prevent us from resolving problems alone in key regional situations; and to exploit opportunities which may occur to pick up chips in the global sweepstakes.

But the Soviets also have the option of keeping the US-Soviet relationship active by doing some business. The President has given them that option, and they are suspicious that it is merely an election ploy. But it is neither unfamiliar nor unattractive:

—Like waiting us out, keeping things going is also "continuity." Very little change would be required: they would continue to build arms, promote "peace," keep western anxieties up, try to split our alliances.

—But standing pat after walking away from nuclear arms negotiations strengthens the Administration's claim that it is the USSR rather than the U.S. that is responsible for current East-West tensions.

—Furthermore, success in managing the U.S. relationship remains a key measure of Soviet leadership competence, and if we insist and persist, competence will require a measure of active dialogue with us this year.

—There may be problems that can only be dealt with if the U.S. and USSR are talking about them. Among regional issues, Zagladin mentioned Lebanon and Central America to the French.⁴ Further down the road, the Soviets are genuinely anxious about the costs of an arms race with American technology in new areas (ABM, space, etc.), and they want to slow us down.⁵ Fear and soft soap—"return to détente" and "return to the cold war," the alternating hot and cold showers of the past three years—have not helped. Negotiations might.

—The Soviet Union can afford to deal with the Americans, short of humiliating major concessions. In Soviet eyes, the USSR was not the expanding monster of 1980, and is no paper tiger now. Their INF "countermeasures" show to their own satisfaction that they have the resolve to compete; they are hurting us in Lebanon, Central America and elsewhere through arms supply; and their last resort—military strength—remains enormous.

There is no surefire way to predict which option the Soviets will choose. Larry thinks that over the past year the Soviets have run up to a number of favorable decisions in relations with us, and then backed away at the last moment—e.g. Shcharanskiy. Andropov's health problems are making

important decisions all the more difficult (and hard to decipher). We tend to be wary, and we should.

Nevertheless, most recent signs suggest that where the Soviets have made decisions, they have been in favor of keeping the option of doing business with the U.S. open. By mid-December, they had fallen back from the high-decibel war scare talk that accompanied initial INF deployments to the line that tensions are unprecedented, but the danger of war is not immediate. In Stockholm, Gromyko's harsh speech was followed by a rather different private line⁶ — nuclear arms control *nyet* (or not yet), other issues *da* (maybe)—not just with you but with other Western colleagues. Andropov's *Pravda* interview January 24 gave nothing away on substance, but resembled Gromyko's private presentation in its structure, and was notably more moderate than his previous statements in its tone.⁷

Moreover, Andropov has now introduced a more flexible formulation on resumption of nuclear arms control—that practical positive steps in the direction of an effective process would find the Soviets duly responsive. East European colleagues have told Yugoslav Foreign Minister Mojsov that START could be resumed by July.⁸ Careful and obedient Czech Prime Minister Strougal told Trudeau last week that the Soviets are trying to find a way to resume the Geneva talks by this summer, although some face-saving device might be needed.⁹

And, in the meantime, the last six weeks have been peppered with concrete diplomatic steps: agreement to and flexibility in the Hotline talks; agreement to meet bilaterally on nuclear non-proliferation in Vienna; agreement to begin negotiations on the Pacific Maritime Boundary here; Gromyko's proposal to resume MBFR on March 16, pointedly given to you first rather than to

another Foreign Minister; and the Soviet proposal in Montreal to form a USSR-Japan-U.S. group within ICAO to study practical steps to prevent another KAL.

In sum, there has been some backing away from the total belligerency of late November. Partly, this has been our doing. The announcement that you were going to Stockholm brought Gromyko there; the President's speech helped force a response in kind.¹⁰ Angry as they are, and under wraps as Andropov has been, the Soviets have been moving in the right direction. It will be, at least in part, up to the United States to determine how much further they move this year.

The U.S. Posture

We have put in place a sustainable strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union over the long term. We have made progress in implementing it. We are in a position to move forward on the dialogue element, by demonstrating the ability to establish a process of serious exchanges designed to find mutually beneficial solutions to real problems.

A stand-pat approach at this point could make it harder to keep the overall policy intact. Both the West Europeans and Japanese welcomed the President's speech partly because it provided long-hoped-for cover for their own desires to talk more to Moscow.¹¹ Foreign ministers will be doing so—Howe, Genscher, probably Abe—and heads of government will not be far behind; others may not follow, but Trudeau has led the way.¹² And, although American opinion is more solid, opposition politicians will be tempted this year to call for “results” in US-Soviet relations that they themselves could not deliver.

In order to continue to set the agenda, we need to continue to be active, and that agenda should include genuine content. Soviet practice is to respond: you saw an example of this in Stockholm, where Gromyko delivered a tirade, you kept your cool and appealed to him, and he came back with the most positive remarks this Administration has heard from him. The Soviets can field propaganda initiatives like non-use of force with ease; they have rarely been able to make the first substantive move. This will be even more true this year than usual.

The 1984 Agenda

I have given some thought to the areas where it ought to be in the interest of both sides to see movement this year. At this point, I think we could hope by the end of the year to have in place a work program of contacts and transactions with the Soviets that will have served (1) to prevent the relationship from deteriorating further, and (2) to create a process and a degree of momentum upon which we could build in 1985 and the years beyond. It is too early to tell whether the Soviets will actually agree to bring even minor matters like the Hotline to successful conclusion. However, if they become more convinced President Reagan will be reelected, and if we are offering things they want, the possibility of concrete results will increase.

The agenda could encompass the four topic areas we have identified to the Soviets:

—On nuclear arms control, the Soviets will have to sort out their approach before they return to negotiations, and it will not be easy. Even if they are moving toward a START/INF merger,¹³ there are many pros and cons, as you are aware, and they are clearly unsure of where they want

to go. It would be to our advantage to get back into dialogue and even back to the negotiating table. One way to hasten their decision-making would be to lay out some more specific ideas in the START area, as we originally contemplated for Stockholm. There has been a great deal of work on START substance in the interagency community, and there is more and more support for the idea of a common framework that you discussed with the President. It would be worthwhile, therefore, to reconfirm the President's support for this idea, and be ready to lay some of its elements before the Soviets early on.

—On non-nuclear arms control, the most promising is also the most modest—an accord on Hotline upgrade, where the technical side can easily be wrapped up by this summer. In MBFR, we should get Option Three approved and presented in Vienna. In CDE, it should be possible to establish a constructive working relationship between the U.S. and Soviet representatives and a serious discussion of the specific measures.

—On regional issues, candid discussion in bilateral channels might help us avoid direct US-Soviet confrontation, and could conceivably help produce parallel steps by the two countries that ease tensions or advance solutions to individual situations. Middle East issues remain the most urgent, but difficult. I think we need to look at ways to establish a more routine and serious dialogue among experts on a number of regions. I will have some thoughts for you on this subject shortly.

—On human rights, we have been running into a stone wall. But last year the Soviets did move on the Pentecostals in response to the President's interest,¹⁴ and we are once again hearing from official Soviets that positive steps are not excluded. Potential priorities are one or more major

cases like Shcharanskiy, Sakharov and Orlov, and movement on a number of lesser cases. The Soviets may choose to mask movement by ostensibly responding to appeals from others rather than us, but we are after results and can afford to respect their sensitivities.

—In the bilateral area, it is in our interest to go as far as we can toward agreement on and implementation of specific measures to prevent a repeat of KAL. If we can get that process underway, there are a few other steps put on the back burner by KAL that are worth considering.

The most likely candidates are things that benefit people or that get us in touch with the Soviet people on a reciprocal basis, in line with the President's own reaffirmation of commitment to this aspect of relations in his January 16 speech and again in the State of the Union message.¹⁵ That, after all, is our basic rationale for post-KAL steps to ensure the safety of air travelers. Our interest in the cultural exchanges agreement and the consulates has the same root, and I understand that Bud McFarlane and Jack Matlock favor moving ahead on these in the near future. I agree, although we should anticipate bureaucratic problems with cultural exchanges.

We might look at new ways to deal with the upsurge of interest across the country in renewing and expanding contacts with the Soviet Union. Wilson Center Director Jim Billington has raised this with me, and I agree with him that there is room to work with responsible people on the outside to limit exploitation of such contacts by the Soviets and by our domestic critics this year. For example, I believe we should now tell the American Council of Young Political Leaders that they can resume their exchanges with young Soviet political leaders. This has been an excellent, tough-

minded program in the past, with Mike Deaver a member of the ACYPL Board.

Congressional visits are another area that bears watching. There will be strong interest on the Hill in visiting the USSR and inviting Soviet "Parliamentarians" here in return. We should continue to brief outgoing delegations thoroughly on the Foley/Pell model to minimize the daylight the Soviets will try to open up between our branches of government,¹⁶ but at this point there are some reservations in our branch about giving the green light to return forays at congressional invitation. However, pressure from the congressional leadership may build, and we may need to reconsider. In that case, we should encourage hosts to broaden the Soviet delegations beyond familiar propagandists to include possible successor politicians like Gorbachev, Aliyev and Vorotnikov. They have had virtually no contact with Americans, and they are in the Supreme Soviet.

Conclusion

Our basic objective this year should be the one we adopted for our Soviet policy a year ago: to get a productive dialogue going at the pace and level justified by the Soviet response. Our realism and our new strength make dialogue possible; dialogue serves to keep the policy framework for realism and strength intact. If we find we are making substantial progress on the issues I have noted, it would be appropriate to consider your going to Moscow to push the process along, and inviting Gromyko to Washington (in keeping with pre-Afghanistan tradition) when he comes to the UNGA in the fall. With such a process underway, we would be able by the end of the year to point at a minimum to a serious effort by the Administration to engage the

Soviets on a broad front. There are a variety of further steps we could take in other areas, bilateral and multilateral, depending upon how far we want to go. We should damp down expectations for any specific agreements, but we might end up with a few small ones. And even if we do not, we would be well positioned both for 1984, and equally important, for 1985 and beyond.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (02/01/1984-02/08/1984); NLR-775-11-14-5-9. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons and Palmer. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on February 8.

² See [footnote 2, Document 167](#).

³ Not further identified.

⁴ In telegram 984 from Moscow, January 24, the Embassy reported on comments made by Zagladin during a reception for a French-Soviet Arms Control Colloquium: "He struck the French as fairly up-beat on prospects for U.S.-Soviet dialogue. He was frank in describing certain arms control negotiations (presumably those dealing with nuclear weapons) as 'blocked.' He nonetheless indicated that there were other areas where the Soviet Union would welcome negotiations with the U.S. He then cited essentially the list of topics subsequently ticked off by Andropov in his interview as possible subjects for U.S.-Soviet dialogue: Space, CDE, etc. Zagladin went beyond Andropov, however, in suggesting that certain regional issues (he mentioned the Middle East and Central America) might also be candidates for bilateral progress. Zagladin concluded that progress in these two areas (arms control and regional) might create conditions which would open up those areas currently blocked." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams,

D840051-0486) For Andropov's interview, see [footnote 7, below](#).

⁵ This sentiment was indirectly expressed by Velikhov during his discussion with Horowitz. See [Document 163](#).

⁶ See [Documents 159](#) and [160](#).

⁷ In telegram 957 from Moscow, January 25, the Embassy reported on Andropov's *Pravda* interview: "Andropov has responded to President Reagan's January 16 speech by reiterating that the Soviet Union is ready for dialogue, while insisting that any US-Soviet dialogue for the foreseeable future be on Soviet terms. His written answers to questions by *Pravda* are less polemical than Gromyko's Stockholm speech (and indeed may be intended to repair some of the damage caused by that speech), but reveal no willingness to address US concerns on nuclear arms control, regional or human rights issues. He does hold out the possibility of progress in MBFR and passes up the opportunity to declare his August ASAT moratorium void in the wake of the US's recent ASAT test; nor does he address compliance. On INF, Andropov repeats his November 24 formula that the US and NATO must 'display readiness' to return to the pre-deployment status quo but adjusts somewhat his language on what Moscow would be prepared to do in response to such a display. The absence of a specific reference to START may be encouraging in that he has forgone the necessity of spelling out conditions for a return to negotiation. Andropov's answers reflect a reaffirmation of Soviet efforts since last fall to portray US-Soviet relations as at a dangerously low level and to deny the Reagan administration the opportunity to claim otherwise. But, in taking a slightly more positive public position than Gromyko's speech last week, it opens the door to US-Soviet dialogue just a crack more. This more positive gloss was spelled out to the French by Party official Zagladin yesterday." (Department of State, Central Foreign

Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840051-0019) The full text of Andropov's interview was printed in the *New York Times*, January 25, 1984, p. A6. For his statement of November 24, 1983, see [footnote 4, Document 141](#).

⁸ In telegram 32806 to Belgrade, February 2, the Department reported that Mojsov "said that some EE Foreign Ministers are speculating that START talks might resume in July, but that they are worried about the high level of emotional anti-U.S. feeling in Moscow and the limiting effect of the U.S. elections." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840073-0049)

⁹ Telegram 978 from USNATO, February 7, reported: "Strougal pointed to Andropov's latest 'appeal' to support his view that the Soviets want real progress (on INF), and he predicted (Soviet) movement in the second quarter of 1984." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840082-0415)

¹⁰ See [Document 158](#).

¹¹ In telegram 15036 to Stockholm, January 18, the Department commented: "Official reaction from our European allies was especially helpful, and much press coverage in the non-aligned nations also welcomed the President's remarks, expressing interest and hope that improved atmospherics would lead to early progress on arms control and a reduction of international tensions." It continued: "Press coverage in Asia was generally favorable, especially in Japan, with many commentators noting that the President's approach to Moscow was based on an upswing in U.S. power." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840035-0270)

¹² In telegram 350 from Ottawa, January 17, the Embassy reported that "in response to Parliamentary questioning Jan 16, Prime Minister Trudeau applauded the 'conciliatory' tone of President Reagan's Jan 16 speech on US-Soviet

relations and called on the Soviet Union to respond in kind. Trudeau welcomed what he saw as ‘a different tone coming out of Washington’ and the President’s commitment to genuine dialogue between East and West.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840034-0074)

¹³ See [Document 161](#).

¹⁴ See [Document 74](#).

¹⁵ In his January 25 State of the Union address, Reagan remarked: “People of the Soviet Union, there is only one sane policy, for your country and mine, to preserve our civilization in this modern age: A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But then would it not be better to do away with them entirely?” For the full text of Reagan’s address, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book I, pp. 87-94.

¹⁶ See [Document 79](#).

February 1984-June 1984 “Talking about each other rather than to each other”: Reagan, Chernenko, and U.S.-Soviet Stalemate

[170. Editorial Note](#)

[171. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs \(McFarlane\)](#)

Washington, February 10, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/4/84-02/11/84). Secret. Sent for action.

[172. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs \(McFarlane\)](#)

Washington, February 10, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR-Andropov Funeral (February 1984). Confidential. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates McFarlane saw it.

173. Memorandum From William Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, February 10, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/04/84-02/11/84). Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates McFarlane saw it.

174. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, February 10, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/04/84-02/11/84). Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates McFarlane saw it, and he wrote in the margin: "Many thanks, Bud."

175. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko

Washington, February 11, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC, Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8401238). In a covering memorandum to McFarlane, Hill wrote: "Attached is a draft letter from the President to be hand delivered by Vice President Bush to the new General Secretary of the CPSU." Bush delivered the letter to Chernenko during their February 14 meeting in Moscow. See Documents 176 and 177. Chernenko was elected General Secretary by the Central Committee of the Communist Party on February 13.

176. Memorandum From the White House Situation Room to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, February 14, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/13/84-02/14/84). Secret. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it, and a stamped notation indicates McFarlane saw it.

177. Message From the Embassy in Italy to the White House

Rome, February 15, 1984, 0025Z

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (2/15/84-2/16/84); NLR-748-25-12-3-4. Secret; Via Privacy Channels; Niact Immediate. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Reagan initialed this cabled message, indicating he saw it. After leaving Moscow Bush traveled to Rome. He met with Foreign Minister Craxi at 8:50 p.m. on February 14. On February 15, the Vice President had a one-hour private audience with Pope John Paul II, and then departed for Paris. (Telegram 4367 from Rome, February 17, and telegram 3990 from Rome, February 13; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840107-0502 and D840096-0838, respectively.)

178. Message From the Embassy in France to the White House and the Department of State

Paris, February 15, 1984, 1640Z

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/15/84-02/16/84); NLR-748-25-12-1-6. Secret; Via Privacy Channels. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Reagan initialed the message, indicating he saw it. Bush traveled from Rome to Paris and met with President Mitterrand at 6:30 p.m. on February 15. (Telegram 6302 from Paris, February 14; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840100-0072)

179. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

Washington, February 15, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1984, 400195. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared by [less than 1 line not declassified], Current Support Division, Office of Soviet Analysis. Poindexter noted on a routing slip: "Bud, This is the paper you asked CIA for. JP." McFarlane wrote: "Many thanks." On a separate routing slip, Kimmit wrote: "JP: Should this be shared with Matlock, Fortier and Lehman?" Poindexter replied "yes."

180. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, February 15, 1984, 2-3:30 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron February 1984 [2 of 2]. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only Mr. McFarlane. Not for System. There is no drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. Brackets are in the original. This meeting took place in Zagladin's office in the Central Committee Building. Matlock accompanied Bush to Moscow for Andropov's funeral and the meeting with Chernenko. Matlock wrote of this meeting: "As I entered the forbidding gray Central Committee Building under KGB escort, I realized that I had been trying to establish some sort of contact with the Central Committee staff ever since my first tour in Moscow in 1961. Now, after twenty-three years of trying, I was entering the inner sanctum of the

Communist system.” (Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, p. 94)

181. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, February 16, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (02/16/1984-02/20/1984); NLR-775-11-17-2-9. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley; cleared by Simons and Palmer. Simons initialed for Dunkerley. McKinley's handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on February 16.

182. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, February 18, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/23/84). Confidential. Sent for information. Prepared by Matlock. Copies were sent to Bush, Meese, Baker, and Deaver. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

183. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan

Moscow, February 23, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, President/Chernenko Correspondence (1/2). No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy. In a covering letter to Shultz, February 24, Dobrynin requested that the letter be brought to Reagan's attention. In a February 24 covering memorandum to the President, McFarlane wrote: "This afternoon Ambassador Dobrynin delivered the attached letter to you from General Secretary Chernenko. Its tone is generally moderate. Standard rhetoric is included, but the commitment to a serious effort to solve problems lends to an improved climate for engaging the Soviets on a variety of subjects. Tomorrow morning I will send you a memorandum (see Document 185) which surveys the state of the relationship and proposes certain courses of action to get things moving. It reflects the thinking of George, Cap, the Vice President and several others. We would like to meet with you to discuss it next week and to receive your guidance as to which of several projects we should move out on. Separately, I am moving the bureaucracy ahead on certain START ideas which we would be prepared to exchange in the near future." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490236, 8490586)) In his diary on February 27, Reagan wrote: "N.S.C. briefing was on Chernenko's letter. We're agreed we are going to make our plans for response with George B., George S., Bud, Cap & me—no bureaucracy." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 322)

[184. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State](#)

Moscow, February 24, 1984, 1241Z

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 17, 1984 March 2, Meetings with the President. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis/Alpha; Stadis.

185. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, February 28, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, February 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. McKinley's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on February 28.

186. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, March 1, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Chronological File, Chron (Official) March 1984; NLR-362-6-22-2-7. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. A note in the margin written by an unknown hand reads: "Orig handcarried to Res. [Residence] for Pres 3/1/84 pm." A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. In a March 1 memorandum to Matlock, returning a marked-up draft of this paper, McFarlane wrote: "Your paper is exactly what I was looking for. I have marked it up a little bit." He continued: "In short, we

should maintain our policy of firmness and of making no preemptive concessions but with evidence of good faith, 'leaning forward' to make clear our commitment to solving problems. Please try and get this back to me today. I would like to send it to the President tonight." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, Briefing Material for President Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting 11/27/1985 (2/3))

187. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, March 2, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (03/02/1984-03/04/1984); NLR-775-11-22-2-3. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons and Palmer. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on March 2.

188. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 2, 1984, 2:15-4 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, 1981-1986, US-USSR Relations (March 1984) 1/2. Top Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System. There is no drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. Brackets are in the original. This private meeting took place in the Treaty Room in the Residence of the White House. In his diary entry for March 2, Reagan wrote: "into the Treaty Room for a top level & secret meeting with Amba. Hartman (Moscow), Bill Casey, Bud McF., Geo. B., Mike &

Jim & Gen. Vessey. Subject was a plan to move into communications with the Soviets. I'm convinced the time has come for me to meet with Chernenko along about July. We're going to start with some ministerial level meetings on a number of substantive matters that have been on ice since the KAL 700 [007] shoot down." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 324) Shultz, Weinberger, and Matlock attended the meeting, although not noted by Reagan in his diary.

189. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, March 6, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490236, 8490586). Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Prepared by Matlock. A copy was sent to the Vice President.

190. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko

Washington, March 6, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490236, 8490283, 8490304). Top Secret. Drafted in the Department of State in accordance with the President's instructions on March 2. See Document 188. In a March 3 note to Shultz, McKinley wrote: "Mr. Secretary, Rick Burt,

Art Hartman, and Jack Matlock have all cleared off on this draft. Larry [Eagleburger] will receive a copy and may have some comments for you. Brunson.” (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Super Sensitive (03/03/1984-03/05/1984))

191. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, March 7, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive Chronology (03/07/1984); NLR-775-11-27-2-8. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Tefft; cleared by Simons. Hill’s handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on March 7.

192. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, undated

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 2c, 1984 Soviet Union Mar. Secret; Sensitive. This memorandum is unsigned. A handwritten note in the margin, however, reads: “Hand carried to the President by Secy 3/8.” According to the President’s Daily Diary, Shultz and Reagan met in the Oval Office on March 8 and March 9. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) The brief March 8 meeting was to discuss Scowcroft’s trip to Moscow. It seems more likely Shultz presented this memorandum to Reagan on March 9 during their weekly

private meeting. Reagan wrote in his diary: "George & I talked Soviets. He had a good meeting with Dobrynin who is very interested in getting some talks going on Cultural exchange, consulates in N.Y. & Kiev etc." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 327)

193. Editorial Note

194. Memorandum From Ronald Lehman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, March 12, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, March 1984 #1. Secret. Sent for action. Lehman signed "Ron" next to his name. In a covering note to Lehman on March 13, Kraemer wrote: "Ron, Thanks for a copy of the attached. Basically a sound memo but I disagree that 'a summit may well be in the cards' and am very concerned re possible implication (almost advocating) 'simple agreements that do not require extensive preparation or get into great complexity.' Even 'simple' agreements require extensive (NSC/SACPG)-controlled preparations. Watch for the end run! P.S. I and Ken deGraffenreid (who works for Casey/McF. meeting agenda) should have had concurrence opportunity/line. Sven."

195. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, March 14, 1984, 11 a.m.-12:30 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (03/09/1984–06/20/1984). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only for Mr. McFarlane. Not for System. This meeting took place in Harry's New York Bar in the Harley Hotel. Reagan initialed the memorandum of conversation, indicating he saw it. In a handwritten note to McFarlane dated March 15, Matlock reported: "As you can see from the attached, the meeting with Menshikov went very well—no new specifics, but clearly a decision to examine some modalities in ways that are not apparent in the formal dialogue. I was struck, once again, by the total lack of polemics. His desire to discuss INF concepts at some length seems to indicate that this is still the key issue for them—and they may be groping around for a way out. We should discuss the implication at your earliest convenience. I have heard nothing on Scowcroft's conversation yet, but assume you'll include me in any debrief." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological Files, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron March 1984) Regarding Scowcroft's mission, see Document 193.

196. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, March 14, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations (March 1984) 3/3. Secret; Sensitive. A Department of State copy of this memorandum indicates it was drafted by Burt on March 13. (Department

of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, March 1984 Super Sensitive Documents) Reagan's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

197. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan

Moscow, March 19, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC, Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8401238). No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy. In a covering letter to Shultz, March 20, Dobrynin requested that this letter be passed to President Reagan. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, E.3, President/Chernenko Correspondence (1/2)) Reagan initialed the March 19 letter and wrote in the margin: "I think this calls for a very well thought out reply & not just a routine acknowledgement that leaves the status quo as is. RR."

198. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, March 19, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations (March 1984) 3/3. Top Secret;

Sensitive. Not for System. Sent for information. The memorandum is unsigned.

199. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, undated

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 18, 1984 Mar. 21 Mtgs. w/ the Pres. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy. In a memorandum forwarding the memorandum to Shultz on March 21, Burt suggested that the Secretary discuss how to respond to the Soviets—in particular, Chernenko’s letter—during his meeting with the President on March 21. According to marginalia on Burt’s memorandum, Shultz “didn’t sign 3/21 but took.” See footnote 4, below.

200. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan

Washington, March 23, 1984

Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Secretary of Defense Files: FRC 330-87-0023, Box 2, Folder USSR 388.3 1984. Top Secret; Sensitive. In a covering memorandum to Reagan, Weinberger wrote: “As agreed by Bud McFarlane’s Senior Arms Control Policy Group, I am forwarding a paper, prepared at my request, to form the basis of Tuesday’s NSC discussion. It should elicit a spirited exchange. It is deliberately straightforward. I believe it is important that this issue not be obscured by the tendency to produce a watered-down consensus. Cap.”

201. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

Washington, March 23, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, March 9–May 10, 1984, Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. This paper was prepared in the Office of Soviet Analysis. Kimmit circulated the paper to agency representatives on March 24 under a covering memorandum that noted that it was “developed to support discussion of the status and prospects for major nuclear arms control negotiations (INF and START) at the National Security Council Meeting on Tuesday, March 27 at 2 p.m.”

202. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, March 27, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, March 1–30, 1984. Secret; Sensitive. In a March 26 covering memorandum to Shultz, Howe and Kelly wrote: “In accordance with your instructions, we have reworked both versions of the memorandum to the President on arms control. The major difference between them is that the first version at Tab A addresses START/INF alone, while the version at Tab B briefly mentions other areas of arms control as well. The argument for the latter is that the

Soviets have indicated that movement in other areas could help with resumption of nuclear arms control talks.” Shultz signed the memorandum at Tab B, which was sent by special courier to the White House on March 27 at 7:30 a.m. in preparation for the NSC meeting that afternoon.

203. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting

Washington, March 27, 1984, 2-3 p.m.

Source: National Security Council, Institutional Files, NSPG Meetings, Box SR-104, NSPG 104. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. There is no drafting information on the minutes. Although titled as a “National Security Planning Group Meeting,” this is listed in the President’s Daily Diary as a National Security Council meeting and is listed at the Reagan Library as National Security Council Meeting 104. NSPG 104 took place on December 17, 1984. In a memorandum to Kraemer and Linhard, conveying draft notes of this NSC meeting, Lehman wrote: “Both of you should study the minutes and notes carefully. From now on we should view ourselves as a task force designed to lay out for Bud and the President the best gameplan for the next year. We can draw upon the interagency, but the time has come for us to put down on paper what it is we really think can and should be done in arms control this year in terms of tactics, issues, and public statements. In truth there is a vacuum and the President is obviously looking for someone or some process to fill it. We have no choice but to step in.” (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, SACPG—NSDD 137—Arms Control April 2, 1984)

204. Memorandum From the Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (Meyer) to Director of Central Intelligence Casey, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (McMahon), and the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (Gates).

Washington, March 29, 1984

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 88T00528R: Policy Files (1982-1984), Box 1, Folder 1: VC/NIC Chron January-March 1984. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified].

205. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, March 30, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations (March 1984) 3/3. Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed this memorandum, indicating he saw it. In a March 28 Information Memorandum, Burt briefed Shultz on Hartman's meeting with Dobrynin earlier that day. Shultz's handwritten note in the margin instructed Burt to "turn into a memo I can hand to the President on Friday. GPS." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 2C, 1984 Soviet Union, March).

206. National Security Decision Directive 137

Washington, March 31, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives (NSDD): Records, NSDD 137, 03/31/1984 [US Nuclear Arms Control Strategy for 1984]. Secret. In a March 30 memorandum to McFarlane, Linhard forwarded a draft NSDD recommending it be sent to Reagan for signature. Linhard explained that the NSDD “tracks the NSC staff understanding of the guidance provided by the President and by you through Ron Lehman concerning the directions the President wishes to issue at this time. The contents of the draft have not been discussed in any way with anyone outside of the NSC staff.” In a covering memorandum to Reagan, McFarlane listed the primary guidance in the NSDD and stated: “It also identifies Secretary Shultz as the primary Administration spokesman for arms control.”

207. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, April 3, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations (April 1984). Confidential. Sent for information. Reagan initialed this memorandum, indicating he saw it.

208. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Kelly) and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Howe) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, April 5, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 2A, 1984 Arms and Arms Control, Mar.–May. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley; cleared by Gordon, Dobbins, and Dean. Brackets are in the original.

209. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, April 6, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron April 1984 (3). Secret; Sensitive. In a covering memorandum to Reagan on April 13, McFarlane wrote: “You will note that Dobrynin took a somewhat more receptive line on several issues than we have been hearing from Gromyko in Moscow—and markedly more positive than current Soviet public stance. I believe we should be cautious about accepting his attitude at face value, since he has a personal incentive to put the most favorable gloss on Soviet policy, and to push the idea that we can get further dealing exclusively with him. Nevertheless, we should not totally exclude the possibility that a policy debate continues in Moscow, and that Dobrynin’s more forthcoming comments on some issues may reflect that, at least in part.” (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations (April 1984)) Reagan initialed the cover memorandum, indicating he saw it.

210. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, April 6, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490488, 8490546). Secret; Sensitive. According to a typed note on a memorandum from Burt to Shultz, the memorandum was sent to the White House via courier at 4 p.m. on April 6. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, April 1984 Super Sensitive Documents)

211. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko

Washington, April 16, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) April-June 1984. No classification marking. The letter was drafted in the Department of State and sent to Reagan on April 6. See Document 210.

212. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, April 17, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/13-04/18/84). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan's initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it. In an April 16 memorandum to Shultz, Burt wrote: "We have prepared the attached memorandum to the President on your meeting with Dobrynin." (Department of State, Executive

Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, April 1984 Super Sensitive Documents) The State Department copy indicates Burt drafted the memorandum.

213. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, April 18, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, April 16-30, 1984, Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by R.F. Smith; cleared by Simons, Palmer, and G. Matthews (HA). Smith initialed for Simons and Matthews. This drafting information appears on the covering action memorandum from Acting Assistant Secretary Kelly to Shultz. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the covering memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. A typed note at the top of the covering memorandum reads: "Memo from Secretary to President LDX'd to White House on 4/18 —2045 MVS."

214. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, April 20, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations April 1984 (2). Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Although the

memorandum is uninitialed, McFarlane's marginalia (see footnotes 3 through 8, below), indicate that he received it.

215. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, May 8, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, NSC Files, Subject File, Soviet (6). Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates McFarlane saw it, and he wrote in the margin: "Good paper. Many thanks."

216. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, May 8, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, May 1-May 10, 1984 ES Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Tefft on May 4; cleared by Pascoe and Palmer. McKinley's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on May 8.

217. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, May 9, 1984, 1040Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840301-0204. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to the Consulate in Leningrad, USIA, USUN, Ankara, Athens, the Mission in Berlin, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Paris, Reykjavik, Rome, USNATO, Dublin, Helsinki, Stockholm, Vienna, Bern, Belgrade, Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Munich, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo, and the Mission in Geneva.

218. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, May 11, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/09/84-05/11/84). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. On a covering memorandum to Shultz from Burt, a typed note reads: "Sec/Pres delivered by Secretary 5/11 cdj." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, May 1984 ES Sensitive Documents) On May 11, Reagan had two meetings related to the Soviet Union. From 9:45 to 9:59 a.m., he met with Ambassador Hartman in the Oval Office. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) He wrote in his diary: "He believes there is friction in the Polit Bureau [Politburo] & Gromyko is much of our problem. He doesn't feel I could have any success in appealing to the Soviets to come to the Olympics." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 346; brackets are in the original) Later that afternoon, Reagan met with Shultz and

McFarlane from 2:05 to 2:25 p.m. They were then joined by Casey until approximately 2:40 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) Reagan wrote in his diary: "George S. & I met with Bud M. It was mainly a report by George on his meetings with Soviet reps.—Ambas. Dobrynin etc. They are utterly stonewalling us." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 347)

219. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, May 18, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/18/84–05/21/84). Secret. In a covering memorandum to Reagan, McFarlane reported: "George agrees that it would be unwise for you to make a public statement on the issue, to avoid further polarization, but is moving—in full consultation with us—to activate other statesmen and prominent private individuals to convey their interest to the Soviet leaders." Reagan initialed the covering memorandum, indicating he saw it.

220. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, May 18, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/24/84–06/01/84). Secret.

221. Special National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, May 18, 1984

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 09T00367R: Intelligence Publication Files, Production Case Files, Box 3, Folder 32: SNIE 11/10/84/JX Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restrictions not declassified]. A note on the cover page reads: "This Estimate is issued by the Director of Central Intelligence. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurs, except as noted in the text. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State." It also notes as participating: The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force; and the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps.

222. Note Prepared in the White House Situation Room

Washington, May 29, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/18/84-05/21/84). Secret. There is no drafting information on the note. The note is based on Intelligence Information Cable

TDFIRDB-31512905-84. Reagan initialed in the upper right-hand corner of this note, indicating he saw it.

223. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan

Moscow, June 6, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, NSC Executive Secretariat, Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490695) (2 of 2). Secret; Sensitive. Dobrynin presented Shultz with this letter and the attached talking points during their June 12 meeting (see Documents 224 and 225). A routing slip indicates Reagan was given this package during his June 14 daily briefing.

224. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, June 14, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich (elected 02/13/1984) died 03/10/1985 8:30pm (3 of 3). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt on June 13. In a covering memorandum to Shultz, Burt wrote: "Attached are a Memorandum for the President analyzing the communications you received from Dobrynin June 12 and talking points based on this analysis for your use with the President today. You may wish to give the President the Memorandum when you see him." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, June 1-June 30, 1984 ES Sensitive

Documents) In a covering note to Shultz attached to another copy of both memoranda, Armacost, who replaced Eagleburger in May as Under Secretary for Political Affairs, commented: "Mr. Secretary, A good set of talkers. I suspect the Soviets are mainly in a quandary due to unresolved issues within their own leadership. Keeping the pressure on makes eminently good sense. I believe a proposal on ASAT along the lines we discussed yesterday would further confound their attempts to regain some initiative."
(Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, June 1984)

225. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, June 14, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, NSC Executive Secretariat, Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490695) (2 of 2). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed this memorandum, indicating he saw it.

226. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, June 15, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron June 1984 (06/15/1984-06/20/1984). Confidential. Sent for information.

227. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, June 18, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (03/09/1984–06/20/1984); NLR-362-3-20-3-1. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Reagan initialed this memorandum, indicating he saw it.

228. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, June 19, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (3/09/1984–6/20/1984); NLR-362-3-20-6-8. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Outside the System.

229. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Vessey)

Washington, June 19, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, June 1-30, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret.

230. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, June 21, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations May-June 1984. Secret; Sensitive. McFarlane wrote in the top margin: "RR—(On mtg w/ Doby) I want to lay out our concerns about their military buildup and relieve theirs over us being a threat." A handwritten note on another copy of this memorandum reads: "President ret'd original to RCM on 8-27-84. RCM gave original to Jack Matlock." (Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (06/21/1984-07/26/1984))

231. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Kelly) and the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Montgomery) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, June 27, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, June 1-30, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive; Wnintel. Drafted by Dunkerley; cleared by Martens, Simons, Palmer, J. Mayhew (INR/SEE), M. Mautner

(INR/SEE), J. Danlyk (INR/CE), D. Howells (INR/PMA), and N. Bellochi (INR). An unknown hand initialed for all clearing officials. Forwarded through Armacost. McKinley's handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on June 28. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. Shultz circled Montgomery's name in the "FROM" line and drew a line to his handwritten note in the margin: "INR: Pls prepare a careful ltr from me to Casey stating our concerns. Clear EUR. GPS."

232. Letter From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, June 28, 1984

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-86-0048, USSR 388.3 (Jun-1984). Secret.

170. Editorial Note

On February 10, 1984, the Embassy in Moscow reported: "As of noon Moscow time we cannot repeat cannot confirm or substantiate rumors that there has been a death in the Soviet leadership. A Western Embassy has just been told by a TASS staffer that there will be an official announcement this afternoon, but that it will not be as serious as we might imagine. This could possibly mean that it is not Andropov but another Soviet leader who has died." (Telegram 1647 from Moscow; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840090-0593) Within a few hours, the Embassy reported: "Soviet news media carried an official announcement at 1430 Moscow time that General Secretary Andropov died at 1650 Moscow time on February 9. No details concerning mourning period, funeral arrangements, or his successor were announced." (Telegram 1651 from Moscow, February 10; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840090-0853) In telegram 1694 from Moscow, February 10, the Embassy commented that "Moscow has reacted with outward calm to the announcement of Andropov's death. Officially, there seems to be an effort to project an image of business as usual. Most scheduled performances have not been cancelled. Classical music dominates but does not monopolize the airwaves. MFA officials kept an appointment with PolCouns after the death was announced and have scheduled another call for Monday, February 13. Muscovites are going about their business with few signs of public grief." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840091-0769)

171. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, February 10, 1984

SUBJECT

U.S. Representation at Andropov Funeral

Now that the Soviets have announced that the Andropov funeral will be held Tuesday, February 14, it would seem that the U.S. delegation will have to depart on Sunday, February 12 in order to arrive in Moscow on the 13th.

I understand from State that the President expressed reluctance to attend in a conversation with Secretary Shultz, since he did not want to seem to “pay homage” to a man of Andropov’s character.² The President’s instinct is unquestionably right on the question of seeming to honor Andropov, but there are other factors which he probably should weigh before making a final decision. They are the following:

—Attending for the primary purpose of having a meeting with Chernenko (assuming he gets the nod over the weekend as the new General Secretary) would be consistent with his policy of dialogue;

—It would diminish domestic and Allied criticism that the President has never talked to the Soviet leader and reduce future pressure to go into an unprepared summit—while not pre-empting a real summit if developments should unexpectedly make one desirable;

—It would avoid seeming out of synch with those Western leaders who are going to the funeral (as of now, Kohl and Trudeau for sure, Thatcher probable, and Mitterrand still a question mark).

—It would indicate clearly to the Soviet leadership that we are seriously interested in dealing with them.

It seems to me that these considerations somewhat outweigh the negative aspects, such as the implicit honor to Andropov's memory, and the risk of charges that he is playing politics. However, I think it would be well for him to wait until tomorrow morning, when more of the relevant facts will be clear, before making a final decision.

Recommendation:

That, unless Secretary Shultz is strongly opposed, you discuss the question with the President and suggest that he think over and sleep on the question, with an eye to making a final decision tomorrow morning.³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/4/84-02/11/84). Secret. Sent for action.

² The President, who was on a short vacation at his ranch in California from February 8 to 12, received a call from Shultz on February 10 at 9:01 a.m. to discuss Andropov's funeral. In his memoir, Shultz wrote: "Should President Reagan attend the funeral and thereby find occasion for his first meeting while in office with the top man in the Soviet Union? There was a brief flurry of debate over the question. It was an election year. The politicians were in favor of the president's leading our delegation. I was opposed. We

should not be running after the Soviets, I argued.” Shultz went on to note that King Hussein of Jordan and President Mubarak of Egypt had scheduled official visits in Washington, which would have to be cancelled if Reagan left for Moscow to attend the funeral. He argued that these visits were a crucial “part of our continuing efforts to bring sense and stability to the Middle East.” And perhaps most importantly, “in a typically Reaganesque way,” the President believed “that to go to the funeral of a man he didn’t know and who had been an implacable adversary would be insincere and inappropriate.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 472)

[3](#) McFarlane approved the recommendation and wrote beneath it: “He jumped the gun,” meaning the decision had already been made.

172. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)1

Washington, February 10, 1984

SUBJECT

Andropov's Funeral and U.S.-Soviet Relations

In case the President is receiving a variety of recommendations that he should attend Andropov's funeral, he should be fully aware of the deleterious consequences of such a move.

Presumably the principal argument in favor of the President's attendance is that it will send a powerful signal that he is ready and anxious to improve relations with the Kremlin, and that therefore he is really a man of peace. This would be therefore yet another way that the President could underscore that America has regained its strength under his Administration and that we can now negotiate with the Soviets from our new position of strength more securely than before.

There are several major problems with this line of thinking which, if ignored, could yield political results that could inflict severe damage to everything the President has done so far to make the world a safer place.

Confusion About the Nature of Renewed American Strength

The principal problem here is that this argument does not reflect a proper understanding of how and why the U.S. is stronger today than in 1980—and that a misunderstanding of this nature could work to undo the real sources of renewed American strength. The unspoken assumption is that we have revived our military power and that as a result we can face the Soviets more confidently and negotiate with them now that we have some chips to play with. This attitude is not only prevalent within the Administration—especially in the State Department—but is widespread even in conservative Republican circles on the Hill, where there is talk about cutting the Defense budget now that we have allegedly done so much to redress military imbalances.

The problem is that our military buildup consists mostly of promissory notes—and in real terms manifests itself today mostly in increased readiness and morale. Secretary Weinberger stated a few days ago to Congress that the Soviets have widened their margin of superiority over us in most categories even further.

The real source of our new national strength is in the moral-spiritual-political sphere—a measure of strength to which the Soviets pay very close attention. As a matter of fact, they see our moral-political strength as *the key criterion* in their measurement of the correlation of forces; for this is what constitutes our national will—our will to use force if necessary to defend our interests, our will to believe that our system has a future and is worth defending, and our will to recognize the realities of the world as they *are* and not as we would wish them to be.

Coddling Illusions and Wishful Thinking

If the President were to decide to attend Andropov's funeral, he would send the Soviets a major signal that this real strength was severely eroding. By going to Moscow and inevitably meeting with some Soviet officials, the President would be saying that he does not feel that he can ensure his reelection without coddling the illusions and wishful thinking of large portions of the electorate. Those illusions are that peace is achieved by better atmospherics and by such direct dialogue with the Soviets as is sufficient to clear up those "misunderstandings" which allegedly are the source of the U.S.-Soviet adversarial relationship. These illusions are bolstered further by the wishful thinking that a reduction of the President's allegedly hostile rhetoric will "improve relations."

The reason, of course, why these notions are illusions is that they rest on the assumptions that the Soviets are not truly a *communist* power with communist objectives, and that therefore there are no fundamental political reasons why U.S.-Soviet relations should necessarily be adversarial. That this is an extreme form of wishful thinking with no basis in fact needs no explanation. It derives from that pervasive Western penchant, as Ambassador Kirkpatrick recently explained, to disbelieve the horrible. Large chunks of the American people simply do not want to believe:

- That the Soviets are communists;
- That they must therefore have unlimited international objectives;
- That the destruction of American democracy is one of those objectives;
- That the Soviets do not share the same concept of peace that we strive for;

- That the Soviets continue to have an enormous Gulag with millions of slave laborers;
- That the mass murders of innocent Afghans are actually going on today, right now;
- That visiting Soviet trade representatives, academicians, “journalists,” UN employees and Embassy personnel might actually be engaged in subversive actions that might conceivably do harm to our country;
- That the Soviets have actually broken various arms control agreements;
- That maybe the Soviets do not find it in their self interest to reach mutual, verifiable arms control treaties and comply with them;
- Etc.

An Improvement of Relations?

Some people may think that the question here is whether the President is more or less likely to get reelected by trying to win over the “wishful thinking” constituency by catering to their illusions. Indeed, the President can try such a strategy. Then, maybe his picture will appear on *Time’s* cover shaking hands with Ustinov, presaging a new improvement of relations, a new “generation of peace.” But would this represent a real improvement of relations, or would it be a deception of the world public that would merely reinforce the illusions of the wishful thinking constituency?

The fact is that it would not be a true improvement of relations—at least not as we would define those terms. A real improvement of relations could take place only: a) if it were conducted on our terms—i.e., by the Soviets exercising greater international restraint, withdrawing from Afghanistan, complying with arms agreements, stopping their military buildup, improving their human rights situation, etc.; or b) if it were conducted on Soviet terms—i.e., by the U.S. silencing itself about Soviet aggression, silencing itself about Soviet human rights violations, letting bygones be bygones after 61 Americans are shot out of the air, by negotiating, signing and complying with arms control agreements that the Soviets will violate or at least circumvent (thus permitting further shifts in the military balance in their favor), by doing absolutely nothing when we catch them violating such agreements, by desensitizing the public and the Congress about the necessity of further defense spending through such silence about Soviet behavior, etc. So long as the Soviets remain communists and so long as we are committed to democracy, there can be no other formula to “improve relations.” The best relations we can hope for are those where stability prevails, where the American people are under no illusions about the adversarial nature of the relationship, and where we are so strong that the Soviets will make no miscalculations.

A Message of Weakness to the Soviets

The fact is that an atmospheric “improvement of relations” would be a deception; and as such it would send a great signal of weakness to the Soviets. Before, Ronald Reagan showed the world that the Presidency could be won by telling the people the unadulterated truth. This was the real sign of American strength—because the people as a

whole were increasingly willing to face the ugly realities of the world, to reject disbelief in the horrible, and to tackle these realities with resolution and determination. Now, if reelection can only be won by coddling wishful thinking and calming public fears, the President will be telling the Soviets:

—That America is unwilling to face the truth and to hear the President tell the truth;

—That the electorate has thus forced the President to “tone down the rhetoric”—which in practice means, stop reminding the country about the nature of the powerful empire we face;

—That therefore the American people are really ostriches at heart;

—That Soviet disinformation efforts to convince the American people that the USSR is not truly a communist power any more have been successful;

—That Soviet propaganda to intimidate the American people has been successful; and

—That Soviet power is so great that America has been forced to meet the Soviets increasingly on their terms.

Acknowledging the Flaws of Past Policy

The President's presence in Moscow now would also signal that his entire previous policy was flawed. It would acknowledge that before, he was not really a man of peace and that peace is not achieved by facing the truth, warning the people of dangers and building up the body, the

spiritual strength and thus the credibility of our deterrent forces.

Peace on Whose Terms

In his January 16 speech, the President already extended an olive branch to the Soviets. He asked them to improve relations on our terms—which is the only acceptable path. The ball is in the Soviets' court and it is their turn to respond. For the President to make an atmospheric gesture of the order of attending Andropov's funeral would be to play the role of a supplicant. It could even be perceived as an effort to compete with Walter Mondale² for Kremlin support in the election. Instead the greatest move the President could make toward achieving peace on our terms would be to show the Soviets he can get reelected without their help at all. The window of vulnerability is open today. The Soviets must be considering what they can do to demand American respect for all that power they have accumulated. Any sign of weakness now may encourage them that they can demand more respect than they have won thus far.

RECOMMENDATION

That you share this memorandum with the President.³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR-Andropov Funeral (February 1984). Confidential. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates McFarlane saw it.

² Walter Mondale, front-runner among the Democratic candidates for President in the 1984 election.

³ McFarlane did not approve or disapprove the recommendation. Instead, he wrote beneath it: “The President decided, correctly in my judgment, not to go before your memo arrived John. I must say that it would strike him as a little pedantic in my opinion. You’re preaching to the saved as you know.”

173. Memorandum From William Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, February 10, 1984

SUBJECT

Impact of Andropov's Death on Soviet Policy

I see only minor modifications of Soviet foreign and domestic policy this year as a result of Andropov's death.

The current chill in U.S.-Soviet relations will probably continue, but the new leadership may want to reassure the Soviet people by somewhat dampening fears of a U.S.-Soviet clash which have been systematically generated for the past few years. Stopping, or at least slowing U.S. INF deployments in Western Europe will remain a high, if not the highest, priority of Soviet foreign policy. Tactics in pursuit of this objective may change, but not because of a change in leadership.

The relatively modest domestic reforms initiated under Andropov will probably continue, but perhaps implemented with less draconic measures. For example, we may, for the time being, not see any more Soviet officials executed for taking bribes.²

The continuity we will probably see in Soviet foreign and domestic policy would be explained by a general satisfaction of the majority of the Politburo with current policies. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a Soviet leadership in transition is not necessarily inhibited from making substantial policy changes. For example, soon after

Stalin's death in 1953, the new leadership initiated dramatic (by Soviet standards) changes in both foreign and domestic policy which continued through the transition period until Khrushchev completely took over in 1957. For example, the Austrian State Treaty was agreed to in 1955—early in Khrushchev's ascent to power. These post-Stalin changes were dictated by a deep concern about Stalin's foreign and domestic policies. I do not see a similar concern in today's Politburo.

I hesitate to speculate about the make-up of the new Soviet leadership, but I would guess that Gromyko and Ustinov will continue to wield considerable influence—insuring a continuity in foreign and defense policies. The selection of Chernenko as Chairman of the Funeral Commission is, of course, interesting. As you recall, Andropov was selected for this honor after Brezhnev's death; however, I see a more collective leadership, for the time being, with Andropov's successor probably moving more slowly to positions of real power than did Andropov, but who knows?

At this point, I see little realistic opportunity for us to influence the new leadership one way or the other. Strictly in the context of U.S.-Soviet relations (and disregarding other possible considerations), I would recommend that, for the time being, our attitude towards the new leadership be one of watchful reserve while keeping open lines of communication with the Kremlin.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/04/84–02/11/84). Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates McFarlane saw it.

² Andropov started a campaign to eradicate corruption and bribery during his short tenure as General Secretary.

Stearman was likely referring to the case of Yuri K. Sokolov, a well-connected Moscow grocer, who was arrested on bribery charges and sentenced to death in November 1983. On November 28, the Embassy reported that “the severity of the sentence is no doubt intended to underscore Andropov’s continued determination to make examples of the most egregious offenders regardless of their connections and presumed untouchability.” (Telegram 14802 from Moscow, November 28, 1983; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830698-0865) Sokolov’s sentence was evidently carried out under Chernenko in July 1984. (Seth Mydans, “Ex-Supplier of Moscow’s Epicures Reported Executed for Corruption,” *New York Times*, July 17, 1984, p. A6)

174. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, February 10, 1984

SUBJECT

Chernenko: Initial Thoughts

I have not yet seen the Intelligence Community's assessment of the Soviet move in naming Chernenko head of the Andropov Funeral Commission,² but my initial thoughts are the following: —Naming him head of the Funeral Commission makes Chernenko the favorite to be named Secretary General. If he does not receive the title over the weekend, however, this will be a clear indication that there is still controversy in the leadership.

—If Chernenko is named to the general secretaryship, it will signify a clear victory by Brezhnev's cronies over Andropov's coterie, and possibly a victory of the traditional Party *apparatus* over the police types favored by Andropov.

—Naming Chernenko also means that the old men in the Politburo are not yet prepared to allow a generational change in the top leadership.

—Chernenko's stewardship, like Andropov's, could turn out to be brief. He is 75,³ and even if he wins a couple of rounds, may still have Andropov's protégés hemming him in various ways. To the extent that he can consolidate his leadership, however, he may be able to ameliorate some of the neo-Stalinist tendencies introduced by Andropov.

(There is considerable circumstantial evidence that he opposed many of the moves, probably in self-interest.)

—Meeting the President briefly during the funeral could be a plus for Chernenko in the intra-Party struggle. (In a sense, the President would be granting to *him* an honor denied Andropov when he was alive.) Even if this should be true, however, it should not carry much weight in the President's decision whether to go, since we have no real reason to believe that Chernenko would necessarily be easier to deal with than others in the leadership. And he may not be around for very long.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/04/84–02/11/84). Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates McFarlane saw it, and he wrote in the margin: “Many thanks, Bud.”

² A February 11 memorandum, “Chernenko: Continuer of Brezhnev's Legacy,” could be the IC report referred to by Matlock. Reagan's initials appear on this memorandum, indicating he saw it. The memorandum noted that in recent months, Chernenko's public appearances and activity increased, as he used Andropov's declining health to “stage a political comeback.” The memorandum continued that Chernenko “emerged early as a staunch supporter of improved relations with the West, including the United States.” On the domestic front, he had “long advocated increased attention to the consumer goods sectors and to the social factor in domestic affairs. In recent pronouncements in the ideological sphere, however, he has taken a more conservative line.” (Ibid.) ³ Chernenko was 72, not 75, when he became General Secretary.

175. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko¹

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Washington, February 11, 1984

Please accept my condolences on the death of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov.²

Chairman Andropov had written to me on January 28, 1984,³ about the Soviet Government's concern for world peace and your willingness to pursue a dialogue aimed at solving some of the very real problems in our relations. I believe that this dialogue is so important that we should proceed with it as soon as your government is ready to do so. Therefore, I have requested Vice President Bush to deliver this letter to you.

As I made clear in my January 16 address,⁴ I have no higher goal than the establishment of a relationship between our two great nations characterized by constructive cooperation. Differences in our political beliefs and in our perspectives on international problems should not be an obstacle to efforts aimed at strengthening peace and building a productive working relationship. Indeed, in the nuclear age, they make such efforts indispensable.

In the months ahead, we will be ready to discuss with you the entire agenda of issues in which our two nations have an interest. We have specific ideas for moving the relationship forward. We will be interested in whatever ideas and proposals you may have to put forth.

One area where practical steps are possible is the reduction of strategic arms. When you are ready, we have ideas on concrete ways to narrow the differences between our respective positions. The common framework we are prepared to discuss would incorporate elements of the current proposals of both sides and permit forces that are not identical, while providing for a more stable strategic balance at lower levels.

We are prepared to talk about such a framework in diplomatic channels. But we also believe that we need to return to the negotiating table. This applies to intermediate range as well as strategic nuclear forces. Here too, the world expects us to resume our discussions and find solutions.

Another area where practical steps are possible is the Vienna negotiations on conventional force reductions. During the next round of negotiations in Vienna, the Western side will be prepared to introduce some new ideas. If the Soviet Union demonstrates significant flexibility in meeting our serious concerns about assuring effective verification, you will find us flexible regarding data.

A practical and business-like approach could also be helpful in reducing the dangers of wider confrontation in the many regional problems in which our two nations' interests are involved. We have had exchanges of views on southern Africa and on Afghanistan over the past several years, and more recently, Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Hartman have discussed Middle East issues at some length with Foreign Minister Gromyko. I see merit to further exchanges of views on developments in these areas.

We recently have had useful exchanges on a number of questions of bilateral interest. For my part, I am prepared

to move ahead in the areas we already have under discussion and to open up new avenues of cooperation as well, assuming there is interest on your side.

Let me conclude by seeking to lay to rest some misunderstandings which may have arisen. The United States fully intends to defend our interests and those of our allies, but we do not seek to challenge the security of the Soviet Union and its people. We are prepared to deal with you in a manner that could establish the basis for mutually acceptable and mutually advantageous solutions to some of our problems.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC, Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8401238). In a covering memorandum to McFarlane, Hill wrote: "Attached is a draft letter from the President to be hand delivered by Vice President Bush to the new General Secretary of the CPSU." Bush delivered the letter to Chernenko during their February 14 meeting in Moscow. See [Documents 176](#) and [177](#). Chernenko was elected General Secretary by the Central Committee of the Communist Party on February 13.

² See [Document 170](#). On February 11, Reagan used his Saturday morning radio address to the nation to discuss the death of Andropov and U.S.-Soviet relations. (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book I, pp. 191-192)

³ See [Document 164](#).

⁴ See [Document 158](#).

176. Memorandum From the White House Situation Room to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, February 14, 1984

SUBJECT

Vice President's Meeting with Chernenko

An informal summary of the Vice President's meeting with Chernenko today was dictated to State by the DCM and passed to the Situation Room by phone.² Jack Matlock asked that it be passed to you immediately.

The meeting lasted ½ hour. The atmosphere was positive and quite upbeat. Chernenko did not depart from standard Soviet positions, but his emphasis was on the positive throughout. His main themes were continuity in the positions of the Soviet leadership—they were in favor of peaceful coexistence but would protect their security interests. They have no desire for military advantage.

On bilateral relations Chernenko said the state of relations was cause for concern. He pledged that the Soviet Union would do all it could in favor of good relations between the two countries. He took note of the President's expression of interest and cooperation and said it was up to the U.S. to take practical steps toward cooperation, citing in this regard the importance they attach to non-first-use of nuclear weapons. He also said the two countries should not transfer the arms race to other areas that do not now have significant armaments. Both sides need to work to keep regional conflicts from getting out of control. The Soviet Union does not believe confrontation between the two

countries is inevitable. This ended Chernenko's opening statement.

The Vice President then handed over the President's letter (in longer version) and went through his talking points.³ He mentioned the President's speech of 16 January and the possibility of a summit if conditions are right.⁴ He discussed regional issues, emphasizing the Middle East, START and human rights, and naming Shcharanskiy, Orlov and Sakharov in particular. After the meeting, the Vice President told the press that the session was constructive and useful. Our ambassador felt that the Soviet side, especially Chernenko and long time Brezhnev aide Alexandrov were particularly cordial. They thanked the Vice President profusely for coming. Chernenko's health appeared to the ambassador to be quite frail. He was short of breath and needed some help getting down stairs.

State comment: The Soviets have been making a real effort to downplay rhetoric. The embassy has the same impression. TASS has been restrained.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/13/84-02/14/84). Secret. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it, and a stamped notation indicates McFarlane saw it.

² The Department of State summary is in the Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive Chronology, (02/11/1984-02/14/1984). The Vice President and his delegation met with Chernenko in Moscow on February 14, after Andropov's funeral services.

³ See [Document 175](#).

⁴ See [Document 158](#).

177. Message From the Embassy in Italy to the White House¹

Rome, February 15, 1984, 0025Z

491. Fm: The Vice President. To: The White House, The President. Info: Bud McFarlane, NSC. I'm sending you this message from the plane following my meeting with Chernenko.² We will be sending a detailed report shortly, but I want to give you my first impressions of the new Russian leader, impressions shared by Howard Baker who was great to have along.³

Despite reports that he might be ill and lacks the intellect and authority of Andropov, Chernenko seemed in command of the situation. He seemed alert, in good health, with a sparkle in his eye, and somewhat younger than his years. He did almost all of the talking on the Soviet side and what he had to say was, in my view, encouraging. He asked me to tell you that we can have better relations; that he believes it is possible to do so. He said that it is by no means certain we will have a fatal confrontation; that we are not inherently enemies. I told him that we, too, were ready for dialogue and progress.

Chernenko is no pushover, but he does seem open and treated us graciously. He gave the clear impression that there is somebody at home in the Kremlin with whom we can do business.

Bud might want to pass this to George Shultz. Now off to Rome to see Craxi, and the Pope in the morning, Mitterrand in Paris in the afternoon, then home.⁴

I'll have the small Mexican plate if lunch is on Thursday.
George.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (2/15/84-2/16/84); NLR-748-25-12-3-4. Secret; Via Privacy Channels; Niact Immediate. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Reagan initialed this cabled message, indicating he saw it. After leaving Moscow Bush traveled to Rome. He met with Foreign Minister Craxi at 8:50 p.m. on February 14. On February 15, the Vice President had a one-hour private audience with Pope John Paul II, and then departed for Paris. (Telegram 4367 from Rome, February 17, and telegram 3990 from Rome, February 13; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840107-0502 and D840096-0838, respectively.)

² See [Document 176](#).

³ Senator Howard Baker (R-Tennessee), Senate Majority Leader.

⁴ Brackets were placed around this paragraph by an unknown hand.

178. Message From the Embassy in France to the White House and the Department of State¹

Paris, February 15, 1984, 1640Z

202. Fm the Vice President. To: The White House for President Reagan Eyes Only, SecState for Secretary of State Shultz Eyes Only, Director, Central Intelligence Agency Casey Eyes Only, Moscow for Ambassador Hartman Eyes Only. Subject: My Meeting With Chernenko, February 14, 1984.

1. The meeting began with Chernenko, reading from a prepared text, expressing to us the gratitude of the Soviet leadership for honoring the memory of the late General Secretary Andropov. He asked me to transmit this sentiment to you. He asked me also to inform you that the Soviet Union was retaining continuity in foreign affairs. He said this meant that the USSR was pursuing the absolutely clear goals of consolidating peace and reducing the threat of war, as well as of pursuing peaceful co-existing between states with different social systems with a view to promoting beneficial cooperation between all states. At the same time, he said the USSR would safeguard its security interests, as well as those of its allies and friends, against any attempts to impinge on their security. Chernenko wanted to emphasize that the Soviet Union had no intention of striving for unilateral military-strategic advantage. The Soviet objective was to preserve under all circumstances the established balance with a view to ensuring peace. The U.S. Government should be absolutely clear on this.

2. Chernenko then said he wanted to set forth the Soviet assessment of the current state of USSR-US relations and of their prospects for the future. The current state of relations, he said, had to be a cause for concern, adding that in his opinion Washington also recognized this. For its part, the Soviet Union would do everything it could to prevent alienation between our two countries, and to promote a constructive interaction between them, based on mutual respect. Chernenko asked me to inform you that the Soviet Union was in favor of smooth, better yet, good relations with the U.S. He asked whether this was possible, and, answering his own question, replied that it certainly was.

3. He then took note of your expression of intent to cooperate with the USSR, and of making the world a better and more peaceful place for all. This required, he said, that relations be based on the concept of equality and equal security, on mutual trust, mutual respect for each other's interests, and that non-ideological differences should not be introduced into Soviet-American relations. This latter point was critical. Otherwise, the relations would be spasmodic and, what was most important, would lead to mistrust rather than mutual trust. Chernenko went on to say that it was primarily up to our two countries to insure stability and prevent the threat of a nuclear arms race, and to proceed with arms limitation and reduction.

4. Chernenko said that to be candid, the Soviet Union believed it was up to us to take practical steps in this direction. The U.S. was in a position to take these steps, he said, without in any way harming its prestige or its interests. He said the Soviets had no convincing reason why the U.S. could not follow their example and undertake not to be the first to use nuclear arms. The Soviet leadership was convinced that this would help relax the

international situation. All that was required was a political will and a desire to reverse a dangerous course of events.

5. Chernenko continued by saying that there were many issues requiring solutions and many that were capable of being solved. The U.S. Government was familiar with these issues. The Soviet policy of pursuing mutually acceptable accords—and he then emphasized, mutually acceptable accords—remained unchanged. Among the most important and pressing problems he would mention arms limitation and reduction, stopping the spread of the arms race to new areas, and resolving regional conflicts, taking into account the legitimate interests of the parties. To be candid, the bilateral relations between our two countries were devoid of meaningful content, he said. This constituted the Soviet approach and the position of the Soviet Union. He then said he hoped that you and your administration would draw the relevant practical conclusion. This would permit an improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations and in establishing the kind of relations which would promote peace. Chernenko told me that the Soviet leadership did not believe in the inevitability of a confrontation. The Soviet and U.S. peoples had not inherited hostility toward each other, he said, adding that he did not want such hostilities to occur in the future.

6. I thanked Chernenko for his remarks and noted that Chernenko had had a very busy day and that he had several traumatic days behind him. I told him that Senator Baker and I had come to offer our sincere condolences. He thanked me for this sentiment.

7. After handing over your letter,² which I told him reflected your sincere feelings, I told him that I was absolutely convinced that, in fact, we did not want to be drawn into any kind of conflict with the Soviet Union. As

you had said in your January 16, 1984 speech,³ the U.S. was prepared to build a relationship based on constructive cooperation. Just as Chernenko had said, we, too, believed that good relations were possible. We, too, recognized that there were differences between us, and like the USSR, the U.S. would defend its own interests and those of its allies. However, the U.S. did not wish to challenge the security of the Soviet Union or its people. We, too, agreed that the time had come to move from words to deeds.

8. I went on to say that in the U.S. view, the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Minister Gromyko had identified areas in which progress was possible in the coming months⁴ and we wanted to make a beginning towards a better and more productive relationship. If real progress on the issues were made—if there was a prospect for serious progress—then you remained interested in a meeting at the highest level.

9. I told him that we especially wanted to avoid conflicts over regional issues. The Middle East was the Middle East, and thus was always difficult. With respect to Lebanon, in particular, we were not seeking a conflict with the Soviet Union, I said, nor were we seeking a permanent U.S. presence there.

10. I then emphasized that the U.S. wanted to move forward on arms control. We believed that START was one area in which constructive steps were possible toward achieving our mutual goal of reducing strategic offensive arms. We were ready, I told him, for serious negotiations. Frankly, we would be interested in hearing the Soviet side's ideas on how to reduce the differences between the two sides on START. We believed it useful to focus on the area of trade-offs between Soviet advantages and U.S. advantages. Our overall objective was to find a framework

for a general reduction of strategic arms which, both sides agreed, had so far eluded us.

11. Noting his statement concerning interference in the domestic affairs of the other country, I said we knew how seriously the Soviet Union viewed this matter. However, it would be most useful if we were able to find ways for taking practical steps—and I emphasized that they should involve quiet diplomacy—in the area of human rights. A number of these cases had become important U.S. domestic concerns. I told him that they had heard various names from us in the past, but I wanted to take this opportunity to mention Shcharanskiy, Orlov and Sakharov.

12. With the meeting drawing to a close, I remarked that there was far more to discuss, but that I wanted to end on the note on which I had begun, namely that the U.S. was ready for better relations with the Soviet Union. We were aware of the difficulties, of course. But we had not come to Moscow to assign blame or to escalate the rhetoric. This should be a new beginning. We were prepared to meet them half way.

13. He thanked me for my remarks, expressing his gratitude to me for taking the time to come to Moscow at such a difficult moment. He asked that this sentiment also be expressed to you. He said that my visit was a human kind of gesture, a good gesture which went in the right direction. The Soviet side hoped for further steps towards improving relations between us. Even this brief discussion, he said, had shown that we had things to talk about, and that there were issues which could be resolved on a mutually acceptable basis. He said that through no fault of our own, we shouldered the task of leading two great powers, the USSR and the U.S. This being the case, he said, we should pursue an honorable policy in order that future

generations remember us as good leaders, wise and kind individuals whose goal was the well being of all. He finished by again expressing gratitude to you and thanking me and Senator Baker for attending the funeral.

14. As I departed, Chernenko remarked that he had not had an opportunity to read your letter, but promised to study it and provide a response if one was appropriate.

15. As I reported in my earlier message,⁵ I was basically encouraged by the meeting.

16. I thought you would be interested in Ambassador Hartman's observations. His experience gives him an excellent perspective. Ambassador's comments:

Chernenko received Vice President with Gromyko, Dobrynin, Alexandrov and another assistant with Sukhodrev as interpreter. He read his opening statement in a strong voice but with his usual slurring of words. He appeared fit and in good humor. His dress was immaculate; suit well-tailored, shirt well-made. Both he and Gromyko were at pains to be pleasant and welcoming. Chernenko had slight shortness of breath as he began to read. He did not wear glasses which were on table in front of him. Gromyko made only one attempt to add or correct by being more explicit in saying that, if there were points in President's letter that required response, there would be answer after they had a chance to study letter. Alexandrov, earlier near receiving line and during meeting, made special effort (unlike other recent contacts) to convey a friendly message and express his own appreciation for Vice President's visit.

In sum, Ambassador had an impression of Brezhnev revisited. Unlike Andropov who was coldly, humorlessly

intellectual, Chernenko appears to be the old wily Russian peasant-type but with an over-layer of having run a Politburo secretariat for many years. There is also no doubt that the memories of Andropov were fading fast as this new leader enjoyed every moment of the ironic situation he found himself in—a loser who became a winner. Many were struck, however, by the sight of an unknown individual holding Chernenko's arm firmly; Chernenko was the only Politburo member who appeared to be aided down the steps (twice) from the top of the Lenin mausoleum. Would there be another rendezvous in fifteen months?

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/15/84-02/16/84); NLR-748-25-12-1-6. Secret; Via Privacy Channels. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Reagan initialed the message, indicating he saw it. Bush traveled from Rome to Paris and met with President Mitterrand at 6:30 p.m. on February 15. (Telegram 6302 from Paris, February 14; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840100-0072)

² See [Document 175](#).

³ See [Document 158](#).

⁴ See [Document 159](#).

⁵ See [Document 177](#).

179. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, February 15, 1984

The Impact of Chernenko's Succession on US-Soviet Relations and Soviet Arms Control Policy

Summary

Past statements by Konstantin Chernenko, and his initial speeches as Party leader, suggest that he is personally inclined toward greater efforts to reduce tensions in US-Soviet relations and to promote negotiation of outstanding issues. In all likelihood, he sees such a policy as a necessary adjunct to the Soviet Union's growing defense capabilities—which he also has been careful to support in recent days—in ensuring the security of the USSR. However, the continuing strong position of Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defense Minister Ustinov, who have clearly been playing a major role in foreign policy decisionmaking, and Chernenko's lack of an independent power base seem to make it unlikely that dramatic new initiatives or abrupt shifts in policy toward the US are imminent. We believe that the coming weeks are more likely to bring further moderation of Soviet rhetoric, continued cooperation with the US on working-level issues, and possibly some tinkering with the foreign policies inherited from Andropov. [*portion marking not declassified*]

A major unresolved issue is when and under what conditions to resume arms control talks with the US. In the final weeks of the Andropov regime, the Soviets had hinted at a willingness to resume substantive exchanges in this field, while maintaining that new initiatives by the US were needed to break the deadlock. Chernenko's accession is likely to give new impetus to this positive strain in Soviet policy, and to heighten Soviet watchfulness for any signals from Washington. [*portion marking not declassified*]

1. Chernenko was a vocal supporter of Brezhnev's policy of improving relations with the US. In the later years of Brezhnev's regime, Chernenko publicly defended that policy against those within the hierarchy who had begun attacking it following the downturn in relations after the invasion of Afghanistan. Although Chernenko's responsibility during Andropov's tenure was for ideology rather than foreign policy, his initial statements as General Secretary suggest that his inclinations have not changed. His accession speech alluded prominently to the theme of peaceful coexistence, avoided direct criticism of the US, and cited the need to settle international problems through "serious, equal and constructive talks."² His eulogy for Andropov struck a similar tone.³ [*portion marking not declassified*]

2. On the other hand, Chernenko has also taken pains since becoming General Secretary to underscore the need for maintaining a strong defense. In the past, he was a leading advocate of increased spending for production of consumer goods, and his initial speech as General Secretary suggests that he continues to be. He therefore probably considers it politically imperative as well to assure representatives of the defense sector, particularly Ustinov, that he is not a threat to their interests. Moreover, despite his apparent

policy preference for providing greater incentives to the Soviet worker and consumer, his duties as General Secretary now confer upon him the heavy responsibility for seeing to the military defense of the homeland, whether or not he assumes chairmanship of the Defense Council. If he proceeds in the future on the basis of his past apparent preferences, he may attempt to convince the power elite over time that a less confrontational approach to bilateral relations and a broader, more constructive dialogue on outstanding issues is the natural complement to the defense effort in ensuring the security of the USSR. The extent to which he can achieve this will depend on the power sharing arrangements and compromises that went into his investiture—issues on which we now have no clear picture. [*portion marking not declassified*]

3. For now, Chernenko's personal inclinations are unlikely to be the paramount influence on Soviet foreign policy. He lacks both an independent power base and experience in foreign policy commensurate with that of Gromyko and Ustinov. Therefore, they almost certainly will—at a minimum—remain key policymakers in that field, and in the recent past they were the principal Soviet spokesmen giving voice to the sharp downturn in US-Soviet relations. In December, Ustinov accused the US of seeking military superiority and charged that the deployment of new US missiles in Europe had wrecked the chances for reaching a mutually acceptable agreement at the INF talks. In his speech in Stockholm at the CDE last month, Gromyko said that statements by the US regarding its readiness to talk while continuing to deploy missiles were “verbal camouflage,” and that the USSR will not participate in talks that serve as a “cover for militarist plans.”⁴ His speech at Andropov's funeral was notably sharper in tone than Chernenko's.⁵ [*portion marking not declassified*]

4. Chernenko's accession therefore is unlikely to produce any immediate initiatives or sharp shifts in Soviet policy. Instead, its effects are likely to appear gradually. Soviet rhetoric, which already had begun to moderate under Andropov, probably will become still less confrontational. Cooperation with the US on working-level issues, which had continued under Andropov, is likely to be maintained and could become more active. The new leader is likely to undertake an ongoing reexamination of the positions inherited from his predecessor and, where he feels reasonably confident of getting Politburo support, to adjust them to accord with his own views. As important as the US-Soviet relationship is to Moscow, however, the top priorities of the leadership now are almost certainly the working out of power balances within the Politburo and setting the course on domestic issues, where there has been conflict during the past year. For now, Chernenko's past policy preferences will have to be tempered by his concern about his immediate political interests. [*portion marking not declassified*]

5. Conflicting statements by Soviet officials in recent weeks suggest that no final decision had been reached prior to Andropov's death on when or under what conditions to resume arms control talks with the US. Some officials had continued to sound pessimistic, while others hinted that the Soviets were prepared to resume substantive exchanges. The latter usually alluded to the need for a positive signal from the US, and Soviet public statements maintained that a US initiative was essential for a resumption of the principal negotiations. [*portion marking not declassified*]

6. Under Chernenko, the Soviets almost certainly will continue sending positive signals, and these could even intensify. They are also likely to continue to maintain that the onus remains upon the US to take an initiative that

would enable the major arms negotiations to resume. However, while Chernenko may be restricted by the views of Gromyko and Ustinov in exploring possible new approaches to an arms agreement, his own influence also will be felt—perhaps increasingly—as he brings the weight of his new position to bear. This could mean that any new US proposal would receive a more sympathetic hearing than would have been the case under Andropov. It does not mean that Soviet bargaining over any such proposals is likely to be less rigorous. [*portion marking not declassified*]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1984, 400195. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Prepared by [*less than 1 line not declassified*], Current Support Division, Office of Soviet Analysis.

Poindexter noted on a routing slip: “Bud, This is the paper you asked CIA for. JP.” McFarlane wrote: “Many thanks.” On a separate routing slip, Kimmit wrote: “JP: Should this be shared with Matlock, Fortier and Lehman?” Poindexter replied “yes.”

² For the text of this speech on February 14, see the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVI, No. 7 (March 14, 1984) pp. 4-7.

³ For the text, see the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVI, No. 7 (March 14, 1984) pp. 9-10.

⁴ See [footnote 3, Document 159](#).

⁵ For the text of Gromyko’s speech at Andropov’s funeral, see the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVI, No. 7 (March 14, 1984), pp. 10-11. An excerpt of his remarks was printed in the *New York Times*, February 15, 1984, p. A7.

180. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, February 15, 1984, 2-3:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin, First Deputy Chief, International Department, CPSU Central Committee
Stanislav Menshikov, assistant to Zagladin
Unidentified Soviet notetaker
Jack Matlock, NSC

Matlock opened the conversation by saying that he regretted disturbing Zagladin during the sad and busy period he was going through, but he wished to take advantage of his presence in Moscow to deliver a reply to the message conveyed by Zagladin through Dr. Horowitz of Senator Kennedy's staff.² Following his meeting with Zagladin on January 19, Dr. Horowitz had conveyed Zagladin's remarks to the White House, as Zagladin had requested. That message had been considered at high levels in the White House, and he wished to provide, in this informal fashion, our reaction and comment.³

As we understood the message, it had essentially two parts: that great powers must allow each other "elbow room" in order to avoid dangerous confrontations, and that although relations between our countries were very bad, they could be improved with mutual effort, and that a Soviet analysis had indicated that a good place to start might be to work jointly on a treaty to ban chemical weapons.

Zagladin confirmed that this was the essence of the message given to Dr. Horowitz.

Matlock observed that we agree on the matter of "elbow room." We felt that we had in fact observed that principle

in practice, and said that if the Soviets viewed the matter differently, he would convey any specific complaints they might have to Washington for consideration. He added that, in our view, the Soviets sometimes restricted their own "elbow room" by their public statements which diminished their own flexibility.

Regarding work on a treaty banning chemical weapons, the U.S. is serious in its desire to reach agreement on a treaty. As Secretary Shultz announced in Stockholm, we would be tabling a draft treaty at the CD in Geneva in coming months. It would be global in its coverage rather than regional, for reasons Shultz had explained to Gromyko in Stockholm.⁴ But from our point of view, verification will be the key to a viable treaty, and it is clear from our analysis that verification procedures must go well beyond the sort of national technical means incorporated in previous arms control agreements. We know from long experience that the Soviets resist most forms of on-the-spot verification, yet they will be essential to any treaty acceptable to us. Unless the Soviet approach to verification changes substantially, therefore, we may have great difficulty coming to an agreement on this subject. For this reason, we wonder quite frankly whether CW is really the best place to start. Since we are serious in our intent to negotiate as many differences as we can, we think it might be useful to discuss the matter frankly, and to see if there are any other candidates at hand which might present fewer difficulties. Does Zagladin have any other ideas?

Zagladin (who took detailed notes himself on the above) said that it was important to allow each side elbow room. As he had told Horowitz, the Soviets recognized the dependence of the U.S. and its Allies on oil from the Persian Gulf, and would understand if circumstances should require action by the U.S. to sustain the flow.

As for a CW treaty, the Soviets have no problem with a global approach. They will study our draft and the verification provisions carefully, and maybe there will be fewer problems there than the U.S. anticipates. As for other areas, does the U.S. have any ideas?

Matlock said that we wondered if START is not an area which would benefit from our joint consideration. It is, after all, the central issue between us so far as arms control is concerned. And although the problems are large, they do not seem insurmountable to us if the Soviets are willing to show the sort of flexibility we can offer. Progress in this area would be an important achievement in its own right, and could have a beneficial effect on our cooperation in other areas.

The U.S. has made clear that it does not seek to restructure Soviet strategic forces to the detriment of the Soviet Union. We believe both sides would benefit from moving toward systems providing greater stability, but how we do that is subject to negotiation. We are prepared to examine possible trade-offs between those elements of our forces which cause the Soviets greatest concern, in return for Soviet willingness to constrain those systems in their arsenal which give us concern. He is no expert in this area and this is not an appropriate time to discuss our ideas in detail, but Gen. Scowcroft would be visiting Moscow in March with a group from the Dartmouth Conference, and we feel it would be useful if he could be received privately at the policy-making level for a frank, informal and unbinding discussion of possibilities. The purpose would, of course, *not* be to negotiate, but simply to provide an opportunity for discussion with an expert who is thoroughly familiar with views in Washington.⁵

Zagladin replied that two things were needed to move the relationship forward: an improvement in the atmosphere, and some concrete steps which would demonstrate that agreements are really possible. On the latter, the Soviets would take a careful look at our CW proposals. Otherwise, their agenda was covered in Andropov's January 28 letter to the President.⁶ For example, U.S. ratification of the TTBT and PNE treaties, mentioned in that letter, would be considered as a clear signal that progress is possible. Regarding START, he would be glad to talk to Scowcroft when he is in Moscow.

Matlock said that we had already gone a long way to improve the atmosphere, but had yet to observe much restraint in Soviet rhetoric. As for concrete steps, we agree they are necessary, and we hope to help identify some in conversations such as this one.

So far as START is concerned, *Zagladin* continued, the Soviets see two problems. The first relates to the effect of the U.S. proposals on the structure of Soviet forces. Soviet forces are structured differently from U.S. forces both because of the historical development of the forces on each side, and because of geography. The U.S., for example, is much better situated to deploy submarines since it has many easily accessible ports. The Soviet Union, in contrast, has few, and they do not provide easy access to the oceans. The Soviets, however, are not against more stable systems in principle. Maybe this problem can be solved in negotiations.

The second problem for the Soviets is the fact that the U.S. deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe has introduced a new strategic factor. Since these systems can strike the Soviet Union, they must be considered strategic, and this is for them relevant to START.

Matlock countered that, if this is the case, then the U.S. must consider the SS-20's as strategic in the same sense, because they can strike our Allies, and we are bound by treaty to consider an attack on them as an attack on us.

Zagladin said that he took the point, but in that case the U.S. should not argue that British and French systems cannot be considered. Indeed, the idea that "Nitze floated with Kvitsinsky" just before the INF talks broke down could have been the basis for settlement if the U.S. had wanted one.⁷

Matlock said that our understanding is that this was Kvitsinsky's idea and that Nitze had made it clear that it could hardly be accepted by Washington. The reasons are clear. The British and French systems are actually irrelevant to the central issue in INF. In his view, the central issue is the Soviet attempt, represented by their deployment of the SS-20's in Europe, to decouple American and West European nuclear security. This simply cannot be accepted by NATO and the U.S. Indeed, it does not even seem in the Soviet long-term interest. For even if it should succeed, and it will not, it would produce dangerous instability in Europe, and probably a growing desire on the part of the Germans for their own national deterrent. These would be developments hardly in the Soviet interest. The British and French systems are not Alliance systems and do not provide the necessary coupling of U.S. and West European nuclear defense. They are, furthermore, in no sense a threat to the Soviet Union, given the enormous disparity in their size and that of the Soviet arsenal.

In short, we feel that the Soviets were never willing to deal with the central issue in INF, and that is why an agreement has eluded us. We regret that we must deploy, but so long as the Soviets insist on keeping some SS-20's there must

be a counterbalance, and this is totally consistent with Soviet long-range security interests. But we would like to find ways to keep deployments to a minimum, and are willing to continue negotiating.

Zagladin then referred to the danger posed by the short flight time of the Pershings.

Matlock said that their flight time was the same as that of the SS-20's to Western Europe.

Zagladin agreed, but said that the great accuracy of the Pershing II's made them a particular threat.

Menshikov joked that "if you feel you need a counter, why don't you just buy SS-20's from us and deploy them in Western Europe?"

Matlock replied, "if that's an offer, you may have a deal," and added that he thought too much was made of short flight times. The fact is that any nuclear missile flight time is too short. Whether the flight time is 40 minutes or 4 minutes, any missile launch could be tantamount to suicide. We should therefore concentrate on making sure that neither side will ever feel it must launch a missile against the other. This is a vital interest for both of us.

Zagladin agreed with the latter thought.

Matlock then observed that, speaking entirely personally, the exchange on the capabilities of our various weapons suggested to him that it might be useful to arrange some way for our military leaders and experts to meet and talk over some of these things. It seemed clear that the Soviets, for example, were exaggerating the capabilities of some of our weapons, and drawing inferences which we would consider quite unwarranted. Maybe we do the same

sometimes. Talking about it would not solve basic problems, but might clear the air a bit and give each side a chance to air its specific concerns.

Zagladin indicated that this was worth thinking about. He then stressed that what is needed now are deeds.

Matlock replied that we agree completely. He noted, however, that *Zagladin* seemed to imply that the deeds must come from us. From our point of view, they should come from them. We have serious and basic problems with many Soviet actions and policies. *Zagladin* is familiar with them and there is no need to catalog them. In our view, there is no basis for expecting us to make the first step—although we have, in fact, tempered our rhetoric without a corresponding adjustment in Soviet statements. Note, for example, the contrast in tone of the Shultz and Gromyko speeches in Stockholm. Perhaps, in our informal discussions, we should try to find ways that we can move jointly on substantive issues.

Zagladin said that this, in fact, is a good time to make a “fresh start,” and said that they would consider carefully what *Matlock* had said. He added that they would be very busy during the period leading up to the March 4 Supreme Soviet “elections,” but that his assistant Stanislav Menshikov planned a trip to New York March 6 for a scheduled conference, and he hoped that he might have a response to our conversation by then, when the General Secretary’s “election” would have occurred. [Note: in a technical sense, *Zagladin* seemed to be referring to Chernenko’s “election” to a seat in the Supreme Soviet. This, however, is an utter formality and a foregone conclusion. He may, therefore, have been hinting that Chernenko is expected to be made Chief of State by “election” as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme

Soviet. If this is in the works, however, it is most unlikely to occur before March 8, since the Supreme Soviet normally meets several weeks after "elections" are held, and these will not occur until March 4.]

Matlock said that he would be pleased to arrange a meeting with Menshikov while the latter is in the U.S., and that Menshikov should let Hartman know of his precise travel plans, so that appointments could be arranged.⁸ He added that any messages for him could be passed through Hartman, who can communicate directly with the White House.

Matlock added that, before leaving, he would like to share with them a few purely personal observations, as an individual who knows the Soviet Union well and also has the perspective of one who has worked in the White House for several months. First, he urged Zagladin and his colleagues to study most carefully the President's January 16 speech, noting that it reflects the President's considered views about the direction he would like the relationship to move.⁹ He noted, for example, the stress throughout on cooperation and a desire to solve problems. If the Soviets are concerned over the atmosphere of the relationship, then they could find many openings in the speech which could serve as a basis for improving it.

Regarding the President personally, *Matlock* said that it was clear that the Soviets misunderstood him. Yes, he does not like communism and is profoundly disturbed by many Soviet policies and actions. At the same time, he is genuinely a man of peace and understands clearly the necessity of the U.S. and USSR managing their inevitable ideological rivalry peacefully. He will defend our interests vigorously, but is also prepared to address real problems

and to solve them in a way which does not threaten the security of the Soviet Union.

Matlock then noted that some commentators in the press had suggested that the President's call for dialogue and negotiation was politically motivated. This was a mistake—although we can anticipate that everything he does this year will be seen by some in this light—because the President really does not need agreements with the USSR to be re-elected. If we are able to agree on some things, this will be good. But if we aren't, it will be very clear to the American people that it is not President Reagan's fault, but rather Soviet intransigence. In sum, even though the issues will be debated in our campaign, the state of U.S.-Soviet relations is most unlikely to affect any votes. The real reason the President is calling for a dialogue is that he genuinely wants to make strides toward arms reduction during his stewardship. He wants it on his record.

If the Soviets wish to wait until 1985 to deal, then that will be their decision. If the President is reelected, his position will not change. He will be neither harder nor softer. But if we lose a year, the advance of technology may make the issues even more complicated. And the Soviets should bear another factor in mind. That is, that President Reagan can deliver on any agreements he signs. That has not always been certain with American presidents, and we can understand the frustration of other countries when they must deal with an American president who may not be able to mobilize the support of 67 senators to ratify treaties. History shows that American conservatives are better able to deliver than liberals.

Menshikov commented at this point that they knew a treaty signed by President Reagan would be ratified, but their problem was how to get him to sign one.

Matlock replied if they would make some realistic offers, they might find it easier than they think.

It was then agreed that Menshikov would get in touch with Matlock when he comes to the U.S. in March. As he departed, Matlock gave Zagladin a couple of pictures of Zagladin and his wife taken at a dinner Matlock hosted in 1981. Zagladin thanked him and reiterated, "It's a good time now to make a fresh start."

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron February 1984 [2 of 2]. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only Mr. McFarlane. Not for System. There is no drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. Brackets are in the original. This meeting took place in Zagladin's office in the Central Committee Building. Matlock accompanied Bush to Moscow for Andropov's funeral and the meeting with Chernenko. Matlock wrote of this meeting: "As I entered the forbidding gray Central Committee Building under KGB escort, I realized that I had been trying to establish some sort of contact with the Central Committee staff ever since my first tour in Moscow in 1961. Now, after twenty-three years of trying, I was entering the inner sanctum of the Communist system." (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, p. 94)

² See [Document 163](#).

³ Matlock recalled that he requested this meeting with Zagladin "with the approval of President Reagan and Secretary Shultz" to respond to the message sent through Horowitz in January. (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, p. 94)

⁴ See [Document 159](#).

⁵ The Dartmouth Group went to Moscow in mid-March. See [Document 193](#).

⁶ See [Document 164](#).

⁷ See [footnote 4, Document 137](#).

⁸ See [Document 195](#).

⁹ See [Document 158](#).

181. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, February 16, 1984

SUBJECT

Analysis of Soviet General Secretary Chernenko's Meeting with the Vice President in Moscow

We have reviewed the record of the Vice President's exchange with new Soviet General Secretary Chernenko immediately following the Andropov funeral.² In particular, we have compared Chernenko's remarks with those of Andropov to the Vice President in November 1982 on the similar occasion of Brezhnev's funeral.³

—Given the immediate needs of the situation for Chernenko to stress the continuity and unity of Soviet policy during this transition, it is not surprising that a fair portion of his prepared presentation to the Vice President closely tracked familiar Soviet themes and Andropov's own comments of fifteen months before. He reiterated the public principles of Soviet foreign policy (peaceful relations on the basis of "equal security" and "non-interference") and expressed regret at existing strains and mistrust in U.S.-Soviet relations. Like Andropov, he affirmed at some length Soviet interest in improving relations, but noted such improvement now required "practical steps" from the U.S. side.

—What was noticeably *different* in Chernenko's presentation was the relative lack of any language accusing the U.S. of being responsible for the current downturn in

relations. We were, for instance, struck by the fact that the new General Secretary made no expression of Soviet anger or regret over, or even any mention of, the U.S. INF deployments. In his 1982 meeting with the Vice President, Andropov had devoted some time to “frank points,” asserting that “it was not the Soviets who took the initiative to worsen relations.” While Chernenko gave nothing away on actual substance, there was none of this accusatory lecturing tone to his remarks.

—Emphasizing that the Soviet Union sought “mutually acceptable” solutions, Chernenko specifically cited several general problem areas where U.S.-Soviet progress might be both desirable and possible: the limitation and reduction of arms, curbing the extension of the arms race to areas where it did not presently exist, the cessation of regional conflict, and the improvement of bilateral relations. (By way of contrast, Andropov did not mention regional problems in the 1982 meeting; Chernenko’s listing of important topics now parallels the agenda for U.S.-Soviet affairs you have presented to Gromyko—with the exception of human rights). As a step which the U.S. might take to relax tensions, Chernenko identified a non first use of nuclear weapons pledge similar to that already given by the Soviet Union.⁴ He showed some sensitivity to the need not to interject “ideological differences into U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations,” saying there should be a clear demarcation between the two.


This exchange was, of course, constrained by the short time available and the general mood of the occasion. It did not demonstrate any substantive shift on the Soviets’ part. Nonetheless, rhetoric and atmospherics are important in the Soviet context and for that reason, it was noteworthy that Chernenko and company apparently made a deliberate

effort to give an upbeat cast to the Vice President's meeting.

In the days to come, we will be sending you our further thoughts on possible follow-up.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (02/16/1984-02/20/1984); NLR-775-11-17-2-9. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley; cleared by Simons and Palmer. Simons initialed for Dunkerley. McKinley's handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on February 16.

² See [Document 178](#).

³ See [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 234](#) .

⁴ See [footnote 3, Document 8](#).

182. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, February 18, 1984

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations: Toward Defining a Strategy

A recent article by James Billington, Director of the Wilson Center and one of America's leading specialists in Russian history, culture and psychology, deserves your attention.² Billington is a tough-minded supporter of our deterrence strategy, and his article provides some important insights in the current situation in the Soviet Union and some thought-provoking suggestions for steps we can take to influence the development of the Soviet system over the long run.

Billington's Arguments

The U.S.-Soviet relationship has been remarkably stable but destabilizing forces have grown as Soviet military might and international involvement has increased without a comparable increase in internal maturity and serenity. Much of Soviet insecurity stems from the regime's failure to exorcise Stalinism and build an internal basis for self respect. Instead, present leaders are reverting to Stalinist techniques of coercion.

We must acknowledge the complexity of the situation and differentiate several distinct elements in the Soviet-American rivalry:

—*Economic*: Here we have already won.

—*Imperial*: A new form of the traditional Russian policy of extending its borders by absorbing or subordinating smaller states, it is most tempting when the U.S. seems weak or irresolute.

—*Ideological*: An expansionist policy is justified on ideological grounds, and the leaders see in revolutions elsewhere a vindication of their ideology which has failed at home.

—*Psychological*: The Soviets have a love-hate relationship with the U.S. We are “the only power that can destroy them, and also the only civilization by which they can measure themselves.”

—*Thermonuclear*: The danger is not deliberate use but the difficulty of avoiding use in an escalating situation and also the potential for blackmail.

We must reject the idea that reaching agreements with the Soviets is an end in itself and also the idea that the Soviet system is on the verge of collapse. The forthcoming generational change of Soviet leaders provides some basis for hope that the system will change. Future leaders will face a choice between a course of further centralization, militarization and oppression and one of moving toward a more open system. The U.S. cannot determine the outcome, but it can influence it.

In order to bring maximum influence to bear on this developing situation, we need a more comprehensive dialogue in three areas:

—With the current leadership, a dialogue that is tough and specific;

—With the broader society and postwar generation, a dialogue that is generous and general;

—With both, a multinational dialogue addressing common problems of the future jointly with other countries.

This will permit us to raise our sights without lowering our guard, and will help the coming Soviet generation to forge better links both with their own past and with our broad, contemporary experience.

Comment

I agree with Billington's point that our policy should include both hard-nosed negotiations with the current Soviet leadership, and measures to influence the future evolution of Soviet society.

—*Dealing with the Soviet Leaders*: We already have under way a sound policy for dealing with the Soviet leaders. We must continue to expand the channels available and to probe for areas of possible negotiability, while recognizing that significant progress may not be possible this year. Power struggles may make it impossible for the Soviet leaders to make the hard policy changes necessary for an improvement in relations with us. We should, nevertheless, continue to convey to them a policy of firmness coupled with negotiability, which can have its own impact on the leadership struggle. Our basic message should be:

(a) That no improvement of relations will be possible without a change in their policies and behavior;

(b) That continued intransigence on their part will result only on a worsening of their own situation;

(c) That we are serious about negotiating fair arrangements in a variety of areas; and

(d) That your political strength at home gives you the ability to deliver on any deals reached.

It will be particularly important to convey credibly the last two points. If the Soviet leaders conclude that no agreements are possible with you, they will simply hunker down and put all their efforts into making trouble (though almost certainly in ways that do not risk direct military confrontation). If, however, they are convinced that agreements are in fact possible, this will strengthen the arguments of those in the Soviet leadership who are inclined to make sufficient concessions to reach agreements with us.

—*The Broader Soviet Public and Younger Generation*: We have given less attention to means of influencing the successor generation than we have to dealing with the leadership. Andropov was moving in a neo-Stalinist direction. His successors, however, will be forced to choose whether to intensify centralization, repression and militarization of Soviet society, or to improve incentives, decentralize decision making and rely more on market factors.

While we can have only a marginal effect on the outcome of this internal Soviet process, we should do what we can to strengthen the tendencies toward greater decentralization and openness, since this would produce a Soviet Union with less commitment to the use of force and less willing to engage in costly foreign adventures. Therefore, even if the rivalry of our systems did not end (it would not), the U.S.-USSR interaction would be safer and more manageable.

Billington's suggestions for reaching the younger generation through greater expanded exchanges are apt. The fact is that the successor Soviet generation is as parochial as the current one. Opportunities to meet with Americans and to come to the United States can undermine officially-sponsored negative stereotypes about the U.S. and stimulate private doubts about the veracity of propaganda caricatures. While the persons involved will rarely if ever be able to influence policy decisions immediately and directly, broader exposure of Soviet citizens to the U.S. can over time produce pressures for more realistic and less rigid Soviet policies.

For these reasons, I believe you should consider reopening negotiations on an exchange agreement in the near future. Exchanges can be broadened considerably on the basis of private funding, and I am investigating ways that we can bring our influence to bear in encouraging private foundations to direct their efforts toward reaching a new Soviet audience, rather than multiplying contacts with regime propagandists like Arbatov.³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/23/84). Confidential. Sent for information. Prepared by Matlock. Copies were sent to Bush, Meese, Baker, and Deaver. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² The article is attached but not printed. In a January 28 memorandum, McFarlane tasked Matlock with summarizing Billington's article, "A Time of Danger, an Opening for Dialogue," which was printed in the *Washington Post* on November 20, 1983, p. F8. "It seems to me that there is much in common between Jim's

prescriptions and your own,” McFarlane commented. “I would like to infuse the President with an historical appreciation of where we stand in the relationship and what we can expect in the way of the Soviet leadership (goals and strategy). Finally, given what I believe we share (a basic pessimism toward any near-term movement away from the deeply Stalinistic values held by the current senior generation of leaders), we ought to propose how we should proceed so as to avoid catastrophe in our strategic relationship while seeking to at least keep alive the hope of an alternative future among the successor generation. I would like to get this to the President as soon as possible.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/23/84))

³ In a February 6 memorandum to McFarlane, Matlock reported, in relation to private foundation money, cultural exchanges, and even trips of U.S. business leaders to Moscow: “I had two extended discussions with Billington about his ideas.” He continued: “Basically he feels, and I strongly agree, that some means must be found to direct foundation money into new channels, so that we do not have a private-sector dialogue dominated by the Arbatovs and Zhukovs, as it has been up to now.” He concluded: “it should be possible to implement some of Billington’s ideas without major changes of U.S. policy or larger commitment of federal funds. We must, however, do what we can to encourage effective goal setting and more effective briefing of U.S. participants.” (Ibid.)

183. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan¹

Dear Mr. President,

Moscow, February 23, 1984

We appreciate the kind feelings transmitted on your behalf by Mr. Bush at the hour of sorrow for the Soviet people.

In your letter you expressed some thoughts with regard to Soviet-American relations and spoke in favor of putting them on a constructive basis.²

I told Mr. G. Bush and would like to reaffirm it to you personally that our approach of principle to dealing with the United States remains unchanged.

This approach reflects a joint view of the Soviet leadership and enjoys a full support of the entire people of our country.

In conducting our foreign policy we will continue persistent efforts with the aim of strengthening the peace and lessening the danger of war. We will stand for a peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, will seek to develop an equal and mutually advantageous cooperations with all countries, if they are ready, on their part, to do likewise. This, of course, applies, in full measure to the United States, too.

In practical terms, this means also that our positions laid down, in particular in our message to you of January 28,³ remain in force. Therein, we clearly expressed our view as to the present state of affairs concerning the issues of

nuclear weapons in Europe and in the area of strategic weapons, as well as with regard to the arms limitation and reduction process as a whole. We are expecting your reaction.

I would like, Mr. President, that you and I should have a clear understanding from the very beginning on the central matters of the relations between the USSR and the USA. These are the matters of security. The Soviet Union does not seek a military superiority, nor does it seek to dictate its will to others, but we will, of course, be safeguarding the interests of our security and those of our allies and friends from any attempts to damage those interests.

I believe, you will agree that in a nuclear age we must not allow the irreparable to take place, be it through design or mistake. We are not seeking a confrontation with the U.S. Such a confrontation would hardly be in the interests of your country, either. If you and I have a common understanding on this point, then it should be put into effect also in practical deeds.

From this standpoint it is important that restraint be exercised in everything, in matters big and small, and that both sides display the high degree of responsibility which is required by the interests of international security and stability. As a minimum, it is necessary to do nothing in the practical policy, that could exacerbate the situation and cause irreversible changes in Soviet-American relations as well as in the international situation as a whole.

We are convinced that it is impossible to begin to correct the present abnormal and, let's face it, dangerous situation, and to speak seriously of constructive moves, if there is a continuation of attempts to upset the balance of forces and to gain military advantages to the detriment of the security

of the other side, if actions are taken prejudicing the legitimate interests of the other side.

There is another important point which the U.S. leadership must clearly understand: not only the U.S. has allies and friends. The Soviet Union has them too; and we will be caring for them.

We look at things realistically and have no illusions that it is possible to carry on business in total abstraction from the objective differences which exist between a socialist country and a capitalist country.

For instance, our morality does not accept much of what is endemic to the capitalist society and what we consider as unfair to people. Nevertheless, we do not introduce these problems into the sphere of interstate relationship. Just as we believe it is wrong and even dangerous to subordinate our relations to ideological differences.

These are the considerations of a general nature which I thought necessary to convey to you. As to the specific areas where the Soviet Union and the U.S. could, right now and with no time lost, move in a constructive way, those have been outlined by us, including in the message that I mentioned. I would like to expect that a positive reaction on your part will follow.

We have always been resolute advocates of a serious and meaningful dialogue—a dialogue that would be aimed at searching for common ground, at finding concrete and mutually acceptable solutions in those areas where it proves realistically possible.

In conclusion I will emphasize once again: a turn toward even and good relations between our two countries has

been and continues to be our desire. And such a turn is quite feasible, given the same desire on the U.S. side.

Sincerely,

K. Chernenko

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, President/Chernenko Correspondence (1/2). No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy. In a covering letter to Shultz, February 24, Dobrynin requested that the letter be brought to Reagan's attention. In a February 24 covering memorandum to the President, McFarlane wrote: "This afternoon Ambassador Dobrynin delivered the attached letter to you from General Secretary Chernenko. Its tone is generally moderate. Standard rhetoric is included, but the commitment to a serious effort to solve problems lends to an improved climate for engaging the Soviets on a variety of subjects. Tomorrow morning I will send you a memorandum (see [Document 185](#)) which surveys the state of the relationship and proposes certain courses of action to get things moving. It reflects the thinking of George, Cap, the Vice President and several others. We would like to meet with you to discuss it next week and to receive your guidance as to which of several projects we should move out on. Separately, I am moving the bureaucracy ahead on certain START ideas which we would be prepared to exchange in the near future." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490236, 8490586)) In his diary on February 27, Reagan wrote: "N.S.C. briefing was on Chernenko's letter. We're agreed we are going to make our plans for response with George B., George S., Bud, Cap &

me—no bureaucracy.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 322)

² See [Document 175](#).

³ See [Document 164](#).

184. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, February 24, 1984, 1241Z

2217. For the Secretary From Hartman. Subject: Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations.

1. Confidential entire text.
2. Summary. As the dust settles from the second Soviet leadership change in 15 months, I am persuaded that we should use this opportunity to test once again whether our relations can be moved forward. I also conclude that the time for such moves is limited and we will not get something for nothing. End summary.
3. Based on your meeting with Gromyko in Stockholm,² on the short exchange here with Chernenko,³ on a tete-a-tete lunch that I had with Dobrynin the day after the funeral,⁴ on Senator Cohen's meetings Monday with Acting Chief of State Kuznetsov and First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko,⁵ and on a long discussion with MFA USA Department Chief Bessmertnykh,⁶ the following points emerge:

—The Soviets' reaction to the President's January 16 speech has been frankly disappointing.⁷ You saw first-hand with Gromyko the depth of their skepticism. For the post-Andropov period as well, all of our contacts with them indicate that they remain weighted down by their distrust of our motives.

—Nevertheless, the new leadership thus far has shown a greater willingness than Andropov to match our shift toward a less strident tone. This could be expected in a post-succession “honeymoon”, but the fact is that Chernenko’s public statements as General Secretary have been far more restrained than Andropov’s first remarks. Chernenko and his colleagues have not yet repeated nor referred to Andropov’s September 28 and November 24 remarks,⁸ which were particularly hostile to the U.S.

—Andropov’s death also coincided with a major Soviet review and reappraisal of their arms control position. At the moment they seem to be looking at a wide range of options. This was hinted at by Gromyko in your conversation and has been indicated to us by several recent interlocutors and confirmed to the French by General Chervov during the week of Andropov’s death. This reappraisal provides the context for the fact that Soviet leaders post-Andropov have been exceedingly coy about any reference to the condition that we must be ready to return to the status quo ante in INF.

—Finally, despite Chernenko’s familiar, aging image, the structure of the Soviet leadership is different from the Brezhnev or Andropov periods. Chernenko is surrounded, not only by Ustinov, Gromyko and Tikhonov, but also by a younger array of leaders, one of whom—Gorbachev—already seems to be number two. A new generation is inexorably coming to the fore.⁹

4. While there is not yet much hard evidence, it appears that the new leadership—for all its apparent stand-pattism—is not just a continuation of Andropov or a throw-back to Brezhnev, that it has at least decided to convey a different and slightly more positive public signal to us on East-West relations, and that it is engaged in a review of arms control

policy and possibly East-West policy in general. Because of this possible approach to a fork in the road, I think that it is a particularly good moment to put something specific and positive into the equation from our side.

5. While the Soviets could answer the President's letter with something positive,¹⁰ I think that they are unlikely to go much beyond Andropov's last letter.¹¹ As long as what we suggest is based on our own clear interests, I see no harm and much political gain from trying to mold their response and in the process attempting to overcome some of their suspicion. We should understand, however, that keeping bilateral channels open or even developing new ones will not be enough. Unless our next moves are significant and substantive, we are not going to convince people here that there is a real possibility of doing business on a mutually satisfactory basis.

6. Here are some suggestions which I know that you are looking at but which I would put high on the priority list:

—First, we should make an effort to reactivate discussion of the major strategic issues before the Soviets' arms control review has reached any final conclusions. Brent Scowcroft's early March trip would be an ideal time to conduct a thorough airing of strategic issues.¹² He should be prepared to discuss in detail the implications of our framework proposal—something I sense the Soviets have not adequately explored as yet. We should make clear that Brent has been authorized by the President and expects to talk to policy-makers, not simply to Academy of Science people. (Dobrynin, for self-serving but also I think for valid reasons was negative on people floating around without a clear Presidential mantle.) The Soviets can be counted on to provide the proper interlocutors. If we can let them know soon enough of Brent's mission and its status, they

will probably be prepared to keep their positions open in this area until they have had a chance to hear him out.

—Second, we should generate some positive momentum on bilateral issues. Proposing early dates for negotiations on an exchanges agreement and on consulates would meet this objective. Both agreements are squarely in our interest and thus should not be linked to Soviet performance in other areas, e.g., air safety. Moreover, while the Soviets have tended to denigrate such bilateral issues as non-central, they could not fail to respond affirmatively since they already did when we first raised them last summer before the KAL debacle. I have reviewed our recent drafts of the exchanges agreement and am convinced we can button up our negotiating position within two-three weeks of hard work.

—Finally, we should also move quickly to give an unmistakable signal of our seriousness on arms control. I know that it is difficult to get clear decisions in Washington at this time. Therefore, I would look for something doable with a minimum of fuss and talk. If our objective is to avoid serious consideration of a CTB, I would propose ratification of the PNE and TTB treaties.¹³ It would respond to a concern the Soviets themselves have raised about our willingness to confirm negotiated agreements. It would also allow us to turn the “deeds not words” appeals back toward Moscow. The treaties do not carry the political baggage of SALT II, and we would be able to utilize their existing verification provisions to gain practical experience with the compliance problem on testing. If those provisions proved inadequate, we would have stronger grounds both for seeking renegotiation of the two agreements and for countering criticism of our CTB position. Of course we should move on TTB/PNE only if we are reasonably sure of a positive reception in the Congress.

7. I am deliberately soft-pedaling a summit. There is no reason to believe the Soviets would be interested now, given the state of the relationship. Nor at this stage do I see any significant advantages from our point in raising this issue. If we can take the kind of steps I've suggested above, and the Soviets respond, the summit option would fall naturally into place—and the Soviets would be much more likely to respond positively if we proposed it.

8. What I have sketched out seems to me a minimal agenda for getting the kind of movement in the relationship that we want. In places we will have to compromise—the Soviets are not going to give us something for nothing. But each area I have identified is one in which progress is in our own interest. As always, timing is key. If many more weeks drag on with no tangible progress, the opportunity presented by the Chernenko succession will be lost and the hard-line arguments in the Kremlin—that not enough time is left for significant progress before the American election and that what progress is possible will simply assist President Reagan's re-election—will assert themselves more and more strongly. If we are to move, it should be now. I hope that some decisions will be taken in the next week or two and I look forward to a discussion of follow-through when I am in Washington beginning March 17.

Hartman

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 17, 1984 March 2, Meetings with the President. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis/Alpha; Stadis.

² See [Document 159](#).

³ See [Documents 176](#), [177](#), and [178](#).

⁴ In telegram 2142 from Moscow, February 22, the Embassy reported that Dobrynin and Hartman had lunch on February 15. No formal report on this lunch meeting has been found. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840115-0672)

⁵ Senators Cohen and Biden went to Moscow on a visit sponsored by the USSR Academy of Sciences from February 16 to 20. In telegram 2222 from Moscow, February 24, the Embassy reported that the primary purpose of the visit was to explain the “concept of a strategic force build-down with a range of Soviet Academy and Institute officials.” The Embassy continued: “The highlights of the visit were Senator Cohen’s meetings with the First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Kuznetsov and First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko. Both admitted to gaining in understanding of the build-down concept from the Senator’s briefing, but neither gave any hint that the official Soviet rejection of it as enunciated in Geneva and in public might be under review. Kuznetsov maintained that it was up to the U.S. to take the first step to repair the bilateral relationship, and he suggested that ratification of the TTBT and the PNET would be a good place to start.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840121-0901)

⁶ In telegram 2142 from Moscow, February 22, the Embassy reported that the DCM had a discussion with Bessmertnykh during a reception for the Cohen-Biden delegation at Spaso House on February 17 regarding the Special Flights Agreement. Other than this brief summary, no formal report of this conversation has been found. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840115-0672)

⁷ See [Document 158](#).

⁸ See [Document 120](#) and [footnote 4, Document 141](#).

⁹ Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, a full Politburo member and the Central Committee Secretary for Agriculture, had been a protégé of Andropov during his short tenure. Under Chernenko, Gorbachev rose to “Second Secretary” on the Politburo. (Telegram 2185 from Moscow, February 23; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840119-0871)

¹⁰ See [Document 175](#).

¹¹ See [Document 164](#).

¹² Scowcroft and the Dartmouth Group visited Moscow in March. See [Document 193](#).

¹³ See [footnote 6, Document 31](#).

185. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, February 28, 1984

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations: Your Meeting with the President, March 2, 1984, 2:15 p.m.

Your meeting with the President is designed to set the framework for our policy towards the Soviet Union for the rest of this year.² You will want to get the President's blessing on moving forward with the Soviets in your next talk with Dobrynin and in Art Hartman's next conversations with Gromyko. It is also important that Brent Scowcroft have substantive things to say during his meetings in Moscow in ten days if he is to have credibility as a channel on nuclear arms negotiations.³ At this point, content is the key to whether we can move forward.

The material you sent the President for the meeting was changed quite substantively by Jack Matlock and Ron Lehman before Bud McFarlane sent it on to the President.⁴ Some of the NSC's updating of the first paper is quite good. However, they also saw fit to gut the substance on START,⁵ eliminating the Framework paper in toto, and introduced some dubious conceptual comments, e.g. Chernenko "needs you more than you need him, and he knows it."

The paper now reflects the better tone we have been hearing from the Soviets since Chernenko took over and the slight widening of opportunities Chernenko may represent. In a nutshell, the Soviets are reticent about helping the President this year, but they are keeping their

options open, and under Chernenko the signs are multiplying that they could well decide to get something serious going with us before the election. It argues we should recognize that major breakthroughs are not in the cards and keep public expectations—including expectations of a summit—low at the outset.

But the paper states that we should also begin to put serious content into the dialogue all along the line, and be willing to go to the summit if the Soviets are willing to respond with concrete steps that take our concerns into account. If they are not, the fault will demonstrably be theirs, and not ours. If they are, we may get some agreements this year, and should lay a solid basis for some serious forward movement beginning in 1985.

On substance, the paper divides the issues and sets forward proposals in the four normal agenda areas. It also talks about channels and timing, noting that we need to organize ourselves for confidential, leak-proof substantive dialogue, through Dobrynin and Hartman, through Brent Scowcroft (when he goes to Moscow with the Dartmouth Group beginning March 8) and possibly through a visit to Moscow by you. And we need the kind of bureaucratic streamlining here that will “pre-position” us for movement on a whole range of issues. Your task in the meeting will be to obtain agreement for movement forward in all areas.

The fundamental flaw in the rewrite is that it eliminates any real substance on START and drops the separate paper on the Framework. As it stands now, there is little left to talk with the Soviets on nuclear arms control issues other than the vague suggestions of tradeoffs that we have offered in the past. The Soviets will not take such an approach as a serious one. During the meeting tomorrow or following it in a separate meeting, it will be important to

get the President's blessing on a more substantive approach.

The problem will be a critical one for your dialogue with Dobrynin and Scowcroft's talks in Moscow. If Brent is sent to Moscow with no more than what is proposed in this paper, the Soviets will be confirmed in their suspicion that our talk of dialogue is no more than an election-year ploy. What he has to say will be a test case of "U.S. seriousness" for the Soviets. If there is nothing new, Brent will be discredited; even worse, you and the President will be discredited and the possibility of getting something serious going with the Soviets this year—including a summit—will not be realized.

Specifically, we believe that Brent should be authorized to convey to the Soviets just what sort of trade-offs we envision and how they might come together in a START package. At the very least, he will have to be able to say explicitly that we are prepared to trade our agreement to limit missiles and bombers together, as the Soviet Union has suggested, in exchange for Soviet agreement to sufficient limits on the ballistic missile capabilities that are important to us. He should be able to describe how such an arrangement could involve two parallel networks of limits and sublimits, one on delivery vehicles (as emphasized by the Soviet side), the other on warheads (as emphasized by the U.S.); and explain how such an approach would not require that we build identical forces. His pitch would be keyed to the need to find agreement on the principles of such a reductions scheme, which could then allow the two delegations in Geneva to hammer out the actual numbers and other details.

The attached suggested talking points (Tab A)⁶ are designed to allow you to shape the conversation to get the

President's blessing on putting substance, particularly on START, into the dialogue with the Soviets, obtaining a consensus on the bilateral, regional, and human rights steps discussed in the paper, and securing agreement on the ideas on timing and channels included in it. They include both the ideas of sending Brent to Moscow and a discussion of the framework. I leave it you whether you want to do this with others present or only with the President. A copy of the paper as it was sent to the President is also attached. (Tab B)

Tab B

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁷

Washington, undated

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS A FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE

What are the prospects for U.S.-Soviet relations in 1984?
What should be our approach?

I. Premise

Chernenko's selection as General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party may provide an opportunity to put our relations on a more positive track. Even before Andropov died, there were signs that the Soviets were accepting the necessity for an intensified dialogue. Now they have started to diminish their hostile rhetoric somewhat and have indicated a readiness to examine privately proposals for solving some problems.

As a Soviet leader, Chernenko has many initial weaknesses. He may have come to power as the head of a relatively weak coalition, and his freedom to maneuver may be severely circumscribed. His public image is not strong, and he may well turn out to be only a brief transitional figure. Nevertheless, he probably does not view himself in that light, and we can assume that he will attempt to consolidate his power and put his own stamp on history. In that effort, an ability to improve relations with the United States would be an important asset to him, and to be seen publicly dealing with you as an equal would bolster his image greatly in the Soviet Union. In short, he needs you more than you need him, and he knows it.

This does not mean that he can sell the store. Crucial strategic decisions will continue to be made by a collective—essentially the same collective which ran things under Andropov. But it is likely that this collective had already begun to recognize the need for the Soviet Union to adjust some of its policies before Andropov died, and Chernenko's accession could hasten that process. The change of the face at the top could make it easier to adjust policies, implicitly blaming past failures on the "previous administration."

To say that these things *could* happen is, of course, not the same as saying that they *will*, or even that the odds favor them happening—The Soviets still harbor a deep and fundamental hostility to your Administration, are tough and cynical bargainers, and will be reluctant to do anything that they believe would facilitate your reelection and vindicate your policy of strength.

Your reelection is of strategic importance for the United States in establishing an effective long-term policy for dealing with the Soviet threat. This means that we must stress in public your call for dialogue and your desire to

reduce tensions and solve problems. Tangible progress and a summit that produced positive results could be helpful if the Soviets decide to bite the bullet and adjust their policies sufficiently to make this possible. But if they continue to resist realistic negotiation, you must be in a position by late summer or fall to make clear that this is their fault, not yours.

For the next few months, however, we should carefully avoid raising public expectations for a summit or any specific accords with the Soviets. To do so would gravely weaken our negotiating leverage with the Soviets, and leave a public impression of failure if they refuse to deal with us realistically. In private, however, we should promptly begin to explore the possibilities for moving ahead in some important areas, and to test Chernenko's willingness and ability to meet at least some of our legitimate concerns. If we play our cards right, we may well be able to induce Chernenko to pay something in advance for the improvement in relations and summit which would be very helpful to him personally.

On the Soviet side, one principal argument against meeting our concerns in some important areas is likely to be that your policy is so hostile that no accommodation is possible, and any attempt to negotiate seriously would only result in Soviet concessions without a deal. It is, therefore, in our interest to make it clear that we will negotiate seriously if the Soviets are willing to meet our legitimate concerns. Such a posture would not only maximize whatever chances exist for major agreements in 1984, but would provide a sound basis for rapid progress in 1985, if the Soviets are unable to get their act together until then, or if they hold back for fear of helping you get reelected. We should not, of course, attempt to stimulate their interest by making prior concessions of substance. This would only encourage them

to continue on their track of trying to get concessions from us without making any of their own. Indeed, our aim should be to obtain some prior concessions from them, particularly if you are to agree to a summit. In this regard we should recognize that there are doubtless limits on what Chernenko can deliver; he can hardly pull Soviet troops out of Afghanistan or make major decisions of strategic significance. But he can deliver on such matters as human rights cases and Jewish emigration if he wishes.

All of this suggests that we should move rapidly to put more content into the dialogue; and to search for more efficient modalities. We should stick to the broad agenda set forth in your January speech, but need to concentrate particular attention on issues where the Soviets can find a direct interest in responding. Regarding modalities, we need channels which permit off-the-record frankness and which are isolated from leaks.

While concentrating on communicating with the leadership (whoever that may be at a given moment), we should also expand opportunities for more broad and effective contacts with a wider public, particularly persons now in their forties and fifties (the successor generation).

II. *The Substance*

It is difficult to predict where on our four-part agenda progress might be possible. In 1983 the Soviets sent a signal in the human rights field by releasing the Pentecostals; this year it could be somewhere else. So we should keep pushing on all fronts, while keeping public expectations low unless and until something concrete materializes.

A. *Regional Issues*

In our dialogue with the Soviets on regional issues, it will be difficult at this stage to strike direct deals. Thus, our near-term objective would be to engage them in a frank interchange regarding the dangers of given situations. Such a discussion would massage Soviet amour propre by treating them as equals (of sorts). It might also serve to alert us and them to particularly delicate aspects which should be taken into account in policy making. Being seen in consultation with the Soviets on these issues helps allay public anxieties and can increase leverage with other parties. Conceivably, the process could lead to reciprocal unilateral actions which might defuse particularly dangerous aspects of regional conflicts, although this is likely to occur only if relations in other respects improve.

The regional issue most likely to attract genuine Soviet interest is the Middle East—Lebanon specifically. At this stage, we should steer away from tactical discussions and asking them to do favors, i.e., UNIFIL. Our objective should be to use a larger strategic discussion to stress the danger of events spiraling out of control of either of us and producing an Israeli-Syrian confrontation which would have serious dangers for both of us.

There is also room for a broad discussion of European issues, where we could drive home some of the dangers for Soviet policy of their present “splitting” tactics. And in general we believe our emphasis on greater Soviet restraint in unstable regions indicates more routine, substantive exchanges among experts on various regions.

B. Arms Control

Strategic arms limitations represent the central arms negotiations between the US and the USSR. However, for the last three years, INF issues have set the mood for a

number of negotiations. Having threatened to walk out of negotiations and to deploy “countermeasures,” the Soviet Union is now following through.

Sufficient face-saving formulas exist for the Soviet Union to return when they wish, although they will be very reluctant to return to INF. We should not make concessions to bring them back to START and INF, nor should we create obstacles to their return. Resumption of talks will be accelerated if our allies are firm, major defense programs proceed, walkout is not rewarded, and domestic pressures are controlled.

Nevertheless, the United States can and should take steps designed to enhance the prospects for arms control “windows of opportunity.” Resumption of more normal negotiations is most likely in multilateral fora or in low key bilateral negotiations such as the “Hotline” upgrade talks, especially if the United States is not perceived as gaining significant public diplomacy advantages. This is consistent with the current Soviet effort to keep political pressure on the Alliance and this Administration.

If, however, the new leadership in Moscow should decide that a major US/USSR arms control initiative might be in their interest, then START is the most likely arena for movement. Prior to the Soviet walkout from START we had indicated that we had some flexibility in basic approaches to trade-offs between areas of US and Soviet interest. Clarification of approaches to these trade-offs could play an important role in creating the climate for agreement in principle or a resumption of negotiations.

Although the Alliance is adamant that we should not make concessions in order to get the USSR to return to the INF talks, Moscow’s unwillingness to discuss Soviet LRINF

systems presents it with a political vulnerability. The United States and its allies should continue to press on this issue. As long as the Soviet Union believes that it can put the West on the defensive with the public in areas such as INF deployments and space arms control, it will see less incentive to negotiate on other issues.

MBFR is important not because an agreement is likely this year or next, but because we have an opportunity to demonstrate that we are serious in our negotiating intent. Our opening position at the next round is thus crucial in conveying the overall message that we are prepared to negotiate seriously. The CDE, the CD in Geneva and bilateral talks on CBM's such as the hot line will have a higher profile than hitherto.

C. Human Rights

While the Soviets will continue to make any discussion on human rights difficult, we should persevere. Last year the Soviets did move on the Pentecostals in the context of improving relations, and we are once again hearing from official Soviets that they see some improvement. We should continue to focus on major cases like Shcharansky, Sakharov and Orlov, and on the need to reopen Jewish emigration. This is an area where deals may be possible if arranged through private, off-the-official-record contacts. If movement in other areas indicate that a summit would be useful, we should push hard for human rights improvements as a precondition.

D. Bilateral

In the bilateral area, Secretary Shultz' meeting with Gromyko opened up a number of possibilities. Gromyko responded positively to the need to examine specific

measures to prevent another KAL. Since then, the Soviet representative at ICAO has proposed a US-Japan-USSR group to look at such measures.⁸ We have developed a set of specific measures. Our objective should be to reach agreement on these measures this year.

We also should take steps which improve our direct communication and contact with the people in the Soviet Union—to give practical effect to your own stress on talking directly to the people in your January 16th speech and again in the State of the Union. That is the objective of a consulate in Kiev (strongly supported in recent letters to the Congress and the Administration by Ukrainian-American organizations) and a cultural exchanges agreement.

By moving forward ourselves in these two areas now, we can help to channel in sensible directions the upsurge of interest across the country in greater people-to-people contacts and limit exploitation by the Soviets. Also to avoid naive groups dominating this area, we should try to establish a mechanism for better guidance and coordination of private efforts. This could be used to encourage those with a tougher-minded track record in dealing with the Soviets, i.e., the American Council of Young Political Leaders.

Some in Congress are interested in inviting a delegation of Supreme Soviet members this year. This could be a way for us to meet possible successors to Chernenko, such as Gorbachev. However, we will want to weigh carefully the risks of negative exploitation.

In other areas of possible bilateral cooperation, the Soviets have not responded formally to our space rescue proposal but informal indications are not promising. There are a

variety of other areas of cooperation which could be pursued should we decide to do so.

III. *Channels*

There are a number of channels we should be utilizing.

We should continue the correspondence with Chernenko, but recognize that it is unlikely that he will be candid, both out of fear his letters will be leaked and in order to protect his negotiating positions. Nonetheless, it is one means of being certain that our views are getting through to the leadership without distortion. And it could help to provide some momentum. (At the moment the ball is in Chernenko's court, since you sent him a letter with the Vice President.)⁹

We also should hold early and regular exchanges between Secretary Shultz and Dobrynin and between Hartman and Gromyko on the full range of our concerns.

On the critical START issue, in the absence of negotiations in Geneva, the Secretary's talks with Dobrynin will be the main channel. As a parallel process we should consider intensifying unofficial informal discussions. Brent Scowcroft is going to Moscow in March and would be able to set forth our views more fully and directly than passing through Dobrynin.

If there is sufficient movement, we should consider another Shultz-Gromyko meeting.

Finally, we should consider some other forms of dialogue. As noted earlier, on regional issues like the Middle East our specialists should meet. In addition, we should consider sending a group of middle-level policy officials to Moscow

to cover a broad range of subjects and touch base with key Soviet organizations, including the Central Committee. And military-to-military discussions are a possibility: discussion of such matters as strategic doctrine or comparison of each other's threat assessments might be useful topics.

IV. Timetable

The following timetable is possible:

—Shultz/Dobrynin within a week to 10 days: further on START framework and propose some of other consultations.

—Hartman/Gromyko: propose Middle East discussion by specialists and/or discussions by policy planners.

—Scowcroft: Brief him on our approach to use privately during his planned trip to Moscow beginning March 8.

—Another Shultz/Gromyko meeting: we should not push for this yet but wait and see how other issues develop. If the Soviets seem interested, we could try to arrange a meeting in May or early June. We also should consider whether to invite Gromyko to Washington to see you when he is here in September for the UNGA.

V. Bureaucratic Preparation

If the Soviets do begin to deal more seriously in areas of interest to us, we must be able to move rapidly in order to sustain momentum. This may require some adjustment of our bureaucratic procedures to make quick decisions possible. It would be useful to clarify as many immediate issues as we can, and to "pre-position" approved

negotiating plans, to be used as developments warrant. A list of the more important U.S.-Soviet issues with summaries of their status is attached.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹⁰

Washington, February 18, 1984

CHECKLIST OF US-SOVIET ISSUES: STATUS AND PROSPECTS

I. *ARMS CONTROL*

START: Status. Soviet deferral of resumption reaffirmed by Gromyko in Stockholm, but with Vice President, Chernenko called nuclear arms control major area for positive US-Soviet discussion. Soviets know we have new things to say on START in restricted channels (Dobrynin pressed Hartman to volunteer Thursday). *Prospects.* If Framework presented to Soviets soon, some possibility of getting detailed confidential discussion underway over next few months (though they may continue to insist on something on INF/FBS as precondition to serious talks).

INF: Status. Soviets continue fixated on U.S. INF, and refuse resumption without some expression of U.S. "willingness to return to the situation that existed before deployments;" in Stockholm Gromyko shied away even from quiet discussions in restricted channels. *Prospects.* Near-term chances of renewed separate INF talks minimal. Gromyko pointed toward inclusion of U.S. INF systems in any resumed START talks, was informed that any

negotiation dealing with GLCMs and P-IIs must also deal with SS-20s.

MBFR: Status. Talks to resume March 16. President's letter to Chernenko said we are prepared to introduce some new ideas and to be flexible on data if Soviets flexible on verification. *Prospects.* Difficult to be too optimistic on these long-running talks, but some forward movement seems possible by summer assuming early Allied agreement on new proposal enabling us to respond to Soviets soon.

US-SOVIET CBMs: Status. January session moved us forward on upgrade of Hotline, but Soviets most reluctant on some of our more ambitious proposals. Soviets appear interested in principle in nuclear terrorism discussions. We are now coordinating USG proposal with Allies before going to Soviets. *Prospects.* Follow-on session on communications CBMs tentatively set for April; basic Hotline upgrade agreement possible by early summer. Could talk with Soviets on nuclear terrorism within a month assuming Allied support firms up; would not move multilaterally until some agreement with Soviets.

CDE: Status. Early sparring in Stockholm with basic NATO and Soviet approaches still far apart, and Soviets pushing declaratory measures such as Non-Use-of-Force Treaty; NATO seeks substantive notification measures. *Prospects.* We should pursue private dialogue underway in Stockholm. Realistic compromise proposals may be months or even years off without high-level political decisions, i.e. a package with points satisfying both sides.

NON-PROLIFERATION: Status. Third round of highly technical and essentially non-political bilaterals just concluded in Vienna; both sides see them as valuable

mechanism for policy coordination in this area. *Prospects.* Soviets have proposed and we are ready to agree to another session for December.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS: Status: Secretary Shultz announced to the CDE that we will be presenting a draft CW treaty in coming months; once State and ACDA competing versions are reconciled, a text will be submitted for interagency clearance. OSD opposes concept of such a treaty, but has proposed US-Soviet bilateral verification discussion. *Prospects:* Final treaty will not be ready for CD submission before April at the earliest; we may wish to pick up bilateral discussion proposal in interim.

NUCLEAR TESTING: Status: Soviets have turned down our proposals to discuss verification before ratification of 1976 TTBT treaty every time, and believe they have the propaganda high ground in calling for discussion only after it is ratified. *Prospects:* An interagency group is studying further approaches to the Soviets. One option involves ratification of TTBT in exchange for Soviet consent to on-site verification of a few nuclear calibration tests. Some agencies oppose any change in our position on basis of our non-compliance report to Congress.^{[11](#)}

ASAT ARMS CONTROL: Status. Soviets probably intend to make this major issue and Tsongas Amendment may prevent our testing the U.S. ASAT system absent talks with Soviets.^{[12](#)} Basically very little possible on this now until fundamental verification problems resolved. Some confidence-building measures are now being discussed within the USG and could be proposed for discussion with Soviets. *Prospects:* Proposals for CBMs or prohibiting certain acts could be discussed once USG study completed, but would be of less interest to Soviets than ASAT ban.

MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS: Status. Little dialogue between military establishments except in Incidents-at-Sea context, and we have held back from proposing regular exchanges between Weinberger and Ustinov or Chiefs of Staff. *Prospects.* A proposal of a Weinberger-Ustinov or Vessey-Ogarkov meeting could be made whenever we deem appropriate. Ex-CJCS David Jones plans to visit Moscow as member of Dartmouth Group delegation in March. Soviets, however, are likely to be extremely cautious until some progress made on other issues.

II. REGIONAL ISSUES

MIDDLE EAST: Status. Talking with Soviets here and Moscow, and Soviets negotiating with French on UN role in Lebanon. *Prospects.* Soviets unlikely to do much to help us in Lebanon, but nervous about Syrian-impelled confrontation with us. Could acquiesce in UN role and possibly eventual Syrian withdrawal in return for commitments on U.S. and Israeli forces. Further discussion in Shultz-Dobrynin and Hartman-Gromyko channels could be useful to avoid miscalculation.

AFGHANISTAN: Status. Soviets dug in for long term, but feeling pressure. Talks under UN auspices may resume in April. Pakistan welcomes US-Soviet bilateral contacts as supporting its efforts, but last US-Soviet "experts" talks in Moscow in July 1982. *Prospects.* As pressure on the ground rises, Soviets may look to further cross-border incursions on Pakistan, to UN process and/or to direct talks with us as safety valve. We could make some points about role of guarantors in overall settlement that included withdrawal timetable if we wished to probe their longer-term intentions and prove we support UN process.

SOUTHERN AFRICA: Status. Steady progress now on South African disengagement from Angola, and discussions on shape of final settlement continue with some prospect for success, but Soviets could still block either through SWAPO or in Luanda. Chet Crocker talked with Soviets three times in 1982, but not since. *Prospects.* Sending Hartman in with an update could give Soviets a better feel for the dilemmas they face.

KAMPUCHEA: Status. Soviets combine support for Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea with more active policy vis-à-vis ASEAN states, and item has not ranked high in bilateral dialogue. *Prospects.* No immediate prospects of inducing the Soviets to decrease aid to Hanoi.

III. HUMAN RIGHTS

EMIGRATION/ANTI-SEMITISM: Status. Decline in levels of Jewish and other emigration continues, with last year's Jewish total about 3% of 1979 figure. Perennial topic in high-level meetings since 1981; latest "representation lists" on divided families and spouses and U.S. nationals handed over to Gromyko's deputy in Stockholm; Secretary raised anti-Semitism with Dobrynin after Stockholm;¹³ Bronfman visit to Moscow now uncertain. *Prospects.* Return to large numbers unlikely, but Soviets could make some gestures—through quiet diplomacy or to public figures—in election year, and numbers could rise slightly as function of overall atmosphere in relationship.

SOVIET DISSIDENTS: Status. Andropov era saw rounding up and sentencing of all but a handful of Soviet dissidents. We raise these issues at regular intervals, including at Stockholm, but Sakharov still in Gorkiy, Orlov is going to internal exile after finishing seven-year sentence, and

Shcharanskiy is still in jail. *Prospects.* Again not good, although, again, gestures are probably more possible under Chernenko, and we should encourage through quiet diplomacy.

IV. BILATERAL ISSUES

MARITIME BOUNDARY: Status. We offered a 50-50 split in the disputed territory in the Bering Sea. January negotiations in Washington complicated by unacceptable new Soviet position claiming additional areas for their exclusive economic zone and continental shelf rights. *Prospects.* New round is expected but not yet scheduled for near future. If Soviets move off their new position, an agreement would be possible within a few months at most. If they dig in, there will be extended negotiations. [14](#)

KAL SAFETY MEASURES: Status. Discussions have begun in Montreal with Soviets and Japanese on installation of beacons, improved communications, and designation of emergency landing fields in the Soviet Far East along KAL 007 route. *Prospects.* Soviets have proposed US-Soviet-Japanese experts' group and signalled willingness to take concrete air safety steps under the ICAO umbrella. Action should be possible, but Soviets will remain wary of accepting even implicit responsibility for shootdown, and results could take months.

KIEV AND NEW YORK CONSULATES: Status. Advance teams preparing for the formal opening of consulates under 1974 agreement were withdrawn as an Afghanistan sanction; now we have no official presence in Ukraine, while Soviets continue activities in New York out of their UN Mission. Last summer both sides agreed to move forward again, but progress ended with KAL; Secretary

reiterated agreement in principle to Gromyko in Stockholm, noting timing must be right. *Prospects.* A negotiating strategy is awaiting NSC approval; Soviets say they are ready to open consulates at any time; talks could resume immediately; agreement could be reached and TDY advance teams could perhaps be in place by summer. Detailed arrangements could delay formal opening for some years.

EXCHANGES AGREEMENT: Status. We allowed US-Soviet cultural exchanges agreement to lapse after Afghanistan. Programs dropped off in both directions, but Soviets can arrange tours through private U.S. organizations, so we cannot exact reciprocity in the absence of agreement. We cannot mount USIA travelling exhibits in the Soviet Union, and Soviets now blocking Hartman's efforts to run cultural programs out of his residence. Two sides agreed in principle in July to begin negotiations, but movement stopped with KAL; Secretary reiterated agreement in principle to Gromyko in Stockholm. *Prospects.* Draft proposal is far advanced, but would require high-level approval. It would probably take some months to negotiate agreement, but might be completed this year.

CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS: Status. First round of talks aimed at alleviating some of our ongoing visa and other consular problems with Soviets recessed in May after FBI refused to agree to additional entry point by sea at Baltimore (in addition to San Francisco) in return for two new points offered by Soviets (Brest and Nakhodka). *Prospects.* If FBI lifts veto on Baltimore, talks could resume at any time and produce balanced package of useful small housekeeping steps.

SIMULATED SPACE RESCUE: Status. Proposed to Soviets in late January. They have yet to respond. *Prospects.*

Soviets have not appeared enthusiastic to date. We need response soon if there is to be any hope of making simulated rescue flight this summer.

COAST GUARD SEARCH AND RESCUE TALKS: Status. Soviets agreed just before KAL to discuss S&R procedures with senior Coast Guard officials, looking perhaps toward an agreement on coordination of search operations in Bering Sea. They deflected our December efforts to set up a meeting. *Prospects.* Soviets would probably agree now. Discussions and a possible agreement could be impressive following our well-publicized frictions during the KAL search and rescue operation.

PRIVATE/CONGRESSIONAL CONTACTS. Status. Already an upsurge of interest in expanding people-to-people contacts; some in Congress want to invite a Supreme Soviet delegation this year. *Prospects.* To limit exploitation by Soviets, we might encourage tougher-minded experienced groups like American Council of Young Political Leaders to visit. Supreme Soviet visit could attract major Soviet figure to U.S.

LONG-TERM ECONOMIC AGREEMENT RENEWAL: Status. 10-year agreement, which has some utility in facilitating U.S. business efforts in Moscow, expires in June. *Prospects.* U.S. could propose renewal in the next few weeks. The Soviets would probably accept.

JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION: Status. A scheduled meeting was cancelled as an Afghanistan sanction, and this official, cabinet-level body has thus not met since 1978. *Prospects.* We could propose meeting later this year, assuming we have had a positive response on other economic steps.

FISHERIES AGREEMENT RENEWAL: Status. Extended twice under this Administration and up for renewal in July, this agreement has allowed a joint fishing venture that benefits U.S. fishermen. Soviets have not been allowed to fish directly in U.S. waters since Afghanistan. *Prospects.* Approval of an 18-month extension would permit improved planning by U.S. fishermen. USG could consider giving the Soviets a direct fish allocation at any time.

CURRENT AGREEMENTS: Status. There are US-Soviet cooperative agreements in force on the environment, health (including artificial heart research), housing, and agriculture that have functioned at low levels, partly because of the political atmosphere and partly because of restrictions on high-level US-Soviet contacts. Soviets interested in reviving these exchanges and giving them appropriate leadership. *Prospects.* Agreements could be given additional content by USG side with the participation of higher-ranking U.S. officials.

NEW BILATERAL AGREEMENTS: Status. A number of agreements were allowed to lapse after Afghanistan, some of which would be in our favor to renegotiate. They include the areas of space, transportation, and basic sciences and engineering. *Prospects.* Soviets are on record as favoring renewal and expansion of agreements, and in these cases, affected agencies also [favor] new agreements. Transportation could be renewed by exchange of notes we had partially carried out before KAL. Others would take some time to develop proposals and negotiate agreements.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, February 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret;

Sensitive. McKinley's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on February 28.

² On February 9, in a memorandum to Shultz, Burt wrote: "Attached is the paper commissioned at the last session of the Saturday morning Soviet group for possible discussion with the President. I put it together with Jack Matlock and Jeremy Azrael, and with substantial help from Mark Palmer. It will probably need to be revised somewhat before going to the President. But I would like your guidance on whether it is generally on the right track." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive Chronology, 02/09/1984-02/10/1984) The attached paper was the first draft of "U.S.-Soviet Relations: A Framework for the Future," jointly written by State and NSC Staff. In a February 22 memorandum to Reagan, Shultz wrote: "The more positive line coming out of Moscow since Andropov's death and the Vice President's meeting with Chernenko underline the need to look once again at the U.S.-Soviet relationship. We have thus taken stock of where things now stand between us and what steps might be pursued in various areas if we want to see things move forward this year. Attached is a package worked out jointly with my people and the NSC staff for your review." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, February 1984 Super Sensitive Documents) Included in this package were the Framework paper, a summary of START options, and a checklist of U.S.-Soviet issues.

³ Scowcroft and the Dartmouth Group delegation made an official visit to Moscow in March. See [Document 193](#).

⁴ In a February 24 memorandum to the President, McFarlane explained: "A paper suggesting a framework for U.S.-Soviet relations in 1984, written on the basis of discussions by the small group organized by George Shultz,

is attached at Tab A. It provides a background for the meeting we have scheduled next week (see [Document 188](#)) to discuss where we go from here in dealing with the Soviets.

“The second attachment reviews the major issues now current in U.S.-Soviet relations and describes in a nutshell where they stand.” (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, 1981-1986, US-USSR Relations (February 1984) 2/2) As noted by Burt, some revisions were made by the NSC Staff in the final version that was sent to the President.

⁵ In a memorandum to Shultz on February 24, McFarlane informed him that the START paper would be discussed in the Senior Arms Control Policy Group the following week, and therefore was not included in the package to the President. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, February 1984 Super Sensitive Documents)

⁶ The talking points are attached but not printed.

⁷ Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System. First drafted by Burt, Matlock, Azrael, and Palmer according to Burt’s February 9 memorandum and revised in the State Department and NSC Staff (see [footnotes 2](#) and [4, above](#)).

⁸ U.S., Soviet, and Japanese negotiators began meeting in Washington on February 26. See [footnote 9, Document 372](#). For the issues under discussion, see point two, “KAL Safety Measures,” in Section IV of the attached Checklist. Discussion of safety in the North Pacific air routes also continued at the ICAO in Montreal.

⁹ See [Document 175](#).

¹⁰ Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe and Simons; cleared by Burt, Palmer, and Howe according to a draft in the file.

¹¹ See [footnote 11, Document 159](#).

¹² The Tsongas Amendment to the 1984 Defense Department Authorization Act, which “unanimously passed” in the Senate, “prohibited the expenditure of funds for tests of explosive or inert ASAT weapons (i.e., exempting directed-energy weapons) against objects in space, unless the President determined and certified to Congress that: 1) the United States was endeavoring in good faith to negotiate a treaty with the Soviet Union for a mutual, verifiable, and comprehensive ban on ASATs; and 2) that pending such an agreement, such tests were necessary for national security.” (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, September 1985, pp. 99-100)

¹³ See [Document 165](#).

¹⁴ See [footnote 8, Document 284](#).

**186. Memorandum From the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane) to President Reagan¹**

Washington, March 1, 1984

SUBJECT

Action Plan for U.S.-Soviet Relations

Attached is a paper setting forth alternative action plans for U.S.-Soviet relations. It will provide useful background for our meeting on the subject tomorrow.

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff²

Washington, March 1, 1984

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
Program of Action for 1984

Background

The Soviets are holding to the position that it is up to us to make the next step. Their main motivation is doubtless to bring pressure to bear on us to make concessions in advance, in order to satisfy public opinion. Other contributory factors may be that they are unable to reach agreement on initiatives of their own, and—to a degree—that they genuinely doubt our good faith in proposing negotiations.

Their stance is unreasonable and we should avoid steps which undermine important substantive positions.

Initiatives, however, are not necessarily the same as concessions. The Soviet stance does not give us the opportunity to *shape the agenda to our advantage* by carefully considered initiatives. There are some steps which are to our net advantage; in other areas, largely cosmetic alterations on our part could be used both to defuse domestic and allied pressures and to attempt to elicit more substantial concessions on the Soviet part.

We should also bear in mind that some of our positions are likely to come under intense public and Congressional pressure in this election year. Minor modifications in advance of that pressure can preserve negotiating leverage which might be undermined if we stand pat and the pressures grow.

A Fundamental Choice

We should decide at the outset whether:

(1) We will engage with low expectations and focus on the easier peripheral issues.

(2) We will in fact attempt to achieve some major breakthroughs, while recognizing that they may not be possible given the disarray in the Soviet leadership.

The first option (“Modest Scenario”) would require some expansion of the dialogue and some steps in bilateral areas where solution favors our long-term interests (e.g., exchanges, consulates).

The second option (“Ambitious Scenario”) would require, in addition, some movement—either cosmetic or conceptual—in our arms control positions. While concessions on basics are neither required nor desirable, we must be prepared to concede enough in form to make it possible for the Soviets to negotiate seriously. And we must be prepared to consider innovative ways to achieve our basic objectives.

The Modest Scenario

This would involve moving rapidly to resolve some bilateral issues which are in our own long-term interest (exchanges agreement and consulates in Kiev and New York), pressing for Soviet cooperation in establishing better navigation aids on the airline route KAL 007 should have followed, trying to settle other outstanding bilateral issues, and expanding the dialogue into a number of regional and general topics. On arms control, however, we would merely discuss the potential of our existing proposals and wait for Soviet movement before changing any of ours. On human rights, we would continue to make representations, but would not offer concrete incentives (other than an improved atmosphere) for better performance. An illustrative scenario is at TAB A.³

The Ambitious Scenario

This would test the limits which might be achieved this year and would include all the items in the Modest Scenario plus the following:

- (1) An attempt (initially in informal channels) to get START and INF off dead center by proposing a new START framework and indicating that, in resumed negotiations, we would accept a modified “Walk-in-the-Woods” solution to

INF, to include some, but not all planned Pershing II deployments. (This would address the most important immediate Soviet concerns.)

(2) An attempt through private channels to agree on a series of independent or joint steps by which the Soviets would take specified actions in the human rights area, which would in turn trigger certain actions by us on bilateral issues, provided the Soviets refrain from going after additional “targets of opportunity” in the Third World or on their borders.

Significant movement on these points would provide an adequate basis for a successful summit meeting, which could produce renewed negotiations on START/INF and/or an agreed “work program” on other issues. If the Soviets fail to move on any of them (as they well might), the initiatives could be made public in late summer or early fall to prove Soviet intransigence.

An illustrative scenario is at Tab B.⁴

PROS

- Would maximize whatever chances exist to make significant progress this year.
- Could be used eventually, whether it works or not, to bolster our public diplomacy.
- Could provide the basis for a successful summit.
- Since any alterations in our position would, for the most part, be contingent upon prior or simultaneous action by the Soviets, implicit concessions could not easily be pocketed.

—If successful, it would vindicate our policy of strength and could be used to keep public support behind future efforts to deal realistically with the Soviets.

CONS

—Soviets may not be either able or willing to make the hard decisions rapidly enough to make it work.

—Premature leaks could endanger the whole process.

—Making proposals contingent upon Soviet actions does not totally remove the danger that they would try to pocket changes in our positions without corresponding changes in theirs.

—Even if successful, this course might lead to public euphoria, which could undermine necessary support for our defense programs. It might also be interpreted as a signal that we have written off Afghanistan, Poland, and other important issues which would remain unsolved.

Public Diplomacy

Whichever option we choose, it will be essential to *minimize public expectations during the next few months*. If we raise expectations at this point, we hand the Soviets a powerful lever to make our policy seem ineffectual just as the result of their inaction. For several months to come we should be very guarded in our predictions, both on the record and on background, and should not encourage expectations either of a summit or of major breakthroughs.

Such a stance would enhance the impact of a summit (if a productive one can be arranged) and of any substantial progress in the relationship. In the absence of major

progress, however, it would permit us to explain in late summer what we had attempted and to place the blame squarely on the Soviets.

Recommendation:

I would endorse proceeding on the basis of the “Ambitious Scenario,” bearing in mind that we will have to gauge each step we make as a function of the quality of Soviet responses to earlier actions. In short, we should maintain our policy of firmness and of making no preemptive concessions but with evidence of good faith, “leaning forward” to make clear our commitment to solving problems.⁵

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Chronological File, Chron (Official) March 1984; NLR-362-6-22-2-7. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. A note in the margin written by an unknown hand reads: “Orig handcarried to Res. [Residence] for Pres 3/1/84 pm.” A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. In a March 1 memorandum to Matlock, returning a marked-up draft of this paper, McFarlane wrote: “Your paper is exactly what I was looking for. I have marked it up a little bit.” He continued: “In short, we should maintain our policy of firmness and of making no preemptive concessions but with evidence of good faith, ‘leaning forward’ to make clear our commitment to solving problems. Please try and get this back to me today. I would like to send it to the President tonight.” (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, Briefing Material for President Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting 11/27/1985 (2/3))

² Top Secret; Sensitive.

³ Tab A, an undated timeline of the “Modest Scenario,” is attached but not printed.

⁴ Tab B, an undated timeline of the “Ambitious Scenario,” is attached but not printed.

⁵ Tab C, an undated “Issues in the Scenarios” paper, is attached but not printed.

187. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, March 2, 1984

SUBJECT

Chernenko's Election Speech

Chernenko has just completed his election speech.² Overall the speech is consistent with the line Chernenko took with the Vice President.³ He toughened up the rhetoric for the public audience, sticking for the most part to standard Soviet formulations on individual issues, but the main thrust was a willingness to move forward if the U.S. takes the appropriate steps.

According to our early readouts of the speech, Chernenko said that detente had struck deep roots and that curbing the arms race is the main task before our countries. While critical of U.S. international policies (but not as tough as Gromyko), he takes note of U.S. statements in favor of dialogue. He does not put down our statements, merely commenting that good intentions can be taken seriously only if supported by real actions. He affirms Soviet interest in concrete solutions to problems and calls for U.S. action on TTBT/PNET, CTB, Demilitarization of Outer Space, Freeze on Nuclear Weapons, and a Chemical Weapons treaty. Agreement on these issues could, in Chernenko's words, signal a real watershed in U.S.-Soviet relations. He claimed this was what the Soviet Union wants, but it is now up to the United States.

On nuclear arms negotiations, Chernenko said that the U.S. had turned the talks into a propaganda forum, a game which the Soviet Union would not play. He said the Americans had created “obstacles” to talks on both European and strategic nuclear weapons by the INF deployments in Europe. He did not use the earlier Andropov formula for a Soviet return to the talks (U.S. “readiness” to return to the *status quo ante*), but conditioned it to “removal of these obstacles (which would also remove the need for our measures in response).” This formulation is sufficiently vague—as with other recent variations—to allow for a tougher or looser interpretation in practice.

Chernenko criticized, in standard terms, U.S. “aggressive policies”, our supposed militarism, policies in Lebanon, Grenada, and Nicaragua, and our placing of missiles in Europe. He put in a special note of support for Cuba and reaffirmed Soviet interest in developing normalization of relations with China. His closing listed standard Soviet declaratory “principles” on “preventing nuclear conflagration.”

A large part of his speech, as usual, was given over to internal politics. Chernenko praised Andropov generously, but reaffirmed his own strong emphasis on promoting the well-being of the Soviet people. He said, in fact, that security expenditures over the past five years had not been financed by curtailing social programs. He gave a harvest figure for last year of over 190 million metric tons, below what we had predicted but reasonably good from their point of view. Chernenko’s delivery was again not particularly good and he missed reading part of his text in the critically important U.S. section.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (03/02/1984-03/04/1984); NLR-775-11-22-2-3. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons and Palmer. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on March 2.

² For the full text of this March 2 speech, see the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVI, No. 9 (March 28, 1984), pp. 1-7. Excerpts of the speech were printed in the *New York Times*, March 3, 1984, p. 5. An extensive analysis of Chernenko's speech is in telegram 2616 from Moscow, March 2. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840140-0467)

³ See [Documents 176](#), [177](#), and [178](#).

188. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 2, 1984, 2:15-4 p.m.

PRIVATE MEETING ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Shultz
Secretary of Defense Weinberger
DCI Casey
Mr. McFarlane
Mr. Baker
Mr. Deaver
General Vessey
Ambassador Hartman
Mr. Matlock

The President opened the meeting by observing that he felt the time had come to think of something between a get-acquainted meeting and a full summit with the Soviet leader. Such a meeting would allow them to talk about the situation and to lay plans for the future. Protocol indicates that Chernenko should come here if there is another meeting. Perhaps the Olympic Games in Los Angeles would provide an opportunity. There does seem to be a change in the Soviet attitude recently. While he is not going soft, it seems to him that there may be things that he could do by direct communication that others cannot.

Secretary Shultz observed that we need to keep the question of a meeting up front in our minds, but that we must concentrate on how we get there.

The President said that Chernenko's letter seemed to open a door in that he said things that had not been said before.²

Secretary Shultz remarked that we are getting mixed signals. Chernenko's speech today had some positive elements,³ but Gromyko's recent speech had been quite negative, and the Soviet speech had blasted us in the UN and there was the UNIFIL veto.⁴ If they take us up on our overtures, that will be fine, but if not . . .

The President noted that they had moved last year on the Pentecostals, which seemed to be a signal, but that KAL had intervened to turn everything around.

Secretary Shultz then outlined the state of play: We are making preparations for a wide-ranging discussion. We must do it in a managed framework. We should make sure all communications are official. We need to put meat on the bones and to decide both on substance and a schedule. We have many issues under discussion and there are tough questions in each.

The President said he has the feeling that he is the villain so far as the Soviets are concerned. Either Chernenko meant that they are prepared for a serious discussion in his letter, or else this is just propaganda. In either case, we must answer the letter. We should level with him and make clear that our negotiations have to be a two-way street.

Ambassador Hartman remarked that on the question of a summit, the Soviets will want to have some real substance. They would consider a summit just to talk a political act, and therefore unacceptable. Preparations, therefore, are an important part of getting into a discussion at a summit.

The President observed that he was not against talking substance now. But we should keep in mind that we want a meeting. September had been suggested, but that would be

too late; July would be better. Perhaps he could invite Chernenko to the Olympics.

Secretary Shultz said that we still have time to work on the issues. We can do hard work in March and April. Although we would get more mileage out of the President going to Moscow, and he would have a crack at communicating with the Soviet people, it is their turn to come here. But once they get the idea that we want a meeting, they will try to use it.

Secretary Weinberger said that he agreed that we should aim for something between a get-acquainted meeting and a full-fledged summit.

The President pointed out that he was thinking of a meeting to break the ground. We have a lot of things to deal with. Why not get together and talk them over.

Secretary Shultz mentioned that the Soviets would have their own agenda to push.

The President added that we should seek some safeguards against regional wars.

Secretary Weinberger observed that so far as the location is concerned, he would consider the Olympics best. It has good associations of peace, friendly competition and the like. It would be a mistake to go to Moscow, since that would seem too eager. We should take some topics out of the agenda and work on them. But it is important to approach them with caution. They want us to stop many things we are doing, and it is to their advantage to get us to stop. We should bear that in mind. A meeting to set an agenda would be preferable.

Mr. McFarlane suggested that we think about what we can achieve this year. We agree on the value of a meeting, and must address how we get from here to there. There seems three dimensions to the question: What to say, When to say it, and Who says it.

He then handed out a suggested action plan,⁵ pointing out that each step had to be gauged by how much good faith the Soviets exhibit and what sort of results are obtained. The purpose of the plan was not to set a concrete agenda, but to set goals.

Regarding channels, he observed that an unofficial channel may be good or bad. It was noted in the game plan because the Soviets may not fully understand our position. They do not seem to understand the “trade-off” concept in a concrete sense, and a private, unofficial explanation might be helpful. We of course should not put on someone else the job of negotiating arms control.

The President observed that the action plan contained some of the things they could hear from him. We have been talking about each other rather than to each other.

General Vessey said that the time schedule presented problems. There will be problems on the Hill in defending the defense budget this spring. Support for our strategic modernization program is wavering. The Russians will not want to help the President get reelected. With the defense budget, the deficit and the election year combined, we could have trouble in the spring. Support for the MX in particular seems to be wavering.

Secretary Weinberger agreed that pressures are building. But we should aim for a meeting and the President could make our points there.

Matlock said that it was important to let the Soviets know our thinking in advance. Otherwise they might not agree to a meeting, and in addition might be inclined to reject proposals made without advance preparation and discussion.

The President said that he understood, but that he would like to have a chance to see if he could sell something. He thought he should show them that he is not the sort to eat his own young.

Ambassador Hartman observed that Chernenko had brought a tonal change to the Soviet stance. It will be valuable to test whether this represents any movement on substance.

McFarlane observed that two or three things are emerging: First, a meeting would be useful; Second, for us to propose it now would give the Soviets leverage; Third, that we have a problem on the Hill, since there is skepticism regarding the dialogue. All of these things seem to be served by an intensified agenda for the dialogue. We should decide the agenda to start on now, and perhaps we should think of monthly meetings like this to monitor the process. Then we can see when we have enough at hand to proceed and plan the meeting.

Secretary Shultz observed that a meeting in mid July during the Olympics is probably desirable, but we cannot reach a final conclusion on that now. If we say we want a meeting to set the agenda rather than establishing the content in advance, the Soviets are likely to play around with it. Since their signals are mixed, the right way to proceed would be to keep in mind the probable desirability of a meeting in July, but to test it in discussions. Their agenda is known. Our answer on the desirability of a

meeting is likely to be “yes” if one fruitful topic emerges in the arms control area.

The President suggested, in regard to the action plan, that we first answer the letter. It should sound forthcoming, and should have some proposals in it. This would be our defense against their using the letter for propaganda. But there must not be a hint that we are talking about a summit. Then, we should proceed with the other things, and if matters progress, we can invite Chernenko to the Olympics.

Casey observed that there were some issues on which the Soviets had not said no. These would be fruitful to pursue. But he was dubious about getting into START, because it is such a contentious issue within the U.S. Government.

Shultz remarked that he seemed to be saying that we cannot discuss anything important because we don't have the capacity to determine our position. He could not agree with that.

The President said that his reply to Chernenko's letter should mention Chernenko's line about the danger of the present situation. And it could refer to things like the hot line.

Casey pointed out that it might be useful to discuss the situation in the Persian Gulf, since we want to minimize the chances of confrontation.

Weinberger said the question of nuclear terrorism might also be an appropriate topic.

Shultz remarked that we have not managed to come up with a proposal in this area yet.

Casey offered the judgment that there is no way START can be completed this year.

Weinberger said that a few other things might be possible.

Hartman pointed out that, for the Soviets, START represents the central question. There seems no harm in testing whether progress is possible. At the very least, it would avoid Soviet use of the issue for propaganda purposes.

Vessey observed that we must go at it in a way to produce something. Otherwise our problems on the Hill may be insuperable.

The President noted that he could say in his letter that he recognizes the problems our negotiators have had in getting across what we have in mind, and then provide further explanation.

The Vice President mentioned that Bill Verity, U.S. Chairman of the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council was just back from a trip to Moscow and had seen Prime Minister Tikhonov. He was received by Tikhonov because he was perceived as being close to the President. Tikhonov had talked about both trade and political relations.⁶ On trade, he had spoken of the need to break the impasse: the Soviet Union has forty billion in trade with Europe, but almost none with the U.S. Grain is merely a "thin thread." He complained about the Aeroflot closure in the U.S. and said that the Soviets feel that the U.S. wants the death of their system. He also mentioned the ban on nickel from Cuba. Then he also talked about the Soviet "no first use" proposal, the proposal for an ASAT moratorium, and INF. On the latter he asked rhetorically how there could be zero if the British and French had systems. The Soviets, he said,

had experienced false reports of U.S. attacks and worried about the dangers of accidental missile launches. In sum, he said U.S.-Soviet relations were the worst ever and that the Soviets felt they were getting no proposals from the U.S. side.

Having mentioned all this, however, Tikhonov said that Chernenko “yearns for peaceful relations.” And Giffen, Verity’s aide, who has visited the Soviet Union some forty times, felt that there is great respect for the President because of his strong leadership and his ability to get the INF deployments through. Therefore, the Vice President wondered whether we might not go forward and have a meeting on ways to lower fears, and explore something to guarantee against accidents.

Weinberger observed that there is no doubt that confidence building measures provided the area where there is most likely to be some agreement. Nevertheless, the Soviets have so far refused to break these issues out of START and INF.

Hartman noted that the Soviets do not want them to become a substitute for START and INF.

Weinberger reiterated that the CBM’s could move rapidly if the Soviets would allow it.

McFarlane observed that Hartman is right. The Soviets view arms control as central. A dialogue will not be credible if it does not include this dimension. Regarding START, an interim agreement may be possible.

Shultz suggested that it might be well to go through the list of issues on the agenda. The Soviet position may be that nuclear arms are a *sine qua non*, but many bilateral questions are available. He then listed the following:

—*Hot line upgrade*: We are now down to technical questions, and this should be completed in April.

—*Technical measures for air safety*: The question is under discussion in the ICAO in Montreal. There is a high probability that the Soviets will agree to something.

—*Renewal of Long-Term Economic Agreement*: Relatively simple to do if we decide to go ahead.

—*Search and Rescue*: Talks with the Coast Guard. Something can probably be worked out.

—*Consulates*: The main interagency difference on exchanging consulates in Kiev and New York is that the FBI wants to keep the total number of Soviets in the U.S. constant, and therefore to require them to take personnel from elsewhere to staff their consulate in New York, while State wishes to establish a reciprocal quota in each city, which would be an add-on to present numbers. [Matlock noted that the exchange of New York for Kiev is inherently advantageous to the U.S., since the Soviets already have hundreds of officials at the U.N. and we have no one in Kiev.]

—*Exchanges Agreement*: The interagency work on a draft agreement is not complete, but much work has been done. The central issue with the Soviets is likely to be a demand by them that we return defectors, which of course we cannot agree to. [Hartman noted that exchanges in general work in our favor.]

—*Consular Review Talks*: These are hung up on the issue of entry/exit points allowed diplomats. State wants to add San Francisco and Baltimore to our list in exchange for Brest and Nakhodka from the Soviets, but the FBI does not agree to the inclusion of Baltimore.

—*Cooperative Agreements*: We could increase activity under those cooperative agreements which are still in force, in the agricultural, housing, environmental protection and health areas. Since Afghanistan we have prohibited high-level contacts under them (although we approved Agriculture Secretary Block's visit to Moscow last year), and we could lift this to stimulate greater activity.

Shultz continued his presentation by saying that, as we work these bilateral issues, it is assumed that we will also continue to make representations on human rights.

He pointed out, however, that for the Soviets, START is the central issue and he wondered whether the Soviets would move much in other areas unless we can achieve some progress here. Perhaps there are ways to break through and find a different framework. The Soviet agenda, he added, includes the following:

—*START/INF*

—*Non-Use-of-Force Treaty*

—*No First Use of Nuclear Weapons*

—*Comprehensive Test Ban*: Here we do not agree because of verification problems.

—*TTBT and PNET*: They are pressing for ratification. Perhaps we could agree to do so if we could get agreement on an on-site observation of calibration tests.

—*ASAT*: Soviets want a moratorium and negotiations. We don't want a moratorium, but we might agree to discuss the issues.

—*MBFR*: We are working on a position with the Allies to present at the next round of negotiations.

—*Regional Issues*: Several might be subjects of discussion with the Soviets.

Shultz concluded by saying that we could select some issues from this list and try to get some worked out. He had the feeling that the Soviet willingness to go along will depend on whether we are willing to talk about START.

Weinberger observed that TTBT and PNET might provide grounds for discussion, but it is dangerous to get into the subject too much. He felt that the interagency process was much maligned. It is, however, the one process which insures that the President has clear all the options available for his consideration. We must not give up the interagency process; it need not be slow. There are a lot of subjects potentially available to discuss with the Soviets, and if we get into them our positions should be the result of the interagency process. As for START, there is a disadvantage to taking the discussions out of Rowny's hands. All of these things can and should go forward, but the IG process is necessary.

Shultz remarked that there is much to be said for the interagency process, but that two things are wrong with it:

First, it includes many people and a third of them don't mind going to the press. We can't run the process without leaks. Second, it takes forever. They follow a consensus approach and have trouble moving rapidly.

McFarlane observed that it used to work that way, but it is not inevitable.

Weinberger said that if the President directs that something be decided by x date, it will be. If we can't solve the leaks, we can't solve anything.

The Vice President noted that the interagency process can be used to clarify the issues without referring to a specific meeting or the overall framework of negotiations.

Baker pointed out that this meeting was in fact an interagency process since all the agencies directly involved were represented. He noted that there is a 120-day deadline for arranging a meeting, and if everything is farmed out, nothing will be accomplished.

McFarlane said that there was nothing in the scenario which could not be done, utilizing the interagency process. He noted that if people outside the group see things being done without consulting them, they are likely to argue against the policies in public. This is less likely if they feel part of the process.

Baker felt that the policies would be opposed in the IG's in any event.

McFarlane said that if all are given a chance to participate, the President will have the high ground and this will diminish opposition.

Shultz summed up the preceding discussion by saying that there is agreement on some of the issues; in some of the others we know the arguments of the various agencies. Some of the issues, such as START, have the potential for a "blow-up." But we must include some of the Soviet agenda in the dialogue in some way.

Vessey suggested that we pick out at least two items from the Soviet agenda—maybe TTBT, ASAT discussions and

START.

Weinberger stated that it is vital that there be agreement on these matters. The interagency process need not be slow or leaky, and the President can make decisions as he wishes, but the process should be used.

Shultz pointed out that we have March and the first part of April, but it will be difficult to consult during the trip to China,⁷ and we will have to focus on the European Summit in May.⁸ When we get back there will be the Republican Convention. This just emphasizes the point Jim Baker was making—we don't have much time for delay.

Dobrynin had asked to come in to see him. He was sick, so sent the Chernenko letter over by messenger. But Shultz had given him an appointment for Wednesday, March 7. He felt that if we are going to move, it is time to start talking turkey.

Casey said the immediate task is to answer the letter.

The President directed that the letter go right away.

McFarlane suggested that we prepare to reopen the talks on consulates and a cultural agreement, and to continue negotiations on the maritime boundary issue.

Vessey noted that we need some sign to Congress that we are making progress or we won't get the strategic modernization program through this spring.

Shultz observed that if there is something going on, people will sense it. It is most important for everything to go on privately.

Weinberger wondered what we should be conveying to Congress.

Shultz said that when people like Cohen and Biden come in, we could just say something like “more is going on than you think.” They will get the idea.

Hartman noted that if nothing is going on, however, the Soviets will blow it by passing the word that there is no substance in our positions.

McFarlane observed that we won on MX last year. This year it may take more. We can reassure Congress that we are working on it.

The President then directed that we start with a reply to the Chernenko letter, get going on some of the things discussed, and aim for a meeting in July.

Shultz mentioned the agenda he wished to take up with Dobrynin.

Hartman noted that many people knew he was in town, and wondered if it was all right for him to say that he had met with the President. The President agreed.

The meeting ended shortly before 4:00 P.M.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, 1981-1986, US-USSR Relations (March 1984) 1/2. Top Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System. There is no drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. Brackets are in the original. This private meeting took place in the Treaty Room in the Residence of the White House. In his diary entry for March 2, Reagan wrote: “into the Treaty

Room for a top level & secret meeting with Amb. Hartman (Moscow), Bill Casey, Bud McF., Geo. B., Mike & Jim & Gen. Vessey. Subject was a plan to move into communications with the Soviets. I'm convinced the time has come for me to meet with Chernenko along about July. We're going to start with some ministerial level meetings on a number of substantive matters that have been on ice since the KAL 700 [007] shoot down." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 324) Shultz, Weinberger, and Matlock attended the meeting, although not noted by Reagan in his diary.

² See [Document 183](#).

³ See [Document 187](#).

⁴ The Soviets vetoed General Assembly Resolutions 38/38A and 38/38B regarding funding for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon on December 5, 1983.

⁵ See [Document 186](#).

⁶ Verity was in Moscow from February 27 to March 1 and met with Zimmermann on March 1, giving a full account of his meetings. Zimmermann reported in telegram 2589 from Moscow, March 2, that while there was "strong support for U.S. trade from several ministers" there was "consistent Soviet skepticism about the sincerity of the President's January 16 speech on U.S. readiness to establish a better working relationship with the USSR." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840139-0724) For the President's speech, see [Document 158](#).

⁷ From April 26 to May 1 Shultz accompanied President Reagan on a State visit to China.

⁸ Shultz accompanied President Reagan to Ireland and the United Kingdom June 2-9. The primary purpose of the trip was to attend the G-7 Economic Summit in London June 7-9.

**189. Memorandum From the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane) to President Reagan¹**

Washington, March 6, 1984

SUBJECT

Your Reply to Chernenko and Next Steps in U.S.-Soviet Relations

Issue

How you should respond to Chernenko's letter of February 23, 1984,² and what steps we should take now to put substance in the dialogue.

Facts

You instructed us, at the meeting March 2,³ to prepare a forthcoming response to Chernenko's letter, for delivery by George Shultz to Dobrynin March 7.⁴ Secretary Shultz also requested authority to inform Dobrynin that we are prepared to resume negotiations on opening consulates in Kiev and New York and on a cultural exchanges agreement, and to urge Soviet cooperation in arranging for improved navigation aids on the North Pacific airline route and Soviet movement on the maritime boundary issue. There was also discussion of the desirability of conveying to the Soviets privately and informally examples of possible START trade-offs and an indication that, if INF negotiations were resumed, we would carefully consider a modified "Walk-in-the-Woods" formula as an ultimate outcome.

Discussion

A letter, drafted in conformity with your instructions, is attached at TAB A.⁵ It has George Shultz's approval.

On the bilateral issues mentioned, I believe it is in the U.S. interest to move ahead in these areas, and therefore recommend that George be authorized to proceed as he suggests.

So far as START and INF are concerned, we have kept the language in your letter general, with a stress on our flexibility, because we consider it undesirable to go on record with new proposals. Nevertheless, I believe that we should do what we can to give the Soviets incentives to keep these two negotiations separate and to get back to the table as soon as possible. Engaging the Soviets in a more substantial dialogue on these issues would also provide incentive for a meeting, one objective of which could be to agree upon a framework for future negotiations in both.

Therefore, it seems desirable to have Brent Scowcroft, when he is in Moscow next week, convey privately and unofficially our thoughts on what sort of trade-offs might be acceptable to us in START, and an indication of our objectives in INF.⁶ This would give the Soviets time to chew on the ideas and give us an unofficial reaction before they are dealt with in a more formal manner.

Recommendations⁷

1. That you sign the letter to Chernenko at Tab A.
2. That you authorize George Shultz to tell Dobrynin that we are prepared to reopen negotiations on the exchange of consulates in Kiev and New York and on a cultural

exchanges agreement, and to urge Soviet cooperation in establishing better air navigation aids in the North Pacific and in settling the maritime boundary issue in the Bering Sea.

3. That you authorize me to develop some examples of the kinds of trade-offs which would meet our common concerns in START and to brief Brent Scowcroft. He would then convey them privately to his Soviet interlocutors and also indicate our willingness to consider a modified "Walk-in-the-Woods" outcome to INF, if negotiations are resumed.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490236, 8490586). Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Prepared by Matlock. A copy was sent to the Vice President.

² See [Document 183](#).

³ See [Document 188](#).

⁴ See [Document 192](#).

⁵ Tab A is printed as [Document 190](#).

⁶ Scowcroft and the Dartmouth Group visited Moscow in mid-March. See [Document 193](#).

⁷ Reagan checked and initialed the "OK" option beneath all three recommendations.

190. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko¹

Dear Mr. General Secretary: Washington, March 6, 1984

I have given careful thought to your letter of February 23 and welcome your desire for a turn toward better relations between our countries.² I agree with you that an improvement in United States-Soviet relations is feasible.

I am also pleased to see how quickly you have been able to pick up the burdens of your heavy responsibilities. My letter carried by the Vice President was intended to ensure that the occasion of your meeting would be used for our continued dialogue.³ Our tasks of leading the world's two most powerful nations are not easy and perhaps we two are the only ones who have the full understanding of these burdens of maintaining world peace. It is for that reason that I want you to know, Mr. General Secretary, how much I value the importance of communicating with you directly and confidentially.

It seems to me that our dialogue has reached a point where, as you said in your letter, we should look for specific areas in which we can move our relationship in a more positive direction. As for some of the principles you address in your letter, let me reiterate what I wrote to the late General Secretary and have stated publicly: the United States has no desire to threaten the security of the Soviet Union and its allies. Nor are we seeking either military superiority or to impose our will on others. I agree with you that we have an obligation to our peoples and to the world

not to allow a nuclear conflict to occur and that this requires restraint in our actions.

You wrote also of “attempts to upset the balance of forces and to gain military advantages to the detriment of the security of the other side.” I agree that such attempts are dangerous. Yet, in our view, many actions of the Soviet Union in recent years would represent just such attempts.

But it is not my purpose to debate these matters here. Our views are well known. We should, instead, move beyond mutual recrimination and attempts to assess blame and find concrete steps we both can take to put our relations on a more positive track. To move this process forward, I would like to re-state once again our position on certain fundamental questions and then to make some specific suggestions as to what we might do concretely.

I think that we both begin with the premise that our strategic nuclear relationship lies at the center of our concern for future peace and stability in the world. I have the feeling that the significance of what I have tried to say recently on this subject is not appreciated by your side. Therefore I would like to explain some of these concepts and suggest a way to achieve a better understanding of our mutual positions.

The strategic arms talks have always had as an important stumbling block the fact that our forces are not constructed—for understandable reasons of history and geography—along the same lines. We are concerned about the current imbalance in large, MIRVed, land-based systems in favor of the USSR, which we consider to be the most destabilizing category of nuclear systems. You have criticized our proposals as one-sided and an attempt to restructure your

forces without any attendant change in our forces. This is not our intent.

Our purpose is to achieve significant reductions in the strategic systems of both sides. Such reductions need not result in identical force structures. The balance we seek must obviously take account of the interests of both sides. That is why in my earlier communications I suggested that we explore what types of reciprocal concessions might bring our interests into better balance.

In my letter presented by the Vice President I went further and suggested that we have ideas on concrete ways to narrow differences between our respective positions. The trade-offs we are prepared to discuss would, I believe, bridge the proposals of both sides and provide, as I said, a more stable balance at lower levels.

The question of intermediate range nuclear arms also continues to be one that should be addressed by our two governments. We have put proposals forward that could form the basis for agreement on this question and we believe it would be in the interests of both of us and the world to return to those negotiations. If your side has new ideas on how to proceed, we are ready to give them serious consideration.

Beyond questions involving strategic and intermediate range nuclear forces, you and we have a broad agenda of arms control issues which offer opportunities for concrete progress. We are prepared to discuss in diplomatic channels our views on each of the areas you mentioned in your speech of March 2.⁴ As you know, our view is that a central problem in these areas is ensuring that any agreements are verifiable. We will take a serious attitude towards exploring possibilities in a constructive dialogue.

In several arms control fields, we have specific ideas for your side to consider. During the next round of the discussions in Vienna on MBFR, we will have ideas for moving the process ahead. On chemical weapons, we will have ready soon a draft treaty providing for a global ban on the production and stockpiling of these weapons. I also believe that the CDE Conference in Stockholm offers possibilities for concrete progress.

You have expressed concern about new American defense programs, particularly those related to ballistic missile defense. One of the reasons we believe it is important to resume discussions of strategic weapons issues in Geneva is that this would provide us an opportunity to discuss ballistic missile defense questions as well. You will recall that we suggested such an approach last year. Our offer remains in force.

Both sides also have expressed concerns about the other's military build-up, the threat we each perceive and the necessity to put in place measures which could help in time of crisis. Should we consider more direct consultations between those responsible for our defense?

One specific area that offers an opportunity for early agreement is improvement in our hotline. The discussions among our experts have gone well. We will deliver to your side technical information in the next few weeks, and anticipate another round of discussions early this spring.

In addition to arms control, I believe that regional issues are also an important topic for our dialogue. You underlined the importance of these issues in your meeting with Vice President Bush.⁵ Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Hartman have taken the initiative in recent months to give you our thinking on a number of critical regional questions.

We are prepared to intensify these regional consultations. One area of immediate concern to both sides is the conflict between Iran and Iraq.

Another major objective of mine is to develop a better working relationship in areas of practical interest to both our nations. I believe our governments can agree on the mutual benefits of establishing consulates in Kiev and New York, as well as negotiation of a new exchanges agreement. And we can benefit from developing a package of measures to facilitate travel and the work of our diplomats through resumption of consular review talks. We are prepared to move ahead in all three of these areas.

We are also prepared to reinvigorate a number of existing agreements and to review seriously those coming up for extension. There are steps that we can take to increase activity under our agreements for cooperation in the fields of agriculture, environmental protection, housing and health.

I am pleased that our representatives at the International Civil Aeronautics [*Aviation*] Organization in Montreal are discussing specific measures countries can take to enhance the safety of civil aviation. Agreement on such measures would be a significant step forward.⁶

There are other areas where I believe we could usefully work together. For example, I would like to reiterate our offer to conduct a simulated space rescue. This is the kind of practical cooperation which our two governments should be seeking to build a basis of greater confidence.

Mr. General Secretary, following his visit to Moscow, Vice President Bush conveyed to me your message that we should take steps to ensure that history recalls us as

leaders known to be good, wise and kind. Nothing is more important to me, and we should take steps to bring this about. For example, last year the agonizing situation of the Vashchenko and Chmykalov families was resolved.⁷ I was touched by this gesture. In my view, this shows how quiet and sincere efforts can solve even the most sensitive problems in our relationship. Similar humanitarian gestures this year also would touch the hearts of all Americans.

Therefore I conclude, as you did, that “a turn toward steady and good relations between our two countries” is desirable and feasible. I am determined to do my part in working for that end.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490236, 8490283, 8490304). Top Secret. Drafted in the Department of State in accordance with the President’s instructions on March 2. See [Document 188](#). In a March 3 note to Shultz, McKinley wrote: “Mr. Secretary, Rick Burt, Art Hartman, and Jack Matlock have all cleared off on this draft. Larry [Eagleburger] will receive a copy and may have some comments for you. Brunson.” (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Super Sensitive (03/03/1984-03/05/1984))

² See [Document 183](#).

³ See [Document 175](#).

⁴ See [Document 187](#).

⁵ See [Documents 176](#), [177](#), and [178](#).

⁶ See [footnote 8, Document 185](#). On March 6, the ICAO Council adopted a resolution condemning the use of armed force that resulted in the destruction of KAL 007 and deploring the Soviet failure to cooperate in the search and rescue efforts. (Aviation Council Faults Soviet," *New York Times*, March 7, 1984, p. A4)

⁷ Reagan was referring to the release of the Pentecostalist families. See [Documents 12, 34, 38, 39, 62, and 74](#).

191. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, March 7, 1984

SUBJECT

Chernenko's Agenda

We have reviewed Chernenko's most significant statements since he was elected General Secretary February 14—his remarks to the Vice President that day, his letter to the President February 23, and his "election" speech March 2—to identify the issues in U.S.-Soviet relations he is presently concentrating on.² His letter to the President adopted the agenda set forth by Andropov in his January 28 letter by stating this was the Soviet position and calling for U.S. responses.³ A review of the results is attached.

Briefly, the "Chernenko agenda" is as follows: START/INF, a non-use-of-force treaty, U.S. matching the Soviet pledge not to use nuclear weapons first, a CTB, U.S. ratification of the TTBT, an ASAT ban, Western response to Eastern moves in MBFR, and "resolving regional conflicts." In his March 2 speech, i.e. the "public" version, Chernenko laid special stress on:

- Ratification of TTBT/PNET and resumption of CTB talks.
- Adoption of nuclear no-first-use, nuclear free zones, etc.
- No militarization of outer space.

Chernenko did not specifically cite ASAT, nor did he raise the non-use of force treaty or MBFR. He dusted off the old Soviet nuclear freeze proposal which had not been given much stress earlier.

The only really new twists were on START/INF and CW:

—In describing US INF deployments, Chernenko said that the US had “created obstacles” to negotiations, and that “it is the removal of these obstacles (which would also remove the need for our countermeasures) that offers the way to working out a mutually acceptable accord.” It is not clear from the context whether Chernenko is implying any new flexibility on resuming negotiations. Like the earlier “display a readiness” formula, there is sufficient ambiguity regarding the precise conditions under which the Soviets might agree to return to Geneva.

—Chernenko was upbeat on CW. He said that the prerequisites “are beginning to ripen” for a resolution of the question of a complete CW ban, and alluded to the new Soviet proposal for continuous inspection of stockpile destruction.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁴

Washington, undated

THE SOVIET AGENDA

In his February 23 letter to the President, Chernenko emphasized the continuity of Soviet policy toward the United States, stating that the positions set forth in Andropov’s letter of January 28 remain in force. Below we

set out the Soviet agenda for relations with us as given in the two letters and in Chernenko's remarks to the Vice President. Included are areas in which we might be responsive and which we cannot, with problems and timing for our position:

START/INF: Chernenko listed arms limitation and reduction first as one of the "most important and pressing problems" in the meeting with the Vice President. The Andropov letter characterized U.S. efforts to upset "the regional and global balance" through P-II/GLCM deployments as "disrupting dialogue on the most important questions." It stated the U.S. needed to take "practical, positive steps" to return to the fundamentals of equality and equal security in nuclear arms negotiations, but carefully refrained from offering any specifics in this regard.

—Soviets are indicating the priority they attach to START and INF but argue the U.S. is not serious about exploring mutually acceptable solutions. East Europeans say Soviets will return to talks if they believe we are interested in substantive discussions. Presentation of our START Framework could be the crucial element to move back to START negotiations into which the Soviets will probably want to merge INF.

Non-Use-of-Force Treaty: In Andropov's final *Pravda* interview,⁵ Chernenko's exchanges with the Vice President and other Western leaders,⁶ and Gromyko's eulogy at Red Square,⁷ special priority and emphasis has been given to the Soviet offer of a non-use-of-force agreement of the sort the Eastern bloc is pushing at the CDE in Stockholm. U.S. acceptance would, the Soviets assert, be a major positive gesture.

—We have traditionally resisted political declaratory measures of this sort because they do not make a real contribution to increased confidence and security. In addition, the Soviets have yet to show any seriousness in considering our own more concrete CBMs at Stockholm. However, it might be possible to work out a bilateral framework for onward multilateral negotiation at Stockholm in which we agree to some form of new non-use-of-force statement (essentially keyed to language already in the UN Charter and Helsinki Final Act) in exchange for explicit Soviet acceptance of the sort of notification/observance CBMs we are seeking. There could be some objections to this in the bureaucracy if it appeared we were not getting enough in return. I will have a separate memorandum for you on this possibility.

No First Use of Nuclear Weapons: Chernenko told the Vice President the Soviets see no reason the U.S. cannot follow their example and undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

—The U.S. position of not giving up the option to use nuclear weapons to counter a massive Soviet conventional attack has been a consistent part of NATO strategy for decades. There is no possibility for a change in our position on this issue.

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (CTB): As part of his case that U.S. is not serious in curbing the arms race, Andropov in his January 25 [28] letter cited U.S. reluctance to seek a CTB agreement.

—We cannot be responsive on this one. There is USG agreement that it is not in our interests to enter a

CTB regime at this time because of verification uncertainties and testing requirements to maintain our deterrent forces.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT): Andropov stated Moscow could not see “any convincing reason” for continued U.S. failure to ratify the TTBT/PNET.

—Considerably more chance for movement than on CTB. EUR is looking at a new option that would move the treaties toward ratification conditional on Soviet agreement to on-site measurement of the calibration shots already called for in the TTBT. Unlike our current position (which the Soviets have rejected several times), this would not require reopening the treaty for negotiations, but would give us some improvement in verification of Soviet nuclear testing. There will be some resistance in the Executive Branch and in the Senate to such a move in light of past compliance ambiguities.

Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASAT) Ban: Andropov urged a favorable U.S. response to the Soviet call for an ASAT moratorium and ban.

—The Soviets will make this a major propaganda theme and are likely to find considerable resonance among the Allies and on the Hill. There are major verification problems involved and strong institutional resistance within the USG to any ASAT-related moves. An interagency group is currently studying outer space CBMs (of much less interest to Moscow). To avoid leaving the field entirely to the Soviets, we will need to push the bureaucracy hard to come up with some concrete proposals—whether forms of ASAT limitations, confidence-building

measures or both—that may be put forward to the Soviets for new negotiations in this area.

MBFR: Andropov prodded for a positive U.S. response to the Eastern proposals tabled in Vienna last summer.

—We hope to indicate to the Soviets during the upcoming MBFR session our readiness to exchange data if Eastern figures fall within an acceptable range. We have yet, however, to bring the allies completely onboard this position or to flesh out within the USG the precise parameters of the Soviet data we are prepared to accept. It is too early to predict if the Soviets will consider this position, when tabled, sufficiently flexible to move the process forward.

Regional Issues: Chernenko listed “resolving regional conflicts” as one of the most important problems for us to discuss. Andropov called for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the territory and waters of *Lebanon*.

—Regional issues are a prime agenda item of ours and will be discussed regularly in high-level meetings between us. Chernenko’s inclusion of this point is actually a nod to our standard agenda. The MNF withdrawal satisfies part of Andropov’s *Lebanon* demand, although the Soviets will continue their pressure against the presence and activities of Sixth Fleet units in the area.⁸ While we need to ensure through more periodic exchanges that the Soviets do not misperceive our intentions, the opportunity and desirability of more constructive engagement with the Soviets on the Mideast remains extremely limited.

U.S.-Soviet Atmospherics: Andropov made a point—explicitly reaffirmed by Chernenko—of the need to avoid the “unhelpful inciting of animosities.”

—The President’s January 16 speech demonstrated our own interest in toning down the rhetoric on both sides.⁹ We need to continue to display special sensitivity on this point. While some of Gromyko and Ustinov’s recent comments have carried some familiar tough talk, Chernenko’s own statements to us have been markedly free of the sharp tone so characteristic of Andropov.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive Chronology (03/07/1984); NLR-775-11-27-2-8. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Tefft; cleared by Simons. Hill’s handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on March 7.

² See [Documents 176-178](#), [183](#), and [187](#).

³ See [Document 164](#).

⁴ Secret; Sensitive.

⁵ See [footnote 7](#), [Document 169](#).

⁶ See [Documents 177](#) and [178](#).

⁷ See [footnote 5](#), [Document 179](#).

⁸ See [footnote 7](#), [Document 152](#).

⁹ See [Document 158](#).

192. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, March 7, 1984

I met with Dobrynin for almost an hour and a half Wednesday afternoon, with notetakers present except for a brief private exchange at the end. I used the meeting (1) to present and explain your letter to Chernenko;² (2) to show we had studied Chernenko's agenda and elicit some comments; and (3) to suggest some follow-up steps. Dobrynin appeared to be in a constructive mood, called our exchange a good effort and the most detailed discussion in three or four years, and promised to be back to me quickly.

I opened by saying that you and your key advisors had carefully considered Chernenko's letter of February 23, that you had taken decisions and that I had a reply to deliver.³ After he had read it, I said I wanted to go over the specifics of your proposals and to hear his comments. You had reports that Moscow does not believe you are sincere in calling for dialogue and is worried about being threatened. These doubts and fears are without foundation, I said: you sincerely want dialogue, and our military programs do not threaten the security of the Soviet Union or its allies.

On the specifics, I made the following points:

—We consider nuclear arms control central to our relationship (Dobrynin said the Soviets agree), and we think the Soviets should respond to the idea of trade-offs

that deal with the asymmetries in the strategic balance. So far they had not done so, and we are willing to pursue it in our private dialogue. On INF, I said we have good proposals on the table, but are willing to listen privately to any ideas they may have.

—On MBFR, I said we recognized they had made some moves on verification, and in the upcoming round we will have some ideas which could lead to flexibility on data if they are willing to pursue verification seriously.

—On chemical weapons, I said we will be ready to table a draft treaty, perhaps in a month or two, though in this as in so many other areas verification poses real problems.

—On strategic defense, I said our position is that we continue to regard the START negotiations as the appropriate forum to discuss these issues, and if the Soviets are prepared to resume there we will be prepared for such discussions.

—On military-to-military conversations, Dobrynin responded to my general suggestion that they might be useful by asking whether we had anything specific, such as regular consultations, in mind. I said we had not developed our ideas, but might envisage one meeting to see what came of it.

—On hotline upgrade, I noted that our meetings had gone well, said we would be getting back to them soon with the technical information required, and concluded we hoped the next meeting would take place soon and produce an agreement.

—Turning to bilateral issues, I told him that we were willing to move ahead if the Soviets were. This included beginning talks on new consulates in Kiev and New York,

talking about a new exchanges agreement, and resuming consular review talks. Similarly, we wished to energize cooperation in the fields of housing, agriculture, the environment and health by getting more senior people involved. The sooner we could reach agreement on air safety measures in Montreal the better, I said. I briefly reiterated that our proposal on a simulated space rescue mission is on the table.⁴ I concluded by recalling that Dobrynin had been asking for concrete and specific proposals, and that we had made some, and hoped to move ahead. Dobrynin said he had noticed, but asked only if our ideas included doing something about the ban on Aeroflot operations here; I said they did not, but if the Soviets had a proposal we were prepared to look at it.

—Finally, turning to human rights, I urged permission for Sakharov's wife to go abroad for medical treatment. Dobrynin said he did not know where this stood, but she had gone abroad before, and he would look into it.

Turning to Chernenko's February 23 letter and the agenda the Soviets had identified, I reminded Dobrynin of our earlier agreement when we initiated our confidential talks: both sides were free to discuss any issue they wanted to bring to the discussions. Thus, I told him that while we had disagreements with various items on their agenda, we would be prepared to listen to their views in our confidential channel. I then touched on the following points:

—I noted we had already dealt with START, INF, MBFR and CW.

—On a non-use-of-force agreement, I said we do not support declaratory proposals because they do not change the actual military situation but we remained ready to

listen to their arguments. I also noted that when our ambassadors at the Stockholm CDE conference got together, theirs declined to discuss the confidence- and security-building measures we have proposed.

—On the comprehensive and threshold test bans (CTB and TTBT), I took the position that the major verification uncertainties made it unprofitable to move on CTB. We had earlier made some proposals on TTBT verification, but the Soviets had shown no willingness to explore them. I reiterated our interest in exploring ways of improving TTBT verification. Dobrynin asked me if we were prepared to negotiate on CTB; I said we were not, but we were prepared to listen to Soviet ideas in the private channel.

—On anti-satellite weapons, I noted that the Soviets have a system deployed while we do not, and that verification problems were once again extremely difficult. However, I reiterated once again our general formulation that we could use the private channel to explore Soviet ideas.

—On the nuclear freeze, I pointed out that it would be excessively difficult to negotiate and that we believe we should concentrate on negotiating reductions, and therefore on START.

Turning to regional issues, I touched on Arab-Israel issues and on the Iran-Iraq war.

On Lebanon, I told Dobrynin that we are disappointed with the abrogation of the May 17 agreement,⁵ which will make it harder to get Israeli withdrawal, but that we will stay engaged, and that we have no desire for a permanent military presence in the area. We are concerned with Syrian ambitions and by what they mean for the Palestinians as well as other parties in the area. I told him

that the most threatening situation in the Middle East was not the Lebanon situation per se, but the possibility of conflict between Syria and Israel. I said that in the current situation the Soviets should be cautious. Dobrynin suggested that we work together on the Palestinian problem as a way of making real progress.

On Iran-Iraq, I said Soviet comments showed a misunderstanding of the situation, and proceeded to recount what we had been doing to help end the war by diplomatic means. The important thing is freedom of navigation, I said, and we would act to protect it if it were threatened, and we would be helpful if oil production were threatened with disruption. U.S. objectives were thus limited and proper. The United States was not seeking to exploit the current situation in the Gulf to expand its influence. Dobrynin replied that the freedom of international waters is enshrined in international law, but the Soviets question whether U.S. intervention in a crisis would not widen the crisis. I stressed in reply that the forces we have in the area are there to deter a crisis, and that the chances of a crisis are fairly low; but disruption would be very serious.

Summarizing my overall presentation, I told him that your letter showed that the United States was willing to take some steps, and we would be waiting for the Soviet reply, to see whether the Soviets were ready.

I then went briefly through the follow-up steps we envisage, depending on their reactions to our proposals: resumption of MBFR March 16; tabling a draft chemical weapons treaty in a month or two; agreement on hotline upgrade this spring; proposing another meeting on the Pacific maritime boundary soon; contact in Washington on consulates next week; tabling a draft exchanges agreement

in Moscow in the next few weeks; proposals to activate various bilateral agreements in the same timeframe; and readiness to explore START and INF if the Soviets are. On TTBT we had various possibilities for improving verification in mind, and I urged Dobrynin to look at this issue.

Dobrynin said this had been a good effort. On START and INF, he had to say that the Soviet position was that we should begin at the beginning, looking to the situation before the U.S. began its INF deployments, and that this was a strong position. But in general he called this the most detailed U.S.-Soviet exchange in three or four years, and added that he thought Chernenko would reply to your letter promptly.

In the private meeting, after again praising your letter as constructive, Dobrynin returned to CTB, pressing on the question of renewing negotiations. I reiterated that we saw little future in such efforts, but were prepared to listen to what the Soviets had to say. At the same time, I again pushed the idea of improving verification for the TTBT, and Dobrynin indicated that they might look at this issue again.

Dobrynin then made some comments on the Soviet leadership situation. He referred to Gorbachev as a man of promise who was on the way up, but I sensed he felt he had some way yet to go. Concerning Chernenko, he did not run him down (as Henry Kissinger claims he did in private recently), but he did stress that being in charge is different from simply being aware of issues, and that Chernenko has begun to feel the weight of his responsibilities.⁶

In the Soviet Union, Dobrynin said, one must persuade to lead—Khrushchev had been removed for not bringing people along—and now that we have a dialogue underway, it will be important to keep it in “recognized channels.” He

did not elaborate, but the message seemed to me to be that Chernenko must build consensus as he moves along, and that it would be a mistake to try to avoid Gromyko, since this might turn him into a wrecker.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 2c, 1984 Soviet Union Mar. Secret; Sensitive. This memorandum is unsigned. A handwritten note in the margin, however, reads: "Hand carried to the President by Secy 3/8." According to the President's Daily Diary, Shultz and Reagan met in the Oval Office on March 8 and March 9. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) The brief March 8 meeting was to discuss Scowcroft's trip to Moscow. It seems more likely Shultz presented this memorandum to Reagan on March 9 during their weekly private meeting. Reagan wrote in his diary: "George & I talked Soviets. He had a good meeting with Dobrynin who is very interested in getting some talks going on Cultural exchange, consulates in N.Y. & Kiev etc." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 327)

² See [Document 190](#).

³ See [Document 188](#). Chernenko's February 23 letter is [Document 183](#).

⁴ The Soviets rejected the proposal on March 13. See [footnote 10, Document 372](#).

⁵ In his memoir, Shultz explained: "On May 17, 1983, Israel and Lebanon signed, at Qiryat Shemona Israel and Khaldah in Lebanon, 'The Agreement on Withdrawal of Troops from Lebanon.' Under the terms of the agreement, each country would respect the sovereignty and territorial rights of the other; the state of war between them was terminated." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 220) Documentation on this is scheduled for publication in [Foreign Relations, 1981-](#)

[1988, vol. XVIII, Part 2, Lebanon, September 1982-March 1984](#) ↗.

⁶ In his memoir, Dobrynin wrote of Chernenko's election to the post of General Secretary: "The election of Chernenko at the age of seventy-two, when he was already weakened by emphysema, did not bring about any serious changes in Soviet foreign policy." He continued: "Chosen by the Politburo as a deliberately transitional figure, he usually joined the majority of the Politburo's members and guided himself by their mood. He was the most feeble and unimaginative Soviet leader of the last two decades." (Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, p. 551)

193. Editorial Note

On March 8, 1984, President Ronald Reagan met with General Brent Scowcroft; Secretary of State George Shultz; Chief of Staff James Baker; the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane; Jack Matlock, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs of the NSC Staff; and Ronald Lehman of the Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate of the NSC Staff, from 1:02 to 1:15 p.m. in the Oval Office. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

Scowcroft was scheduled to travel to Moscow from March 10 to 12 with the Dartmouth Conference for three days of meeting with Soviet officials and scholars on U.S.-Soviet relations, nuclear arms control, and other bilateral issues. The Dartmouth Conference, which started in 1960 aimed to create a sustained, non-governmental dialogue between leading U.S. and Russian citizens. Although Scowcroft served as the Chairman of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, his visit to Moscow with the Dartmouth Group was not in an official capacity. As Shultz recalled in his memoir: "We proposed to ask Brent Scowcroft, who was one of a group of private citizens—the 'Dartmouth Group'—who held periodic meetings with the Soviets, to serve as a private channel of communication during the week of March 8." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 473) During the March 8 meeting in the Oval Office, Scowcroft received talking points on START and INF and a letter from Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko, evidently drafted by Matlock. In the letter, Reagan told Chernenko: "I believe the time has come for us to examine closely how we can make progress in the relationship and particularly in the area of nuclear arms reductions. An informal exchange of views may assist us in this effort." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State

File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490236, 8490283, 8490304))

A few weeks earlier in February, while in Moscow for former Soviet General Secretary Andropov's funeral, Matlock raised Scowcroft's upcoming visit during a meeting with Vadim Zagladin, First Deputy Chief of the Central Committee's International Department (see [Document 180](#)). Matlock later recalled of this meeting that after some discussion of "our respective positions on INF and START," he suggested to Zagladin that "they continue the dialogue with General Brent Scowcroft, who would be coming to Moscow the following month for a meeting of arms control experts. Zagladin agreed that this would be a good idea and assured me that he would receive Scowcroft and, if possible, arrange for him to call on Chernenko." Matlock continued: "When I returned to Washington and reported that Scowcroft would be received in the Central Committee to discuss START and INF, we considered this a signal breakthrough in establishing direct communication with the Soviet leaders. Scowcroft was briefed on the administration's positions and agreed to conduct exploratory talks, particularly regarding the sort of trade-offs Reagan had in mind in his March letter to Chernenko [see [Document 190](#)]. However, Secretary Shultz insisted that we ask Gromyko to arrange for Scowcroft to meet Chernenko, ostensibly to deliver a letter from the president. I was not in the meeting when it was decided to handle the visit this way, but when I was asked to draft the letter to Chernenko, I told McFarlane I doubted it would work. In the first place, it was aiming too high. Of course, we hoped that Scowcroft would be able to see Chernenko, but the real communication had to be with members of his staff. And asking Gromyko to arrange the meeting immediately put it in an official context that Gromyko wished to avoid. McFarlane conceded that this might be

right, but it was too late to change our approach. Scowcroft was leaving within hours, and he needed a letter from the president.” (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, pages 94-95)

In a memorandum to Shultz on March 12, John Kelly, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, reported: “We learned by secure phone this morning from Art Hartman that Gromyko told him yesterday Chernenko would not be able to see Scowcroft. He commented that this was ‘no way to do business.’ Gromyko offered instead Deputy Foreign Minister Komplektov. Art did not respond but he and Brent believe that Brent should not agree to see Komplektov. They view this as an insult calculated to emphasize that there is no way around Gromyko on foreign policy issues.” Kelly continued: “Brent also had asked to see Zagladin in the Central Committee. He bumped into Zagladin at a reception for the Dartmouth Group and told him about his mission. So it is likely that Chernenko will learn from another source than Gromyko that Brent is carrying a message and is ready to talk, but very unlikely that a meeting with Chernenko will occur.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, March 1984 Super Sensitive Documents) Two days later, the Embassy delivered a similar verdict: “The head of the US delegation described the three-day meeting of the Dartmouth Conference Arms Control Group in Moscow as the worst in 25 years of personal participation in US-Soviet consultations. In spite of the high level of the US group, the Soviets stuck to an uncompromising, polemical line and showed little interest in exploring compromise solutions to arms control problems, even on the fringes of the formal sessions.” (Telegram 3043 from Moscow, March 14; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840168-0365)

As Matlock later wrote in his book: “The result was what I had feared: Gromyko flatly refused to arrange the appointment, but offered a meeting with his deputy, Georgy Korniyenko, which Scowcroft rejected.” (From the telegram noted above, it seems Matlock meant Viktor Komplektov instead of Korniyenko.) Matlock continued: “Then, to make matters worse, the whole incident became public knowledge after Scowcroft returned to the United States. Whoever leaked the story was, in effect, cooperating with counterparts in the Soviet Union who wished to block further negotiation on arms reduction and continue the arms race.” (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, page 95)

194. Memorandum From Ronald Lehman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, March 12, 1984

SUBJECT

Casey Note on Arms Control

Casey's Prognosis on Arms Control

On March 6, CIA Director Casey sent you the attached note (Tab A)² on "Next Steps in Arms Control" as a follow-up to the March 2 meeting on East-West Relations.³ You will be meeting with him this Thursday,⁴ and he may bring it up.

Casey's basic theme is that any quick arms control agreement with the Soviet Union will have to be simple in both substance and process. For that reason, and because he believes Chernenko will not be allowed too much leeway on central issues, Casey notes that progress in START and INF "is unlikely over the next few months." Instead, the Director suggests that we look at some of the issues that Chernenko raised on March 2,⁵ noting his emphasis on chemical weapons and the Soviet offer of improved verification. Casey also suggests opportunities exist in talks on crisis communications, KAL prevention talks, consultations on regional issues, and issues in the SCC. The Director believes that progress on one or more of these issues could pave the way for a summit which could, in turn, pave the way for arms control progress next year.

Comments on Casey's Paper

For the most part, we already have underway a program that meets Casey's recommendations. The Shultz initiatives on the New York/Kiev consulates, the hotline discussions, bilateral reciprocity agreements, and the Bering Sea issues all move in the areas where he believes progress is most likely. It remains to be seen whether these will be sufficient for a summit. The same applies even more to CW and SCC discussions. Although we will table a CW treaty early this year, it is extremely doubtful that there will be progress sufficient to highlight a summit simply because of the magnitude of the task. The few areas in the SCC where we might reach agreement will be overshadowed by compliance issues which are not likely to be resolved this year.

Thus, we are left with the prospect that any summit will be either (1) justified on the merits of a face-to-face meeting and highlighted only by the conclusion of a number of little agreements, or else (2) highlighted by some certifiable progress on a central issue such as START or INF. The former is more likely than the latter which will require a decision by the Soviet Union that any concessions they make may give the President a major political victory. This, in turn, would undoubtedly lead the Soviet Union to demand significant concessions on our part. Indeed, that seems to be what the Soviet Union is signaling; namely that if we make sufficient concessions (ratification of TTBT—despite the compliance issue, enter into CW bilaterals—perhaps thereby also reducing the sting of accusations of non-compliance, enter into talks on space arms control—ASAT and SDI, or some similar gesture or combination of concessions) then they may be willing to return to the START talks and set the stage for a summit. They might

also drop their demands that we remove our LRINF missiles before INF talks can begin again.

In short, a summit may well be in the cards, but Director Casey is undoubtedly correct in that any new substantive agreements worth highlighting will have to be “simple agreements that do not require extensive preparation or get into great complexity.” We may ultimately find that time and political circumstances preclude the announcement of any arms control breakthrough at a summit.

Jack Matlock concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you thank Director Casey at your next Thursday meeting for his memo on arms control and ask him what the agency believes are the Soviet Union’s motivations for a summit.⁶

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, March 1984 #1. Secret. Sent for action. Lehman signed “Ron” next to his name. In a covering note to Lehman on March 13, Kraemer wrote: “Ron, Thanks for a copy of the attached. Basically a sound memo but I disagree that ‘a summit *may well be* in the cards’ and am very concerned re possible implication (almost advocating) ‘simple agreements that do not require extensive preparation or get into great complexity.’ Even ‘simple’ agreements require extensive (NSC/SACPG)-controlled preparations. Watch for the end run! P.S. I and Ken deGraffenreid (who works for Casey/McF. meeting agenda) should have had concurrence opportunity/line. Sven.”

² Tab A is attached but not printed. In a covering memorandum to McFarlane, Casey wrote: “It is my view that the only way that what we talked about on Friday [the March 2 meeting on U.S.-Soviet relations] is likely to work is to focus on simple agreements that do not require extensive preparation or get into great complexity. The attached note makes this case.”

³ See [Document 188](#).

⁴ March 15.

⁵ See [Document 187](#).

⁶ There is no indication of approval or disapproval by McFarlane. No record of a meeting between Casey and McFarlane was found.

195. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, March 14, 1984, 11 a.m.-12:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Stanislav Menshikov, International Department, CC CPSU Secretariat
Jack F. Matlock, NSC Staff

Menshikov began the conversation by asking what was behind the *New York Times* story that Hartman may have discussed a summit with Gromyko Sunday. He said that he had no report on the Gromyko meeting, since he was in New York at the time.

I told him that Vogel, the German SPD leader who originated the report, must be imagining things.² To the best of my knowledge, the subject did not come up. I added that it seemed to me that our respective positions on a summit were the same: one could be useful if it were properly prepared so that it would lead to progress in our relations, but that this point had not yet been reached.

Menshikov agreed that this was, indeed, their position. He then said that a month had passed since our conversation in Moscow,³ and they had had time to consider the situation. Chernenko's speech of March 4 had been intended to stress both substantive continuity in the Soviet positions and a willingness to work for improvement.⁴ Additionally, they had taken note of our conversation regarding a chemical weapons treaty and had attempted to signal their cooperativeness by the statement in Geneva. I interjected that it was a small step indeed, and Menshikov agreed, but said it was intended as a response to my comments on the difficulty of verification in our

conversation in Moscow, and that they had found our public reaction encouraging.

Menshikov continued, saying that he had word that the “consultations with Scowcroft had begun,” but nothing more, so he did not know how they were going. Maybe they will clarify some possibilities.⁵

He then said that he left Moscow before the text of the President’s letter arrived.⁶ I told him that the President had proposed a number of steps to improve the bilateral working relationship, and had made a number of fairly general comments on arms control issues, but that we hoped that Scowcroft could convey more specific ideas on some of them during his visit.

Menshikov said that they had noted our interest in START and are still considering the possibilities. They are not ready to resume negotiations. But they are interested in exploring ideas privately and unofficially. I told him that is precisely what we hoped to do, but that they should understand that we wish to consult on START possibilities because we feel it is in both countries’ interest to do so. We do not feel we have more pressing needs in this area than the Soviets have.

He then observed that they understood that we were not interested in INF. They assumed we intended to continue deployments as scheduled. As for their side, they would have to consider further countermeasures (he used the Russian word *otvetnye mery*, which means literally “measures in response”), in accord with what actually happens. I said that this was not an accurate understanding of our position: while it is true that Soviet policy had given us no alternative but to continue deployments as scheduled, we still hoped that negotiations could be

resumed so as to arrive at lower levels, and in fact to move toward zero. As for Soviet counter deployments, we saw no justification at all for them, since we believe the NATO deployments scheduled do no more than redress the imbalance caused by the introduction of the SS-20's.

Menshikov then asked about the other arms control issues: did the President deal with the Soviet proposals in his letter? I said that he offered to discuss them, but did not comment on each in detail.

Menshikov then reviewed their list, asking first why we resist the "non-use-of-force" proposal. I told him that our problem with it is that it does not address a real problem. It involves only reiteration of obligations we have already undertaken in signing the U.N. Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. The fact that force and the threat of force continue to be used by parties to general obligations of this sort suggests to us that this is not a very useful way to proceed. It seems far more useful to deal with the actual problems and see if we cannot solve some of them. The Western package of CBM's in Stockholm, for example, deals with some of the real problems in developing confidence that force will not be used.

He then asked about the status of our consideration of a draft treaty on chemical weapons. I told him we hoped to table one in Geneva in April, but that our work was not yet complete on the text. He observed that they were operating on the assumption that one would be tabled soon, and it was important not to drag out the process too long without producing something concrete to discuss. I reiterated that we hoped to have something on the table before the current CD session in Geneva ends.

Regarding MBFR, he said that they understood that we would be making a proposal when the negotiations resumed in Vienna, and that this would be important. I told him that we would indeed have a proposal which we hoped would move negotiations forward, but that it might be introduced a week or so after the session began, since we were still coordinating it with our Allies. If the Soviets respond favorably, we will be prepared to go further. To this, Menshikov warned that we should not expect speedy replies, observing "You know how we do things; the Politburo will have to consider it and discuss it, and we just cannot answer important questions quickly."

Menshikov then asked why ratification of the TTBT and PNET is such a difficult question for us. "That should be an easy one for you," he observed. I explained that the problem is in the verification provisions. Since the treaty was negotiated, we had found that we could not verify with confidence the level of testing. We had called their attention officially to our doubts, and they also have claimed that some of our tests have gone over the threshold, which suggests that they are having the same problem. We wonder, therefore, why they resist discussing measures we might take to improve the verification provisions. We both have experience in verification accumulated since the treaties were signed, which should be reflected in our discussions before the treaties are put into legal force.

Regarding discussion of space systems, Menshikov said that they understood our position to be that we were not willing to discuss the issues unofficially, but would do so only in the context of official negotiations. I told him that there seemed to be a misunderstanding on this score: I was unaware that we had taken a position against unofficial discussions. As for negotiations, we do have problems,

since our studies have demonstrated the difficulty both in defining the systems to be covered and in verifying compliance. And, of course, the Soviet proposal for a moratorium on testing ASAT systems is bound to be unacceptable to us, since they have a tested system deployed and we do not. But I undertook to obtain clarification on the point regarding our attitude toward unofficial discussions of the issue.

I then observed that the continued Soviet insistence that we must continue to take steps to “prove” our good faith was troublesome and unjustified. This approach was quite noticeable in Gromyko’s comments to Hartman Sunday.⁷ Yet, they should recognize that we have already taken a number of steps to improve the relationship, and they can hardly expect us to continue on this course if they are unwilling to show the same readiness. I cited our lowering of the polemics—not yet fully reciprocated on the Soviet side—as well as the President’s proposals in his recent letter for bilateral steps to improve the working relationship.

In this connection, I said that though I was aware that it was a delicate issue for them, I would be remiss if I failed to point out the importance to our relationship which Soviet treatment of persons like Shcharansky, Bonner, Sakharov and Orlov has, and the importance of allowing Jewish emigration to get back to a normal level. We recognized that the Soviets had difficulty negotiating in this area, and we would not press them to do so officially (though we have to keep mentioning the problems), but that if they wished to send a signal of their good faith, moves in this area would be noted by the President.

Menshikov let this pass without comment, and turned the conversation back to INF. He observed that our present

course seemed destined to result in a spiraling arms race, and wondered if we did not realize that deployments in Western Europe could continue to encounter opposition. He referred to my comments in Moscow about the problem of decoupling (implying that they understood and accepted them) and asked whether our INF position was based primarily on military or political considerations. I told him that one cannot separate the two, since political acceptability is based importantly on military balance and feasibility. Nevertheless, that said, I felt personally that the political question was the dominant one; we could not be flexible on that, while we could consider possible variations in the military arrangements necessary to preserve it.

Menshikov then raised the problem of British and French systems. He said that they understood that the positions taken by Britain and France gave us little choice, but could we really expect Soviet military planners not to take these systems into account? I asked if Soviet military planners contemplated a contingency whereby they might attack Britain or France. Menshikov said of course not. I replied that, in that case, I saw no reason at all for Soviet military planners to worry about these systems. They are simply too small to be relevant to the strategic balance. Furthermore, anyone who understands anything about the political process in our countries and the nature of the Western alliance should know that using these systems in any hypothetical first-strike scenario is simply out of the question. So even if they don't believe us when we say we would never launch a first strike (and they should believe this, because it is true), there is no reason for them to fear that British and French systems are relevant to that question.

I added that, entirely aside from the positions taken by the British and French governments, we do not view their

nuclear systems as relevant to the basic issue in INF. The fact is, they provide no umbrella of nuclear deterrence for the other NATO Allies. This is potentially a very sensitive issue, particularly in Germany, and if it is perceived that the U.S. nuclear umbrella is in doubt, the consequences could be profound and, indeed, contrary to Soviet national interests. For these reasons, we feel that maintenance of an adequate and stable American nuclear umbrella for NATO is no threat to the Soviets, but actually in their interest, if they take a long-term view and are genuinely interested in peace and stability in Europe.

Menshikov observed that, if we did not exclude the possibility of reaching some agreement in INF, would not the proposal discussed by Nitze and Kvitsinsky last November have some possibilities? If we think of it as a “build-down” from 572 weapons, then we could arrive at a figure without mentioning British and French systems. Of course, he added, the idea came up too late in the negotiations to be explored fully, particularly when there was the “unfortunate leak” to the Germans, but could we think about it now?

I told him that I was far from an expert in these matters, but in my personal view we would have great difficulty arriving at an acceptable solution by this route. The problem is that, by Soviet count, this would still leave them with a substantial SS-20 force, and NATO with nothing. So we have the basic problem with the umbrella and decoupling. Perhaps, instead, the Soviets could look again at the proposals the President made at the UN in September; these opened several important doors.⁸ For example, the idea of a global ceiling with the U.S. taking only part of it in Europe left a lot of room to discuss specific numbers. And our offer to discuss the mix of cruise and Pershing II's reflected a willingness to be flexible on this

score as well. I recalled that, when we talked in Moscow, he and Zagladin seemed particularly concerned with the Pershings; if this is the case, they should note that we have offered to negotiate the mix.

Menshikov then said, "I'm just thinking out loud now, but if you do want to get back on a negotiating track, we'll have to find some way that takes account of our current position. Now, if you came to us and said something like, 'You say we must withdraw our LRINF missiles if negotiations are to resume. Let's talk about the conditions under which that might be possible' . . . , and then outlined how you thought negotiations might develop. Well, if you took that approach, we would listen—and maybe this could give us a basis."

I told him I would relay this thought, and Menshikov concluded our discussion of START and INF by saying that we should now wait to see what the reaction in Moscow will be to what Scowcroft says.

Before we parted, Menshikov remarked that they are now receiving a "flood" of American visitors in Moscow, many claiming ties to the White House, and asked how they should regard them. I told him that we receive many prospective visitors and brief them in general on our policies, but that unless we specifically indicate to the Soviets otherwise (as we did with Scowcroft), the visitors should be considered only private citizens, whose ideas are their own.

Menshikov also remarked, regarding concrete proposals, that while these were necessary in formal negotiations, they are not necessary in conversations such as the one we were having. He made clear that the Soviets had found our exchanges useful, and asked how we should proceed. I told him that we too found them useful, and would continue to

communicate our ideas in whatever way both of us find most acceptable. I pointed out that we both are most likely to find a way to make progress on some of the issues before us if we can get an informal understanding of each other's positions in advance, and that this required a means of communication not subject to leaks. For this reason, we had held knowledge of our conversations to a very small number of individuals—six or so.

Menshikov said they would make every effort to avoid leaks, but that knowledge of our conversations had been conveyed to more people in Moscow: the Politburo, including of course Chernenko, had been informed of our previous discussion, and had approved continuation of the contact. (He then qualified this by saying, "not all of them, but the core members"—presumably meaning either those involved in foreign policy and security or, possibly, those that are Moscow based.) He added that Gromyko had approved our conversations, and that Troyanovsky was aware of the meeting today. He presumed, but was not certain, that Dobrynin had been informed.

I told him that it was not our intent to cut anyone out, but only to preserve the privacy of the contact. On our side, Shultz and Eagleburger had been briefed, but others in the State Department had not. Art Hartman is of course in the loop, and any message they may have can be passed through him, or in his absence, through Warren Zimmermann.

Regarding contacts with the Embassy in Moscow, Menshikov said that this would be possible *provided* Hartman makes it clear that it is a message from me. He said that, for bureaucratic reasons, they could not grant appointments to members of the Embassy in general, and this was the reason, for example, that neither Zagladin nor

Alexandrov was able to receive Art last year. (This was a reference to Art's efforts to get letters directly to Andropov's staff.) However, if Hartman says he wants an appointment to deliver a message from me, they will receive him, and Gromyko has approved this procedure.

So far as our meeting today was concerned, Menshikov noted that he may have made a mistake when he inadvertently mentioned to David Rockefeller that he would be seeing me. He said that during a call on Rockefeller, the latter had asked him if he would be talking to anyone in the Administration. Menshikov told him he had an appointment with me, and he realized later that he probably shouldn't have, but thought that Rockefeller would not spread it around or draw the conclusion that the appointment was anything more than casual.⁹

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (03/09/1984–06/20/1984). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only for Mr. McFarlane. Not for System. This meeting took place in Harry's New York Bar in the Harley Hotel. Reagan initialed the memorandum of conversation, indicating he saw it. In a handwritten note to McFarlane dated March 15, Matlock reported: "As you can see from the attached, the meeting with Menshikov went very well—no new specifics, but clearly a decision to examine some modalities in ways that are not apparent in the formal dialogue. I was struck, once again, by the total lack of polemics. His desire to discuss INF concepts at some length seems to indicate that this is still the key issue for them—and they may be groping around for a way out. We should discuss the implication at your earliest convenience. I have heard nothing on Scowcroft's conversation yet, but assume you'll include me

in any debrief.” (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological Files, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron March 1984) Regarding Scowcroft’s mission, see [Document 193](#).

² Hans-Jochen Vogel and Chernenko met in Moscow on March 12. On March 17, in telegram 79152 to the Mission in Geneva, the Department reported: “In a United Press International dispatch, the *New York Times* reported from Moscow (quote) the visiting West German opposition leader said . . . that the United States and Soviet Union had discussed the possibility of a meeting between President Reagan and Konstantin U. Chernenko, the Soviet leader.” The telegram continued: “A spokesman for the United States Embassy, Frank Tonini, denied that the possibility of a summit meeting had been discussed. ‘We understand that there has been some speculation in Moscow that a U.S.-Soviet summit was discussed during Ambassador Hartman’s call on Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on Sunday,’ Mr. Tonini said. ‘I am authorized to state that the question of a summit did not come up at that meeting. The Ambassador was there to review a range of bilateral and arms control issues.’ (unquote)” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840177-0601) For an account of the Hartman-Gromyko discussion on March 11, see [Document 196](#).

³ See [Document 180](#).

⁴ This is likely a reference to Chernenko’s March 2 speech. See [Document 187](#).

⁵ See [Document 193](#).

⁶ See [Document 190](#).

⁷ Sunday, March 11. See [Document 196](#).

⁸ See [footnote 3, Document 120](#).

⁹ David Rockefeller was Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations.

196. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 14, 1984

SUBJECT

Art Hartman's Meeting with Gromyko March 11

Art Hartman tells me that he met with Gromyko for two and a half hours Sunday to discuss your letter and my talk with Dobrynin March 7.² Gromyko was careful to say his response was "preliminary" and that we will get an early formal reply to your letter, which has been passed to Chernenko. Art feels Gromyko may not yet have fully familiarized himself with what we have presented. That said, however, he was also very tough.

After Art had begun by stressing your sincerity and the very specific character of our message, Gromyko spent an hour and a half complaining that we had killed off a whole series of agreements and had not yet offered anything to move us forward in a constructive way. The chief items were:

—START and INF, where the policy of the Administration makes talks impossible after the U.S. had "paralyzed" SALT II;

—other arms control items—TTBT, outer space, CW, nuclear non-first-use, non-use of force—where the U.S. had refused to ratify, was ignoring Soviet proposals or was making promises of a kind it had not delivered on in the past; and

—bilateral cooperation agreements (environment, health, etc.) which the U.S. had "cast aside."

In rebuttal, Art told Gromyko that he was defining negotiations in a one-sided way, that we need a give-and-take process and adjustments on each side, and that we should add deeds that address real problems to international life, rather than just words. He stressed that Gromyko was misunderstanding your intentions if he thought we are just repeating the importance of dialogue: you had made substantive decisions and are ready to move forward. Gromyko concluded that he was not convinced.

Art thinks that part of Gromyko's point was to prove that we cannot go around him; the fact that TASS immediately announced the meeting had made no progress suggests that he also continues to fear we will exploit any dialogue between us to prove we are in business-as-usual. It was not an encouraging meeting, but it is hard to draw conclusions from it, and both Art and I agree we should wait for the formal reply to your letter that Gromyko promised. In the meantime, we should do what we need to do here to be ready to move on the issues you identified in your letter.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations (March 1984) 3/3. Secret; Sensitive. A Department of State copy of this memorandum indicates it was drafted by Burt on March 13. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, March 1984 Super Sensitive Documents) Reagan's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² For the President's letter, see [Document 190](#). For a record of the March 7 Shultz-Dobrynin meeting, see [Document 192](#).

197. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan¹

Dear Mr. President,

Moscow, March 19, 1984

I have carefully read your letter of March 6.² And I am responding to it also taking into account the additional comments made by your Ambassador in the conversation with A.A. Gromyko and by Secretary George Shultz to our Ambassador in Washington.³

In doing so, I intend to address the main issues of a principled nature, as some clarifications in greater detail will be given to the Secretary of State by our Ambassador who is receiving appropriate instructions to this effect.⁴ I also assume that you are already familiar with the views which were expressed on our side by A.A. Gromyko in the said conversation with Ambassador Hartman.

First of all, I would like to emphasize that, like yourself, I value the importance of our correspondence which makes possible a direct exchange of views on the cardinal problems of relations between our countries and the international situation.

In this regard I would like to note two points in your letter: the stated desire to improve relations between the USSR and US and your concurrence that specific measures are required to that end.

It is precisely from this perspective that I wish to express our considerations on the questions you raised and explain the way we see the possibility for a constructive turn in

Soviet-American relations, considering the special role and responsibility of our countries in international affairs.

I, too, am not in favor of engaging in our correspondence in mutual recriminations, and this is not my purpose. At the same time it is obviously difficult to hope to move forward while not remaining on the ground of reality. In other words, we assess and will continue to assess the intentions of the United States first of all by the practical policy it pursued and currently pursues, by concrete positions the U.S. side maintains on the security issues. And, frankly speaking, so far we have seen no encouraging signs in this regard.

Having initiated the deployment of its missiles in Western Europe, the United States is, thereby, creating an additional strategic threat to the Soviet Union. It is impossible for us to ignore it. This step has become the main obstacle on the path of negotiations, it has undermined in general the process of limiting and reducing nuclear arms.

From your letter it does not transpire at all that the United States is prepared to remove that obstacle and deal on the only possible basis of equality and equal security. From the explanations provided by the Secretary of State it follows all too clear that there are no changes in the U.S. position either on the strategic or "European" nuclear arms. The essence, and details, too, of this position are sufficiently known to us; any additional "clarifications", in whatever form they are offered official or unofficial—will not of themselves help in this matter and will not be able to change our view of this unconstructive position.

I would like you, Mr. President, to have a correct understanding of this. Attempts to somehow sidestep the

deadlock will not be productive. But, we are convinced, there is a way out of the obtaining situation. Our view of what that way should be is known to you. I believe there is no need to state again in specific terms our position in this regard.

I would like to hope that your government will be able to take a broad and long-term view of this matter and will draw conclusions which would make it possible to give an impetus to the solution of the problem of nuclear arms—a central problem, as you recognize, in our relations.

We are for solving this problem in a most radical manner, with no detriment, of course, to the security of either side, while maintaining the existing balance of forces and strengthening the strategic stability.

I would like to point out in this connection that the development of large-scale ABM systems would be in direct contradiction with the objectives of strengthening stability—and you in your letter speak in favor of strengthening stability. It is not that the Soviet Union has some sort of a special concern in this regard. The United States must be concerned about it to an equal degree. After all, the inescapable consequence of the implementation of such plans can be only one thing—an arms race in all directions whose magnitude it is difficult even to imagine today. What is needed is not the negotiations on what such systems might be, but a resolute and unequivocal renunciation of the very idea of creating such systems. A clear and unambiguous stand in this regard would prove to be also a weighty reaffirmation of the commitment of our two countries to the Treaty on the limitation of ABM systems which is of unlimited duration and which is an important element in the package of the existing limitations in the area of strategic arms.

The policy of the Soviet Union—which with all due force was emphasized in my speech of March 2 that you mention⁵—has been and will continue to be oriented in a practical way toward a cessation of the arms race and not toward transferring that race into new areas, toward specific agreements leading to a real reduction of the war danger and strengthening the security for all peoples.

In furtherance of the views set forth in the said speech and with account taken of the interest that, as I understand, you expressed in your letter, we propose that the USSR and U.S. undertake on a priority basis the following:

1. Initiate without delay—making a public announcement to this effect—a concrete discussion aimed at reaching an agreement on the prevention of the militarization of space and the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the Earth. We are prepared to conduct such negotiations at the level of specially appointed delegations and at the beginning stage through diplomatic channels if the U.S. side finds it more convenient.

Without prejudging the outcome of this issue at the present time, one might, as a practical matter, proceed on the understanding that initially such an agreement would include the relevant obligations of the USSR and U.S., laying at the same time a basis for working out a broad international agreement, a draft of which could, by our mutual consent, be submitted, for instance, for consideration at the Geneva disarmament conference.

The question of anti-satellite weapons would then be solved either in the framework of such bilateral discussions on the general problem of the prevention of space militarization or as a major separate step leading in this direction.

2. Make, jointly or in parallel, a statement on the intention of the USSR and U.S. to implement the idea of nuclear weapons freeze and on their readiness to begin in this regard a meaningful exchange of views on the matter. The subject of such a discussion could be possible forms of freeze accord (a bilateral agreement, unilaterally taken obligations), the scope thereof, etc.

3. Resume, in agreement with the British government, the trilateral negotiations on the complete and general ban of nuclear weapon tests. We believe that, given the goodwill, it would be possible to count here on rapid progress, considering a substantial amount of positive work done at the previous stage of the negotiations.

4. You know, Mr. President, that in my speech of March 2 I spoke in favor of having the nuclear powers adhere in their mutual relations to certain norms. This would meet the urgent requirements of the present day and help create such a climate that would raise the level of trust in international affairs, thereby facilitating the prevention of nuclear war and curbing of the arms race.

There is no doubt that the incorporation of such norms into the practice of Soviet-American relations would bring about a qualitative change in these relations and place them on a secure and stable basis.

We expect the United States to give a most serious consideration to this initiative and respond to it in a positive way.

Mr. President, we have taken note of what you said with regard to the questions of chemical weapons and the Vienna negotiations. In this regard, too, we maintain positions that are constructive and far-reaching. We will, of

course, give a careful study to the promised U.S. proposals when they appear at the negotiating table. It is important, though, not to repeat the past unproductive experience, if there is a genuine desire to solve those issues that have been long outstanding.

We hope that positive results will be achieved at the Stockholm conference. We regard confidence-building measures as a large-scale political problem requiring, also, appropriate major decisions. In Stockholm it is not only proper, but necessary, too, to negotiate agreements on the no-first use of nuclear weapons and on the non-use of force in general. Equally, we are for implementing other measures which should be directed precisely at building confidence and which should not pursue some different objectives.

I would like to see the U.S. side being prepared to act in such a manner. It would undoubtedly contribute to a success in the work of the Stockholm conference.

You mention regional problems. I think the developments of the past years have shown graphically that the absence of interaction between our countries has a negative impact also on the settlement of regional problems and, accordingly, on the general situation in the world.

The main thing in such interaction is that each side be guided by broad interests of peace and not seek benefits for itself at the expense of the interests of others. I am sure that an exchange of views between the USSR and U.S. on relevant regional problems in such a context would undoubtedly be useful.

You will recall that in the course of the previous correspondence readiness was expressed on our part to

jointly intensify the search for ways leading to an overall political settlement in the Middle East. Today, too, we continue to be ready for it. In this regard there definitely exists a subject matter for an exchange of views. I am confident that, acting in such a manner, our two countries would in a practical way contribute to the relaxation of the continuing dangerous military and political tension in that region, which would also have broader positive results.

As to the question of the Iran-Iraq war, that you touched upon, you will recall that the Soviet Union from the very outbreak of that war has been consistently coming out—also in the contacts with the leadership of Iran and Iraq—in favor of putting an end to the senseless bloodshed. We have supported the activities of the mediating missions and the political efforts of the UN. The USSR intends to continue to act in the same spirit. In this regard we ourselves have done nothing—and we believe that other countries should act likewise—that can additionally exacerbate the situation and induce the parties to the conflict to take even more dangerous actions the consequences of which would go beyond the immediate area of the conflict. This first of all concerns any demonstrations of military nature, no matter what pretexts are being used for carrying them out.

In conclusion I would like to touch briefly on the area of bilateral relations between our countries. We have always been and remain to be advocates of active and really meaningful ties in a variety of fields, mutually beneficial and equal ties. The experience of a relatively recent past shows that this is possible.

If the U.S. side is truly ready at the present time to correct the abnormal situation that has developed in our bilateral relations as a result of its actions, it could be a welcome thing. We will judge if such a readiness is there by the

practical steps the U.S. side will be taking in furtherance of the general concepts contained in your letter. We are instructing our Ambassador in Washington to discuss in greater detail these questions with the Secretary of State.

Sincerely,

K. Chernenko

Attachment

Oral Remarks From Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin⁶

Washington, undated

First. In Moscow a careful consideration has been given alongside with the President's letter to what was said by you, Mr. Secretary, in the conversation on March 7. In the course of that conversation a broad range of questions was addressed with regard to Soviet-American relations.

Regrettably, you, Mr. Secretary, in your comments confined yourself, in fact, to the statements of a general nature within the framework of the already known positions of the U.S. side.

One has to state that from those statements no real movement can be perceived in the positions of the U.S. in the direction of putting Soviet-American relations on a steadier course. Indeed, one cannot take for a constructive approach stated readiness of the U.S. side "not to object to continue to listen to additional arguments" of the Soviet side or to expect the Soviet side to come up with some new initiatives in matters whose solution has been blocked by actions of the U.S. Such an approach is in no conformity with the statements in favor of setting up business-like discussions.

Second. Whether or not the administration really intends to work for correcting the relations between our countries, we judge and will continue to judge not by words, not by declarations, but by specific actions.

Let us take an important question of principle in our relations. Recently, we have found ourselves being intensively persuaded that the United States allegedly is not striving for military superiority and does not wish to create a threat to our security. But this does not square at all with the U.S. official concepts and programs in the military area. Quite tangible material things are involved here. We are witnessing a build-up of the U.S. forward based forces, including nuclear forces, along the perimeter of our country which is continuing and getting even more active. We also know the tempo of the general military build-up that is going on in the United States and the scope of appropriations allocated for that purpose. Given all this, mere verbal assurances sound unconvincing.

Such is the reality on the basis of which we draw one conclusion—the U.S. is not giving up attempts to assume domineering positions in world affairs. We will resist it in a most resolute fashion, we will not permit the military balance to be upset.

Third. Our position of principle on the issues concerning the limitation of nuclear arms—both offensive and defensive—was presented in an exhaustive way in the letter of K.U. Chernenko and the conversation of A.A. Gromyko with Ambassador Hartman.

Fourth. We proceed on the assumption that the U.S. side will give a careful and constructive study to our proposals regarding the priority steps which should be taken for the purpose of a genuine reduction of the military threat.

The question of preventing the militarization of space is an acutely urgent question. Otherwise, a very dangerous situation is to develop. The issue of anti-satellite weapons is one of the important elements of this problem. It is futile for the U.S. side to try to allege that it will find itself in an unequal position, should it agree to ban such weapons. This is not so. We propose that an agreement be reached not only to prohibit the development of new anti-satellite systems, but also to eliminate the already existing systems of such kind. Thus, we have in mind a truly radical and equal approach, whereby, the problems of verification, too, would be much easier to solve. The desire of the Soviet side to find a mutually acceptable solution is convincingly manifest in the fact that the Soviet Union has initiated a unilateral moratorium on launching into space any types of anti-satellite weapons. It was a clear signal, and the fact that the U.S. side has so far not responded to it in a proper way tells us a lot. However, it is not yet too late to stop, and our proposals open up a path to the solution of the question of anti-satellite weapons equitable to both sides.

We believe a freeze to be a real means to put an end to the process of a quantitative and qualitative build-up of nuclear weapons. The arguments put forward by the U.S. side against such a step, the doubts it expresses in this regard are not convincing either on their merits or in relation to the result that the implementation of that idea would lead to. In the course of the proposed discussions we could present additional considerations in order to spell out further specifics of our position.

We are raising the need to resume the trilateral negotiations on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear tests in the belief that an agreement on this subject could be a weighty indicator of the intentions to work for ceasing the rivalry in the development of nuclear weapons.

The same purpose would be served also by the ratification of the known treaties of 1974 and 1976. Currently the U.S. side is justifying its position with regard to those treaties by the alleged "imperfection" of the mechanism of verification contained therein, although this mechanism has not been so far tried in practice. It is just as unconvincing as the earlier made assertion according to which the ratification of these treaties would have impeded the trilateral negotiations or the ratification of the SALT-2 Treaty. Indeed, treaties are signed in order to be put into force and to be operative and not to be covered with dust on the shelves.

Fifth. To implement the important idea of principle put forward in the speech by K.U. Chernenko on March 2, with regard to the need that the relations between nuclear states be governed by a set of certain norms, we are prepared to begin discussing this matter first of all between the USSR and U.S., as the most powerful nuclear states bearing a special responsibility for maintaining the international security. We are ready to conduct an exchange on this subject with a view to achieving an appropriate agreement in this regard.

Sixth. The issues of the prohibition of chemical weapons, the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, and confidence-building measures are being considered at multilateral fora. The interests of ensuring forward movement at those negotiations would be served by employing also a method of bilateral Soviet-American consultations which can be usefully conducted both in the capitals and in the venues of those fora.

Seventh. As to the question raised by the U.S. side regarding consultations between military representatives of the USSR and U.S., it is impossible to regard this

question out of the context of the general situation in our relations. Should there be positive changes in the nature of Soviet-American relations, the usefulness of such consultations, too, could be considered.

Eighth. As a matter of principle, the Soviet side is for having talks on regional problems when it proves necessary and when the purpose is to achieve a settlement of conflict situations with account taken of the interests of all parties. To put it briefly, we are for constructive interaction, and, by the way, we have with the United States a rather positive experience of such cooperation.

There is yet another side of this matter: the interaction becomes effective when it is reinforced by mutual restraint. This is true of all situations fraught with conflict or a dangerous flare-up. The recent developments, including those in the Middle East and in Central America, have shown that attempts to use forceful methods and a direct armed intervention aggravate both the situation in those regions and the overall situation in the world.

In connection with the Iran-Iraq conflict we would like to emphasize the following: the actions of the U.S. in the Persian Gulf area, the threats to use military force there, to put it bluntly, exacerbate the situation even further. The Soviet Union believes that no obstacles should be created to the freedom of navigation, including that in the Strait of Hormuz. But to be sure, no one has the right to arrogate to himself the role of some sort of a traffic policeman over international lines of communication.

Ninth. The approach of principle that the USSR maintains regarding the bilateral relations with the U.S. has been repeatedly made known to the U.S. side, also in connection with the specific questions it raised.

We want to see the affairs in that area proceed in a normal, steady fashion, rather than be determined by some expedient considerations. The determining factor here must be the mutual interest of the sides.

The Soviet side is for reinvigorating the existing agreements between the two countries, for revitalizing those of them which have become paralyzed. And, of course, if we do have agreements, they must be implemented to the full extent, and not partially or selectively. It is not so much a matter of formality here, say, of the level the contacts are carried out on. The main thing is to have normal contacts, beneficial to each side.

There is, of course, a number of agreements (on the World ocean study, fisheries, preventing incidents on the high seas, facilitating economic, industrial and technical cooperation) which are expiring this year. We would like to have a clarification as to what the U.S. side means saying that it is prepared "to review seriously" these agreements. At any rate, one can hardly regard as displaying a constructive approach the formal extension of agreements which in fact are devoid of real content.

Improvement of the hotline. This is a concrete technical question discussed by the experts of the two countries. We are waiting from the U.S. side for the promised technical proposals regarding the introduction of a facsimile communication facility. Such proposals will be studied, whereupon we shall be able to present our views as to the timing of the next round of negotiations.

We believe that the U.S. side has now a clearer understanding of our position on the delimitation of the sea areas and continental shelf in the Chuckchee and Bering Seas and in the Arctic and Pacific Oceans. We continue to

be in favor of resolving these issues—in an equitable way in accordance with the sides' legitimate interests and rights. The announcement by the U.S. side that sea bottom areas are open for bidding in the regions which are a subject of the Soviet-American negotiations, runs in direct contradiction to such a solution. This is yet another example of how the practical steps of the U.S. do not square with its declared readiness to improve Soviet-American relations.

We shall be drawing appropriate conclusions from the further conduct of the U.S. side in this matter and will see whether it will refrain from actions which would seriously complicate the on-going negotiations.

Consular negotiations. We are for continuing those and we shall be ready to look at questions which can be discussed in that area.

With regard to Consulates-General in Kiev and New-York there have already been quite a few zigzags on the U.S. side. We shall study what the U.S. has to say this time on this subject in order to ascertain what the intentions are in this regard. The very existence of consular offices, of course, their functions have nothing symbolic about them, they serve a practical purpose in dealing with certain questions of bilateral relations, in safeguarding the interests of the citizens of the country represented by a Consulate-General. Accordingly, whether the work of a consular office is effective depends directly on the state of affairs in various areas of relations between the countries, including those in the field of transport and communications.

For that reason, the resumption of the Aeroflot flights to the U.S. has an important practical significance for the

effectiveness of the work of our Consulate-General in New-York. Incidentally, in a direct practical way, it applies also to the question of all kinds of exchanges, including those in the cultural field. Obviously, each side in carrying out such exchanges has a right to choose at its own discretion the airlines it finds most suitable also in terms of convenience and financial considerations. For the Soviet side this again is the question of Aeroflot flights, and we proceed on the assumption that the U.S. side will take a positive decision in this respect.

Taking into account the intention expressed by the U.S. side, we are prepared to discuss questions related to negotiating a general agreement on contacts and exchanges, including cultural exchanges. At the same time we proceed on the assumption that the American side should resolve the problem of a principal nature, that of securing proper conditions for the stay in the U.S. of Soviet participants in such exchanges, which otherwise cannot be carried out in a normal way.

Well, indeed, it is high time for the U.S. authorities to take, after all, effective measures to ensure the safety and normal conditions for Soviet offices and citizens in the U.S. What is required here is an elementary observance of generally recognized norms in relations among states, and it must be done. Failure to take appropriate measures would have most serious consequences, and the statements by the U.S. side regarding its readiness to improve relations would remain an empty phrase.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC, Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8401238). No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from

Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy. In a covering letter to Shultz, March 20, Dobrynin requested that this letter be passed to President Reagan. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, E.3, President/Chernenko Correspondence (1/2)) Reagan initialed the March 19 letter and wrote in the margin: "I think this calls for a very well thought out reply & not just a routine acknowledgement that leaves the status quo as is. RR."

² See [Document 190](#).

³ See [Documents 192](#) and [196](#).

⁴ Reference is to the attached oral remarks.

⁵ See [Document 187](#).

⁶ No classification marking. Reagan initialed the first page of the oral remarks.

198. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, March 19, 1984

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations: Thoughts on Where We Stand

We have gotten some very mixed signals from the Soviets recently. On the one hand, Dobrynin seemed very upbeat after seeing the President's letter,² and Menshikov was relatively positive in his conversation with me last week.³ But we also have the curious treatment of Brent,⁴ Gromyko's hard-line approach in his meeting with Hartman,⁵ and the very rigid Soviet position taken in talks with the Dartmouth group last weekend.⁶ Is there any sense in this pattern?

First, we should not be surprised that the Soviets continue to maintain a fairly rigid line on matters of substance at this point. They obviously want to test how far they can push us before they begin moving in our direction. Therefore, we should not be surprised either by Gromyko's stance with Hartman, or the line taken by Soviet interlocutors with the Dartmouth group.

Brent's treatment is more problematical. I believe that either a decision was made over last weekend to harden the Soviet position, or else his treatment was a reaction to our effort to have him see Chernenko, without advance warning. Menshikov was clearly under the impression last Wednesday that he was meeting with Zagladin, so this

meeting must have been planned and expected when Menshikov left Moscow March 8. The letter and the effort to secure an appointment with Chernenko may, however, have caused problems. Gromyko could have seen it as an effort to bypass him, or as an effort to obtain a publicized meeting which we could present as constituting negotiations on START. In any event, his treatment could well have reflected such protocollary and bureaucratic factors rather than a refusal to listen to what we have to say on this subject.

If this is the case, it would suggest that we should not jump to conclusions about the Soviet position at this time. Chernenko's reply to the President's letter will provide the most authoritative indicator, as will Soviet willingness to move ahead expeditiously on some of the bilateral measures mentioned in the President's letter and by Shultz to Dobrynin.

At this point, I believe our stance should be to wait for the next Soviet move and avoid showing too much eagerness. Nevertheless, we must recognize that time is slipping by, and that a meeting can probably not be arranged on the spur of the moment. Therefore, we should continue to prepare our positions as rapidly as we can so that if there is Soviet movement, we will be able to move rapidly.

We also need to give some thought to how the timing of a meeting affects our tactics. If July is the optimum time, then we would need to have the question under discussion by early May at the latest. If the possible agenda is not shaping up by then, the President will need to decide whether he wants us to pursue some of the topics more aggressively (at the risk of losing some negotiating leverage), or of reconsidering the possibility of shooting for a meeting in September in connection with the UNGA. In

either case, however, we must recognize that if we want the meeting more than they do, they will have an advantage, since by stalling they tend to increase our incentives to give them something. It might be useful to discuss this factor with the President privately, in order to obtain his thoughts and guidance.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations (March 1984) 3/3. Top Secret; Sensitive. Not for System. Sent for information. The memorandum is unsigned.

² During their March 7 meeting, Shultz gave Dobrynin a letter to Chernenko from the President. See [Document 190](#).

³ See [Document 195](#).

⁴ See [Document 193](#).

⁵ See [Document 196](#).

⁶ See [Document 193](#).

199. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Chernenko's March 19 Letter and Accompanying "Oral Remarks"

We have given some thought overnight to what this message really means.

The overall thrust is that the Soviets are skeptical of your offer of dialogue, and very wary of working with us at least until we have put more on the table. As a response to your last letter,² the message came fast (thirteen days after yours); and it passes up the chance to indulge in the kind of sharp language we have been hearing from Soviets in public these last two weeks. On the other hand, it does go in for some very self-serving argumentation, and it is extremely careful when it comes to specific issues. In brief, while Chernenko did not slam any doors, he did not open any either.

The whole message, in general, is permeated with the fear that we will trap them into sham dialogue and exploit it for electoral purposes to prove that business-as-usual is going on. To some extent, this wariness probably reflects the intense competition for power among the Soviet leaders. We knew the Soviets were suspicious. This letter shows how far that is the case.

Turning to specifics, the message avoids engaging us on START and INF. The argument is that there is nothing in our current position that provides for serious negotiation. Chernenko asserts that our new INF missiles present a new

strategic threat. It may be they understand we will not withdraw them without a negotiated agreement, but do not know how to proceed without legitimizing our deployments. This dilemma would explain why Chernenko says he sees no need to restate the Soviet position explicitly, and no additional “official or unofficial” clarifications from us will help “of themselves.” They may well have concluded that for the time being they are better off waiting for a change in the political situation in Europe or here before looking at the negotiating problem again.

Instead, they are pressing their own agenda on other issues. He restates the same tired, sterile agenda for non-nuclear arms control set forth in Andropov’s last letter of January 28 and Chernenko’s March 2 speech.³ Chernenko identifies four top priorities: renunciation of space weapons, a nuclear weapons freeze, resumption of comprehensive test ban negotiations, and agreement on norms of conduct among nuclear powers. More constructively, he then calls for use of our bilateral channel to facilitate progress in multilateral negotiations on chemical weapons, MBFR and non-first-use of nuclear weapons and non-use of force agreements together with confidence-building measures at Stockholm. The “oral remarks” add ratification of the TTBT and PNET treaties to this list, and also suggest favorable consideration of military-to-military contacts, if overall relations improve.

Both Chernenko’s letter and the “oral remarks” are relatively positive with regard to your suggestion that we need more regular consultations on regional issues. The stress is on the Middle East and especially Iran-Iraq, and they are suspicious of our intentions in moving forces toward the Gulf. But the oral remarks also state that “we are for constructive interaction, and we have a rather positive experience of such cooperation with the United

States.” This may be no more than a masked reference to the aborted October 1977 joint statement on the Middle East, but it amounts to a green light to further exchanges on such issues.

Chernenko essentially transfers the action on bilateral issues to the Foreign Ministry, which gives wary responses to the issues you raised in your March 6 letter. They start with a warning that these matters should proceed in “normal, steady fashion, rather than be determined by some expedient considerations,” i.e. election-year tactics. On the issue of consulates, they seek to link movement to our lifting the Poland/KAL sanction against Aeroflot operations here, thus creating an additional burden to progress. But they close no doors, not even on the Pacific maritime boundary negotiations where we announced last week we would be accepting bids for exploration in the disputed area. And they do engage the Soviets to respond to whatever we can come up with.

I think we ought to be firm and candid in responding to Chernenko’s arguments that we are responsible for an impasse, in refusing to be drawn into negotiation of the non-starters he puts up front, and in keeping the dialogue focussed on genuine issues where real progress could be made if the Soviets are willing. When we reply, we should make it clear once again that it is Soviet SS-20 deployments that caused the INF problem; that the Soviets have an anti-satellite weapon deployed and we do not; and that they too have research and development programs in the strategic defense field. We need not be polemical, but we should keep these facts before them.

At the same time, we should continue to define steps that would be in both our interest and the Soviet interest, and to put them on the table.⁴ We have in fact made a few small

moves implementing your March 6 letter. On the hotline, we have sent along technical information and proposed another meeting; we have proposed another session of the Pacific maritime boundary talks; and we have asked formally whether the building prepared for us in Kiev is still available, as a preliminary to negotiations. We are at work here to produce a draft chemical weapons treaty, and we are working with our Allies on some new ideas to put into MBFR. But it is in fact not much so far, and if we are to have a credible record available in case of need, there will need to be more to it than that.

I will be back to you with suggestions for a draft reply to Chernenko and some thoughts on next steps.⁵

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 18, 1984 Mar. 21 Mtgs. w/ the Pres. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy. In a memorandum forwarding the memorandum to Shultz on March 21, Burt suggested that the Secretary discuss how to respond to the Soviets—in particular, Chernenko’s letter—during his meeting with the President on March 21. According to marginalia on Burt’s memorandum, Shultz “didn’t sign 3/21 but took.” See [footnote 4, below](#).

² See [Document 190](#).

³ See [Documents 164](#) and [187](#).

⁴ In his covering memorandum to Shultz (see [footnote 1, above](#)), Burt suggested the “next steps should be the following: 1) On Friday when you see the President, you might go over the letter and discuss the line you propose to take with Dobrynin. 2) Then call Dobrynin in next week (he expects to be working again by the middle of next week) to go over the Chernenko letter and ‘oral statement.’ The purpose would be to obtain a better feel for the Soviet

position before we draft a reply for the President. 3) Draft a response for the President to consider by the end of next week. 4) Proceed with the Soviets where we think it is in our interest—from Consulates to CDE—prodding the interagency process for appropriate U.S. positions where we do not yet have them.”

⁵ Shultz met with Reagan at the White House at 1:35 p.m. on March 21 (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary), and seemingly delivered this memorandum to the President, but it was not discussed until their regular Friday meeting on March 23. From Reagan’s diary entry it is clear they discussed the Soviets during this March 23 meeting: “George Shultz, Bud & I met for a strategy session on where we go with the Soviets. I think they are going to be cold & stiff-necked for awhile. But we must not become supplicants. We’ll try to get agreement on a few lesser matters.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 331)

200. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 23, 1984

SUBJECT

Arms Control Strategy

In the last eleven months of his Administration, President Carter abruptly changed his policy towards the Soviet Union, withdrawing the SALT II Treaty from Senate consideration, instituting sanctions in response to the invasion of Afghanistan and proposing 5% real growth in defense spending. But the change came too late to regain the confidence of the American people: the voters in large numbers ignored the new policy by voting against the old. Indeed, Carter's shift seemed to vindicate the criticism that led up to it: by abandoning his established policies and appearing to embrace new and contradictory ones, Carter himself seemed to acknowledge that he had been weak in the face of Soviet strength. Candidate Reagan's steadiness of purpose stood in sharp and winning contrast.

There now remain fewer than five months until the party conventions and only eight before the election. Strategic decisions bearing on our conduct of East-West relations, especially arms control negotiations with the Soviets, must be made soon if President Reagan is to appeal to the electorate on the basis of a clear, coherent philosophy of arms and arms control.

Between now and November it must be a central element of Administration strategy to convey in a consistent manner a sense of the President's approach to East-West relations—an approach based on the strength of our re-armament

coupled with a continuing search for militarily significant, balanced and verifiable arms reduction agreements that diminish the threat to our security and that of our allies.

This Administration has rightly rejected Soviet proposals that would codify their monopoly of intermediate missiles, freeze U.S. forces in urgent need of modernization, and permit the continued growth of Soviet strategic forces. And while we must continue to probe the attitude of the new Soviet leader toward arms control (and his ability to shape Soviet policies), we must not abandon the properly demanding standard for agreement that has distinguished the approach of this administration from that of its predecessors. Above all, we must not permit the merit of our security policy to be tested by whether we achieve an arms control agreement or bring the Soviets back to the bargaining table. For try as we might, the Soviet leaders may well seek to deny President Reagan a fair agreement, precisely so that his "failure" to achieve one will damage his re-election prospects and bring into office a Democratic administration, ready to agree to terms more favorable to the Soviets and certain to slow the rebuilding of our defenses.

After all, it is only this President's strategic modernization program that promises to restore America's strategic strength and dissuade the Soviet leadership from the attempt to reach decisive superiority. Opposition to that program has become a central theme of Soviet diplomacy and propaganda. And opposition to much of our modernization program and arms reduction philosophy, together with support for SALT II, the freeze and other arms control measures rejected by the President, has already become a campaign theme of the Democratic Party and its leading candidates. While an agreement manifestly tilted in the Soviets' favor might lure them from their

current intransigence, it is most likely that Moscow will do nothing that might help re-elect a President who has mounted the most effective challenge to Soviet power in more than a decade: "Better to wait—and hope—for Mondale or Hart."²

The Soviets are tough bargainers, even in adversity. If they sense that the Administration is negotiating with one eye on the ballot box (and there will be plenty of commentators to suggest that we are) they will be tougher still. They have shown no sign of letting up on the demand that we remove (or at least halt) INF deployment in Europe as a precondition for a return to the START/INF talks. (In recent days they have repeated this demand to Senators Cohen and Biden, to Brent Scowcroft and the Dartmouth group, and to SPD leader Vogel).³ Even if they were to return to Geneva, or agree to a summit, it would be risky in the extreme to take such a tactical move as a softening of their basic unyielding position. An acrimonious summit, or an October breakdown of renewed talks might well figure in a Soviet strategy to undermine the President's re-election. (Even Khomeini, who had every reason to believe he had Carter over a barrel, preferred to hold the hostages until Inauguration Day).

It is important for the Administration to make an early judgment as to whether the Soviet government under Chernenko is likely to be more accommodating between now and the election than it has been since President Reagan took office. Our strategy since January has been predicated on the assumption that there is at least a fair chance for an improvement in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, including an arms control agreement on terms that the Reagan Administration could defend. Private diplomatic activity, public pronouncements and our approach to the compliance issue have all been aimed at coaxing the

Soviets along a path of accommodation. The result has been disappointing. And while we must explore any genuinely promising opening, we must not drift toward November in the hope that a late break-through will obviate the need for a re-assertion of this Administration's record and philosophy.⁴

If we judge that there is little prospect that the Soviets will become more tractable in coming months, we should develop *now* a strategy reflecting that judgment. And, far from using a muffled voice on the need for firmness and perseverance in dealing with the Soviet Union, the President should stress the continuing validity of his rearmament program and his approach to arms control. With respect to arms reductions, we should elaborate the themes that have guided our policy for the last three years: insistence on sharp reductions, the need for full verification (especially in light of Soviet non-compliance with existing agreements), the flexibility inherent in our willingness to "build down" and to "trade off" our advantages against theirs, and dissatisfaction with the past approach to arms control in which agreements like SALT I and II actually led to a startling increase in nuclear weapons. We also should be more assertive (although moderate, almost clinical in tone) on the issue of Soviet violations and their walk-out from the Geneva talks.

The Administration's handling of two important issues illustrates the dilemma of the policy choice the President now faces. Until now the Administration has deliberately down-played the Soviet walk-out from Geneva and the Soviet record on compliance. In both cases we have, for the last four months, taken pains to encourage the Soviets to return to the negotiating process by withholding criticism of their actions. "Not justified" is about the strongest comment we have made on the Soviet withdrawal from the

Geneva talks. And a dispassionate *sotto voce* bill of particulars has been the extent of our comment on the Soviet record of non-compliance, with the single exception of our wholly justified, two-year long attack on “yellow rain.”⁵

It is now time to ask whether this policy of restraint, which has been met by an unrelenting Soviet attack on the President and his policies, will achieve its intended effect of eliciting an improvement in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. If we conclude that it is unlikely to move the Soviets to constructive negotiations, then it is fair to ask whether we are wise to forfeit a more assertive argument centered on the facts and merits of these two issues.

These are not only issues on which the Soviets are vulnerable; they are also issues the American people can understand.

Every poll conducted on the subject confirms that the American people believe that the Soviets will, if given an opportunity, cheat on their international obligations. The fact of their record of violating SALT II, the ABM Treaty and other agreements could be profitably amplified to support the President and diminish the weight of the Mondale/Hart appeal for new “quick fix” agreements even less verifiable than the present ones—the freeze, the threshold test-ban, ASAT, and the like.

The same holds true of the Soviet walk-out. With the Democratic National Committee running television spots that portray Ronald Reagan as the first President since John Kennedy who is not presiding over a nuclear arms negotiation, surely we can begin to drive home the point that the Soviets have broken off the Geneva talks because we would not accept a Soviet monopoly in INF missiles.

However conscious we in Washington may be of the Soviet walk-out and their compliance record, they'll forget it in Kansas if we continue to be inaudible on the subject.

It may be argued that we can go on with our current strategy, watching and waiting, adopting neither an approach that is appropriate to Soviet recalcitrance and stalling through November, nor one that assumes a breakthrough before the election. The trouble with this view is that time is passing—days and weeks are going by in which we are not mounting a defense of the President's three-year record in the conduct of East-West arms control—with all the ammunition at our disposal. As we approach the national conventions there is a risk that we shall lose the initiative—that vigorous explanation of our policies mounted in the aftermath of the Democratic attack on them will sound defensive and thus unpersuasive.

A more assertive defense of our record and philosophy need not—indeed should not—sound strident, hostile, or pessimistic. Nor would it rule out a continuing private effort, through the President's correspondence with Chernenko or the Shultz-Dobrynin channel, to probe for signs of Soviet flexibility. We have a good story to tell, an admirable record to explain and defend, and we should get on with it.

In the nearly 15 years since the SALT I negotiations began in Helsinki, the Soviets have added some 7,950 medium and long-range nuclear missile warheads to their arsenal—an increase of 515%. *Fully 3,850 of these warheads, an increase of almost 65%, have been added since the SALT II agreement was signed in 1979.* And despite the permissive terms of the agreements between us, the Soviets have resorted to circumvention and violation to sustain a fifteen year strategic build-up of unprecedented proportions.

This dismal history would be reason enough for a new President to try a different approach. And Candidate Reagan's criticism of SALT II, echoed by the Senate Committee on Armed Services which declared it contrary to our national security interests, set the stage for this Administration's effort to obtain sharp reductions, better verification and, in general, agreements that, while more difficult to negotiate, would yield results of military significance.

The "zero option" was one such proposal.⁶ And while it was unacceptable to the Soviets, its embrace by the President turned a tide of opinion that had been running against us and helped to sustain a successful U.S. INF deployment. Above all it was a concrete expression of our desire for an agreement that offered the reality, and not merely the appearance, of a significant and understandable reduction in nuclear arms.

Similarly, our proposal for START, which departed in fundamental ways from SALT II, was—and remains—a sound expression of the arms control objectives that this Administration has put forward as an alternative to the cosmetic results of its predecessors. The 10 major changes that we have subsequently made to the 1982 START proposal, including the "build down" and the offer to balance U.S. against Soviet advantages in the reductions process, has positioned us well to argue that we have been fair, flexible and responsible.⁷ We have negotiated on a broad front, adjusting the elements of our position to encourage the give and take of negotiation. At the same time, and it is this that distinguishes the President from his critics, we have properly refused to travel the path of the Soviet approach—an approach that would allow a 45% increase in ballistic missile warheads and that is structured along the lines of SALT II.

For some weeks a number of experts drawn from the departments have been exploring new “frameworks”⁸ that might be put to the Soviets in the hope of advancing towards a resumption of negotiations and possible agreement. Adoption of a new “framework” or “structure” that parallels SALT II would almost certainly entail abandonment of this Administration’s attempt to break out of the SALT II mold. And since it is only prudent to assume that any such framework we might table would form the basis for further negotiation, it is likely that, in due course, we would find ourselves negotiating largely within the SALT II structure. Were this to happen, we could face the election with something like the SALT II Treaty on the table in Geneva.

Given the history of the conduct of the negotiations thus far, the Soviet walk-out, the broad Congressional support that our current position has attracted (particularly the build down feature) and the flexibility inherent in the President’s willingness to trade off U.S. for Soviet reductions, it is fair to ask whether a new “framework” at this stage would serve our interest. It would certainly create confusion. It would almost certainly run counter to the underlying logic of the position we have taken from the beginning. And it would diminish the clarity of the President’s position as we enter a period in which the defense of that position will be crucial to our domestic politics.

The Soviets have recently adopted a strategy of pressing for concessions on arms control issues other than START or INF. Most of these—chemical weapons, anti-satellite weapons and nuclear testing—entail multilateral negotiations, under United Nations auspices, where serious negotiation is difficult and the opportunity for propaganda is great. Moreover, all are complicated by extreme, if not

insurmountable, verification problems. And taken together, this new Soviet agenda seems aimed at obscuring their Geneva walkout.

The urgent requirement before us is to settle on a working assumption about likely Soviet arms control strategy and to fashion an appropriate response. Given the risks of basing a U.S. strategy on unfounded optimism, a policy of defending the President's record and philosophy, while remaining poised to move if the Soviets desire, should form the keystone of our public policy. We should move quickly to put such a policy in place, and to develop a broad strategy for its implementation.

With all of the above being said, it is still desirable, I believe, to try to secure Soviet agreement at least to consider some or all of the following:

- (a) Renegotiation of the TTBT *with* effective verification;
- (b) A ban on chemical weapons with full rights to on-site inspection for purpose of verification;
- (c) Notification to the other side of *all* ballistic missile tests;
- (d) Agreement *not* to encrypt test parameters;
- (e) Notification of all *major* military exercises.

Some or all of the above, even though it is not "arms reduction," might help us hold the Aspin-Dicks⁹ types who voted for MX last year "if we would be more forthcoming on arms reduction," and could help us with the public opinion of the world, and would not hurt us if the Soviets

agreed. It might put them on the defensive—or they might agree to talk with us. Either result would be good.

I'd be glad to develop further details if you wish.

Cap

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Secretary of Defense Files: FRC 330-87-0023, Box 2, Folder USSR 388.3 1984. Top Secret; Sensitive. In a covering memorandum to Reagan, Weinberger wrote: "As agreed by Bud McFarlane's Senior Arms Control Policy Group, I am forwarding a paper, prepared at my request, to form the basis of Tuesday's NSC discussion. It should elicit a spirited exchange. It is deliberately straightforward. I believe it is important that this issue not be obscured by the tendency to produce a watered-down consensus. Cap."

² Senator Gary Hart (D-Colorado), who ran for President in 1984, lost in the Democratic primary to Walter Mondale.

³ See [footnote 5, Document 184](#). Reagan wrote in his diary on March 6: "met with Sens. Bill Cohen & Joe Biden. They've been to Russia & are all wrapped up in 'Arms Reductions.' I suspect that at least one of them (J.B.) doesn't believe I'm sincere about wanting them." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 325) For information on Vogel's trip to Moscow, see [footnote 2, Document 195](#), and [footnote 3, Document 201](#). Regarding Scowcroft and the Dartmouth Group, see [Document 193](#).

⁴ Needless to say, we must be prepared, on short notice, to engage the Soviets in negotiations should they resume. Our current approach to START—and in particular, our willingness to "trade-off" reductions in our potential advantages for reductions in theirs—is broad enough to

permit rapid negotiations should they be willing. It is unlikely, however, that we could achieve closure on a complete draft treaty before November. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁵ Reference is to U.S. charges that the Soviet Union was using chemical weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. Secretary of State Haig raised the issue with Gromyko in January 1982; see [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 137](#). A Department of State fact sheet released in February 1982 stated that the Soviet Union and its allies were “well prepared to wage chemical warfare.” (*Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 33-36)

⁶ See [footnote 2, Document 2](#).

⁷ Reagan signed NSDD 33, “U.S. Approach to START Negotiations,” on May 14, 1982. See [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 168](#).

⁸ See [Document 185](#).

⁹ Reference is to Congressmen Les Aspin (D-Wisconsin) and Norman Dicks (D-Washington).

201. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, March 23, 1984

Soviet Interest in Arms Control Negotiations in 1984

Summary

The Soviets appear to have adopted a two-pronged strategy on arms control, taking an inflexible line on INF and START, while simultaneously expressing willingness to move ahead on other security issues, and signaling that a breakthrough in US-Soviet relations is possible if Washington shows flexibility in these other areas. They presumably calculate that this strategy enables them to stand firm on the central issues of INF and START, without making themselves appear so intransigent as to rally support for NATO's policies or to demonstrate that they, not the Administration, are responsible for poor US-Soviet relations. Meanwhile, they continue to probe for US flexibility on a range of issues, with the aim of extracting the maximum price for any marked improvement in relations or arms control issues before the US elections. The Politburo will be wary of any major steps unless convinced that significant gains are at hand for the USSR, especially on their fundamental concerns in START and INF. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The Soviet Calculus

1. Two major considerations appear to be behind current Soviet policies on arms control and US-Soviet relations; the need to keep the deadlocked INF and START issues from seriously damaging the Soviet political position in Europe—including the effort to fan anti-INF sentiment—and calculations regarding the US election campaign. [*portion marking not declassified*]

2. The Soviets appear interested in a dialogue with the US that would end the spiraling deterioration in relations. Nonetheless, they have made it clear they are reluctant to do anything that would enhance the reelection prospects of the present Administration by enabling it to claim a major success in the area of US-Soviet relations. At the same time, they apparently believe that if they appear unyielding, the Administration will be able to lay the blame for poor relations on their doorstep and claim that its own attempts at a bilateral improvement have been rebuffed. Moreover, they appear not to have excluded the possibility of some kind of agreement at this time if convinced it would serve their interests. [*portion marking not declassified*]

3. The Soviets appear deeply pessimistic about the prospects for a significant US concession on START and INF, and probably are sensitive to the possibility that by suspending arms control talks and taking military countermeasures, they have made West Europeans less receptive to arguments that the breakdown in the East-West dialogue is due exclusively to US intransigence and belligerence. Moscow nevertheless may continue to hope that domestic pressures in the US, including electoral politics, and increased concern and pressure from Western Europe over the US-Soviet stalemate could prompt the US to alter its current stance to a position more acceptable to Moscow. [*portion marking not declassified*]

4. The Soviets already are trying to heighten these pressures through direct appeals to West European leaders, with whom Moscow has maintained close contact despite earlier warnings about the consequences of the first deployments. In private Soviet demarches at this level, as well as public commentary, they have sought to demonstrate popular opposition to INF, claimed that the US has spurned Soviet efforts to restore the East-West dialogue, and warned that deployment of US missiles subverts the sovereignty of West European countries as well as their "gains" from detente. Moscow might further try to court West European opinion by hinting at willingness to consider multilateral negotiations that would draw the British and French into direct discussion of INF and their own forces' role. It appears more likely at present, however, that the Soviets will try to gain credit by expanding upon their initiatives on non-INF issues in existing multilateral forums such as MBFR, the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, or the CDE. [*portion marking not declassified*]

5. The Soviets also will continue trying to cast the US in the villain's role by encouraging opposition leaders in the INF-basing countries—particularly the Social Democrats in West Germany—to speak out forcefully against INF deployments. Further, Moscow has maintained and perhaps even raised the level of its direct and covert support to the West European peace movement. The Soviets may hope that the existence of deployed missiles—along with announced basing sites—will provide a focus for renewed demonstrations by the dispirited and divided movement. Moscow's efforts in this area probably will be tempered, however, by the concern to avoid the charge of manipulating the peace movement. In addition, it now must face the possibility that elements of the movement could direct their opposition activities against Warsaw Pact

countermeasures. Moreover, Soviet exit from the negotiations makes it difficult for them to recapture the high ground in the contest for public opinion. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Intransigence on Resuming START and INF Talks

6. Following Chernenko's accession, a brief hiatus in the repetition of Moscow's demand that the INF missiles be withdrawn had suggested that the Soviets might be hinting at greater flexibility on resuming talks. There now have been several recent indications that Moscow has decided to maintain its firm line against resuming the Geneva negotiations. In a number of public statements, Soviet leaders have said they will not return to the Geneva talks unless the new US missiles are removed from Europe. In talks on 10-12 March with senior US arms control specialists in Moscow under the auspices of the Dartmouth Conference,² as well as in Chernenko's talks on 13 March with visiting leaders of the West German Social Democratic Party,³ the Soviets also rejected the idea of merging the negotiations,⁴ some implying and others asserting outright that neither negotiation could resume unless NATO's new intermediate-range missiles were withdrawn from Western Europe. [*portion marking not declassified*]

7. Soviet officials at the Dartmouth Conference also dismissed as a solution to INF the "walk-in-the-woods" formula.⁵ By rejecting both the walk-in-the-woods formula and a merger, these officials seemed to be closing the door on two potential avenues which some Soviets had speculated as recently as January could lead to a revival of the talks. [*portion marking not declassified*]

8. Some Soviets have hinted that INF talks could resume this year if the US agreed to a moratorium in the INF deployment schedule and taking the UK and French systems into account somewhere in the arms control negotiations. The most recent statement to this effect was made in mid-March by a representative of the Institute for the USA and Canada at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, who said that INF talks could be resumed in 1984 if the US met these two conditions. A first secretary [*1½ lines not declassified*], also has suggested that the USSR would be more interested in resuming the INF talks if the US met these two conditions. He also raised the possibility of an INF negotiation involving the US, USSR, France, and the UK. [*portion marking not declassified*]

9. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin has taken a more upbeat stance on the prospects for strategic arms negotiations in discussions with correspondents than the general line would indicate. His statements clearly have been intended to portray the USSR, despite its tough public stance, as sincerely interested in movement, and thereby to put pressure on the Administration for greater flexibility. His remarks also probably reflect instructions to keep open a channel through which Moscow's hoped-for movement from the US side might be conveyed. [*portion marking not declassified*]

10. The Soviets almost certainly realize that they eventually must moderate their position if they are to limit NATO INF deployments and US strategic systems through resumed INF and START negotiations. However, while the Soviets hope to use negotiations to limit US strategic programs, their R&D programs provide them with the capability to compete with or without arms control agreements. Strategic offensive systems currently in development and flight-testing provide the Soviets with the basis for

improving their strategic capabilities under SALT II Treaty limits or those of their START proposals, as well as in the absence of any arms control constraints. There is room under SALT II and the Soviet START position for their new MIRVed SLBM systems (the SS-N-20 and SS-NX-23), the ALCM-equipped Bear H and Blackjack heavy bombers, and the MIRVed SS-X-24 ICBM. Further, the claim by the Soviets that their single-RV SS-X-25 is a “modernized” SS-13 is intended to permit deployment of this system as well. While the Soviets at START have thus far insisted that long-range SLCMs and GLCMs be banned, they are testing such systems and are well-positioned to deploy them in the absence of a ban on them. [*portion marking not declassified*]

11. The Soviets have proposed talks for an agreement that would eliminate existing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and ban testing and deployment of all space-based weapons. In addition, they have announced a moratorium on testing ASAT weapons in space, as long as the US refrains from such tests. Their immediate aim probably is to preclude the development and deployment of the US direct-ascent ASAT interceptor, while their longer term aim is to prevent the US from translating its technological capabilities into systems such as space-based lasers that could be used both for ASAT weapons and for ballistic missile defense. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Prospects for Progress on Other Issues

12. Chernenko seemed to imply in his speech of 2 March that an agreement on issues usually regarded as secondary—particularly the banning of chemical weapons and the demilitarization of space—could prepare the way for a “dramatic breakthrough” in US-Soviet relations despite the

impasse in START and INF.⁶ The suggestion that it might be possible to bypass the most intractable issues and achieve progress elsewhere appears intended to improve the Soviet image as a proponent of arms control and reduced international tensions despite the USSR's continued refusal to return to Geneva. At the same time, the Soviets are probing for flexibility on a range of issues where progress would not necessarily require a reversal of fundamental US or Soviet positions. [*portion marking not declassified*]

13. The proposals Chernenko listed represent longstanding Soviet goals and public positions:

- US ratification of the treaties limiting underground nuclear weapons tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes;
- resumption of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty, suspended by the US;
- an agreement to limit weapons in outer space;
- US acceptance of a freeze on nuclear weapons; and
- an agreement to ban chemical weapons, where he said conditions for an accord are “beginning to ripen.”

He hinted that the Soviets, who recently accepted the principle of continuous international monitoring of chemical weapons destruction sites, may be willing to make further moves on chemical weapons verification. He said that they favor an agreement under which there would be effective control of the “whole process of destruction—from beginning to end.” Reliable sources have told the US delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva

that the Soviets are preparing to table a draft treaty to ban chemical weapons. [*portion marking not declassified*]

14. Soviet officials, particularly the Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, Vladimir Shustov, have indicated that the USSR attaches high priority to initiating “unofficial” talks with the US on limiting the deployment of weapons in outer space. A Central Committee staff member, Stanislav Menshikov, arrived in the US recently with the primary purpose, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] of helping organize such a conference. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Menshikov, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] said that there is no need for the US and USSR to resolve differences on INF and START before engaging in a dialogue on other security issues, such as chemical warfare and space weaponry. [*portion marking not declassified*]

15. Chernenko’s claim that a US-Soviet agreement on these issues could signal the start of a sharp improvement in bilateral relations suggests the Soviets might consider such an agreement as partial grounds for a meeting at the highest level. Soviet leaders have made a point of insisting, however, that it is up to the US to act first. Moreover, Moscow may well hold out for a firm US commitment to at least negotiate on fundamental Soviet concerns in START and INF before agreeing to any dramatic bilateral gesture. The Soviets will be looking in particular for signals that the US is willing to consider major steps in accordance with Soviet objectives, such as:

—a freeze on further INF deployments, particularly Pershing IIs;

—an agreement to take into account UK and French systems; or

—an agreement to limit future deployment of US strategic systems the Soviets consider most threatening—SLCMs, ALCMs, MX, or the D-5 SLBM.

The Soviets have been ambiguous on the extent to which they hold progress in START dependent upon US concessions in INF. For now, it appears that they would refuse to resume the strategic negotiations unless satisfied that their central INF concerns would be addressed, but this line is doubtless intended in part to probe US willingness to make such concessions, and a definitive Soviet position is likely to emerge only in response to specific US initiatives. [*portion marking not declassified*]

16. Chernenko also suggested that progress could be made toward agreement on “norms” to govern relations between nuclear powers, particularly an agreement to hold urgent consultations in the event of a situation threatening nuclear war. This area would appear to include current US-Soviet negotiations to upgrade crisis communications and talks aimed at preventing a recurrence of the KAL shootdown. Chernenko, however, raised this possibility separately from those issues which he suggested could lead to a “breakthrough” in relations, perhaps to signal that agreement on this point would not be of comparable significance. [*portion marking not declassified*]

17. Chernenko made no reference on 2 March to the MBFR talks, and the Soviets appear to hold little expectation of an early breakthrough. A deputy director of the Institute for the USA and Canada said in late February that the Soviets would not have agreed to resume the talks had they been bilateral, a remark that suggests Moscow believes the principal advantage of the talks lies in the possibilities they offer for wedge-driving between the US and its allies. This view probably has been strengthened by Western press

reports of differences between the US and West Germany over the Allied position. Even if the Western allies were to agree on softening their position regarding prior agreement on data, the Soviets would be unlikely to accept Western proposals on verification to the extent necessary for an early breakthrough in the talks. [*portion marking not declassified*]

18. Since the beginning of the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe, Soviet spokesmen have been stressing the importance of an agreement on the non-use of force as a step toward improving the climate of East-West relations. Chernenko, however, did not refer to this proposal, and although the Soviets appear to attach greater importance than the US to declaratory measures, it is doubtful that a moderation of US opposition on this point alone would evoke any response from them on more substantive issues. [*portion marking not declassified*]

19. Soviet spokesmen have also listed a number of other issues where they claim that agreement by the West would lead to a significant lowering of international tensions. These include a pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, a nonaggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, an agreement to reduce military spending, and the establishment of nuclear-free zones, including northern Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean. The Soviets doubtless realize that these proposals, where they are not purely cosmetic, would require major strategic concessions by the West, and the proposals therefore appear largely rhetorical, rather than serious attempts to find common ground. By dint of repetition, however, they may have acquired some real significance in Soviet eyes, and it is possible that US willingness to consider the more innocuous among them could be part of

a package to improve bilateral relations. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Uncertainties and Soviet Political Dynamics

20. While the ultimate authority for approving arms control policy rests with the Politburo, the formulation of key decisions in this area takes place in the Defense Council, a group of about half a dozen political and military leaders. Functioning as the Defense Council's executive secretariat, the General Staff—through its Main Operations Directorate—coordinates the flow of information to the Defense Council decisionmakers. This arrangement assures the military a highly influential role in the arms control policy-making process. Information and policy proposals are channeled through the General Staff from the Defense Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the Military Industrial Commission, and specific Central Committee staffs, notably the International Department and International Information Department. Individuals from the Academy of Sciences and probably the personal secretariats of Politburo members can also inform Soviet leaders on arms control issues, but do not have access to the details of military plans and programs. [*portion marking not declassified*]

21. Of those highly visible Soviet spokesmen on arms control issues, three have inter-agency access to official arms control policy information. They are Chief of the General Staff Nikolay Ogarkov, his first deputy, Sergey Akhromeyev, and Nikolay Chervov, chief of the Main Operation Directorate's Treaty Negotiating Directorate. Vadim Zagladin of the International Department and Leonid Zamyatin of the International Information Department are believed to have some limited inter-agency access, as do high-level officials of the Foreign Ministry. Public figures of

prominence such as Aleksandr Bovin, an *Izvestiya* commentator, and Georgiy Arbatov, Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, probably have little information on the specifics of the formulation of arms control beyond that gleaned through personal connections with other members of the political elite and from instructions on the party line. [*portion marking not declassified*]

22. Evidence of current power relationships and individual views on arms control within the Politburo is admittedly sparse. We believe, however, that the strategy toward relations with the US suggested in Chernenko's speech reflects a Politburo decision that was made before Andropov's death. [*portion marking not declassified*]

23. We do not know the full range of differences within the Politburo on US-Soviet relations. The extent to which Chernenko and his colleagues will stand fast in their demand for significant changes in US positions, especially before the US elections, is unclear. They appear to be concerned, however, that any show of compromise in Moscow prior to some US move would be interpreted as a Soviet retreat in the face of a stiffening American defense posture. [*portion marking not declassified*]

24. The evidence at least suggests therefore that the Soviet leadership in the coming months is unlikely to approve any measures that imply a major breakthrough in relations unless they are convinced that some US concessions will be forthcoming on significant arms control issues. [*portion marking not declassified*]

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, March 9–May 10, 1984, Super Sensitive Documents.

Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. This paper was prepared in the Office of Soviet Analysis. Kimmit circulated the paper to agency representatives on March 24 under a covering memorandum that noted that it was “developed to support discussion of the status and prospects for major nuclear arms control negotiations (INF and START) at the National Security Council Meeting on Tuesday, March 27 at 2 p.m.”

² See [Document 193](#).

³ Chernenko met with Vogel in Moscow on March 12 to discuss INF deployments and arms control. (Telegram 2949 from Moscow, March 13; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840164-0707)

⁴ The merger of START and INF negotiations had been discussed by U.S. policymakers since the Soviet walk-out on November 23, 1983, in Geneva (see [Documents 145](#) and [161](#)). At the March 27 NATO Special Consultative Group meeting, chaired by Burt, there was a discussion of deployment status and options for moving forward with the Soviets: “The SCG discussed U.S. and Italian papers on Soviet options, with the common conclusion that there were reasons to think that the Soviets might believe a START/INF merger would not serve the USSR’s interests.” (Telegram 2424 from USNATO, March 29; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840205-1029) Papers and analysis on consequences of a START/INF merger are in telegram 1891 from USNATO, March 12; telegram 7181 from Rome, March 16; and telegram 82042 to multiple Western European posts, March 21. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840161-0901, D840176-0323, and D840184-0805, respectively)

⁵ See [footnote 3](#), [Document 6](#).

⁶ See [Document 187](#).

202. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 27, 1984

SUBJECT

Arms Control in 1984

This is a critical year for arms control. In the United States, voters will choose between two very different visions of how to conduct the process. In the Soviet Union a new leadership faces a choice between continuing to stress propaganda aspects of arms control or returning to the more serious and confidential discussions of an earlier period. It will be an important year for our European Allies, who are just emerging from the trauma of INF deployment, who face major uncertainties about the future policies of both Moscow and Washington, and who must respond to strong demands from their own publics to revitalize the East-West dialogue.

Thus far, the Soviets have maintained a tough line on the central nuclear arms control issues, continuing to assert that a resumption of START and INF negotiations is impossible without major U.S. concessions. They have expressed skepticism over your call for a more constructive dialogue. Their reaction is dictated by a number of factors. First, they have taken a self-acknowledged political defeat on INF, which will take time to absorb. Second, their leadership situation, uncertain for half a decade as Brezhnev weakened, only to be replaced by an ill Andropov and now by Chernenko, still seems to be evolving. Finally, the Soviets must balance their probable preference for a Democratic victory in November against their clear incentives to negotiate seriously before the elections in

view of the likelihood that they will be dealing with you for four more years.

Suspicious of our motives, Chernenko in his letters to you has nonetheless expressed a cautious interest in testing our seriousness about arms control dialogue. Thus, while stonewalling on START/INF, the Soviets have indicated a willingness to move ahead bilaterally on several lesser matters, underscoring their interest in MBFR, CW, TTBT, ASAT and hinting at a compromise between our respective positions at the Stockholm CDE conference. They have stressed various possible declaratory measures as well. In doing so, they have suggested that progress on these issues could lead them to initiate a substantive dialogue on the more basic problems, including nuclear arms control.

Some of these Soviet offers (such as a no-first-use of nuclear weapons pledge) would clearly be to our disadvantage and are non-starters. In other areas, the development of new Western proposals are already underway; we should be in a position to present initiatives to the Soviets in the Vienna MBFR talks and the Geneva CW negotiations in the coming weeks. We have interagency groups examining questions related to outer space arms control and the limited nuclear testing bans and expect to continue our bilateral exchanges with the Soviets on the fringes of the CDE in Stockholm. Specific opportunities for progress in some of the fields may become possible.

We should clearly recognize the difficulties involved and not put ourselves in the position of rewarding Soviet intransigence. We do not see the likelihood of a major breakthrough in either START or INF in the near future. Nonetheless, as Art Hartman has noted, the leadership situation in Moscow and accompanying Soviet policy decisions has not yet been finalized. It is possible, for

instance, that we may see a more activist Chernenko if he is elected to the Chairmanship of the Presidium later this spring. Because we cannot predict the course of Soviet action with any certainty, it would be a mistake to build our strategy solely on the likelihood of the Soviets adopting a more positive approach. It would be equally self-defeating for us to assume in the current situation that the Soviets will make no move at all this year. We need to be prepared to deal quickly and effectively with either prospect.

If we find that the Soviets are not disposed to take more than minor steps forward with us this year, you ultimately may want to move beyond our current emphasis on confidential diplomacy to enunciate publicly a vision of U.S. arms control policy for your second term. Such a declaration, which might contain new initiatives, would be an effective response to the political pressures which inactivity on nuclear arms control will inevitably engender as the year progresses. At the same time, such a statement would set the Western agenda for 1985 and could pave the way for a resumption of nuclear negotiations in the new year, both in perception and reality.

In sum, we must be ready to engage in serious, substantive arms control discussions whenever—and indeed whether—the Soviets signal they are ready to resume business. I know there are those who feel that our best tactic with the Soviets, with our Allies, and with our public is to rest upon our arms control record of the past three years, call upon the Soviets to return to Geneva, and emphasize non-compliance and the difficulties of verification. They would argue we should refrain from putting forward, or even looking internally at, any new steps until the Soviets do so. There is logic to this approach—why should we negotiate with ourselves when our arms control objectives are correct and our arms control principles are sound? There is

also a certain emotional appeal—the Soviets walked out; why should we make concessions to bring them back? I subscribe to the logic and reject any notion that we should—or need to—compromise any of our basic goals. At the same time, however, one must examine the effect of this approach upon the three audiences we must seek to influence.

For the Soviets, this is the most convenient U.S. strategy, the one that plays best to the strengths of their own position, and which puts the least pressure upon them for change. Under such an approach the Soviets would not be forced to react to new U.S. initiatives, their inflexibility would not be revealed anew, and their accusations of U.S. inflexibility would, over time, be given added weight by some.

For our Allies, this approach creates the greatest incentive for uncoordinated initiatives on their part to build bridges to the USSR, and to suggest ways to get the nuclear negotiations back on track. Europe's Foreign Ministers (UK, FRG and Portugal) and heads of state (France) are already booking their reservations in Moscow. The flurry of such visits throughout 1984 will create its own momentum for new initiatives.

Finally, such a stand pat approach, if it is to work, requires that we persuade our public throughout the balance of this year that the Soviets will accept in this Administration's second four-year term those arms control arrangements which they refused to adopt in the first. This will be a difficult case to make. The Soviets will not give us any help.

The evolution through 1984 of our arms control strategy obviously must depend upon a number of factors, including Congressional pressures on the defense budget and

strategic modernization program, Allied actions, and the Soviet response to our current overtures. It will require that our approach retain a degree of flexibility, that we continue our quiet exploration of possible new steps in START/INF, and that we look closely at possible areas for movement on selected secondary issues as well.

We need not make a decision on the details of any new approach at this time. I feel strongly, however, that we should not, by ceasing our preparations now, rob you of the ability to make such a decision at some appropriate moment in the future.

1 Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, March 1-30, 1984. Secret; Sensitive. In a March 26 covering memorandum to Shultz, Howe and Kelly wrote: "In accordance with your instructions, we have reworked both versions of the memorandum to the President on arms control. The major difference between them is that the first version at Tab A addresses START/INF alone, while the version at Tab B briefly mentions other areas of arms control as well. The argument for the latter is that the Soviets have indicated that movement in other areas could help with resumption of nuclear arms control talks." Shultz signed the memorandum at Tab B, which was sent by special courier to the White House on March 27 at 7:30 a.m. in preparation for the NSC meeting that afternoon.

203. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, March 27, 1984, 2-3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Nuclear Arms Control Discussions (S)

PARTICIPANTS

The President

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

George P. Shultz

OSD

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

CIA

Director William J. Casey

JCS

General John W. Vessey, Jr.

ACDA

Director Kenneth L. Adelman

CHAIRMAN, U.S. INF DELEGATION

Ambassador Paul H. Nitze

CHAIRMAN, U.S. START DELEGATION

Ambassador Edward Rowny

WHITE HOUSE

Robert C. McFarlane

NSC

Ronald F. Lehman

Minutes

Mr. McFarlane opened the meeting by focusing the discussion on two questions: (1) what is the Soviet strategy toward arms control, and (2) what does that imply about

our behavior for arms control, for dealing with our allies and for handling Congress? The CIA paper indicates that the Soviet Union is following a two pronged strategy aimed at diverting attention away from their walkout of START and INF and yet permitting them to keep the high ground by treating other issues such as ASAT, CDE, “no first use,” etc.² The Soviet Union has been implementing that strategy through private groups and Congress to get the United States to engage on the Soviet agenda. We also have a positive agenda: CBMs, Hotline, MBFR, CW, and others. (S)

The United States can compile a positive agenda as well. We have the community of advisors looking at CIA study and asking how we should deal with the Soviet Union in arms control. Mr. President, you have received from your advisors and have read a number of papers expressing views as to how best to proceed.³ Overall, there is much agreement. For example, everyone agrees that we should reject the Soviet agenda and establish our own agenda. However, there is also some disagreement on what should be our positive agenda and how we should deal with negative Soviet behavior such as non-compliance and the walk-outs. In short, we do not have complete agreement on how we validate the record of three years of effort. Today, we will hear from the President’s key advisors. (S)

Secretary Weinberger indicated that his paper begins by asking the question, “What is the interest of the Soviet Union in reaching an agreement this year?” and it concludes with the answer that there is very little evidence that they are interested in an agreement. We need to focus on the content of an agreement, not on agreement for agreement’s sake. The Soviet Union has little interest in giving the President a victory. They would only give him an agreement for which he could not take credit. What are they interested in then? A SALT II agreement that did not

provide for reductions. To get an agreement, they will require us to make major concessions. Those who talk of a new framework are really talking about going back to SALT II 1/2. The Soviet Union has walked out of three talks. We should make our case based on the merits. The zero option was very popular and the only reason it was rejected was because the Soviet Union wanted a monopoly. They walked out because we would not agree to their having a monopoly. We want more than a piece of paper; we want real reductions. They are violating SALT II; SALT II means we won't worry about throw-weight. We should be vigorously defending our proposals and pressing the Soviet Union to return to the table. That doesn't mean that there are not things we can negotiate now. We should press to renegotiate the TTBT. We can negotiate a full ban on chemical weapons with full verification. We can negotiate notification of ballistic missile tests and Hotline improvements. If we become too eager, the Soviet Union will sense weakness. And even if we get them back to the negotiations, they can set you up for a later walkout when it will hurt most. The reality is that no one across the table is in charge—they have a collegial organization. Chernenko is not only not responding, he wouldn't even receive the letter that Scowcroft carried. We should emphasize our proposals, we should make clear that we are ready, and we should speak out on the compliance issue. (S)

Secretary Shultz responded with ten do's and don'ts, really, six don'ts and four do's. (1) Don't base policy on speculations about the Soviet Union. (2) Don't negotiate with ourselves or Congress. (3) Don't make concessions for the purpose of getting Soviets back to the table, but we can reorganize our positions to make them more presentable. (4) Don't get into the position where you need an agreement. (5) It is a mistake to change our positive posture on arms control into a negative one because this

risks loss of publics, the Congress, and our allies. (6) Don't rest on past work; let's keep working to be prepared. The process is veto prone and therefore we can't let fear of leaks delay the effort. (7) We must continue to set positive messages that we are prepared to deal across the board—look at START and INF for better ways to present our position. (8) We should be prepared to take parts of the Soviet position and shouldn't be against everything in SALT. The Secretary of Defense uses the word “framework” as if it were a swear word. We need to move on MBFR and we need to go further, depending on the Soviet response. We should move quickly on the CW Treaty and the Hotline. We should move on CDE and we could move on TTBT if we could manage a decision to take it on forthrightly. (9) We should look at the fundamental differences between us and the Soviets in START. You can debate over whether START or INF is more important, but I don't see how you can move on START without considering INF. (10) We should look to see what is important for us, and with all due respect to the CIA analysis, they could be wrong. (S)

Director Adelman said that he agreed with much of what had been said. *Adelman* reminded the President that he worked with the campaign during the hostage crisis and negotiations with Iran and he saw the dangers of setting oneself up for an agreement—the risks are great. To answer the mail, we must show that we have sound policies and are serious about arms control. We need to identify areas where movement is possible. In INF, *Adelman* and *Nitze* have identified a proposal that would have the Soviets reduce to a level which we would stop at. We could negotiate such a step or it could be a declaratory policy. We could attempt to reach a US-Soviet understanding on non-proliferation. We could develop rules of the road or proper behavior through space-CBMs in the CD. We should work with our allies to set the stage for a policy of no early use of

nuclear weapons—we can look at different ways to package this and move slowly and cautiously. (S)

General Vessey put forth a military view. We must maintain the momentum of our defense build-up at the highest levels possible. We must protect the President's strategic modernization program. We must keep the Alliance together, and we must cap or reverse the Soviet military build-up—Soviets can't or won't negotiate until after elections. The Scowcroft coalition and support on the Hill need tending. Allies are not carrying the load. (S)

Director Casey agreed that we must make judgments about the Soviets but argued that we have a fair amount of history. We can assume that Moscow is not anxious to help the President, but they don't want to appear intransigent. They believe that treaties in START and INF are out of reach. Clearly, the prospects for getting an agreement are remote. We should continue to assess our own interest. We can accomplish something on second order issues. At CDE, we can trade Western confidence building measures for a non-aggression pact. (S)

Ambassador Rowny recognized that there was not a consensus on how to get the Soviet Union back to the table, but believed that they might even return on their own. The Soviet Union didn't really explore what was in the trade-offs for them. They may come back when they see that there is really something in it for them. If we show a little ankle, maybe a little thigh, then you can get movement. There is no chance for a full START agreement this year, and speculation on an Interim Agreement is dangerous. Vladivostok is a better precedent, an aide memoire is safest. The Soviet Union never closed the door on START; they still want to limit D-5 and ALCM. (S)

Ambassador Nitze agreed that we should seek US objectives, but we are already clear on that. The issue is tactical. It is not impossible to get an agreement, but 90% chance you won't. It is wholly unlikely that Moscow will negotiate seriously in an election year. What does one do? One does the CW treaty—that is a perfectly solid thing to do. There is no chance the Soviets will agree to that. But it is dangerous to be solidly engaged in START or INF in an election year. (S)

Secretary Weinberger commented further that he didn't disagree with Secretary Shultz's ten points, only with the interpretation of them. At this time, we will have to pay a very high price to get an agreement. We have all agreed that we shouldn't make any concessions to get them back to the table. All agreed that we don't want to get into a position where we must have an agreement. We can keep up our work, but we don't want to further weaken our proposals. We can keep sending messages that we are ready to negotiate, but that is hard to do in an empty room. I agree that we should do what we can do in lesser areas, but I'm very worried about space arms control. Also, talk of a START "framework" is a codeword—I'm opposed. (S)

The *President* suggested that we are all not as far apart as it might seem. There is no question that the Soviet Union is trying to make us look non-cooperative. I believe the Soviets want to avoid the onus for having walked out of Geneva. In my answer to the letter from Chernenko, we should recognize that we have opposite views on who is threatened. We should cite their quotations that are threatening to us; we should cite their build-up. Then we could cite the fact that in the 1940's, we proposed to do away with all these systems and they said no. Nineteen times since then, we have tried to reach agreements, for example, Eisenhower's open sky proposal. We can't go on

negotiating with ourselves. We can't be supplicants crawling, we can't look like failures. I've read the papers and made some notes. Let me share them with you. They want to avoid the onus of walking out, therefore, it is unlikely that they will give us anything in START and INF right now. We want an agreement, but we want a good agreement. I do not intend to make unilateral concessions to get them back to the table, but I believe we must have a full credible agenda on arms control. Maybe we could build a record. Mitterrand believed that they would give us the cold shoulder for several months, therefore, we will need to do lesser things, MBFR, chemical weapons, confidence building, notification of all ballistic missile tests, agreement not to encrypt, and CDE. But we shouldn't let them off the hook on START and INF; we must keep the pressure on. To do this, we need solid, flexible positions on both START and INF. (S)

The *President* continued, I don't want to fall into the trap of SALT II, but if there are some things that are good, then we shouldn't ignore them simply because they are a part of SALT II. For example, having a launcher limit isn't wrong, so long as it is matched by warhead and throw-weight limits. In short, we need a position which takes part of their approach and melds it with ours so that they have a fig leaf for coming off their position. I think my letter to Chernenko should be substantive and positive along these lines, and stressing that they have an obligation to resume START and INF talks. Perhaps we should offer to have Ed Rowny and Paul Nitze engage in private talks with the Russians. I would like to table the chemical treaty before we set off for China.⁴ I think the Senior Arms Control Policy Group should accelerate their work and present me with options for new START/INF positions within a few weeks. This is for us, not for the public. Maybe we should consider a speech in a few months to bring out our record. George (Shultz), I

want you to be our public spokesman on arms control. Leaks and gratuitous backgrounders have got to stop. I understand we have procedures for dealing with clearing testimony. I think we should work in private channels, but we will not crawl, we will build a record. (S)

Mr. McFarlane noted that we have our instructions and now we have to get down to work. (S)

The *President* asked if anyone had any disagreements. (S)

Secretary Weinberger expressed concern that the President's guidance not be misunderstood. In a few days, the *New York Times* may be reporting that the President has ordered new proposals on START and INF. Aren't we talking about what we didn't say, but could say, about our proposals? (S)

Ambassador Rowny noted that the Soviet Union has not listened to all that we had to say in Geneva. (S)

Ambassador Nitze volunteered that what we were really talking about was fleshing out our positions. (S)

The *President* said that Director Adelman had a good idea on INF about their reducing to a level which we would reach at the end of 1985. Something like that might be an option worth looking at. (S)

Secretary Weinberger said that some of our allies might use this as an excuse not to do what must be done on deployments. (S)

Director Adelman agreed with Secretary Weinberger. (S)

Secretary Weinberger said that we should agree that we will fill out our position. (S)

The *President* noted that his letter to Chernenko offers an opportunity to get their attention. Have we given enough attention to the fact that they have a climate of insecurity? (S)

Mr. McFarlane noted that we will press on with the guidance, noting that we will make no pre-emptive concessions, flesh out our positions and be ready if they return, and prepare to table a chemical weapons treaty before the China trip. (S)

¹ Source: National Security Council, Institutional Files, NSPG Meetings, Box SR-104, NSPG 104. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. There is no drafting information on the minutes. Although titled as a “National Security Planning Group Meeting,” this is listed in the President’s Daily Diary as a National Security Council meeting and is listed at the Reagan Library as National Security Council Meeting 104. NSPG 104 took place on December 17, 1984. In a memorandum to Kraemer and Linhard, conveying draft notes of this NSC meeting, Lehman wrote: “Both of you should study the minutes and notes carefully. From now on we should view ourselves as a task force designed to lay out for Bud and the President the best gameplan for the next year. We can draw upon the interagency, but the time has come for us to put down on paper what it is we really think can and should be done in arms control this year in terms of tactics, issues, and public statements. In truth there is a vacuum and the President is obviously looking for someone or some process to fill it. We have no choice but to step in.” (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, SACPG—NSDD 137—Arms Control April 2, 1984)

² See [Document 201](#).

³ See [Documents 200](#) and [202](#).

⁴ Reagan was scheduled to make a State visit to China from April 26 to May 1.

204. Memorandum From the Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (Meyer) to Director of Central Intelligence Casey, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (McMahon), and the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (Gates)¹

Washington, March 29, 1984

SUBJECT: [*1 line not declassified*]

[*8 paragraphs (20 lines) not declassified*]

[*1½ lines not declassified*] General Atkeson strongly recommends that NFIB Principals meet [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. He believes we should ask NSA to reexamine what we know about Soviet reactions to Able Archer 83. Was the Soviet response what we would expect if in fact they were anticipating a first-strike? Did we detect additional anomalies which were not brought to Community attention at the time? Note the attached NID item from 10 Nov 83, which does suggest that the Soviets responded to Able Archer 83 in an unusual fashion.²

5. You should be aware that on 3 April the US will begin a set of exercises led by NIGHT TRAIN, a worldwide procedural nuclear command post exercise. These will include a live firing of a naval Poseidon missile. If in fact the Soviets were scared by Able Archer, these upcoming exercises could really frighten them. This raises the question of whether you want to make the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate officials aware of the possibility that the Soviet level of concern may be considerably higher than generally believed.

Herbert E. Meyer

Attachment

Intelligence Report³

[*location not declassified*], March 20, 1984

[*11 pages not declassified*]

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 88T00528R: Policy Files (1982-1984), Box 1, Folder 1: VC/NIC Chron January-March 1984. Top Secret; [*codeword not declassified*].

² See [Document 134](#).

³ Top Secret; [*codeword not declassified*].

205. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 30, 1984

SUBJECT

Conversations with Dobrynin and his Deputy

Over lunch the past two days, Art Hartman and Rick Burt have separately had constructive conversations with Ambassador Dobrynin and his Deputy Sokolov. The talks will provide a good basis for my meeting with Dobrynin on Monday² (assuming his swollen foot has healed sufficiently for him to come to the Department) and for Art's meeting with Gromyko on Tuesday. The main content of the conversations is given below.

Treatment of Scowcroft: Dobrynin told Art that Moscow had thought our Scowcroft effort was a trick. The people there (read Gromyko) are "very sensitive" about these things, he said, and we should have taken time to better prepare the way. Art responded that we had taken the time, that he had discussed the trip with Dobrynin and had gone over it in detail with Gromyko.³ He added that the Soviets had missed an important opportunity to talk with Scowcroft. Dobrynin confirmed that the offer of a Deputy Foreign Minister was a deliberate action to respond to a U.S. "trick".

U.S.-Soviet Atmospherics: Art complained about the message the Soviets are passing out in Moscow, noting that while Dobrynin says they want to move ahead, his people in Moscow are telling everyone there is no hope in dealing with the Administration. Dobrynin said this had not come from official Soviets, "only Arbatov, who has non-

governmental duties". Art noted that Arbatov, Falin, and others had turned off an important group of Americans. Dobrynin promised to report Art's complaints about the treatment of the Dartmouth group to Moscow. Art also asked why people were being told in Moscow that U.S. efforts were merely election-year politics. Dobrynin said that "maybe this was so, but why wait?", adding that over the years they have learned that regardless of the promises made in Presidential campaigns, once in office the foreign policy approach remains essentially the same.

START/INF: When Dobrynin raised next steps in our dialogue, Art noted that we have put a full agenda on the table, but the Soviet side has not been very responsive. He noted that our START ideas put forward in September had considerable promise and should be given careful study. Dobrynin said they had not found them all that interesting. Art also told Dobrynin the present Soviet position on INF is hopeless and we are waiting for them to come forward with a more reasonable position.

TTBT: When Art mentioned TTBT, Dobrynin commented that if the U.S. could do something in this area (even if we make an effort on the Hill and it fails), it would make an important impression on Moscow. Rick was specifically invited to lunch by Sokolov to discuss TTBT.⁴ During their conversation, Rick noted the impasse created by the Soviet position against renegotiation and our need to resolve political and verification problems. Sokolov suggested the Soviets might agree to a separate understanding on verification to be negotiated and made public following U.S. ratification of the TTBT. Rick said any agreement would have to be reached beforehand so that it would form part of our rationale for asking the Senate to ratify the agreement. Sokolov said this might be possible if the U.S. side agreed not to make public either the separate agreement or the

fact it was being negotiated until the time the President announced he was seeking ratification.

CTB: Both Dobrynin and Sokolov asked about CTB and were told there was no chance to move forward on this now. They suggested we look closely at TTBT instead.

Outer Space: Both Soviet diplomats also said Moscow was very concerned about outer space and hoped we could move to negotiations on ASAT. Art pointed Dobrynin to your last letter to Chernenko.⁵ Dobrynin said they know their ASAT technology is poor and assume ours is great. We must see if it can be kept under control now, he said, because if it is not, the Soviet side will do all it can to catch up. Sokolov told Rick Moscow is willing to take all necessary steps to dismantle their ASAT system as part of an agreement to ban all such systems. Rick said we wanted to know what steps they would be willing to take that would allow us to verify their system had been dismantled. Sokolov said he would get back to us on this subject.

CDE: Sokolov said that in response to our complaints, they had decided to allow their Ambassador in Stockholm to have more leeway in discussions with Jim Goodby at CDE. Rick said we noted the change and, as a result, Goodby had invited their man to Washington for further discussions.⁶ Sokolov commented that the Soviets were afraid we would exploit such a visit to show the world it was “business as usual” between us. Rick suggested we discuss the public rationale beforehand and Sokolov seemed interested. Dobrynin asked Art about our position on their Non-Use-Of-Force proposal at Stockholm, adding that they know we are not interested No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons. Art reminded Dobrynin that we also have some things on the table there (our transparency measures) that we want.

Other Arms Control: When Art noted that we will put forward our CW treaty soon, Dobrynin indicated he knew we would not reach an agreement on this issue, but he praised the effort nevertheless. They agreed that the Hotline issue is going well and that we should be able to get an agreement in the next round.

Bilateral Issues: Both Soviets were upbeat on moving forward on the bilateral issues. Dobrynin was optimistic on the maritime boundary negotiations. He confirmed that the Soviets are ready to move ahead on an exchanges agreement "as soon as you are". He said they were also interested in moving on the Consulates. In this connection, Dobrynin commented that they know full well we want these agreements to get deeper into Soviet society, but that on their side they need the foreign exchange from cultural groups and he needs a Consulate in New York. Rick asked Sokolov about the apparent Soviet effort to link the Aeroflot issue with opening of the Consulates. When Sokolov suggested a tie to an exchanges agreement instead, Rick told him such linkages sounded like a runaround to us and that each issue should be negotiated on its merits. Sokolov appeared to accept this. Rick also emphasized the need for them to take constructive steps in Montreal on the technical measures we have discussed to increase the safety of the Northern Pacific airways.

Regional Issues: Although regional issues were not discussed at any length, Dobrynin did indicate to Art the strong interest they had in engaging us more deeply on the trouble spots around the world. He mentioned the Middle East in particular in this regard, bring up Gromyko's pet project for an international conference. Art said they should be able to do better than that old proposal.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations (March 1984) 3/3. Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed this memorandum, indicating he saw it. In a March 28 Information Memorandum, Burt briefed Shultz on Hartman's meeting with Dobrynin earlier that day. Shultz's handwritten note in the margin instructed Burt to "turn into a memo I can hand to the President on Friday. GPS." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 2C, 1984 Soviet Union, March).

² Monday, April 2. For a record of this meeting, see [Document 209](#).

³ See [Document 193](#).

⁴ According to telegram 92817 to Moscow, March 30, Burt met Sokolov for lunch at the Soviet Embassy, where they discussed TTBT, CTB, space arms control, CDE, and bilateral issues. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840005-0227)

⁵ See [Document 190](#).

⁶ In an April 28 privacy channel telegram from Goodby in Moscow to Shultz, Goodby reported: "In this message I forward my personal impressions of the discussions here during the past days. I spoke along the lines we agreed in Washington. Grinevski did not tip his hand very much, but evidently the Soviets are prepared to negotiate some concrete confidence building measures in the context of an understanding on reciprocal assurances against the use of force. The outlook is for hard sledding, however. Grinevski had problems with our proposals on exchange of information and on notifications of mobilization activities. Our key concept of notifying 'out of garrison activities' also seemed to trouble him. On the other hand, he stipulated that the Soviets were prepared to negotiate agreements for advance notification of certain military activities above a specified numerical level (which he declined to identify), invitations of observers to such activities, and some form of

verification.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, April 1-30, 1984, Super Sensitive Documents)

206. National Security Decision Directive 137¹

Washington, March 31, 1984

US Nuclear Arms Control Strategy for 1984 (U)

After giving the matter considerable thought, I have reached the following conclusions concerning how we should deal with the Soviet Union on nuclear arms control during this year. (C)

First of all, I believe that we have the opportunity to deal with the Soviet Union from more of a position of strength than in previous years. This is due to the progress that we have made over the last three years in a number of areas. Perhaps of greatest importance is that we have established the basis for a national, bi-partisan consensus in support of our strategic modernization program. Based on this consensus, this critical modernization program is now moving from the discussion stage, where it had been stalled for a number of years, to the deployment of fielded capability. (C)

With the continued help of all those involved, steady progress in implementing our strategic modernization program will help us gradually to reverse the existing adverse trends in certain key indicators of the strategic nuclear balance. In doing so, it will provide us the basic leverage we need to do more than simply negotiate arms control agreements. It will, over time, generate the incentives to the Soviet Union needed to put us in a position to negotiate meaningful and effectively verifiable agreements, agreements that both enhance world stability and our security, and that permit significant reductions in

the nuclear arsenals of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
(C)

In addition, over the past year it has become clear that the Soviet Union has failed in its attempt to drive a wedge in the linkage between the United States and our NATO allies. Over the last few years, we have had nearly continuous, intensive consultations with our NATO partners. This process has also added to our strength. Our allies have not only stood squarely by us as we implemented the negotiation track of the 1979 NATO "dual track" decision.² They have also sustained the NATO LRINF modernization decision and deployments are currently in progress in the United Kingdom, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany. (C)

As a result of this Soviet failure, the Soviet Union is now in the difficult position of seeking means to avoid their clear responsibility for walking away from both the START and INF negotiations. However, no matter what they now choose to do, the legacy of their actions will continue to haunt them and the mantle of responsibility will sit heavy on their shoulders. (C)

Given this situation, I believe that the United States should stay firmly on the high road that it has traveled thus far in pursuit of meaningful, equitable, verifiable arms control involving significant reductions in nuclear arsenals. This means that we will not compromise our principles by chasing expedient agreement. We will not entertain proposals which involve preemptive concessions to attempt to entice the Soviets back into negotiations before they sincerely wish to sit with us and solve problems. And, we will not reward Soviet intransigence, thus turning their policy failure into victory and dissipating the strength we

have accumulated due to the principled, yet flexible stance that we have taken over the last three years. (C)

On the other hand, maintaining the high road does mean that, while we avoid the pitfalls cited above, we will continue vigorously to conduct a sincere, positive effort to reach agreement with the Soviet Union. While encouraging the Soviets to return to the START and INF tables in Geneva, we will remain ready to talk at any time and in any place without preconditions. We will take every appropriate opportunity to explain patiently the virtue of our sound, flexible positions in both START and INF. We will use every appropriate avenue to explore ways of finding appropriate ways to bridge the distance between the requirements of our principled positions and the legitimate concerns of the Soviet Union. We will remain prepared to discuss means of trading areas of U.S. advantage of concern to the Soviet Union for areas of Soviet advantage of concern to the United States and our Allies. And, we will make full use of time during which we wait for a positive Soviet response to fully prepare ourselves to exploit opportunities that may present themselves for making progress towards meaningful agreements that meet our criteria. (C)

Toward this goal, the Senior Arms Control Policy Group (SACPG) will complete, on a priority basis, its current efforts toward identifying and evaluating for me the full range of potential U.S. options in the START and INF areas under likely alternative scenarios. This work should address options which flesh out and enhance our current position. However, it should also identify the key differences between the U.S. and Soviet positions, and identify options that could, under certain conditions, bridge those differences. I do not intend nor will I permit us to repeat the mistakes made by previous arms control agreements. However, if elements of previous agreements

put in the right context meet our needs, we should not ignore them. Finally, the SACPG work should also address likely Soviet initiatives and prepare us to appropriately respond to them. (S)

This SACPG activity should serve as the primary clearing house for the various ideas that have been suggested about these topics. This work will have the priority support of all agencies and should be completed with a report submitted to me by May 5.³ (S)

It is essential that the task given to the Senior Arms Control Policy Group be accomplished promptly, thoroughly, and on a close-hold basis and without the unauthorized disclosure of the nature of the work or the various options being studied. Taken out of the proper context, the unauthorized disclosure of this task could be misinterpreted with severe consequences to the fundamental interests of the United States. The National Security Advisor will clear in advance any statements used in Congressional testimony, in consultations with our Allies, made on the record or on background with the press, and made publicly as related to this task of the Senior Policy Group. (S)

We will exploit opportunities as they present themselves to provide the Soviet Union further information about the flexibility that is inherent in the U.S. START and INF positions. To this end, I would like a letter drafted for my signature to the leader of the Soviet Union. This letter should note that I recognize that the United States and the Soviet Union do hold opposite views on who is threatened. It should explain fully the basis for the U.S. concern, citing Soviet statements threatening to the U.S. and the record of Soviet arms build-up. It should note the history of U.S. initiatives aimed at reducing tensions. It should make clear

the continued, sincere U.S. interest in meaningful, equitable and effectively verifiable agreements which would reduce the size of nuclear arsenals. It should highlight the flexibility in the current U.S. positions and our readiness to find appropriate ways for trading U.S. areas of advantage that are of concern to the Soviet Union for Soviet areas of advantage that are of concern for the U.S. and its allies. Finally, it should make clear the readiness of the U.S. to resume both the START and INF negotiations and should encourage the Soviets to reopen a constructive dialogue with us on these matters. (S)

A draft of this letter should be available for my review by April 7.⁴ (S)

We will move forward in those other areas in which there may be prospects for progress toward meaningful agreements. For example, the U.S. draft Chemical Warfare Treaty will be tabled before the end of the current session of the Conference on Disarmament. (S)

Ongoing work on the full range of the U.S. arms control agenda (to include additional confidence building measures, nuclear testing, and space related issues) should be reviewed by the Senior Arms Control Policy Group. This work should be brought to a timely conclusion. (S)

In addition to these actions, we will intensify our efforts to explain publicly the principled positions we have taken in the various nuclear arms control negotiations over the last three years. We have established a record about which we should be proud. We must ensure that that record is known and understood. (C)

A detailed plan for accomplishing the task of publicly explaining our positions in START and INF should be

developed. This plan should outline the major themes to be stressed and the mechanism for most effectively presenting these themes. This plan will be prepared and submitted for my approval by April 14.⁵ (C)

Finally, as we implement the steps I have directed, it is essential that clarity and coherence of this Administration's position on arms control be maintained. To that end, the Secretary of State will serve as the Administration's chief spokesman on arms control. Congressional testimony and all major statements on arms control will be cleared in advance through the National Security Advisor. (C)

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives (NSDD): Records, NSDD 137, 03/31/1984 [US Nuclear Arms Control Strategy for 1984]. Secret. In a March 30 memorandum to McFarlane, Linhard forwarded a draft NSDD recommending it be sent to Reagan for signature. Linhard explained that the NSDD "tracks the NSC staff understanding of the guidance provided by the President and by you through Ron Lehman concerning the directions the President wishes to issue at this time. *The contents of the draft have not been discussed in any way with anyone outside of the NSC staff.*" In a covering memorandum to Reagan, McFarlane listed the primary guidance in the NSDD and stated: "It also identifies Secretary Shultz as the primary Administration spokesman for arms control."

² See [footnote 3, Document 2](#).

³ Not found.

⁴ Shultz sent a draft of this letter to Reagan on April 6. The letter was signed and sent to Chernenko on April 16. See

[Documents 210](#) and [211](#).

⁵ An April 14 memorandum from Hill to McFarlane transmitted a “memorandum recommending a public diplomacy strategy for START and INF,” in accordance with NSDD 137. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives (NSDD): Records, NSDD 137, 03/31/1984 [US Nuclear Arms Control Strategy for 1984])

207. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)1

Washington, April 3, 1984

SUBJECT

Social Contact with Soviet Citizens: Current Attitudes

I had an interesting and lengthy conversation with two Soviet "Americanologists," during dinner the evening of April 2. The two Soviets, Georgy Skorov (one of Arbatov's deputies) and Stanislav Filippov (a specialist in U.S. law, now with the Soviet patent agency) are not at the policy-making level by a long shot, but are members of the politically aware and relatively well-informed upper intellectual class.

My wife and I invited them to dinner because we had gotten to know them well in Moscow, and they had been socially accessible and occasionally helpful (as for example with advice on how to deal with Arbatov, for whom there is no love lost on their part).

They seemed mainly interested in hearing my views on U.S. perceptions of U.S.-Soviet relations at present—not so much on our concrete positions, as on our motivations. But in the course of our long conversation, they expressed several views of possible interest. Those that struck me in particular were the following:

—Soviet specialists on the U.S. believe that the President will probably be reelected, and are convinced that the Soviets can do nothing to damage his reelection chances.

They believe, however, that if they cooperate—particularly in resuming negotiations on INF and START—this will help him. They are unwilling to do this, and will probably wait until November.

—Chernenko’s leadership is relatively weak in security areas, and it is more difficult to get decisions now than it was before Andropov fell seriously ill. Chernenko is, however, “not a crazy,” and won’t do anything dangerous.

—Soviet decision making is plagued by a number of “really primitive people” in key positions. They don’t understand the West or the U.S., are convinced we are out to get them in every way we can, and are capable of reacting in truly stupid ways.

—Even relatively well informed Soviet citizens are confused about the facts. Filippov questioned me closely about whether we really had evidence that the Soviets had used chemical weapons in Afghanistan, and when I assured him we had, the distress was evident on his face. He observed, in what can only be described as personal agony, “I didn’t know that. I really didn’t. But I know you are an honest man and wouldn’t lie.” He then turned to Skorov (his brother-in-law), and said, “How could those idiots of ours do a thing like that.”

—Access to Soviet media—even if greatly circumscribed—can have a deep effect if used wisely. Filippov recounted how he had attended many meetings of Soviet citizens to discuss relations with the U.S. (Though he did not say so, these were obviously organized by the regime to whip up anti-American sentiment.) The theme of the meetings usually centered on describing various U.S. “iniquities,” but Filippov said that he was struck by how often someone could comment on my July 4 TV speech of 1981, saying

something like, “Well, it sounds pretty bad, but I remember a couple of years ago the American ‘Ambassador’ was on TV, and he said . . .” The citizen would go on to paraphrase a couple of lines and observe, “Now he seemed an honest man, and a serious man, and he wanted peace. So maybe it’s not as bad as you say. We shouldn’t forget that side of America.”² The point Filippov was trying to make was that we need more communication with the Soviets which is not perceived as threatening or demeaning. Implicitly—and doubtless inadvertently—his observation also explained why the Soviet regime resists our access to their media—it does, in fact, undermine their propaganda when it runs counter to the stereotypes they are purveying.

As they were leaving, Skorov and Filippov remarked that they had not reported to the Soviet Embassy that they would be seeing me. If they had done so, they said, the Embassy might have ordered them not to, and at the very least they would have been subjected to lengthy briefings regarding what they should say, and required to submit detailed reports later. (They presumably pointed this out to ensure that I should not mention our dinner to anyone in the Soviet Embassy.)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations (April 1984). Confidential. Sent for information. Reagan initialed this memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² Matlock served in Moscow as Chargé d’Affaires from January to September 1981. As he recalled later in his book, he “was offered five minutes of prime time on Soviet television to deliver a message to the Soviet people on our national day. It was normal Soviet practice to offer foreign ambassadors such an opportunity once a year, but U.S.

Ambassador Thomas Watson had been refused the year before because his planned address contained a reference to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.” Matlock concluded: “The impact of this brief presentation surpassed all expectations. For years, Soviet citizens would quote back things to me I said on television that day. It was so unusual for them to hear a foreign representative challenge Soviet propaganda stereotypes—even with cautious indirection—that people noticed and remembered.” (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, pp. 20-21)

208. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Kelly) and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Howe) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, April 5, 1984

SUBJECT

NSDD-137: U.S. Nuclear Arms Control Strategy for 1984

The White House has issued an NSDD² (attached) setting out the President's decisions on our nuclear arms control strategy based on the March 27 NSC discussion.³ On the whole, the thrust of the NSDD is favorable to us and can be used to support our continuing efforts to move forward on START and other arms control issues.

Continuing Approaches to the Soviets: In an apparent bow to OSD, the NSDD cites several times the virtues of our current positions and states: "we will not compromise our principles by chasing expedient agreement." At the same time, however, it also notes that we should "use every appropriate avenue to explore ways . . . to bridge the distance between the requirements of our principled positions and the legitimate concerns of the Soviet Union," specifically citing trade-offs.

Priority Study of START/INF Options: To that end, the SACPG is directed not only to flesh out our current proposal, but to complete its evaluation of "options that could under certain conditions bridge [U.S.-Soviet] differences" by May 5. In this connection, the NSDD notes that while the previous arms control mistakes should not be

repeated, “if elements of previous agreements put in the right context meet our needs, we should not ignore them”—an implicit rejection of the OSD argument that the Framework concepts of State, JCS and ACDA are too similar to SALT II.⁴

Chernenko Letter: A draft letter is requested for Presidential review by April 7; it is tasked in general terms to cite again the flexibility of our position, express our readiness to explore trade-offs, and replay our readiness for constructive dialogue on START/INF.

Other Arms Control Items: The NSDD states the draft CW treaty will be tabled before the end of the current CD round. It states ongoing work on nuclear testing, space-related issues and additional CBMs should be “brought to a timely conclusion.”

Protecting Against Disclosure: The NSDD emphasizes the need to protect the ongoing SACPG work from unauthorized disclosure, and, in this regard, states that Congressional testimony, consultations with our Allies, background statements to the press and public statements are to be cleared in advance through Bud McFarlane.

Public Affairs Handling: The President calls for intensified efforts to explain publicly the U.S. arms control record, setting an April 14 deadline for a detailed plan to do so (we would note in this regard, State already has underway a special arms control speakers’ course at FSI; you are, moreover, scheduled to give a major arms control address to the League of Women Voters in early June).

Coordination of the Administration Position: Finally, citing the need for “clarity and coherence,” you are designated as “the Administration’s chief spokesman on arms control.”

Testimony and all major statements are to be cleared through McFarlane.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 2A, 1984 Arms and Arms Control, Mar.-May. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley; cleared by Gordon, Dobbins, and Dean. Brackets are in the original.

² See [Document 206](#).

³ See [Document 203](#).

⁴ See [Document 185](#).

209. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 6, 1984

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Dobrynin

I called in Dobrynin Monday afternoon to discuss the state of play of the relationship following your exchange of letters with Chernenko.² He held to the rigid Soviet positions on START and INF, but showed interest in other arms control issues. We agreed to go ahead on several bilateral items. We also agreed on discussions on regional issues, including the Middle East, and confidential preliminary discussions on outer space.

To start off, I professed to be puzzled about where things now stand, noting that we have been hearing things from Moscow that seem different from the confidential exchanges we have been having and your correspondence with Chernenko. I noted we were ready to move forward, questioned if Moscow was, and asked for his personal assessment of the last Chernenko letter, the “oral remarks”,³ and the recent Moscow line.

Dobrynin claimed the letters and “oral remarks” were self-explanatory. He said our dialogue covered three areas— nuclear arms control/security, regional, and bilateral issues—and proceeded to give his views. On nuclear issues, they had “invited” us to remove obstacles to negotiations, i.e., to reverse our INF deployments. They had also proposed concrete actions on other issues such as non-militarization of space (including ASAT), the nuclear freeze, test ban negotiations, and the “nuclear norms”—some vague

declaratory measures including no-first-use. Dobrynin asserted the Soviets were very serious about this list which, he added, could be discussed in diplomatic channels or through special envoys.

He also noted that the Chernenko letter proposed discussion of regional issues, particularly the Middle East, and bilateral issues, including such things as the consulates, agreements that would soon expire, fisheries, and artificial heart research. Dobrynin said they were ready to sit down with a calendar and discuss these issues concretely.

In response, I made the following points: 1) We want reductions in nuclear arms, not a freeze which would be as complicated to negotiate as START. I pointed out that even they had come out for reductions from SALT-II in their START proposal. 2) We want to talk about INF but have no intention of withdrawing our missiles as a precondition. I again told him we have ideas on both INF and START and are ready to negotiate on these issues. 3) We were disappointed that Brent Scowcroft was not received by the Soviets at a proper level. There was no attempt to bypass anyone and we had used diplomatic channels to ask for a meeting. Summing up, I reiterated that we consider the nuclear issues to be of central importance for our two countries.

Dobrynin said he came to the conclusion from my comments that there is no way to make progress on nuclear issues. I told him I disagreed; we believe progress can be made.

Dobrynin returned again to outer space. I told him we were working on this issue and gave him a copy of our unclassified report to Congress.⁴ We are interested in

achieving something in this area, I said, but do not now see a way to do so because of verification problems. I noted we had proposed discussions on space and strategic defense at START but they had not been interested. I said we continued to be willing to discuss this issue but it had to be recognized that there are real problems with verification.

Dobrynin said we need to discuss this issue now, adding that this question could become the most dangerously destabilizing factor in our relationship. I asked if he were willing to discuss this in private diplomatic channels, rather than begin negotiations in publicly acknowledged talks. Dobrynin said that they were willing. We both agreed to think about how to organize these exchanges and who should participate, and then discuss this subject again.

I turned aside his questions about the possibilities to discuss a nuclear freeze and the CTB, noting again that the former is simply not a good idea and that the latter has profound verification problems. When he pressed on the CTB issue, I told him I would inform you of any new ideas that the Soviets might have on the subject.

I then said we plan to table our CW draft in Geneva later this month and hope to have a new proposal in MBFR by the end of the round on April 16 in Vienna. In this regard, I told him that if the Soviet side reacted positively to our steps in MBFR, there could be some further motion in the Western position. On CDE, I said we were glad to see the substantive discussions between Ambassadors Goodby and Grinevskiy, noting Goodby's invitation for Grinevskiy to come to Washington. Dobrynin said Moscow would decide on whether Grinevskiy should come.

On the Hotline talks, I noted we had recently conveyed technical information to them and looked forward to

meeting at the end of April. (Dobrynin and his deputy seemed surprised we had not been informed by Moscow of a starting date.) I also told him we were working on a draft agreement that we hoped to pass to them before that meeting. Dobrynin said that sounded fine.

Dobrynin then again moved to the Middle East, saying we needed an exchange of views on steps to greater stability in the region and to work for a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. He noted these discussions could be “very secret.” I said we were ready for discussions on regional problems, but that we would need to set an agenda of the issues to be discussed and decide who would participate. I told Dobrynin we were interested both in sharing information and working on damage limitation to avoid potential crises between us, noting that the Iran-Iraq war was a good subject for discussions. We need to start modestly, I said, to see if progress can be made, indicating I had in mind something along the lines of Chet Crocker’s talks with them earlier on Africa.

Dobrynin and I agreed we would give them our ideas on an agenda for regional discussions and the level of the talks. I stressed that even if we have our experts conduct some of these talks, it would be important that Gromyko and I keep close control of these discussions through our respective ambassadors.

On bilateral affairs, I said that we would talk with them this month on our ideas for revitalizing some of the bilateral agreements (on agriculture, health, housing, and the environment) currently in effect. To Dobrynin’s questions about expiring agreements and fishing quotas, I said we would have to study them on a case-by-case basis. When I raised the Consulates issue, Dobrynin said they also wanted to talk about Aeroflot. I told him we would discuss

that only as a separate issue. I also said that the shutdown of the KAL plane was still an emotional issue in the United States and they should take some positive steps on our suggestions in Montreal for improving the Pacific air routes.

When I asked about the building for our Kiev Consulate, Dobrynin noted that Art Hartman is planning a trip there soon and would be able to get an answer on the building question. I noted we would propose the text of an exchanges agreement in the next two weeks and suggested that the Consular Review Talks resume in Moscow in May. Dobrynin agreed. When I also mentioned we would propose a new time for the Coast Guard search and rescue talks, Dobrynin seemed unfamiliar with them but agreed to raise this with Moscow.

I noted his positive remarks to Art on the Maritime talks. Dobrynin said yes, he thought that progress could be made.

I then said that Dobrynin had suggested only three areas on the agenda, we had a fourth—human rights. I noted the positive reaction here to the emigration of the Pentecostals, suggested it would be useful for them to take further steps on human rights, noting the case of Shcharanskiy. Dobrynin said his position on this was well-known. When I again suggested something in the human rights area would be helpful to the overall relationship, he said he had been telling American Jewish groups that an improvement in US-Soviet relations would help on the emigration issue.

Finally, Dobrynin asked if you would be responding soon to Chernenko's letter. I said a letter would be forthcoming, but we wanted to hear what Dobrynin had to say and what Gromyko had to say to Art Hartman in Moscow the

following day before discussing a reply. I then once again urged that the Soviet side reconsider its position on the START and INF talks, emphasizing the central importance of this issue.

When Art met with Gromyko on Tuesday,⁵ Gromyko seemed most interested in southern Africa and outer space. He read Art an oral statement on southern Africa, emphasized the value of past discussions of this subject, and seemed interested in having Chet Crocker talk with them further. He restated Dobrynin's points on ASAT, suggesting we had no interest in discussing space issues. Art repeated my points that we do not want negotiations, but that we were willing to have confidential discussions. It was clear Gromyko was not completely informed of Dobrynin's discussions with me of this issue.

I have attached a separate memorandum laying out next steps to be pursued in our dialogue with the Soviets.⁶

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron April 1984 (3). Secret; Sensitive. In a covering memorandum to Reagan on April 13, McFarlane wrote: "You will note that Dobrynin took a somewhat more receptive line on several issues than we have been hearing from Gromyko in Moscow—and markedly more positive than current Soviet public stance. I believe we should be cautious about accepting his attitude at face value, since he has a personal incentive to put the most favorable gloss on Soviet policy, and to push the idea that we can get further dealing exclusively with him. Nevertheless, we should not totally exclude the possibility that a policy debate continues in Moscow, and that Dobrynin's more forthcoming comments on some issues

may reflect that, at least in part.” (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations (April 1984)) Reagan initialed the cover memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² Monday, April 2.

³ Attached to [Document 197](#).

⁴ For Reagan's letter transmitting the report, see “Arms Control for Antisatellite Systems, letter to the Congress”, March 31, 1984, in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1984, p. 48. For the report, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 204-219.

⁵ Telegram 4074 from Moscow, April 3, reported on Hartman's April 3 meeting with Gromyko. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840005-0326)

⁶ Attached but not printed.

210. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 6, 1984

SUBJECT

Response to Chernenko's March 19 Letter

We have drafted a response to Chernenko's March 19 letter (attached),² taking into account my meeting with Dobrynin last Monday, Art Hartman's exchange with Gromyko last Tuesday,³ and the guidance you provided in NSDD-137 on nuclear arms control strategy.⁴

The letter serves a number of the policy objectives you stressed at the March 27 NSC meeting:⁵

—it counters the Soviets' arguments about an alleged U.S. "threat" by describing some of the Soviet actions and military programs which make them appear a threat to us;

—it reaffirms the U.S. commitment to arms control and our readiness to be flexible in the search for agreements; and

—it attempts to reassure the Soviets we are not a threat, and to "get Chernenko's attention," by expressing our readiness to consider in the CDE a non-use of force undertaking if the Soviets agree to some of the specific confidence-building measures we have proposed.

On this last point, the Soviets at all levels have been asking for just such a "concrete signal" from us. Although they are now giving somewhat more attention to outer space arms control, they also have been signalling for months that they consider our attitude toward non-use of force as a kind of

litmus test of U.S. “seriousness” in the arms control field. Chernenko’s April 4 message to the Socialist International cited non-use of force once again.⁶ By highlighting our willingness to move in reciprocal fashion on this issue, therefore, our proposed letter provides tangible evidence for Chernenko of your commitment to moving the relationship forward.

The Soviets today invited Jim Goodby to Moscow for consultations with his Soviet counterpart; we are now working on the dates. This would be an opportunity to begin exploring the idea.

Jim Goodby is confident that our Allies will support our pursuit of a trade between non-use of force and CBMs at the next round of the CDE. In fact, the Allies and he have been planning on the Western countries agreeing to a working group discussion of non-use of force—which would represent implicit acceptance of it. Gromyko, however, may try to obscure the significance of our willingness to have working group discussions unless we broach the idea directly with Chernenko—only through the letter can we ensure that you will get credit for our move.

Without this language on CDE, there will be nothing in this letter to get Chernenko’s attention. Pending your approval of the proposal, we have put the relevant language in brackets.

In addition to the above, our proposed reply reviews the rest of our arms control agenda (our paramount interest in START and INF; our disappointment that the Soviets have failed to take up the offer of private exploratory exchanges; and our desire for progress on CW and MBFR). The subsequent discussion of regional problems takes into account Gromyko’s interesting *démarche* on southern

Africa⁷ and my agreement with Dobrynin to more intensive exchanges on regional issues, including the Mideast and Persian Gulf. The letter concludes with paragraphs on bilateral issues and human rights, noting in particular your regret at Chernenko's failure to respond to your appeals for humanitarian gestures.

Bureaucratic Considerations: In NSDD-137, you requested a letter to Chernenko be drafted focusing on START and INF—the flexibility we have shown to date, our readiness to reopen talks anytime, anywhere, etc.—and refuting Soviet allegations about the U.S. threat. We believe our draft, while perhaps not going into all the detail envisaged in the NSDD, fulfills its main requirements without neglecting other areas of our agenda. For this reason, we believe that this letter should be sent now, and that it not be coordinated with the other agencies. Based on previous experience, reaching consensus in the SACPG on anything specific will take weeks if not months. Moreover, I believe strongly that, as a general rule, the drafting of Presidential correspondence should not become the province of the bureaucracy. Of course, as constructive ideas develop from the process launched by the NSDD, they can be incorporated into other letters to Chernenko.

A Final Point: A Supreme Soviet session has been called for early next week, and it is widely anticipated in Moscow that the meeting will “elect” Chernenko as Chairman of the Presidium, the titular Head of State. Thus our draft includes bracketed language congratulating Chernenko on his new appointment, and addressing him as “Mr. Chairman.”⁸

If you approve our proposed reply, I would envisage having Art Hartman deliver it in Moscow next week. I would at the

same time call in Dobrynin to give him a copy, as well as to continue our discussions of last Monday.

Recommendation

That you approve the attached reply to Chernenko's March 19 letter.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490488, 8490546). Secret; Sensitive. According to a typed note on a memorandum from Burt to Shultz, the memorandum was sent to the White House via courier at 4 p.m. on April 6. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, April 1984 Super Sensitive Documents)

² The draft is attached but not printed. The final version of the letter, sent to Chernenko on April 16, is printed as [Document 211](#).

³ See [Document 209](#) and [footnote 5](#) thereto.

⁴ See [Document 206](#).

⁵ See [Document 203](#).

⁶ For a summary of this message, see Serge Schmemmann, "Chernenko Affirms Soviet Stand on Reviving the U.S. Arms Control Talks," *New York Times*, April 5, 1984, p. A14.

⁷ See [footnote 5](#), [Document 209](#).

⁸ In telegram 4494 from Moscow, April 11, the Embassy reported: "As expected, the April 11 Supreme Soviet session named Chernenko as Chairman of the Presidium." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840237-0672)

211. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko¹

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Washington, April 16, 1984

I have carefully reviewed your letter of March 19, together with the views expressed by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin in recent discussions with Ambassador Hartman and Secretary Shultz.² I welcome the fact that you too recognize the value of direct exchanges of views on the important issues in U.S.-Soviet relations.

First of all, I would like to reiterate my congratulations upon your assumption of the new and responsible position of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. I look forward to productive working relations with you in your new capacity, to the mutual benefit of our peoples.

In looking at the present state of affairs between our two countries, I believe it will be useful to reflect upon our differing perceptions of one another. You have expressed concern about U.S. actions and military programs which you see as threatening to the Soviet Union. I fully appreciate the priority you attach to the security of the Soviet state, particularly in light of the enormous costs shouldered by your people in helping to defeat Nazi Germany, but I cannot understand why our programs can be considered threatening. On the contrary, in our view there are many Soviet actions and military programs which we and our Allies consider to be threatening to our own vital security interests.

For example, the Soviet Union continues to ship massive quantities of arms to sensitive areas near our borders, and appears bent on promoting instability rather than peaceful change in many areas of the developing world. Your country's large-scale and sustained use of force in Afghanistan, in close proximity to one of our closest friends, Pakistan, makes less reassuring your government's frequent avowals of peaceful intent.

Perhaps of greatest concern to us is the enormous increase in recent years in Soviet nuclear forces targeted against the United States and our Allies. This build-up may initially have been designed to attain parity with the United States, yet at some point in the last decade that goal was achieved; we have good reason to question, therefore, why the growth in Soviet nuclear forces has nonetheless continued unabated.

Take strategic offensive forces as an example. Since 1970, the Soviet Union has deployed three new types of intercontinental ballistic missiles, five new types of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and at least thirteen modernized versions of existing missiles. As you well know, the USSR is now flight-testing two new ICBMs, plus another new type of SLBM. As we see it, you claim to be responding to U.S. programs, yet your new missiles have been deployed years ahead of their U.S. counterparts, not to mention in greater numbers.

In the area of ballistic missile defense, your country has been engaged for many years in a research effort similar to that recently initiated in the United States and, indeed, is the only nation to deploy an active anti-ballistic missile system; moreover, your deployment of a network of advanced radars gives us legitimate grounds to question whether the USSR is laying the basis for a nationwide ABM

defense of the USSR. And there are, of course, other aspects of existing arms control agreements where the concerns we have raised with you have not been alleviated.

As you know, your country's deployment of the SS-20 has been of especially grave concern both to the United States and our Allies. Since NATO's December 1979 decision, when your country asserted that a "balance" existed in intermediate-range nuclear forces, the Soviet Union has deployed 238 additional SS-20's with over 700 additional warheads. These missiles constitute a far greater threat to the security of the western alliance—both in quantitative and qualitative terms—than previous Soviet missiles, which had fewer warheads and lower accuracy.

These are some of the realities of the international situation as we see it. I recognize that neither of us will be able to persuade the other as to who is to blame for the present poor state of our relations. Nor would it be productive for the two of us to engage in a lengthy debate on this subject. I doubt, however, that we can make progress in reducing the tensions between our countries, or in reducing the high levels of armaments, if either of us is unwilling to take into account the concerns of the other.

As for myself, I am prepared to consider your concerns seriously, even when I have difficulty understanding why they are held. I am willing to explore possible ways to alleviate them. But solutions will elude us if you are unable to approach our discussions in the same spirit, or if you demand concessions as an entry fee for the discussions themselves.

As for the negotiations now underway, I believe the Stockholm conference provides an opportunity for both our countries to take steps to reduce some of the

apprehensions about each other's military activities. I was encouraged by your expression of hope for positive results at Stockholm and your support for measures aimed at building confidence between East and West. As you know, we and our Allies have presented a package of specific measures which, if implemented, could substantially reduce the dangers of misunderstanding and miscalculation in Europe.

If the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate seriously on such concrete confidence-building measures, the United States will be prepared to discuss the question of reciprocal assurances against the use of force and the context in which such an agreement can be reached. You have asked for a "concrete signal" in the area of arms control, and your representatives have specified that U.S. willingness to agree on non-use of force would be considered such a signal. In this connection let me add that I am pleased that our Ambassadors to the Stockholm conference have agreed to get together soon. This will provide an opportunity to discuss an arrangement that would meet both countries' concerns.

There are many other arms control topics where we hope to move forward in the weeks and months ahead. As I said in my previous letter, the Western countries plan to present new proposals at the Vienna negotiations which will provide a solid basis for progress on the related issues of data and verification. In the Conference on Disarmament, the Vice President will table a draft treaty to ban chemical weapons on April 18. In addition to this step in the multilateral forum, perhaps the time has come when bilateral consultations on the issue could advance the prospects for an effective and verifiable ban.

While the foregoing issues are important, and while there may be other arms control areas—including those raised in your letter—where steps forward could be made, we have always considered the central element of our dialogue on arms control to be the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons. The United States has advanced proposals that would substantially reduce the most threatening nuclear weapons systems on both sides. We have demonstrated considerable flexibility in an effort to respond to the concerns your negotiators have expressed. I must state frankly that I am disappointed that the Soviet Union has not yet shown such flexibility, or taken advantage of the opportunity for private discussions on ways to make progress in the START and INF negotiations.

I am well aware of your views regarding the impasse in these negotiations. You are, I am sure, equally aware of the fact that we and our Allies do not agree with your analysis of the balance in intermediate-range missiles or your assessment of the “obstacles” that supposedly stand in the way of further negotiations. For our part, we are prepared to consider any equitable outcome, and to halt, reverse or eliminate entirely our deployments of Pershing and cruise missiles in the context of an agreement between the two sides.

Experience has shown that neither side can hope to impose its view of the situation on the other as a precondition for negotiations. Rather, what is needed is for our representatives to sit down and devise a formula for nuclear arms reductions that is consistent with the security interests of both our nations. So let us focus on the concrete task of reaching agreements in this spirit, rather than wasting our energies debating further the meaning of “equality and equal security.”

I would like to reaffirm once again the readiness of the United States to explore with the Soviet Union possible ways for moving forward on the nuclear arms negotiations. As I have said previously, we have a number of specific ideas to present for overcoming some of the fundamental differences that have divided us in the negotiations. We are prepared to discuss these in private diplomatic channels or between our respective negotiators. If the Soviet side is prepared to match U.S. flexibility, I would hope that, by this means, the way could be cleared to resumption of formal talks on nuclear arms reductions. I would welcome any concrete suggestions you might have on how to proceed.

I am pleased that we agree on the importance of exchanges of views on regional problems. As you state, such exchanges should be directed toward the peaceful settlement of local disputes and the strengthening of peace. Over the past three years, the United States has taken the initiative to discuss a number of regional problems in precisely this spirit. For example, we have initiated formal consultations with your country's experts on Afghanistan and southern Africa. While such exchanges have not been as fruitful as we had hoped, I would like to pursue them, with the objective of establishing a more productive dialogue on regional issues. I believe it would be useful for our experts to hold more detailed discussions of developments in southern Africa—as Foreign Minister Gromyko has suggested—because there are promising signs of progress toward a diplomatic settlement. Such a settlement would serve the interests of the states in the area, and of all those who value stability and prosperity there.

The Middle East and Persian Gulf is another area where a further exchange of views would be helpful. In this regard, I was pleased to read of your personal commitment to

seeking an end to the Iran/Iraq conflict and to avoiding any actions which might lead the parties to prolong or expand it. I wish to assure you that the United States shares these objectives, and that we will continue making every effort to achieve them.

To improve mutual understanding on this issue, Secretary Shultz has on several recent occasions voiced to Ambassador Dobrynin our concerns about any expansion of the war to other areas of the Persian Gulf. In doing so, we have tried to communicate the importance we attach to maintaining freedom of navigation there for the ships of all nations. We believe our interest in supporting this principle of international law serves all and threatens none, and we regret the misrepresentations of our position which have appeared in the official Soviet news media. Such commentaries cannot serve to calm tensions in the area.

With respect to our bilateral relations, I think we agree that we should seek to enlarge the areas of mutually beneficial cooperation and inject real content into our bilateral agreements. My representatives will continue to present specific proposals in this regard, and I hope that the Soviet side will not put any artificial barriers in the way of progress.

I must add that I am disappointed that you did not respond to the appeal in my March 6 letter concerning humanitarian issues.³ Steps in this area could have a substantial impact on other aspects of our relations, and I hope that you will continue to give them serious consideration.

To conclude, let me state once again that the United States is ready for a turning point in our relations with the Soviet Union. We have made a concerted effort to put content into

our dialogue. We have a number of specific ideas to explore with you on questions of vital importance to both our peoples. We intend to continue our efforts in this direction. Real progress, however, will require similar efforts on the part of the Soviet Union.

I look forward to receiving your comments on the thoughts I have expressed.⁴

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) April-June 1984. No classification marking. The letter was drafted in the Department of State and sent to Reagan on April 6. See [Document 210](#).

² See [Documents 197](#) and [199](#).

³ See [Document 190](#).

⁴ In a handwritten note at the end of the letter, Reagan wrote: "P.S. Mr. Chairman, In thinking through this letter, I have reflected at some length on the tragedy of scale of Soviet losses in warfare through the ages. Surely those losses which are beyond description, must affect your thinking today. I want you to know that neither I nor the American people hold any offensive intentions toward you or the Soviet people. The truth of that statement is underwritten by the history of our restraint at a time when our virtual monopoly on strategic power provided the means for expansion had we so chosen. We did not then nor shall we now. Our concern and urgent purpose must be the translation of this reality into a lasting reduction of

tensions between us. I pledge to you my profound commitment to that goal.”

212. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 17, 1984

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, April 16, 1984

I met with Dobrynin for a little over an hour this afternoon. I gave him your letter to Chernenko,² made a few points about your thinking in sending it, and touched on some of the doubts we have concerning Soviet willingness to move forward with us. I also suggested a number of concrete forward steps we could take in the near future. I noted that discussions could continue with Ken Dam and Rick Burt in my absence between Wednesday and May 3.³

In presenting the letter, I told Dobrynin that you value your private exchanges with Chernenko. You were disappointed with the tone of some recent Soviet statements, including Chernenko's April 9 interview with *Pravda*,⁴ but you want to use this correspondence to move things forward.

I said that you had been giving thought to the Soviet charge that our programs threaten them, and therefore went into some detail in your letter about the legitimate grounds we have for seeing a threat in Soviet actions and programs. Nevertheless, I said, the most important thing is that both sides take into account the concerns of the other.

I drew special attention to your hand-written postscript as evidence of your thinking and testimony to how deeply you feel.

Going over the highlights of the letter, I pointed to your treatment of the Stockholm negotiations as a direct response to points Chernenko had made: we are prepared to discuss reciprocal assurances on non-use of force if they are prepared to negotiate seriously the confidence-and-security-building measures we have proposed. Chernenko had referred to this in his *Pravda* interview and called for a concrete signal in arms control; you had now provided this signal. In this connection, I said that we accepted their invitation to Ambassador Goodby to come to Moscow for further discussions.

On START and INF, I said you had reiterated that we are ready to move forward in private discussions and have some ideas, and that we fail to understand why they will not engage us confidentially on these central issues. They must realize, I said, that making removal of our missiles a precondition for further talks is a non-starter.

On MBFR, I noted you had said we hope to present some new ideas before the end of the current round in Vienna.

On chemical weapons, I pointed out that the Vice President would be tabling our draft treaty in Geneva Wednesday, and gave him a copy of the text.⁵ I said we considered our draft to be a constructive proposal, although we know it will be hard to negotiate, since verification is a very serious problem. On the other hand, the issue itself is serious. Since World War I, use of these weapons had stopped until very recently, and although the Soviets disagree with us about use in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, we should both recognize the danger that use in the Iran-Iraq war presents. In addition to discussions in the Geneva conference, therefore, I said we had some thoughts to present on a bilateral basis if the Soviets were ready for such an exchange.

At that point, speaking personally, I said I had encouraged efforts to move US-Soviet relations forward, but had to say frankly that I was not sure the Soviets were ready. We had seen polemics out of Moscow, a “deep freeze” in their language, which made me wonder about Soviet readiness to move. I told Dobrynin there were plenty of people who were ready to offer their analysis of current Soviet behavior; but in government discussions I stressed that we should not speculate, and that we should make an effort to improve things. This was especially true in the area of nuclear weapons, where neither side should lay down preconditions.

Moving to outer space arms control, I recalled that during our last discussion I had given Dobrynin our report to the Congress on this subject, and had thought he had agreed to beginning private discussion with me on this topic.⁶ However, Art Hartman’s conversation with Gromyko April 3 had suggested otherwise.⁷ Dobrynin objected that I had been very negative, and that he had come away with the impression that we would only listen in any confidential discussions. I replied that we were not predisposed to be negative, but that verification would remain a very difficult problem in this area; we were willing to talk without preconditions, but the verification problem would not go away. This exchange left me unsure whether the Soviets are prepared to accept discussions on this basis.

I then raised a subject I told Dobrynin he wouldn’t like: human rights. Your letter expressed disappointment that Chernenko did not respond to the appeal in your March 6 letter concerning humanitarian issues, and this was a real concern. We were pleased with reports that scientist David Goldfarb may soon be allowed to leave, and that binational spouse Yuri Balovlenkov has been asked to submit his papers. We hope he and others like him will be permitted to

join their American spouses. But the Shcharanskiy case remains unresolved, and we have concerns about both Sakharov and his wife.

Referring to the language in your letter on regional issues, I then turned to them, and said I had two proposals to make:

—On southern Africa, Gromyko had suggested to Hartman that another round of discussions would be useful, and I said Assistant Secretary Crocker would be prepared to meet with a Soviet counterpart in a third country in late April or early May.

—On the Middle East/Persian Gulf, I suggested that Dobrynin and I meet for a special session accompanied by experts, and that he might wish to have someone come from Moscow for this purpose. In response to his question, I said I would be ready after my return from Asia, and reiterated the importance of talking about the Iran-Iraq situation in light of chemical weapons use there.

I then raised a number of bilateral issues:

—On new consulates, I said we would be ready to begin discussing details as soon as Rick Burt returned from Europe at the end of this week.

—On minor consular issues, I said we expect to have ideas for another round next week.

—On an exchanges agreement, I said I hoped Art Hartman would be able to table a draft text in Moscow next week.

At our last meeting, Dobrynin had asked about bilateral agreements expiring this year, and I gave him a status report:

—On fisheries, I noted that we had agreed this week to extend our agreement for eighteen months, and that we are looking at what else might be done in this area.

—On the Long-Term Economic Cooperation Agreement, I said we expected to have a response for the Soviets soon, and I was optimistic about the possibility of an extension.

—On the Incidents-at-Sea Agreement, I said the Navy expected to propose renewal during the regular talks scheduled for May in Moscow.

—On the World Oceans Agreement expiring in December, I said we would be reviewing it in our normal process.

We touched briefly on our hotline upgrade talks, and here I pressed for a Soviet response to our proposal for another round at the end of the month. Dobrynin said he expected no problems, but it is being reviewed “in our White House,” so it is impossible to predict with certainty.

Dobrynin asked if I had checked with you about our position concerning negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. I said I had, and the position remains unchanged.

Finally, after reading your letter, Dobrynin asked what the language about Soviet unwillingness to take advantage of opportunities for discussion on START and INF referred to. I said it referred to discussion in our private channel.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/13-04/18/84). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan’s initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it. In an April 16 memorandum to Shultz, Burt wrote: “We have prepared the

attached memorandum to the President on your meeting with Dobrynin.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, April 1984 Super Sensitive Documents) The State Department copy indicates Burt drafted the memorandum.

² See [Document 211](#).

³ Shultz accompanied Reagan on visits to China from April 26 to May 1, then South Korea from May 1 to 2.

⁴ In an information memorandum to Shultz dated April 9, Burt provided analysis of Chernenko’s *Pravda* interview, noting that the “thrust of Chernenko’s remarks on the possibilities of improved U.S.-Soviet relations can only be considered as unhelpful. They reflect a special Soviet sensitivity to and fixation with the possibility that the Administration might win public relations benefits from a supposed U.S.-Soviet thaw without paying Moscow an appropriate price. We will doubtless continue to hear this theme in one form or another throughout the year. At the same time, however, Chernenko also makes a special point of denying that the Soviets are in any way trying to wait out the 1984 U.S. elections. His reply that the situation can improve whenever the American leadership shows ‘realism and a responsible approach to relations with the USSR’ may have been generated to deflect such Western criticism, but also has the effect of leaving open the door to such improvement—even with the current U.S. administration still in office. Not surprisingly, Chernenko reaffirmed a Soviet hardline on START/INF, putting the onus on the U.S. and NATO to ‘take measures to restore the situation.’” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, March 9–May 10, 1984 ES Sensitive Documents) For the text of the April 9 interview, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 234–238.

⁵ For a record of the Vice President's statement, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1984, pp. 40-43.

⁶ See [footnote 4, Document 209](#).

⁷ See [footnote 5, Document 209](#).

213. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 18, 1984

SUBJECT

Sakharov Plans to Go on Hunger Strike

Elena Bonner, Sakharov's wife, has left with our Embassy in Moscow several documents "to hold until her return". They indicate that Sakharov had planned to begin a hunger strike April 13 and to request our Embassy to offer Mrs. Bonner temporary refuge during the hunger strike.² His goal was to obtain a positive response to Mrs. Bonner's longstanding request for permission to go abroad for medical treatment. A medical problem—phlebitis—apparently caused him to postpone the hunger strike. Mrs. Bonner is due back May 7 from Gorkiy, Sakharov's city of exile, and there is a strong possibility that he will begin the hunger strike shortly thereafter.

A Sakharov hunger strike would receive enormous world attention. We would come under great pressure to grant Mrs. Bonner the refuge Sakharov requests, which would further complicate matters. It would be very difficult for the Soviets to give her exit permission while she was staying in our Embassy. Moreover, once having taken refuge in our Embassy, Mrs. Bonner would be unable to play a decisive role in seeking to end Sakharov's hunger strike, and the life-threatening consequences would be even more acute. The major diplomatic confrontation that would ensue would very likely bring the rest of our dialogue to a standstill which, depending on the outcome, could endure for some time.

I think that the best chance for heading this off is for you to make a personal appeal to Chernenko to grant exit permission to Mrs. Bonner. She has been abroad twice before for medical treatment and there appears to be no problem such as state security which would keep her from going again. If we were able to tell Mrs. Bonner that such a private request had been made, we would have a good chance at persuading the Sakharovs not to undertake public steps, such as the hunger strike and request for refuge, which would undercut your efforts. A draft letter is attached for your consideration.³

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, April 16-30, 1984, Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by R.F. Smith; cleared by Simons, Palmer, and G. Matthews (HA). Smith initialed for Simons and Matthews. This drafting information appears on the covering action memorandum from Acting Assistant Secretary Kelly to Shultz. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the covering memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. A typed note at the top of the covering memorandum reads: "Memo from Secretary to President LDX'd to White House on 4/18 —2045 MVS."

² In the covering action memorandum to Shultz forwarding this memorandum to Reagan, Kelly noted: "There is convincing evidence (Tab A) that Sakharov plans to go on a hunger strike soon and to request the U.S. government to provide temporary refuge for his wife." Kelly attached at Tab A telegram 4699 from Moscow, in which the Embassy reported: "Before departing for Gor'kiy on April 12, Elena Bonner gave EmbOffs 'for safe-keeping' copies of three separate appeals drafted by Sakharov: one to Chernenko, one to the USG, and one to 'friends the world over.' In the

appeals Sakharov announces the beginning of a hunger strike and asks, inter alia, that the USG grant Elena Bonner temporary refuge in the Embassy for the duration of the strike. The hunger strike, announced for April 13, was presumably delayed.” The telegram continued: “Bonner made it clear that she was not at this moment asking for any action on the appeals.” The Embassy warned: “There will be great public pressure for us to grant refuge should the hunger strike take place and Sakharov’s request be made public.” The summary concluded: “Given the current low ebb in our relations with the Soviets, we expect our involvement would be ineffectual, merely stiffening the Soviets’ resolve not to appear to give in to foreign pressure. The Soviets might welcome the prospect. As we observed during the prolonged stay of the Pentecostal families, to shift some of the public pressure from themselves to the United States, with Bonner’s presence here attributed more to a lack of will on our part than to Soviet intransigence, our inclination is to try to persuade Bonner, if she raises the issue, that our participation would not serve a useful purpose.”

³ A signed copy of this letter was not found; it is unclear if it was sent.

214. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, April 20, 1984

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations: Current State and Next Steps

I have the following thoughts on the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations, which you may wish to consider in case there is discussion on the subject with the President and Secretary Shultz during the China trip.

1. The public stonewall the Soviets have erected to our positions is disappointing, but should not be unexpected. In my view, we are on the right course both in dealing with them, and in positioning the President on the high ground for the political debates which will intensify this year. Both objectives will be served by continuing our position of leaning forward, short of course of making major substantive concessions without a quid pro quo.
2. Although Malcolm McIntosh's analysis is in general very accurate,² it seems to me that he may underestimate the intensity of the debate which I believe is going on in the Soviet leadership over policy toward the U.S. The odds are that he will prove to be right that the Soviets will be unable to change course importantly before late next year. But, given the debate, the pressures on the Soviet system, and the differences among personal interests of the principal players (and we can only guess at the precise nature of

these), we should not exclude the possibility that some fundamental decisions could be made this year.

3. Attempting to maximize whatever chance still exists for the Soviets to deal with us seriously this year is fully consistent with the requirements of our public diplomacy—which should remain our top priority in the coming months.³

4. The President's desire to meet with Chernenko during the Olympics now seems increasingly impractical. Does he still exclude the possibility of working toward a meeting in connection with the U.N. session in September?⁴ That obviously presents problems of timing, but it is probably more realistic than hoping for an opportunity at the Olympics.

5. The Soviet handling of the Olympics will in fact be an important element in the relationship. If they stay away, they will step up propaganda to a degree that a shift in the tone of their dealing with us will have to wait a certain cooling off period. This raises the question of whether we should do anything else to attract them to the Olympics.

a. I start from the premise that we have already bent over backwards to meet their demands, and should go no further. Certainly, we should not handle their participation in any way that presents a serious security threat, or that smacks of groveling to persuade them to attend.⁵

b. On the other hand, being familiar with Soviet psychology, I must say that the leadership probably has serious concerns about the potential for harassment of their team and officials, and takes seriously the campaign by private organizations to lure their athletes away. They probably

believe that many of these activities have official USG connivance.

c. Given this attitude, we might wish to consider two steps—which could be taken in early May—which might operate to alleviate some of the concerns:

(1) The President could write Chernenko assuring him that his Olympic team will be welcome and will be treated in full accord with principles of the Olympic Charter. The letter should be carefully drafted to avoid any implication that he is begging them to come, but I believe that such a message could have some effect on the Soviet decision, particularly if it were made public.⁶

(2) Word could be passed through Dobrynin that if any senior Soviet officials desire to attend the Olympics, we will be pleased to arrange appropriate invitations for them. This would imply that their counterparts here would invite them, and would also convey the implication that we do not plan to stage any “provocative” (in their eyes) actions which would embarrass them.

6. We should also consider carefully whether we should make one more effort to suggest an overall framework of interaction for the rest of the year. I could, for example, test such an idea with Zagladin in May. We would obviously have to think carefully what we put in it, but a package which should be attractive to them might include:

a. renewing START and INF negotiations along the lines Scowcroft was willing to discuss;

b. the CBMs/NUF trade-off at Stockholm;

c. submitting TTBT and PNET treaties for ratification, subject to some further arrangements on verification; and

d. beginning negotiation of some aspects of ASAT (e.g., weapons directed at high orbital systems).

Such a package would go far to address those items on the Soviet agenda which are not *prima facie* pernicious. It should be clear, of course, that what we are suggesting is a package deal, and that the sequence will be important (e.g., we must get back to INF and START before there can be negotiations on any aspect of space systems).⁷

7. If we can do it, I believe an unofficial but authoritative proposal along these lines would get serious consideration. While the Soviets have to work themselves out of the policy corner where they have positioned themselves, I believe they recognize the President's strength of leadership and, behind all their hurt feelings rhetoric, they would like nothing better than to demonstrate that they can deal with him. But Chernenko has to be able to argue that he is getting something, or else the charge that he is only helping the man who wants to do them in will prevail.

8. The idea of suggesting a meeting in Moscow of an interagency team from here to review the U.S.-Soviet agenda (and determine whether a Gromyko-Shultz meeting would be useful before the UN session in September) might be useful in this context. I understand that Rick Burt has suggested to Secretary Shultz that a team including Burt, Rodman, Perle and myself go to Moscow for a tour d'horizon and counterpart meetings. If accepted by the Soviets, such an effort might not only clarify Soviet intentions on some of the issues, and their willingness to consider a more forthcoming stance, but also would provide an opportunity for a private meeting with Zagladin where some of the issues could be pursued more directly and unofficially. (Alternatively, of course, there are other ways to arrange such a meeting if the Soviets desire one.)

Obviously, these matters require a good deal of thought, but I offer them now because I believe that if we are to move at all along these lines, it should be no later than sometime in May.⁸

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations April 1984 (2). Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Although the memorandum is uninitialed, McFarlane's marginalia (see [footnotes 3](#) through [8](#), below), indicate that he received it.

² Malcolm Mackintosh was a prominent British Sovietologist during the Cold War era, who served in the Foreign Office and then continued to advise the government on the Soviet Union and intelligence matters after his retirement. It is unclear to which analysis Matlock was referring.

³ McFarlane wrote in the margin: "agree."

⁴ McFarlane wrote below: "No."

⁵ McFarlane wrote in the margin: "agree."

⁶ McFarlane wrote in the margin: "agree."

⁷ McFarlane wrote in the margin: "agree."

⁸ McFarlane wrote at the end of the memorandum: "Jack—The Pres would benefit from an analysis of the internal personal political interplay going on in the Kremlin now as it affects foreign policy. Could you prepare that please working with whomever you think best. Bud."

215. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, May 8, 1984

SUBJECT

Reactivation of U.S.-USSR Environmental Agreement

Once again another U.S.-Soviet agreement is up for reactivation or renewal. Once again the issue appears all by itself and out of context. Renewal of such an agreement seems innocent enough. It does not appear to pose the risk of a technology transfer hemorrhage, nor does it appear to pose a significant hostile intelligence threat. Its political impact seems relatively insignificant: not too many people pay attention to meetings between environmental officials at the Under Secretary level.

The problem with this is that it is part of a pattern of a wide variety of agreements that are appearing before us for renewal one by one.² The real policy question here is whether this is a pattern to which we want to subscribe at this time. Other issues which form the pattern include: the reactivation of U.S.-Soviet Health agreements, the U.S.-Soviet Fishing relationship, the Agricultural Cooperation agreement, the agreement on Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation, the Consular agreement, the Exchanges Agreement and others. (The ones listed are only those which have appeared in recent weeks.)

Taken together, these add up to a relationship of wholesale cooperation with the Soviets that amounts to a revival of

the “detente” relationship established by President Nixon. These types of agreements were to help diminish the fundamental political tensions between the two systems not only by their intrinsically cooperative nature, but because they formed a web of relationships which were organically linked so as to provide a system of incentives for the Soviets to behave in a more moderate fashion. Fully recognizing that we had more to offer the Soviets in these various fields than vice versa, the threat of U.S. withdrawal from these accords was to serve as the stick accompanying the carrots. Even though it was recognized that these agreements were not truly reciprocal, it was nevertheless part of the price we were willing to pay to supply both the positive and negative incentives of a “linkage” policy so as to encourage in particular Soviet good faith in arms control.

If somebody is articulating the philosophy behind the current renewal of U.S.-Soviet agreements, I have not heard it. Perhaps the strategy underlying this has appeared in secret documents which I have not seen. What I have been able to see is a rather underarticulated policy of “intensified dialogue.” But, this expression cannot explain an entire foreign policy strategy.

Is the current policy a repetition of the Nixon policy of “linkage” and incentives? Or are we willing, as it appears, to give more and more carrots to the Soviets regardless of their external behavior?

Today they are conducting a major escalation of their attack on the innocent people of Afghanistan. Yet the reactivation of the Environmental agreement as well as others involves lifting of Afghanistan sanctions which, though imposed by President Carter, we have chosen to retain for three and a half years. The Soviets are harassing

the Sakharovs with new intensity. They have rejected countless of our good-faith efforts to get them to return to several negotiating tables in spite of their dubious record of treaty compliance. On top of this, their policy seems pointed, as much as ever before, toward an open attempt to take sides in a U.S. presidential election. How else to explain their decision to pull out of the Olympics?³

Under these circumstances, I believe the entire package of agreements should come under review and should be postponed until such time as the Soviets are willing to take even a few steps—much less move halfway—toward reaching some kind of mutual code of behavior with us.

Unless we begin to treat these agreements more directly as part of the entire strategic relationship with the USSR, and in doing so link them to Soviet external behavior in a way that establishes a coherent system of incentives, the Soviets will interpret our actions as signs of weakness and will have no incentive to mitigate the various types of aggression which they and their proxies are currently conducting around the world. Clearly we must continue our efforts to demonstrate that we in fact want peace, but the challenge we face in trying to do so involves avoiding adopting the position of a supplicant for Soviet good will.

From a variety of indications, the Soviets appear to believe that they can paint the President as a warmonger to assist his electoral defeat and by tarring him this way, induce him to make concessions in symbol if not substance. They are looking to see if we are conscious of the nature of the signals we send them and if those signals are ones of strength or weakness.

Renewing agreements in the absence of a clearly defined and articulated strategy will only be seen as a sign of

weakness—especially a sign that we fear their anti-Reagan propaganda campaign so much that we are willing to reach even for Environmental agreements in hopes of mitigating it.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, NSC Files, Subject File, Soviet (6). Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates McFarlane saw it, and he wrote in the margin: “Good paper. Many thanks.”

² Shultz and Dobrynin discussed a number of these agreements in their April 16 meeting. See [Document 212](#).

³ See [Document 217](#).

216. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, May 8, 1984

SUBJECT

Soviet Turndown on Meeting with Soviet Scientists

The Soviet rejection of your invitation to meet with visiting Soviet scientists Velikhov and Sagdeyev is one additional example of Soviet reluctance to do business with us on anything but their own terms.² The Velikhov turndown, coupled with Dobrynin's failure to date to respond to your offer of private space arms control discussions may indicate the Soviets want renewed ASAT negotiations and nothing else. We are continuing to work in the interagency ASAT group to come up with an agreed Administration position on space arms control as quickly as possible.

The Soviet rejection was foreshadowed this weekend by Soviet behavior at a conference on the ABM Treaty sponsored by the Federation of American Scientists.³ The conference sponsors invited Brent Scowcroft to attend the dinner opening the conference. Scowcroft joined Velikhov, Sagdeyev, Paul Warnke, Bill Colby and others at the head table. At the end of dinner Velikhov quickly excused himself, passing up the opportunity for an after-dinner conversation which the sponsors had hoped would ensue. Instead, Velikhov left a member of his delegation, one of Arbatov's deputies, for an extended discussion with Scowcroft.

It was also apparent during the conference that the entire Soviet delegation had little latitude for discussion. They repeated standard Soviet positions and refused to be drawn into anything which might foreshadow their position in future negotiations. With few exceptions the delegation passed up nearly every opportunity to explore specific ABM Treaty-related issues in depth, much to the frustration of the American sponsors.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, May 1–May 10, 1984 ES Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Tefft on May 4; cleared by Pascoe and Palmer. McKinley's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on May 8.

² In a telegram to Shultz, Dam informed him: "Rick Burt is sending you a cable raising the possibility of your meeting with the Deputy Head of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Yevgeniy Velikhov, but in the end advising a meeting at the Schneider/Burt/Howe level. You should be aware that I will be seeing Velikhov at a purely social dinner, an invitation accepted by my wife as an opportunity to practice her Russian. EUR sees no problem with my attendance at this affair.

"You might consider meeting with Velikhov. You won't have many opportunities to meet with a Soviet who is very well connected with the Soviet leadership, doesn't work for Gromyko, and has a solid record as a scientist, academic, and government official. I am told he is a very articulate spokesman for the Soviet line on SDI, space arms control, etc. You might keep this thought in mind as you read Rick's cable." (Telegram Tosec 40050/118238 to Shultz, April 21;

Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840006-0129)

³ The Soviet scientific delegation was scheduled to be in the United States from May 4 to 11. They attended a symposium sponsored by the Federation of American Scientists, "Defending the ABM Treaty," from May 4 to 7, and participated in the annual meeting of the National Academy of Sciences from May 8 to 11. (Telegram 112642 to the Mission in Geneva, April 18; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840253-0271)

217. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, May 9, 1984, 1040Z

5689. Subject: Moscow's Olympic Boycott—A Morning After Analysis.

1. (C—Entire text)

2. Three main factors lay behind Moscow's decision to boycott the Los Angeles games.² The proximate cause of yesterday's announcement, however, was probably a new development neither side could have foreseen in advance.

3. Soviet misgivings about participation in the Games have been evident for some time and have their roots in the following:

—A lingering desire to pay us back for “spoiling” the 1980 Moscow competition;³

—Traditional concerns over defections of athletes;

—The growing incompatibility of participation with Moscow's efforts to portray U.S.-Soviet relations as in a state of crisis due to Reagan administration policies.

4. Of these, the first must be considered a constant which, while it set the emotional backdrop for the May 8 decision, would not have been sufficiently compelling in its own right to precipitate it. The last factor has taken on increasing importance as Moscow's calculated sulk has deepened, and was probably a major factor in deciding to stay home. The defection problem has in all likelihood assumed greater

prominence over the course of recent months, as Soviet plans for dealing with the problem (their “Olympic attaché”) have been upset and they may have begun to believe their own scare stories about concerted FBI efforts to encourage defections and anti-Soviet demonstrations. We reported last week a dissident-based report that Ustinov and the KGB were lobbying hard against going.

5. It seems likely that these three sets of concerns came together last month (presumably when the leadership, its party/government house in order after Andropov’s death, had time to focus on the issue) to produce the first hint that the Soviets would stay away—their April 10 call for an emergency IOC meeting. In the wake of the Lausanne meeting two weeks later, however, Soviet Olympic officials were upbeat in assessing prospects for attendance, specifically denying Moscow would participate in a “boycott.” Soviet media criticism of preparations subsequently adopted a less hostile tone, and even began featuring coverage of athletes preparing for the Games. We had word from Soviet contacts in a position to know that training was continuing through last week, and that athletes were planning on being in Los Angeles. All of this suggests that, as recently as a week ago, there was strong internal support for participating in the Olympics, and that those favoring staying home had not yet carried the day.

6. What probably tipped the balance in their favor and precipitated yesterday’s announcement was the early May failure of a Soviet exchange professor, Kozlov, to board a plane for the USSR after confused signals that he might wish to seek asylum in the U.S. The incident quickly got into the public domain, leading the Soviets to make public diplomatic protests of the USG’s handling of the incident.

7. It seems likely that the continuing Kozlov incident coincided with the final stage of Moscow's consideration of whether or not to attend the Olympics—a decision which would have had to be made no earlier than June 2. The impact may well have been to demonstrate that even a carefully selected, mature individual with a family in the USSR could not be relied upon not to become a media event. The potential for similar embarrassment of turning loose an entire team of young, world-class athletes amid the temptations of Los Angeles may thus have taken on an immediacy for Soviet policymakers it did not have before Kozlov's refusal to embark. In the context of the generally tough line on the U.S. currently prevailing in leadership circles here, it would have taken a strong, confident voice to have argued against a boycott. As we have seen too often of late, there is no evidence such a voice exists in the current leadership.

8. As to timing, it seems to us most likely that those opposing participation (and we have no reason to believe there were divisions within the Politburo itself on this point) wanted the decision announced quickly to cut off further internal lobbying on the issue. It is possible, however, that, knowing how difficult the move would be to explain domestically, the leadership calculated that an announcement on the eve of the Victory Day holiday—when patriotic fervor could be counted upon to be at a yearly high—might quell any doubts.

9. Comment: The impact of yesterday's announcement, of course, will fall most heavily on Soviet interests. Moscow's justification of its boycott is unconvincing, and the efforts the Soviets will presumably make to keep their allies and clients home seem likely to strain ties with those states. Coming on top of their action last week against Elena Bonner and Sakharov⁴ —to say nothing of their handling of

the KAL episode last fall—the move will reinforce perceptions of Soviet callousness with respect to world opinion, as well as of Soviet negativeness and of defensiveness on East-West issues. Without any help from us, in short, the Soviets have shot themselves squarely in the foot.

Zimmermann

1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840301-0204. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to the Consulate in Leningrad, USIA, USUN, Ankara, Athens, the Mission in Berlin, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Paris, Reykjavik, Rome, USNATO, Dublin, Helsinki, Stockholm, Vienna, Bern, Belgrade, Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Munich, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo, and the Mission in Geneva.

2 On May 8, the Soviet National Olympic Committee announced that they were “compelled to declare that the participation of the Soviet athletes in the 23rd Olympic Games in the city of Los Angeles is impossible. To act differently would be tantamount to approving the anti-Olympic actions of the American authorities and the Games’ organizers.

“In adopting this decision, we do not have the slightest wish to cast aspersions on the American public or to cloud the good feelings that link our countries’ athletes.” The full text of the Soviet statement was printed in the *New York Times*, May 9, 1984, p. A16.

³ In his memoir, Shultz wrote: “We knew the Soviets, with their sense of reciprocity, would have the U.S. boycott of the 1980 Olympics in Moscow on their minds.

Nevertheless, we proceeded on the assumption that the Soviets would attend. After an April 24 meeting of the Olympic Committee in Lausanne, the head of the Soviet National Olympic Committee announced, ‘There will be no boycott. That is our principal position. The Soviet Union never intended nor intends at the present to take a political decision of a boycott.’ But on May 8, the Soviets reversed themselves, issuing a statement in *Tass* saying that the United States was conniving with ‘extremist organizations’ that aimed to create ‘unbearable conditions’ for their delegation and athletes, an apparent reference to their fear that anti-Soviet demonstrations by human rights activists would embarrass them in Los Angeles. We had, in fact, bent over backward to meet all the Soviet concerns and had developed a plan for 17,000 people to be involved in Olympic security.” The Soviets claimed ‘inadequate security for their athletes’ and announced ‘they would not attend the Olympics,’ We denounced their action as unjustified and a ‘blatant political action.’ We knew that security was not the problem: the Soviet action was their way of retaliating against Jimmy Carter’s decision to boycott the 1980 Olympics in Moscow as a protest against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviet statement implied that Moscow hoped to heighten tensions and hurt President Reagan’s chances for reelection. That didn’t pan out for Moscow.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 474-475)

⁴ The *Washington Post* reported that Bonner had been “placed under investigation for defaming the Soviet state” and barred from leaving Gorky. (Dusko Doder, “Sakharov Reported Fasting to Win Travel Permit for Ailing Wife,” *Washington Post*, May 9, 1984, p. A28)

218. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, May 11, 1984

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, May 10, 1984

I met with Dobrynin for a little over an hour this morning. He was accompanied by his No. 2 man, Sokolov, and Rick Burt was with me. He had asked to come in on instructions from Moscow to give some responses to proposals we had made.

The responses dealt with outer space arms control and opening new consulates in Kiev and New York, and he handed over papers (attached) on these two issues.²

After reading the paper on outer space, I commented that the two sides seem to have different ideas. We had proposed discussions without preconditions; they seemed to be proposing discussions linked to negotiations. While we were not necessarily negative on negotiations, he knew of our concerns on verification. But we would look at their paper and get back to them.

After reading the paper on the consulates, I commented that the Soviets seem to be making agreement on Aeroflot operations a precondition for moving forward. Dobrynin replied that this was not so; rather, they were proposing parallel or even later discussion of Aeroflot. They think they can satisfy our concerns on Kiev, and are prepared to help. At the same time, he said, opening consulates is more in our interest than theirs, since it would give us an "entirely new point" in the capital of the Ukraine. As a practical

matter—and he stressed that it was a practical and not a political matter—opening up in New York would not make much sense without Soviet travelers to take care of.

I then pointed out that there is a range of other issues where we are awaiting Soviet responses. I mentioned our proposals for bilateral discussions here in Washington on chemical weapons; for experts' talks on southern Africa; for an exchange on the Middle East; and for a concrete date to resume talks on consular housekeeping matters. I also noted we are awaiting a suggestion for a date to resume negotiations on the Pacific maritime boundary, and a lifting of their beach ban on our Moscow diplomats in response to the lifting of the ban on theirs in Glen Cove, New York. Dobrynin said answers would be forthcoming in due course.

Continuing, I said that on various other issues they had raised with us, our responses were pretty much in hand. However, I said, we have to ask ourselves whether it makes sense to move forward on them. We have to ask ourselves if Soviet policy is not to shut down meaningful U.S.-Soviet discussions at this point. If it is, so be it. In any event we are puzzled.

I then went on to raise three issues—the Sakharovs, the Soviet scholar in their Embassy, and the Olympics—where the problem is not just substance but what the Soviets are saying. On these issues, I said, we are not telling the Soviets what they should do, but we do expect them to stick to the facts.

On the Sakharovs, I pointed out that both I and Eagleburger had raised the issue privately with Dobrynin, and that these *démarches* were designed to encourage the Soviets to allow Mrs. Bonner to go abroad for medical

treatment. In response, TASS had then alleged that U.S. Embassy personnel and Mrs. Bonner had coordinated a plan for Sakharov to go on hunger strike and for her to seek refuge in our Embassy. The fact is, I said, that U.S. officials did not at any time discuss either a Sakharov hunger strike or a Bonner temporary refuge with Mrs. Bonner. There is thus no foundation for the TASS statement.³ The facts in it are wrong. We had tried to handle the issue privately, not publicly, and the Soviets had blown it up. We think they made a mistake. Sakharov is a Nobel Prize winner, and Mrs. Bonner fought and was wounded in the War. But the point is that the facts the Soviets are stating are not correct.

On the Soviet scholar Kozlov, I said we have no desire to keep him in this country, and when we talked to him he did not indicate he wanted to stay. It was on that basis that we gave him permission to board the plane April 30. But the Soviets have now alleged through TASS that he was subjected to blackmail at the airport, isolated for a long time from their Embassy staff and ultimately prevented from departing.⁴ This is absolutely not the case, I said. The facts are that we talked to Kozlov to ensure that he was not being hustled out of the U.S. involuntarily; that there was at least one Soviet official present with him at all times; and that he himself decided not to board the plane despite repeated urgings by the Soviet official present. Once again, therefore, the facts are not as the Soviets allege.

On the Olympics, I said that this was once again a decision for the Soviets to make. If they changed their minds, their athletes would be welcome at the Games. But they have alleged through TASS that at the April 24 Lausanne meeting, the IOC found the complaints of their Olympic Committee to be just and substantiated; that U.S. authorities continued to interfere in affairs within the

exclusive competence of the Los Angeles Committee; and that U.S. authorities were conniving with extremist organizations which aim to create “unbearable conditions” for their delegation and athletes.⁵

The facts, I said, are that the IOC did not make the finding TASS describes; that the U.S. Government has not interfered in LAOOC affairs (nor has the LAOOC ever claimed it has), but has worked with the LAOOC on issues within the sole competence of the U.S. Government at the committee’s request; and that there has been no connivance with nor encouragement of these groups, that we have bent over backwards to meet all Soviet concerns, and have met them. I said I could run through a long list of facts about the tremendous effort we had made to meet Soviet concerns. For instance, we would have 17,000 people involved in Olympic security, and we were prepared to spend up to \$50 million to assure it, including \$500,000 for the Soviet ship alone. We had taken every imaginable step to ensure that Soviet athletes were safe and able to compete in the Olympics.

Overall, I said, it was hard for us to see how the effort we had undertaken over a year ago to make progress in our bilateral relationship was going anywhere but downhill. The concrete efforts we had made had been pretty much rebuffed. There seemed to be a Soviet effort underway to close down the avenues of U.S.-Soviet discussion. I said that I assumed our diplomatic channel would stay open, but noted on the other hand that they were not even permitting scientists like Velikhov to talk with us.⁶

For our part we believe that the right posture is to be reasonable, ready to talk, and ready to make progress whenever the Soviets are. But, I concluded, the picture from our point of view is bleak.

Dobrynin objected to this analysis. I had asserted that the Soviets are trying to cut off efforts to create better relations, he said. That was not the Soviet intention. They wanted “better, even normal” relations with us. This was, is and will remain the goal, regardless of the Administration in power here.

He said he could not see a single issue where the Soviets are saying no. The single exception was temporary: the agreement between the American Council of Learned Societies and their Academy of Sciences, which Arbatov had received last-minute instructions not to sign as long as Kozlov was in the U.S. This agreement could be signed as soon as the Kozlov case was resolved. On all other issues, Dobrynin said, they think progress can be made.

On the comprehensive test ban, for example, all they were suggesting were negotiations, even if they did not reach conclusions, and the U.S. was refusing to talk. They are still awaiting our answer on the Long-Term Economic Cooperation Agreement. They are prepared to deal with the Administration on everything, if we are willing to meet them halfway. This was true of nuclear testing, of consulates, of the hotline.

Overall, Dobrynin said, it seemed to the Soviets that this Administration was seeking to cut all ties with the Soviet Union except in agriculture. My conclusion that the Soviets are seeking to cut ties is wrong: they are prepared for better relations; but he had to ask where we are prepared to move.

Turning to the specific points I had raised, Dobrynin started with the Sakharovs. Their “people” got the information that Mrs. Bonner had been to the Embassy and given us a letter asking to stay there during Sakharov’s

hunger strike. Their government had to act on that information. It was a coincidence that it had acted while we were making our démarches. We had "three fellows" (i.e. U.S. Embassy officers) going around with this family. Mrs. Bonner was a Soviet citizen, not ours. And we are dealing with a woman with anti-Soviet intentions. The Soviets had treated Sakharov well. He was in a big city with all facilities. Mrs. Bonner had gone abroad three times for eye treatment, when everyone knows that Soviet eye doctors are the best in the world. And when she goes abroad she meets with people who are working against the Soviet Union.

On Kozlov, Dobrynin went on, Rick Burt had been there at the airport and asked him his intentions twice, and it was clear he did not want asylum here. The Soviets had now brought in two doctors, and appreciated our giving them visas. Kozlov had been in California on his own, and they had had no contact with him until he arrived in Dulles. Burt pointed out that he had in fact been with a Soviet official on his trip across the country. I cut this short by commenting that we were not trying to keep Kozlov, and that his case had been handled in the proper way. Nevertheless, Dobrynin went on, we are still insisting on an interview; he asked what our aim could be, and what we would do if Kozlov said he wanted to stay here. In the end, however, he suggested that Burt and Sokolov be in touch to work out the case, and we will continue to talk with the Soviet Embassy about this matter, ensuring that Kozlov's rights are protected.

We also had a discussion of ratification of the nuclear testing agreements. I will be reporting to you separately on this issue.

Attachment

**Summary of Papers Provided to Secretary of State Shultz by Soviet
Ambassador Dobrynin⁷**

Washington, May 10, 1984

POINTS HANDED OVER BY AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN

The question of *preventing the militarization of outer space*, as was emphasized by the Soviet side in the course of recent contacts, is acute and urgent. Solutions to this effect must not be delayed. Hence, the need to hold appropriate negotiations with an aim of reaching a mutually acceptable agreement.

In this regard, we would like to be clear as to the real position of the U.S. side. It is all the more necessary, since initially the U.S. side declared its negative attitude to an exchange of views on the issue of preventing the militarization of space, although later it did express in general terms readiness to discuss this problem without any preconditions. It is also known that two months ago the U.S. government in its report to the Congress maintained that it did not deem it necessary to enter into official discussions on the space issue. Should it be understood that the said position is now becoming invalid? For it is obvious that those two things are incompatible.

So, if the previously declared negative position of the U.S. is discarded, we propose that the two sides, in parallel and simultaneously, make an official statement to the effect that they have agreed to begin discussions of the problem of preventing the militarization of space.

The discussion through diplomatic channels should accordingly be focused on coming to an agreement, with no time lost, on the practical questions concerning the time of

the negotiations, their venue and the level of representatives or delegations. We believe that no difficulties should arise in this respect.

It would seem that in the course of this exchange of views the agenda of the negotiations could be agreed upon in more specific detail. As has already been said, we prefer that there should be a comprehensive and full scope discussion and solution to the problem of preventing the militarization of space. Our specific views in this regard have been outlined to the U.S. side. At the same time, we do not rule out the possibility of discussing, for example, the question of a mutual complete renunciation of anti-satellite systems separately, in parallel with the negotiations on the problem as a whole.

It is clear that in order to ensure the necessary conditions it is important for the sides not to take actions contrary to the goal of the negotiations, that is, to refrain from launching anti-satellite weapons into space. For our part, we have been doing precisely that.

Regarding the *consulates-general in New York and Kiev*. On the question asked by the U.S. side with respect to the buildings earlier allocated for a U.S. consulate-general in Kiev, we can say that in principle this is a solvable problem. The main thing, however, as has already been indicated, is that the practical usefulness of the opening of the consulates-general will be considered in the light of the attitude of the U.S. side to the resumption of Aeroflot flights to the U.S. Again for purely practical reasons, this also applies to some other matters in the area of bilateral relations.

Accordingly, we shall be waiting for the results of the review of the question of Aeroflot flights, which was

promised by the U.S. side.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/09/84–05/11/84). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. On a covering memorandum to Shultz from Burt, a typed note reads: “Sec/Pres delivered by Secretary 5/11 cdj.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, May 1984 ES Sensitive Documents) On May 11, Reagan had two meetings related to the Soviet Union. From 9:45 to 9:59 a.m., he met with Ambassador Hartman in the Oval Office. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) He wrote in his diary: “He believes there is friction in the Polit Bureau [Politburo] & Gromyko is much of our problem. He doesn’t feel I could have any success in appealing to the Soviets to come to the Olympics.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 346; brackets are in the original) Later that afternoon, Reagan met with Shultz and McFarlane from 2:05 to 2:25 p.m. They were then joined by Casey until approximately 2:40 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) Reagan wrote in his diary: “George S. & I met with Bud M. It was mainly a report by George on his meetings with Soviet reps.—Ambas. Dobrynin etc. They are utterly stonewalling us.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 347)

² One paper, not two, covering both outer space arms control and the consulate issues, is attached and printed below.

³ The statement was released on May 4. (Serge Schmemmann, “Tass Says Sakharov Wife Sought U.S. Haven,” *New York Times*, May 5, 1984, p. 7)

⁴ The statement, which reported that the Foreign Ministry delivered a protest to Hartman, was released on May 2. (“Moscow Charges U.S. With Detaining Soviet,” *Washington Post*, May 3, 1984, p. A36)

⁵ See [footnotes 2](#) and [3, Document 217](#).

⁶ See [Document 216](#).

⁷ Secret; Sensitive.

219. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, May 18, 1984

SUBJECT

Next Steps on Sakharov

Dr. Andrei Sakharov's hunger strike is now in its fifteenth day.² In view of his fragile health, time is already running out for U.S. and Western efforts to persuade the Soviet authorities to allow Mrs. Bonner to go abroad for medical treatment, and thereby allow Dr. Sakharov to terminate his hunger strike. According to relatives, Mrs. Bonner was scheduled to join Dr. Sakharov in his hunger strike on May 12. Soviet efforts to prevent news about the Sakharovs from reaching the West have thus far been successful, and we do not know what is happening to the Sakharovs or what their condition is.

The U.S. Government has already undertaken several steps to encourage the Soviet authorities to relax their pressure on the Sakharovs:

—We have brought up the Sakharov situation with the Soviets at a number of levels (including my May 10 meeting with Dobrynin).³

—The Department has released two public statements condemning Soviet behavior toward the Sakharovs.⁴

—We have instructed our Embassies in 21 Western and Third World capitals to request the help of host governments and international political organizations in convincing the Soviets to cease their pressure on the

Sakharovs. Some governments have already responded, and there is a possibility that Mitterrand may precondition his June trip to Moscow on resolution of Sakharov's case.

—We have initiated special discussions of the Sakharov case with visiting foreign leaders or during the travels of our own leadership overseas. For example, during his visit to New Delhi, Vice President Bush raised Sakharov with Indian officials.

—We have consulted with National Academy of Sciences President Frank Press, who has in turn informed sister Academies of other nations of his concern about the Sakharov situation and caused the Soviets to worry that his mid-June trip to Moscow will not take place as planned.

—USIA is putting together a public affairs strategy for dealing with the Sakharov situation, and has already advised posts to give their support to Sakharov Day observances (May 21) and to distribute as widely as practicable key public documents on the situation.

—We are continuing our close contact with Sakharov family members in this country, and are advising posts where they can be of assistance to Sakharov relatives during their travels to other countries.

—Finally, we are consulting with prominent Americans not in government who might have some influence with the Soviets to use on the Sakharovs' behalf. George Kennan has already undertaken to discuss Sakharov with Dobrynin in the context of an upcoming trip to the USSR.

Action Plan for Additional Efforts

In the coming days we will be taking steps designed to place increasing pressure on the Soviet authorities. Our objective is to provide them additional avenues for resolving the situation favorably should they so choose and make clear that this is an issue of worldwide humanitarian concern, rather than a U.S.-Soviet political confrontation.

—At this time we do not recommend that you make either a private or a public statement on behalf of the Sakharovs, since this could have the effect of further polarizing the issue. As you know, we made a private approach to the Soviets on your behalf to try to avert the present crisis. The Soviet response, both in private and then in public, was to accuse us of having conspired with the Sakharovs to create the present situation. The same response is likely to any new Presidential statement on Sakharov.

—We will, however, encourage other U.S. officials to raise the issue when appropriate, stressing the international nature of concern about the Sakharovs.

—We are making a discreet approach to East German lawyer Vogel, who has brokered some past spy and dissident trades,⁵ to determine whether there is any Soviet interest in principle in trading for the Sakharovs. There is little chance that the Soviets will trade for Sakharov. But despite the limited prospects for success, this avenue should be tried to provide the Soviets with another option to resolve the present situation short of tragedy.

—We will also be going privately to other governments who have persons the Soviets want (such as the West Germans and the Norwegians) to determine if there is any willingness on their part to trade for Sakharov.

—We will be following up our 21-country demarche of last week with additional demarches, at the Ambassadorial level where appropriate, to encourage wider international private and public efforts on behalf of the Sakharovs.

—I am asking Foreign Minister Genscher to raise the Sakharov matter during his May 20–22 trip to Moscow.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/18/84–05/21/84). Secret. In a covering memorandum to Reagan, McFarlane reported: “George agrees that it would be unwise for you to make a public statement on the issue, to avoid further polarization, but is moving—in full consultation with us—to activate other statesmen and prominent private individuals to convey their interest to the Soviet leaders.” Reagan initialed the covering memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² Sakharov began his hunger strike on May 2 because his wife, Elena Bonner, was not permitted to leave the Soviet Union for medical treatment. The Politburo extensively discussed Sakharov’s hunger strike and Bonner’s medical situation from April to July 1984. For documentation on these Soviet deliberations, see Rubenstein and Gribanov, eds., *The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov*, [Documents 169–175](#), pp. 284–298.

³ See [Document 218](#). On May 2, Burt called Sokolov regarding the Sakharov case. (Telegram 129312 to Moscow, May 3; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840286–0384)

⁴ On May 8, the Department of State spokesman issued the following statement regarding the Sakharovs: “The Department of State is strongly concerned about press reports that Andrei Sakharov has been on a hunger strike

since May 2 and that his wife, Elena Bonner, has been charged with slandering the Soviet state, which could lead to as much as three years' confinement. The refusal of the Soviet authorities to reveal any information about the present welfare and whereabouts of the Sakharovs lends credence to these reports. Dr. Sakharov has been trying for many months to obtain permission from the Soviet authorities for his wife to travel abroad for medical treatment, something she has been allowed to do three times before. He has apparently been driven to this extreme action by the continued refusal of the authorities to even respond to his requests. The Soviet handling of this matter has been inhuman and incomprehensible."

(Telegram 135441 to various Western European posts, May 9; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840300-0373)

⁵ Wolfgang Vogel was an East Berlin lawyer with contacts in the East and West who engaged in "spy trading" during the Cold War. See Craig R. Whitney, "Spy Trader," *New York Times Magazine*, May 23, 1993.

**220. Memorandum From the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane) to President Reagan¹**

Washington, May 18, 1984

SUBJECT

Phone Call to Dobrynin on Sakharov

As you know, Andrei Sakharov is beyond the two-week point in his hunger strike. I had an idea, which I have discussed with George Shultz, who agrees, which might make a difference in Soviet thinking. Basically, we propose that you call Dobrynin (as opposed to a meeting which would attract attention) and make a plea for the Soviet leadership to reconsider. I have worked up talking points (attached). If you agree with this, the sooner you have an opportunity to do it, the better. No one, and I stress no one, knows about this except George and me. It seems to me best that it stay that way.²

Attachment

Talking Points for President Reagan³

Washington, undated

TELEPHONE CALL TO DOBRYNIN

—Anatoly, I would have asked you to come and see me, but I know what I have to say touches on a delicate subject, and I thought it best to give you a call so we don't risk any press attention.⁴

—Would you let Chairman Chernenko know that I'm very concerned over the situation that has developed with Mrs. Bonner and Sakharov.

—I've been careful not to make any public statements, because I don't want anyone to get the idea that I am bringing public pressure on your government.

—But, you know, if a tragedy occurs, it could have the most serious implications for our relationship. I wouldn't be doing my duty if I didn't point this out while the situation can be resolved.

—The fact is that the American people will never be able to understand why a sick woman shouldn't be allowed to travel abroad to get an operation. And if either of the Sakharovs dies under present circumstances, that will make a lot of things more difficult than they are already. I think you will agree that relations are bad enough as it is.

—So I hope you'll pass these thoughts on to Chairman Chernenko. Let him know also that I consider this a purely private conversation. If he makes a humanitarian decision, he can be sure that I won't mention this conversation in public and I certainly won't try to claim any credit or use it politically.

—You know, I had really hoped that our relations could be improved. We have some real problems, but I've made a number of decisions which I hoped could start us on a better road.

—Right now I'm puzzled by your government's actions. I just don't understand why we can't get down to business and settle some of the problems between us.

—Let your people know that I'm still willing to try to settle our problems if they are. I keep being asked to make some new gesture, but every time I make one, they slap me in the face. And, you know, I could ask the same. But we'll never get anywhere if we keep up this "Alphonse and Gaston" act.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/24/84-06/01/84). Secret.

² According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan spoke to Dobrynin on Saturday, May 19, from 9:53 to 10:03 a.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No substantive record of the conversation was found.

³ Secret.

⁴ In his memoir, Dobrynin wrote: "On May 19, a Saturday morning while I was at home, I got a call from the president himself from Camp David. He said he wanted to make a personal and confidential request to Chernenko to permit Bonner to leave for medical treatment. Some reports said that she was in very poor health, and God forbid that she should die now. If so, Reagan thought, angry American public opinion would drive our very difficult relations to the lowest conceivable level. Reagan remarked that he did not question the high level of Soviet medical science, but, 'What if she dies in the Soviet Union? There will be no end of trouble. If she is to die, let her die here. At the very least, nobody, hopefully will blame me for that.' Reagan added in a conciliatory tone that, of course, he was not in a position to judge just how critical Bonner's condition was but he was acting only on unofficial information he had. I promised to relay his request to Moscow promptly. I considered Reagan's intervention as something of a goodwill gesture." (Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, p. 552)

221. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 11-10-84/JX

Washington, May 18, 1984

IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT SOVIET MILITARY-POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

KEY JUDGMENTS

During the past several months, a number of coincident Soviet activities have created concern that they reflect abnormal Soviet fear of conflict with the United States, belligerent intent that might risk conflict, or some other underlying Soviet purpose. These activities have included large-scale military exercises (among them a major naval exercise in the Norwegian Sea, unprecedented SS-20 launch activity, and large-scale SSBN dispersal); preparations for air operations against Afghanistan; attempts to change the air corridor regime in Berlin; new military measures termed responsive to NATO INF deployments; and shrill propaganda attributing a heightened danger of war to US behavior. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Examining these developments in terms of several hypotheses, we reach the following conclusions:

—We believe strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States. This judgment is based on the absence of forcewide combat readiness or other war preparation moves in the USSR, and the absence of a tone of fear or belligerence in Soviet diplomatic communications, although the latter remain

uncompromising on many issues. There have also been instances where the Soviets appear to have avoided belligerent propaganda or actions. Recent Soviet “war scare” propaganda, of declining intensity over the period examined, is aimed primarily at discrediting US policies and mobilizing “peace” pressures among various audiences abroad. This war scare propaganda has reverberated in Soviet security bureaucracies and emanated through other channels such as human sources. We do not believe it reflects authentic leadership fears of imminent conflict. *[portion marking not declassified]*

—We do not believe that Soviet war talk and other actions “mask” Soviet preparations for an imminent move toward confrontation on the part of the USSR, although they have an incentive to take initiatives that discredit US policies even at some risk. Were the Soviets preparing an initiative they believed carried a real risk of military confrontation with the United States, we would see preparatory signs which the Soviets could not mask. *[portion marking not declassified]*

—The Soviet actions examined are influenced to some extent by Soviet perceptions of a mounting challenge from US foreign and defense policy. However, these activities do not all fit into an integrated pattern of current Soviet foreign policy tactics. *[portion marking not declassified]*

—Each Soviet action has its own military or political purpose sufficient to explain it. Soviet military exercises are designed to meet long-term requirements for force development and training which have become ever more complex with the

growth of Soviet military capabilities. [*portion marking not declassified*]

—In specific cases, Soviet military exercises are probably intended to have the ancillary effect of signaling Soviet power and resolve to some audience. For instance, maneuvers in the Tonkin Gulf were aimed at backing Vietnam against China; Soviet airpower use in Afghanistan could have been partly aimed at intimidating Pakistan; and Soviet action on Berlin has the effect of reminding the West of its vulnerable access, but very low-key Soviet handling has muted this effect. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Taken in their totality, Soviet talk about the increased likelihood of nuclear war and Soviet military actions do suggest a political intention of speaking with a louder voice and showing firmness through a controlled display of military muscle. The apprehensive outlook we believe the Soviet leadership has toward the longer term US arms buildup could in the future increase its willingness to consider actions—even at some heightened risk—that recapture the initiative and neutralize the challenge posed by the United States. [*portion marking not declassified*]

These judgments are tempered by some uncertainty as to current Soviet leadership perceptions of the United States, by continued uncertainty about Politburo decisionmaking processes, and by our inability at this point to conduct a detailed examination of how the Soviets might have assessed recent US/NATO military exercises and reconnaissance operations. Notwithstanding these uncertainties, however, we are confident that, as of now, the Soviets see not an imminent military clash but a costly and—to some extent—more perilous strategic and political

struggle over the rest of the decade. [*portion marking not declassified*]

DISCUSSION

Introduction

1. There has been much Soviet talk about the increased danger of nuclear war. This theme has appeared in public pronouncements by Soviet political and military leaders, in statements by high officials targeted at both domestic and foreign audiences, in internal communications, and in other channels. Soviet authorities have declared that Washington is preparing for war, and have issued dire warnings that the USSR will not give in to nuclear blackmail or other military pressure. The articulation of this theme has paralleled the Soviet campaign to derail US INF deployment. It continues to this day, although at a somewhat lower intensity in recent months than in late 1983. [*portion marking not declassified*]

2. Since November 1983 there has been a high level of Soviet military activity, with new deployments of weapons and strike forces, large-scale military exercises, and several other noteworthy events:

—*INF response*: Start of construction of additional SS-20 bases following Andropov's announcement on 24 November 1983 of termination of the 20-month moratorium on SS-20 deployments opposite NATO; initiation [*less than 1 line not declassified*] of patrols by E-II nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines off the US coast [*less than 1 line not declassified*]; forward deployment [*less than 1 line not declassified*] of long-range missile-carrying D-class SSBNs; and the start of deployment [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

of 925-km range SS-12/22 missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and continued propaganda and active measures against INF deployment.

—*Response to NATO exercise*: Assumption by Soviet air units in Germany and Poland [*less than 1 line not declassified*] of high alert status with readying of nuclear strike forces as NATO conducted “Able Archer-83,” a nuclear release command post exercise.

—*Soviet exercises*: Large-scale exercise activity during spring 1984 [*1½ lines not declassified*] featuring the multiple launches of SS-20s and SLBMs; survivability training including the dispersal of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] operational Northern Fleet SSBNs supported by a large number of ships; and the use of survivable command, control, and communications platforms, possibly in a transattack scenario.

—*Berlin air corridors*: Periodic Soviet imposition beginning 20 February 1984 of minimum flight altitudes for the entire length of one or more of the Berlin air corridors—a unilateral change in the rules governing air access to Berlin.

—*Afghanistan*: Deployment in mid-April of several airborne units to Afghanistan, launching of a major spring offensive into the Panjsher Valley, and initiation on 21 April for the first time of high-intensity bombing of Afghanistan by over 105 TU-16 and SU-24 bombers based in the USSR.

—*East Asia*: Deployment in mid-November 1983 of naval TU-16 strike aircraft to Vietnam for the first

time; positioning of both Soviet operational aircraft carriers for the first time simultaneously in Asian waters in March 1984; and the first joint Soviet/Vietnamese amphibious assault exercises on the coast of Vietnam in April.

—*Caribbean*: A small combined Soviet/Cuban naval exercise in the Gulf of Mexico, with the first-ever visit of a Soviet helicopter carrier in April/May, and Soviet/Cuban antisubmarine drills.

—*Troop rotation*: Initiation of the airlift portion of Soviet troop rotation in Eastern Europe 10 days later in April than this has occurred for the past five years.

This Estimate explores whether the Soviet talk about the increasing likelihood of nuclear war and the Soviet military activities listed above constitute a pattern of behavior intended either to alarm or intimidate the United States and its allies or to achieve other goals. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Possible Explanations

3. Specifically, in examining the facts we address five explanatory hypotheses:

a. Both the Soviet talk about war and the military activities have been consciously orchestrated across the board to achieve political effects through posturing and propaganda. The object has been to discredit US defense and foreign policies; to put Washington on notice that the USSR will pursue a hard—perhaps even dangerous—line, unless US concessions are forthcoming; to maintain an atmosphere of tension conducive to pressure by “peace” groups on

Western governments; and, if possible, to undercut President Reagan's reelection prospects.

b. Soviet behavior is a response to Washington's rhetoric, US military procurement and R&D goals, and US military exercises and reconnaissance activities near Soviet territory—which have excited Soviet concerns and caused Moscow to flex its own military responsiveness, signaling to Washington that it is prepared for any eventuality.

c. Moscow itself is preparing for threatening military action in the future requiring a degree of surprise. The real aim behind its recent actions is not to alarm, but to desensitize the United States to higher levels of Soviet military activity—thus masking intended future moves and reducing US warning time.

d. A weak General Secretary and political jockeying in the Soviet leadership have lessened policy control at the top and permitted a hardline faction, under abnormally high military influence, to pursue its own agenda, which—intentionally or not—looks more confrontational to the observer.

e. The Soviet military actions at issue are not linked with the talk about war and are basically unrelated events, each with its own rationale.

Soviet Talk About Nuclear War

4. Our assessment of the meaning of alarmist statements and propaganda about the danger of nuclear war provides a starting point for evaluating recent Soviet military activities. [*portion marking not declassified*]

5. Soviet talk about the war danger is unquestionably highly orchestrated. It has obvious external aims:

—To create a tense international climate that fosters “peace” activism in the West and public pressure on Western governments to backtrack on INF deployment, reduce commitments to NATO, and distance themselves from US foreign policy objectives.

—To elicit concessions in arms control negotiations by manipulating the anxieties of Western political leaders about Soviet thinking.

—To strengthen cohesion within the Warsaw Pact and reinforce Soviet pressure for higher military outlays by non-Soviet member states. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The overall propaganda campaign against the United States has recently been supplemented with the boycott of the Olympic Games. [*portion marking not declassified*]

6. The talk about the danger of nuclear war also has a clear domestic propaganda function: to rationalize demands on the Soviet labor force, continued consumer deprivation, and ideological vigilance in the society. This message is also being disseminated [*less than 1 line not declassified*] within the Soviet and East European [*less than 1 line not declassified*] bureaucracies, [*less than 1 line not declassified*]:

[*12 lines not declassified*]

7. The central question remains: what are the real perceptions at top decisionmaking levels of the regime? Our information about such leadership perceptions is

largely inferential. Nevertheless, we have confidence in several broad conclusions. [*portion marking not declassified*]

8. First, we believe that there *is* a serious concern with US defense and foreign policy trends. There is a large measure of agreement among both political and military leaders that the United States has undertaken a global offensive against Soviet interests. Central to this perception is the overall scope and momentum of the US military buildup.

Fundamentally, the Soviets are concerned that US programs will undercut overall Soviet military strategy and force posture. Seen in this context, Moscow condemns INF deployment as a telling—but subordinate—element in a more far-reaching and comprehensive US effort aimed at “regaining military superiority.” *The threat here is not immediate, but longer term.* However, the ability of the United States to carry out its longer term plans is questioned by Soviet leaders not only to reassure domestic audiences but also because they genuinely see some uncertainty in the ability of the United States to sustain its military effort. [*portion marking not declassified*]

9. Secondly, in our judgment *the nature of the concern is as much political as it is military.* There is a healthy respect for US technological prowess and anxiety that this could in due course be used against the USSR. The Soviets are thus concerned that the United States might pursue an arms competition that could over time strain the Soviet economy and disrupt the regime’s ability to manage competing military and civilian requirements. More immediately, the Soviets are concerned that the United States could achieve a shift in the overall balance of military power which, through more interventionist foreign policies, could effectively thwart the extension of Soviet influence in world affairs and even roll back past Soviet gains. From this

perspective, the United States' actions in Central America, Lebanon, Grenada, and southern Africa are seen as a token of what could be expected on a broader scale in the future. [*portion marking not declassified*]

10. Third, and most important for this assessment, we do not believe the Soviet leadership sees an imminent threat of war with the United States. It is conceivable that the stridency of Soviet "war scare" propaganda reflects a genuine Soviet worry about a near-future attack on them. This concern could be inspired by Soviet views about the depth of anti-Soviet intentions in Washington combined with elements of their own military doctrine projected onto the United States, such as the virtues of surprise, striking first, and masking hostile initiatives in exercises. Some political and military leaders have stressed the danger of war more forcefully than others, suggesting that there may have been differences on this score—or at least how to talk about the issue—over the past half year. [*portion marking not declassified*]

11. However, on the basis of what we believe to be very strong evidence, we judge that the Soviet leadership does not perceive an imminent danger of war. Our reasons are the following:

—The Soviets have not initiated the military readiness moves they would have made if they believed a US attack were imminent.

—In private US diplomatic exchanges with Moscow over the past six months the Soviets have neither made any direct threats connected with regional or other issues nor betrayed any fear of a US attack.

—Obligatory public assertions of the viability of the Soviet nuclear deterrent have been paralleled by private assertions within regime circles by Soviet experts that there is currently a stable nuclear balance in which the United States does not have sufficient strength for a first strike.

—In recent months top leaders, including the Minister of Defense and Politburo member Dmitriy Ustinov, have somewhat downplayed the nuclear war danger, noting that it should not be “over-dramatized” (although Ustinov’s recent Victory Day speech returned to a somewhat shriller tone). At the same time, high foreign affairs officials have challenged the thesis that the United States can unleash nuclear war and have emphasized constraints on such a course of action.

Moreover, the Soviets know that the United States is at present far from having accomplished all of its force buildup objectives. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Recent Soviet Military Activities

12. *Intimidation?* It is possible that some of the Soviet military activities listed above were intended, as ancillary to their military objectives, to intimidate selected audiences:

—The East Asian naval maneuvers, deployment of strike aircraft to Vietnam, and amphibious exercises have displayed military muscle to China.

—The bombing campaign in Afghanistan could be seen not only as an operation against the insurgency

but also as an implicit threat to neighboring countries
—Pakistan and perhaps Iran.

—In mounting large-scale and visible exercises (such as the March-April Northern and Baltic Fleet exercise in the Norwegian Sea) Moscow would understand that they could be perceived as threatening by NATO audiences. [*portion marking not declassified*]

13. Soviet INF-related military activities have also been designed to convey an impression to the West that the world *is* a more dangerous place following US INF deployment and that the USSR is making good on its predeployment threats to counter with deployments of its own. [*portion marking not declassified*]

14. There is uncertainty within the Intelligence Community on the origins of Soviet behavior with respect to the Berlin air corridors. It is possible that Soviet action was a deliberate reminder of Western vulnerability. Alternatively, airspace requirements for exercises may have motivated this move. The low-key manner in which the Soviets have handled the issue does not suggest that they have been interested in squeezing access to Berlin for intimidation purposes. Nevertheless, the Soviets have been in the process of unilaterally changing the corridor flight rules and thereby reminding the West of their ultimate power to control access to Berlin. After a short hiatus in late April and early May, the Soviets declared new air corridor restrictions, indicating that this effort continues. In a possibly related, very recent development, the Soviets declared tight new restrictions on travel in East Germany by allied missions located in Potsdam. [*portion marking not declassified*]

15. In a number of instances we have observed the Soviets avoiding threatening behavior or propaganda when they might have acted otherwise, perhaps in some cases to avoid embarrassment or overcommitment. For example, they:

—Never publicly acknowledged the incident in November 1983 in which a Soviet attack submarine was disabled off the US coast as it attempted to evade a US ASW ship, and moved the sub quickly out of Cuba where it had come for emergency repairs.

—[2 lines not declassified]

—Took no tangible action in March when one of their merchant tankers hit a mine off Nicaragua.

—Notified Washington of multiple missile launches in early April as a gesture of “good will.” [*portion marking not declassified*]

16. *Reaction to US actions?* The new Soviet deployments of nuclear-armed submarines off US coasts and the forward deployment of SS-12/22 missiles in Eastern Europe are a Soviet reaction to NATO INF deployment, which the Soviets claim is very threatening to them—although the threat perceived here by Moscow is certainly not one of imminent nuclear attack. [*portion marking not declassified*]

17. Soviet military exercises themselves sometimes embody a “reactive” element. [*8½ lines not declassified*] A key issue is whether this counterexercising takes on the character of actual preparation for response to a perceived threat of possible US attack. [*portion marking not declassified*]

18. A case in point is the Soviet reaction to “Able Archer-83.” This was a NATO command post exercise held in

November 1983 that was larger than previous "Able Archer" exercises. [*2½ lines not declassified*] The elaborate Soviet reaction to this recent exercise included [*2½ lines not declassified*] the placing of Soviet air units in East Germany and Poland in heightened readiness [*2½ lines not declassified*]. Alert measures included increasing the number of fighter-interceptors on strip alert, [*3½ lines not declassified*]. Although the Soviet reaction was somewhat greater than usual, by confining heightened readiness to selected air units Moscow clearly revealed that it did not in fact think there was a possibility at this time of a NATO attack. [*portion marking not declassified*]

19. How the Soviets choose to respond to ongoing US military activities, such as exercises and reconnaissance operations, depends on how they assess their scope, the trends they may display, and above all the hostile intent that might be read into them. We are at present uncertain as to what novelty or possible military objectives the Soviets may have read into recent US and NATO exercises and reconnaissance operations because a detailed comparison of simultaneous "Red" and "Blue" actions has not been accomplished. The Soviets have, as in the past, ascribed the same threatening character to these activities as to US military buildup plans, that is, calling them preparations for war. But they have not charged a US intent to prepare for imminent war. [*portion marking not declassified*]

20. *Preparation for surprise military action?* There is one case in our set of military activities that might conceivably be ascribed to the "masking" of threatening Soviet initiatives. For the first time in five years, the airlift portion of the troop rotation in Eastern Europe began on 25 April rather than 15 April. This may have reflected a change in training and manning practices or the introduction of new

airlift procedures. The change of timing of the airlift portion of the annual troop rotation could also be a step toward blurring a warning indicator—a comprehensive delay of annual Soviet troop rotations which would prevent degradation of the forces by withdrawing trained men. But the rail portion of the rotation began ahead of schedule and, in any event, the pattern of rotation was within broad historical norms. [*portion marking not declassified*]

21. In early April, when the Soviets began to assemble a bomber strike force in the Turkestan Military District, there was some concern that it might represent masking of preparations for operations against Pakistan, or even Iran, rather than against the most obvious target, Afghanistan. At this point the force is clearly occupied against Afghanistan. It was never suitably deployed for use against Iran. We believe that, although the force could be used against Pakistan, a major air offensive against Pakistan without forewarning or precursor political pressure would serve no Soviet purpose and is extremely unlikely. [*portion marking not declassified*]

22. [*1 paragraph (23 lines) not declassified*]

23. *Policy impact of leadership weakness or factionalism?*
The Soviet Union has had three General Secretaries in as many years and, given the age and frail health of Chernenko, yet another change can be expected in a few years. This uncertain political environment could be conducive to increased maneuvering within the leadership and magnification of policy disagreements. Some have argued that either the Soviet military or a hardline foreign policy faction led by Gromyko and Ustinov exerts more influence than it could were Chernenko a stronger figure. Although individual Soviet military leaders enjoy great authority in the regime and military priorities remain high

for the whole leadership, we do not believe that the Soviet military, as an institution, is exerting unusually heavy influence on Soviet policy. Nor do we believe that any faction is exerting influence other than through Politburo consensus. Consequently we reject the hypothesis that weak central leadership accounts for the Soviet actions examined here. [*portion marking not declassified*]

24. *A comprehensive pattern?* In our view, the military activities under examination here do tend to have their own military rationales and the exercises are integrated by long-term Soviet force development plans. However, these activities do not all fit into an integrated pattern of current Soviet foreign policy tactics. The different leadtimes involved in initiating various activities argue against orchestration for a political purpose. A number of the activities represent routine training or simply refine previous exercises. In other cases, the activities respond to circumstances that could not have been predicted ahead of time. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Conclusions

25. Taken in their totality, Soviet talk about the increased likelihood of nuclear war and Soviet military actions do suggest a political intention of speaking with a louder voice and showing firmness through a controlled display of military muscle. At the same time, Moscow has given little sign of desiring to escalate tensions sharply or to provoke possible armed confrontation with the United States. [*portion marking not declassified*]

26. Soviet talk of nuclear war has been deliberately manipulated to rationalize military efforts with domestic audiences and to influence Western electorates and

political elites. Some Soviet military activities have also been designed to have an alarming or intimidating effect on various audiences (notably INF “counterdeployments,” the naval exercise in the Norwegian Sea, and naval and air activities in Asia). [*portion marking not declassified*]

27. Our assessment of both Soviet talk about nuclear war and Soviet military activities indicates a very low probability that the top Soviet leadership is seriously worried about the imminent outbreak of nuclear war, although it is quite possible that official propaganda and vigilance campaigning have generated an atmosphere of anxiety throughout the military and security apparatus. The available evidence suggests that none of the military activities discussed in this Estimate have been generated by a real fear of imminent US attack. [*portion marking not declassified*]

28. Although recent Soviet military exercises combine with other ongoing Soviet programs to heighten overall military capabilities, we believe it unlikely that they are intended to mask current or near-future preparations by the USSR for some directly hostile military initiative. Moreover, we are confident that the activities we have examined in this Estimate would not successfully mask all the extensive logistic and other military preparations the Soviets would have to commence well before a realistic offensive initiative against any major regional security target. [*portion marking not declassified*]

29. Both the talk of nuclear war and the military activities address the concerns of a longer time horizon. Moscow’s inability to elicit major concessions in the arms talks, successful US INF deployment, and—most important by far—the long-term prospect of a buildup of US strategic and conventional military forces, have created serious concern

in the Kremlin. We judge that the Soviet leadership does indeed believe that the United States is attempting to restore a military posture that severely undercuts the Soviet power position in the world. [*portion marking not declassified*]

30. The apprehensive outlook we believe the Soviet leadership has toward the longer term Western arms buildup could in the future increase its willingness to consider actions—even at some heightened risk—that recapture the initiative and neutralize the military challenge posed by the United States. Warning of such actions could be ambiguous. [*portion marking not declassified*]

31. Our judgments in this Estimate are subject to three main sources of uncertainty. We have inadequate information about:

- a. The current mind-set of the Soviet political leadership, which has seen some of its optimistic international expectations from the Brezhnev era disappointed.
- b. The ways in which military operations and foreign policy tactics may be influenced by political differences and the policy process in the Kremlin.
- c. The Soviet reading of our own military operations, that is, current reconnaissance and exercises.

Notwithstanding these uncertainties, however, we are confident that, as of now, the Soviets see not an imminent military clash but a costly and—to some extent—more perilous strategic and political struggle over the rest of the decade. [*portion marking not declassified*]

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 09T00367R: Intelligence Publication Files, Production Case Files, Box 3, Folder 32: SNIE 11/10/84/JX Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities. Top Secret; [*codeword and handling restrictions not declassified*]. A note on the cover page reads: "This Estimate is issued by the Director of Central Intelligence. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurs, except as noted in the text. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State." It also notes as participating: The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force; and the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps.

222. Note Prepared in the White House Situation Room¹

Washington, May 29, 1984

Soviets Desire Increased Tension with U.S.

[1½ lines not declassified] the President and his advisors have skillfully avoided a confrontation with the Soviet Union, be it verbal or otherwise. This has increasingly angered the Soviet Union, since Moscow wants to dramatize the international situation by provoking the U.S. into bellicosity which could then be portrayed to the world, and especially Western Europe, as proof that Washington is to blame for the present confrontational atmosphere.

- Moscow's goal is to create a climate of fear which would prompt at least one NATO country to call for a withdrawal of the Pershing and cruise missiles, and stir public opinion against the U.S.

[less than 1 line not declassified] the U.S. had avoided Soviet efforts and defused opportunities for heightening international tension in what he characterized as a skillful manner. As two recent examples, [less than 1 line not declassified] cited the "clever" way in which the White House responded to Ustinov's recent announcement that Soviet missile submarines had moved closer to the U.S. in response to the deployment of the INF,² and the way the U.S. has handled the Sakharov affair so far.³ However, Moscow may deliberately aggravate the Sakharov affair in a continued effort to provoke the U.S.

- [1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/18/84–05/21/84). Secret. There is no drafting information on the note. The note is based on Intelligence Information Cable TDFIRDB-31512905-84. Reagan initialed in the upper right-hand corner of this note, indicating he saw it.

² The *New York Times* reported that on May 20 Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov said in an interview: “the Soviet Union had increased the number of missile-carrying submarines off United States coasts and that the missiles were within 10 minutes of American targets. Marshal Ustinov also said the number of SS-20 medium-range missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union would be increased ‘accordingly’ in the event that the United States proceeds with its plan to deploy additional Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe.” (John F. Burns, “Soviet Said to Add New Subs Off U.S.: Missiles are Within Ten Minutes,” *New York Times*, May 21, 1984, p. A1) For the full text of Ustinov’s interview, see the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVI, no. 20 (June 13, 1984), pp. 8–9. An excerpt of the interview is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 417–419. The White House responded on May 21: “the Soviet Union’s buildup of missile-carrying submarines off American coasts did not alter the balance of power. ‘There has been no essential change in the strategic situation,’ Larry Speakes, White House spokesman, said. ‘The numbers don’t change much.’ He added that Soviet submarines had been operating in coastal waters for years, although he declined to estimate how many might be present. Mr. Speakes said the purported increase was part of a ‘familiar litany’ by which the Russians have been ‘playing the arms control game.’ (Wayne Biddle, “White House Plays Down Soviet Sub Threat,” *New York Times*, May 22, 1984, p. A13)

³ See [Document 220](#).

223. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan¹

Dear Mr. President,

Moscow, June 6, 1984

In connection with your letter² I would like to express some thoughts in continuation of our exchange of views with you.

I, of course, took note of the pledge of commitment to the lessening of tensions between our countries made by you in the handwritten addition to your letter. In turn, I can affirm once again what I wrote in my first letter to you—namely, that it has been and continues to be our wish that there be a turn toward steady, good relations between the USSR and the USA.³ As a matter of fact, the numerous specific proposals submitted by our side, including those proposals put forward in my letters to you, have been aimed at reaching that very objective.

As regards interpreting a certain period in the history of our relations, about which you had already written once before, here our views differ. We have presented our point of view in this regard, so I will not repeat myself. I will note, however, that one side's having military superiority or seeking such superiority cannot be perceived by the other side as an indication of good intentions. There can be only one indication—a willingness to conduct affairs as equals, a willingness reflected in practical policies. The position of the Soviet Union in this regard is clear and precise: we are not seeking superiority, but we will not allow superiority over us. I do not see anything here that should be unacceptable to the United States, if one wants stability

and a lessening of tensions. It is from a position of equality that it is possible to agree on really mutually-acceptable solutions, when neither side can have reason to believe that it is making unilateral concessions.

I thought it necessary to point this out, having in mind the way in which the intentions of the Soviet Union are interpreted in your letter. I cannot agree with this. This has already been stated on our side in the past. But since you return again to the question of intentions and how they can be perceived, I will express a few opinions, illustrating them with specific examples.

If one is to sum up what on many occasions has been publicly stated by you and other representatives of the Administration, one concludes that the only situation that would be acceptable to the United States would be one in which it was militarily ahead of the USSR. The fact of the matter, however, is that such a situation has not been and is not acceptable to us. In this respect we have experience—bitter experience. The history of our relations, especially in the postwar period, has seen quite a few complications too. Quite a few attempts have been made to exert political, economic, and even military pressure on us.

Let us take the current situation. There is, it seems, an American idiom “to turn the table.” Try to look at the realities of the international situation from our end. And at once one will see distinctly that the Soviet Union is encircled by a chain of American military bases. These bases are full of nuclear weapons. Their mission is well known—they are targeted on us. Nothing like it can be found around your country.

And what about the fact that entire regions of the globe have been proclaimed spheres of American vital interests?

And not only proclaimed, but made the object of a U.S. military presence. And this is done, among other places, at our very doorstep. And again we, for our part, are not doing anything like it. What conclusions should we draw from this as to the intentions of the U.S.? I believe the conclusions readily present themselves. Such an approach is nothing other than a hypertrophied idea of one's interests in which the legitimate interests of others are completely ignored, an effort to gain, to put it mildly, positions of privilege at the expense of the other side. This approach is not compatible with the objective of ensuring stability. On the contrary, such an approach as a matter of policy objectively helps to create and sustain tensions.

Or let us take strategic arms. Here, too, no claims can be directed toward the Soviet Union. The fact that there is rough parity between the USSR and the USA and, in a wider sense, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, can be disputed by no expert familiar with the situation. The SALT-2 Treaty was a reflection of this fact. It was not the end of the road, and we did not consider it as such. But the merit of the treaty was, among other things, that it established, I would say, with mathematical precision the strategic balance that has evolved.

Your military experts can tell you that the Soviet Union has done nothing to upset this balance. At the same time we see what kind of attitude is displayed toward the Treaty by the other side. Is it not the criterion by which to judge its intentions?

The same applies as well to medium-range nuclear forces in Europe. I will recall only that it was we who offered to reduce their number to the minimum on the side of the USSR and NATO. In response, "Pershings" and cruise missiles are appearing near our borders. How would you

regard it, Mr. President, had something similar happened with respect to the U.S.? I believe that your assessment of the intentions of the other side under the circumstances could only be one—as regards both the other side’s approach to negotiations and the essence of its intentions.

But even under these circumstances we have displayed and continue to display utmost restraint. The response we were forced to take, in terms of its scope and character, has not gone beyond the limits necessary to neutralize the threat posed to us and our allies. Moreover, we propose to return to the initial situation and, instead of further unleashing an arms race, to address ourselves in a decisive fashion to curbing the arms race, and to radically limiting and reducing nuclear arms. This is far from imposing conditions. As a matter of fact, what is unfair about the two sides cancelling those measures whose effect was to heighten the level of nuclear confrontation and, conversely, to lessen global security? There can be nothing unfair or damaging for either side in this. A return to the previous situation in the present circumstances would constitute forward movement by both sides toward stabilizing the situation, toward the practical renewal of the entire process of limiting nuclear weapons that is of decisive importance for the future of international relations and for peace as such.

So far, however, we see no indication that the American side proceeds from such an assumption. Regrettably, nothing new on this major issue of the day can be found in your letter either. I say this not for the sake of polemics, but rather in the hope that you will still find it possible to appreciate the way out of the extremely grave situation that we are suggesting.

From my correspondence with you, Mr. President, as well as from previous correspondence, one can conclude that, in general terms there seems to be an understanding on your part that there are a number of important questions concerning the problem of security which require solutions and where joint efforts by our two countries are necessary.

For my part, in my last message I specifically mentioned several of these questions.⁴ Let me remind you that these included renouncing the construction of large-scale anti-ballistic missile defense systems, entering into negotiations on preventing the militarization of outer space and on banning anti-satellite weapons, a freeze on nuclear weapons, resuming talks on a complete and comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, and some other measures. In other words, we are not for dialogue in a general sense between our two countries, but propose to fill it with concrete, weighty substance. We are convinced that practical movement in these and other directions and mutual determination to achieve practical results would fundamentally ease the situation in our relations and throughout the world in general. The degree of trust would increase significantly.

But we have not received a response to these proposals that would enable us to say that the United States is prepared for such concrete actions. I will not make a judgment as to what is the problem here, but I am convinced that, seriously speaking, there is no good reason and, moreover, no justification for avoiding the solution of problems that can play a decisive role in determining the road the world will take in the near future. Awareness of this is growing on the part of the public and the leaders of many states. Graphic evidence of this is the recent appeal by the leaders of six countries from four continents to the governments of the nuclear powers.⁵ Mr. President, this

appeal is a very serious reminder, to our countries as well, of the enormous responsibility they bear for the destinies of the world and mankind. Our common duty is to respond to this appeal honestly, without delay, and through concrete actions. For its part, the Soviet Union is prepared for it.

In addition to those of our proposals already mentioned, I would also like to draw your attention to additional areas of possible cooperation in the interests of strengthening peace. One of these is the limitation of naval activity and naval armaments. This problem is very urgent; it is no coincidence that the United Nations has attached such importance to it as well. We have specific ideas on what could be done to reduce the growing tensions on the high seas, to ensure freedom of navigation and the safety of international sea communications. We have spoken in favor of discussing this problem within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament or in separate multilateral negotiations. Taking into account the role of our countries, we also propose to discuss this set of questions on a bilateral basis. We would like to know your opinion on this score.

Furthermore, the Warsaw Pact countries recently made a proposal to NATO countries to begin multilateral consultations on the subject of concluding a Treaty on mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations. The essence and the importance of the idea of such a Treaty are well known. Attention to this proposal has been growing from the moment of its introduction. And here our two countries could also play an important part. We are ready to study any ideas the American side might have on this question.

The Soviet Union will, furthermore, do everything in its power to promote agreements on the problem of banning

chemical weapons and on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Our delegations in Geneva and Vienna will be prepared to cooperate with American representatives. It goes without saying that, within the framework of these fora, we shall also express in detail our views on recent positions advanced by the American side. However, I have to note that the overall impression—and not only ours—is that these positions do not constitute a constructive contribution to the work already done in these fora.

Recently the Soviet Union introduced at the Stockholm conference a concrete and carefully balanced document directed at attaining a really significant agreement, which would fundamentally strengthen security on the European continent. In preparing this document, we took into account the opinions expressed at the first round of the conference as well as in the course of bilateral consultations, including those with American representatives. We would like to expect that in Stockholm the United States will take a position that would make possible agreement on mutually acceptable solutions.

As it has already been pointed out on our part in correspondence with you, we favor a bilateral exchange of opinions on regional matters. Our Ambassador is instructed to present to the Secretary of State more specific considerations on these and some other matters. Here I find it necessary to stress the main point: the need for restraint, for refraining from actions—no matter what their motives—which could only intensify dangerous tensions in various regions and make difficult the achievement of a just political settlement. The world has proven more than once that it is a hundred times more difficult to extinguish a fire than to prevent it. To remember this is in everyone's interests.

I do not want to conclude this letter on a negative note, but in view of some of the remarks in your letter, I must point out that introduction into relations between states of questions concerning solely domestic affairs of our country or yours does not serve the task of improving these relations—if this is our goal. I wish questions of such a nature did not burden our correspondence, which both of us, as I understand it, value.

Sincerely,

K. Chernenko

Attachment

Talking Points From Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin⁶

Moscow, undated

First. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the solution of major questions, including new ones, set forth in the message of K.U. Chernenko would be of principal importance from the point of view of improving the Soviet-American relations and the international situation in general. Thus we again confirm in the practical way the line toward conducting a businesslike exchange of views with the Government of the United States with the aim of achieving constructive agreements on a wide range of issues in the Soviet-American relations. It concerns both the questions of strengthening security and ending the arms race as well as the area of bilateral relations.

Up till now, however, the American side acts in such a way that we do not see its readiness to go forward in practice to improving our relations, though quite a few words about such readiness have been said recently. The repeated

promises to do something positive are not followed by anything tangible as yet.

At the same time it is often said that the American side allegedly introduces some concrete proposals, but the Soviet side reacts to them negatively. It is stated even as if we consciously counteract to some constructive efforts by the Administration and do not want progress in our relations. It is obvious for us that the situation is just the opposite. It is not clear, however, why a deliberately false impression is created, if, indeed, there is a desire to find a common language.

It is known, by whose initiative the Soviet-American relations were brought to such a mediocre shape. If an unbiased approach is used, there cannot be two opinions. Nevertheless, not once we proposed to revive our relations and to fill them with concrete contents. These questions have been discussed with the Secretary of State many times.

If businesslike views in this regard were expressed by the American side, and promises of such nature were given many times, then, by all means, we would consider them with due attention.

We wish only that it could be something specific and not simply symbolics presented as something positive in the way of formal extension of some agreements which are in fact not working. For example, we are told for some time already that a question of allocating fishing quotas for us is being considered. But at the same time, as we find out, measures of the opposite nature are being taken. Is it not the decision on limiting the activity of the joint Soviet-American fishing company on the Pacific coast that speaks about it?

There are attempts to attribute to us the desire to curtail the contacts and ties, including the area of scientific and cultural exchanges. However, the situation here as well rests on the position and acts of the American side. It rests on its unreadiness to solve the question of providing security for Soviet participants in such exchanges and normal conditions for their presence in the US. It is a question of principle and it cannot be avoided. It is again proven by recent hostile acts against Soviet people in the US. The American side also avoids the solution of the question concerning the practical side of such exchanges, connected with the resumption of the flights by the Aeroflot to the United States.

Now the American side keeps some kind of rosters of questions, replies to which should be given by this or that side. But even if to approach the situation with this formal point of view, it still turns out that we constructively develop our position and introduce concrete proposals, while the American side limits itself to promises to think about something and to consider something.

On the Soviet side there is no lack of desire and efforts to really improve the situation in our relations. It is up to the American side.

Second. Questions of security.

The Soviet position on the question of *preventing the militarization of outer space* has been already presented quite clearly to the Secretary of State. We proceed from the idea that formal negotiations on this matter should start between especially appointed delegations. The organizational side of such negotiations should be discussed through the diplomatic channels. In other words now the question is this: is the American side prepared to

solve this urgent problem, which long ago has already gone because of its importance beyond the framework of the Soviet-American relations only?

A proposal has been introduced by the Soviet side that both sides should reject the very idea of developing and deploying *large-scale antiballistic missile defense systems*. We would be ready to discuss the means of realization of this proposal—for example to discuss the substance and the form of appropriate statements, the order of making them public, etc.

Our position with regard to the question of the treaties of 1974 and 1976 on the limitation of underground nuclear explosions is also clear. The treaties were carefully worked out including the part concerning control. They were signed and should be put in force. There is no necessity in any additional interpretation of any provisions of the treaties. The questions, should the sides have them in the future as the treaties are in force, could be considered and solved in accordance with relevant provisions of those treaties themselves. The issue now is only whether the American side is or is not willing to ratify these treaties. We favor doing this and as far as possible without further delay.

The Soviet side attributes great significance *to the banning of chemical weapons, to the reduction of the armed forces and the armaments in Central Europe*. These questions must be solved. Our specific considerations in connection with the latest proposals of the United States concerning these questions will be stated by the Soviet representatives at the appropriate forums.

However, it may be said even now that the American position, unfortunately, does not give hope. We would like

to think that the American side will properly take into account those observations and remarks which we and not only we shall express in Geneva and Vienna. There the Soviet delegations will be ready to maintain contact with the American side as before.

As for discussing these questions in some other manner, now there is no basis for that in view of the character of the latest American proposals.

Third. Regional problems. We repeatedly expressed our readiness to discuss with the American side regional problems named by it and other ones.

In this connection we are prepared to listen to the possible considerations of the American side in response to what has already been said by us on the South of Africa, and also on the situation in the Middle East and on the conflict between Iran and Iraq. In the future, depending on the progress made, we could agree to hold certain special meetings of our representatives as well. We do not exclude this.

As we have already pointed out, it is especially important that restraint be shown, no actions which could exacerbate the situation be taken. This concerns the above mentioned as well as other regions.

Fourth. The Soviet side intends in the nearest future to propose the date of the next round of negotiations *on the convention line in the Bering sea*. We expect that the American side has analyzed the results of the previous round and could take the position which would enable us to come to a just and mutually acceptable solution of this question.

We also intend to convey in the near future our views concerning the negotiations on *cooperation in the search and rescue operations in the Northern part of the Pacific ocean*.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, NSC Executive Secretariat, Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490695) (2 of 2). Secret; Sensitive. Dobrynin presented Shultz with this letter and the attached talking points during their June 12 meeting (see [Documents 224](#) and [225](#)). A routing slip indicates Reagan was given this package during his June 14 daily briefing.

² See [Document 211](#).

³ See [Document 183](#).

⁴ See [Document 197](#).

⁵ See *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 420-421.

⁶ No classification marking. A note in the upper right-hand corner written by an unknown hand reads: "talking points"

224. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 14, 1984

SUBJECT

Chernenko's June 6 Letter and Dobrynin's Talking Points: Analysis

I would like to share with you my analysis of Chernenko's reply to your last letter and to the points Dobrynin handed over in my meeting last Tuesday.²

These communications basically contain nothing new, and confirm my impression that the Soviets are currently uncertain about how to handle us. Since the letter was signed June 6, it does not respond to your Dublin speech.³ But your last letter already contained your offer to negotiate on non-use of force if they would negotiate on confidence-building measures at Stockholm.⁴ Meanwhile, we have put down two other new arms control negotiating proposals, on chemical weapons and in MBFR. The Soviet reaction has been to pull out of the Olympics and to ratchet up their propaganda campaign,⁵ while claiming privately that they are willing to move forward (and agreeing to another round of talks on minor consular issues). In this letter and these points, Chernenko repeats the general argument that they want to move forward and we do not, but offers practically nothing to back it up.

Chernenko's language is correct and non-polemical. In response to your effort to explain why we see a threat in many Soviet actions, he goes on at length with a familiar rendition of Soviet complaints about us (encirclement with

bases, INF missiles at their doorstep, etc.). The core theme is that we refuse to treat the USSR as an “equal.”

On the security side, Chernenko basically reiterates the same tired agenda of one-sided arms control proposals as the solution to the problems in the relationship. On regional issues, he calls for restraint and says Dobrynin will present some “specific considerations” on our proposals for talks, but all Dobrynin had to say was that they are willing to listen to our views on southern Africa and the Middle East/Persian Gulf before deciding whether they will sit down for actual exchanges of views.

As in previous letters, Chernenko leaves bilateral issues to others, i.e. Gromyko and the Foreign Ministry, but even here Dobrynin had mainly complaints that we are not moving on the things they care about, like fishing allocations and Aeroflot flights to the U.S. However, he also promised to get back to us soon on our proposals for new rounds of talks on hotline upgrade and the Pacific maritime boundary and for talks on search and rescue operations in the northern Pacific.

Finally, Chernenko closes with a complaint that you keep injecting Soviet internal affairs—meaning human rights—into your letters.

On the arms control side, there are a few items of detail worth pointing out:

—In terms of the emphasis given to various arms control items, the “Chernenko agenda” as it now stands is: negotiations on outer space arms control; renouncing construction of large-scale anti-ballistic missile defense systems; limitations on naval activities and naval

armaments (a recent Gromyko “initiative”); non-use of force; and nuclear testing.

—On non-use of force, Chernenko is careful: he touts their proposal for a Warsaw Pact-NATO treaty on non-use of force, which they propose to discuss separately from the Stockholm conference; he next talks about chemical weapons and MBFR, and only then turns to Stockholm, where he expresses the hope that “the United States will take a position that would make possible agreement on mutually acceptable solutions.” Dobrynin’s points do not mention non-use of force at all. This suggests there may be some unresolved differences between Chernenko and Gromyko on how to handle your offer to discuss non-use of force together with our confidence-building measures in Stockholm. (Their negotiator in Stockholm is being almost totally non-committal at this point.)

—Finally, both communications promise to negotiate on chemical weapons in Geneva and MBFR in Vienna, even though they are very skeptical of our offers, but Dobrynin’s points turn down our offer of private discussions here on either issue “in view of the character of the latest American proposals.” In other words, they accept bilateral discussions, but only at the negotiating sites.

In sum, then, the Soviets have given us a mixed but, on balance, a poor showing. The tone is defensive, and so is the content. This is not surprising: they are on the defensive because we have the initiative in most aspects of our relationship. I found it interesting that Dobrynin—in his remarks—insisted so strongly that they “are not afraid to be seen negotiating with this Administration,” and that they can do business even this year. But there may be some daylight between him and Moscow, where they continue to appear unwilling to negotiate on the basis of the

substantial agenda you have put forward. So, despite Dobrynin's complaint about accusations that they are "hibernating," I think that remains a fairly accurate description of what they are doing.

To sustain our initiative, I think you should respond fairly quickly to Chernenko's message, and I will be sending you a draft in the next week or so. Overall, our response should be to keep pressing them both privately and publicly, as you did so successfully in your Dublin speech.⁶

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich (elected 02/13/1984) died 03/10/1985 8:30pm (3 of 3). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt on June 13. In a covering memorandum to Shultz, Burt wrote: "Attached are a Memorandum for the President analyzing the communications you received from Dobrynin June 12 and talking points based on this analysis for your use with the President today. You may wish to give the President the Memorandum when you see him." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, June 1-June 30, 1984 ES Sensitive Documents) In a covering note to Shultz attached to another copy of both memoranda, Armacost, who replaced Eagleburger in May as Under Secretary for Political Affairs, commented: "Mr. Secretary, A good set of talkers. I suspect the Soviets are mainly in a quandary due to unresolved issues within their own leadership. Keeping the pressure on makes eminently good sense. I believe a proposal on ASAT along the lines we discussed yesterday would further confound their attempts to regain some initiative." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive

Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, June 1984)

² See [Document 223](#). For the June 12 meeting, see [Document 225](#).

³ Reagan traveled to Ireland from June 1 to 4, addressing the Irish Parliament in Dublin on June 4. After examining the major issues facing the United States and Soviet Union, he stated: “In summary then, we’re seeking increased discussion and negotiation to reduce armaments, solve regional problems, and improve bilateral relations. Progress on these fronts would enhance peace and security for people everywhere.

“I’m afraid the Soviet response has been disappointing. Rather than join us in our efforts to calm tensions and achieve agreements, the Soviets appear to have chosen to withdraw and to try to achieve their objectives through propaganda, rather than negotiations.

“The Soviets seek to place the blame on the Americans for this self-imposed isolation. But they have not taken these steps by our choice. We remain ready for them to join with us and the rest of the world community to build a more peaceful world. In solidarity with our allies, confident of our strength, we threaten no nation. Peace and prosperity are in the Soviet interest as well as in ours.” For the full text of this speech, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book I, pp. 804–811.

⁴ See [Document 211](#).

⁵ See [Document 217](#).

⁶ In his diary entry on June 14, Reagan wrote: “then a meeting with Geo. S. & Bud. We dug into the subject of a meeting with Chernenko. I have a gut feeling we should do this. His reply to my letter is in hand and it lends support to

my idea that while we go on believing, & with some good reason, that the Soviets are plotting against us & mean us harm, maybe they are scared of us & think we are a threat. I'd like to go face to face & explore this with them.”
(Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 357)

225. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 14, 1984

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Dobrynin June 12

I had an interesting 40-minute meeting with Dobrynin this afternoon, at which he handed over Soviet Embassy translations of Chernenko's reply to your last letter of April 16 and of some additional "talking points" on issues he and I have been discussing. The Russian original with our more accurate translation of the letter is attached along with their version of the talking points.² I read them over quickly at the meeting, and will be getting you my analysis of them shortly. At first glance they do not appear to move things forward very much, if at all.

After he handed over the Chernenko reply, I raised Sakharov. I said that you had told me about his call with the message from Chernenko,³ and that I thought everyone's interests, including theirs, would be best served if they could figure out a way to reassure people about the health of Sakharov and his wife. I suggested that Mitterrand's upcoming visit to Moscow might offer an opportunity for the Soviets to clarify the Sakharov situation.⁴

Dobrynin replied that they saw things differently, and the fact that Chernenko had replied to you directly and so quickly should be understood as a "gesture of good will," even though the Soviets consider Sakharov purely a domestic matter. Asking for more information casts doubt on Soviet credibility, he added. I said I was not questioning their credibility, but making the observation that the issue

was a real problem of concern to many people, especially scientists worldwide. He replied that the Soviets are prepared to live with the problem.

Turning to the letter and talking points, I said we would study them carefully and respond shortly. The problem, I said, is that we have been trying to do what we can to move the relationship in a positive direction, but cannot seem to get it off dead center. We have talked about revitalizing our bilateral agreements, we have made proposals in the arms control field, and we have suggested discussions on regional issues.

To take an example, on southern Africa we have a report that they had offered to discuss the issue with the British,⁵ yet it seemed unclear whether they were ready to talk with us. Dobrynin replied that if we had something to say on southern Africa, they were prepared to listen. I told him that on some regional issues we should be thinking of going beyond information sharing to damage control and even to trying to find mutual solutions.

Summing up, I reiterated that the general problem is how to get our relations off the ground and moving forward. If we could do that, I suggested, he and I and perhaps others might take a day and review the whole relationship. If no progress seemed possible on some issues, we could move on to others.

Dobrynin replied by saying that movement on bilateral issues should be easy. He said we had been discussing them for almost a year and a half without getting anywhere. I said our preparations to upgrade activities under the four bilateral agreements we had been discussing were ready. He replied there are no obstacles on the Soviet side.

Security and arms control problems were more difficult, he went on, but still he thought it should be possible to begin or renew negotiations on some of them. Our election year did not matter to them, he stressed. He had been hearing “tales” of the Soviets “hibernating” and accusations that they were interfering in our politics. The Soviets are not afraid to move ahead on bilateral issues and to begin negotiations on “big subjects.” It would be good to show the world that the “big boys” are talking, he said. “We are not afraid to be seen negotiating with this Administration,” he concluded. He said he hoped we would study the messages, and that I would sit down with Gromyko in the fall at the United Nations and “get something done.”

I went back to Sakharov in conclusion, urging him to consider what I had said. He ended by saying that requests for more information raise the issue of credibility after Chernenko had given a substantive answer. Chernenko had only done so because the President himself had asked. I said it was not a credibility issue, but an objective and scientific fact about the importance of the problem.

Dobrynin said he would be going on vacation at the beginning or in the middle of July, in order to get to Moscow while Gromyko was still there. I said I would be going to Asia for two weeks in July. We agreed we should get together again before we both left town.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, NSC Executive Secretariat, Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490695) (2 of 2). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed this memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² See [Document 223](#). The original letter in Russian and talking points are attached.

³ Reference is presumably to the May 19 Reagan and Dobrynin telephone conversation. See [Document 220](#).

⁴ Mitterrand was scheduled to visit Moscow from June 21 to 23, but delayed confirmation of his visit pending Soviet assurances on Sakharov's health. In telegram 23178 from Paris, June 14, the Embassy reported: "Three days before the visit was announced, Mitterrand had lunch with the Soviet Ambassador and, according to press accounts, told him he would go to Moscow as planned, provided he received assurances that the Sakharovs were in good health. The Soviet response was the TASS announcement of the visit on June 4, followed two hours later by the TASS announcement on Sakharov which led shortly, as recounted reftel, to Elysée confirmation. So far as we have been able to ascertain the TASS announcement represented the sum total of Soviet assurances given to Mitterrand so far."

(Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840386-0650) In his diary on June 26, Reagan wrote: "I forgot yesterday to note that I called Pres. Mitterrand about his trip to Moscow. Very interesting. He said Chernenko gives evidence of not being well & doesn't say a word without a script in front of him. He believes the Polit Bureau [Politburo] is kind of a collective in charge." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, pp. 361-362; brackets are in the original)

⁵ In mid-June, the Soviets and British held bilateral discussions on Africa in Moscow. (Telegram 13812 from London, June 20; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840397-0010)

226. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, June 15, 1984

SUBJECT

Soviet Military Priorities

Jeremy Azrael has called my attention to a most interesting interview which appeared in *Red Star*, May 9, by Marshal Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff.² He prepared a memorandum for Secretary Shultz, a copy of which is attached at Tab I,³ and I believe you will find his observations of interest.

First, Ogarkov's comments on nuclear war are entirely consistent with our conviction that the Soviet General Staff is *not* fearful of an imminent U.S. first strike.⁴ Although the interview is directed at a military audience, and therefore would be expected to convey an air of confidence, his categorical statements that nuclear war makes no sense comes very close to an explicit endorsement of MAD. It is particularly interesting in this regard that he does not dwell on the alleged threat of the Pershing II's and GLCM's in Europe.

A second striking feature is his treatment of ET.⁵ The emphasis he gives it implies that he sees developments along these lines as his greatest future worry.

It would be foolhardy to attach too much significance to a single statement. But this one is indeed food for thought.

As Jeremy points out, one of the questions it raises is whether we may not have more leverage in vigorous pursuit of ET in the conventional area than in the strategic nuclear area. Going somewhat further afield with speculation, one can also read in Ogarkov's treatment a recognition that the Soviet economy cannot support competition across the board and may have to make some agonizing decisions on priorities. This *could* mean that the Soviet military may not be as rigid in opposing strategic arms reduction as many assume. Even if this should be the case, however, we should understand that the most likely reason will be a desire to have more resources available for ET.

I have asked the Agency to be alert for any further commentary in Soviet military literature which reiterates or supports Orgakov's themes.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron June 1984 (06/15/1984-06/20/1984). Confidential. Sent for information.

² For an extract of the interview, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 391-394.

³ Tab I is attached but not printed. In a covering note to Shultz on a Department of State copy of the memorandum, Rodman wrote: "I believe you will find the attached memorandum from Jeremy [Azrael] well worth reading. Among other things, it highlights a number of questions that you might want to take up at a 'Saturday seminar' on Soviet affairs." Per Shultz's request on June 26, a slightly revised version of this memorandum was sent to Weinberger, Casey, and McFarlane on July 2. (Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/ Correspondence from the

Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P
Chron's PW 6/16-30/84)

⁴ See [Document 221](#).

⁵ ET: emerging technologies.

**227. Memorandum From the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane) to President Reagan¹**

Washington, June 18, 1984

SUBJECT

Secretary Weinberger's Views on an ASAT Initiative

Following your meeting last week with Secretary Shultz in which he proposed that he be authorized to agree to the Soviet proposal to open "discussions" which would lead to "negotiations" on limiting weapons in space, George and I met with Cap on Friday to discuss how to proceed.² It became clear that Secretary Weinberger was worried that such discussions could be unwise not only in light of severe verification problems but as well because we might want to pursue certain highly sensitive programs which would give us the ability to neutralize certain Soviet satellites in time of crisis. Cap will discuss these with you this afternoon.³

I am aware of these programs and they do offer promise. But we must keep one fundamental truth in mind. You are under tremendous pressure from the allies and the Congress to open some kind of talks on ASAT. In addition to the French initiative in Geneva opposing your strategic defense initiative, every other leading ally (UK, Germany, Italy, the Dutch, Belgians and Danes) have lined up against us. Many of our warmest supporters on the Hill are also calling for talks and even a complete ban. Thus, we are simply faced with a legislated diktat if we don't regain the initiative.

In my view, having looked at the possibilities for negotiation (which protect our interest and are verifiable), we can discuss certain restrictions (particularly on high altitude systems) and should do so. The key is to shape the agenda (in the Shultz-Dobrynin channel) so as to limit the scope of the talks to things which are truly in our interest. Cap and the JCS ought to be heard on this issue.⁴ At today's meeting, I recommend that you: 1) Hear Cap out; 2) Note the mounting pressure which will lead to our being told to do things much worse than those we might choose on our own; and 3) Suggest that we agree to open discussions to shape an agenda in preparation for which he and the Chiefs would be given a full opportunity to limit the scope of any negotiations.

Such a plan would lead to:

—A joint announcement by us and the Russians this week that we have agreed to open discussions in August for the purpose of defining the scope, timing and venue of negotiations on limiting weapons in space.

—The interdepartmental studies would then be completed by August 1st so that you could take decisions on our position in the negotiations.

—In August, the “discussions” would begin probably leading to the actual “negotiations” opening after the elections, perhaps even next year.

Such a scenario would have the great advantage of preempting pending legislation which will be acted upon this week and next.

(Note: Please return this memo to me personally).

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (03/09/1984–06/20/1984); NLR-362-3-20-3-1. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Reagan initialed this memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² Friday, June 15. No record of this meeting was found.

³ Reagan and Weinberger met on June 18 from 3:02 to 3:30 pm. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) In his diary entry for June 18, Reagan wrote: "Cap Weinberger came by—he's concerned it would not be to our advantage to discuss an antiweapon in space treaty with the Soviets. We are making progress on a defense against nuclear missiles." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 359)

⁴ See [Document 232](#).

**228. Memorandum From the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane) to Secretary of State Shultz¹**

Washington, June 19, 1984

SUBJECT

Next Steps on US-Soviet Relations

In the wake of your meeting with the President last week,² that of Secretary Weinberger,³ a meeting of the Arms Control Policy Group and the forthcoming meeting this Friday between the President and the JCS,⁴ the following scenario seems to me manageable for reaching decisions on the arms control aspects of your dialogue with Ambassador Dobrynin. While the specific content of any ultimate negotiations with the Soviet Union will have to await completion of ongoing work now scheduled to be completed by August 1st, there appears to be a high probability that the US will be prepared to enter a negotiation. The question is whether we should go ahead within the next week or so to agree to open "discussions" with the Soviets (perhaps in August) for the purpose of setting an agenda and agreeing on the timing and venue for the negotiations. I believe the President can make that decision following his meeting with the JCS, perhaps in an Oval Office meeting next Monday.⁵

At my morning session with the President today, he expressed interest in seeking to gain Soviet agreement to also open talks on improvements to verification in the TTBT/PNE context. He would like for you to explore this issue with Ambassador Dobrynin in your meeting tomorrow.⁶ The President's point is that notwithstanding

the Soviet walkout and their separate refusal to discuss verification issues in the TTBT/PNE context, we are willing to accept their proposal for discussions of ASAT arms control. The emphasis should be put on the Soviet attitude toward verification generally. In ASAT, we would be entering an area in which both sides acknowledge serious verification difficulties. There is a reasonable point to be made that the Soviets have an opportunity to demonstrate their appreciation of this issue and willingness to treat verification seriously by agreeing to open talks toward improved verification on TTBT/PNE. (Perhaps unsaid is the obvious point that absent agreement, we would be constrained to point to the Soviet refusal and call into question their seriousness in dealing with verification in the ASAT context. We would also continue to criticize their absence from the START and INF talks.)

The outcome of your dialogue with Ambassador Dobrynin and the President's meeting with the JCS will facilitate a decision making session with the President next Monday.

If you see problems with this scenario I would be pleased to discuss it at any time.

Robert C. McFarlane⁷

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (3/09/1984–6/20/1984); NLR-362-3-20-6-8. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Outside the System.

² See [footnote 6, Document 224](#).

³ See [footnote 3, Document 227](#).

⁴ On June 22, Reagan went to the Pentagon for a briefing by the JCS. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) In his

diary entry for June 22, Reagan wrote: “It was a briefing on where we are going weapon wise, communications & intelligence gathering. I can only say I left for the Oval Office filled with optimism, pride & a sense of safety.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, pp. 360–361)

⁵ June 25.

⁶ Shultz and Dobrynin met on June 20. See [Document 230](#).

⁷ McFarlane signed “Bud” above his typed signature.

229. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Vessey)¹

Washington, June 19, 1984

SUBJECT

US/Soviet Tension

1. I attach here a rather stunning array of indicators of an increasing aggressiveness in Soviet policy and activities. These include developments in the media, civil defense sector, security operations, political harassment, logistical steps, the economy, intelligence preparations and political activity.
2. The depth and breadth of these activities demand increased and continual review to assess whether they are in preparation for a crisis or merely to embarrass or politically influence events in the United States.
3. In the light of the increasing number and accelerating tempo of developments of this type, we will shortly begin to produce a biweekly strategic warning report which will monitor and assess the implications of these incidents which we report on as they occur, but have not, thus far, pulled together in any systematic way.

William J. Casey²

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency³

Washington, undated

U.S./SOVIET TENSION

The recent SNIE-11-10-84 JX examined a range of Soviet political and military activities that are influenced by Soviet perceptions or a mounting challenge from U.S. foreign and defense policy.⁴ Each Soviet action could be sufficiently explained by its own military or political purpose consistent with developing military readiness or a “get-tough” policy to counter the current U.S. stance.

This summary will consider some longer term events that may cause some reflections about the kinds of actions the Soviets could orchestrate that would create a political embarrassment for the U.S. in the wake of deployment of INF in Europe. We believe the Soviets have concluded that the danger of war is greater than it was before the INF decision, that Soviet vulnerability is greater and will grow with additional INF emplacements and that the reduced warning time inherent in Pershing II has lowered Soviet confidence in their ability to warn of sudden attack. These perceptions, perhaps driven by a building U.S. defense budget, new initiatives in continental defense, improvements in force readiness, and a potentially massive space defense program may be propelling the USSR to take national readiness measures at a deliberate pace. There is a certain consistency and coherence in the symptoms of measures being taken that suggest central decisionmaking. Some of “civilian to wartime-type” of activity suggest a broad-based plan. These activities may all be prudent

precautions in a period of anxiety and uncertainty on the part of the Soviets. Some of the measures we perceive follow.

A. Media

Soviet media have portrayed the environment as dangerous to the domestic populace. The risks involved have been recognized in that in December 1983, the Soviets carefully modulated the tone to allay what appeared to be brewing hysteria. A message has been that the present state of U.S.-Soviet relations is comparable to those between Nazi Germany and the USSR prior to WWII and that the Soviets will not be surprised again.

B. Civil Defense

It is difficult to document an increase in attention to this area, but the civil defense exercise at Omsk in March in which 800 persons walked 50 km was without precedent in our knowledge. Civil defense remains an area of perennially high interest in the Soviet domestic media.

C. Security Procedures

—Leningrad has become a closed city to Western attaches. U.S., UK, French and Canadian attaches in Moscow have been denied travel to Leningrad on numerous occasions in 1984. The Soviets prevented attache travel by international visas from Helsinki to Leningrad to Helsinki in May 1984. Their willingness to ignore the international portion of that trip to prevent attache travel indicates high-interest activity in the Leningrad area and/or a critical time-frame.

—In May 1984, valid visas for 58 Americans planning tour travel of USSR were cancelled. Apparently, the decision was made by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow. The trip included a flight from Naples to Leningrad and it appears that those with defense security clearances were denied visas.

—According to the DAO Moscow, there has been an important change in the “political atmospherics” surrounding attache operations. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] in particular, has become intense. The publication of an article in *Red Star*, 25 May 1984, against U.S. Naval Attaches suggests the Soviet campaign will be generalized and expanded.

—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] a Hungarian Ambassador at a non-European Embassy has forbidden all of his staff to have contact with Western officials.

—The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs reportedly issued a directive in late 1983 that officials abroad should terminate contact with U.S., British and West German officials.

—The changes in Permanent Restricted Areas (PRA) in East Germany impose significant restraints on operations of the Allied MLM.⁵ Most of the training areas, major unit facilities (air and ground) and their observation vantage points are now in the PRA. The new boundaries effectively restrict the missions to autobahns when traveling any distance in East Germany. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] restrictions severely hamper the right to free and unimpeded transit guaranteed under the Huebner-Malinin agreements and similar agreements.⁶

—In June 1984, for the first time since 1972 a portion of the City of Potsdam was included in a TRA.⁷

—The Soviets continue to declare multiple TRA's in addition to the PRAs.

—There have also been other travel restrictions. In Poland, there has been a perceptible increase in surveillance of attaches in the southwest corner of the country (Wroclaw, Zegnia, Swietoszow, Zagan), but not elsewhere. There has also been an increase in instances of surveillance since late 1983.

—Three recent incidents occurred in Poland where army and security personnel detained NATO attaches and then forced them to drive through a military restricted area for posed photography. In each case, the attaches were detained on public roads in an apparently well-planned effort at intimidation.

—In the Soviet Union, *Pravda* articles in June called for greater vigilance of Westerners and Soviet dissenters. Other reporting indicates that harassment of Western reporters has increased. Soviet border guards are conducting more intensive searches of Western visitors.

—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] there has been a steady increase in civilian companies apparently enforcing discipline and improving "piece rates." The greater presence of guards and security people at defense-related production plants is also reported.

D. Political Harassment

—On 20 February 1984, the Soviets imposed new restrictions on Allied flights in the three corridors linking

Berlin to West Germany. Basically, altitude restrictions apply to the entire length of the corridors, rather than the central portions as had been the practice. New traffic-identification demands have also been made and met by the Allies.

—On 22 March 1984, an East German military vehicle rammed a French MLM vehicle killing the driver and injuring two others.

—On 18 April 1984, the Soviets briefly detained an eight-vehicle French Army convoy at an Autobahn Checkpoint.

—On 2 May 1984, a U.S. military train bound for Berlin was delayed by East German railroad officials.

—On 16 May, East Germans refused to pull a French military train to Berlin until the French protested to the Soviet Embassy.

—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] East Germany party official, the Soviet leadership wants to remind the West of the fragility of free air access to Berlin. East Germans look to take advantage of the Soviet behavior.

—On 8 June, the U.S. Consul General in Leningrad was called to a Soviet review of the assault on Ronald Harms on 17 April accusing the press coverage of being an exaggerated claim in a U.S. Government anti-Soviet campaign.

E. *Logistics*

The 1983 study of Soviet railroads concluded that the industry must improve its performance.⁸ The need for attention to the railroads is beyond question, but the new

campaign which features early completion of the BALCOM line adds a sense of urgency to transportation improvements.

F. *The Economy*

—There has been a significant reduction in production of commercial aircraft in favor of military transport production since about June 1982. DIA studies show commercial aircraft production down 14 percent in 1983.⁹ Not only are traditional Soviet aircraft customers not adding new aircraft of Soviet make to their fleets, but the Soviets are buying back civil aircraft from Eastern European airlines. The increased allocation of resources for military aircraft production is supported by DIA production data.

—Other changes under way in selected segments of the economy point toward shifts to military needs. The termination of military support to the harvest, by directive of March 1984, may say that the success of the harvest is less important than the maintenance of military capabilities at high readiness. Such a decision is consistent with a leadership perception that danger is present, but inconsistent with the alleged priority of the food program and stated Soviet concerns about internal security problems owing to shortages and consumer dissatisfaction.

—In December 1983, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] production of tank chassis at the Chelyabinsk tractor plant for the first time since World War II. A second plant has also converted from tractors to tanks. Since July 1983, the first new nuclear weapons storage facility in a decade is under construction at Komsomolsk. Throughout the USSR, floorspace for ammunition and explosives plants has been

expanding since about 1980 after a decline of several years' duration. In April, the East German ammunition plant at Luebben increased to full three-shift 24-hour production and has more than doubled its output. These developments cross several sectors of national economic life and indicate that decisions are being made consistently across economic sectors.

—The increases in production are complemented by developments in the factors of production, especially labor and management. These have been subjected to one of the most strenuous and long-lasting campaigns to improve performance and expand output ever undertaken by Soviet authorities.

—At the same time, there has been a cutback in Soviet support for the East European economies, Soviet demands for better quality products from them, and higher prices for Soviet exports. These trends became evident in the fall of 1980 during the Polish crisis and have persisted. Although there are many sound reasons for the trends, they complement those already mentioned.

—Rationing of key products may be affecting commercial interests. State-owned trucking companies in Czechoslovakia are reported operating far below capacity due to insufficient fuel rations allotted as of 1 January 1984.

—In Poland, Jaruzelski apparently has formally agreed with the USSR to give up civilian production capacity to supply the Soviets with more military hardware.

—In a Magdeburg, East Germany metal processing cooperative, there are resource allocation shortages and increased target plans for 1984. While the imbalance could

be blamed on poor management, the situation was exacerbated by a new bank law that prevents using state financial reserves since 1 January 1984.

G. *Military Activity*

—In June, DAO Moscow reported that rail movement in support of Soviet troop rotation, although with a slightly reduced volume, was continuing. (This extension also occurred during the last two rotation periods.) Extending the rotation seems to conflict with other Soviet efforts to minimize the impact of rotation, and the flow of personnel over three months would seem to disrupt programmed training.

—Other irregularities have occurred in the troop rotation. Past railroad rotation activity was marked by a regularity of arrival and departure times. This rotation has been scheduled inconsistently. Additionally, there have been a number of anomalies. Railroad cars have arrived at Weimar, East Germany with approximately 75 troops but departed with only 35. [*3½ lines not declassified*]

—The Soviets may, for the first time during peacetime, be keeping a portion of their nuclear forces in Eastern Europe on quick-alert status, using sites for their SS-22 brigades in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

—On 23, 24, 25 and 26 March 1984, approximately 3,650 Soviet troops arrived in Hungary.

—In June 1984, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that during the past 6-12 months additional SPETNAZ troops have arrived in Hungary. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] an increase of SPETNAZ forces in Hungary and

Czechoslovakia as well as an ongoing “aggressive indoctrination” of Warsaw Pact forces.

—[*1½ lines not declassified*] he is concerned about stockpiling of material and an increase in Soviet troop strength in Hungary.

—In Hungary, a recall of an undetermined number of reservists was under way in May 1984.

—In the fall of 1983, the length of service for Czechoslovakian Army draftees with missile/rocket specialities was reportedly extended from two to three years. The length of service for air defense draftees with missile training was similarly extended.

—In Poland, the length of required military service for new reserve officers was to be increased from 12 to 18 months effective in 1984.

—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] a mobilization exercise involving armed forces and territorial forces as well as civil defense elements is to occur in June in Czechoslovakia.

—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] since 1983, men up to 35 years old have been drafted without consideration of family difficulties or their profession.

—The Soviets have pressed for stationing additional troops in Poland. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] additional Soviet air elements are already sanctioned by the Poles.

H. *Intelligence Activity*

A spate of clandestine source reports have related the extraordinary intelligence directives that have been issued.

The thrust of these directives is to increase the authority of the intelligence agencies at the expense of career diplomats and to focus intelligence collection on survivability of networks and on warning. [*2 lines not declassified*]

I. Political Activity

—In external relations, Soviet activity has been intense. A series of relatively low-level harassments concerning Berlin air corridors and ground access to Berlin fall into this category and have the potential to become more escalatory. The Soviets have recently cancelled a long-standing commercial accord with the U.S. The level of official harassment of Western attaches is high throughout the Warsaw Pact, even including a shooting incident in Bulgaria. New travel restrictions have been placed on Western diplomats in the USSR.

—A message of dissatisfaction in U.S.-Soviet relations is clear, but more than the message the Soviets may actually be paying costs—surrendering commercial contacts and their own freedom of access. Activity resembles a calculated and careful withdrawal on multiple fronts; a limitation of exposure and vulnerability.

J. Military Behavior

The behavior of the armed forces is perhaps the most disturbing. From the operational deployment of submarines to the termination of harvest support to the delayed troop rotation there is a central theme of not being strategically vulnerable, even if it means taking some risks. It is important to distinguish in this category those acts which are political blustering and those which may be, but also

carry large costs. The point of blustering is to do something that makes the opponent pay high costs while the blusterer pays none or little. The military behaviors we have observed involve high military costs in terms of vulnerability of resources for the sake of improved national military power, or enhanced readiness at the price of consumer discontent, or enhanced readiness at the price of troop dissatisfaction. None of these are trivial costs, adding thereby a dimension of genuineness to the Soviet expressions of concern that is often not reflected in intelligence issuances.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, June 1-30, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret.

² Casey signed "W.J. Casey" above his typed signature.

³ Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

⁴ See [Document 221](#).

⁵ According to telegram 15109 from Bonn, June 7, a Soviet representative delivered a new permanently restricted area (PRA) map to the U.S. Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) at the Potsdam House on May 16. The "new PRA will severely hamper right to free unimpeded transit guaranteed under the Huebner-Malinin" agreement. (See [footnote 6, below](#).) (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840368-0687)

⁶ The Huebner-Malinin agreement, which officially established the U.S. Military Liaison Mission in Potsdam, was signed by the United States and Soviet Union in April 1947. It ensured the rights of each side to protect the interest of their nationals in the German zones of occupation and "complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever it will be desired over territory and roads in both

zones except in places of disposition of military units, without escort or supervision.” (Ibid.)

⁷ TRA: temporary restricted area.

⁸ The study on Soviet railroads was not found.

⁹ The DIA studies were not further identified.

230. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 21, 1984

SUBJECT

My meeting with Dobrynin June 20

We met for a little under three hours, and went through some 25 issues on the US-Soviet agenda. The meeting demonstrated that our dialogue is well enough established now for us to be able to move through successive topics in very businesslike fashion with an occasional sense of motion on details suggesting that some desire for progress is appearing on their side. I was accompanied by Rick Burt, Dobrynin by his Minister-Counselor Viktor Isakov.

In the preliminaries at the outset of the meeting, Dobrynin expressed uncertainty about the meaning of your press conference statements.² I told him that you are prepared as always to meet with Chernenko. I said you believe there should be content in such a meeting, and while we are not saying major agreements have to be reached, a significant, concrete agenda should be addressed. I added that perhaps some items on our agenda today could contribute to a summit agenda.

Dobrynin went on to say that they were interested in our response to Chernenko's last letter and talking points,³ but it developed that his main point, which he made early in the meeting and returned to at the end, was that it would be "good for you and good for us" if we concentrated on getting some negotiations going on one or two of the "big" security issues.

In our review of the US-Soviet agenda, I began with *arms control* issues, and it emerged from this discussion that Dobrynin's prime candidates for "big" issues to work on were nuclear testing and outer space.

—On outer space, I explained your concerns about verification and your skepticism about negotiations, but told him that as a result of Chernenko's letters and our discussions you are taking a fresh look at the problem and would be making a decision soon. Dobrynin asked whether we were considering just anti-satellite weapons or all of outer space. I replied that we were looking at a range of things, and that verification was a real problem, but you were focussing on the most promising areas, and would be making a decision soon. At that point Dobrynin said he had just received a telegram calling him back to Moscow, and he would be leaving July 3. I noted I would be leaving for Asia shortly thereafter,⁴ and said I would try to get back to him before he left.

—On the Stockholm talks he was evasive. I told him that the offer in your last letter of Chernenko and the Dublin speech to discuss non-use of force commitments *together* with our confidence-building measure proposals was a direct response to Chernenko,⁵ and that we are disappointed by the lack of an answer. His reply was that although they were "interested," they needed additional clarification and elaboration of what the offer means before they can respond.

—On START and INF he was absolutely rigid. I reiterated that we considered their walkouts from the two negotiations unjustified, and that we remained prepared for private discussions on nuclear arms reductions. He replied that they are not prepared for such discussions while INF deployments continue, since they believe deployments have

changed the strategic situation, and merely reiterated their position that they would reverse their “counter-measures” if we were prepared to withdraw our new missiles.

—On chemical weapons and the MBFR talks in Vienna, he was not forthcoming either. I said that although verification is a major problem in both areas, our new proposals were meant to be constructive, and I urged them to negotiate. Dobrynin grumbled about our MBFR proposal, and his statement that they are prepared to make progress in both areas was pretty weak.

—On nuclear testing, he pressed for resumption of negotiations for a comprehensive test ban, and I worked hard to explain how important it is to concentrate first on reducing the margin of error in verification of the threshold testing and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties (TTBT/PNET). That was why we had proposed very confidential discussions involving such measures as calibration tests, I said, and I stressed that progress on verification could help us move in another area where verification was difficult, namely anti-satellite weapons. But Dobrynin was very dug in on ratification of the two treaties first, calling it a “matter of principle” for the Soviets. Although he suggested that new verification proposals could be discussed in resumed CTB negotiations, simply getting us back into CTB talks was clearly his main purpose.

—On strategic defense, I reiterated that this was a research program, that we have no intention at this time of departing from the ABM Treaty and that we remain prepared to have a confidential discussion about ballistic missile defense in START, the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) or some other forum. Dobrynin said he took note of my statement on abrogating the ABM Treaty

and would get back on the question of discussions. I briefly touched on Soviet proposals concerning non-first-use of nuclear weapons, a code of conduct for nuclear powers and naval arms limitations, and rejected them all. He was not anxious to pursue them either.

—On hotline upgrade, I pointed out they had our proposal for another round; Dobrynin said they would be getting back to us soon. I said we hoped this could be settled this round; he responded that it would be. Since both he and I would be out of town in July, I suggested that Gromyko and Art Hartman in Moscow might exchange the notes settling the issue. He said he would have to ask Gromyko about a Moscow venue but didn't think it would be a problem.

We discussed only two *regional issues*, southern Africa and the Middle East. On southern Africa I reminded Dobrynin of our offer to have Chet Crocker meet with his counterpart for an update, but he said that they think we owe them a reply to Gromyko's presentation to Art Hartman April 3 before they consider other meetings,⁶ and I promised to send Art in with our views. On the Middle East I sketched out our position on the Iran-Iraq war, and made the point that we have a common concern about Iraqi use of chemical weapons. I reminded him of my suggestion that experts join us for a special session. He replied that they also think the war "completely useless," and are also against any military movements in the area that could make the situation worse. On talks, they think any bilateral discussions should address the problems of an overall settlement; I replied that if they wanted a small-group discussion, it could discuss this problem too, and he appeared to agree.

Turning to *human rights*, I repeated that the Sakharovs were an issue of world concern and would remain one until

the Soviets clarified their situation.⁷ I also mentioned a number of other human rights issues—Soviet Jewry, harassment of Americans, problems in Leningrad and binational marriage cases—and gave him your view that the way such issues are handled will have a big impact on our overall relationship. He groused about the contacts our diplomats there have with dissidents—“they are looking for trouble”—but made no other reply.

We concluded with a checklist discussion of *bilateral issues*:

—I described the steps we propose to take to revitalize activities under our agreements on agriculture, housing and the environment. On health, I told him we are considering a number of steps, but the Soviet approach to Mrs. Bonner’s request for foreign medical treatment is holding up initiatives to expand activities.

—I told Dobrynin Art Hartman would be tabling our draft of a new exchanges agreement in Moscow soon.

—On the Kiev/New York consulates, I repeated our request to send a study team to Kiev to look at our facilities there. Dobrynin replied by raising the resumption of Aeroflot flights. I said we are prepared to talk about it, but we are waiting for a Soviet reply to our February proposals in Montreal to improve air safety in the northern Pacific.⁸ In addition, I said, there may be a problem for Soviet planes under our noise abatement regulations, and American carriers flying to the Soviet Union would have to have a better deal than before. All in all, I suggested, we should move ahead on the consulates, while also talking about Aeroflot. Dobrynin said he would pass the suggestion back.

—In this same connection, I noted that the Incidents-at-Sea talks between our two navies had gone well, and described the Soviet Navy's proposals we are looking at (Dobrynin appeared not to have heard of them). I suggested we might look at similar opportunities for other contacts between our two militaries, in keeping with the interest in such contacts you expressed in your March 6 letter.⁹

—On the Economic, Technical and Industrial Cooperation Long-Term Agreement, Dobrynin said they would have a reply soon to our proposal for a ten-year extension, and I said we were thinking of an eventual Joint Commission meeting in terms of cabinet-level participation.

—On the Pacific maritime boundary talks, I proposed resumption July 23 (instead of in June, as they have proposed). He said they would be back to us, but there appeared to be no problem.

—On fisheries, I said we would be getting to them soon and were working on an allocation for them, but it would be less than before. When Dobrynin grumbled, I said this was true for most countries.

In conclusion, I told him once again you wanted to see motion in the relationship, and noted that even if there is little on the "big" security issues, we do seem to be making progress on the bilateral side. Dobrynin reiterated that movement on one or two of the big issues we can talk about bilaterally would be good for both countries and once again identified outer space and nuclear testing as the prime candidates, and ones on which they would like an answer from us.

Looking at the meeting in the big picture, I think it was probably an important discussion, with some interesting

implications for US-Soviet relations overall.

The most interesting is the way Dobrynin chose to play the two issues now at the top of the Soviet agenda, outer space and CTB. On substance, he had no new ideas to offer. But he defined these topics in the context of the desirable negotiations between the superpowers, negotiations that “would do you good, and would do us good.” Getting talks going on such issues would show the world that the two superpowers are talking to each other, that both sides can address important problems, he observed. And, while he reiterated that the Soviets are not concerned with US domestic politics, he pointed out that if we cannot move on issues like these, by the end of the year there will be nothing to indicate that the two sides are working on major topics.

We should ask ourselves what this means.

Clearly, the Soviets would like to draw us into negotiations on topics they have long promoted. In CTB, they would like to blunt our technological potential in the field of nuclear testing, especially as it relates to our Strategic Defense Initiative. On outer space, they know we are catching up to their early lead, and here too they are worried about our superior technological capacity.

At the same time, this focus on getting arms negotiations underway this year may also reflect a change in Moscow’s political approach to us. It could well mean that there are at least serious doubts in Moscow that “hibernation,” the deep chill the Soviets suddenly reintroduced in our relations last month, is working, or will work for them over the rest of 1984. Your policy of firm but reasonable openness to dialogue and negotiation with the Soviets has given us the initiative in the eyes of world opinion. What

the Soviets may now be saying, it seems to me, is that in face of your program for US-Soviet dialogue, small bilateral business will not be enough to preserve their credibility, and they have invested so much in being rigid on START and INF that their credibility would be further weakened by returning to these negotiations in the immediate future. Hence, they may now believe that, aside from START and INF, it is in their interest as well as ours to see movement on arms control between the superpowers, and they have chosen nuclear testing and outer space as the prime candidates.

As you know, I believe that the area where we ourselves can safely move is ASAT. By defining our objectives for talks clearly, we can protect our technological interests in any ensuing negotiations. I do not believe we should pick up on the Soviet interest in resumed CTB negotiations; instead, we should continue to seek improvements of existing verification methods for the TTB/PNE treaties that would enable us to ratify them. That said, we should also be wary of creating any direct linkage between space arms control and improvements in verification of nuclear testing.

In general, however, it is worth pointing out that even though the meeting may have pointed to some evolution in the Soviet approach, it also demonstrated that our current posture is the correct one. We should keep plugging away on each item of our broad agenda with the Soviets. Progress on a number of these items could provide the basis for a constructive meeting between you and Chernenko. But, while we should be ready to engage them constructively on the range of issues between us, we must avoid appearing anxious to go to the summit. If we seem overeager to get there, we will be taking pressure off them to meet us half-way on the substance, and that should remain our primary objective.¹⁰

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations May-June 1984. Secret; Sensitive. McFarlane wrote in the top margin: "RR—(On mtg w/ Doby) I want to lay out our concerns about their military buildup and relieve theirs over us being a threat." A handwritten note on another copy of this memorandum reads: "President ret'd original to RCM on 8-27-84. RCM gave original to Jack Matlock." (Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File —1984 (06/21/1984-07/26/1984))

² During his June 14 press conference, the President was asked repeatedly about the possibility of a summit meeting with Chernenko. Reagan was clear when asked: "Would you be willing to meet with Mr. Chernenko even if he won't send his delegation back to the nuclear arms talks?" He responded: "Yes, yes, I'm willing to meet with him." For the full text of the press conference, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book I, pp. 851-859.

³ See [Document 223](#).

⁴ Shultz traveled to Asia and the Pacific region from July 7 to July 17.

⁵ See [Document 211](#). Regarding the Dublin speech, see [footnote 3](#), [Document 224](#).

⁶ Hartman and Gromyko met in Moscow on April 3. See [footnote 5](#), [Document 209](#).

⁷ See [Documents 219](#) and [220](#).

⁸ The ICAO continued to meet in Montreal to discuss Pacific air routes in the aftermath of the KAL shutdown and safety precautions for civil aviation. See [footnote 8](#), [Document 185](#).

⁹ See [Document 190](#).

¹⁰ In his memoir, Dobrynin recalled: "On June 20 Shultz invited me for another conversation. This time it lasted

more than three hours.” He continued: “We took stock of all controversial and unsettled questions, but made no attempt even to outline solutions. The discussion undoubtedly proved useful for putting all our affairs in systematic order.” (Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, pp. 553-554)

231. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Kelly) and the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Montgomery) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, June 27, 1984

SUBJECT

CIA Study of Indicators of Increased Soviet Aggressiveness

Bill Casey has sent to the President, yourself and other senior members of the National Security Council a study (attached) entitled "US/Soviet Tension," which he characterizes in his cover note as "a rather stunning array of indicators of an increasing aggressiveness in Soviet policy and activities." We have serious reservations about the tone and methodology of this CIA paper.² The study itself is essentially a shotgun listing of reports on various Soviet activities in the political, propaganda, commercial, internal security and military fields which taken together, are read as perhaps suggestive of a coherent Soviet decision to move from "civilian to wartime-type" activity. Citing "the increasing number and accelerating tempo of developments of this type," Casey says the CIA will begin to produce a biweekly strategic warning report of a similar nature.

In past weeks a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE-11-10-84 JX) examined recent Soviet political and military activities in light of their possible perceptions of an increased U.S. threat.³ It concluded that each Soviet action could be sufficiently explained by its own military or

political rationale and was consistent with larger policies of developing military readiness over the longer term or conveying a “tougher” public posture vis-a-vis the U.S. in the post-INF deployment environment. This new CIA paper readily admits those points, but raises the question whether they may also represent coordinated preparation on the part of the Soviets for a major East-West crisis—presumably at their instigation.

The CIA paper flags a useful cautionary note and one which we have tried to be sensitive to in our own ongoing assessments of Soviet activity. It is important in the current state of relations that we remain especially alert and continue to pay careful attention not just to immediate and specific events, but to the underlying patterns of Soviet behaviour as well.

We too noted earlier this year that the Soviets have apparently chosen to project a somewhat more assertive “Don’t Tread on Me” posture in response to their INF embarrassment. Some of their more consciously visible naval deployments and pressures in the Berlin area, for instance, seem at a minimum designed to remind the West of Soviet power and its potential. Along with recent examples of ongoing modernization of the Soviet military in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, they are also consistent with increased Soviet concern over growth in our own military capabilities.

However, that being said, we believe there are serious problems with this CIA paper. The analysis is neither systematic nor sophisticated. In some instances, there are obvious misstatements of fact (the study incorrectly claims, for instance, that the Soviets have recently cancelled long-standing commercial accords with us when almost the opposite is the case).

In other areas, individual reports are misinterpreted or out of context (the non-use of military trucks in the grain harvest in a single Soviet republic cited by the study, for instance, seems more related to institutional economic shifts than to preparations for significant military purposes; similarly, it is hard to stretch local Soviet complaints about publicity concerning the April attack on our consul in Leningrad as a serious indicator). There seems to be relatively little discrimination in assessing the relative import of particular Soviet actions and no attention given to evidence contrary to the study's general thesis.

In sum, we do not believe that careful examination of the evidence available supports the sort of breathless warning that the paper's apparent conclusions or Casey's cover note convey.

We are especially concerned that this report will create a greater sense of impending danger among its high-level readers around town than the facts warrant. By mixing a variety of tenuous pieces of evidence and questionable assertions with significant indicators of Soviet strategic intentions, the study risks devaluing the concept of warning indicators. It makes it that less likely we can correctly assess such indicators if we begin to pick up signs of something truly ominous.

It may be useful for you to mention our concerns in your next meeting with Bill Casey. You might want to note in particular that:

—We welcome the idea of approaching the study of Soviet strategic warning indicators on a more systematic and rigorous basis and believe such a regular exercise can play a useful role.

—However, we have carefully reviewed the June 19th study of “US/Soviet Tension” and have serious problems with some of its analysis and conclusions. We believe it is slanted too much towards reaching a conclusion of increased Soviet aggressiveness than the evidence warrants.

—The Soviets have been trying to encourage divisions in the West, in part by seeking to scare people about the state of East-West relations, and we do not want to play their game. Should this piece reach the press, it would do more harm to our policies in Western Europe than several months worth of Soviet propaganda.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, June 1-30, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive; Wnintel. Drafted by Dunkerley; cleared by Martens, Simons, Palmer, J. Mayhew (INR/SEE), M. Mautner (INR/SEE), J. Danlyk (INR/CE), D. Howells (INR/PMA), and N. Bellochi (INR). An unknown hand initialed for all clearing officials. Forwarded through Armacost. McKinley’s handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on June 28. A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. Shultz circled Montgomery’s name in the “FROM” line and drew a line to his handwritten note in the margin: “INR: Pls prepare a careful ltr from me to Casey stating our concerns. Clear EUR. GPS.”

² See [Document 229](#). In his memoir, Shultz recalled: “Toward the end of June, the CIA produced a shotgun listing of reports citing increased Soviet aggressiveness in the political, propaganda, commercial, internal security, and military arenas. The CIA suggested a Soviet decision to

move from civilian-to wartime-type activity, which could easily be read as a prediction of war. I told CIA director Bill Casey that I had problems with the report. It was a sloppy piece of work and more alarmist than the facts warranted. It appeared to be straining toward a conclusion of heightened Soviet aggressiveness. I pointed out to Casey that the Soviets had been trying to encourage divisions in the West, in part by seeking to scare people about the state of East-West relations. 'We do not want to play *their* game,' I told Casey. 'Should this piece reach the press, it would do more harm to our policies in Western Europe than several months of Soviet propaganda.'" (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 476)

³ See [Document 221](#).

232. Letter From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Dear Bud:

Washington, June 28, 1984

(C) I am very concerned with the accelerating search for ASAT arms control options that might serve as a basis for near-term discussions with the Soviets.² While we all have attempted to separate ASAT and SDI in public and Congressional fora, it is clear that they are linked, both technically and from the perspective of arms control options. The worst possible scenario I can imagine would be one that places the President in a position of destroying his own defensive initiative via arms control proposals. I understand that the Senior Arms Control Policy Group (SAC PG) is meeting on June 28th to review the progress of your directed study effort. As you deliberate, I urge that you carefully consider the following preliminary assessment of the impacts on SDI of the several principal options being considered. Other options also have important implications for our security and we will continue to work closely with your study efforts.

(S) The thrust of the approaches to an ASAT Treaty ranges from an Incidents in Space initiative, to a ban on high altitude ASAT interceptors, to a ban on all ASAT interceptors. Our basic concern is that distinctions between ASAT and SDI will not be capable of being maintained.

(S) While I assume efforts will continue to draft language that would not legally constrain SDI, I believe that

constraints would result. For example, the negotiating process will likely lead to political pressures to make a U.S. proposal more comprehensive, and consequently, further restrict SDI. In addition, the greater danger is that it would likely create expectations in Congress that would result in significant reductions in the SDI program.

(S) The proposal currently being studied to ban testing of high-altitude ASAT interceptors provides an example of the problem. The distinction between an ASAT interceptor and kinetic energy weapons that are being examined in SDI would be difficult to make and sustain in a negotiation. Several of the kinetic energy weapons that we will be demonstrating will have the inherent capability to attack high-altitude satellites.

(C) If we were unable to demonstrate these kinetic energy weapons, the net effect would be to eliminate our ability to develop the technology for near-term boost phase and post-boost phase intercept systems and cripple our ability to develop midcourse defense systems. In addition, we would be unable to demonstrate the kinetic energy weapons that would be used to protect our space-based sensors systems from attack by enemy ASATs.

(C) I offer our services to assist you in evaluating the impact on SDI of the various ASAT arms control proposals. Initially, I believe our mutual interests would be served by having the SDI staff brief those involved in this process at State and on the NSC staff on exactly what we are attempting to accomplish with SDI. While we recognize the international political pressure which we all are under and will fully support the finally agreed to position, my larger concern is that we are about to get involved in a process that could turn on us. Even if we are successful in structuring an option that meets our requirements, we

must anticipate counterproposals from the Soviets and urging from our own Congress that will expand the scope of negotiations to impact the President's strategic initiative.³

Sincerely,

Cap

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-86-0048, USSR 388.3 (Jun-1984). Secret.

² See [Documents 227](#), [228](#), and [230](#).

³ Below his signature, Weinberger wrote: "Bud—This is simply to sum-up my oft repeated points!"

June 1984-October 1984 “Sitting on Mountains of Nuclear Weapons”: The Reagan-Gromyko Meeting

[233. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan](#)

Washington, June 29, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/24/84-06/01/84); NLR-748-25A-3-5-1. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Shultz. A typed note on another copy of the document filed without the attachments reads: “Original carried by GPS to the President on June 29.” (George Shultz Papers, Box 5, Secretary’s Meetings with the President, 06/29/1984-07/23/1984) According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan met with Shultz in the Oval Office from 1:55 to 2:25 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) Reagan wrote in his diary for June 29: “Met with George Shultz & Bud & came to an agreement on our statement to the Soviets.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 363)

[234. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko](#)

Washington, July 2, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490757, 8490769, 8490793). No classification marking. In their meeting on July 3, Shultz gave the letter to Dobrynin for transmission to Chernenko. (see Document 236). In a July 2 briefing memorandum to Shultz for his meeting with Dobrynin, Kelly noted that the Senior Arms Control Planning Group meeting “was almost entirely devoted to working out the text of the letter and your talking points. The spirit was unusually cooperative. There is no controversy about our basic line, i.e., lack of preconditions. There was the usual concern that we not go too far on ASAT, but a consensus that we will be able to do something substantive on ASAT.” (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 21, 1984 July–December, Mtgs. w/A. Dobrynin) In a covering memorandum to Reagan forwarding the letter, Poindexter indicated Matlock drafted the final version of the letter, and that the letter was cleared by Shultz, Ikle, and Moreau in the JCS. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490757, 8490769, 8490793))

[235. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy \(Iklé\) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger](#)

Washington, July 3, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Fred Ikle Files, 1984—Arms Control. Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

236. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, July 3, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/19/84-06/27/84); NLR-748-25A-5-3-1. Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum on July 4, indicating he saw it. A copy of this memorandum was sent to Hartman in Moscow in telegram 196102, July 3. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 21, 1984 July-December, Mtgs. w/A. Dobrynin)

237. National Security Decision Directive 142

Washington, July 5, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives (NSDD), NSDD 142 [Arms Limitation Talks, September 1984]. Confidential. In a July 2 memorandum to McFarlane forwarding the NSDD, Linhard and Rye wrote: "At this juncture, we are in a very strong position. We should take every step to keep the pressure on the Soviet Union. To do this, we should: —We should not characterize the U.S. intent to discuss our full agenda as a precondition to meeting in September. But, we should also not agree that we will only discuss the Soviet agenda. Rather, we should continue to make it clear that we agree to meet in September in Vienna, and at that meeting, we intend to discuss all items in these areas. —We should not accept a Soviet no. No matter what the initial Soviet response, we should visibly press on with our internal preparations for the September talks and press the Soviets for a positive response without preconditions on the

agenda. The attached NSDD should help us in this regard.” Matlock initialed his concurrence. They attached a memorandum for McFarlane to forward the NSDD to Reagan for signature, which McFarlane sent and Reagan signed on July 5.

238. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, July 6, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron July 1984 [07/01/1984-07/14/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Eyes Only McFarlane and Poindexter. Sent for information. McFarlane wrote in the margin: “I agree with your points, especially in re Gromyko & the need to find another way. What measures could we try? Bud.”

239. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)

Washington, July 6, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983. No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on July 6.

240. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan

Moscow, July 7, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490757, 8490769, 8490793). Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy. In a July 7 memorandum to Reagan, Acting Secretary Dam noted that Soviet Chargé Isakov delivered the letter during a July 7 meeting with Burt. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, July-December, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents)

241. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Dam to President Reagan

Washington, July 7, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490757, 8490769, 8490793). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt.

242. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)

Washington, July 9, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984. No classification marking, Dictated by Dam on July 9.

243. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)

Washington, July 10, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary Kenneth W. Dam. No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on July 10.

244. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, July 13, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron July 1984 (07/01/1984–07/14/1984). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. On an attached routing slip, Poindexter wrote: "Bud, I opt for Jack trying to meet with Zagladin." McFarlane replied in the margin: "I think we should seek to arrive at option 1 outcome (ie Matlock Zagladin) by pursuing option 2. Ty [Cobb] could see Zagladin & make clear our interest."

245. Memorandum From Walter Raymond of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, July 17, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1984, 400684. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for action.

246. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger

Washington, July 18, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Fred Ikle Files, 1984—Arms Control. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

247. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko

Washington, July 18, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490757, 8490769, 8490793). No classification marking. In his personal notes for July 16, Dam described the drafting process: "We also met today to decide what we would recommend to the President should be his response to the letter from Chernenko on the proposed Vienna talks. This is something we have met a great deal on, and we have a draft response which we sent out to the Secretary

on his trip. There are many bureaucratic ins and outs to the drafting of Presidential correspondence, and in fact we sent a copy of the draft response to the National Security Council staff, where Bud McFarlane drafted several of the paragraphs of what we now plan to send back to the National Security Council as our proposed response. The real problem here is getting Defense and specifically Cap Weinberger to sign off on our response without setting the precedent that Presidential correspondence is drafted by an interagency committee. The big problem in the proposed Vienna talks is that it is unacceptable to Cap Weinberger, and probably to the President too, to say that we are prepared to negotiate on the Strategic Defense Initiative. Yet without a fairly forthcoming position on that, it is unlikely that the Soviets would be prepared to negotiate on what we want to negotiate, namely, on offensive strategic weapons.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984)

248. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan

Washington, July 23, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and the Soviet Union, USSR (07/03/84–07/07/84); NLR-748-25A-8-9-2. Secret. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. Casey also sent a copy of this memorandum to Shultz; the copy is stamped with Shultz’s initials, indicating he saw it. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Files, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (07/25/1984–07/26/1984); NLR-775-12-15-11-0)

249. Memorandum From Robert Linhard, Ronald Lehman, Jack Matlock, and Sven Kraemer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, July 23, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (07/03/84-07/07/84); NLR-748-25A-8-7-4. Secret. Sent for action.

250. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)

Washington, July 23, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984, No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on July 23.

251. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, undated

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, July–December, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents Secret; Sensitive. According to the covering memorandum from Burt to Shultz, this memorandum was drafted by Pascoe and cleared by Palmer. It is unsigned, but a note in the

margin on the covering memorandum reads: "original of Sec Pres delivered by J. Crawley/S to McFarlane." A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the covering memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.

252. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan

Moscow, July 26, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (84900829). Secret; Sensitive. The original Russian language text is attached. Sokolov provided Dam with the text translated from Russian. In a covering memorandum to Reagan, Shultz wrote: "Soviet Charge Sokolov, under the impression I was out of town, came in today to hand over to Ken Dam a new letter from Chernenko on Vienna. The letter takes a tough line. It claims our response to their proposed announcement 'does not tally' with the statement in your letter that you accept their proposal and leaves 'no doubt whatsoever' that we are 'not prepared to conduct negotiations with the aim of preventing the militarization of outer space.' Chernenko says that they 'regret that the current American position makes it impossible to conduct the negotiations,' that they would be ready to 'return to consideration of the issue' should we change our position, and that the Soviet position of June 29 remains in force." See also footnote 3, Document 253.

253. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, July 26, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, July 1-July 31, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Dam, Armacost, and Chain. McKinley's handwritten initials are on the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on July 26.

254. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, July 26, 1984

Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 7/16-31/84. Secret; Sensitive.

255. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, July 27, 1984

Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 7/15-31/84. Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System. Shultz's handwritten initials are on the memorandum, indicating he saw it, and McKinley's handwritten initials are in the upper right-hand corner, indicating he saw it on July 27

256. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, July 28, 1984, 0510Z

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490829). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

257. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan

Moscow, July 31, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490847, 8491054). Secret; Sensitive. Sokolov delivered the letter to Dam on July 31. See Document 258. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy. The oral statement is not attached to this copy of the letter in the Head of State File; however, it is attached to a copy in the Matlock Files. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, E.3, President/Chernenko Correspondence (1/2))

258. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 31, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Memoranda of Conversation 1984. Secret. Drafted

on August 1. There is no other drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. The meeting took place in Dam's office. Dam's handwritten initials are to the right of the list of participants, indicating he saw it. McKinley's handwritten initials are in the upper right-hand corner, indicating he saw it on August 1,

259. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 31, 1984, 0936Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840009-0359. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. A copy was sent for information to Shultz, who was on vacation in California. (Telegram 224320/Tosec 80009, July 31; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840009-0362)

260. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs

Washington, August 2, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Vienna Talks 08/04/1984-08/27/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow and Simons; cleared by Palmer and Burt. In a covering note to Shultz on a July 25 draft of this paper, Burt wrote: "Attached is our long-awaited paper that attempts to analyze the context of East-West relations over the next four years, and sets forth a strategy for dealing with the Soviets." (Department of State, EUR Records, Records of Ambassador Thomas W. Simons, Jr., (Chron),

Lot 03D256, July–August, 1984) In an August 1 memorandum to Shultz, Rodman provided a “status report on the Looking Ahead exercise and the preparation for the August 7 meeting,” noting that “EUR is doing a redraft of its paper on ‘East-West Relations: The Next Four Years.’ The July 25 draft, which you already have, was subjected to the constructive critique of the Seventh Floor ‘Looking Ahead’ Wise Men on Tuesday. EUR will now refine the paper, which we will get to you later this week.” (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (08/01/1984–08/05/1984) In an August 6 memorandum to McFarlane, Sestanovich provided a summary of the paper, commenting: “This analysis may be correct, but with so few specifics it’s hard to judge. If our entire policy depends on arms control (to win domestic support) and could crumble on its own, what terms will Moscow accept? And can we really combine arms control so easily with tough policies elsewhere? Maybe, but it’s a much bigger challenge than EUR admits. Finally, regular summits may be possible if we make progress; they don’t produce progress.” (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Vienna Talks 08/04/1984–08/27/1984) In an August 7 PROFs note to Matlock, Poindexter wrote: “This morning you received a Sestanovich paper that forwarded to Bud an EUR long range planning paper. Please consider that a privileged paper for your eyes only. Don’t acknowledge that you have seen it. Don will be meeting with you soon on the long range planning process.” (Ibid.) The paper was used for the August 7 meeting held at Shultz’s residence in Palo Alto, California, to discuss “Looking Ahead in Foreign Policy.” See Document 262.

[261. Letter From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan](#)

Washington, August 3, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (7/27/1984–9/27/1984); NLR-362-3-22-2-0. No classification marking; Eyes Only.

262. Memorandum of Conversation

Palo Alto, California, August 7, 1984, 9 a.m.–5 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 18, 1984 Aug. 13, Mtg. w/ the Pres. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on August 10. There is no other drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. This meeting took place at Shultz's residence.

263. Editorial Note

264. Special National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, August 14, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (08/08/84–08/16/84). Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A fuller copy of SNIE 11-9-84 is available on the CIA Electronic Reading Room website. A note on the cover page

reads: "Issued by the Director of Central Intelligence. Concurred with by the National Foreign Intelligence Board. The CIA, DIA, NSA, the intelligence organization of the Department of State, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence of the Department of the Navy, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Department of the Air Force, and the Director of Intelligence of the Marine Corps participated in the preparation of the Estimate." In a June 26 memorandum to Casey, McFarlane requested further analysis of Soviet activities related to Casey's June 19 memorandum to Reagan (see Document 229) and building on the May 1984 SNIE (see Document 221), resulting in this SNIE. McFarlane wrote: "It would be helpful if you would integrate pieces of evidence to develop further these and any other relevant hypotheses which may help us anticipate potential Soviet political or military challenges during the coming six months. Specifically, detailed discussion of the utility to the Soviets of interfering in various geographic trouble spots, and of indicators that they might plan or have the opportunity to do so, would be helpful, with prioritization of potential problems in order of likelihood. Competitive analysis would be appreciated." (Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1984, 400571)

265. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, August 14, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, July-

December 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Palmer. Forwarded through Armacost.

266. Note From the Advisor for Strategic Policy to the Deputy Secretary of State (Timbie) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)

Washington, August 17, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, August 1984. No classification marking. In a covering note forwarding the note and attached memorandum to Shultz, Dam commented: "I highly commend this memo for your careful review. Despite its length, it is by far the most refreshing and cogent piece that I have read on the process of arms control negotiations." Shultz replied in the margin: "KD for discussion next week."

267. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Chain) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, August 20, 1984

Source: Department of State, S/S, Lot Lot 92D52: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984-1989, August 16-31, 1984. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dobbins and Vershbow on August 17; cleared by J. Gordon (PM/SNP), R. Davis

(PM/SNP), R. Dean (PM), and Palmer. An unknown hand wrote in J. Campbell (P) as an additional clearing official. Vershbow initialed for Dobbins. Forwarded though Dam. The memorandum was also slated to be sent through Armacost, but his name is struck through.

268. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, August 23, 1984, 1402Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840010-0077. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

269. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, September 4, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (07/27/1984–09/27/1984); NLR-362-3-23-1-0. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. Reagan also wrote in the margin: “This sounds practical. RR.”

270. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, September 6, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (08/27/84-08/31/84); NLR-748-25A-25-1-1. Secret. Sent for information. A stamp on the first page reads: "Noted."

271. Editorial Note

272. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, September 14, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, September 1984 #2. Secret; Sensitive. Weinberger wrote "Bud" above McFarlane's title. In a September 13 covering memorandum to Weinberger, Iklé wrote: "I had a good discussion with Tony Dolan who is quite enthusiastic about using these themes for the President's UN speech. But he says it would be easier for him to work on it if Bud McFarlane requested him to do so. Hence, the last paragraph in the attached memo." He continued: "I also discussed these ideas with Jeane Kirkpatrick. While she agrees with the general thrust I proposed, she feels more strongly about the economic aspects of the UN speech. I have talked to Ken Adelman also, and he is more or less moving in the same direction. At the NSPG, now scheduled for Tuesday [September 18] to discuss arms control, he

intends to argue against making a specific proposal now and that we should instead urge general talk on an overall framework for arms control.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-86-0048, USSR 388.3 (Jul-) 1984)

273. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, September 14, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File 1980-1986, Matlock Chron September 1984 (2/5). Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information on the memorandum.

274. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, September 17, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (07/27/1984-09/27/1984); NLR-362-3-22-6-6. Secret; Sensitive. Reagan wrote in the margin: “Let’s talk about this. RR.”

275. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, September 17, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (09/01/84); NLR-748-25A-26-3-8. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe and cleared by Palmer according to the forwarding memorandum from Burt to Shultz. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, July-December, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents). Reagan initialed Shultz's memorandum on September 18, indicating he saw it.

276. Memorandum From William Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, September 18, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (09/22/84); NLR-748-25A-26-4-7. Secret. Sent for information. McFarlane wrote in the margin: "Many thanks. M."

277. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting

Washington, September 18, 1984, 11 a.m.-noon

Source: National Security Council, Institutional Files, NSPG Meetings, Box SR-109, NSPG 96. Secret. There is no drafting information on the minutes. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Although titled a "National Security Council Meeting," this meeting is listed in numerical order as NSPG Meeting 96 in the NSC and Reagan Library files. In a September 15 memorandum to

McFarlane, Kraemer and Linhard forwarded a package of preparatory materials for this NSPG meeting, including the interagency paper detailing Options 1,2,3 and the NSC-formulated Option 1½. (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, September 1984 Chron File #40-42)

278. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)

Washington, September 18, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984, No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on September 18.

279. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)

Washington, September 19, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984, No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on September 19 and September 22.

280. Letter From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Wick) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, September 19, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Matlock Files, Chronological File 1980-1986, Matlock Chron, September 1984 (2/5). Secret.

281. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, September 21, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (07/27/1984-09/27/1984); NLR-362-3-22-7-5. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Prepared by Matlock. A copy was sent to Bush.

282. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan

Washington, September 22, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, USSR: September Meeting President/Gromyko Meeting September 1984 (3). Secret. In a covering memorandum to McFarlane, Matlock wrote: "Secretary Weinberger has sent a memorandum to the President recommending certain talking points for his meeting with Gromyko. I believe the points he proposes are sound and deserve a place in the President's presentation to Gromyko." There is no evidence Matlock's memorandum went forward to the President.

283. Memorandum From the National Intelligence Officer for the Soviet Union (Ermarth) to the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (Gates).

Washington, September 25, 1984

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 86M00886R: Subject Files (1984), Box 6, Folder 7: B-257, Hostile Intelligence Threat Analysis Committee. Secret. In a covering note forwarding this memorandum and its attachment to Casey, Jay Rixse wrote: "Bob Gates sent the attached memo up to John [McMahon] as a matter of interest. As it represents a different interpretation of the Gromyko visit, John thought you should see it also." Gates wrote in the margin: "ADCI—FYI. RG."

284. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, September 26, 1984, 9:45 a.m.-12:35 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D188, Reagan/Bush/Shultz/Gromyko/Dobrynin in New York and Washington September 1984. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Zarechnak; cleared by Palmer, Butler, and McKinley. An unknown hand initialed for the clearing officials. The meeting took place in the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York. Brackets are in the original. In preparation for this meeting with Gromyko, Burt provided Shultz with a 36-page briefing packet on September 22, prepared by Simons and cleared by Palmer. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super

Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, March 1984 Super
Sensitive Documents Super Sensitive July 1-Dec 31, 1984)

285. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the White House

New York, September 27, 1984, 0105Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840011-0169. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to the Department of State. Repeated as telegram 293390 to Moscow, October 2. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840011-0327)

286. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 28, 1984, 10 a.m.-noon

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, President-Gromyko Final Papers (5). Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Matlock. This meeting took place in the Oval Office. According to the President's Daily Diary, from 3:03 to 3:54 p.m. on September 27, the President participated in a briefing for Gromyko's visit. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) McFarlane also briefed Reagan for the meeting with Gromyko at 9 a.m. on September 28. (Ibid.) No record of these meetings has been found.

287. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 28, 1984, 12:30-1:45 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials President-Gromyko—Working Papers (7). Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Zarechnak. This lunch took place in the State Dining Room at the White House. In his memoir, Dobrynin recalled of the reception and lunch: “Nancy Reagan appeared during the cocktail party before lunch. Gromyko, after the introductions, proposed a toast to her. He had cranberry juice, her glass was filled with soda water. ‘We both are certainly fond of drinking,’ he remarked with characteristic dry humor. Gromyko had a short chat with the president’s wife. ‘Is your husband for peace or for war?’ he asked. She said that he of course was all for peace. ‘Are you sure?’ Gromyko wondered. She was one hundred percent sure. ‘Why, then, does not he agree to our proposals?’ Gromyko insisted. What proposals? she asked. Someone interrupted the conversation, but right before lunch Gromyko reminded Mrs. Reagan, ‘So, don’t forget to whisper the word “peace” in the president’s ear every night.’ She said, ‘Of course I will, and I’ll also whisper it in yours, too.’ I must report that Gromyko got a kick out of this exchange and recounted it to the Politburo with great animation.” (Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, p. 555)

288. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 29, 1984, 10 a.m.-12:20 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, President-Gromyko Final Papers (6). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Zarechnak; cleared by Simons. The meeting took place at the Department of State. In a September 29 memorandum to Reagan summarizing his meeting with Gromyko, Shultz wrote: “I sensed somewhat

more flexibility on his part concerning how to get going, and I think that hearing your candid and intense views probably helped.” He continued: “Looking over our meetings with Gromyko this week, I think they are the most lively and genuine dialogue we have had with the Soviets for many years. We are addressing real issues, and even—in Gromyko’s case—revealing sensitivities that the Soviets usually conceal, on Germany and Japan and the fear of losing what they achieved in the War. This kind of frank discussion on substance cannot help but be useful, in contrast to talking past each other. Moreover, in today’s meeting, Gromyko began to display a measure of genuine interest in the expanded dialogue you have proposed. On the other hand, because he was so defensive, he revealed no new substance at this time.” (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, President-Gromyko—Working Papers (2))

289. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, October 2, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, October 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons and Hartman. Forwarded through Armacost. Printed from an uninitialed copy. McKinley’s handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on October 2.

290. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the White House

New York, October 5, 1984, 1754Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840011-0446. Secret; Nodis; Immediate. Sent for information to the Department of State. An October 3 State Department draft of this memorandum indicates it was drafted by Vershbow on October 3; cleared by Simons, Palmer, Dobbins, and Kanter. In a covering note to Shultz, Armacost wrote: "Mr. Secretary: My only reservation is to the formation of an interim restraint agreement. The linkage proposed is ambiguous. We could agree that 'being the process of reducing . . .' means some actual reductions. But another interpretation is possible. In the initial bargaining stage I would think a more straight-forward linkage is desirable bureaucratically, politically, and for negotiating purposes. I recognize the President's words impose some constraint, but if we want to establish a tougher linkage—as I think we should—this letter offers an opportunity." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, October 1984 Super Sensitive Documents) A typed note in the margin of the draft reads: "memo revised by S and dispatched from NY 10/5. bdf."

291. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, October 9, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Umbrella Talks 10/05/1984-10/15/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

292. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, October 15, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (10/15/84-10/23/84). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Brackets are in the original. McFarlane wrote at the top of the page: "Mr. President, I thought you would find this interesting. It reinforces the value of bringing Paul Nitze into the White House. Bud." In an attached handwritten note on Air Force One stationery, Reagan wrote: "Very interesting and if I've read it correctly affirms something I've felt for some time; namely that part of their problem is their inferiority complex. They want to feel we see them as a superpower. I'm willing to look at a pvt channel but believe this would have to have Georges approval. If he, you & I were the only team in on it at this end with someone like Nitze the channel—talking only to us—why not? To bypass George would be a personal humiliation I wouldn't want to inflict. RR."

293. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, October 16, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, October 1984. Secret. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Dobbins and Niles. Shultz's handwritten initials are on the memorandum, indicating he saw it. McKinley's handwritten initials are also on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on October 16. In a covering note forwarding the memorandum to the White House, McKinley wrote: "Paul, The Secretary wanted Bud to have this internal memo. Brunson."

294. Memorandum From Robert Linhard, Ronald Lehman, and Sven Kraemer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, October 24, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Umbrella Talks 10/24/1984-11/04/1984. Secret. Sent for action. Matlock concurred. On a routing slip attached to this memorandum, Poindexter wrote: "I think the NSDD is good. You may feel you are a little beyond the point of the cover memo, although everything that has been done is consistent with it. JP." McFarlane then wrote: "Pls run my proposed chgs by Ron Lehman." On the draft of the NSDD, McFarlane made substantial changes to the last paragraph, which were reflected in the final version signed by Reagan. See Document 298.

295. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs

(Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, October 25, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, October 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. A more complete account of this meeting is in telegram 325166 to Moscow, November 1. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840700-0675)

296. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, October 26, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (10/25/84-10/30/84); NLR-748-25A-36-3-7. Secret; Sensitive. An October 26 covering memorandum from Burt to Shultz indicates the memorandum was drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons and Palmer. A handwritten note on this covering memorandum reads: "Orig. Sent by Courier 10/26." Reagan initialed Shultz's memorandum on October 30, indicating he saw it.

297. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, October 26, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives (NSDD): Records, 1981-1987, NSDD 148 [The U.S. Umbrella Talks Proposal]; NLR-751-7-33-2-2. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Linhard, Lehman, and Kraemer (see footnote 5, Document 291). A stamp on the memorandum reads "signed."

298. National Security Decision Directive 148

Washington, October 26, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives (NSDD): Records, 1981-1987, NSDD 148 [The U.S. Umbrella Talks Proposal]. Secret. In a memorandum on October 27, McFarlane forwarded the signed NSDD to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Stockman, Casey, Vessey, and Adelman.

233. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 29, 1984

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin on Friday, June 29, 1984

Ambassador Dobrynin called on me this morning at his request. We talked for about three-quarters of an hour covering three subjects.

1. Dobrynin delivered an additional proposal from the Soviet Union on negotiations about the “militarization of space” in which they add some specificity to the modalities of their proposal, particularly a date and place for negotiations. I said that we are not yet prepared to respond to their proposal but that there are no doubt a number of issues involved that need some discussion. For example, does “militarization” in space apply only to defensive systems or do they want to talk about offensive systems that go through space as well? Dobrynin did not respond to that suggestion, but I don’t think it went by him either. The text of the Soviet proposal and the oral statement accompanying it are attached.

2. Dobrynin asked for anything I might tell him of a philosophical nature on our approach to the management of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, raising as an example his problem in interpreting your recent speech in which there was a part that was “good” from their standpoint and another part that was “bad.”² I said that the message from that speech and from the fact that you sent our negotiators back to Geneva at the height of the tension over the Korean

airliner suggested an effort on a philosophic plane along the following lines:

We know that our systems are very different and the likelihood is that they will remain so. We know that our interests are often at variance and the likelihood is that they will remain so. It is, nevertheless, the case that our two countries have the preponderance of military power in the world and are at the moment the two largest economies, so the existence of a working relationship between us is of great importance to each of us and to the world more generally. Therefore, we have to seek a way of managing the relationship that will have important elements of continuity through the ups and downs of events that will trouble us greatly and that we will feel call for statements and actions on our part. That philosophy, I said, is what motivated the President to send our negotiators back to Geneva some months ago and, more recently, to identify a large number of significant—if not quite “the big”—problem areas where positive work can and is taking place. If such a philosophy can be implemented in practical terms, then we would consider that a positive achievement.

3. Dobrynin also raised questions about the personal and technical management of our relationship and used the Scowcroft mission as an example of how a good thing misfired because it wasn't handled right. The elements of incorrect handling from his point of view were: (a) it came about too suddenly, (b) there was no back-and-forth discussion of something so important as sending a Presidential Emissary to their head of state, and (c) it seemed to be an effort to go to Chernenko through some part of their government other than the Foreign Ministry. Dobrynin said that if the Scowcroft mission and Presidential letter had been worked out through him and then on to Moscow with careful preparation, he could have

“guaranteed 100 percent” that Scowcroft would have seen Chernenko.

I told him that we were prepared to work out with him the technical aspects of our relationship in a way that did everything possible to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings. We recognize the importance of giving interpretations of statements and activities we undertake and wish that they would also take note of this point in terms of their own behavior and work with Art Hartman. We also agree that private and small and perhaps one-on-one discussions could make an important contribution to the development of the relationship.

He stated that he felt the START and INF talks might have gone in a more constructive way if, in the discussions I had with him about them some time ago, it had been possible to discuss them in broad terms in a one-on-one meeting as distinct from meetings “where Rowny or Nitze or someone else was always present.”

Dobrynin said that he is looking forward to the opportunity for conversation with you at the Diplomatic Reception on Sunday.³

Attachment

Proposal by the Soviet Government⁴

Moscow, undated

STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

The Soviet Government most insistently draws attention to the necessity of urgent measures aimed at the prevention of the militarization of outer space.⁵

The spreading of the arms race to outer space would sharply increase the risk of the military disaster, undermine the prospects of the limitation and the reduction of armaments in general. Everywhere the understanding of this is widening, the demands are growing to stop such development of events until it is too late. And it is necessary to do everything in order not to waste this opportunity, to close reliably all the channels without exception of the militarization of outer space.

In practical terms this means that weapons of any type—conventional, nuclear, laser, beam or any other should not be launched in space and deployed there, whether on piloted or pilotless systems. Space weapons of any basing mode should not be developed, tested or deployed either for antiballistic missile defense, or as antisatellite means, or for the use against targets on the ground or in the air. Means of such nature already created must be destroyed.

The use of force in space or from space against the earth, as well as from the earth against the objects in outer space should be banned forever.

Such approach, which would ban and eliminate the whole class of armaments—the attack space means including antisatellite and antiballistic missile space-based systems, as well as any other ground, air or sea-based means designed to destroy objects in space, allows to ensure a reliable control over the compliance by the sides with their obligations.

The Government of the Soviet Union proposes to the Government of the United States of America to begin Soviet-American negotiations on the prevention of the militarization of outer space at the level of specially appointed delegations. Within the framework of these

negotiations the question of mutual comprehensive repudiation of antisatellite systems should be resolved too.

Such negotiations could be started this September in Vienna (Austria), if the Government of Austria agrees to this. The specific date of the beginning of the negotiations would be agreed upon through the diplomatic channels.

For the purposes of creating the favorable conditions for achieving an agreement and of undertaking practical measures on the prevention of the arms race in outer space already now the Soviet Union proposes also to establish on mutual basis beginning from the date of opening the negotiations a moratorium on testing and deploying such weapons. It goes without saying that the joining of other states to such moratorium will be welcomed.

As the leading powers in the area of exploration of outer space, the USSR and the USA are called upon to do everything in their power to provide peace in space for the mankind and to show an example to other states in resolving this task common to all the humanity, creating the basis for multilateral agreement on this matter.

In view of the urgency and importance of this question the Soviet Government expects a prompt and positive reply of the US Government to this appeal.

Attachment

Soviet Oral Statement⁶

Moscow, undated

I am instructed to deliver to you a text of the statement of the Soviet Government on the question of preventing the

militarization of outer space.

We would like to draw your attention to the fact, that the Soviet Union suggests a radical solution—to ban and to eliminate the whole class of attack space weapons and to close once and for ever all channels of possible militarization of outer space. It is exactly the attack space means that would be banned. While the means used for the purposes of control, navigation, communication, etc. would not be covered.

We deem it necessary to emphasize the importance and the urgency of the solution of the question of preventing the militarization of outer space, the special responsibility which rests upon the USSR and the USA as the leading space powers, and the necessity in this regard to show an example to all other states engaged in research and exploration of outer space.

The beginning of the negotiations on outer space between the USSR and the USA would be a practical proof of the readiness of the sides to wage a businesslike and concrete dialogue on one of the major questions of ensuring security and peace.

The Soviet side is ready to begin such negotiations in Vienna on September 18, 1984, for example, if there is a consent of the Austrian Government, and to send a special delegation for this purposes.⁷

We would like to express hope that the American side will consider the Soviet proposal with all due attention and give a positive reply to it.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/24/84-06/01/84); NLR-748-25A-3-5-1. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Shultz. A typed note on another copy of the document filed without the attachments reads: “Original carried by GPS to the President on June 29.” (George Shultz Papers, Box 5, Secretary’s Meetings with the President, 06/29/1984-07/23/1984) According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan met with Shultz in the Oval Office from 1:55 to 2:25 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) Reagan wrote in his diary for June 29: “Met with George Shultz & Bud & came to an agreement on our statement to the Soviets.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 363)

² Dobrynin was referring to Reagan’s speech in Dublin. See [footnote 3, Document 224](#).

³ On Sunday, July 1, the Reagans hosted a BBQ at the White House for Chiefs of Mission and their spouses. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) Reagan wrote in his diary: “Anatoly Dobrynin (Soviet Amb.) was at my table along with Geo. Shultz. Anatoly wanted to talk about our situation—the Russians wanting us to meet in Sept. to talk about weapons in space & our reply that we’d like to discuss this and nuclear weapons etc. which they have refused to do. We didn’t settle anything but I got a few things off my chest.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 364) On Monday, July 2, Reagan wrote: “We had the usual staff times but this one attended by Geo. Shultz—our 1st chance to compare notes about Anatoly. We’re telling the Soviets we’ll be in Vienna in Sept. waiting for them—our terms.” (Ibid.)

⁴ No classification marking.

⁵ TASS released the Soviet statement on June 29. The next day the White House issued the U.S. response, approved by McFarlane. Excerpts of both were printed in the *New York*

Times. (“Soviet and U.S. Statements on Space-Weapons Negotiations,” *New York Times*, June 30, 1984, p. 4)
Matlock later recalled the reaction to the Soviet proposal and the development of the U.S. response: “The proposal was obviously directed at Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, even though it defined the subject of negotiation in terms so broad that it was hard to determine just what specifically it was intended to cover. There had been no previous discussion of the proposal in diplomatic channels, so the announcement seemed designed for the public rather than policy makers.” Matlock continued: “By late afternoon [on June 29], the Senior Arms Control Policy Group, with representatives from all relevant U.S. agencies, gathered in the Situation Room. At first, the sentiment was almost universal: ‘It’s directed straight at SDI. We can’t do it. Besides, it’s nothing but propaganda.’ But as we went around the table, opinion began to shift, aided by McFarlane’s deft mention, from time to time, of arguments in favor of acceptance. In less than an hour, it was unanimous: the United States would accept, but say that it would also discuss ways to resume negotiations on INF and START. The Soviet Union would not have to agree to reopen those negotiations, but would be placed on notice that the U.S. considered ballistic missiles that travel through space a part of the ‘militarization of outer space.’ The statement I had prepared in advance was revised to stress this before McFarlane took it to the president for his approval. Reagan approved it without change and it was issued in time for the evening news on television, and for the following day’s papers, which carried both U.S. and Soviet statements. It was probably the most rapid decision ever made by a committee in the U.S. government dealing with arms control.” (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, pp. 99–100)

[6](#) No classification marking.

[7](#) An unknown hand inserted “in Vienna” following the word “negotiations.”

234. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko¹

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Washington, July 2, 1984

Your letter of June 6 deals with a number of issues which I would like to pursue after careful deliberation,² but I wish to take the opportunity provided by Ambassador Dobrynin's return to Moscow to give you my thoughts on the proposal your government made June 29 for a conference in Vienna in September regarding the "militarization of outer space."³

First, let me say that I believe your proposal for a conference is an excellent idea. I am prepared to have a delegation in Vienna September 18. I would observe that the date and location is of less importance than our agreement to begin serious discussions of ways arms competition can be slowed and the risk of nuclear war reduced.

Let me describe my concept of the way a useful conference might be organized. I believe that each of our delegations should be free to raise questions of concern to its side which are relevant to the overall topic. However, these should not be raised merely for the sake of exposition and debate, but with a clear mandate to seek out and find mutually acceptable negotiating approaches which hold promise for concrete results.

I have studied the position you have taken regarding the resumption of negotiations on nuclear arms. Even though I

cannot agree with your reasons, I am not asking you to change that position in order to start discussions. But inasmuch as strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons systems are the most lethal systems and are intimately associated with those other space weapons on which you propose to negotiate, it is clear that it will be difficult to move very far in solving some of the problems without addressing the others. It would, therefore, be difficult to understand a refusal even to discuss ways that negotiations on nuclear systems might be resumed. As I have pointed out to you several times, I have a number of ideas as to how these problems might be resolved to the advantage of both our countries. I believe that it is in our mutual interest to resolve our current impasse on offensive nuclear weapons.

Regarding the other space weapons referred to in your proposal, I am optimistic that we can find significant aspects of anti-satellite weaponry which could be a fruitful object for negotiations. In sum, I am agreeable to a conference without preconditions of any sort, but one based on a commitment by both of us to find mutually acceptable negotiating approaches to the important questions before us.

You spoke in your last letter about the necessity of dealing with each other as equals. Naturally, I agree, and I believe the approach I have outlined for a conference embodies this principle in both form and spirit. As we have both often observed, it is time for deeds. Finding ways to make progress on the central issues I have outlined would be a deed for which the whole world would thank us.

Of course, we need not wait until a conference is organized to discuss the issues before us. I will be pleased to continue our discussion of these and related topics, on a confidential

basis, both in our correspondence and through our respective representatives.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to receiving your thoughts on these matters. It is my earnest hope that you will join me in seizing the opportunity we have to make a major step toward improving relations between our countries and creating a safer world for all.

Sincerely yours,

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490757, 8490769, 8490793). No classification marking. In their meeting on July 3, Shultz gave the letter to Dobrynin for transmission to Chernenko. (see [Document 236](#)). In a July 2 briefing memorandum to Shultz for his meeting with Dobrynin, Kelly noted that the Senior Arms Control Planning Group meeting “was almost entirely devoted to working out the text of the letter and your talking points. The spirit was unusually cooperative. There is no controversy about our basic line, i.e., lack of preconditions. There was the usual concern that we not go too far on ASAT, but a consensus that we will be able to do something substantive on ASAT.” (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 21, 1984 July–December, Mtgs. w/A. Dobrynin) In a covering memorandum to Reagan forwarding the letter, Poindexter indicated Matlock drafted the final version of the letter, and that the letter was cleared by Shultz, Ikle, and Moreau in the JCS. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490757, 8490769, 8490793))

² See [Document 223](#).

³ See [Document 233](#).

235. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Iklé) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

Washington, July 3, 1984

SUBJECT

Arms Control Diplomacy

Monday we had two White House meetings (chaired by Poindexter) on what to say to Moscow about the September arms control meeting.² George Shultz joined us during the first meeting. He explained the President sought to engage the Soviets by having Dobrynin take a letter back to Chernenko.³ According to Shultz, we would say to the Soviets:

- (1) We are prepared to meet in Vienna, 18 September (the Soviets proposed date).
- (2) We are prepared to discuss any aspect of limitations on space systems (including those that start from a land-base and land on a land-target, i.e. ICBMs).
- (3) We expect them to put issues on the table and we will do likewise.
- (4) We can start with negotiations on ASAT, particularly low altitude.

Shultz continued, we could discuss arrangements for negotiations, and stressed the importance of discussing ideas from both sides. We might possibly develop a new venue in Vienna, a general setting for guiding arms control

talks that would make efforts to find areas that can be spun off for specific negotiations. ASAT might be the first area to be spun off, also confidence building measures in space. This would be a bit like the General Motors-United Auto Workers negotiations, with specific issues being dealt with at side tables. (FYI: I found it noteworthy that this “analogy” was being proposed.)

I pointed out (1) that we should not have ASAT negotiations move ahead of ICBM/INF, and (2) that we were still working (deadline of August 1) on the whether and how of a verifiable and acceptable ASAT limitation.

FYI: State tends to take position that it was decided in Oval Office meeting you attended that we could and would agree to negotiate *some* ASAT limits.⁴ However, the more I am looking into the questions of (1) verifiability, and (2) ASAT-SDI entanglement, the less likely it seems to me that there is such an option that meets our US interests. Almost any ASAT limitation would be pounded by Soviet and Congressional pressures, into an ever more comprehensive inhibition on our SDI (though not equally effective in limiting Soviet missile defenses).⁵ The Soviet negotiating strategy is a replay of what they did in 1969-1972, when they pressed for an ABM Treaty first, only begrudgingly and belatedly acceding to a very lopsided and incomplete limitation on offensive missiles.

Our SACPG Group then drafted talking points for today’s Shultz-Dobrynin meeting and the attached letter from the President to Chernenko.⁶ Shultz’s talking points track with the letter, adding the points that (1) ballistic missiles were the first weapons using space, (2) the US was agreeable to have the arms control/space meeting take place in September or, if the Soviets preferred, after our elections.

In our meetings yesterday, there was reference to a President-Chernenko letter being in draft stage as a reply to a recent letter from Chernenko. I assume you are being shown these letters; I have not seen them (but Rick Burt and his deputy are fully involved).

I am afraid, we in OSD, and you personally, will have to weigh in frequently and heavily to slow down the train that's speeding up toward extensive SDI limitations, largely unverifiable and hence unilateral, with but token limits/reductions on offensive arms. The question who will be the negotiator is also an important one. Rumor has it Brent Scowcroft or Walt Stoessel are possibilities.

Fred C. Ikle⁷

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Fred Ikle Files, 1984—Arms Control. Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

² Monday, July 2.

³ See [Document 234](#).

⁴ Iklé was likely referring to a June 26 meeting. In his diary for June 26, Reagan wrote: "Then an N.S.C. meeting on how to respond to the Soviet challenge to negotiate on limiting militarizing Space. The problem is they are ahead of us in that dept. and want to freeze us into inferiority. I think we've worked out a plan that will 'head them off at Eagle gap.'" (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 362) Weinberger's handwritten notes of the June 26 meeting are in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Part I: Top Secret Sensitive Compartmented Information, Department of Defense, 1981–1987, Appointment and Diary File, 1980–1987, White House, cabinet, and other

important meeting notes, Box I: TS SCI 9, Set B, 1984, 2, #23-49.

⁵ Weinberger expressed similar concern in a letter to McFarlane on June 28. See [Document 232](#).

⁶ An unknown hand inserted “(copy attached)” after “meeting.” See [Documents 234](#) and [236](#) for the letter and the meeting with Dobrynin.

⁷ Iklé signed “Fred” above his typed signature.

236. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, July 3, 1984

SUBJECT

Breakfast Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin

Following a relaxed breakfast, I gave Dobrynin your letter,² and elaborated on its contents by running through the agreed talking points (attached). Dobrynin read your letter carefully and promised to deliver it to Chairman Chernenko tomorrow.

Dobrynin professed not to grasp how we intended to proceed with the September meetings in practical terms. The Soviets, he said, had raised one issue (the demilitarization of space), and we had raised another (resuming negotiations on offensive nuclear systems) which they regarded as unacceptable. Did we, he asked, plan to simply register our views on such matters as START and INF, and then proceed to address arms control in outer space? Or did we intend to continue to refer back to the issues on our agenda? In his quest for clarification, he claimed the negotiators needed a precise understanding of the agenda; that the delegations could not be left simply to talk about "the cosmos;" and that without clarity regarding the scope of the talks further misunderstandings could burden our relationship.

In response I emphasized that we were prepared to meet in September without preconditions. I said that we are ready to discuss the issues the Soviets have raised, but that we have issues of our own to discuss as well. I noted that they say they wish to talk about "the demilitarization of space."

We have our own definition of what that means, and intend to relate our presentation to that definition. They did not have to agree to discuss the issues we were raising in order for us to show up.

I noted that, in every negotiation there is a preliminary sorting out of issues. As the conference proceeds, and as a variety of subjects are discussed, some ideas may appear susceptible to negotiations. Others will not be. On the subject of verification, for example, we have doubts that some arms control proposals in outer space are verifiable. The Soviets may have a different view. We are ready to listen and perhaps we can learn something. We have an open mind. We think there are some possibilities for negotiating approaches to ASAT limitations. Perhaps others can be identified.

While Dobrynin did not indicate acceptance of this concept, I believe he understands our intentions more clearly. Obviously the Soviets would prefer to restrict the talks to their agenda, but he could not deny the logic of our position that since weapons in space affect nuclear deterrence, limitations of arms in outer space and limits on offensive and defensive nuclear systems are conceptually connected.

I urged Dobrynin to push the discussion of this subject back into diplomatic channels. I noted that the USSR had made a proposal and publicized it. We consequently publicized our response after notifying the Embassy. Now, I said, you are writing confidentially to Chernenko to confirm that we accept the Soviet proposal without preconditions. But we want them to know that there are some additional things which we expect to discuss. This is not in the nature of a precondition, but rather a statement of our intent.

I emphasized that since our systems are different, and that won't change, we think it is important to take steps to stabilize our relationship. We consequently have laid out a broad agenda of "smaller" and large issues,—arms control proposals, regional issues, bilateral matters, concerns about human rights. Now, I said, the Soviet government has made a proposal. We believe we need to look at that proposal in a broader context to get something moving. We are prepared to discuss that either in September or following our elections, if the Soviets prefer. The timing is a matter of indifference to us, since we surely need no help from them in the elections. I underscored the fact that our purpose was merely to push our relationship in a constructive direction.

Dobrynin asked whether we conceived of the September conference as directed toward merely sorting out issues or conducting negotiations. I said we could envisage a variety of possibilities. When our delegations showed up in Vienna in September, led by broad gauged negotiators, they could take one of several approaches. They would, I presumed, examine the broad subjects that each government had raised with an eye to identifying those subjects susceptible to early negotiation. As subjects were identified, they could either negotiate them seriatim, divert those issues to special negotiators while continuing themselves to address the broad issues at the main table, or confine themselves to the task of isolating negotiable issues, while leaving actual negotiations until later. I told Dobrynin that we envisaged further private discussions—at the Assistant Secretary level—to work out the modalities for the September conference.

Dobrynin was noncommittal, but he indicated that we could expect an official response from the Soviet government. He indicated that at this stage he could not say that the Soviets accept our acceptance, reiterated some distaste for

a loose agenda, and implied that further clarification will be sought.

While Dobrynin did not tip his hand, I feel we have framed a response that his government will find difficult to handle. Eventually I suspect they may be forced to take yes for an answer.

Attachment

Talking Points for Secretary of State Shultz³

Washington, undated

—I think that you gathered last night a first-hand sense of the President's seriousness about getting substantive arms control talks moving forward.⁴

—He carefully studied Mr. Chernenko's last letter and has prepared this letter today in reply. It does not try to address all of the issues between us, but concentrates on a problem Mr. Chernenko focused on—what he called the "militarization of outer space."

—The President confirms what we indicated to your Embassy last Friday night. We accept your proposal of earlier that day to meet September 18 in Vienna.

—As we have indicated in our statement on Friday, the militarization of space began when the first ballistic missiles were tested and when such missiles and other weapons systems using outer space began to be deployed.

—We have noted what you wish to discuss in Vienna. We will be prepared to address those issues. We have identified issues we plan to raise as well.

—As the President notes in his letter, we anticipate that we will come to Vienna with constructive suggestions both on the question of resuming negotiations on offensive nuclear systems and on negotiating approaches to ASAT limitations.

—I wish to make one point very clear: contrary to initial press commentary, we have set no preconditions for these talks in September.

—The U.S. and the Soviet Union need not agree to any common agenda on those talks. The U.S. is prepared to meet at the time and place the Soviet Union has proposed, and to address all the issues the Soviet Union has raised, in addition to which, the U.S. side will raise other issues.

—The U.S. believes that it is important to consult privately on more detailed preparations and groundwork for this meeting in order to ensure that it is fruitful.

—As the President has indicated, we see this meeting as a valuable opportunity for businesslike and constructive exchanges through which we might work out mutually acceptable approaches to arms control negotiations. We are serious about taking advantage of this opportunity to make progress.

—Thus, we are prepared to refrain from any further public comment on these discussions if you will do the same. Our preference is to pursue this question quietly through private diplomatic channels.

—I would further note that on several recent occasions, the Soviet government has stated that the upcoming U.S. Presidential election has no bearing on its policies in this regard. I can confirm to you the same holds true for us. As the President's letter indicates, if the Soviet side wishes to hold these talks after the election in late November or

December as opposed to September, that is acceptable to us as well.

—I hope that in your consultations in Moscow, you will personally underscore the seriousness and positive manner in which we are seeking to handle your proposal.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/19/84–06/27/84); NLR-748-25A-5-3-1. Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum on July 4, indicating he saw it. A copy of this memorandum was sent to Hartman in Moscow in telegram 196102, July 3. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 21, 1984 July–December, Mtgs. w/A. Dobrynin)

² See [Document 234](#).

³ No classification marking. See [footnote 1, Document 234](#).

⁴ Presumably a reference to the discussion at the July 1 BBQ. See [footnote 3, Document 233](#).

237. National Security Decision Directive 142¹

Washington, July 5, 1984

ARMS LIMITATION TALKS, SEPTEMBER 1984 (U)

*The Official Response to the Soviet Proposal of May 29.*² I have authorized the following response to the Soviet proposal made on May 29, 1984. (U)

“The United States Government has taken note of the statement by the Soviet government proposing a meeting of delegations in September to begin negotiations on preventing the “militarization of outer space.” The militarization of space began when the ballistic missiles were tested and when such missiles and other weapons systems using outer space began to be deployed. The United States Government, therefore, draws attention to the pressing need for the resumption of negotiations aimed at a radical reduction of nuclear arsenals on a balanced and verified basis.” (U)

“Therefore, the United States Government has informed the government of the Soviet Union that it is prepared to meet the Soviet Union in September at any location agreeable to the Soviet Union and to the government of the country where the meeting is held for the following purposes:

- (1) to discuss and define mutually agreeable arrangements under which negotiations on the reduction of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons can be resumed; and

(2) to discuss and seek agreement on feasible negotiating approaches, which could lead to verifiable and effective limitations on anti-satellite weapons.

We will also be prepared to discuss any other arms control concerns or other matters of interest to both sides.” (U)

“We will continue contacts with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels on arrangements for these September talks.” (U)

Implementation. The U.S. will be prepared to begin discussions in Vienna on September 18, 1984. However, the date and location is of less importance than our agreement to begin well prepared and serious discussions. The U.S. agrees to the discussions proposed without preconditions, but based on a commitment by both sides to find mutually acceptable negotiating approaches to the important questions before both the United States and the Soviet Union. (C)

We should attempt to shift the continuing discussion between the U.S. and the Soviet Union concerning these talks out of the public arena and into private diplomatic channels. To do this, we should seek Soviet agreement to join us in refraining from further public comment. (C)

Preparations for Discussions. No matter what the initial Soviet response, the United States will be prepared to begin the discussions as outlined above on the dates initially proposed by the Soviet Union.

—Initial priority must be given to completing those papers which have been already tasked as a part of the ongoing program of work in the ASAT, START and INF areas. The prompt completion of this work is essential to providing the

detailed, substantive foundation needed to support the final development of a U.S. approach to the discussions in September. This work program should be completed and its results delivered for my consideration no later than August 1. (C)

—Based upon this work, the Senior Arms Control Policy Group will develop and coordinate the necessary strategy and position papers needed to support the generation of instructions for the team representing the United States at the discussions beginning in mid-September. These papers will be provided for my review and approval no later than August 31. At that time, the Senior Arms Control Policy Group will also recommend a plan for timely consultations with the Congress and our Allies as appropriate. (C)

—Within the next few weeks, the National Security Advisor will provide the Senior Arms Control Policy Group with additional guidance as needed to sequence, develop, and coordinate other aspects of U.S. preparations. (C)

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives (NSDD), NSDD 142 [Arms Limitation Talks, September 1984]. Confidential. In a July 2 memorandum to McFarlane forwarding the NSDD, Linhard and Rye wrote: “At this juncture, we are in a very strong position. We should take every step to keep the pressure on the Soviet Union. To do this, we should: —We should not characterize the U.S. intent to discuss our full agenda as a precondition to meeting in September. But, we should also not agree that we will only discuss the Soviet agenda. Rather, we should continue to make it clear that *we agree to meet in September in Vienna*, and at that

meeting, we intend to discuss all items in these areas. —We should not accept a Soviet no. No matter what the initial Soviet response, we should *visibly press on* with our internal preparations for the September talks and press the Soviets for a positive response without preconditions on the agenda. The attached NSDD should help us in this regard.” Matlock initialed his concurrence. They attached a memorandum for McFarlane to forward the NSDD to Reagan for signature, which McFarlane sent and Reagan signed on July 5.

² This NSDD incorrectly dates the Soviet proposal to meet in Vienna for negotiations on preventing the “militarization of outer space.” The Soviet proposal was made on June 29. See [Document 233](#).

238. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, July 6, 1984

SUBJECT

The Soviets: Where We Stand

I have the following miscellaneous (but interconnected) thoughts on the current state of play in our Soviet relations and how we might handle some of the issues tactically.

The September Meeting

The June 29 Soviet proposal and our quick response has put us in a very strong tactical position, both publicly and privately.² We must move carefully to exploit our current advantages.

The Soviet response shows clearly that Gromyko has no intention of allowing a meeting to materialize in September unless we buy the Soviet position in full. However, he is coming on increasingly defensive, and may not be able to hew to this rigid position as the time approaches. Evidence is accumulating that his critics in Moscow may be becoming more assertive. If we play our cards right we may be able to achieve a breakthrough, and if not, undermine the Soviet position even further, with useful implications for 1985.

Publically, we should stick right where we are: we are placing no preconditions on the meeting, therefore assume

it will take place, and are pursuing arrangements in diplomatic channels. This forces the Soviets to growl and concentrate on *their* preconditions, which are looking less and less tenable. Meanwhile, this relieves us of the immediate pressure to define our ASAT position, which is desirable tactically, since we need to squeeze the Soviets as much as we can in advance. Since they have proposed a conference, there is no rational argument in favor of our communicating in advance what our position is. To do so would only give Gromyko the ammunition to say it is inadequate and to shift attention from their intransigence to the alleged shortcomings of our substantive position.

This thought should also lie at the basis of our private communications with the Soviets. We should make our proposals general enough and ambiguous enough to provide no logical grounds for complaint (the diplomatic equivalent of a stealth design).³ One way to do this would be to propose an agenda whereby the first item would be the Soviet exposition of their proposals, and the second item the U.S. commentary and proposals, followed by a Soviet commentary, etc. If we do not define the subjects precisely, it will be exceedingly difficult for the Soviets to argue that there are any preconditions, or that we are refusing to discuss their agenda.

As for the timing, if the conference begins September 18, we need to handle it so as to minimize the opportunity for the Soviets to break it off before November claiming U.S. intransigence. Therefore, there is an advantage in letting them go first, and instructing our delegation to ask frequent questions in order to maximize the amount of time necessary to get their position on the table. We could then take our time in commenting in detail and putting forth our thoughts. This process, if handled adroitly, could easily carry us into November without giving the Soviets

ammunition to cry foul and break off. Such tactics would also drive home the point implicitly that they should expect little in the ASAT area until they start talking turkey on nuclear arms.

Gromyko's Role

The above is predicated on the assumption that Gromyko will retain his stranglehold on Soviet policy throughout this period, and that therefore our object should be to demonstrate the weakness of that policy while not damaging our own public image.

With every move on the U.S.-Soviet chessboard, my conviction deepens that Gromyko is in fact our principal problem, and that we are likely to make no significant progress until sufficient pressure is brought to bear on him from within the system to modify his approach.

Two recent straws in the wind support this interpretation. First, Strobe Talbott informed me that during his recent visit to Moscow, his interlocutors (mainly from the Institutes) put the finger on Gromyko quite explicitly.⁴ This came up in a discussion of the treatment given Scowcroft; all the Soviets said privately that the problem was the effort to secure a private audience with Chernenko, which caused Gromyko to "hit the ceiling." So far, nothing new, but what was surprising was that the Institute types added (when they were out of the office and walking in the park), that our analysis was quite correct; it *is* necessary to bypass Gromyko, and the only thing wrong with our effort was the way it was done, since it gave Gromyko the opportunity to block it. A quieter effort at a lower level might have worked, they observed.

Second, Robert Anderson informed me today that Velikhov had telephoned his assistant Hirsch twice since their visit to inquire about the fate of "point three" of Anderson's "Bering Straits" proposal. You will recall that Anderson had given them an off-the-cuff idea for a declaration regarding the Bering Straits, which included a proposal for a high-level binational commission to discuss this and other matters (TAB).⁵ The idea has many potential problems and probably is not worth pursuing on its merits, but I am struck by Velikhov's obvious and uncharacteristic interest. Could it be that a "commission" of some sort would provide a structure for those outside the MFA to interact with us on behalf of the Party and/or KGB? No other explanation comes readily to mind.

In sum, while it will be necessary for us to continue to play out the game with Gromyko, I am convinced that we are unlikely to find any real opening for a breakthrough, this year or next, unless we can get something going, very quietly, with other elements in the Soviet hierarchy. It should be obvious by now that we cannot do this with officials in the State Department, because Gromyko will always have the perfectly sound bureaucratic argument that it is his responsibility to deal with them. He is on much weaker ground in fending off counterpart-to-counterpart meetings, even if he should know about them in advance (which he will), and gets reports on what transpires.

The fact is that every senior official puts more credence in what his own staff produces than in what comes from others. Therefore, it makes a real difference bureaucratically whose staff does the initial work. So long as the Central Committee *apparat*, for example, has no direct contact with us, they have little means of reaching conclusions other than those Gromyko is pushing. With direct contacts, they are better able to activate their boss

to their own ultimate advantage, provided political conditions permit.

The argument that we should continue to try to communicate with various elements in the Soviet hierarchy is not based on a “good guy, bad guy” presumption. There are no “good guys,” and we should never act as if there were. But we should not pass up any feasible opportunity to utilize normal and natural bureaucratic rivalries in the Soviet system to our own advantage.

The Danger of Leaks

Few things can be more damaging to our ability to maximize our current tactical advantage than a further succession of leaked stories about the progress of our interagency consideration, possible positions on specific issues and the like. We need either to achieve much greater discipline than we have managed in the past, or else simply keep the bureaucracy (including the SACPG) ignorant of the President’s decisions until we have had time to act upon them and can time our public disclosures.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron July 1984 [07/01/1984-07/14/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Eyes Only McFarlane and Poindexter. Sent for information. McFarlane wrote in the margin: “I agree with your points, especially in re Gromyko & the need to find another way. What measures could we try? Bud.”

² See [Documents 233](#) and [236](#).

³ McFarlane wrote in the margin: “Right on.”

⁴ Strobe Talbott, *Time* Magazine correspondent on U.S.-Soviet relations. Likely a reference to the Institute of US

and Canadian Studies (ISKRAN).

⁵ The tab is not attached. For more on Robert Anderson and this proposal, see [footnote 3, Document 244](#).

239. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, July 6, 1984

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

We had a very good internal meeting this afternoon in my office in which we discussed our approach to the talks that appear to be shaping up for September in Vienna with the Soviets on ASAT.² Our approach is to include the subject matter of START and INF in those talks, whereas the Soviets are claiming that our desire to talk about ballistic missiles means that we are imposing preconditions to any negotiation on what they call the “militarization of outer space.” This is a rather delicate war of words, because we are saying that we have accepted the Soviet proposal to talk about the militarization of outer space and that all we want to do is to talk about the whole picture, which includes ballistic missiles passing through space, and in any event the overall subject matter cannot be limited simply to weapons originating in space or used against space objects. The full richness of the possibilities from a definitional and rhetorical point of view became obvious, and a good number of papers are going to be written as a result of this meeting. Our first step will be to get a sound approach. The second will be to get it through the interagency process, and the third will be to sell it to the Soviets, assuming that the Soviets do not try to back out of what they have already offered.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files: Lot

85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983. No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on July 6.

[2](#) In telegram 199520/Tosec 70065 to Shultz in Asia, July 7, the Department forwarded the text of “a memorandum in progress on ASAT and the other arms control issues relative to the Vienna talks, which was used today as the basis for an in-house discussion in Ken Dam’s office. It will be the basis for further meetings on the issue and will evolve further, but we did want you to have our tentative thinking.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number])

240. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan¹

Dear Mr. President:

Moscow, July 7, 1984

I have carefully read your letter of July 2, 1984.² Let me say frankly that I was looking in it for a positive response to our proposal to hold Soviet-American negotiations this September on preventing the militarization of outer space.³ Regrettably, there is no such response in the letter.

One has to reach such a conclusion despite the fact that you express readiness to start negotiations in Vienna. For from your letter it clearly follows that the U.S. is not agreeing to participate in the kind of negotiations which the Soviet side proposes and in which it is prepared to participate.

Let me recall that the Soviet Union favors the adoption of urgent measures which would enable us effectively to block all channels for extending the arms race into space. This can be done by banning all space attack systems, which is precisely what we propose to have negotiations about, and by establishing a moratorium, simultaneously with the start of negotiations, on testing and deployment of such systems.

The American side essentially is talking about conducting not negotiations on space, but some sort of "conference" without a definite agenda, i.e. there would be a conversation about everything and about nothing specifically.

We are far from underestimating the importance of questions of nuclear armaments, which in your letter are linked with the problem of space. You know our position with regard to how to solve these questions. But as before, nothing points to the readiness of the American side to take into account this position and open the way out of the present impasse. Banning space weapons is a problem of great importance in its own right. To tie it to questions of limiting and reducing nuclear arms, which are in fact currently blocked, would be to put negotiations on space attack weapons into a stalemated position as well. At the same time, the deployment of space attack weapons would inevitably lead to a sharp escalation of the arms race on earth too, and would complicate all the more the possibility of undertaking effective measures for limiting and reducing armaments in general. We are convinced that such a development of events would serve nobody's interests.

As for space weapons themselves, the emphasis here should, of course, not be on studying something. It is necessary to reach agreement on practical measures in order to prevent the appearance of space attack weapons of any kind. This is also what determines the concrete questions put forward by the USSR for negotiations, in order to resolve the problem in all its aspects and in a radical way.

We approach these negotiations seriously and responsibly, and we expect the same attitude from the American side. If, however, for some reason it is difficult for you to give consent to such negotiations at the time we suggested, we would have to take that into account. It is important that we be in agreement that such negotiations are necessary, and that we will conduct them without unjustifiable delays.

In conclusion I wish to emphasize the main point once again. There cannot be any doubt that it is more sensible to exclude space from military competition in advance, rather than trying later on to eliminate the otherwise inevitable, serious and perhaps even irreparable damage to stability and security. I appeal to you, Mr. President, to look at this whole problem once again from this perspective. I would like to hope that you could give a positive reply to our proposal, which remains in force.

Sincerely,

K. Chernenko

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490757, 8490769, 8490793). Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy. In a July 7 memorandum to Reagan, Acting Secretary Dam noted that Soviet Chargé Isakov delivered the letter during a July 7 meeting with Burt. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, July-December, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents)

² See [Document 234](#).

³ See [Document 233](#).

241. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Dam to President Reagan¹

Washington, July 7, 1984

SUBJECT

Chernenko's Response to Your July 2 Letter on the Vienna Talks

Soviet Chargé Isakov came in to see Rick Burt Saturday afternoon under urgent instructions from Moscow to hand over a reply from Chernenko to your July 2 letter on the Vienna talks.² An unofficial translation, as well as the Russian original, are attached.³

Chernenko's letter stresses the following points:

—It insists that you have not yet given a positive response to the Soviet proposal to negotiate on preventing “the militarization of space” in September,⁴ and that “the American side” is still talking about some “conference” without a definite agenda.

—It very forcefully makes the point that nuclear negotiations are frozen, and that linking them to negotiations on outer space is therefore a recipe for deadlock on outer space too. The resulting arms race in space would accelerate the arms race on earth as well, Chernenko says, and would make it harder to limit and reduce armaments in general.

—As a result of these two factors, the letter goes on, “it is necessary to come to a clear understanding as to the subject of these negotiations” before our delegations meet at the negotiating table. If it is hard for us to agree to such

negotiations in September, they will “take that into account.”

In response, Burt first recalled that it was we who had suggested beginning talks later if the Soviets preferred. He said we would study the letter and reply soon, but stressed that both you and the Secretary have told the Soviets we are prepared to come to Vienna with clear substantive ideas on outer space arms control. At the same time, we believe that if we are going to address this topic we must also discuss related issues like offensive nuclear weapons. In any event, however, we are prepared to enter into diplomatic discussions of the agenda for talks, and Burt invited the Soviets to begin such preparatory discussions without delay.

Isakov replied by asking again whether we are ready to negotiate on “preventing the militarization” of outer space. If we were making an announcement, would we be willing to say that, he asked. Burt said that in discussing the agenda for a Vienna meeting, we could address the issue of what any announcement might say. Isakov concluded that he would report the exchange, and the specific question of initiating a discussion of the Vienna agenda, to Moscow.

On the way out, Isakov commented to the State Department official accompanying him that the Soviets are offering the Administration a political “bumper harvest” if negotiations on outer space begin in September; all that was being asked was that the agenda be fixed before the two delegations sat down. The official replied that you do not need Soviet help to get reelected, and that the Administration is approaching the talks on the assumption that they must be to mutual benefit, without regard to such considerations.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490757, 8490769, 8490793). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt.

² Saturday, July 7. See [footnote 1, Document 240](#). The President's July 2 letter is [Document 234](#).

³ Both are attached. The Russian original is not printed. The translation is printed as [Document 240](#).

⁴ See [Document 233](#).

242. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, July 9, 1984

I attended a meeting this afternoon in the White House with Bud McFarlane and John Poindexter to discuss next steps on the meeting that the Soviets have proposed for September in Vienna on "the militarization of space." The meeting went on for an hour and a half, and so we covered many topics, but we came down to the conclusion that the President should, in a week or so, respond to a letter received on Saturday from Chernenko attacking the U.S. position that we must discuss not only space but also associated offensive systems.² The general situation is that the Soviets are most interested in talking about our strategic defense initiative, whereas we, partly for internal reasons within the Administration, have no interest in negotiating away the SDI in any way at this time, but we do want to talk about offensive systems.

Actually there are several aspects of the current situation. First, we would obviously like to have a series of meetings in Vienna in September, both because it would provide a substantive opportunity and because the President and his closest campaign aides would like to see some arms control negotiations restarted before the election. On the other hand, the Soviets understand this and are using that fact to put the negotiations on the basis which is best for them substantively. Second, we have the problem of knowing what it is that we are prepared to negotiate about. On the one hand, we have been going through an exercise in the interagency process which no doubt dictates being cautious about being able to negotiate about very much at all at this

point. On the other hand, the President is very interested in having a heart-to-heart broad discussion with the Soviets about how to get into a posture where we can negotiate very broadly about all kinds of offensive and defensive weapons.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984. No classification marking, Dictated by Dam on July 9.

² See [Document 240](#).

243. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, July 10, 1984

I attended a Senior Arms Control Policy Group meeting this afternoon in the Situation Room. Bud McFarlane chaired the meeting, which was on space arms control, and kept it well off the procedural question of how we tie the Soviets down to a broad-based discussion in Vienna and well onto the substance, with heavy emphasis on the procedures for getting the substantive work done. It became clear that the major problem is going to be how to protect the strategic defense initiative. This is important primarily from the standpoint of preventing DOD from vetoing participation in the Vienna talks in September, because Cap Weinberger is prepared to go to any lengths to protect that initiative from being limited in arms control negotiations at this time and will probably be able to count on the President to back him up in view of the fact that the President views the strategic defense initiative as a path to a future free from the threat of nuclear weapons (an expectation that I find groundless). The upshot was that the SACPG meeting was usefully boring. We will be able to handle in a smaller group the preparation for agreement with the Soviet Union on an agenda.²

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984, Personal Notes of Deputy

Secretary Kenneth W. Dam. No classification marking.
Dictated by Dam on July 10.

[2](#) The Department reported the results of this meeting in telegram 202711/Tosec 70220 to Shultz in Asia, July 11. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number])

244. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)1

Washington, July 13, 1984

SUBJECT

Establishing Contact outside Gromyko's Staff

You asked for my thoughts on how we might go about establishing a contact outside Gromyko's staff. Several possibilities come to mind, which are not mutually exclusive. Tactically, I believe we should not show too much eagerness, but simply let it be known that we would have something to say if they wish to listen.

Our principal target, in my opinion, should be the CC CPSU Secretariat staff. These are the people who work directly for Chernenko and presumably Gorbachev, since the latter seems to be acting as Chernenko's number two in running the Secretariat. He may actually be the more active of the two; if he aims for the top spot—as he doubtless does—he is probably eager to get his finger in the foreign affairs field, where he has little prior experience. The most valuable interlocutor here is probably Zagladin. He runs the International Department (although Ponomarev is the titular head), is a Central Committee member in his own right, and clearly has a vested interest in building up his organization's influence, as compared with Gromyko's MFA.

In the past, however, this channel has not been used (except for my two meetings this year, the second with Stanislav Menshikov, Zagladin's "desk officer" for the

U.S.).² In the past, private channels have either been through Dobrynin (who seems to have had a direct line to Brezhnev's office, but this may not exist any more), or through KGB contacts who acted merely as message bearers. There are dangers in using Dobrynin, since we don't know how direct his own lines of communication are, and since we should not subject our messages to whatever spin he chooses to put on them. The use of KGB contacts would be feasible—and should be done if that is the Soviet preference—but has the disadvantage of dealing with a person who is only a message bearer and who plays no personal role in the policy making process. For some types of subjects, this is preferable—for example in arranging a prisoner exchange, or some other limited, concrete deal which the Soviets want off the record. It has its limitations, however, if our objective is a broader discussion of how disparate issues might be put together to form a package.

The following specific possibilities come to mind:

1. We could have Hartman pass a message to Zagladin that another meeting might be useful to review informally what might be possible for the balance of this year and next year. If he agrees, we could offer to meet quietly in Washington, Moscow or a third country, as he suggests. If we decide to follow this course, the best way to get the message to Hartman would be to call him on the secure line. Nothing should be done in telegraphic traffic, because it is too difficult to control distribution.
2. Ty Cobb has an outstanding invitation from the USA Institute to visit Moscow in connection with a research project initiated before he came on the NSC staff. It has been renewed verbally since he became a staff member, but he of course has done nothing about it. We could have him pick up the invitation (if the Soviets are still willing). When

he was there in 1981 he was given excellent access to a variety of senior officials, including Zagladin. Ty would not have to go with any particular message (and probably should not), but his Soviet interlocutors would know that they could get messages back to us by him if they desired.

3. Robert O. Anderson's suggestion (TAB I)³ could provide an avenue to Academician Velikhov (who has gone out of his way to express an interest in it). I am not sure just how influential Velikhov is (aside from his prominent role in Soviet space, SDI, and ASAT programs), or on whose behalf he may be speaking. He is not himself a member of the Central Committee, which would indicate that his personal status in the Party is not very high. On the other hand, he may be a channel to someone else, and the matter might be worth exploring.

There are several ways this might be done:

(1) Hartman or his Deputy might ask for an appointment with Velikhov, in the course of which inquiries could be made about the Soviet view of Anderson's proposal.

(2) A USG official from Washington could do the same, and perhaps with greater success than the Embassy can. For example, Alvin Trivelpiece of DOE⁴ has an invitation from Velikhov which he is willing to accept if we want him to. He could be briefed to raise the Anderson proposal and attempt to smoke out just what the Soviets find appealing about it.

(3) Finally, we could ask a reliable private citizen with ties to Velikhov to raise the matter. Anderson and his assistant Hirsch,⁵ for example, could be encouraged to follow up on our behalf. There are dangers here, however, because, as I mentioned before, I don't find the idea attractive as it

stands, and its main utility would be as a vehicle for smoking out possible Soviet interest in establishing a special channel. Therefore, I believe it would be better to use a USG official to inquire, if we decide to do so.⁶

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron July 1984 (07/01/1984–07/14/1984). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. On an attached routing slip, Poindexter wrote: “Bud, I opt for Jack trying to meet with Zagladin.” McFarlane replied in the margin: “I think we should seek to arrive at option 1 outcome (ie Matlock Zagladin) by pursuing option 2. Ty [Cobb] could see Zagladin & make clear our interest.”

² See [Documents 180](#) and [195](#).

³ Robert O. Anderson, Chairman and CEO of Atlantic-Richfield Company (ARCO), visited the Soviet Union and apparently met with Velikhov, discussing issues regarding access to the Bering Straits. Attached at Tab I, but not printed, is a memorandum that Anderson gave to Velikhov on the Bering Straits, dated May 24. Matlock explained in a handwritten note: “This is the proposal Anderson gave Velikhov during his trip in late May/early June. It was the third point that Velikhov asked about specifically in two subsequent telephone calls to Hirsch, Anderson’s assistant.” Point three of the memorandum proposed forming a joint commission to “pursue any and all other matters of any nature whatsoever that may be of importance to the long term interest of both countries. The commission shall consist of 14 members, equally divided between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.” Matlock’s note continued: “As I mentioned in my earlier oral briefing, I don’t think we need a private commission meeting with Soviet officials. But we might think about a “commission”

from within the USG (and perhaps with a few reliable 'outsiders') as a vehicle to maintain contact with Soviet officials outside MFA. It is the latter aspect which *may* explain Velikhov's interest." McFarlane clearly preferred Matlock's options 1 and 2 over using Anderson as a contact (see [footnote 1, above](#)).

⁴ Alvin Trivelpiece, Director of the Office of Energy Research, Department of Energy.

⁵ Robert L. Hirsch, ARCO Vice President.

⁶ In a follow-up memorandum to McFarlane on July 24, Matlock wrote: "All of Anderson's proposals have serious defects in my view. Nevertheless, we must decide what we will tell Anderson. In doing so, it would be well to look at his ideas to see if they might be adapted to serve any of our purposes." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (07/09/84-07/11/84))

**245. Memorandum From Walter Raymond of
the National Security Council Staff to the
President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (McFarlane)1**

Washington, July 17, 1984

SUBJECT

Soviet Covert Action Program

My understanding from former colleagues is that the Soviet/East European Covert Action Program was budgeted at \$8.3 million for FY 84. The program managers projected funding needs at \$9.1 million for FY 85, however the "bureaucracy" (probably including John McMahan) has cut the figure to \$7.6. Some of my figures may not be totally accurate but the *bottom line* is that there is a projected cut in this program. I do not believe that this issue has been brought to Bill Casey's attention. I have a personal interest in this program, not only because I was responsible for it before, but also because I worked very closely with the Agency on this activity. I have been trying to generate a parallel non-covert dimension in the field of political action toward the target. I think it is vital that funding be continued. Indeed, more could and should be more meaningfully spent on this program.

I would urge you to raise this with Bill Casey privately and insure that he sees the program is continued without reductions.

Attached at Tab I is a bootleg copy of a recent letter from Secretary Shultz to Bill Casey underscoring the importance

of the program and the need for it to be expanded.² Ken and I and others share this view.

FYI: [*2 lines not declassified*] This is a second item I believe you should raise with Bill Casey in order to develop a Congressional strategy designed to reverse this HPSCI position.

Recommendation

That you underscore to Bill Casey your commitment that the Soviet/East Europe Covert Action Program continue at equal or greater funding levels in FY 85.³

That you raise [*less than 1 line not declassified*] funding with Bill Casey to develop strategy for use with HPSCI.⁴

Ken deGraffenreid concurs.⁵

Tab I

Letter From Secretary of State Shultz to Director of Central Intelligence Casey⁶

Dear Bill:

Washington, undated

I know that you see the US-Soviet relationship as a long-term struggle. Some of our most important allies in that struggle ultimately may prove to be the various peoples of the Soviet Union. For that reason, this Administration's basic policy document on the Soviet Union (NSDD-75)⁷ set out as a major objective encouraging the internal liberation

of that society and penetrating the controls set up by the system.

We have limited means to pursue this process. The CIA's programs designed to get materials to the Soviet and East European peoples and to support groups there and in exile are among the most important. I have in mind such programs as the dissemination of books and other publications within the Soviet empire, letters by Soviet emigres to their contacts in the Soviet Union, [*1 line not declassified*].

It is sometimes difficult to measure results in our penetration efforts, to know precisely what materials get through. But at a time when the KGB has managed temporarily to stifle most organized dissent inside the USSR, keeping the struggle going outside is even more significant as it preserves hope.

Similar programs directed at Eastern Europe are also important. Poland is only the latest demonstration of the fundamental instability of these systems, of the strong desire of Eastern Europeans for the lifestyles and basic freedoms of the West. Also, dissent in Eastern Europe has some spill-over influence inside the Soviet Union.

Recognizing the difficulty of measuring results but also emphasizing the long term benefits, I urge that you sustain the existing programs designed to increase Soviet and East European preoccupation with the aspiration of their own peoples. For a variety of reasons I do not advocate an immediate expansion of these programs, and I understand and agree with your desire to avoid additional controversy now with such pressing priorities as Nicaragua facing us. But looking towards the future, I believe that we should be thinking about a new and more ambitious finding in this

field. I suggest that our staffs get together as soon as possible to develop plans for additional and increased activities over the next four to five years that might usefully be undertaken vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Sincerely,

George P. Shultz

Attachment

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to Secretary of State Shultz⁸

Washington, May 4, 1984

SUBJECT

Suggested Response to Letter dated 19 April 1984 Regarding US-Soviet Relationship

I very much appreciate the interest and support you express for our covert action programs directed at the Soviet Union and its East European allies. You can be sure that I take a personal interest in preserving the momentum they have developed over the past many years and will continue to give high priority to finding ways in which these programs can be sharpened and eventually expanded, within our current overall budgetary constraints.

I find your idea of beginning staff planning in this field now for the next four to five years an excellent one and have initiated action through our International Activities Division to pursue this proposal from our side. [*name not declassified*] who heads the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] within IAD, will start the process with your European Bureau. Deputy Assistant Secretary Mark Palmer

knows both [*name not declassified*] and our existing programs well and will be our initial point of contact.

William J. Casey⁹

¹ Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1984, 400684. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for action.

² Raymond called this a “bootleg copy” because the letter from Shultz to Casey is undated and unsigned. The single attachment is referred to as “Casey-Shultz correspondence” but is printed below as two enclosures.

³ McFarlane approved the recommendation.

⁴ McFarlane approved the recommendation.

⁵ DeGraffenreid initialed his concurrence and wrote in the margin: “Strongly agree with Walt that we must *not* let these programs be reduced.”

⁶ Secret; Sensitive. See [footnote 2](#), above.

⁷ See [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 260](#).⁷

⁸ Secret; Sensitive.

⁹ Casey signed “W.J. Casey” above his typed signature.

**246. Memorandum From the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane) to Secretary of Defense
Weinberger¹**

Washington, July 18, 1984

SUBJECT

Responding to Chernenko

Further to our conversation at breakfast this morning concerning how we respond to Chernenko's latest letter (Tab B),² I enclose at Tab A a draft which has been prepared based upon specific guidance from the President.³

I draw your attention to two points—one involving tactics for the talks and the other more fundamental long-term arms control strategy. The first arises in paragraph four on page one in which the President offers to let the Soviets go first. This is designed to make clear to the Soviets that we are willing to hear them out. The risk we face, of course, is that having made their case on ASAT and SDI, they would walk out if we began to talk about offensive systems. Our strategy would be that after their presentation, we would open by asking questions about their ideas over a prolonged period. During this period, however, we would weave in the obvious relationship between weapons in space and offensive systems leading to a full-blown presentation of why negotiations on offensive systems must be resumed.

The second issue in my mind is more fundamental. It concerns the President's wish to state to the Soviets that

our experience during the past 15 years reflects that we have focussed on the short to mid-term programs which have an inexorability which has led us to making gestures at the margins while future systems are ignored. In a rational world in which the Soviets approached arms control as we have, such a proposal is eminently sensible. But it has two risks. First, the Russians do not approach arms control as we do. They negotiate to weaken us. In this Administration we have reflected this reality by acting in our self-interest to deal with anticipated Soviet programs. Our focus on exploring SDI reflects this realism. The second risk is one of public diplomacy and opportunities we may give the Soviets to charge us with raising new issues and either introducing "preconditions" or at least proposing such fundamental new directions as to make clear that we are not serious. As defensible as our position would be on the merits, we could receive substantial criticism from the cult of arms control writers who believe we should not alter the existing framework for discussion.

I have discussed these reservations with the President and I must say that he was very emphatic in his view that we can deal with such criticisms as we may face and that at bottom the importance of getting to these longer term issues requires that we proceed as he proposes. With some impatience he accepted that we might introduce the last paragraph on page two with the phrase "Looking beyond the matter of talks in September. . ." so as to relieve suspicions that we are introducing either a precondition or insisting on a short-term focus on this broader concept. He was supported by the Vice President and Ed.⁴ Jim shared my reservations.⁵

The President wants strongly to send a reply today. Could I ask you to review the draft letter and let me know your views. I intend to try to get time on his calendar this

afternoon to discuss this further and will invite you to attend.⁶ Many thanks.

Robert C. McFarlane⁷

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Fred Ikle Files, 1984—Arms Control. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

² Tab B is not attached. The letter is printed as [Document 240](#).

³ The draft letter from Reagan to Chernenko with revisions suggested in the text and margins is attached but not printed. The final version of the letter, sent on July 18, is [Document 247](#).

⁴ Reference is to Edwin Meese.

⁵ Reference is to James Baker.

⁶ According to the President's Daily Diary, Weinberger, McFarlane, and Baker met with Reagan from 3 p.m. until about 4:12 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No substantive record of the meeting was found.

⁷ McFarlane signed "Bud" above his typed signature.

247. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko¹

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Washington, July 18, 1984

Thank you for your prompt reply to my letter of July 2.² I appreciate the opportunity to clarify my reaction to your proposal for a meeting of delegations in Vienna in September,³ as my earlier statements seem to have been misunderstood.

It is certainly not my intention to propose a “conference without a definite agenda,” involving “a conversation about everything and about nothing specifically.” Of course, agreement on the content and objective of these talks is desirable, and both sides should have a clear idea of the issues the other considers relevant and important, so that the interchange can be concrete and productive.

It is also not my desire to have a conference merely to “study something,” as you put it in your letter. As I stated in my previous letter, there should be a clear mandate to seek out and find mutually acceptable negotiating approaches which hold promise for concrete results.

Defining the agenda should be the immediate task of our diplomatic representatives. As you know, yours have been invited to present Soviet views on this question. I have no objection to making presentation of the Soviet proposals the first item, and my delegation will be instructed to respond to them promptly and constructively.

As we consider the agenda, I think you will agree that neither of us can assert the right to define for the other those issues which are relevant to the questions being discussed. To attempt to do so would not reflect a serious and responsible approach to solving problems and would hardly be consistent with the indispensable principle of dealing on the basis of equality.

The fact is that, if we are to negotiate effectively regarding weapons in space—or as you would put it, “the militarization of outer space”—we must take into account the overall strategic environment of which these weapons are but one element. Many military activities in space, after all, involve efforts to monitor, to communicate with, to warn against, or to counter offensive nuclear systems, while many of those offensive weapons pass through outer space to reach their targets. Problems involving strategic systems, including anti-satellite weapons, therefore, must encompass existing offensive systems. This is not a matter of policy preference, but a practical fact of life. I am sure you recognize this since, in your last letter,⁴ you noted the close relationship between the question of weapons in space and the arms competition on earth.

Is it reasonable to assume that we can make significant progress in solving part of the problem, while ignoring other parts? I think not, and this is the reason I have suggested that we try to find ways to resume negotiations on offensive nuclear arms. These are in fact the most destructive weapons in our hands, and if we cannot find ways to reduce the dangers they present, whatever efforts we make in other areas will be severely hampered. This is the reason I feel strongly that we must also discuss ways to resume negotiations on offensive nuclear arms while at the same time we turn our attention to arms control of weapons in space.

Mr. Chairman, I can reiterate to you that I accept your Government's proposal to begin talks in Vienna on September 18. My acceptance is without any precondition—as I assume your proposal was. I am confident that our representatives can rapidly work out an agreed statement of the meeting's content and objectives, so long as my interest in making concrete progress is matched on your part.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490757, 8490769, 8490793). No classification marking. In his personal notes for July 16, Dam described the drafting process: "We also met today to decide what we would recommend to the President should be his response to the letter from Chernenko on the proposed Vienna talks. This is something we have met a great deal on, and we have a draft response which we sent out to the Secretary on his trip. There are many bureaucratic ins and outs to the drafting of Presidential correspondence, and in fact we sent a copy of the draft response to the National Security Council staff, where Bud McFarlane drafted several of the paragraphs of what we now plan to send back to the National Security Council as our proposed response. The real problem here is getting Defense and specifically Cap Weinberger to sign off on our response without setting the precedent that Presidential correspondence is drafted by an interagency committee. The big problem in the proposed Vienna talks is that it is unacceptable to Cap Weinberger, and probably to the President too, to say that we are prepared to negotiate on the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Yet without a fairly forthcoming position on that, it is unlikely that the Soviets would be prepared to negotiate on what we want to negotiate, namely, on offensive strategic weapons.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984)

² See [Document 234](#).

³ See [Document 233](#).

⁴ See [Document 240](#).

248. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan¹

Washington, July 23, 1984

I thought you would be interested in this roundup of recent information and current judgments on Chernenko's ability to function, his standing in Moscow, and its impact on decisionmaking there.

Respectfully yours,

William J. Casey²

Attachment

Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency³

Washington, July 23, 1984

SUBJECT
Chernenko

[10 paragraphs (33 lines) not declassified]

Politics

[less than 1 line not declassified] a perception among his colleagues that he will be only an interim leader, thereby weakening him politically. This is underscored by the bureaucracy's persisting denigration of him. Since he became General Secretary, there have been several indications that much more than Brezhnev, or Andropov,

Chernenko must share power with his senior Politburo colleagues:

—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] after Chernenko's election that Ustinov and Gromyko had backed him with expectation they would share power with him while maintaining control of their defense and foreign policy bailiwicks.

—Two weeks after Chernenko's election, Gromyko [*1 line not declassified*] cited his own statements, not Chernenko's as expositions of Soviet line.

—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] that our only hope of softening Moscow's foreign policy would be somehow—perhaps via unofficial, high-level academics—to bypass Gromyko.

—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] that Gromyko has played larger role in their talks with Chernenko than he did under Brezhnev or Andropov.

—When reporting the Politburo's approval of Chernenko's talks with foreign leaders, Soviet media have included names of other Politburo members who participated in the talks—a departure from practice under Andropov.

Decisionmaking

We do not believe that this wider distribution of power has paralyzed the Politburo, but it may have reduced the flexibility and speed of decisionmaking:

—Shifting tone of Soviet reactions to our response on the space weapons talks offer may indicate increased

difficulty in reacting to unexpected events. Moscow's handling of issue may have reflected leadership disagreement over how much flexibility to display. Under a strong leader, such differences could be more quickly resolved.

—Differences in statements by Soviet leaders on nature of US "threat" and resources necessary to meet it suggest allocations decisions for the next five-year plan, which should already have been made, might have been delayed because of uncertain leadership situation over past year.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and the Soviet Union, USSR (07/03/84-07/07/84); NLR-748-25A-8-9-2. Secret. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. Casey also sent a copy of this memorandum to Shultz; the copy is stamped with Shultz's initials, indicating he saw it. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Files, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (07/25/1984-07/26/1984); NLR-775-12-15-11-0)

² Casey initialed "WJC" above his typed signature.

³ Secret; Nofoin; Nocontract; Orcon.

249. Memorandum From Robert Linhard, Ronald Lehman, Jack Matlock, and Sven Kraemer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, July 23, 1984

SUBJECT

Responding to Soviet Proposed "Agreed Statement"

Alternative Responses. Attached at *Tab A* is a draft response that NSC staff would recommend be used in responding to the Soviets.² It does not use any of the alternative formulations suggested in the package that Secretary Shultz provided to the President this morning (provided at *Tab B*).³

NSC staff have problems with the State alternatives. None of the alternatives mention limits on offensive nuclear arms. All put us in the position of depending upon our ability to bring up reductions in offensive nuclear arms only as this is "related" to the subjects of the "militarization of space" or weapons in space. Given the Soviet actions, we don't feel that we should try to finesse this issue any further. We are in the process of negotiating an agreed statement. We had best make our interests clear.

The NSC staff alternative simply states what we have asserted before—that we are ready to meet to discuss negotiating approaches to areas of concern without preconditions. The specific references make it clear that we are ready to deal with Soviet concerns. They also restate

US intentions to pursue both ASAT negotiations and a resumption of negotiations on offensive nuclear arsenals.

The State package (*Tab B*) also suggests that we consider announcing our own version of an ASAT moratorium. NSC staff would *strongly recommend against such a step* without additional staffing and discussion. The NSC alternative (*Tab A*) handles the Soviet call for a moratorium by explicitly stating that we would be prepared to discuss this in Vienna.

Timing of the Response. State has proposed that we make a response to the Soviets this afternoon, and then consider making that response a matter of public record. NSC staff feel that it remains in our interest to keep the exchanges on preparations for Vienna private if possible. It shows to the Soviets and to the knowledgeable publics a seriousness of purpose on our part.

Once a decision is taken on *how* to respond to the Soviets, the NSC staff would recommend that we *not rush to deliver it today*. Tomorrow would certainly be early enough to meet our commitment to a prompt response.

Staff would also recommend that we *not release the US response to the press* in order to avoid giving the impression that we are simply reacting to Soviet public diplomacy tactics. It would also underscore our seriousness of purpose with the Soviets.

Talking Points. Attached at *Tab I* are a set of talking points which you might find useful in this afternoon's meeting on this subject.⁴

Recommendations

That you recommend the response at *Tab A* as the preferred initial U.S. counter to the Soviet “agreed statement” proposal.⁵

That you recommend against too prompt (i.e., this afternoon) a formal response to the Soviets lest we look like we are reacting to their public diplomacy tactics.⁶

That we not make the U.S. response a matter of public record but maintain our efforts to keep the diplomatic exchanges private.⁷

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (07/03/84–07/07/84); NLR-748-25A-8-7-4. Secret. Sent for action.

² Attached but not printed. The Soviet proposal for a joint communiqué was given to Burt on July 20. See [Document 250](#).

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ Attached but not printed.

⁵ McFarlane approved the recommendation and wrote “as mod.”

⁶ McFarlane noted: “RR approved reply today.”

⁷ McFarlane approved the recommendation.

250. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, July 23, 1984

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

Finally I had several meetings with the Secretary and Rick Burt to discuss our response to the note that Soviet Charge Isakov gave Rick Burt Friday night,² giving the Soviet response to the President's recent letter to Chernenko.³ The Soviet response was simply a proposed public statement which was extremely tendentious. In fact, the Soviets published it today. Our own response we intend to make in the form of a draft joint statement announcing the talks, but unlike the Soviets, we do not plan to publicize it, because it is simply impossible to negotiate in public, as the Soviets are doing. Indeed, their own behavior indicates that they probably do not intend to go forward with talks, but one can never be sure what is motivating them to release publicly immediately their own diplomatic communications.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984, No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on July 23.

² July 20.

³ A Department of State chronology, which accounted for U.S. and Soviet statements on the Vienna talks, is attached to an information memorandum from Kelly to Shultz, July

30. According to the chronology: "Soviet Chargé Isakov gave Assistant Secretary Burt text of a Soviet proposal for US-Soviet joint announcement of agreement 'to open talks in order to draw up and conclude an agreement on the prevention of the militarization of outer space, including the complete mutual renunciation of anti-satellite systems.' The proposed statement would also announce agreement on a 'mutual moratorium on the testing and deployment of outer space weapons commencing on the day of the start of the talks.' Isakov suggested U.S. should be able to accept Soviet draft, since the President accepted Soviet proposal 'without preconditions.'" (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, July 1984)

251. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

July 24 Meeting With the Soviets on Vienna

Rick Burt called in Soviet Charge Isakov early this morning on the Vienna meeting. He led off by emphasizing the disappointment felt by you, me, and other senior US officials that the Soviets had chosen not to respond to your letter directly, but instead handed over a formulation for an announcement and then went public.² Burt said we had examined their formulation and produced one of our own, which he then provided Isakov.³

Isakov did not respond to Burt's point about not replying to your letter, although he seemed embarrassed. He did respond to our draft announcement, saying it did not move the process forward. He said it was like our other responses to the Soviet June 29 proposal in that we apparently refuse to respond to their central proposal—negotiations on the “prevention of militarization of outer space.”⁴ Our current formulation, he continued, like those immediately following the June 29 proposal and your letters, also refuses to agree to “negotiations,” talking merely about “approaches”. Finally, Isakov noted that our response was silent on a moratorium for space weapons testing and deployment.

Burt replied that our position has been clear all along. We are prepared to discuss outer space issues in Vienna. We also believe it necessary to address offensive strategic arms, such as ballistic missiles, that fly through space and

are related to the outer space issue. He told Isakov that we are serious about the subject and thus were interested in continuing our dialogue in diplomatic channels, adding that Soviet public relations ploys made us question if they were equally serious.

Isakov said he would report to Moscow. He is returning to Moscow tomorrow on vacation and told Burt he would brief Oleg Sokolov who will take over as Charge so we can continue our discussions.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, July-December, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents Secret; Sensitive. According to the covering memorandum from Burt to Shultz, this memorandum was drafted by Pascoe and cleared by Palmer. It is unsigned, but a note in the margin on the covering memorandum reads: "original of Sec Pres delivered by J. Crawley/S to McFarlane." A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the covering memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.

² In telegram 9294 from Moscow, July 24, the Embassy reported that TASS released a public statement on the possible Vienna negotiations on July 23. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840472-0067) In remarks to the press the same day, Speakes said that the administration was "pleased that the Soviets have now responded to our suggestion that we work out the joint statement" and that the United States would "respond promptly in diplomatic channels." (Dusko Doder, "Soviets Seek Talks Pledge From U.S.," *Washington Post*, July 24, 1984, p. A1) In his diary entry for July 23, Reagan wrote: "Bud brought Cap, George S. & Gen. Vessey in re the answer to the Soviets demand for a meeting on

ASAT. We're holding out for talks also on reducing nuclear weapons." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 370) According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was from 4:35 to 5:10 p.m. in the West Sitting Hall. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

³ The draft text of this July 24 joint announcement given to Isakov by Burt was not found.

⁴ See [Document 233](#).

252. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan¹

Dear Mr. President:

Moscow, July 26, 1984

In your letter of July 18,² it was stated that you accept without any preconditions our proposal of June 29,³ and the wish was expressed that our representatives work out an agreed statement regarding the beginning of the negotiations we proposed.

Taking this into account, on July 21 we handed over to the American side a draft of such an agreed statement prepared in strict conformity with what we proposed on June 29, namely: to begin negotiations with the aim of working out and concluding an agreement on preventing the militarization of outer space, including complete mutual renunciation of anti-satellite systems, and to establish from the day of the beginning of the negotiations a mutual moratorium on testing and deployment of space weapons.

Since, as I have already noted, you wrote that you accepted our proposal of June 29, it was natural to expect that such a text of a joint statement would not meet with any objections on the American side.

However, the response which we received through the Department of State does not tally in any way with what was said in your letter. The draft statement proposed by the American side has nothing at all to do with the negotiations which we proposed. Instead of negotiations on outer space, it speaks of some "meeting to discuss and to define

approaches for negotiating” and it is absolutely unclear what the negotiations will be about.

To put it briefly, Mr. President, no doubt whatsoever now remains that the American side is not prepared to conduct negotiations with the aim of preventing the militarization of outer space.

To be candid, we deeply regret the unwillingness of the American side to reach agreement on this vitally important problem. We believed and continue to believe that now, while things have not yet gone too far, it would be easier to reach agreement on the complete prohibition of the entire class of space attack systems. Such is the objective of our proposal for the negotiations.

And the establishment of a mutual moratorium on testing and deployment of space attack weapons, as we proposed to do in conjunction with the beginning of the negotiations, would of itself be a major step showing, among other things, the commitment of the sides to the goals of strengthening strategic stability and reducing the military threat.

I repeat, we regret that the current American position makes it impossible to conduct the negotiations. Should this position subsequently change—and we would like to hope this will happen—and should the wish be expressed on the part of the U.S. to start negotiations with the aim of reaching agreement on the complete and unconditional prohibition of space weapons, we would be ready to return to consideration of this issue. In other words, our position, as it was presented in the statement by the Soviet Government of June 29, remains in force.⁴

Sincerely,

K. Chernenko

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (84900829). Secret; Sensitive. The original Russian language text is attached. Sokolov provided Dam with the text translated from Russian. In a covering memorandum to Reagan, Shultz wrote: "Soviet Charge Sokolov, under the impression I was out of town, came in today to hand over to Ken Dam a new letter from Chernenko on Vienna. The letter takes a tough line. It claims our response to their proposed announcement 'does not tally' with the statement in your letter that you accept their proposal and leaves 'no doubt whatsoever' that we are 'not prepared to conduct negotiations with the aim of preventing the militarization of outer space.' Chernenko says that they 'regret that the current American position makes it impossible to conduct the negotiations,' that they would be ready to 'return to consideration of the issue' should we change our position, and that the Soviet position of June 29 remains in force." See also [footnote 3, Document 253](#).

² See [Document 247](#).

³ See [Document 233](#).

⁴ On a routing slip attached to the letter, Poindexter wrote: "Bud, Jack [Matlock] and Ron [Lehman] are working on a memo for the President. My initial reaction is we should stick to our position and respond to Chernenko accordingly. We should still keep the position that *they are* setting pre-conditions. I also think we need a good public affairs assessment of where we stand with the media and the public. JP." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (84900829))

253. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Mr. Secretary:

Washington, July 26, 1984

The Soviet reaction to our draft announcement for Vienna was fairly predictable.² Their own draft statement was obviously unacceptable, particularly its pre-condition of a moratorium, but our response went so far to the other extreme of emptiness that it did not begin a process.

I know you think that the process of discussing a joint statement has made it more difficult for the Soviets to extricate themselves from talks in Vienna, but I do not share this view. I do not think the Soviets have decided whether to come to Vienna. They have been quite candid in noting that their coming would help the President politically, which they have no interest in doing. If they come, their part of the bargain would be a negotiation on an area where the US has considerable technological potential.

So far we say that we accept their proposal, but for their suspicious mind (and they are more suspicious of us than we are of them) we have not really done so. We have not said we are prepared for negotiations (this despite the fact that even the most minimal position, on "incidents in space", is a negotiating position). Nor have we clearly said that one of the subjects of Vienna talks would be outer space.

I recognize that the Soviets are engaging in a bit of brinksmanship, and we should not be overly alarmed. Nevertheless, we must be aware that unless there is something in it for them, they won't go. I do not believe that agreeing to negotiate on outer space would be a major concession. We should not accept the Soviet demand for a moratorium, nor should we prejudge the outcome of talks by agreeing to negotiate on the "demilitarization of outer space" on Soviet terms. But, as we have discussed many times, I believe it is possible to devise a negotiating approach covering ASAT that is in our interest and is politically defensible.

The three formulations we looked at the other day would all provide an acceptable basis for negotiations: they provided for "talks" (I prefer "negotiations") "on: (a) the militarization of outer space; *or* (b) antisatellite weapons and related subjects of mutual interest; *or* (c) weapons related to space, including antisatellite weapons."

What is necessary now is to tell the Soviets that we are prepared to "negotiate"; that we are prepared to address "outer space" arms control; and that their requirement for a moratorium is prejudging the outcome of the negotiations.

We could make this point to Chernenko in a succinct letter from the President. Alternatively, you or someone else in the Department could make the point to Sokolov. I do not believe that Art Hartman should make this point to Dobrynin, since neither of them have been close enough to this process to date. On balance, I do not think a Presidential letter is the best vehicle to convey our response; perhaps not even you. Because of the empty nature of our first draft, we are now in the situation of having to "clarify" our position. The President should not

be directly engaged. But whoever conveys our new formulation, it should be clear that he is not free-wheeling and that he is providing officially-authorized language.

It may well be that because the Soviets are trying to prejudge the outcome and are trying to stop ASAT and SDI altogether, they may still be unwilling to come to Vienna. So be it. At least in the public debate over who was responsible for the lack of talks, we and not the Soviets would be seen to be the reasonable party; the ones who agreed both to a meaningful public statement/agenda and to show up in Vienna without preconditions.

I hope to discuss this with you at the 7:00 meeting.³

Richard Burt⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, July 1–July 31, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Dam, Armacost, and Chain. McKinley’s handwritten initials are on the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on July 26.

² By this time, several rounds of U.S. and Soviet proposals had been rejected. According to a chronology of Vienna related statements and events, on July 26: “Sokolov gives Deputy Secretary Dam Soviet message responding to U.S. message delivered in Moscow on July 19.” This message was a letter from Chernenko to Reagan. See [Document 252](#). “Message states that U.S. response to their proposed joint announcement does not square with U.S. acceptance of Soviet proposal for talks, and leaves no doubt that the U.S. is not prepared to conduct negotiations aimed at preventing the militarization of outer space. Message expresses regret that the U.S. position makes it impossible

to conduct negotiations, but says USSR is prepared to reconsider if the U.S. alters its position.” (Attachment to Information Memorandum from Kelly to Shultz, July 30; Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, July 1984)

³ In his personal notes for July 26, Dam wrote: “The Soviet Charge Sokolov came in today to deliver a letter from Chernenko to President Reagan [see [Document 252](#)]. The subject was the proposed Vienna space negotiations. The Soviets took a pretty hard line. It is clear that they are trying to back away from negotiations. Tonight at 7:00 we met in the Secretary’s office to consider our reply. We came to the conclusion that the best thing to do was to prepare a letter or other document in response that could be released to the public if the Soviets chose to release their letter. The Soviets in the letter seem to be making a record for justifying their refusal to go to the Vienna talks. We settled on an approach which would allow us to go back and show that we really were accepting their proposal without preconditions, although we would not accept all of their exact language and we would make clear that from our standpoint, their phrase ‘militarization of outer space’ included the use of offensive nuclear arms that passed through space, such as ICBMs.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984)

⁴ Burt signed “Rick” above his typed signature.

254. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, July 26, 1984

Here is a redraft of the “Dealing With the Soviets” memorandum that we discussed with you yesterday afternoon.² Since Rick had to be out of the building for most of the day he has not seen it, but Mark Palmer has and his suggestions have been fully incorporated.

Attachment

Memorandum Prepared in the Policy Planning Council³

Washington, July 26, 1984

DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS

I. Where We Stand

—In the past four years, we have managed to halt what had become a worrisome pro-Soviet shift in the global “correlation of forces.” On our watch, “containment” has become an operational reality instead of a pious slogan.

—Likewise, the strictly damage-limiting objective of detente—to “manage” the emergence of the Soviet Union as a global superpower—has been supplemented by a new determination to resist Moscow’s demands for unilateral advantage.

—These changes have been accompanied by what our critics call a “deterioration” in U.S.-Soviet relations. In fact, our ability to meet the Soviet challenge is greater than at any time in recent memory. There is clear evidence that Moscow knows this and has become more sensitive to the costs and risks of continuing a cutthroat competition.

—More concretely, we can—and should—take credit for the following successes:

- We have made real (though still insufficient) headway in redressing the military balance, restoring our economic vigor and our national self-confidence.
- We have demonstrated a renewed willingness to use [*less than 1 line not declassified*] force in the “grey area” competition (Grenada, Lebanon, Central America, Afghanistan, etc.).
- We have reconfirmed the cohesion of the anti-Soviet coalition of the democratic nations and China.
- We have stimulated and been able to capitalize on rising doubts about Moscow’s reliability as a friend and ally (Grenada, Iraq, Angola, Mozambique).
- We have put and kept Moscow on the diplomatic defensive (INF, START, CW, Vienna).
- We have cast doubt on Moscow’s claim that “there is no international question that can be settled without Soviet participation” (Southern Africa).
- We have reinforced Moscow’s “isolation” within the Communist world (improving U.S. relations with China, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Romania, etc.).

II. *Opportunities*

—Our primary objective in a second term will be to consolidate and build on these achievements, thereby further narrowing Moscow's opportunities for self-aggrandizement.

—At the same time, we will want to be alert and to probe for signs that Moscow is willing to deescalate the competition and take meaningful steps to stabilize East-West relations.

—Contrary to conventional wisdom, the continuing leadership transition in the Kremlin may be conducive to a modification of established Soviet policies and priorities and create further incentives for international self-restraint:

- This is what happened in the post-Stalin succession struggle, and it could happen again.
- While there is no way we can determine (or even accurately monitor) the jockeyings for power within the Kremlin, we can help to ensure that would-be militants face an uphill struggle and more moderate elements can make a plausible case.

—What is required, above all, is continued firmness and resolve. It is illusory to think that the Soviets will moderate their behavior in the absence of countervailing power. We must further increase our military capabilities and convince Moscow that it will lose a continuing arms race.

—Our demonstrations of military prowess must be coupled with political overtures and negotiating initiatives that convey a sincere willingness to take account of legitimate Soviet security concerns and to reach equitable

agreements. Otherwise, the competition will escalate to increasingly dangerous and, for us, unsustainable levels.

III. *Negotiations*

—One of the strengths of Soviet foreign policy has always been its steady, patient determination. The Soviets have a long-term strategy. We must have as well.

—Moscow's outrageous behavior makes it tempting to treat the Soviet Union as an international pariah and limit diplomatic contacts and communications to an irreducible minimum. This is the more tempting because more intensive dialogue can create dangerous illusions among susceptible Western publics. Nonetheless, this is a temptation we must resist. Negotiations—and negotiating flexibility—are crucial ingredients of our overall strategy:

- Some agreements with the Soviet Union would be in our interest. (Similarly, with other adversaries Vietnam on MIA, Cuba on Marielitos, Nicaraguans on ways of halting subversion, etc.)
- In such cases, we must put forward negotiable proposals and be prepared to make reasonable compromises and trade-offs.
- Serious diplomatic exchanges and credible offers to negotiate are essential for putting relations with Moscow on a more stable basis and reducing the risk of unnecessary confrontation.
- They are also essential in order to retain domestic and allied support for our overall strategy. Over the long run, Western publics will not tolerate the absence of good-faith efforts to reach agreements.

—Even in the near term, standing pat helps the Soviets put us on the defensive:

- Pressures build up and *force* us to move. The move we make loses some of its political impact because people believe we were forced into it.
- To some extent we lose control of the process and leave the initiative in the hands of our opponents.

—The need for negotiating flexibility is particularly acute in a period which could see some erosion of Congressional support for the defense programs, security and economic assistance [*less than 1 line not declassified*] efforts required to counter the Soviets and give them real incentives to moderate their behavior.

—Accordingly, we must continue to use negotiation as a weapon of political strategy. We have done this:

- Putting forward a positive arms control program was good strategy.
- In Central America, our positive political program (support for Duarte, Contadora, Marielito talks) is keeping our opponents off balance and our public support more solid. Similarly in Southern Africa.

IV. *Problems and Pitfalls*

To sustain our strategy we must anticipate and overcome a variety of difficulties:

—We must clearly identify our negotiating goals and priorities and ensure their effective and timely implementation. Decisive presidential leadership is needed

to overcome bureaucratic infighting and obstructionism here in Washington. Otherwise, as experience clearly indicates, the interagency process will lock us into a position of sterile immobilism.

—We must not oversell the agreements we reach or exaggerate the prospects of a fundamental and enduring change in U.S.-Soviet relations. The Soviets will not change their spots and we must protect our strategy against the public's tendency to fluctuate between outrage and euphoria.

—We must be prepared to respond to recurrent incidents of outrageous Soviet behavior without allowing them to deflect us from our strategic course. Your decision to couple strong condemnation of KAL with new arms-control initiatives provides a model for the future. We start with no illusions about the Soviet Union and we are thus in a position to maintain a steady course (unlike Carter, who was shocked by Afghanistan).

—We must not permit the prospect of reaching agreement in some areas (if it in fact materializes) to inhibit our reaction to Soviet encroachments on our interests in other areas. We must compete while negotiating and be ready to confront not only periodic episodes of Soviet misconduct but an uninterrupted Soviet effort to prevail in a long-term global contest.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 7/16-31/84. Secret; Sensitive.

² In a July 24 memorandum to Burt with a draft of the memorandum attached, Rodman wrote: “This is what the Secretary referred to this morning. He asked me Friday to do some talking points for his use with the President articulating the approach to US-Soviet relations that we have been pursuing. The purpose was (a) to stress the value of a consistent, steady course that is more immune to shocks, and (b) to help us fight off the constant attempts (at home) to derail our negotiating efforts. This is what Jeremy [Azrael] and I came up with. The Secretary is impatient to see it, so Charlie [Hill] suggested I send this to you simultaneously with sending it forward.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, July-December, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents)

In a July 24 memorandum to Hill, Rodman wrote: “Here is a first cut at talking points on US-Soviet relations. As you suggested, I have sent a copy also to Rick Burt.” Hill then wrote in the margin: “for the Secretary’s use with the President.” (Ibid.)

³ Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Azrael; cleared by Palmer in draft.

255. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, July 27, 1984

SUBJECT
Soviet "Hard Ball"

I believe you will be interested in and disturbed by the possibilities that Jeremy conjures in the attached memorandum.

Attachment

Memorandum Prepared in the Policy Planning Council²

Washington, undated

ARE THE SOVIETS ABOUT TO ESCALATE?

I am extremely concerned that the Soviet "cancellation" of the Vienna talks marks the beginning of a more active effort to embarrass the President and discredit the Administration's policies.³ More particularly, I am apprehensive that Moscow's predictable denunciations of our continuing "intransigence" will be followed by "retaliatory" actions—actions that will demonstrate that there are limits to Soviet "patience." I do *not* anticipate the sorts of "adventures" that would mobilize support for the President and invite a confrontational U.S. response. What I fear are less provocative, "grey area" challenges that put our credibility on the line but are difficult for us to counter without seeming to overreact.

My most immediate concerns center on what I see as the increasing likelihood of escalating cross-border operations against Pakistan⁴ and the transfer of military jets to Nicaragua.⁵ Failure to react strongly to either of these contingencies could jeopardize important U.S. regional interests and cast serious doubts on the effectiveness of our overall foreign policy.

Provided the cross-border operations were “limited” to air strikes against Afghan encampments and the planes transferred to Nicaragua were “only” trainers, the adoption of strong countermeasures would stimulate sharp domestic controversy and could contribute to the President’s electoral defeat. In either case, the Soviets could hope to reap significant benefits while running only minor risks.

The intelligence assessments I have seen tend to downplay the likelihood that either of these contingencies—let alone others of equal or greater moment—are likely to materialize. However, my reading of the underlying evidence makes me *far* less sanguine. At a minimum, I think there is enough evidence to be urgently making serious contingency plans and, above all, for us to be considering possible measures of deterrence.

Unfortunately, some of the options that come to mind in this regard would be extremely controversial in their own right—e.g., the deployment of AWACs to Pakistan, the reenforcement of our air and naval forces around Cuba and Nicaragua. But this is not the case with other options such as demarches to the Nicaraguans, Cubans, or Indians or other, more ambitious, political and diplomatic undertakings. Even in the case of our more muscular options, moreover, managing the attendant controversy may be preferable to dealing with Soviet *faits accomplis*.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 7/15-31/84. Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System. Shultz's handwritten initials are on the memorandum, indicating he saw it, and McKinley's handwritten initials are in the upper right-hand corner, indicating he saw it on July 27

² Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Azrael.

³ TASS released a statement on July 27 alleging that the United States was "engaged in deceitful play over the question of the Soviet-proposed talks on the prevention of militarisation of outer space and was not going in fact to enter into such talks." (*Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 549-550)

⁴ According to a weekly situation report on Afghanistan, the Soviets had increased efforts to seal border crossings in the Paktia region: "The extensive military convoys observed in Kabul on the Jalalabad road have evidently been on their way to Paktia province, where fighting reportedly continues to be heavy. There have been reports that Soviet and DRA troops are massing in the Ghazni area for an early move to Paktia and Paktika. According to our sources, the aim of their operations will be to try and seal off border crossing points between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This jibes with other reports we have had that the regime is actively trying to buy off local tribesmen in an effort to seal the border. Regime media, which claimed on July 22 that Pashtun tribesmen are refusing to permit 'counter-revolutionaries' to cross their areas tend to support the proposition that the Soviets/DRA may be putting new emphasis on trying to prevent border crossings." (Telegram 1074 from Kabul, July 23; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840469-0336)

⁵ In telegram 3740 from Managua, July 10, the Embassy reported: "The Soviet Political Counselor [Vladimir

Burovlev] told PolCouns July 9 that a Soviet commitment in principle to supply fighter aircraft to the GRN has existed for some time. However, its implementation remains a matter 'to be discussed at an appropriate time.' PolCouns warned that such a step would be regarded with gravity by the U.S. Burovlev said the Soviet side understood that. He later said the Soviet Union did not want Nicaragua to become a sore point in U.S./Soviet relations, and would welcome a negotiated solution to Nicaragua's problems." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840440-0375)

256. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, July 28, 1984, 0510Z

222775. Subject: President's 7/27 Letter to Chernenko.²

1. S—Entire text.

2. Ambassador should deliver the letter beginning para 3 from the President to Chernenko along with the draft statement at highest available level of the MFA on Saturday.³ In delivering the letter and draft statement, the Ambassador should stress the seriousness of the President in approaching the meeting in Vienna. He should also make the following two points.

A) On the Soviet moratorium proposal: We would consider language in the statement which states that both sides will consider what mutual restraints on activities would be appropriate during the course of the negotiations.

B) We offer the proposed joint statement on the understanding that, if questioned about the meaning of the phrase "militarization of outer space," the United States will make clear that it refers to proposals which either side may make relevant to this matter.

3. Begin text of letter: Dear Mr. Chairman:

—Candor should be an essential feature of our dialogue given the responsibilities of our two offices. Thus, I must be frank in informing you that I am surprised by your letter of July 26, 1984,⁴ since it draws conclusions which are not warranted by the explanations I have given you.

—Mr. Chairman, since receiving your proposal to begin negotiations on the “militarization of outer space” on June 29,⁵ I have believed that our two countries have an important opportunity to make progress in arms control in an area of fundamental importance. This is why I immediately accepted your proposal and in subsequent letters and diplomatic exchanges suggested that our representatives get down to work on developing an agreed formulation for the Vienna meeting, so that negotiations there could lead to meaningful results.

—Thus, I am disturbed that in your most recent letter, you misrepresent our position. Let me once again make the US position absolutely clear. As I stated in my letter to you of July 2,⁶ your proposal for a conference on the “militarization of outer space” remains “an excellent idea.” The concept of the “militarization of outer space” is a broad one, and as I have indicated previously, in my view accommodates offensive as well as defensive systems. Your side may have a different concept, but the important thing at this stage is for our negotiators to meet in Vienna and work out whatever differences may exist.

—So, Mr. Chairman, contrary to your assertion in your latest letter, the United States is prepared for talks on the “militarization of outer space” without preconditions. I must remind you that it is the Soviet Union, not the United States, that seems unwilling to reach negotiated solutions to important military problems. It was, after all, the Soviet Union and not the United States that left the negotiations on intermediate range nuclear forces in Geneva, and it is the Soviet Union and not the United States that continues to refuse to cooperate on the important task of reducing strategic arms. Thus, Mr. Chairman, your latest letter raises a question in my mind about whether, having made a

proposal to go to Vienna, you are now backing away from it. I hope this is not the case.

—If, as you say in your latest letter, your proposal still stands, I think it is time now for our representatives to work out the preparations for the meeting in Vienna, including, if possible, a joint statement. I have instructed Secretary of State Shultz to continue this effort. If your side approaches this task with the good will and serious intent which is the basis of my approach, I am confident that we can serve the interests of both our countries. Ronald Reagan. End text of letter.

4. Begin text of draft statement: Joint Soviet-American Statement. As a result of exchanges through diplomatic channels between the USA and the USSR, agreement has been reached to open talks with the aim of working out and concluding agreements concerning the militarization of outer space, including anti-satellite systems and other aspects of this issue. The talks will begin in Vienna on September 18, 1984, at the level of specially appointed delegations.

End text.

Shultz

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490829). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

² In a July 27 note to Bush, McFarlane noted that the letter was staffed “with Cap, Jack Vessey and George and hope to take it to the President later today.” Two drafts were found with Matlock’s handwritten suggestions and edits. (Ibid.) According to an attached NSC routing slip: “Pres approved

msg” on July 27. No formal, signed copy of the letter was found.

³ July 28.

⁴ See [Document 252](#).

⁵ See [Document 233](#).

⁶ See [Document 234](#).

257. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan¹

Dear Mr. President:

Moscow, July 31, 1984

I agree completely that the subject of our correspondence requires complete candor.

In the spirit of such frankness, I cannot but object categorically to the fact that the American side continues with its persistent attempts to distort the very essence of our proposal of June 29.² This is evident from your letter, too.³

You write, for example, that we supposedly proposed that negotiations begin on questions of the “militarization of outer space.” We have, however, proposed and continue to propose that negotiations be conducted on the prevention of the militarization of outer space. These things are different in principle.

Further. An integral part of our proposal of June 29 is the establishment on a mutual basis, beginning from the date of the opening of the negotiations, of a moratorium on the testing and deployment of space weapons. It was also stated quite clearly in my letter to you of July 7.⁴

Since in your reply of July 18 you wrote that you accepted our proposal without preconditions,⁵ we naturally were entitled to believe that you agreed to introduce a moratorium as well. Now, however, the American side refuses to include in the joint statement a provision

regarding a moratorium. The question of a moratorium is also passed over in complete silence in your last letter. The conclusion from this is inescapable.

The case is exactly the same as regards the attitude of the American side toward another integral part of the proposal—to the effect that, within the framework of the negotiations, the issue of complete, mutual renunciation of antisatellite systems also be resolved.

Such is the actual state of affairs, Mr. President. The facts show that, stating its acceptance of our proposal without preconditions, the American side actually speaks about negotiations with the aim not of prohibiting but, in fact, of legalizing space weapons. And, in addition, it also drags into them weapons which have nothing at all to do with the subject of the negotiations we have proposed.

You are certainly free, Mr. President, to put forward any proposals of yours. But why should the public be misled by purporting that the U.S. accepts our proposal? Why should the impression be created that the Soviet Union were backing away from its own proposal?

As far as we are concerned, our proposal continues to remain in force, but it is precisely the proposal which was made public in the Statement of the Soviet government of June 29 and which was outlined in my letters to you. We did not put forward any other proposal which could be construed simply as an invitation “to go to Vienna.” Anyone who familiarizes himself with our correspondence can easily see that.

K. Chernenko

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490847, 8491054). Secret; Sensitive. Sokolov delivered the letter to Dam on July 31. See [Document 258](#). Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy. The oral statement is not attached to this copy of the letter in the Head of State File; however, it is attached to a copy in the Matlock Files. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, E.3, President/Chernenko Correspondence (1/2))

² See [Document 233](#).

³ See [Document 256](#).

⁴ See [Document 240](#).

⁵ See [Document 247](#).

258. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 31, 1984

SUBJECT

Vienna Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

Oleg Sokolov, Charge, Soviet Embassy
Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary
Mark Palmer, EUR
James P. Timbie, D

Sokolov said he was authorized to present a letter from Chernenko to President Reagan, and handed over the text.² He also handed over the text of an oral statement,³ which he said was analogous to the oral statement presented by the U.S. on Saturday.⁴ After reading the text, Mr. Dam said we would, of course, study this communication, but on first reading two questions came to mind.

Mr. Dam noted it is not entirely clear what is meant by the phrase "prevention of the militarization of outer space." The Soviet Union already has military systems in space. Sokolov replied that they had used this term from the very beginning. They were prepared to foresake anti-satellite systems altogether. In the Russian language and in Soviet eyes "militarization" without the word "prevention" implies something different than what the Soviets had in mind for these talks. Sokolov claimed it changes the entire emphasis.

Mr. Dam said his second question concerned the proposed moratorium. How does this fit into the process, the proposals the Soviets might make and the proposals the U.S. might make at the actual negotiations? He noted there

was a problem with the formality of exchanges of letters like this. It is difficult to understand exactly what meaning is intended without some discussion. Sokolov replied that they would like to strictly abide by the terms of their proposals. In the past, the U.S. and the Soviet Union were able to come to agreement not just on words but even their meaning. This letter speaks for itself in response to the President's last letter. Mr. Dam said the moratorium sounded like a precondition to him. Sokolov replied the Soviet side included it from the beginning. If the two sides enter negotiations with one side being able to do all it wants during the course of the negotiations, then what is the purpose of the negotiations? Mr. Dam responded that it is to discuss what can be accomplished that would be in our mutual interest. Sokolov said we shouldn't waste time. We should do it right away. Mr. Dam said there should not be preconditions on negotiations.

At this point, Sokolov said he did not have any instructions to interpret the letter. Mr. Dam replied that he was pointing out two difficulties in trying to understand the Soviet position so that we could decide how to react. Sokolov pointed out that the key words are even underlined in the text. Mr. Dam told Sokolov we would study carefully what he had given us.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Memoranda of Conversation 1984. Secret. Drafted on August 1. There is no other drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. The meeting took place in Dam's office. Dam's handwritten initials are to the right of the list of participants, indicating he saw it. McKinley's

handwritten initials are in the upper right-hand corner, indicating he saw it on August 1, ² See [Document 257](#).

³ The statement reads: “The version of the joint statement proposed by the American side is completely unacceptable for the reasons outlined in the letter of K.U. Chernenko to President R. Reagan.” (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, E.3, President/Chernenko Correspondence (1/2)) ⁴ July 28. See [Document 256](#).

259. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, July 31, 1984, 0936Z

9589. Subject: Ambassador's Meeting With Dobrynin, July 30.

1. (Confidential—Entire text.)
2. On Monday Dobrynin came to lunch and we had a general review of our relations. I took the occasion to question him closely on the current campaign against the outside world that seems to characterize the press and television of his country. He was in a relaxed, pre-holiday mood and, therefore, unwilling to admit that his propagandists might be filling the air waves with stories of war dangers. I said that apparently his colleagues in the Foreign Office took the same relaxed approach since we had been unable to find any senior officer on Saturday morning to deliver a Presidential letter to.² He laughed and said, "the weather was too nice. They were all at their dachas."
3. There was nothing particularly new in our review of bilateral issues. He did confirm that they were giving serious attention to the Montreal proposals on air navigation in the North Pacific.³ Otherwise, he seemed pleased with the general progress on bilateral matters.
4. Our main conversation centered on space. I said that Senator McGovern had come away with the impression from his talk with Gromyko that September talks were not in the cards.⁴ Dobrynin confirmed that that was the current

assessment. He summed up the positions by saying that they were trying to make progress on the issue of space and that we were trying to use it to re-launch strategic and INF talks or just make propaganda points. I corrected him by saying that we had accepted unconditionally but had thought it only proper to point out to them that these issues were interconnected. We would be in Vienna and have serious things to say about space and proposals to make, for example, on ASAT. But when the discussion reaches the question of what either side puts in space to defend against missiles, we would naturally want to talk about the missile threat and the necessity to deal with that.

5. I also said that their general language was confused and misleading. Did they, for example, want to talk about eliminating all military activities in space, e.g., command and control, observation, etc.? He said of course not, but we were trying to confuse the issue. Were they, I said, just trying to put pressure on the administration to postpone our ASAT test? He said, "what is wrong with a moratorium? Your President, when he is re-elected, can say the negotiations have not made progress and go ahead with test." I said that if all the President got was the doubtful benefit of negotiating in September, that seemed to ignore some political realities. He tried to make it sound as though they had done us a favor suggesting a major negotiation at this time. I said the President needs no favors. But if they want to be serious, they will find us prepared to treat the problems with all due seriousness.

6. One theme running through Dobrynin's comments was that space was a separate issue. We shouldn't worry about getting back to talks on offensive arms. That would come in its own time, after the elections.

7. In sum, I got the impression that the Soviets are playing this out in public for the moment, but haven't made a firm decision on what they will do come September.

8. In a more general vein, Dobrynin countered my comments about how they had not taken us up on changing the tone of our exchanges by repeating arguments he has used with the Secretary that we don't prepare our approaches with enough care, i.e., we don't consult him in private so that he can pave the way in Moscow. He was unabashed in yearning for the old days when Kissinger could call him and tell him not to pay too much attention to our Middle East alert, we would cancel it tomorrow. His conclusion, however, was interesting and perhaps more believable, that the present leaders don't know each other and have no confidence in each other. Can the leadership here be sure what is said one day will hold the next? I said that the President's record on doing and saying what he intends are pretty good and that should be noted here.

9. On the UN meetings, he seemed pretty firm on their taking place and made a plea that enough time be set aside that both sides could go beyond an exchange of known positions.

10. Dept pass as desired.

Hartman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840009-0359. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. A copy was sent for information to Shultz, who was on vacation in California. (Telegram 224320/Tosec 80009, July 31; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840009-0362)

² See [Document 256](#).

³ Discussion in the ICAO in Montreal of the Pacific Air routes was directly related to the downing of the KAL 007 in August 1983. See [footnote 8, Document 185](#).

⁴ McGovern and Gromyko met on July 27. On July 29 McGovern had lunch with Hartman and reported on his meeting with Gromyko: “Gromyko outlined the dangers of putting weapons in space or pursuing ASAT and characterized the US administration as not serious about space arms control. He blamed the INF collapse almost entirely on the unfairness of our continuing to refuse responsibility for British and French forces.” (Telegram 9619 from Moscow, July 31; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840486-0442)

260. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs¹

Washington, August 2, 1984

EAST-WEST RELATIONS: THE NEXT FOUR YEARS

So many variables affect East-West relations that it is difficult to do a paper of this sort. These variables include: the staying power of our economic recovery; the degree of Congressional support for big defense and covert action programs; the level of instability in critical regions like the Middle East and Central America; various imponderables on the Soviet domestic scene like Chernenko's health. So predicting the context for US-Soviet relations over the next four years is genuinely "looking through a glass darkly." That said, we have taken our best shot.

I. Introduction

In this administration's first four years, we have begun to establish a sounder foundation for dealing with the Soviet Union. We have moved to rebuild US economic and military strength, repair relations with key Allies and friends, and restore US confidence. Moreover, we have seized the diplomatic initiative at a time when the Soviet leadership is locked in a rigid policy matrix of its own making. But while we have been successful in gaining the respect on the part of the Soviet leadership and reinforcing its caution, our reviving strength, our policies, and sometimes, our rhetoric have had the effect of creating a new truculence in Moscow. In short, we have succeeded in halting the erosion in the balance of power, but our dialogue remains sticky on

the small issues and sterile on the big, and the Soviets are in a generally nasty mood.

The challenge over the next four years will be to sustain the momentum of Western resurgence, and to translate it into greater progress in our dialogue with the Soviets, so that we can put East-West relations on a stable footing for the long haul. "Strength" and "dialogue" are mutually reinforcing. The former may well be as difficult as the latter in the years ahead, especially if economic stringencies, allied pressures, and Congressional meddling in arms control policy-making increasingly constrain our freedom of action. Therefore, as we look for ways to move forward in our dialogue with Moscow, it is essential that we continue to give top priority to maintaining our overall strength.

In considering US policy, it is important to appreciate the Kremlin's view of its domestic and external situation. While our knowledge is far from perfect, and there are so many unpredictable variables that preclude making solid predictions, we have attempted to make informed judgments about how the next four years look from Moscow's perspective, and whether continuity or change will be the dominant feature in Soviet policies.

II. *The View From Moscow, 1985-1988*

If the bulk of Leonid Brezhnev's eighteen years in office witnessed a shift in the world "correlation of forces" in Moscow's favor and the achievement of unprecedented domestic stability, his last few years and the two years since his passing have been a period in which the Soviet Union has found itself on the defensive in many parts of the international arena, and mired in a protracted and, thus far, inconclusive succession process at home.

To be sure, none of the USSR's problems have reached crisis proportions, and the leadership has shown that it is still adroit enough to exacerbate serious problems for the United States in specific areas, as well as to tweak a mini-rebound out of the Soviet economy. But the Soviet leadership has clearly lost some of the buoyancy with which it used to confront major challenges. Barring the sudden demise of a large number of the older men still at the top, next January it will still be an amalgam of unimaginative seniors and the younger men waiting to succeed them.

A. Muddling through at home

Domestically, the Soviet leadership will confront two principal challenges over the next four years: modernizing the country and revitalizing itself. The response in both cases will likely be cautious and incremental, reflecting a large measure of continuity.

When Andropov entered office in November 1982, he stimulated high expectations for change. But despite a more candid recognition of the country's problems, Andropov focused his energies on consolidating power, rather than embarking on major reforms to revitalize the country's faltering economy. His rapid incapacitation, demise and replacement by an even older man, one who made few pretensions to being a promoter of reform, may have exacerbated concerns within Soviet society over whether the system is capable of renewing itself.

Yet the domestic outlook may not seem as hopeless to the top leadership as Western optimists and Soviet pessimists have forecast, and these rays of hope are important to it.

On the *economic front*, Soviet GNP in 1983 and early 1984 has grown at an annual rate of about 3% (contrary to CIA estimates of 2% growth for the remainder of the decade).² The growth spurt reflects the somewhat better harvest in 1983, increased production capacity, and the effects of Andropov's labor discipline campaign. Growth could slow again, of course, particularly in the event of more bad harvests by a failure to deal with the impending decline in oil production. But looking to the 1985-88 period, growth rates appear sufficient to reinforce the view that no drastic economic reforms are necessary, and that steady growth in military spending is possible without a shift of resources from the civilian economy.

Thus we can expect a continued "muddle-through" economic strategy, with some modest expansion of the present experiments in decentralization, a continued discipline campaign, and more exhortations to greater productivity. The USSR's present favorable hard currency position is likely to continue, although the long-term outlook is less certain given the problems the Soviets face with oil, their main hard-currency earner; oil production has apparently peaked, and huge investments will be required just to maintain output at the present level.

Hence, we can expect the Soviets to remain interested in trade with the West to obtain the technology needed to modernize their economy. Although they will try to avoid becoming too dependent on the US, they will be interested in American oil and gas technology which cannot be obtained elsewhere. Even with access to Western technology, however, the USSR will continue to have problems absorbing and reproducing new techniques and equipment, and confront an ever-widening "technology gap" with the West.

What does this quick survey of Soviet economic prospects indicate about their capacity for *military spending*? Even at the present 2% annual rate of growth in military outlays, the momentum of Soviet weapons programs and the level of military R&D (twice that of the US in recent years) will enable them to keep pace with likely US and Allied spending increases. Thus, they probably will not face any unmanageable guns-versus-butter conflicts in the near term. It is possible they may even increase the rate of growth to 3% if the US sustains its present levels of annual increases and/or if the Soviet economy continues to grow at the present rate.

In any case, we can expect steady modernization in both nuclear and non-nuclear forces. In the strategic area, the Soviets are now testing several new types of ICBMs, SLBMs and cruise missiles, as well as the Blackjack bomber and modernized versions of current missile systems—all of which are likely to be deployed in the next four years. Ironically, the major trends—toward increased reliance on survivable systems (mobile ICBMs, SLBMs) and on primarily second-strike systems (bombers, cruise missiles)—are those that our START proposals have sought to encourage (albeit to a greater degree). In theater forces, we can expect a sustained Soviet build-up in SS-20s (probably surpassing 450 missiles, with close to 300 in or in range of Europe), deployment of a Soviet GLCM, and continued modernization of shorter-range ballistic systems—many of which will be billed as counters to US LRINF.

Soviet R&D in the area of strategic defense technologies will also remain active: prototype tests of lasers can be expected, but an operational Soviet space-based ABM capability is more than a decade off; the Soviets are not expected to overcome the changing threat posed by US bombers and cruise missiles, particularly those with Stealth

techniques. Soviet capabilities for conventional and chemical warfare will also continue to receive a sizeable share of investment, both in procurement and R&D, in order to preserve Soviet advantages and to keep pace with the new US technologies highlighted by Ogarkov in his May 9 interview.³

Are there offsetting *domestic political problems* which could constrain the Soviets and turn them inwards?

One of the biggest potential challenge is separatist tendencies among their *nationalities*. But while nationality problems will continue to grow (such as assimilation of the burgeoning Muslim population, rising anti-Russian sentiment in the Baltics and Ukraine), over the next four years they are unlikely to pose a major threat to the Soviet system or to affect foreign policy calculations to a significant degree.

A continuation of current repressive policies is likely with regard to *human rights* as well, and there is little likelihood of any real challenge to the regime's authority on the part of dissident groups. Soviet authorities have been successful in their efforts to cut activists off from each other and from supporters abroad, and have shown themselves willing to accept the isolation and damage to the USSR's international reputation that result. Moreover, no potential successor to Chernenko has displayed a more moderate attitude on human rights, and at least one, Romanov, has established a reputation as liberal only in his use of repression.

Perhaps the one significant potential area for change on the domestic front will be *within the leadership itself*. Since the death of Brezhnev in November 1982, the Soviet leadership has been undergoing a period of instability and change

unprecedented in the post-World War II period. At present, many observers see considerable consensus in the top leadership around a lowest common denominator seeking a breathing space to come up with solutions to tough problems. Others believe the balance of forces on the Politburo is more precarious at present, and that even relatively minor shifts could lead to wholesale changes in the top-level lineup.

What might these changes be? In the long run, of course, the Soviet Union faces the hurdle of generational turnover, when the senior members of the Politburo (Chernenko, Tikhonov, Gromyko, Ustinov, Kunayev, Grishin, Ponomarev) retire or die and are replaced by younger men who may have significant differences in outlook. Unlike the older men, the new generation will not have spent its early career surviving (or carrying out) Stalin's purges. While there appear to be substantial differences in background and outlook among the younger men now in the top leadership, on the whole we suspect that ideology will be less of a living force for them, that they will believe more in technology and cost/benefit analysis. At the same time, we suspect they will be even more susceptible to resurgent Russian nationalism, and more sensitive to slights and real or imagined challenges to Soviet "equality."

Of course, it is perfectly possible that in 1988 we may still be awaiting the formal succession of the new generation. The Old Guard can be expected to hang onto their perks and power until the last breath, and it is not impossible that Gromyko, Chernenko and Ustinov might all still be in power four years from now. If so, we can expect a perpetuation of the present delicate situation in which Chernenko leaves much of the decision-making in the foreign and defense fields to Gromyko and Ustinov, while concentrating his efforts on building personal support

among the party cadres by stifling needed personnel changes and reforms. If Chernenko remains healthy and succeeds in this consolidation, we may eventually see his personal stamp on foreign policy.

If the Old Guard does not continue in power for very long, there will be a chance for substantial changes in Soviet policies, though not necessarily to the liking of the US. The most likely candidates to succeed Chernenko are thought to be unofficial "Second Secretary" Mikhail Gorbachev and ex-Leningrad Party boss Grigoriy Romanov.⁴ The conventional wisdom is that Gorbachev is the more moderate candidate from the US viewpoint, and less insular in outlook than most of his Politburo colleagues. Romanov, in contrast, is reported to be strikingly ignorant of the internal workings of the US, and his past domestic performance gives little indication he possesses the talent or flexibility to manage an improvement in US-Soviet relations.

Given the Soviet record of leaders adopting the policies of their defeated opponents, however, it would be unwise at this point for us to set much store by these characterizations, or to divide the new men into hawks and doves. After all, Khrushchev's policies of destalinization and peaceful coexistence surprised everyone, and Romanov could turn out to be the Soviet equivalent of Richard Nixon should he inherit Chernenko's mantle.

In any of the possible scenarios, moreover, it should be recognized that the prevailing Soviet view of US policy will be one of extreme distrust, verging in some instances on paranoia, and that the road to more flexible, constructive habits in dealing with us will be long and uphill. The new "1930s generation" will resemble the departing seniors who brought them along in many essentials: basically

bureaucratic, wary of reforms and other “harebrained schemes,” still—after two-thirds of a century—inclined to see themselves as a guerrilla regime facing a hostile populace and a hostile outside world, immensely proud of Soviet power, and acutely sensitive about the “equality” they believe they have earned by virtue of the USSR’s attainment of strategic parity with the US.

The *role of the military* in high-level policy-making is likely to continue to remain prominent over the next few years. Transitional periods in Soviet history have always witnessed an increase in the military’s influence, and since 1964 the military has had a major voice in decisions on resource allocation, as well as playing the decisive role in the formulation of Soviet positions in arms negotiations. Moreover, notwithstanding evidence of periodic disagreements between civilian and military leaders on individual issues, Soviet military leaders share the same political background and world view as their civilian cohorts.

B. Continued Challenges on the External Scene

The foregoing suggests that continuity will be the watchword in domestic affairs over the next four years, with or without generational turnover in the top leadership. The same can be said in general terms with respect to Soviet foreign policy.

The achievements of the Brezhnev era left the Soviet Union with the military might of a superpower, and a strong desire to compete with the US on the basis of an asserted equality. The two years since Brezhnev’s death have seen small improvements in some areas, but on balance the record of Soviet foreign policy has been negative. Not only

has Moscow suffered an historic policy defeat on the specific issue of INF; it has also witnessed an impressive consolidation of Western alliances on a broad range of political, economic and security questions, and an erosion of Soviet positions in several areas of the third world competition. Overall, the Soviets have been forced to reappraise their high hopes of the 1970s—that the “world correlation of forces” was making rapid progress toward irreversible Soviet advantage.

The Soviets’ biggest challenge, of course, will be *how to deal with the United States*. Since January 1981, Moscow has seen itself up against an Administration that is, from the Soviet perspective, the most unequivocally anti-Soviet since the 1950s, unwilling on principle to accept what Moscow sees as a new historical reality: the USSR’s attainment of “superpower” status and the right to pursue Soviet expansion, particularly in the Third World, while maintaining “détente”-like relations in privileged sanctuaries like Europe or bilateral ties. This perception was progressively reinforced by the Administration’s defense build-up, by the push to deploy INF, by the ideological rhetoric employed by US officials, by our continuing emphasis on human rights, and by the presence in high USG positions of individuals reputed to be philosophically opposed to US-Soviet cooperation and arms control.

Moreover, from the Soviet point of view our record of backing up our commitment to correct the imbalances that emerged in the 1970s is not unimpressive. We have proven our capacity to stake out tough bargaining positions in arms control and manage pressures for unilateral concessions; to compete in regional contexts and to drive up the costs of Moscow’s adventurism; to introduce US forces in support of regional security objectives, even

where there are risks of direct engagement with Soviet personnel (Lebanon); and to intervene decisively to overthrow Soviet client regimes (Grenada).

We have not always been successful, and the returns are by no means in with regard to the Mideast, Central America, essential rearmament programs and a score of other issues. Moreover, the Soviets take a long view of their competition with us, and we should not exaggerate the degree of pressure they are feeling or the degree of pessimism with which they face the future.

On balance, nevertheless, the Soviets see ample reason to remain nervous about US intentions, and wary of the President's political strength and his dexterity at seizing the diplomatic initiative from Moscow. The paranoid side of the Soviet mind probably fears that a reelected President Reagan could be even more hard-nosed in his approach to arms control talks, and more willing to compete in the developing world and to intervene militarily to defeat Soviet clients. Moreover, they are probably apprehensive that the US will use its technological edge in pursuit of military superiority. US space-based defense technologies seem to be of particular concern, since these threaten to negate the strategic advantages Moscow arduously built up over the past two decades. The Soviets may also fear that the US, in addition to expanding its global reach, will exploit technological breakthroughs in conventional forces to neutralize traditional Soviet conventional superiority in Central Europe.

If Soviet leaders are likely to feel pinched concerning the overall US-Soviet balance of power, they also cannot be especially sanguine about the *prospects on the USSR's perimeter*:

—Political instability still bubbles beneath the surface in *Poland*, the *East Germans* are getting excessively friendly with the FRG, and economic stagnation continues to plague much of *Eastern Europe*. Moscow's continuing dilemma will be to find the proper balance between continued repression to enforce the political status quo, and tolerance of economic reforms and political liberalization to relieve underlying social tensions.

—In *Western Europe*, the Soviets have been seriously set back by the failure of their anti-INF campaign to block initial deployments, and they have so far been unable to revive the peace movement or to reestablish much credibility with the major allied governments. On the other hand, Moscow will continue to fuel public anxieties and attempt to exploit the attachment of European governments and publics to détente and arms control to drive wedges between the US and Europe—and will doubtless enjoy success on some issues. The Soviets' prospects for success in this respect will grow if left-wing parties who have broken with the NATO defense consensus come to power in the UK, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and/or the FRG (a real possibility over the next four years).

—In the *Far East*, the Soviets have achieved some improvements in bilateral cooperation with *China*, but these have been modest due to Soviet inflexibility on all the obstacles identified by Beijing, and the tone has recently turned harsher. At the same time, they have watched our relations with China improve, and may see expanding *Sino-US military cooperation* as the first step toward a virtual military alliance. Moreover, while *Japan* poses no serious present-day military threat, the Soviets must be apprehensive about the long-term prospects, especially as Japan's GNP is about to surpass the USSR's, and as *Sino-*

Japanese ties continue to expand. Thus far, however, Moscow shows no sign of changing its bullying tactics toward Tokyo, but rather has sharpened threats, raised historical antagonisms and rejected any discussion of the Northern Territories.

—The Soviets remain bogged down in *Afghanistan*. Their recent more aggressive tactics in the Panjsher valley did little to alter the stalemate, and the Kabul regime's authority continues to extend no further than the range of Soviet artillery. Moreover, Pakistan has remained stalwart in resisting Soviet pressures to negotiate directly with Kabul and to curtail aid to the rebels.⁵ At the same time it is important to remember that the Soviets see Afghanistan as a long-term geopolitical gain for them, and may believe time will wear down the resistance as in Soviet Turkestan in the 1920s.

The balance sheet in other regions is somewhat more favorable to the Soviets, but still likely a source of concern:

—In the *Mideast*, they do not discount our major assets, but view our setback in Lebanon as a significant gain for them. Their strategy has long been to fuel instability in order to decrease US influence, and gradually to expand their own. They have achieved some successes in their efforts to expand their ties (exchanging Ambassadors with Egypt, arms deals with Jordan and Kuwait). They may also be encouraged by Arab and European support for their proposed International Conference. But their fortunes in the region remain largely hostage to the actions of Syria and a fragmented PLO, and moderate Arab states remain unconvinced that they have a positive role to play in Mideast diplomacy.

—In the *Persian Gulf*, the Soviets are apprehensive about the possibility of US military intervention to protect the flow of oil. But they appreciate that the US has little influence with Iraq and none with Iran, whereas they have been successful in using their arms relationship with Baghdad to induce Tehran to seek better ties (viz: the recent Sadr visit to Moscow).

—In *southern Africa*, the Soviets have suffered a setback with US diplomatic efforts to achieve a modus vivendi between South Africa and Mozambique and Angola. But here again they may be more relaxed about our long-term prospects; moreover, they are striving to ensure that the Cubans and they remain in an MPLA-dominated Angola and that an independent Namibia will be dominated by SWAPO. In the longer term they probably nurture the hope that racial conflict in South Africa will ultimately explode in race war, and that in the interim they will benefit from continuing racial tensions.

—*Central America* now offers the Soviets an opportunity to make fairly serious trouble for the US at relatively low risk and cost. They recognize the possibility we may take fairly decisive action after the elections to defeat Soviet-backed forces in El Salvador, and perhaps even to topple the Sandinista regime. But they probably believe that the chances are better than even that Congress will prevent this. They are continuing to ship significant levels of arms—while withholding from Nicaragua the jet fighters (and Cuban troops) we have termed “unacceptable”—and clearly hope both to tie us down there and to gradually expand their beachhead on the mainland of the Western Hemisphere.

In sum, the Soviets confront a mixture of threats and opportunities on the external scene. Although a

retrenchment remains possible, it does not appear likely that the Soviet leadership will feel compelled in the next four years—either for political or economic reasons—to pull back systematically from its global commitments. The “burdens of empire” are not all that great (in fact, many of their third-world arms relationships generate sizeable hard-currency revenues), and the Soviets can be expected to continue to take advantage of whatever openings appear in order to gain influence at our expense—albeit in their characteristically cautious, low-risk fashion. At the same time, top priority will remain shoring up their power position along the Soviet periphery.

III. US Policy toward the USSR, 1985-1988

A. US Objectives

The objectives set forth in NSDD-75—to counter Soviet expansionism, to do what little we can to encourage greater liberalism and pluralism within the USSR, and to reach mutually beneficial agreements with the Soviets—remain valid.⁶ Sticking to them will also keep our policy approach consistent and predictable, and that in itself is an advantage after the pendulum swings of the last decade and a half. But the late 1980s will present new challenges and opportunities for US policy, both in the Soviet external environment and on the Soviet domestic scene, and we must take them into account in pursuing the overall objectives set by the President.

B. A US Agenda, 1985-1988

The US Agenda for 1985-88 should be a balanced one, continuing our policy of handling arms control, regional,

human rights, and bilateral issues as coequal parts of one overall approach. While arms control performance will remain of central concern, we will want to add more content in the other areas as well. It is important that we be, and be seen by the rest of the world to be, in regular and systematic contact with the Soviets on important issues across the board.

Our foregoing analysis suggests that the most likely Soviet course for the next four years is continuity, but this should not mean we forsake the tools diplomacy gives us to shape their decisions. We will want to send signals to the current and future leadership, while they are wrestling with the major problems we have outlined, that appropriate behavior on their part is in their own long-term interests. We will also want to position ourselves so that, if the next generation comes to power soon and attempts major changes, we can have some hope of influencing their direction.

We will thus want to use our own greater internal confidence as a basis for a more creative and active diplomacy toward the Soviet Union designed to achieve what we can on the merits of a particular issue and to improve our chances to effect changes in the future. We will need to refine what we believe is possible for the relationship and then work actively to bring it about. In this context, more negotiations, contacts, and exchanges can be vital tools for achieving our long-term goals.

The suggestions that follow will enable us to deal adequately with the Soviets whether they pursue continued self-isolation or serious substantive engagement with the United States. But they are designed to encourage the Soviets to choose the latter course.

1. Defense and Arms Control

Substantial US and Western rearmament, with new stress on conventional weapons and greater Allied contribution to out-of-area capabilities, will remain a necessary component of any sound US policy vis-à-vis the USSR. Arms control will remain an essential complement for two reasons: as a way of slowing the Soviet build-up in certain specific areas (although we should continue to recognize that the results are likely to be modest); and, above all, because a plausible US negotiating program will continue to be the sine qua non for continued rearmament: western publics will not pay for an adequate deterrent unless they are convinced we want the lowest possible level that can be negotiated.

If during this Administration's first four years we achieved political support by advancing extraordinarily ambitious proposals, over the next four years allied and public support will hinge increasingly on whether our strategy yields results. Thus, negotiability will become a more important criterion in designing arms control proposals. Should economic recovery slow and support for defense increases decline, a convincing negotiating program will be all the more necessary.

In addition to adopting more negotiable positions, we must be increasingly prepared to take the initiative. Experience has shown that it is more difficult for the Soviet system to produce meaningful proposals of its own than to respond to US ideas. This is even more of a factor today, with the Kremlin leadership picture so uncertain, and with the Soviets determined not to validate US predictions that INF deployments would compel them to negotiate. In the past, monopolizing the initiative has worked to our advantage, as we have been able to structure the agenda around US proposals.

Maintaining a stable nuclear balance with the Soviets will continue to be the most important security issue for us in political and military terms, and hence a priority area for a US arms control initiative. Moreover, 1985-1986 will be an especially critical juncture because, without careful management on our part, we could witness the unraveling of the existing nuclear arms control regime: 1985 is the last year SALT II would have been in force and we can expect pressures—fueled by legitimate concerns over Soviet noncompliance—to abandon our “interim restraint” policy; at the same time, Soviet ABM programs and our own SDI will put increasing strains on the ABM treaty as the 1987 Treaty Review approaches.

The Soviets, despite their current intransigent stance, still view nuclear arms control as “central” to the relationship, and they will retain a genuine interest in limiting US programs, as well as a qualified willingness to limit some of their own programs in return. Negotiations will be difficult, and we must in the current situation avoid moves that would appear to reward Soviet intransigence. But ultimately a well-conceived US nuclear arms proposal, presented quietly, could succeed in providing tangible evidence to a skeptical Soviet leadership that we are prepared to address their concerns on the basis of equality, in talks involving give-and-take between serious interlocutors.

What form that initiative should take will be determined to some extent by the outcome of our current effort to engage the Soviets in “September talks” dealing with START and INF as well as ASAT. If we are successful, we may have both the forum and the signal we need to begin discussing the complex trade-offs required to achieve an agreement that meets our criteria in this field. If the Vienna talks do not come off, or if we are unsuccessful in broadening their

agenda, we will need to focus on early steps to reintroduce the topic on the bilateral agenda.

In the latter case, one possibility might be a letter from the President to Chernenko on November 7 (or January 21) setting forth a genuinely new and negotiable nuclear arms initiative. Especially if it came on the heels of a sound US ASAT proposal in Vienna, it could help open the sort of private, exploratory channel we have been suggesting to the Soviets, to no avail, over the past year. Some Soviets have, in fact, recently suggested that establishing a serious negotiating process on ASAT could serve as the "bridge" for a Soviet return to nuclear arms discussions in some forum.

Whether broached in Vienna or in private diplomatic channels, the more promising area for a US nuclear arms initiative would appear to be START rather than INF, where the sides' differences on fundamentals proved irreconcilable. However, neither the Soviets nor our Allies may find agreeable the prospect of limits on strategic forces while INF systems run free. The Soviets themselves have already laid the groundwork for merger in their START position, and thus we may want to focus attention on developing an initiative that would more closely integrate strategic and intermediate-range forces under a single "offensive nuclear arms" umbrella (perhaps extended to encompass defensive systems as well), while offering a trade-off between Soviet proposals to aggregate missiles and bombers and US proposals for special restrictions on the more destabilizing silo-based MIRVed ICBMs.

Our acceptance of the Soviet June 29 offer on ASAT and the link we established to START and INF ensure that space arms control will remain another top-priority item at least

for the near future. The public and Congress will remain fascinated; the Soviets, while they have played propaganda games with their June 29 proposal, may be genuinely interested in the longer term because of potential US technological breakthroughs in space weaponry; and the topic has multiple ramifications within our own rearmament effort. As noted, the first step is to come up with a solid ASAT position by fall.

2. Regional Issues

With the Soviets somewhat on the defensive, we have an opportunity to shift the global balance of power in our favor through increased and more highly concentrated efforts in third areas. We should keep up and consolidate our relationships with friends and associates on the front line of Soviet/proxy expansionism: Pakistan, ASEAN, Nicaragua's neighbors. But beyond continuing these efforts, we should also move toward a more forward and opportunistic US policy, designed not only to counter Soviet expansionism and reduce regional instabilities that hurt us, but to exploit those that hurt the Soviets and actually roll them back in some areas. Two types of new policy efforts are called for.

First, we should bring a new activism to US policy vis-à-vis the Soviet borderlands: Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Northeast Asia:

—In *Eastern Europe*, previous Soviet leadership transitions in 1953–56 and 1964–68 produced some latitude for local options, albeit with mixed results, and the next four years could witness both opportunities for the West and instabilities that absorb much of the East-West agenda. Firm commitment to our differentiation policy will be more

vital than ever, and we will need new, sustained efforts in two directions. First, we (like the Soviets) have fewer economic resources with which to compete in Eastern Europe, and we will have to work harder to field them. Second, for that reason, we will need to mobilize better for political competition, for ideological struggle aimed both at governments (through more frequent and intensive consultations) and at peoples (through the radios and through exchange programs of all kinds).

—In the *Middle East*, for reasons independent of the Soviet angle, we may well want to pursue a renewed US initiative in Arab-Israeli diplomacy. Moreover, the Soviets have, as noted, embarked on a diplomatic offensive of their own in the region; while their ties with Damascus militate against any major inroads with moderate forces, they could exploit a continued lack of momentum in US diplomacy to build support for their unwieldy international conference proposal. As we pursue our own initiatives, we will want to maintain a diplomatic channel with the Soviets on Middle East issues, if only to dispel any misconceptions about US intentions in the area and to minimize the risks of miscalculation in the event of renewed hostilities.

—In the *Persian Gulf*, including *Afghanistan*, there is no guarantee that the Soviets will remain as prudent as they have been recently. During the first term we bolstered our relationships with the friendly states of the area, and we should continue to do so. We should also raise the ante on the ground in Afghanistan to increase the pressure on the Soviets, promote unity among opposition forces, and provide military help as needed to our friends to protect against the possibility of greater Soviet risk-taking. And we should also continue to discuss the region in our dialogue with the Soviets—to induce caution and avoid miscalculation, as well as to make clear our readiness to

facilitate a political settlement as soon as the Soviets are ready to discuss troop withdrawal within the framework of the UN-sponsored talks.

—In *Northeast Asia*, sound relationships with the three area countries—China, Japan, South Korea—should provide us all the leverage we need to help the area deal adequately with both Soviet blandishments and Soviet intimidation. A consultative process with the Chinese and Japanese that covers an expanding gamut of topics could prove particularly important, but assistance to China on non-offensive weaponry, closer economic and cultural ties and careful management of the Taiwan issue are key.

Second, we should actively apply our multifaceted approach to regional issues not just where we are vulnerable, but where the Soviets are vulnerable, and where diminishing Soviet influence would further our broader objectives in the region. For example, the Mengistu regime in *Ethiopia* may be vulnerable [*less than 1 line not declassified*], and this could lay the basis for displacing the Soviet/Cuban presence. *India* may be interested in modest steps to diminish its economic and military dependence on Moscow. And we should also be prepared to act, as in Grenada, where the Soviets are over-extended and the balance is clearly in our favor: increased pressure on *Nicaragua* is an obvious possibility.

A forward strategy of this sort will require creativity, active diplomacy and, to the extent possible, enhanced resources in military, economic and covert-action terms; it will require close coordination with regional allies like Pakistan and ASEAN; to reduce misunderstanding and miscalculation, it will also require increased consultations with the Soviets on regional issues. It will involve risks, but

the payoff—more freedom for the people involved, reduced Soviet influence—may make them worth taking.

3. Human Rights and Bilateral Cooperation

We must also continue our efforts on human rights and work on the day-to-day issues of our bilateral relationship. Our human rights policy stems from deeply-held values and is both morally right and essential for public support. On occasion, it also pays off in human terms for the individuals involved. The bilateral tone of our relationship is to a large extent driven by overall US-Soviet political ties. Here our emphasis should remain on creative attempts to improve and expand working-level contacts under the various bilateral agreements, to use our ties to increase our influence on the Soviet leadership and to penetrate more directly to the peoples of the Soviet Union, and ensure that a maximum level of reciprocity and correctness is maintained.

4. Summitry and other Symbols

Our ability to bring the Soviets toward a more responsible role in world affairs will depend not only on the substance of US initiatives in arms control, bilateral and other areas, but also on whether we can affect the psychology of the Soviet leadership. To a far greater extent than we may have appreciated, our early ideological attacks—which seemed to deny the legitimacy of the Soviet regime, and by extension, its claims to superpower status—and seemingly minor slights such as the handling of Gromyko's plane prior to the 1983 UNGA,⁷ have left scars that have not been healed by this year's more conciliatory tone.

Relatively low-cost steps—such as inviting Gromyko to the White House during his UNGA visits, encouraging high-level parliamentary exchanges in both directions (inter alia, to try to establish relations with such potential next leaders as Gorbachev and Vоротnikov), easing restrictions on social contacts with Soviet diplomats—could help to dissipate some of the Soviets' accumulated hostility toward the Administration.

But we should also rethink further our position on a summit. Simply holding a summit confers the highest form of legitimacy on a Soviet leader, and a serious US summit offer after the elections might well be received positively in Moscow. Now that we have told the Soviets the President would like to meet with Chernenko but would also like the meeting to be a good one, we should consider the idea of quietly proposing to the Soviets in November, without any publicity, that our Presidents agree to meet, say, six months into the Administration's second term, and that our dialogue in the interim be focused on preparing as full a summit agenda as possible. Indeed, a properly-handled summit offer could favorably influence the Soviet reaction to any accompanying US proposals in arms control. And, of course, proposing a summit would be hailed by our Allies, who will be getting increasingly nervous the longer the apparent stalemate in high-level US-Soviet contacts persists.

One natural opportunity for a summit next year is provided by the heads-of-state meeting in Helsinki on the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, which the Finns are promoting. Such a meeting would, of course, have to be weighed carefully, but this or other such meetings would give a clear sense that we are in close contact with the Soviets including at the highest level.

Over the longer term, we should consider using a mid-1985 summit as the beginning of a series of regular, annual meetings at the highest level. This would help “demystify” the whole summit question, and over time serve to lower public and allied expectations in regards each summit meeting. By the same token, the prospect of an annual summit could help galvanize decisions on arms control and other East-West issues in the slow-moving policy-making bureaucracies both here and in Moscow.

In sum, the next four years are likely to call for new US activism on both the competition and cooperation tracks of our approach to the USSR. We should continue to rearm; and we should target Soviet vulnerabilities abroad for change to our advantage. But we will also need a more convincing arms control negotiating program. This new two-track activism can provide the basis for a somewhat better relationship with the USSR, whether under old or new leadership, recognizing that the basic relationship will remain adversarial for the foreseeable future.

No matter how fast the pace of leadership change, we should not attempt to play favorites, any more than in the recent past. We will not have the information to do so skillfully in any case, and being tagged as “the US candidate” will be the kiss of death in leadership competition. Rather, we should continue to deal with the leadership that is before us, on the basis of substantive issues, but with an awareness that there are or soon will be new men to preside over the country’s fortunes into the 21st century.

The next four years will therefore be a time of continued testing for the Soviet leadership. We will not be offering the breathing space they would prefer, but by our conduct, we

will be telling them that we recognize them as a superpower and expect them to act like one, responsibly.

IV. Policy Implications

The *prerequisites* for an effective approach to Soviet affairs over the next four years are the same as the prerequisites for the restoration we have effected over the last four: steadiness and patience; continued economic recovery; steady growth and modernization of our military forces, and the will to use them; and solid alliance relationships and international friendships.

None of these factors can be taken as a given; in fact they may well be harder over the next four years than over the past four. Budget deficits and impatience with the pace of arms talks will likely lead to increased Congressional pressure on key rearmament programs; economic stringencies will also make it more likely that we will have fewer rather than greater resources with which to compete for influence in areas where the Soviets are vulnerable; the inherent tensions between the need for secrecy and Congressional oversight will continue to inhibit our ability to carry out covert action; and we very well may have to cope with renewed transatlantic strains over fiscal and technology transfer policies, and perhaps over security issues as well (particularly if the SDI or a protracted hiatus in nuclear arms talks leads to a comeback by the peace movement). Indeed, the endless challenge of managing problems such as these may make it difficult to keep relations with the Soviets near the top of the list of the Administration's priorities during a second term.

In view of the many constraints we will face, sustaining momentum on both the competitive and negotiating tracks

of the US-Soviet relationship will depend on bringing about improvements in the *formulation and management* of our East-West policies:

—On the domestic front, we will need to do a better job of explaining and generating public support for the competitive aspects of our policy—building a consensus behind a realistic, well-focused program of covert action; securing the modest increments in economic and military aid needed to enable us to make inroads on the Soviet borderlands and other regions where Moscow's position can be challenged. This will require more work with Congress and, in particular, continued Presidential involvement.

—In dealing with Allies and friends, we will need not only to sustain the process of frequent and candid consultations we have established, but to devise new consultative mechanisms to deal with what is likely to be a less compartmentalized arms control agenda.

—In dealing with the rest of the world community, we should broaden our efforts to get the U.S. message across to world opinion and to strengthen democratic political institutions by improving the quality of the radios and of USIA's informational programs, and by creatively promoting democratic institutions through the National Endowment for Democracy and similar programs.

In the final analysis, our ability to build and maintain domestic and allied support for the competitive aspects of our Soviet policy will depend increasingly on our success in achieving results on the negotiating track, especially in arms control. Small steps in bilateral relations have brought us to a point where both sides have gained confidence that the other is, after all, able to negotiate

about some things; we should continue to take such steps. But they cannot of themselves carry the overall relationship much further: arms control results will be needed to keep both tracks going.

Here the biggest challenge will be to find a way of alleviating the interagency strife that has hampered the development of US positions throughout the first four years. This will require not only continued White House leadership in senior-level decision-making groups, but a stronger lead from the NSC at the middle and working levels as well.

One additional device for imposing greater discipline on the policy-making process would be to move toward the idea of annual summits noted earlier. By imposing fixed deadlines on the policy-making process, regular meetings at the highest level could help facilitate quicker decisions than have been the norm these past four years.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Vienna Talks 08/04/1984-08/27/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow and Simons; cleared by Palmer and Burt. In a covering note to Shultz on a July 25 draft of this paper, Burt wrote: "Attached is our long-awaited paper that attempts to analyze the context of East-West relations over the next four years, and sets forth a strategy for dealing with the Soviets." (Department of State, EUR Records, Records of Ambassador Thomas W. Simons, Jr., (Chron), Lot 03D256, July-August, 1984) In an August 1 memorandum to Shultz, Rodman provided a "status report on the Looking Ahead exercise and the preparation for the August 7 meeting," noting that "EUR is doing a redraft of its paper on '*East-West Relations: The Next Four Years.*' The July 25 draft, which you already

have, was subjected to the constructive critique of the Seventh Floor 'Looking Ahead' Wise Men on Tuesday. EUR will now refine the paper, which we will get to you later this week." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (08/01/1984-08/05/1984) In an August 6 memorandum to McFarlane, Sestanovich provided a summary of the paper, commenting: "This analysis may be correct, but with so few specifics it's hard to judge. If our entire policy depends on arms control (to win domestic support) and could crumble on its own, what terms will Moscow accept? And can we really combine arms control so easily with tough policies elsewhere? Maybe, but it's a much bigger challenge than EUR admits. Finally, regular summits may be possible if we make progress; they don't *produce* progress." (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Vienna Talks 08/04/1984-08/27/1984) In an August 7 PROFs note to Matlock, Poindexter wrote: "This morning you received a Sestanovich paper that forwarded to Bud an EUR long range planning paper. Please consider that a privileged paper for your eyes only. Don't acknowledge that you have seen it. Don will be meeting with you soon on the long range planning process." (Ibid.) The paper was used for the August 7 meeting held at Shultz's residence in Palo Alto, California, to discuss "Looking Ahead in Foreign Policy." See [Document 262](#).


² The estimates were not found.

³ See [Document 226](#).

⁴ In telegram 192685 to USNATO, June 29, the Department reported: "As second-ranking Party Secretary, Gorbachev (53) is the Soviet leader best positioned to succeed Chernenko. But Gorbachev's fortune could change sharply before Chernenko leaves office. Romanov now looks like Gorbachev's strongest rival for the succession, and he is accruing power in domestic and national security."

(Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File,
Electronic Telegrams, D840420-0678)

⁵ See [footnote 4, Document 255](#).

⁶ See [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 260](#) .

⁷ In the aftermath of the KAL shutdown in 1983, the governors of New Jersey and New York unilaterally decided not to grant landing privileges to Gromyko's plane for his attendance at the UNGA. (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph* p. 371)

261. Letter From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan¹

Dear Mr. President:

Washington, August 3, 1984

I worry a great deal that the issue of the Vienna talks on “the militarization of outer space” could, from here on, be manipulated by the Soviets so as to help the Democrats in the campaign. So far luck has been with us. But the Soviets have laid the groundwork in their attempt to maneuver you into a position that would help Walter Mondale’s campaign.²

As you know, Mondale and the Democratic platform have attacked your Strategic Defense Initiative.³ “Mr. Reagan wants to open the heavens for warfare,” they say. To be sure, Mondale also advocates reductions in existing nuclear arsenals. He wants to do this “within the framework of SALT II;” but his most dramatic difference with your arms control position does not lie in the esoteric details of SALT II, or with your START proposals. The difference that he has been stressing the most, and that could become the main theme if there are Vienna negotiations, is his opposition to what they call “Star Wars.” The Democratic Platform calls for reaffirming the ban on ballistic missile defense, and for starters, a moratorium on the testing of anti-satellite weapons and of “all weapons in space.” In short, the leading edge of the Mondale arms control position will be identical to the present Soviet position for the Vienna talks.

Hence, the closer we come to agreement with the Soviets on Vienna talks, the closer we move to accepting *in principle* the premises of the Mondale position. Our current pre-negotiations with Moscow are inching us towards accepting:

- that we must “prevent” the imminent “militarization of outer space,”
- that we must start with some moratoria on testing;
- that banning *defenses* against ballistic missiles is at least as worthy a topic for arms talks as reducing *offensive* missiles.

If a US-Soviet joint statement for the talks accepts these premises or, if the Soviets have their way, and it does not mention that offensive missiles will be a vital part of the agenda, you would be put into a very awkward position. For example, if in a debate with Walter Mondale you defend your position on ballistic missile defense, you will be speaking up in opposition not only to the Soviet proposals, but will appear to go counter to the atmospherics of the Vienna talks. The Soviets might then walk out and blame you for the failure of the talks. If on the other hand, you move with the “spirit” of the Vienna talks by saying that we are “seriously considering” the Soviet proposal for a ban on strategic missile defenses, you will, in effect, be abandoning your beliefs and position, and be blamed for inconsistency, at best, or for having had to concede that Walter Mondale is right and that you were wrong on this fundamental issue.

I doubt that it would be possible to escape this dilemma. The media will pounce on us with relish and force us all to come down one way or the other.

Thus, the Soviets could provide the Democrats with a good campaign issue. And the other side of the coin would be that you would have lost a good issue against Mondale. The American people favor ballistic missile defense. You may have seen the results of a Statewide poll in California, taken last February, where the registered voters were asked, which of five weapons they thought "most important to our national defense." These were the answers:

Cruise Missile	3.9%
B-1 Bomber	4.4
MX Missile	5.8
Nuclear submarines	14.1
"a system to defend against incoming nuclear missiles"	71.9

Similarly, a nationwide poll in April showed that three out of four Americans support the development of space-based "defensive weapons."

The Democrats have been noticing these polls, too. They have therefore toned down a bit their unqualified opposition to missile defense. After their initial almost total rejection, they now say in their platform: "If we and our allies could defend our populations effectively against a nuclear war, the Democratic Party would be the first to endorse such a scheme." But the rest of the Platform is replete with the implications that we never can develop such a defensive system. They have given up on the inventive and productive genius of America.

Incidentally, today the Strategic Defense Initiative looks more promising, and more realizeable than it did late last year, when the results of our initial studies were reported to you. The ideas then briefed to you have since been

supported by further analyses of many of the key concepts, and by many and varied tests of specific components (especially the June 10th test in the Pacific of the interception of a ballistic missile warhead).

Mr. President, I would recommend strongly that you reassert your position on strategic defense. It is both good politics and very sound policy. If we stick to your compelling rationale for protecting our people rather than avenging them, the American people will understand that we should not let the Soviets talk us into banning systems that can stop missiles from killing people. I believe the American people see great merit in your holding on to your conviction, now further validated by additional tests. They know full well that if they simply want to purchase an agreement with the Soviets regardless of whether it serves our security or is verifiable, they can do so by voting for Walter Mondale.

Very respectfully,

Cap

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (7/27/1984–9/27/1984); NLR-362-3-22-2-0. No classification marking; Eyes Only.

² The Democratic National Convention took place in San Francisco from July 16 to 19, officially nominating Walter Mondale as the Democratic candidate for President. A transcript of his acceptance speech was printed in the *New York Times*, July 20, 1984, p. A12.

³ One example in the 1984 Democratic Platform included the following statement by Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, Dr. Carl Sagan, Dr. Henry Kendall, and Admiral Noel Gayler, from

the DNC Platform committee hearing, June 12: ““Star Wars is not the path towards a less dangerous world. A direct and safe road exists: equitable and verifiable deep cuts in strategic offensive forces. We must abandon the illusion that ever more sophisticated technology can remove the perils that science and technology have created.”
 (“Political Party Platforms: 1984 Democratic Party Platform,” *The American Presidency Project*; University of California at Santa Barbara; accessed online)

262. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Palo Alto, California, August 7, 1984, 9 a.m.-5 p.m.

SUBJECT

Looking Ahead in Foreign Policy

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Shultz, Robert McFarlane (NSC), Michael Armacost (P), Charles Hill (S/S), Peter W. Rodman (S/P), John Chain (PM)

[Omitted here is the material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

2. *US-Soviet/Arms Control.*

COMMENTARY:

S/P: This category includes the *Eastern European* issue: (e.g., the evolution of East Germany and the question of improving relations with individual countries). We should be clear about the criteria by which we differentiate or by which we measure the appropriateness of better relations. We cannot regard every Eastern European country as a candidate for wooing (Bulgaria is not), but in the case of East Germany we should look at the centrifugal forces that might give the East a "German problem." We should, however, carefully assess how our interests would be affected by a free-wheeling Germany in the center of Europe. Other issues in this East-West topic include arms control, geopolitical competition, and the role of negotiation generally.

P: What is our strategic choice in East-West relations? We can concentrate essentially on the geopolitical competition, looking for further means of bolstering our position,

courting weak links in the Soviet camp, building our defenses, seeking to isolate the USSR, etc. Alternatively, we can attempt major adjustments in our approach to key arms control and regional issues with a view to seeking a modus vivendi or revisiting detente. The bargaining situation has some appeal. Can detente be revisited without hyperbole? If we go this route, we will probably have to consider trading something in SDI for major Soviet reductions in offensive systems.

NSC: Arms control has to be a central element of the discourse, partly because of feelings here and partly because of the Russians' fear. We should seek a "zero-based" examination of the past 15 years and of the next 15 years in arms control: Arms control has unfortunately been a placebo/substitute for sensible strategic thinking. We need to engage the Soviets in a fundamental discussion on how we view stability, how we view the relation between offense and defense, and what's in it for them. But we cannot do so in our present bureaucratic system. The Soviets are also too suspicious. However, the Soviets might respond to an agenda of fundamentals at the first of the year. There would be value in laying out our ideas. We could send them two or three of our most knowledgeable, thoughtful people: e.g., Scowcroft, Nitze, Wohlstetter.² They would seek to reinspire an agenda of serious arms control talks. In addition we must demythologize arms control in the US, although it is better if private groups (not USG) do it. A bipartisan board is needed.

S/P: The Soviets take strategic defense seriously. They don't accept the idea that defense is immoral as do our critics.

PM: On arms control in general we must (a) Get our own house in order. Some on our side are opposed to arms

control. Top-down guidance is needed; (b) We need a wise men's group to talk to the Soviets and provide the core for a future agenda that would not separate SDI from START, (c) We must look at the Soviet and US strategic balance in the 1990's and develop a master mosaic. PM is now working on what a balance would look like that would be tolerable to both sides.

P: It's time to review all aspects of the US-Soviet relationship. Arms control should not be abstracted from other issues. It must be related to competition on geopolitical issues and our bilateral political relationship.

CONCLUSIONS

—We should focus on the Secretary's meeting with Gromyko in New York.³ The Secretary may be able to do nothing more than foreshadow our approach, but his instructions for that meeting will be important.

—Linking arms control with Soviet behavior on regional issues is a dubious exercise. Any arms control agreement should stand on its own feet as advantageous for us. Swapping concessions in and out of the arms control field will not work. Our problem is how to get a sustainable relationship with them while conveying that we will respond appropriately to outrageous behavior.

—We need to get a Presidential decision on guidance to the arms control community. The community must work from the same basic concept. The cast of characters must be changed.

—The notion of a grand, "zero based" look is desirable, both to get our own thinking together and then to engage them in a broad conversation. This will require our best

people, who can dedicate themselves to it over 2–3 years. Possible participants would be Kampelman, Wriston,⁴ and Wohlstetter. This group might have a bipartisan advisory commission attached to it, including members of Congress. We need to focus on how such a group would tie into the Presidency and its relationship to the JCS, State, and the NSC.

—The Eastern European issue should be examined further. Perhaps have Roz Ridgeway look at the relevant papers, come back to Washington for consultations, and lead a discussion of the issues.

—We need to reevaluate the issue of discussions with the Soviets on regional issues: What is the concept that lies behind it? How does it relate to other things we're doing? P will coordinate.

—We should set forth our conceptual approach clearly: McFarlane's Commonwealth Club speech and the Secretary's Rand/UCLA speech⁵ offer special opportunities.

[Omitted here is the material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 18, 1984 Aug. 13, Mtg. w/ the Pres. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on August 10. There is no other drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. This meeting took place at Shultz's residence.

² Albert Wohlstetter was an influential expert on U.S. nuclear strategy. He and his wife, Roberta, were both awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom by Reagan in 1985 for their "great contributions to the security of the United States." Mr. Reagan said Mr. Wohlstetter had been

‘influential in helping to design and employ our strategic forces.’” (See his obituary, “Albert Wohlstetter, 83, Expert on U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Dies,” *New York Times*, January 14, 1997, p. B8)

³ Shultz and Gromyko were scheduled to meet during the UNGA session in late September.

⁴ Walter B. Wriston served as Chairman of the President’s Economic Policy Advisory Board and was Chairman and CEO of Citicorp.

⁵ In his memoir, Shultz wrote: “I was invited to address the opening of the new RAND/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior on October 18. I used my speech to develop the larger conceptual issues that faced us in managing U.S.-Soviet relations over the long term and to make an important conceptual point: I put aside the Nixon-era concepts of ‘linkage’ and ‘détente,’ and set out a new approach that I hoped would prove more effective and that reflected the reality of what we were in fact doing.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 487-488) The full text of the speech is in [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 209](#).

263. Editorial Note

On the morning of August 11, 1984, while vacationing at his ranch in California, President Ronald Reagan prepared to record his weekly Saturday radio address. During the sound check, Reagan joked: “My fellow Americans, I am pleased to tell you I have signed legislation to outlaw Russia forever. We begin bombing in five minutes.”

According to a *Washington Post* article reporting on the incident, unbeknownst to the President, at least two networks had already started recording and picked up his remarks during the sound check. The President’s comments were widely reported in the international media. (“Tapes Pick Up Reagan Joke About Soviets,” *Washington Post*, August 13, 1984, page A6) In his diary, Reagan wrote: “my Sat. radio tapings. On one of them I gave the press an opening to display their irresponsibility which they did. Doing a voice level with no thought that anyone other than the few people in the room would hear I ad libbed jokingly something about the Soviets. The networks had a line open & recorded it and of course made it public—hence an international incident.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 372)

The Soviets seized on Reagan’s joke, releasing an official TASS statement on August 15: “This episode is being perceived, and with every justification, as a manifestation of the same frame of mind that earlier was officially formulated in calls for a ‘crusade,’ in the doctrines of limited and protracted nuclear war, and in military-political plans for gaining a dominant position in the world for the US. Now, the US administration prefers to keep silent about all this, but its practical actions speak for themselves.” (“Reagan ‘Bombing Joke’ Irks Moscow: TASS Calls it ‘Unprecedentedly Hostile,’” *Current Digest of the*

Soviet Press, volume XXXVI, No. 33 (September 12, 1984), page 5)

In an August 15 memorandum to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane, National Security Council Staff member John Lenczowski suggested: "If public discussion and press attention to the President's joke about bombing Russia persists, one way we can handle it is by explaining the real nature of the joke: the President was merely making a parody of Soviet propaganda attempts to portray him as a trigger-happy warmonger. The joke, therefore, was designed to illuminate how ludicrous that propaganda is. Such an explanation can put the President on the offensive rather than remaining on the defensive with the explanations of how it was an 'unfortunate comment.'" (Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, NSC Files, Chron File August 1984)

264. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 11-9-84

Washington, August 14, 1984

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES IN 1984

KEY JUDGMENTS

Current Soviet policy toward the United States expresses deep hostility to US aims and interests. It is shaped primarily by the Soviet perception that the United States is acting to alter the overall military power relationship, seeking to strengthen US alliances, and conducting regional security policies—all for the purpose of containing and reducing Soviet influence in world affairs. US policies threaten to undercut earlier Soviet expectations that the 1980s would be a period in which the USSR could, against the backdrop of its military power, expand its international influence at low risk, and enjoy the economic and diplomatic benefits of Western acceptance of its superpower status. US policies and pronouncements also contain a degree of challenge to the moral and political legitimacy claims of the Soviet regime which its leaders find unusually disturbing. Soviet policy is motivated by the desire to combat and, if possible, deflect US policies, and to create a more permissive environment in which Soviet relative military power and world influence can continue to grow. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Current Soviet policy toward the United States makes hostile initiatives in crisis areas, such as Central America and Pakistan, a distinct near-term possibility. However, we do not see in current Soviet political and military behavior preparation for a deliberate major confrontation with the

United States in the near future. [portion marking not declassified]

The Soviets perceive that US policies directed against their objectives enjoy a considerable base of political support within the United States and in NATO. At the same time, they see weaknesses in that political base which can be exploited to alter or discredit US policies, making it possible to blunt the challenge posed by the United States and perhaps to return to a condition of detente on terms consistent with Soviet international ambitions. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The policy implications of these perceptions for Moscow are fairly straightforward, up to a point:

—First, Soviet leaders seem at present to believe that the likelihood that the United States will continue the policies of the past several years into the rest of the decade is high enough to require some political and military gearing up for a period of lasting and more intense struggle. How vigorous an effort this will require in the future is uncertain to them, and possibly in some dispute. [*portion marking not declassified*]

—Second, the Soviets believe they can influence the content, effectiveness, and durability of US policies they see directed against them. The rigidity and hostility of Soviet policy toward the United States, on one hand, and attempts to take initiative and show flexibility, on the other, are aimed at negating those policies. Up to now, they have evidently calculated that rigidity and hostility are the most promising posture. But their recent performance and the

outlook for the future plausibly call this into question.
[*portion marking not declassified*]

Moscow's policies toward the United States are focused on undercutting the domestic and alliance bases of public support for US policies and programs. Hostile propaganda, which blames the United States for an increased danger of war and for diplomatic rigidity with regard to regional security and the major arms control issues, is used to put the US administration on the defensive where possible and to excite opposition to Washington's policies. [*portion marking not declassified*]

At the same time, a hostile stance toward the West is seen by Soviet leaders as convenient for exhorting greater discipline, sacrifice, and vigilance on the Soviet home front, where the Politburo is preoccupied with a range of complex problems. These problems include stagnating economic performance and the resistance of the system to reform, flagging social morale and the dwindling effectiveness of exhortation and disciplinary measures to boost worker performance, continuing isolated dissent, ethnic nationalism, "antisocial" attitudes among youth, and some doubts among the elite as to top-leadership effectiveness. Commanding a great deal of their attention, these problems create a setting in which a deliberately stimulated image of the USSR's being embattled abroad is used by the Politburo to reinforce its political and ideological control at home. [*portion marking not declassified*]

An alternative view is that, while the Soviet leaders recognize the existence of a number of longstanding domestic problems, they are not so preoccupied with addressing these issues that it prevents them from acting decisively and resolutely on foreign policies. Moreover, the

holder of this view also believes that, while there may be some criticisms among party functionaries, there is no evidence that these criticisms affect Soviet policies.²
[*portion marking not declassified*]

Although there may be debates among Soviet leaders about tactics toward the United States, we believe that current Soviet policy, combining a dominant hard line with steps and hints of progress, is based on consensus in the Politburo. The uncertain political power of General Secretary Chernenko, his and other Politburo members' limited foreign affairs expertise, and Gromyko's long experience as Foreign Minister have probably given the latter influence over Soviet foreign policy tactics he has not enjoyed under any previous General Secretary. We doubt, however, that he is unilaterally able to enforce his preferences over the objections of the rest of the Politburo, or that explicit contention on foreign policy—as recently rumored with respect to the USSR's space arms control initiative—led to his being temporarily overruled. The consensus-maintaining mores of the Politburo and the skills of its members in avoiding isolation make such showdown situations unlikely. Rumors of foreign policy conflict in the Politburo are probably exaggerations of more routine debate over tactics, and may be deliberately spread to influence Western perceptions. [*portion marking not declassified*]

In the last few months, the Soviets have been amenable to progress on several US-Soviet bilateral issues and have made a prominent initiative on antisatellite systems/space weapons negotiations. On bilateral issues, such as the hotline upgrade and the renewal of the technical and economic cooperation accord, the Soviets appear motivated by a desire to preserve the basis for substantive dialogue on issues of direct benefit to them, despite their underlying

hostility toward the present US administration. The space weapons initiative, on the other hand, was intended primarily to stimulate concessions from the United States, or political controversy about them, in an election period when the Soviets judge that the administration wants to display progress in US-Soviet relations. Failing US concessions, the Soviets want, at a minimum, to deny the US administration any basis for claiming that it can manage constructive US-Soviet relations while pursuing anti-Soviet military and foreign policy goals. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The USSR's as-yet inconclusive initiative on space weapons is an example of the policy mix being pursued. Soviet behavior on this subject is motivated by a profound concern that the United States will develop strategic defense capabilities—whether space-based or an ABM version—that would seriously undercut the credibility of Soviet strategy and by a strong desire to achieve real constraints, by agreement or political influence, on what the Soviets regard as threatening long-term technology challenges by the United States in space weapons. This desire will persist and shape future Soviet actions whether there are space weapons talks in the near future or not. But short-term political considerations have clearly influenced the Soviets' tactics so far. They proposed specific talks in Vienna in September for a combination of reasons: to put Washington on the defensive if it refused, to coax it into major concessions if it chose not to refuse, and to stimulate political interference from Congress and elsewhere with US ASAT and space weapons programs. The Soviets have expected all of these possibilities to be greater in an election season, and have evidently been willing, for a time, to risk the US administration's claiming progress on arms control for its own political advantage. Throughout the diplomatic exchanges that followed their proposal of 29

June, the Soviets combined a dominant line of hostility and accusation that the United States blocks the talks with repeated hints that compromise leading to Vienna is possible. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The USSR is currently following a deliberate dual-track policy toward the United States. It involves, on one hand, hostile propaganda on all subjects, hostile acts such as harassment of US diplomats and tampering with access to Berlin, stubborn resistance to compromise on central arms control issues, and incremental increases in military capability dramatized by exercises and INF-related deployments. It has also allowed, on the other hand, forward movement on selected bilateral issues and contained hints of progress on arms control and wider US-Soviet issues if the United States makes concessions. Sustained Soviet efforts to undermine US interests and policies, from Central America, to Europe, to the Middle East, are an integral part of this policy course. [*portion marking not declassified*]

We expect this mixed Soviet policy to continue in the near future. It provides a basis for denying political benefits to the US administration—which the Soviets expect, but are not sure, will be reelected—while exploring for concessions and a new tactical base for dealing with the administration in a following term. This tactical posture leaves open the possibility of joining ASAT/space weapons talks in September if the United States appears ready to make inviting proposals, and also the possibility of refusing such talks, or walking out on them, if the administration looks politically vulnerable to such moves. [*portion marking not declassified*]

As of now, we believe the chances are well less than even that the Soviets will see it in their interest to start some

form of ASAT/space weapons talks in September. They have probably not yet conclusively decided this, notwithstanding high-level assertions that talks are not expected. In any case, they will handle the matter for the short-term purpose of stimulating pressures for a US ASAT test moratorium and to coax concessions on the agenda and substantive issues. Should such talks begin, it is highly likely that the Soviets will hold over them the constant threat of a walkout or suspension to keep up this pressure. If they see the US administration as unbending on Soviet demands, divided within, and politically vulnerable as the election approaches, there is a significant chance they would stage some sort of walkout for political effect. It is somewhat more likely, however, that they would remain at the talks, press for a scheduled adjournment or suspension before the elections, and maintain a drumfire of public and private accusations that the administration is blocking progress on a vital arms issue that could open the way to progress on the rest of the strategic arms control agenda. This tactic would maintain pressure on Washington for concessions, keep the issue alive during the campaign, but not damage irretrievably the prospects for resuming the game should the administration be reelected. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Soviet desires to exacerbate the political vulnerabilities of the administration or to exploit inhibitions on its behavior in the preelection period could play a role in Soviet behavior toward potentially confrontational situations that may arise in regions of tension, or could be instigated by Soviet action. On the whole, Soviet behavior toward regional crisis contingencies will be governed more by local opportunities and risks than by the Soviet reading of the US political environment. As regards the latter, while the Soviets may see opportunities to hurt the US administration politically or to exploit election-year

inhibitions, they will also reflect on a spotty record of assessing these effects, realizing that a Soviet challenge might strengthen the administration's standing and generate support for a forceful response unwelcome to Moscow. The following examines possible contingencies we believe most worthy of attention, and we have reached judgments as to their probability: [*portion marking not declassified*]

—In *Central America*, an insurgent offensive of limited scope and moderate effectiveness is likely to occur in El Salvador in late summer or the fall, and the Soviets expect it to undermine Washington's claim that its policies there are working. There is evidence that the Soviets are arranging the shipment of L-39 trainer/combat aircraft to Nicaragua, possibly before November. Although the United States has made clear that it will not accept MIGs or other combat jets in Nicaragua, the Soviets would count on the less capable L-39 to introduce ambiguities into the situation and to complicate a US response. The Soviets would be betting that the United States is unwilling militarily to challenge the L-39 deployment before the election, and constrained by its prior acceptance to tolerate the planes thereafter. The Soviets may intend to introduce more advanced fighter aircraft (such as MIG-21s) into Nicaragua at some point in the future. Their decision on MIGs or other advanced aircraft would depend principally on US reaction to deployment of the L-39s. The Soviets could also exploit the availability of Nicaragua's large new military airbase for visits by Bear reconnaissance and ASW aircraft, to shape the political environment for other deployment actions, and for military activity, such as maritime monitoring at the approaches of the Panama Canal. An

alternative view is that the estimate places too much emphasis on the L-39 issue. If these aircraft are shipped to Nicaragua, Moscow would perceive their introduction as only one of a number of increments in the Sandinista regime's military capability—others would include the construction of a large military airfield at Punta Huete and three Soviet-equipped communications intercept facilities. In evaluating the probable US response to the MIGs, Moscow would consider US reaction to all of such increments, not to the L-39s alone. The Soviet concern not to provoke the United States into military action that has kept Moscow from delivering MIGs to Nicaragua for over two years would continue in play.³ [*portion marking not declassified*]

—The Soviets may take hostile action against *Pakistan* to end its support of the Afghan resistance, the tenacity of which appears to have increased the Soviets' frustration and perhaps led to doubts as to whether they ought to be satisfied with their protracted strategy for imposing control on Afghanistan. They are likely to support, and may take some measures to stimulate, an Indian military initiative against Pakistan, such as an attack on Pakistan's nuclear facilities, to pressure President Zia into more congenial policies while leaving the United States in a position where it is politically difficult to support him. The Soviets cannot direct Indian actions against Pakistan. But we believe that the likelihood of India's taking action over the next 12 months for its own reasons has risen distinctly, and we believe that the Soviets are in consultation with New Delhi about the situation and strongly motivated to exploit it.⁴ It is somewhat less likely that the Soviets will make direct but limited attacks on Pakistan's border

because this would present the best political circumstances for increased US support while not altering Zia's policies. Nevertheless, given Moscow's strong incentives to try to change Pakistan's policies toward the Afghan war, recent signs of increased Soviet pressure on Islamabad, and Moscow's inability to command Indian action against Pakistan, the prospect of unilateral Soviet political and military pressures on Pakistan, such as limited air attacks and hot-pursuit raids on border sites, cannot be ruled out. The Soviets may decide to increase the frequency and scale of limited cross-border raids in an attempt to force President Zia to rein in the insurgents, but we believe large-scale Soviet military actions against Pakistan remain unlikely. [*portion marking not declassified*]

—In the Persian Gulf region, escalation of the *Iran-Iraq* war and the prospect of US intervention might induce the USSR preemptively to apply military pressure on Iran to end the conflict and to assert a Soviet role as a superpower in the Gulf region. Various developments in the Gulf are possible, but in the short term the most likely Soviet responses will be efforts to gain increased political influence in Iran and other regional states, rather than confrontational military actions. An Iranian victory over Iraq and Soviet reaction to it could lead to a Soviet invasion of Iran, and thereby to a direct military confrontation with the United States. But we believe this course of events is highly unlikely in the time frame of this Estimate. There is no evidence to suggest that the Soviets are readying their military forces in the region to exert visible pressure or to take local action, but they could be brought within weeks to sufficient readiness to attack Iran or play a part in a

Soviet pressure campaign against Iran. [*portion marking not declassified*]

—In *Berlin*, where the Soviets have been acting to remind the West of its vulnerable access, the Soviets could escalate pressures to stimulate fear and tension among the United States and its allies. Some increase in Soviet actions to test US and allied reactions cannot be ruled out in the short term. We believe any major escalation of pressure is very unlikely because the risk of counterproductive political effects in the West or a genuine confrontation is higher than the Soviets wish to run now. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Taken together, these regional conflict situations, in which US and Soviet interests are opposed and the potential for local conflict escalation is significant, generate possibilities for limited US-Soviet confrontation over coming months which we cannot rule out, although we judge them unlikely. Circumstances could arise in which local events combine with Soviet desire to gain local objectives and, secondarily, to embarrass the United States, resulting in a degree of confrontation the USSR did not originally seek. Domestic political conditions in the United States will play some role in Soviet calculations. The Soviets would expect the election period to impose inhibitions on US responses to their initiatives or other developments which would enhance their prospects of local success. To a lesser extent, they may expect regional crises to put the US administration on the defensive regarding its overall foreign policy. At the same time, uncertainties about US reactions to challenge and about the political effects of Soviet challenges on US politics will continue to be a restraining influence on Moscow's actions. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Recent Soviet military and political actions have created concern that the Soviets may be preparing for a major military confrontation with the United States. During the past six months or so the Soviets have pursued a vigorous program of large-scale military exercises, have engaged in anomalous behavior with respect to troop rotation and withdrawn military support for harvest activities, have demonstratively deployed weapon systems in response to NATO's INF deployments, and have heightened internal vigilance and security activities. Amidst continuing propaganda and intermittent reporting [*less than 1 line not declassified*] about Soviet fears of impending war, there is concern that recent Soviet military and defense-related activities might be read as revealing (or attempting to cloud) definite Soviet preparations for a near-term confrontation with the United States that could sharply heighten the risk of a general war. [*portion marking not declassified*]

There is also concern about the possibility that the Soviet leadership might be of a mind to attempt a "now-or-never" effort to dramatically shift the terms of the US-Soviet power struggle through central confrontation, fearful that future Soviet domestic problems may make it excessively difficult for the USSR to achieve its military and international goals in the future. It is feared that Soviet military activities could be in preparation for such a confrontation. [*portion marking not declassified*]

We strongly believe that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States. Also, we do not believe that Soviet war talk and other actions "mask" Soviet preparations for an imminent move toward confrontation on the part of the USSR. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Supporting the conclusion, the analysis underlying the present Estimate has led us to judge, further:

—The Soviet leadership displays an expectation of intensified power competition with the United States in the years ahead, along with some hope that US policies can be deflected by a combination of stubbornness and cajolery. It does not now display a view that dangerous confrontation may be required to defend its interests and advance its power. [*portion marking not declassified*]

—While pleased with the USSR's improved military situation achieved in the past decade, the Soviet leadership is not so confident in it that it would deliberately seek out a central test of US-Soviet strategic strength to "keep history on track." [*portion marking not declassified*]

—Patterns of power and decisionmaking in the Soviet Politburo at present are very unlikely to generate initiatives that are politically dangerous for its members, which a risky confrontational strategy would be. [*portion marking not declassified*]

—Examined comprehensively, Soviet military and defense-related activities are in line with long-evolving plans and patterns, rather than with sharp acceleration of preparations for a major war. Noteworthy by their absence are widespread logistics, supply, and defense-economic preparations obligated by Soviet war doctrines and operational requirements. We have high confidence in our ability to detect them if they were occurring on a wide scale. [*portion marking not declassified*]

To be sure, Soviet propaganda and other information activities have deliberately tried to create the image of a dangerous international environment, of Soviet fear of war, and of possible Soviet willingness to contemplate dangerous actions. Some, although by no means all, recent Soviet military activity appears to have been directed in part at supporting this campaign, especially large and visible Soviet military exercises. We believe that the apprehensive outlook the Soviets have toward the long-term struggle with the United States has prompted them to respond with a controlled display of military muscle. [*portion marking not declassified*]

In reaching these judgments, we must point out that the indicators and methodologies of our strategic warning establishment are oriented toward the provision of warning of war within a short period, at most one to two months. Because we give less emphasis to defense-economic and other home front measures that might provide strategic warning beyond so short a period, and because a pattern of such activities is inherently difficult to detect in their early stages unless deliberately signaled by the regime, we have less confidence in longer range warning based on military and defense-related activities alone. However, in the total context of Soviet foreign and domestic developments, we judge it very unlikely that the Soviets are now preparing for a major war or for confrontation that could lead to a major war in the short run. [*portion marking not declassified*]

It is possible that, following the US elections and their reading of the overall political results, the Soviets could adjust their present foreign policy tactics to give more emphasis to steps of limited accommodation. Their aim would be to encourage US political trends that would deflect or alter the defense and foreign policies of the

United States which the Soviets see directed against them. They would seek a return in some form to the detente environment of the early 1970s in which they enjoyed many political and economic benefits of East-West amity but suffered few constraints on the expansion of their military power and international activities directed against the West, especially in the Third World. Although political circumstances in the West, both in the United States and in Europe, may encourage them to make more serious attempts in this direction than in the past several years, the present Soviet leaders appreciate that detente consistent with longstanding Soviet aims requires fundamental changes in US policies, namely a substantial US retreat from efforts to contain Soviet power. They also appreciate that this is unlikely to be accomplished solely by diplomatic maneuver on their part. [*portion marking not declassified*]

It is highly unlikely that the Soviets will fundamentally moderate their military and international aims and shift to a policy of genuine and far-reaching accommodation toward the United States in the period of this Estimate. This could occur in the years ahead as a result of the USSR's facing greater internal problems and external obstacles. For the present and the foreseeable future, Soviet leaders are likely to remain attached to expanding their military and international power. They will try to manage the Soviet internal system to sustain these objectives. They would like to achieve a form of East-West detente that facilitates these objectives while limiting the costs and risks of pursuing them. They are not yet ready for a form of detente that forswears the expansion of their power. [*portion marking not declassified*]

In brief summary, the near-term projections we have made are as follows (percentages are merely for display of qualitative judgment; note that judgments of probable

Soviet behavior in some cases are contingent on prior developments having a lower probability):

—The USSR is likely to continue through the remainder of 1984 the mixed policy toward the United States observed during the summer months so far, with heavy emphasis on hostility and rigidity, but with an undercurrent of hints about progress in bilateral relations and arms control (70 percent). [*portion marking not declassified*]

—It is now unlikely, but not ruled out, that the USSR will agree at the last minute to commence space weapons talks in September (20 percent). The odds rise sharply if the United States agrees to an ASAT test moratorium (70 percent). [*portion marking not declassified*]

—Should space weapons talks begin in September, there is a chance that the Soviets will contrive some sort of breakoff to damage the US administration politically (30 percent), but more likely that they will simply accuse the United States of blocking substantive progress (70 percent). [*portion marking not declassified*]

—A moderately effective insurgent offensive is very likely to occur in El Salvador in late summer or the fall, and the Soviets will welcome it for putting significant although not decisive political pressure on Washington (90 percent). [*portion marking not declassified*]

—It is likely that the Soviets will introduce L-39 jet aircraft into Nicaragua (70 percent). It is unlikely that more advanced fighters (such as MIG-21s) will

be introduced before November (10 percent). Should they successfully introduce L-39s, then the probability of their sending more advanced fighters rises. See the alternative view, held by the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, as referenced in [footnote 2](#).⁵ The Soviets could also use the new large airfield soon to be completed for visits by Bear reconnaissance and ASW aircraft.

—Should India evince interest in attacking Pakistan [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the Soviets probably would be privately supportive, and probably would agree to provide intelligence and some logistic support (70 percent). The Soviets' main aim would be an end to Pakistan's support of the Afghan resistance. [*portion marking not declassified*]

—There is also a serious possibility that the Soviets will take escalated unilateral military steps such as airstrikes and hot-pursuit actions to pressure Islamabad toward this end in the months ahead (40 percent). A major Soviet attack on Pakistan, requiring new deployments and some weeks of preparation, is very unlikely during the period of this Estimate (5 percent). [*portion marking not declassified*]

—Near-term Soviet behavior toward the more probable developments in the Iran-Iraq war is likely to be continued efforts toward political openings in Tehran and among the Persian Gulf states (80 percent). Only in the event of dramatic military success by Iran against Iraq (10 percent) or major US intervention on Iranian soil are the Soviets likely to take direct military measures toward intervention (70 percent). [*portion marking not declassified*]

—The Soviets are unlikely to escalate substantially their present very low-key pressures on Berlin access (10 percent). They may, however, test Western reactions by small increases in the degree and visibility of pressures they are now applying (30 percent). [*portion marking not declassified*]

—There is some likelihood that the Soviets will try, following the US elections, a mix of tactics toward the United States that give greater emphasis to flexibility on arms control and movement on bilateral issues, without giving up fundamental positions (30 percent). Continuation of present policy mix well into 1985 is more likely (70 percent). [*portion marking not declassified*]

—It is highly improbable that the Soviets will shift to more far-reaching accommodations toward the United States during the period of this Estimate (5 percent). [*portion marking not declassified*]

—It is highly unlikely that the USSR is now preparing for and will move deliberately into a visible posture of direct, high-level military confrontation with the United States during the next six months (5 percent). It cannot be ruled out, however, that the USSR could move quickly into such a posture as a result of a local crisis escalation not now planned or sought by Moscow (10 percent). [*portion marking not declassified*]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (08/08/84–08/16/84). Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. A fuller copy of SNIE 11-9-84 is available on the CIA

Electronic Reading Room website. A note on the cover page reads: "Issued by the Director of Central Intelligence. Concurred with by the National Foreign Intelligence Board. The CIA, DIA, NSA, the intelligence organization of the Department of State, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence of the Department of the Navy, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Department of the Air Force, and the Director of Intelligence of the Marine Corps participated in the preparation of the Estimate." In a June 26 memorandum to Casey, McFarlane requested further analysis of Soviet activities related to Casey's June 19 memorandum to Reagan (see [Document 229](#)) and building on the May 1984 SNIE (see [Document 221](#)), resulting in this SNIE. McFarlane wrote: "It would be helpful if you would integrate pieces of evidence to develop further these and any other relevant hypotheses which may help us anticipate potential Soviet political or military challenges during the coming six months. Specifically, detailed discussion of the utility to the Soviets of interfering in various geographic trouble spots, and of indicators that they might plan or have the opportunity to do so, would be helpful, with prioritization of potential problems in order of likelihood. Competitive analysis would be appreciated." (Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1984, 400571)

² The holder of this view is the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. [*portion marking not declassified*; footnote is in the original.]

³ The holder of this view is the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. [*portion marking not declassified*; footnote is in the original.]

⁴ See NIE 31/32-84, India-Pakistan: Prospects for Hostilities, 13 August 1984. [*portion marking not declassified*; footnote is in the original.]

⁵ See [footnote 3](#), above.

265. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, August 14, 1984

SUBJECT

Dealing With Gromyko in September

Further to our conversation on Gromyko, I wanted to review with you our thinking on how we deal with him this fall.

One obvious problem we need to consider is whether Gromyko might be so harsh in his public statements that it would vitiate the positive aspects of a meeting with the President. We certainly can expect Gromyko to be tough in New York²—both in private and in public—but we doubt he would attempt to use a meeting as a way to humiliate the President. The Soviets have a strong incentive to keep the lines open and would look at such a meeting as the opening round of talks in the next four years in addition to it being a political gesture by the President.

In fact, they may be hinting at wanting a meeting with the President. A Soviet diplomat (probably Sokolov) told John Scali³ a few days ago that he thought Gromyko would be invited to meet with the President this fall. Another Soviet diplomat in Berlin told Nelson Ledsky⁴ a traditional Gromyko trip to Washington during the UNGA depended on whether he was treated in the same way as he had been before Afghanistan. Today Sokolov passed on Gromyko's "heartfelt gratitude" for your letter on his 75th anniversary,

clearly meant as an appreciation of the diplomatic niceties, and Sokolov pointed to your reference to a meeting at the UN in the message as an important gesture.

I suggest the following scenario: Sokolov owes me a reply on Gromyko's UN plans. At that time it would be appropriate to take up with him the modalities of a meeting between you and Gromyko early in your stay in New York (perhaps on September 25) and tentatively schedule a follow up session toward the end of your time at the UN. If your first session goes well and Gromyko's speech is not too outrageous, you can invite him to Washington to meet with the President at the time already penciled in for a second meeting.

Such a scenario would provide us maximum flexibility and avoid undue embarrassment. To increase our leverage on Gromyko's department, we might quietly let the Soviets know ahead of time that there was a possibility of a meeting with the President. This could encourage Gromyko to take a somewhat more constructive tack in his public and private utterances. It would also give the Soviets an early graceful out if they calculated that they did not want to provide a boost to the President during the election campaign.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, July-December 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Palmer. Forwarded through Armacost.

² Gromyko was scheduled to attend the UNGA session in late September in New York.

³ John Scali was a senior ABC News correspondent. From 1973 to 1975, he served as the U.S. Representative to the United Nations under President Nixon.

⁴ Nelson Ledsky, U.S. Minister in Berlin, 1981-1985.

266. Note From the Advisor for Strategic Policy to the Deputy Secretary of State (Timbie) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

KWD:

Washington, August 17, 1984

I wrote the attached while you were in Mexico. I put it aside when the Vienna excitement broke, because no one concentrates on long-term issues when there is a hot subject to work instead. Now that Vienna has receded over the horizon, I offer it as a thought for approaching the next term.

You will notice right away the big role for GPS. I am skeptical of the notions I see in the looking ahead exercise of turning this all over to a band of outsiders. The few months after November 7 offer a rare opportunity for an experienced Secretary to make a fresh effort with the Soviet leadership. It would be a waste to use that time educating a set of loose cannons so they could set out to discuss a common strategic policy with the Soviet Union. That is clearly impossible. What may be possible are practical steps. The only way to find out if they are possible is to propose some and see what happens.

JT²

Attachment

Memorandum From the Advisor for Strategic Policy to the Deputy Secretary of State (Timbie) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)³

Washington, July 2, 1984

SUBJECT

Arms Control in the Second Term

Permanent Features of the Landscape

—Arms control will continue to be a difficult and complex subject. Major problems include (1) finding a way to define equality despite differences in forces and geography, (2) securing Soviet agreement to significant reductions in modern weapons, (3) devising effective verification measures, and (4) treatment of third-country forces.

—The Soviets will be difficult to negotiate with, will continue to oppose our interests around the world, and will periodically act in a manner contrary to all civilized norms. The Soviets consider relations with the U.S. important, but subordinate to their perceived security needs.

—There will be no consensus in Washington on our objectives in pursuing arms control. There will be articulate opposition to all plausible agreements as contrary to U.S. interests.

—There will be broad public support for arms control, but practical steps will be controversial. Opposition to agreements comes from many quarters—levels too high, not verifiable, unduly constrains U.S. programs, does not end the arms race, etc.

Success in overcoming these obstacles will require substantial measures of hard work, imagination, and good luck. There is considerable room for improvement within the Administration and within the State Department in

preparing ourselves substantively and organizationally to deal with this challenge.

Setting Priorities

Fifteen years ago there was only one major arms control forum—SALT—and major agreements were produced in 2½ years of concentrated effort. Today arms control efforts are spread over at least six major subjects, and nothing of consequence has been accomplished over the last five years, and only one significant agreement—SALT II—has been concluded in the last ten years. There are, of course, many reasons for this, but one is a lack of what in business is called strategic planning—setting priorities and focusing effort and resources in areas of highest potential payoff. Agreements are possible only with the direct and personal intervention of the leadership in both countries, a scarce resource that should be concentrated on one or two subjects at any one time.

START (including INF) should obviously be the top priority. It deals with the essential subject of our time, and substantial agreements in other areas are not likely in the absence of accomplishments in START.

The other subjects (MBFR, nuclear testing, space, CW, and CDE) all have rationales and should be nursed along. From time-to-time it may make sense to briefly focus some high-level attention on one of them, and some (e.g. space) might be packaged with START. But START should have top priority, and we should recognize that concrete accomplishments require great concentration of resources to surmount obstacles large and small. If this seems unfair to people with personal stakes in the other subjects, it should be kept in mind that success in START would give a

large boost to the other subjects, and conversely without a START agreement prospects for most of the others are poor.

Leadership-to-Leadership Exchanges

Delegations in the field have a role to play, especially in working out the language of formal Treaties. Delegations, however, are extensions of bureaucracies, and the U.S. and Soviet bureaucracies are incapable of significant arms reductions agreements. The basic elements of all significant arms control agreements have without exception been worked out in direct exchanges between the leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Direct exchanges also have potential for overcoming the procedural obstacles which have prevented negotiations for the past six months.

Experiment and Exploration

There is usually more than one way to achieve a given objective. Our ignorance of the Soviet decision-making process is such that it is extremely difficult to predict which approach is the most promising. It is therefore useful to have a mechanism for informal experiments and exploration. Each side could try out ideas, objectives, and tentative proposals on the other. Such informal probing and testing is a common negotiating technique, but has become rare in arms control negotiations. Such exploration would be conducted with the knowledge and approval of the White House, but the President would reserve the right to review any tentative results.

The risk of such a procedure is that a tentative bargain could be overruled by the White House, which would discredit the U.S. officials involved, would add to the U.S. reputation as an unreliable negotiating partner, and could cause political problems for the White House. This actually happened in January, 1976, when a SALT II deal worked out by Kissinger in Moscow was rejected by President Ford.

The potential benefits, however, outweigh the risks. Reliance on the existing interagency process has three drawbacks: (1) It is extraordinarily time consuming. (When we tabled our draft INF Treaty in February 1982, we told the Soviets the accompanying verification procedures would be tabled shortly. Two and one-half years later, these procedures are still being worked out.) (2) The inevitable result is a compromise between conflicting agency views, which may be justifiable on bureaucratic grounds but which usually lacks substantive rationale and has little value for advancing negotiations. (The recent "move" in MBFR is a typical example.) (3) Once such a position is arrived at and blessed by the President, it becomes very difficult to change. Informal exchanges would allow testing of ideas on the Soviets without the delays and distortions of the interagency process, and without locking us into a position.

One example of a subject that could usefully be explored with the Soviets is the possibility of a new interim restraint regime to replace SALT II after 1985. (This, in fact, is next year's number one priority.) A second example is the new START framework.

Mutual Benefit

In order to conclude an agreement, both sides must perceive benefits in the bargain. This elementary notion is not reflected in our START approach to date, which calls for dismantling two-thirds of the Soviet ICBM force in return for marginal constraints on U.S. forces. More generally, our arms control approaches tend to be most popular with the least informed, regarded skeptically by the well-informed, and of little interest to the Soviets.

We have, however, been extremely successful in deriving public relations benefits from the fact of START and INF negotiations and from the positions we have taken, notwithstanding their small prospects for success. Both INF deployment and the M-X program have been greatly facilitated by our approach to the negotiations, and the Soviets are not likely to cooperate further in unproductive negotiations which benefit us without corresponding benefits for them. Predictions that the Soviets will return to the negotiations after the election are probably optimistic. More likely, they will return when they perceive that there is some prospect for a result that would be in their interest. They are not likely to be interested in talking for the sake of talking. From this perspective, the Soviet walkouts are not so much a pressure tactic as a refusal to cooperate in a process that is working against their interests, even though this refusal has serious costs, especially in Europe.

If this analysis is correct, introduction of new U.S. ideas is more likely to lead to resumption of START than the passage of time or the occurrence of the election.

Substance

Lack of substantive ideas is not a serious problem. The proposed "framework" should be the basis for the next

substantive exchanges on START. It would implement the U.S. objectives (reductions, equality, enhancement of stability, and verification), meets the Soviets half-way on the central issue (aggregation of warhead limits), combines the best features of our position with the least objectionable elements of the Soviet position, and represents a vast improvement over SALT II in unit of account, levels, and structure. This approach has the potential to reduce the negotiations on the basic provisions of a START agreement to haggling over numbers.

The most difficult problem in strategic arms negotiations is the treatment of INF and third country systems. This has been the case since 1969, and while the separate INF negotiations have obscured this fact for the last few years, it will be obvious when talks resume. The problem arises from the clash of fundamental goals—the United States needs U.S.-Soviet equality, the Soviets need constraints on all comparable forces facing constrained Soviet forces. The long-term solution is a five-power arrangement. The short-term solution is to isolate strategic force reductions from INF to the maximum extent possible, and create an outcome which permits each side to claim victory.

It will not be easy to isolate a START agreement from INF. In the past this has been done by keeping the levels of strategic forces high (so INF is relatively insignificant) and granting the Soviets an offsetting asymmetry (heavy missiles). Our objective of significant reductions well below SALT II, our continuing deployment of LRINF missiles, and British and French plans to expand their number of missile warheads by about an order of magnitude all ensure that INF will be a very difficult problem for START. The one positive note is the possibility of “tradeoffs”, which the U.S. could consider to be a balancing of U.S. and Soviet

strategic advantages, but which the Soviets could consider to include an element of compensation for FBS.

Another major problem will be future ballistic missile defenses. While development and deployment decisions will not be made for many years, if ever, the Soviets will not be interested in constraints on offenses if there is a serious prospect of large-scale defenses. It is possible that a simple provision making a START agreement contingent on continuation of the ABM Treaty would suffice. But it is also possible that the future of defenses will need to be addressed and resolved again before a START agreement can be concluded. Properly handled, there is leverage here; the Soviets respect our defensive technology.

Once a basic framework for a START agreement begins to take shape, a large number of other problems will come to the fore—verification measures, Backfire, definitions, counting rules, and many more. This is the way the negotiating process proceeds—as central issues are resolved, new layers of problems previously perceived as too obscure and technical for senior-level attention present themselves for senior-level decision and negotiation. These need to be considered problems to be resolved rather than reasons why agreements are impossible.

Form

Most of our efforts are directed toward formal Treaties. Treaties are, however, only one part of a spectrum of possibilities, and we should consider other, less formal concepts as well. One possibility would be a new interim restraint arrangement to replace SALT II when it expires next year. Such an agreement could, for example, cap certain parameters near current levels. A follow on could

lower these levels. Such a simple arrangement would produce substantively and politically useful results long before negotiations on a complete Treaty were concluded.

When we attempt to breathe life into START next year, our immediate objective should be to work out a new interim restraint regime to replace SALT II in 1985. The expiration of SALT II is an action-forcing event, and the best solution would be to have in place by December 31, 1985 a replacement regime based on our preferred unit of account—warheads and ALCMs. Absent this, we would face a tough choice—continue to abide by SALT II, which would require dismantling of large numbers of Poseidon and MM-III as Trident boats are deployed, or be the first nation to breach the central provisions of the Treaty (which we have criticized as setting levels that are too high).

Since a new interim restraint regime would set a precedent for the follow-on agreement, and since the interim restraint arrangement would be most defensible as a temporary measure pending a more comprehensive agreement, our proposal for temporary, informal restraints should be consistent with and advanced together with a more comprehensive proposal (e.g. the framework). Once direct exchanges have produced a replacement interim restraint formula and an agreed framework analogous to the one produced for SALT II at Vladivostok, the stage would be set for useful work by the delegations.

Proposals and Objectives

When we make proposals, we should adopt the practice of advancing both our position and the objectives we seek to achieve. Giving our objectives equal weight with our position has advantages:

—Sometimes the Soviets agree with the objective but not the position, and can propose an alternative way to achieve it.

—Keeping our objectives clear can help avoid inflexible adherence to a particular means rather than the intended end result. (For example, our single-minded emphasis on a ban on encryption of telemetry, which is not plausible, is impeding our ability to pursue other ways to verify missile characteristics.)

Organization

Serious negotiations would require the State Department to carry out the following tasks, all more-or-less simultaneously:

—Conduct of informal exchanges with the Soviets, including formulation of ideas and tactics, coordination with the White House, etc.

—Management of the interagency process for analysis of ideas, problems, options, etc. Most of the groups formerly chaired by NSC are now chaired by State or co-chaired by State and OSD.

—Support of the Delegation in Geneva. ACDA plays a big role here, but needs State's help where there are interagency differences.

—Take the lead in dealing with compliance problems and interim restraint.

—Consult with the Allies and Congress, engage in public diplomacy, etc.

PM. The PM bureau has over the last few years put together a small group of people highly skilled in arms control analysis. They spend the great majority of their time writing interagency papers and attending and presiding over interagency meetings. They think of themselves primarily as members of the interagency community, and when they do think about State's interests, it is usually in terms of which option in an interagency paper State should support.

This deep involvement in the interagency process has advantages: PM has taken over much of the management function once carried out by NSC, and much of the technical analysis function once carried out by ACDA. PM, and Admiral Howe in particular, have earned the respect of the other agencies. The down side is that after devoting 60 plus hours a week to their interagency work, PM analysts have little additional time or energy for supporting the Secretary. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that a PM analyst considers his job is finished when he has successfully negotiated interagency clearance on a paper hundreds of pages long analysing a dozen or more options.

General Chain should be encouraged to reorient PM to play a larger role in State's internal efforts to find solutions to problems, explore possibilities with the Soviets, etc. General Chain needs a few more people, especially at the working level, in order to devote more resources to this task while continuing to discharge State's interagency obligations.

EUR. EUR has also put together a small group of highly skilled people, and they have been the source of most of the innovative ideas in START, INF, and other subjects over the last few years. EUR has a flare for initiative and action, and many of their suggestions which were controversial at the

time are now widely considered to have been successful (e.g., the INF moves in 1983, the CW Treaty draft, and the Dublin offer on NUF).⁴ EUR is well positioned to support serious negotiations conducted on several levels.

The Seventh Floor. The Seventh Floor has played a small role in START and other arms control negotiations to date. A serious negotiation conducted on several levels will require much more participation by the Seventh Floor principals. The Secretary himself would have major responsibilities as the principal point of contact with the Soviets and with the President. He could use substantial support, however, in such tasks as management of the process (planning, analysis, tactics, etc.) supporting the private exchanges, liaison with the White House, coordination of the positions State representatives take in interagency meetings and papers, and senior-level discussions with other agencies. These functions are best carried out at a level between the bureaus and the Secretary. Such a role would (if the negotiations go anywhere) require a major commitment of time and energy, and would involve engagement in this issue on a day-to-day basis. I, of course, think D would be a good place for this responsibility, but other possibilities are P or a new Seventh Floor principal.

The traditional entree for the Deputy Secretary into this subject was the SIG. There would be no point in resuming meetings of the SIG, however, since there is no need for a group between the IG and the SACPG. While the interagency analysis is necessary, and in some cases even useful, it will never resolve the major problems and is not the place where additional effort should be expended.

ACDA. The ideal ACDA would consider itself to be de facto, if not de jure, a branch of the State Department. ACDA

retains significant capability for technical analysis, and would be a useful ally. In the past ACDA has at times worked closely with State, and at other times opposed State. Today it is somewhere in between. ACDA's problems include uneven staffing, a mandate that overlaps State's, and a subject matter that is too important and too bureaucratically difficult to be left to a tiny and bureaucratically weak agency. Once serious negotiations began, ACDA would want very much to be involved. State could benefit from access to ACDA's technical analysis capability. If handled carefully, there is therefore the basis for closer cooperation than in the recent past.

Conclusion

The combination of smart but largely procedural U.S. moves and dumb Soviet moves has worked well to date in gaining support in Congress and elsewhere for our arms control approach. The build-down episode illustrates that a surprising amount of short-term political gain can be extracted from an initiative with no substantive content whatever. But as time goes by, more will be demanded of our arms control policy than statements that arms control is difficult, the Soviets are hard to deal with, and everything is under study. Without either tangible results or evidence of innovative efforts, the perception will grow that while our stated goals are laudable, little is being done to achieve them. This will have an increasingly negative effect on support for the defense program, on the Alliance, and on overall support for the President.

It is possible that even with our best efforts nothing worthwhile can be accomplished. The Soviets may or may not be prepared to make the major changes in their approach that will be necessary. The only way to determine

how the Soviets would respond to a more equitable proposal is to suggest one and see what happens.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, August 1984. No classification marking. In a covering note forwarding the note and attached memorandum to Shultz, Dam commented: "I highly commend this memo for your careful review. Despite its length, it is by far the most refreshing and cogent piece that I have read on the process of arms control negotiations." Shultz replied in the margin: "KD for discussion next week."

² Timbie initialed "J.T." above his typed initials.

³ Secret. Not for the System.

⁴ Reagan traveled to Ireland from June 1 to 4, addressing the Irish Parliament in Dublin on June 4. In this speech he addressed U.S.-Soviet relations and the Soviet proposal for 'non-use-of-force.' For the full text of this speech, see the *Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book II, pp. 804-811. See also [footnote 3, Document 224](#).

267. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Chain) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, August 20, 1984

SUBJECT

1985—Year of Decision for Arms Control

EUR's recent paper on the next four years of US-Soviet relations noted that 1985 was likely to be a particularly critical year for nuclear arms control.² This memo explores in greater detail the issues and dangers we will face this coming year. Our focus is explicitly short-term: how do we cope with a potentially serious and immediate set of problems. But our proposals will also need to be examined in the light of the longer-term piece we are doing for you reviewing the strategic situation as it is likely to develop toward the end of this decade, and suggesting means by which arms control could enhance stability.

The Erosion of the Current Regime

The current arms control regime, the product of two decades of intensive US-Soviet negotiations, has proven relatively resilient, withstanding five years of mounting suspicion, intense recrimination, lack of new accords or even progress toward them. Yet an unraveling process is visible, and is likely to accelerate in the months ahead. In recent months we have formally accused the Soviets of violating both the accord which opened that arms control

era—the 1962 Limited Test Ban Treaty—and the agreement which closed it—the 1979 SALT II accord—as well as many arms control agreements concluded in between (most notably the ABM Treaty, viewed by many as the single example of an arms control agreement that has worked).³ Further, there is in preparation a report to Congress that will charge the Soviets with further violations.⁴

For our part, the United States has not ratified or put formally into effect (as opposed to “not undercutting” as a matter of policy) any US-Soviet arms control accord since 1973, nor have we concluded any such agreement since 1979. As a new four-year Presidential term opens, no bilateral US-Soviet arms control negotiations will be underway.

This erosion of the existing arms control regime is likely to gather further momentum. The Soviets are likely to persist and expand their self-serving interpretation of commitments under existing (and for the most part, unratified) arms control agreements—if not renounce them altogether. We will find ourselves under similar pressures. The SALT II accord was intended to run only until the end of 1985, and we will need either to abandon our “interim” compliance with it, or explain why we are extending the term of this “fatally flawed” accord in the face of numerous allegations of Soviet noncompliance. We will face this decision at precisely the moment when the provisions of that agreement would require us to begin dismantling existing US systems. For it is in late 1985 that the launching of another new Trident ballistic missile submarine will require the dismantling of Poseidon submarines or Minuteman III ICBMs if the US is to stay under the SALT II limits of 1200 MIRVed missile launchers.

We are thus entering an increasingly vicious cycle in which each side's suspicions of the other's intentions and actions make that side less likely to adhere scrupulously to its commitments, in turn further stimulating the other side to reinterpret or disregard its commitments. Our commitment to SDI, for instance, will force us to break, abrogate, or renegotiate the ABM Treaty within a few years. It is not credible to assume that the Soviets will wait passively until we do so, particularly given their own very active ABM program and the role that defense plays in their strategic doctrine. By the same token, there is already strong pressure within and outside the Administration for us to abandon our compliance with SALT I and II on the basis of judgments—based frequently on ambiguous evidence—of Soviet violations.

Are "Existing Agreements" Worth Preserving?

In the light of the Soviet compliance record, and the continued military buildup on both sides which has been permitted under existing agreements, one must ask whether the current arms control regime is in fact worth preserving. The following considerations should guide our answer:

—*The Soviet Union is still observing the majority of its nuclear arms control commitments, although as noted, the trend toward noncompliance with selective constraints is quickening.* These commitments place meaningful, if modest, constraints on the size and capabilities of US and Soviet offensive and defensive nuclear forces: for example, a ban on deployed ABMs save for one site per side; a prohibition on increases in the numbers of ICBM and SLBM launchers, including a requirement that older missile submarines be dismantled as new ones are deployed; a

ceiling on the number of missiles with MIRVs and limits on the number of warheads per missile.

—By certain measures, these constraints have been more onerous for the USSR than the US. In observing SALT I limits, the Soviets have in the last few years been forced to dismantle recent-vintage Yankee missile submarines, whereas the US has only had to retire Polaris submarines that had reached the end of their serviceable life in any case; moreover SALT II limits have prevented the Soviets from putting 20–30 warheads on their heavy SS-18 missiles, or from building any new ICBM silos.

—The Soviet Union could respond more quickly than the US to a lifting of these restraints to expand substantially the number of its missiles and warheads. The Soviets have a more active production base to support deployment of a substantial number of additional MIRVed ICBMs in existing single-warhead ICBM silos, and could quickly test existing types of missiles with greater numbers of warheads, as well as rapidly expand their ABM coverage, as noted above.

—The resultant situation, were the restraints to be lifted, could be more dangerous, less stable, and more costly for both sides.

The arms control regime built up over the past two decades has one key attribute particularly worth preserving—enhanced predictability. The network of commitments, and the extensive communications required to arrive at and sustain such undertakings, have increased both sides' understanding of the other's force structure and future plans. In an earlier era, lacking such understanding, the United States was constantly reacting to unpleasant surprises—the Soviet Union's first atomic weapons test in 1949, five years earlier than expected; the Soviet Union's

first H-bomb test in 1953, only a year after the first such US test; the 1957 launch of Sputnik; the bomber gap of the mid-1950s; and the missile gap of the early 1960s. Our understanding of Soviet strategic programs has improved to the point where militarily important developments are projected years in advance of their actuality. For instance, the mid-1980s' "window of vulnerability" of the US ICBM force was foreseen by the mid-1970s. Although we were not able to "solve" this problem in the interval, we have had time to adjust our thinking and plans to the new situation.

Today, however, as a result of the absence of serious arms control dialogue with the Soviets since the late 1970s, and despite our vast intelligence collection efforts, our understanding of Soviet strategic intentions is again deteriorating. As one example, the Soviets are developing and will soon begin deploying mobile ICBMs. Yet we remain uncertain as to the form of mobility (e.g., rail, road, cross-country) or the numbers envisaged. This is information which should have been the by-product of the START talks. Another example is our lack of any real understanding of how the Soviets plan to deploy their air, ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles. A third example is our current uncertainty as to when the SS-20 program will stop, with total numbers already nearly double our earlier predictions.

The uncertainties we and the Soviets face over each other's space weapons and ballistic missile defense programs are even more extensive. Our knowledge of where the Soviets may be going in these areas is skimpy, and having given them some unpleasant shocks with our recent ASAT and ABM tests, we will, in the absence of serious talks, ourselves encounter comparable surprises sooner or later.

Other Obstacles to Arms Control

Predictability is a necessary prerequisite to stability, for if one has less confidence in the future evolution of the strategic balance, one is less able to judge what steps are necessary to assure stability. While arms control alone cannot provide stability or guarantee security, it can create a more structured context in which both sides can develop force postures with a higher confidence of meeting those criteria.

Yet Americans have constantly asked more of arms control. Since the days of the Baruch Plan⁵ and the open-skies proposal,⁶ American hopes for arms control have been excessive. Beyond helping to establish the parameters of our strategic problems, we have insisted unrealistically that arms control solve them. This Administration has further fed unrealistic expectations for arms control, proposing for instance to abolish an entire class of INF weaponry, to close the window of ICBM vulnerability, and to eliminate the throwweight gap. If we are to make any progress in this area in the coming years, we must bring our objectives, and our rhetoric, into line with the more modest results we can expect to achieve.

But even a more modest set of goals will be difficult to achieve in the environment of the mid-1980s. For a decade arms control has been moving slowly, and finally not at all, while technology has been developing apace. There are three principal areas where the challenge to arms control is becoming particularly acute:

—Technological developments are making it more difficult to define or categorize many new weapons, and hence to limit them effectively. The line between strategic and tactical, between nuclear and conventional, between

offensive and defensive weapons is becoming increasingly blurred. Cruise missiles epitomize this trend: they can carry conventional or nuclear warheads; they can be launched from airplanes and from ground- and sea-based launchers; their range can vary substantially depending on the payload and fuel supply; they are, as a result, suitable for a wide variety of missions ranging from short-range anti-ship to strategic counterforce attack. In addition to cruise missiles, many other systems also fall into the “gray areas” between traditional arms control categories: US dual-capable aircraft deployed in Europe, which the Soviets sought to limit in INF as “forward-based” nuclear systems, but which we insisted could not be constrained because of their conventional mission; the Soviet Backfire bomber, which was developed and deployed for theater missions, but which has inherent intercontinental capability; and the SS-20, which is deployed as an intermediate-range missile, but could be modified to attain intercontinental range.

—*New weapons technologies are becoming increasingly difficult to verify.* The miniaturization, versatility and mobility of new weapons systems makes it difficult, if not impossible, to monitor their numbers, range or armament through “national technical means,” and in some cases, even through intrusive on-site inspection. Cruise missiles, again, are the prime example. While the number of cruise missiles deployed on aircraft can be monitored with some confidence, their tiny size and mobility make them difficult to count when deployed in ground-launched versions, and virtually impossible to count when deployed on surface ships or submarines (where they can fit in any torpedo tube); determining whether they carry a conventional or nuclear warhead is impossible without taking each missile apart. Verification problems just as formidable are emerging in other areas, as both we and the Soviets move toward deployment of mobile ballistic missile systems

which rely on concealment and deception for survivability. While we have been able to monitor SS-20 numbers because of their deployment at centralized bases, the Soviets may be developing a rail-mobile launcher for the SS-X-24 ICBM that will be far more difficult to verify.

—*The growth of third-country nuclear arsenals is making it more difficult to pursue limitations on a strictly bilateral basis.* The Soviets have long sought to obtain compensation for British and French nuclear forces, and this emerged as one of the central issues that blocked the INF talks. By the 1990s, when UK deployment of MIRVed Trident missiles is complete, [*3½ lines not declassified*]. These developments will make it harder for us to insist on strict US-Soviet equality in arms control agreements, despite the validity of our position that UK and French forces fulfill a qualitatively different role from that of US nuclear forces (in particular, they do not provide a “nuclear umbrella” for the non-nuclear states of NATO), and thus cannot be treated as one-for-one equivalents of US forces.

Arguably, many recent developments in strategic weaponry—nuclear SLCMs, mobile ICBMs, new ABMs—can enhance deterrence, reduce the incentive to strike first, and thus reinforce stability. But the growing uncertainties created by the unrestrained introduction of these new technologies, especially in the current political climate, are stimulating new anxieties and suspicions, and thus uncertainty itself is becoming a source of additional tension and potential instability (as well as the cause of increasing public and congressional pressures for arms control results). Yet the problems of verification and definition are such that, even with the best will in the world, with an agreed agenda and sustained high-level commitment, the United States and the Soviet Union would be hard put to come up with sound and verifiable limitations on these weapons.

Restoring the Dialogue

Decisions taken by Washington and Moscow in the early months of 1985 will do more than set the pattern for another four years. Events in 1985 will determine whether the US and the USSR prove able to build upon the legacy of a generation in arms control, or whether we must begin again the slow process of constructing a wholly new structure for communication, mutual accommodation and restraint of defense programs.

The Soviet proposal for negotiations on space weapons offers one potential vehicle for a resumption of the US-Soviet arms control dialogue. We need, of course, not only a vehicle, but some fuel—that is, some substance for the dialogue. We have sent you our proposals for a comprehensive US approach to a Vienna meeting. EUR's recommendation is for a three-year interim agreement on offensive and defensive systems, including:

—a three-year moratorium on all ASAT and ABM testing;

—interim reductions in offensive nuclear delivery vehicles and warheads along the lines of our START framework, perhaps expanded to encompass INF systems; and

—a commitment to open new nuclear arms talks encompassing both offensive and defensive systems, aimed at reaching accord by the end of the three-year interim agreement on deeper reductions and longer-term limits.

PM has recommended a somewhat different package:

—a limited-duration ban on testing of high- and low-altitude interceptors against targets in space;

—a short-duration moratorium on ASAT tests while talks proceed;

—an expression of U.S. willingness to go beyond our current START position along the lines of the earlier START concepts work, and to expand on last fall's INF proposal, with a view toward concluding an early Valdivostok-style understanding on the outlines of a long-term offensive arms agreement; and

—a substantive discussion of future missile defense technologies with the possibility of negotiating specific limits in the longer term, but no immediate constraints on the SDI beyond those already contained in the ABM Treaty.

Unfortunately, it appears unlikely that we will have a Vienna forum for advancing a proposal along either of these lines this year. Indeed, much of next year could also be lost in sterile US-Soviet maneuvering over the modalities of resuming bilateral arms control talks. The President's address to the UNGA in September offers an alternate venue to lay out such a new agenda for US-Soviet arms control;⁷ the interagency work going forward in preparation for Vienna could provide the basis for such a Presidential statement. Alternatively, you might put such a comprehensive proposal privately to Gromyko in September, as the suggested basis for more serious US-Soviet dialogue in the new year.

However the proposal is presented, we should not anticipate a positive Soviet response in the near term. But a set of realistic and attractive US proposals, along the lines cited above, could provide the basis for early resumption of the substantive dialogue in 1985. In particular, agreement on the main outlines of a long-term strategic arms reductions agreement, or negotiation of a

shorter-term interim strategic accord involving more modest reductions, would provide the basis for dealing with the looming question of “interim” compliance before the problem of Soviet non-compliance and the momentum of our own defense buildup bring about the collapse of remaining restraints in the strategic arms field.

Preparing for the Worse

Even as we press for an optimum outcome—a resumption of serious US-Soviet negotiations on the basis of a meaningful and balanced US proposal—we also need to prepare for the situation more likely to obtain in 1985—an absence of meaningful communication on these issues between Moscow and Washington, declining compliance with existing commitments on both sides, accompanied by mounting pressures to abandon them altogether, and a quickening pace of technological and military developments which, while they may arguably reinforce our national security, will certainly generate a heightened sense of insecurity, which will in turn make a rational approach to arms control and defense planning all the more difficult.

In these difficult circumstances we will need to:

- elaborate the best possible case for further extending some or all of the SALT I and SALT II limits;
- deal with compliance issues in a way which does not further diminish Soviet incentives to fulfill their obligations;
- put forward publicly, even if the Soviets will not negotiate privately, a persuasive arms control agenda; and

—review the impact of our own evolving military programs upon the strategic balance.

We will also want to begin presenting a more modest vision of arms control. There will be a strong temptation to do just the opposite: to engage in public competition with the Soviets, each side touting ever more ambitious and unrealistic proposals. But if our rhetoric continues to feed the American public's appetite for arms control, while our accomplishments fail to satisfy it, we will generate an eventually unmanageable counteraction—not against arms control, but against our management of it.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/S, Lot Lot 92D52: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984-1989, August 16-31, 1984. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dobbins and Vershbow on August 17; cleared by J. Gordon (PM/SNP), R. Davis (PM/SNP), R. Dean (PM), and Palmer. An unknown hand wrote in J. Campbell (P) as an additional clearing official. Vershbow initialed for Dobbins. Forwarded though Dam. The memorandum was also slated to be sent through Armacost, but his name is struck through.

² See [Document 260](#).

³ See [footnote 11](#), [Document 159](#).

⁴ Reagan sent a report on Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements to Congress on October 10. See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book II, p. 1493.

⁵ Bernard M. Baruch served as the U.S. representative at the first meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in June 1946, where he presented a proposal to establish international oversight of atomic energy and prevent the unchecked proliferation of nuclear weapons. Of the 12 members of the UNAEC, the Soviet and Polish

representatives abstained and prevented the adoption of the Baruch Plan. For documentation, see [Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. I, General; The United Nations, Documents 395–577](#).

⁶ For an explanation of President Eisenhower's Open Skies proposal, see [Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. XX, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Document 48](#).

⁷ Reagan addressed the UN General Assembly on September 24. See [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 206](#). For the full text, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book II, pp. 1355–1361.

268. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, August 23, 1984, 1402Z

10777. For Under Secretary Armacost and Asst Secretary Burt. Subject: Looking Toward the UNGA—Moscow's Mind-Set.

1. (S—Entire text).

2. Summary: As the Department begins preparations for the Secretary's UNGA bilateral with Gromyko,² it may find useful some sense of the mind-set he will bring to the exchange. We expect he will be self-righteous at best and possibly quite confrontational. The political environment for the meeting will be less than propitious, and nothing in Gromyko's recent performances, or in Soviet policy more generally this year, suggests he will be any more prepared in New York than heretofore to respond constructively to US initiatives. This does not obviate the need for a positive US position nor does it diminish the value of the bilateral itself. It does mean we should not have unrealistic expectations as to what the meeting will accomplish. We should use the exchange to prepare the ground for Soviet policy reviews likely to follow the US Presidential elections. Sending Gromyko back to Moscow with the impression that US policy for the mid-eighties will be vigorous, consistent and constructive regardless of the Soviets' attitude will be far more important in this context than our treatment of specific issues. End summary.

Gromyko—A Confrontational Approach

3. Meetings between US and Soviet Foreign Ministers have taken place under less auspicious signs than the forthcoming UNGA bilateral—but not much. Gromyko has spent the past year honing his anti-administration spiel on interlocutors from Perez de Cuellar to Geoffrey Howe.³ He has lambasted US policy every time he has been given access to a podium. In the wake of KAL first anniversary recriminations, the perceived slights which led him to cancel his UNGA trip last year will be fresh in his mind.⁴ He will sit down with the Secretary within days of the proposed start of the Vienna meeting that didn't happen, a source of embarrassment to the Soviets, and one which will not improve Gromyko's mood. In short, there is no evidence Moscow will have come out of its nearly year-long sulk, and no reason, a month before the US Presidential elections, why it should choose New York to do so. Odds are, therefore, that we can expect Gromyko at his worst both publicly and privately.

Publicly . . .

4. In terms of substance, we doubt he will have anything very dramatic to say in either forum. Having been burned by their June 29 space arms control ploy, any initiatives Gromyko may unveil in his address to the Assembly will probably be confined to areas on which we will have difficulty responding positively. Based on recent Soviet moves, candidates for a public proposal include something on limiting naval forces, a repackaging of one or more elements of Chernenko's March 2 arms control/nuclear norms menu, or the July 29 Soviet Middle East plan. None of these are likely to electrify the audience, and Gromyko may resort to harsh criticism of the administration, a la his performances in Stockholm and Budapest earlier this year,⁵

to mask his unwillingness to come to terms with the big issues.

. . . and in Private

5. We see no reason to expect anything different in private. Gromyko's objective, in the absence of any fresh ideas of his own or desire to respond to our initiatives, will be to keep the Secretary on the defensive by attacking the Administration's record. He will make the most of the August 11 joke.⁶ He will portray our handling of the Soviet space initiative in the worst possible light. He will dwell heavily on the "state terrorism" theme. He will lecture the Secretary that US claims to have regained the strength necessary for serious arms control are belied by the administration's failure to curtail military budgets. He will, in short, seek to make the case that our actions do not correspond to our words, and that the basic thrust of Ronald Reagan's foreign policy is to undermine the Soviet Union and its allies as viable social systems.

Prospects for a Change

6. Nothing we can do at this point is likely to make Gromyko and his colleagues adopt a more constructive approach in New York. That will come—if it comes—after November 6, when the Soviets will no longer be able to argue that conciliatory US statements are an electoral ploy, and especially when they have had a chance to reassess the substance of post-election US policy. Any proposals we make for cosmetic or minor steps in New York are likely to be turned aside as inadequate or cynical; more substantive overtures will simply be pocketed. This does not mean that we should not use the period between now and September

(or even November) to keep the ball in the Soviets' court through prudent initiatives. On the contrary, we should recognize that the Soviets have become prisoners of their own immobility (of which Gromyko is a principal architect) and they need to find their way out of the impasse. We should not expend negotiating capital to overcome their intransigence, but they need to be convinced that it is worth their while to resume real negotiations.

7. The UNGA meeting offers a good opportunity to drive home this message. While Gromyko will not have a negotiating brief, he will be alert to any indications as to the long-term direction of US policies. The impressions he takes back will shape post-election Soviet reviews of East-West policy which are certain to begin once the votes are counted in the US. That being the case, the agenda for the New York meeting will be less important than the general approach the Secretary brings to it.

Some Thoughts on the Agenda

8. As suggested above, Gromyko's aim will be to keep the Secretary on the defensive. He is likely to focus on the administration's arms control record, and particularly our response to Moscow's recent space initiative. We will need to rebut firmly Gromyko's litany of complaints. But we will find little advantage in a "who-struck-John," and should seek as early as possible to move the conversation beyond simple polemics. In addition to whatever we may have on arms control, we will want to raise Sakharov and human rights in general, reiterating our call for an independent verification of his condition and for an end to Bonner's persecution. In view of Moscow's non-response to our proposals for detailed discussions of Southern Africa and the Middle East, it would be inappropriate to press further

for such talks. This need not prevent the Secretary from outlining our views on these and other regional questions, however. In view of recent Soviet/DRA pressure against Pakistan, we should take advantage of the occasion to make clear to Gromyko our solidarity with Islamabad.

9. In the bilateral area, it will not hurt to recognize the small steps taken in recent months, underscoring that such progress reflects the administration's willingness to approach issues of mutual concern in a businesslike fashion when it finds a partner. It would be well in this context to emphasize the importance of a positive response to our proposals on improving North Pacific civil air safety, in unblocking a variety of bilateral matters (Aeroflot, consulates, and possibly the exchange agreement). New York would also be the logical place for new initiatives to expand the bilateral consultative process. We could express our readiness to raise the frequency and level of US-Soviet political contacts during the year ahead. If a concrete proposal were considered desirable, we could indicate a willingness to begin yearly pre-UNGA consultations at the policy level—a move under discussion in 1979 but never implemented.

A Broader Message

10. As already noted, however, more important than the ritual exchange of views we can expect on specific issues will be the overall impression we make on Gromyko. The Secretary's presentation—on specific topics and more generally—should pose for the Kremlin a fairly stark choice: To move toward a more businesslike and satisfactory relationship with the US after November or accept the consequences over the next four years and beyond. At the UNGA, as in our other high-level exchanges

with the Soviets in recent months, our message should be that the US is strong, vigorous in its approach to the problems facing it, and confident of its ability to engage the real issues of the eighties. Gromyko should understand that our approach is not directed a priori against Soviet interests, and that the demise of the USSR is neither our goal nor our expectation. It should be equally clear to him, however, that we will be as consistent as we will be patient, and that we have no intention of begging or bribing Moscow to deal with us on matters which are as much of concern to the Soviets as to ourselves.

Kamman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840010-0077. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² Shultz and Gromyko had a meeting scheduled during the UN General Assembly session in New York in late September.

³ Javier Pérez de Cuéllar was the United Nations Secretary General. Geoffrey Howe was British Foreign Secretary.

⁴ See [footnote 7, Document 260](#).

⁵ For Gromyko's address to the CDE at Stockholm, see [footnote 3, Document 159](#).

⁶ See [Document 263](#).

269. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)1

Washington, September 4, 1984

SUBJECT

Establishing a Private Channel with the Soviets

While it is encouraging that Secretary Shultz has decided that a private channel could be useful, I do not believe that the idea of proposing one to Gromyko (or inviting him to propose one) is the way to proceed if we want one that is effective and which does not give Dobrynin a monopoly over both directions of the messages.

Private channels are useful basically for two reasons:

- (1) They would allow us to work out compromises privately and informally, giving the Soviet leadership the possibility of avoiding accusations that they are compromising on principles; and
- (2) If properly established, they would allow us to communicate directly with elements of the Soviet bureaucracy outside the Foreign Ministry.

When and if the Soviet leadership has decided that they want improved relations, they will desire a private channel, largely for the first reason. But if we put the ball in their court, by working through Gromyko, we can be sure that he will arrange any channel established so that it is maintained under his control, thus depriving us of the second advantage—which could ultimately prove very

useful to us. Also, if we accept Dobrynin as *the* channel, we in effect give him a monopoly over communications in both directions. This is something we should never do again, since (particularly in the absence of frequent high-level direct meetings), we would have absolutely no control over the spin he puts on our messages.

I believe that any effort to establish a private channel should be made directly to the Soviet agency with which we wish to communicate. The obvious target for us is the Central Committee apparatus, which provides the staff support for the General Secretary (and other Central Committee Secretaries such as, for example, Gorbachev).

Such efforts undoubtedly would be reported to Gromyko, and if they come from someone in State, he would have solid bureaucratic ground to turn it off, since it is his formal duty to deal with foreign ministries. An effort by the White House to communicate with the CC Secretariat is different, however. Since it is, roughly, counterpart to counterpart, Gromyko would in effect have to argue that the Secretariat personnel cannot be relied upon to deal with us. This would be more difficult for him to do, and Zagladin's willingness to meet with me in February and to have Menshikov meet me in March shows that it is not out of the question.² (You will recall that Menshikov pointed out that the contact had been approved by the Politburo, including Gromyko, and that Zagladin was authorized to receive messages through Hartman provided they were from me—but *only* under that condition.) I take this as confirmation that the bureaucratic factors mentioned above are in fact operative.

Since we have not followed up on the March meeting, we cannot be sure that the arrangements worked out earlier are still acceptable. However, *if* we have something substantial to say, I believe the route to try initially is the

one used before; if the Soviets reject it, then it will be a signal that they are not ready for a private channel in the full sense. If they are willing, however, such a mode of communication could be very useful to us if (as appears very likely) the Soviets are on the brink of another transition. The CC Secretariat will be in the vortex of any maneuvering; the Foreign Ministry will be very much off on the side.

Testing Soviet willingness to reactivate the channel established earlier would be very simple. With Secretary Shultz's approval, I could ask Hartman by secure telephone to pass a proposal to Zagladin that the two of us meet. If he accepted, it would mean that they are willing to activate the contact.

In sum, I recommend:

1. That Secretary Shultz be dissuaded from mentioning the matter of private channels to Gromyko or anyone in his party, and
2. That I be authorized to proceed as outlined above if we wish to test Soviet willingness to establish a channel.

Before anything is decided or done, it might be useful if I had the opportunity to discuss privately with Secretary Shultz and you some of the tactical considerations in establishing and maintaining a special channel.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (07/27/1984–09/27/1984); NLR-362-3-23-1-0. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw

it. Reagan also wrote in the margin: “This sounds practical.
RR.”

² See [Documents 180](#) and [195](#).

270. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, September 6, 1984

SUBJECT

Ogarkov Removal

The intelligence community is in the throes of trying to reach a judgment on Ogarkov's removal and will presumably have a considered piece available in the morning.² The basic problem in judging the implications of this move is the paucity of information: as if now we literally have nothing more than the brief public announcement. In the meantime, I offer the following very tentative thoughts.

1. The announcement implies that Ogarkov's removal is *not* in connection with a promotion (e.g., to replace Ustinov as Minister of Defense) or a more-or-less lateral transfer (e.g., as CINC Warsaw Pact Forces). In either of these cases, the promotion or transfer is normally announced first, or at least simultaneously with, the announcement of a replacement.
2. These circumstances lead one to suspect that Ogarkov is being demoted. And if that is the case, one must suspect that it is either for policy reasons, or as part of a leadership power struggle.
3. Akhromeyev was Ogarkov's most senior deputy, and therefore was, in bureaucratic terms, the logical successor.³ He has been more active in the past than the

other deputies in speaking with foreign visitors, particularly on arms control matters. However, I am not aware of any information available which would give us a fix on possible policy differences between him and Ogarkov.

4. Although it is intriguing to speculate as to what this might mean for a succession, I see little point in it at this time, since we know too little to do more than imagine conceivable scenarios. The important thing to note is that it *may* be connected in some way with a policy or power struggle. If so, we will have to wait for future events before we can judge what it is about. At a minimum, however, this sudden move, and the cryptic announcement, do reinforce the growing impression that major changes may be afoot in the Soviet leadership.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (08/27/84-08/31/84); NLR-748-25A-25-1-1. Secret. Sent for information. A stamp on the first page reads: "Noted."

² On September 8, Robert Kaiser reported in the *Washington Post*: "One of the most powerful men in the Soviet Union, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, was suddenly, unexpectedly replaced as chief of staff of the Soviet armed forces and first deputy minister of defense." The article continued: "Tass announced that Ogarkov had been removed from his post and replaced by Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, his chief deputy and apparently his intimate colleague. This sequence confirms that Ogarkov's ouster was sudden, and probably a surprise to Ogarkov himself. But why did it happen? Moscow was rife with rumors and theories today, none of them confirmable." (Robert G. Kaiser, "Moscow Mystery: Theories Abound on Cause of

Marshal Ogarkov's Ouster," *Washington Post*, September 8, 1984, p. A17)

For the official Soviet announcement, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVI, No. 36 (October 3, 1984), p. 6. Several telegrams provided analysis of the situation: telegram 11384 from Moscow, September 7; telegram 270143 to Jerusalem, September 12; and telegram 270792 to Bonn, September 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840569-0399, D840579-0534, and N840010-0366, respectively)

³ In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "Ogarkov had been known in military circles for his 'independent of the party' tendencies. At sixty-one, Akhromeyev was the youngest marshal in the Soviet army. He reputedly had extensive arms control experience and major responsibilities for operations in Afghanistan. Art Hartman had met Akhromeyev and described him as candid, affable, and less prone to polemics than other Soviets, with an unusually sophisticated grasp of strategic and arms control issues." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 480-481)

271. Editorial Note

After a series of discussions, President Ronald Reagan, Secretary of State George Shultz, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane decided to invite Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to the White House during the UN General Assembly session in September 1984. During a September 11 press conference, Reagan announced: "I've invited Soviet Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to meet with me at the White House on September 28th, and Mr. Gromyko has accepted. I believe it's important to use the opportunity provided by Mr. Gromyko's presence in the United States to confer on a range of issues of international importance. One of my highest priorities is finding ways to reduce the level of arms and to improve our working relationship with the Soviet Union. I hope that my meeting with him will contribute to this goal, as our administration continues to work for a safer world." Reagan then responded to questions from reporters. (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book II, pages 1268-1271)

In his memoir, Shultz wrote that Gromyko's invitation had been under discussion since August: "During the first part of August, while I was in California, hints came in that Gromyko might be looking for a chance to meet the president. A Soviet diplomat—we thought it was probably the Deputy Chief of Mission Oleg Sokolov—had told Washington correspondent John Scali that he thought Gromyko would like to be invited to meet with the president 'this fall.' Another Soviet diplomat in Berlin told Nelson Ledsky, one of State's German specialists, that a traditional Gromyko trip in Washington during the UN General Assembly depended on whether he would be treated in the same way as he had been 'before

Afghanistan.’ Shortly thereafter, Sokolov passed on to my Gromyko’s ‘heartfelt gratitude’ for my letter marking his seventy-fifth birthday. Sokolov also pointed to my reference to our prospective meeting at the United Nations in New York as an important gesture.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 480) See [Document 265](#).

Reagan, who had been on vacation at his ranch in California since July 28, had a meeting in Los Angeles on August 13 with Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti and Shultz. After this meeting, Shultz recalled: “I sought a little extra private time with the president and told him of these feelers from Gromyko. I reminded the president that Gromyko had not been invited to the White House since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and that ‘we would be reinstating something without a change in Afghanistan.’ But ‘if we could get something going that would be a little more constructive, that would be helpful.’ There was no need for him to decide this right away, I said. ‘But perhaps you’d like to consider whether to invite Gromyko this fall.’ The president said he didn’t need to think about it. ‘It’s the right thing to do. Try to work it out,’ he said.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 480) On August 13, Reagan “lunched with Bud & George S. & we looked at the Soviets from several directions. I approved asking Gromyko to the W.H. if he comes as he usually does to N.Y. for the U.N. General Assembly opening. I have a feeling we’ll get nowhere with arms reductions while they are suspicious of our motives as we are of theirs. I believe we need a meeting to see if we cant make them understand we have no designs on them but think they have designs on us. If we could once clear the air maybe reducing arms wouldn’t look impossible to them.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 372) Following two more discussions with McFarlane and Shultz on August 29 and September 5, Reagan noted:

“George S. & Bud came by. It’s just between us for now but I am going to meet with Gromyko. Sept. 28 is the day.”
(Ibid., page 379)

272. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, September 14, 1984

SUBJECT

The Issue of Arms Control in the President's UN Speech and in His Meeting with Gromyko (U)

(S) What needs to be done now at the UN and with Gromyko is quite different from the issue before us when we responded to the possibility of Vienna talks in September. At this time, we can and should take a broader, longer-term view, seeking to reshape US-Soviet relations on arms control in a more fundamental way.

(S) Given the present turmoil and uncertainty at the top of the Soviet government, and given the proximity of our elections, I believe it would be a mistake to use the forthcoming meeting with Gromyko or the UN speech to present specific, short-term arms proposals to the Soviets. Specific proposals aimed at the next six to twelve months of negotiations can be presented far more effectively *after* the elections.

(S) The theme of the "arms control" part of the President's UN speech (and of his discussion with Gromyko) should be a broad one. We should stress the need to develop a long-term charter for US-Soviet relations in general and for arms control in particular. In other words, we first need a *program* for arms control before we need more arms control *proposals*.

(S) Specifically, the President's speech at the United Nations should present the following themes:

—The United States, the Soviet Union, and other major powers, must make a fresh effort to advance the prospects for peace and disarmament.

—The diplomacy of arms control has focussed a great deal on proposals and counter-proposals for various measures, and on the many differences of the proposed measures, without being able to develop common long-term objectives. To realize the potential promise of genuine arms control, the nations will have to take a long journey together. They must agree on a common road map. The ultimate, and only really important objective is to secure a real and a major *reduction* in arms of all kinds, down to levels of parity, and all agreements must be fully verifiable.

—The United States is ready to meet with the Soviet Union (and with other powers as appropriate) to develop a plan for disarmament and for strengthening the peace that will take us into the next century. This plan should guide us on the steps we must take the first few years, and beyond, and it will show the goals we should reach in five years, in ten years, and at the end of this century. We need to insure that the arms reduction measures we manage to agree on will have a cumulative effect, that they can survive moments of crisis and tension, and that they will truly lead to a safer world. In the last two decades, there were many prolonged arms control negotiations and quite a few agreements. But as we total up this whole effort, we find that progress fell far short of our hopes. None of them really *reduced* arms. Most provided for some attempts to limit the ratio of expansion, but along the lines desired by the Soviets. The necessary consensus on this broad objective was in fact

lacking; and even some other agreements that we signed were violated.

—It is also essential for long-term progress on arms control to agree on a steady reduction in military secrecy. (*Explain* why movement to an “open world” is critical for arms control verification.) To make possible the progressive implementation of a long-term arms control program leading to a safer peace, the US proposes a comprehensive schedule to move towards an “open world.” This should include:

- An agreed calendar for specific reductions in secrecy measures for the next twenty years.
- A commitment to move ahead, far more vigorously than has been the case, with negotiations on military observers and exchange visits.
- An annual exchange of military five-year plans, subject to JCS and DCI review and approval.

—Thus, the arms control program “for the journey towards a safe peace at the beginning of the next century” will have three elements: (1) the series of cumulative arms reduction measures, (2) a schedule to reduce secrecy, and (3) full verifiability of everything agreed on.²

(U) If you feel that these above suggestions would serve the President’s objectives, you might want to task someone to see how they might be phrased as part of the UN speech.

Cap

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, September 1984 #2. Secret; Sensitive. Weinberger wrote “Bud” above McFarlane’s title. In a September 13 covering memorandum to Weinberger, Iklé wrote: “I had a good discussion with Tony Dolan who is quite enthusiastic about using these themes for the President’s UN speech. But he says it would be easier for him to work on it if Bud McFarlane requested him to do so. Hence, the last paragraph in the attached memo.” He continued: “I also discussed these ideas with Jeane Kirkpatrick. While she agrees with the general thrust I proposed, she feels more strongly about the economic aspects of the UN speech. I have talked to Ken Adelman also, and he is more or less moving in the same direction. At the NSPG, now scheduled for Tuesday [September 18] to discuss arms control, he intends to argue *against* making a *specific* proposal now and that we should instead urge general talk on an overall framework for arms control.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-86-0048, USSR 388.3 (Jul-) 1984)

² A September 17 memorandum to McFarlane from Kraemer, Lehman, Linhard, and Matlock noted: “NSC staff generally support the thrust of Weinberger’s recommendation; however, we would need to review the specifics such as the five-year plan exchange proposal. Weinberger’s suggestion is generally compatible with our own ‘Option 1½’ approach.” (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, September 1984 #2) In a September 18 memorandum to Reagan, McFarlane forwarded Weinberger’s memorandum noting: “Cap may well present this proposal at today’s NSPG meeting.” (Ibid.) See [Document 277](#). Reagan initialed McFarlane’s memorandum, indicating he saw it.

273. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, September 14, 1984

SUBJECT

What To Expect From Gromyko

Andrey Gromyko will come to Washington at the peak of his political career and with 45 years of experience in negotiating with the United States. Neither his increasing influence in the Kremlin nor his long exposure to US leaders—he has met every President since Hoover—has mellowed the Soviet Foreign Minister. Westerners who have met with him over the years report that, if anything, he has grown more suspicious of the United States.

[portion marking not declassified]

Gromyko will come as an emissary of the Soviet leadership as a whole and will report fully to his colleagues on his meeting with the President. At the same time, he personally is a principal architect of the tough Soviet line toward Washington and has a stake in proving that it will lead eventually to more moderate US policies. His strong-minded instincts will color his presentation and his perceptions of what the President will tell him. His recommendations upon returning to Moscow will do much to shape the Soviet approach to bilateral relations for months and even a year or so to come. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Operating Style

He does not like small talk and prefers a no-nonsense approach in negotiating situations. He rarely couches his comments in ideological terms or engages in discussions about the relative merits of the Soviet and American political systems. He is a dour, sober-sided person and delivers his remarks without enthusiasm. He is cagey about starting a substantive discussion and likes for his adversary to show his hand first. As in previous conversations with recent US Presidents, Gromyko is likely to be tough—even abrasive—in presenting Soviet positions. He has long been unwilling to make even small concessions in the interest of getting to the heart of an issue or finding common ground. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Soviet Motives for Agreeing to Visit

Gromyko will be intent especially on making a personal assessment of the President and gauging how his personality and convictions affect US policies. He will probe in various ways to estimate the prospects for doing business during his second term. [*portion marking not declassified*]

He may seek to evoke the President's reactions both by delivering a strong presentation of Soviet views and by occasionally hinting at flexibility. He is unlikely to use the meeting with the President, however, either to provoke a further deterioration in relations or to offer a quick deal. [*portion marking not declassified*]

He may expect the President to raise the possibility of a summit. Given Chernenko's health, he is likely to hew to the standard Soviet position that such a meeting must be well prepared and based on some degree of mutual

understanding on fundamental issues. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Bilateral Issues

Gromyko's remarks probably will hone in on bilateral issues, particularly arms control. He will criticize US defense and arms control policies, harping on two major allegations:

—That the United States seeks to upset an existing military balance and achieve superiority through a massive buildup of arms. To support this charge, he will refer to US defense programs for strategic and space systems, reject any notion that the USSR has upset the military balance, and staunchly assert that sufficient Soviet military programs will be undertaken to offset US defense efforts. [*portion marking not declassified*]

—That the United States is not serious about arms control and puts forward proposals deliberately designed to be unacceptable and to camouflage a continued arms buildup. He may charge that the United States is setting preconditions for space talks, holding up ratification of existing nuclear testing treaties, and refusing to resume negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Gromyko probably will devote a substantial portion of his remarks to the issue of space talks. He is likely to argue strongly for a moratorium on the testing of space weapons, claiming that talks would be meaningless if such tests continue. He may reiterate the statement in Chernenko's

early September *Pravda* interview² that progress in the area of space talks could “facilitate” progress on limiting and reducing “other” strategic arms, possibly hinting that US agreement to a moratorium on ASAT testing might lead to a resumption of strategic arms talks. He probably will reject any suggestion, however, that space talks be combined with INF and START talks in a single negotiating forum. In broad terms, Gromyko is likely to argue that US ASAT and ABM testing threatens to undermine the basis of strategic arms agreements and that it will create a new strategic, political, and psychological climate. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Gromyko will maintain that arms control agreements are needed by the United States no less than by the Soviet Union and must be based on the principle of equality and equal security. He may complain that US charges of Soviet SALT violations demonstrate US ill will, and he is certain to claim the USSR is fulfilling all its obligations under past agreements. He is likely to assert that US questions regarding treaty compliance should be addressed confidentially. If pressed on this issue, he will lay out counter-accusations of US violations. In an effort to probe US intentions, he may ask about US willingness to continue to abide by SALT limitations, particularly the ABM Treaty. [*portion marking not declassified*]

He is likely to claim that preventing nuclear war is the cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy and refer to a laundry list of Soviet proposals. In this regard, he may:

—Reiterate the standard Soviet pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and criticize US reluctance to assume a similar obligation.

—Call for a mutual freeze of the nuclear arsenals of both sides.

He also likes to recall the 1946 Soviet proposal to ban nuclear weapons—a proposal he tabled while Ambassador to the United Nations.³ [*portion marking not declassified*]

Regarding Moscow's position on reductions in nuclear arms, Gromyko probably will highlight the Soviet proposal at START that called for a 25 percent reduction of the strategic armaments of both sides. Concerning INF, he probably will contend that US missile deployments in Europe have created a new situation and maintain that negotiations cannot resume while such deployments continue. He may hint that a moratorium on further US deployments in Europe might be sufficient basis for resumed negotiations. In meetings this summer with UK Foreign Secretary Howe and Senator McGovern, he avoided an explicit call for the removal of US missiles already deployed in Europe.⁴ He will continue to insist, however, that British and French missiles be taken into account in any agreement. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Gromyko probably will refuse to discuss the situation of dissident Soviet physicist Andrey Sakharov although he may state that he is alive, well, and working. In May, when Australian Foreign Minister Hayden brought up Sakharov's treatment, he cut off conversation on the subject and said that Moscow would not talk about Sakharov with "anybody." [*portion marking not declassified*]

Public Followup

Gromyko's public comments after the meeting are likely to be reserved or downbeat, designed to defeat any expectation of a breakthrough in relations. Moscow is well aware of the impact of this meeting on the US elections. Gromyko's public comments are likely to be carefully crafted to maintain pressure on the President from domestic constituencies eager to see an easing of US-Soviet tensions and tangible progress toward a renewed arms dialogue. We consider it somewhat less likely that Gromyko will assail the Administration in harshly critical terms in an effort to embarrass the President. Gromyko personally is clearly capable of such a performance, but Moscow's agreement to the meeting and the apparent Soviet assumption that the Kremlin will be dealing with the President for the next four years suggest that Gromyko will adopt a more measured public posture. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Foreign Policy Issues

Although Gromyko will concentrate in substantive discussions on exploring the President's intentions on bilateral issues, he probably also will raise a number of global issues that have been irritants in relations. In addition to Arab-Israeli issues, there are other possible areas of dispute:

—He will reject criticism of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and rule out the possibility of Soviet withdrawal until external assistance to the insurgents is terminated and the Communist regime in Kabul is accepted as legitimate. He may repeat the proposal that a political resolution must be fashioned by the states in the region (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran) with appropriate guarantees of non-interference by

the United States and the USSR. [*portion marking not declassified*]

—On the Iran-Iraq war, he will argue the USSR has regional interests it must protect and might insist on international guarantees of freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf. He will reject any US claim of special interest in the area. [*portion marking not declassified*]

—Moscow has argued consistently that Nicaragua is not an East-West issue, but should Central America come up in the talks, he would condemn US military activity in Central America and the Caribbean and question whether Washington is serious about negotiations with Managua and the Contadora group. [*portion marking not declassified*]

—The Soviets have signaled privately that Southern Africa need not be a cause of Soviet-US conflict, but he may choose to raise the subject, portraying South Africa as the cause of the region's troubles and berating Washington for encouraging Pretoria to take an "aggressive policy" in the area. [*portion marking not declassified*]

He is likely to be most defensive in those areas where he perceives US exploitation of Soviet weakness, particularly the Sino-Soviet dispute. He might attempt to probe US intentions toward Beijing and might warn against providing the Chinese with modern technology and military equipment. [*portion marking not declassified*]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File 1980-1986, Matlock Chron September 1984 (2/5).

Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information on the memorandum.

² For the full text of Chernenko's interview, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 658-661. In telegram 11179 from Moscow, September 4, the Embassy provided an analysis of Chernenko's September 2 comments. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840561-0003) See also Seth Mydans, "Chernenko Statement Urges Talks with U.S. on Disarmament Issues," *New York Times*, September 2, 1984, p. 1.

³ Gromyko served as the Soviet permanent representative to the United Nations from 1946-48. He made the proposal on June 19, 1946, at the second meeting of the UN Atomic Energy Commission. For the text of his address, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 17-24.

⁴ See [footnote 4, Document 259](#).

**274. Memorandum From the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane) to President Reagan¹**

Washington, September 17, 1984

SUBJECT

Organizing for Serious Arms Control Negotiations

For a number of reasons, which will be presented in a separate paper,² I believe we can expect the Soviets to have a high interest in making headway on arms control during the next four years. In order to be able to have a responsive and imaginative process within the US Government, I recommend that you consider two fundamental changes in the way your Administration handles this issue. First, the record of the first term makes clear that there is determined opposition within the Department of Defense (OSD, not JCS) to the very concept of arms control. In my judgment, this opposition will endure unless personnel changes are made. Secondly, this opposition and a traditionally incremental approach to making changes to the US position within State makes it desirable to elevate the management of the bureaucracy to the White House. Right now, the Interdepartmental groups (IGs and SIGs) are managed by the Departments. Unless and until these groups are chaired within the White House, we will continue to face the paralysis we have often faced these past four years. What I am suggesting is that you consider naming a high-level experienced personal representative to manage this process—a man the Soviets would respect and who is knowledgeable on both the technical and political aspects of arms control. There are two or three possible candidates for such a position.

Were you to think this a sensible thing to do, it would be important to discuss it with George Shultz so that there is no appearance of his suffering a diminution of his authority. But the truth is that your predecessors have only been able to make breakthroughs when they have entered the process directly from the White House. If George can be asked to think about this, it could lead to its being his idea and thus minimize the public appearance of his being subordinated in the process. You may wish to think about this prior to your meetings with the Secretary this week. If he comes to agree with the value of such a change, it might be possible to use it in your meeting with Gromyko and, later, to announce this initiative which promises a more visible and active role by the President in the next four years. Such an announcement would show leadership and meet persistent criticisms from the Congress and press of the way the process has been handled these past four years. It would also be seen by Gromyko and the Soviet leadership as indicative that you are indeed serious about arms reductions in the coming years. I would be glad to discuss this at your convenience.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (07/27/1984–09/27/1984); NLR-362-3-22-6-6. Secret; Sensitive. Reagan wrote in the margin: “Let’s talk about this. RR.”

² An interagency paper entitled “Next Steps in Preparing for Vienna,” September 4, is in a package of preparatory material for the September 18 NSPG meeting. (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, September 1984 Chron File #40-42)

275. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 17, 1984

SUBJECT

My Meeting Today With Ambassador Dobrynin

Looking toward our upcoming meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, I called in Ambassador Dobrynin today. I told him you are looking forward to your meeting with Gromyko in order to discuss your views of the US-Soviet relationship and your hopes for the future. I said you would also probably want to discuss arms control issues, particularly those raised in conjunction with the Vienna talks proposal, some regional questions, human rights, and bilateral topics.

Dobrynin reported that following his vacation, Gromyko was also eager to talk with us. He essentially accepted my agenda, but did ask if you really needed to raise human rights. I responded that you did and that you would want to explain to Gromyko why they were important to us. Dobrynin said Gromyko would want to give you his appraisal of the US-Soviet relationship and to address the issues raised in your correspondence with Chernenko.

In discussing plans for my meeting with Gromyko in New York, I told Dobrynin we would want to go through our agenda in some detail, as Gromyko and I had usefully done in Stockholm.² I also told him that we believed their Vienna Talks proposal had held some promise as a way of organizing discussions on the issues involved, and offered some hope of reenergizing our negotiations;³ we should therefore pick up on these discussions again, this time in

private.⁴ Dobrynin replied that they were interested in talking about the demilitarization of outer space and he probed for further indications of our thinking.

We discussed modalities of both meetings. I confirmed that you would meet with Gromyko from 10:00 to 12:00 on Friday⁵ and then host a lunch for him. Dobrynin said that he and First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko would sit in on the meeting (and, of course, lunch). He asked if I was considering a second session with Gromyko before he left, noting that Gromyko would be available Friday afternoon and until late afternoon on Saturday, when he had to leave Washington for return to Moscow. I confirmed I would be available in that period, and we agreed that an additional meeting could be arranged if needed.

Finally, I raised the question of the five Americans detained several days ago on the Siberian coast. I emphasized the men should be released right away so that their detention does not become an irritant in our relationship.⁶ Dobrynin noted that our Embassy had been in telephone contact with the captain of the vessel earlier today,⁷ but he clearly registered my point, saying that he also hoped the issue would be resolved quickly.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (09/01/84); NLR-748-25A-26-3-8. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe and cleared by Palmer according to the forwarding memorandum from Burt to Shultz. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, July-December, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents). Reagan initialed Shultz's memorandum on September 18, indicating he saw it.

² See [Document 159](#).

³ See [Document 233](#).

⁴ For discussion of establishing a private channel, with the goal of bypassing Gromyko and the Foreign Ministry, see [Document 269](#).

⁵ September 28.

⁶ On September 12, a U.S. barge, the *Frieda K*, based in Alaska, accidentally entered Soviet territorial waters and was seized by Soviet forces. On September 14, Kapralov delivered a Soviet oral statement to the Embassy, which noted that on September 12, the Soviets seized the *Frieda K* and its five crew members. After drifting into Soviet territorial waters, the barge was intercepted by a Soviet vessel and escorted into the Bay of Providence. The crew was being housed at a local hotel. An investigation was underway. (Telegram 11751 from Moscow, September 14; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840585-0280) In his memoir, Shultz recalled: the “U.S. embassy in Moscow managed to get a phone call through to the captain of the barge, Tabb Thoms, and heard that all were safe and well. Then the phone ‘inexplicably’ went dead when Thoms was asked whether he had been allowed to contact the embassy. Soviet authorities were handling the manner in a tough and uncooperative manner.” He also recalled telling Dobrynin that “it was ‘ridiculous for an incident of this type to become an issue right now,’ that we should ‘get rid of it—solve it—right away.’ By September 20, I was able to report to the president that the five crewmen of the *Frieda K*. had been safely escorted by the Coast Guard cutter *Sherman* en route home.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 481)

⁷ In telegram 11945 from Moscow, September 18, the Embassy commented on the short conversation with Thoms. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840592-0586)

276. Memorandum From William Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, September 18, 1984

SUBJECT

Possible Gromyko Arms Control Proposal

Gromyko could, during his U.S. visit, put us on the spot by proposing a resumption of INF and START negotiations, if we agree to begin space talks with a concurrent moratorium on ASAT testing and deployment. Chernenko's September 2 *Pravda* remarks strongly hint at this.²

Chernenko was quoted by *Pravda* as stating that an agreement to negotiate on the "arms race" in space with a simultaneous reciprocal moratorium on the testing and deployment of "strike space systems," including ASATs, "would facilitate the solution of questions of limiting and reducing other strategic armaments." He then added: "I would especially like to stress this." This is clearly a significant emphasis. (See Tab A for text.) About a week later Gorbachev in Sofia generally seconded Chernenko's remarks. (See tab B.)³

As you know, both Chernenko and Gorbachev omitted the standard Soviet precondition for resuming START and INF talks: withdrawal of all U.S. INF systems from Europe. In fact, Chernenko blamed breaking off the Geneva talks not on the INF deployments, as had always previously been asserted, but on the U.S. rejection of the principle that both

sides' "equality and identical security are strictly observed." This is clearly a significant shift in position.

The Kremlin probably now despairs of ever reversing the INF deployments and, at the same time, has become gravely concerned about current and future U.S. military space programs. The Soviets are now giving top priority to thwarting current U.S. ASAT programs and the future deployment of our SDI and of nearer-term possible BMD capabilities.

I have no doubt that Moscow sees the pre-election period as the ideal time for pressuring us into making arms control concessions. Recent Soviet public statements clearly reflect the belief that the President is under considerable pre-election pressure to "appear" to be more accommodating in respect to U.S.-Soviet relations in general and specifically to arms control negotiations. It would be remarkable if Gromyko and the rest of the Politburo did not believe this. They also no doubt believe that Mondale would be more forthcoming on arms control issues. His position on a "freeze," for example, would validate this belief. This may well be the reason why Gromyko wants to see Mondale before he sees the President. Despite any protestations to the contrary, it might be difficult for Mondale to oppose the kind of Soviet proposal described at the beginning of this memorandum.

One cannot really know what Gromyko will do here, but I am sure you will agree that it is always prudent to be prepared for all contingencies, and this seems to be a likely one.⁴

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (09/22/84);

NLR-748-25A-26-4-7. Secret. Sent for information.
McFarlane wrote in the margin: “Many thanks. M.”

² See [footnote 2, Document 273](#).

³ Tabs A and B were not attached.

⁴ At the bottom of the page, Lehman wrote: “Bud, These scenarios are among a number of difficult challenges Gromyko may place before us. Even as we look at what we want to say, we must also prepare carefully for what Gromyko may do. Ron Lehman.” Next to Lehman’s note, Matlock wrote: “Bud—Certainly we should think about all contingencies, and if Gromyko should propose something like this, the President should agree to consider it most carefully. It would, however, surprise me greatly if Gromyko made this specific proposal. Jack Matlock.”

277. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 18, 1984, 11 a.m.-noon

SUBJECT

Next Steps in the Vienna Process (C)

PARTICIPANTS

The President

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

Admiral Daniel J. Murphy

STATE:

Secretary George P. Shultz
Under Secretary Kenneth Dam
Dr. Henry Cooper

OSD:

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
Dr. Fred C. Ikle

CIA:

Director William J. Casey
Mr. Robert Gates

USUN:

Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick

JCS:

General P.X. Kelley
Admiral Arthur S. Moreau

ACDA:

Director Kenneth Adelman
Ambassador Edward L. Rowny
Ambassador Paul H. Nitze

WHITE HOUSE:

Mr. Edwin Meese, III
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane

NSC:

Mr. Ronald F. Lehman
Col. Robert E. Linhard

Minutes

Mr. McFarlane: Over the last four months we have worked in developing a position on anti-satellite systems that would be in the US interest and aid stability. On June 29, the Soviets offered to talk to us about the militarization of space. We agreed but reformulated their offer so as not to let the Soviets off the hook on discussing offensive systems. Since that time, the interagency has concluded its work in planning against two contingencies:

—What should be the US position if the Soviets agree to the talks?

—How should we handle the situation if they do not agree to the talks? (C)

Three alternative approaches were developed. Each addresses both anti-satellite capabilities and offensive systems. (S)

The first option suggests that we use a Vienna meeting to simply discuss with the Soviets issues of concern to both sides. (S)

Option two suggests that we use such a meeting to negotiate an incidents-in-space agreement. Such an agreement would provide rules of the road for space operations. Such an agreement would largely depend upon goodwill and be more of a statement of intent to abide by these rules of the road than anything else. (S)

Option two also suggests that we could possibly offer not to test our anti-satellite systems against high-altitude objects if others show similar restraint, and to suspend testing of

the F-15 system after completing some certain number of tests. (S)

With respect to offensive systems, this option would have us encourage the Soviets to return to the negotiating table by signalling our willingness to discuss possible trade-offs, e.g., limits on bombers and cruise missiles. The approach would have us implicitly link negotiations on ASAT limitation or changes to other arms control positions to specific progress in negotiations. (S)

The approach would also make it clear that we are willing to talk about the offensive, defensive force relationship and to discuss how we could both move toward a greater reliance on defensive forces while maintaining stability. (U)

The third option suggests a comprehensive proposal envisioning two phases. In Phase One, we would suggest to the Soviets that we agree to a temporary moratorium on the testing of specific ASAT interceptors and an interim agreement to cap or limit offensive systems. This cap could perhaps include INF forces. This agreement would also involve a commitment to certain objectives for later phases of negotiations. (S)

Phase Two would involve a long-term ban on the testing and deployment of ASAT interceptors. This would require the Soviets to dismantle their existing ASAT systems. It would also involve the negotiating of an incidents-in-space agreement. On the other hand, with respect to offensive forces, we would expect progress toward deep reductions, a discussion of the offensive, defensive force relationship, and in the context of these items, we would consider whether we would accept limits on defensive systems. (S)

Beyond the content of these specific options, we must consider how the Soviets are currently looking at arms control and what the Soviet calculus may be. For example, when will it be in their interest to engage the US across-the-board in this area? It may be that our assessment will argue against any proposals being made right now. To make such proposals may cause us to appear too anxious and may signal to the Soviets that they could coerce us into concessions. The other view that one could hold is that pursuing any initiatives now would demonstrate US leadership and put the Soviets on the defensive. Could we have agency views on this issue? (U)

Secretary Shultz: We should try to move the ball along now. To do so, we need to make reasonably concrete proposals. (S)

First of all, unconstrained military growth by the Soviet Union is not to our advantage. We have more difficulty with the politics of modernization than they do. Reductions are to our advantage. (S)

Secondly, the Soviets' Vienna proposal has some interesting aspects. It provides us the opportunity to change venue from Geneva. It provides a way to rearrange the situation, to permit them to go back to the table at a different place (i.e., saving face). (C)

Third, the idea of holding simultaneous discussion of offensive and defensive systems is good. They are worried about our SDI program. (S)

We should take timely action on this. We should show to the Soviets where they could go with the U.S. at this time. We need to put out enough concreteness to demonstrate to Gromyko that we are interested in serious negotiations. (C)

I think a quick interim agreement would be to our advantage. We could go on from there to a better agreement, and short-term constraints may be a real benefit to us. (S)

With respect to your upcoming UNGA speech, any arms control initiatives offered in such a speech would not be viewed by the Soviets as serious. I feel we should make our points privately and make them directly to Gromyko. (U)

Mr. McFarlane: We are all agreed on that point. (U)

Secretary Weinberger: Now is very inappropriate for any proposal.² (S)

—There is no interagency position on ASAT or defensive systems. (S)

—The Soviets most fear SDI and that will be what they urge us to give up. (S)

—What we limit on an interim basis now could harm us in the future. This applies to a temporary ASAT moratorium as well as an interim agreement on offensive forces. (S)

—We will find it impossible to back away from an interim agreement. (S)

—We're not ready to set the trend which a set of interim agreements establishes. (S)

—We would be binding ourselves at a time when the Soviet leadership is in a state of turmoil. (S)

With Gromyko, Mr. President, I would recommend that you reaffirm your commitment to genuine reductions. Make it

clear you are prepared for general discussion but discussions aimed at framing specific negotiations. Note the advantages and disadvantages of our different force structures, etc., and highlight the benefit of understanding how we both view first principles. (U)

Now is the worst time in the world for a temporary ASAT moratorium interim agreement proposal. It can lead us to preclude SDI development, and interagency agreement is lacking. (S)

We should use the Gromyko meeting to reaffirm U.S. commitment and the need for resumption of START/INF. Beyond this, we should stay flexible. (C)

We could set the stage for more substantive talks later. (C)

Given the total lack of verifiability associated with ASAT options and no real Soviet government, any accord would prematurely bind us to patterns of behavior not in our interest. (S)

General Kelley: I echo the SecDef. We should avoid a premature accord which binds our SDI activity. Our understanding of the relationship between offensive and defensive systems and SDI is vague at best. (S)

Director Adelman: I would recommend Option Two once we are in the negotiations. But the real problem is, how do we get back into negotiations? If the Soviets are serious, we need to find a way. We could have a delegation go to talk about offensive and defensive systems, SDI, START, INF, and ASAT, along the lines of SALT I. (S)

I would avoid concrete proposals *now*. We should only pursue general discussion, because the Soviets will pocket specific proposals. On interim accords—it's a good idea to

seek reductions, but the reductions should not be interim. It's too optimistic to hope for militarily significant reductions any quicker by approaching the project as an interim accord. (S)

With respect to your meeting with Gromyko, we should revisit the idea of on-site inspection of our sites and theirs, and move on a Threshold Test Ban Treaty. (C)

Ambassador Kirkpatrick: No comments. (U)

Director Casey: I agree with Cap and General Kelley. The Soviets want to cut SDI. Bellikov³ is here in the U.S. trying to build Backfire as a counter to SDI. There are two in Geneva who tell that there has been a fivefold increase in science to counter SDI; trying for counter measures by cutting IR plume of ICBMs by 60 percent or by a small nuclear explosion in space; they are worried about optics. (S)

This degree of open discussion is unusual in the amount of detail concerning Soviet plans; it is authorized to create a public backwash. (S)

The Soviets see ASAT as an opening wedge to SDI. We could entangle ourselves on SDI via ASAT. There could be an opportunity if we were able to handle ASAT as a part of discussions of the range of offensive and defensive systems; then ASAT weapons would be only a small portion of *all* weapons. (S)

Option One is an approach which could provide a framework for the future. We should work toward the future. (S)

Secretary Shultz: I agree with most but not all of this. We should use ASAT both as a stalking horse to protect SDI

and as a way to get limits on offensive systems. (S)

The idea of waiting for the interagency group to agree is a non-starter. The IG never agrees. If we wait for it to agree, nothing will go to the President. The IG is not a fourth branch of government. We can't give it a veto power. (U)

The idea of general palaver now and specifics later is unreal. We have been around four years. What have we been doing? (C)

The President: Gromyko's visit may have an effect. I had not anticipated specifics. I have to believe that the USSR (mainly its leaders) has a world aggression program. But, in meetings we have to show an understanding of its concerns: a fear of invasion, a fear of being surrounded. It's the only country in the world with an internal passport. During World War II, no Allied planes were routinely permitted to land in the USSR. Since World War II they approach us with suspicion; they're not getting soft. Maybe we have tried too hard for specifics; we fear world aggression. (S)

Maybe we need a general discussion to clear the air, telling them "here are the reasons why we fear your actions." We are not going to seek advantage, but we will keep our defenses up. The Soviet must be made to have a healthy respect. They must know we will stay even. This being the case, our mutual choices are: We can keep going up and up, or *reduce down* down to a point neither side is a threat. We should avoid an arms race which impoverishes both sides. We should explore in a general way how to get agreement; if there is any *agreement*, then discussions on specifics can follow later. (C)

Secretary Weinberger: It's important that you let them see your desire for reducing but also that we are not going to permit them to maintain an advantage. If we get into specifics, we are likely to preemptively preclude areas where our greatest hopes lie. We could be playing into their hands, limiting what they fear—like Pershing II. (C)

About the IG: My point is not that they decide; my point is they haven't sent you options on this subject so that you can see options and agency positions. (C)

Viewing this meeting as a theater for progress is wrong. (S)

Let him leave knowing that we have strength and will. Then let's discuss reductions. (U)

The President: We need to understand the other actors pushing us to make reductions. We have weakness we must correct soon; they don't. Without us honestly moving on track, Congress will prevent us from doing what's needed. (S)

We can't ignore developing specific proposals. (C)

You are tempting me with the idea of having no IG papers to review. (U)

We need to take care. We are moving toward defense programs that could make certain destabilizing offensive weapons useless. We don't want to be trapped from that path. However, with respect to ASAT—maybe we could make some progress, maybe through some high-level *informal* discussion. (C)

The idea of interim agreement is aimed at carrying us until we can find a way back to more comprehensive agreement. (C)

Secretary Weinberger: The Soviets did cave in the face of U.S. resolve during the Cuban missile crisis. But, of most importance is the simple fact that an interim agreement is not interim; as a first stage, it has total lack of verifiability. They have no public or Congress to deal with. They can engage in “interim” policies that we can’t. They need to see and know your resolve. (S)

The President: During the Cuban missile crisis, we had an eight to one advantage. They said they’d never be in that position again. (U)

Secretary Weinberger: We must recognize that our ASAT program is linked to SDI in many ways. The Soviets are working on defense just as hard as we are. (U)

Ambassador Kirkpatrick: The Russians think we do everything for a purpose. If we don’t say something, it means something. They worry about CW and BW. In your meeting with Gromyko, you must include some reference to CW and BW and to the problem of verifiability. (C)

The President: That is a good point. (U)

Director Casey: The Soviets have two new BW sites. They have 5,000 people at each, working on biological and chemical agents. They put a lot of emphasis on this. (S)

Director Adelman: The Soviets have shown us they are able to shift their positions. For example, in 1979 they argued they would never negotiate on the basis of NATO’s dual-track decision, and reversed themselves. The US should not make their return to START and INF more difficult. (C)

The President: I agree. But when they reversed themselves, we had not yet deployed weapons. (C)

Director Adelman: If there are general discussions in a grand setting, the discussion of the relationship between offensive and defensive systems would be a good springboard back to negotiations on offensive systems. (C)

Richard Pipes notes that the USSR did not move from a small duchy to eleven time zones by being invaded. In 1898 the Czar's General Staff did a study that concluded that 80 percent of the wars fought by Russia were okay since Russia started them. (U)

The President: Genscher told us that they still have left the World War II barbed wire up near Moscow, to show how far Hitler got in World War II. The U.S. is allied with the FRG. The Soviets have great fear of US/FRG capacity. How do you argue with this fear? (S)

Secretary Weinberger: That's what we need to tell the Soviets: make them understand that we understand their fear, yet we still can't let them possess enough force to dominate the world. (U)

Secretary Shultz: But suppose Gromyko says "okay; let's talk. Why not set a date before the end of the year?" Could we take "yes"? (C)

Director Adelman: Yes, the preparatory work is laid out. (U)

Secretary Weinberger: No, we have not figured out a full approach. (C)

Secretary Shultz: Don't need the full approach. We need agreement on the end points. (C)

Mr. McFarlane: Mr. President, you have already reviewed the options for START and INF. (S)

The President: Yes. (U)

Ambassador Nitze: I'm a skeptic on interim agreements. They are all poison. If you want a useful agreement, don't go down the interim agreement path. (S)

The President: Concerning the ASAT thing, all theirs are ground-based. Ours are on a plane. I don't know how limits on either ground-based or airborne ASAT systems interferes with SDI. (C)

Secretary Weinberger: Because you offer a moratorium, they won't move. It puts us on a slippery slope. If we could limit the final agreement to matching our opening position, fine, but we can't. By beginning, we must open the entire area for discussion. (C)

We need to have final limits in mind before entering into negotiation; therefore we must avoid a three-year moratorium or incidents-in-space. (S)

Mr. McFarlane: It is their ability to argue that an ASAT is a system that hits a satellite; but that SDI systems can do so *too*. They are difficult subjects to keep separate. (C)

Secretary Shultz: We're not ready to take "yes." (S)

Secretary Weinberger: No. (C)

Director Casey: I want us to be able to say "yes," but we need to be ready to take on negotiations on *all* areas. We must not negotiate just ASAT and mortgage SDI. We risk being out-traded. If we start in ASAT, they will push into SDI. (S)

Secretary Weinberger: They should go home sincerely convinced of the President's desire for arms reduction. (U)

Mr. McFarlane: Mr. President, I think you have heard it all. (U)

The President: Ed— (U)

Ambassador Rowny: The Soviets are interested in trade. You should make clear we are ready to discuss trade-offs in START. (U)

The President: No matter what happens, no one should consider giving away the horse cavalry. (U)

The meeting adjourned at 12:00 noon. (U)

¹ Source: National Security Council, Institutional Files, NSPG Meetings, Box SR-109, NSPG 96. Secret. There is no drafting information on the minutes. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Although titled a “National Security Council Meeting,” this meeting is listed in numerical order as NSPG Meeting 96 in the NSC and Reagan Library files. In a September 15 memorandum to McFarlane, Kraemer and Linhard forwarded a package of preparatory materials for this NSPG meeting, including the interagency paper detailing Options 1,2,3 and the NSC-formulated Option 1½. (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, September 1984 Chron File #40-42)

² See [Document 272](#).

³ Reference is to Yevgenii Velikhov of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, who was involved in the analysis of SDI and space weapons.

278. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, September 18, 1984

I attended the NSPG meeting with the Secretary today.² The ostensible subject was preparations for Vienna negotiations. The actual subject which surfaced more or less during the meeting from time to time was what the President and the Secretary should say to Gromyko in their upcoming meetings. I found the discussion rather appalling. It was clear that the President wanted to take some steps in his meeting with Gromyko and particularly to hold out some prospect of real movement on our arms control position. But except for the Secretary of State, all of the agencies appeared implacably against anything significant. Only Ken Adelman was prepared to see any movement and very slight at that. Bob Gates from the CIA handed me a note near the end of the meeting saying that the President was out in front of all of his advisers, and that was certainly true, with the exception, of course, of Secretary Shultz. Somehow or the other everyone seems to believe that we can keep the "high ground" without making any concrete moves. It is certainly true that we don't want to make public concessions designed to bring the Soviets back to the table, but at the same time, if we are not prepared to unveil even informally to Gromyko what we would be prepared to do in Vienna negotiations, there aren't going to be any ASAT negotiations nor any START or INF negotiations either. The State Department's approach has generally been to feel that the Vienna forum is a good one, because it would allow us to link offense and defense and involve negotiations on offensive systems with the Soviet Union without forcing the Soviets to admit that they

were coming back to START and INF negotiations. That is a principal advantage of the Vienna forum over a Geneva forum. But everyone seems to be frightened that we might make a mistake, and Cap Weinberger seems so concerned that something might be done which would in some way compromise the strategic defense initiative, that no one else is willing to move. That said, it is of course true that almost anything that we might negotiate in the ASAT area or on defensive systems generally would hold out the possibility that we would in some way restrict the strategic defense initiative. The problem, of course, with that kind of concern, quite aside from what anyone may think about the SDI program, is that we are not going to be able to get funding from the Congress for a strategic defense initiative unless we are shown to be willing to deal with the Soviets on arms control.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984, No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on September 18.

² See [Document 277](#).

279. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, September 19, 1984

The weekly Defense/State/NSC breakfast was held today. Either because the Secretary was having difficulty getting started this morning (which is quite atypical for him) or because he decided not to have substantive discussions with Cap Weinberger this morning in view of the tension in yesterday's NSPG meeting on the Gromyko visit and arms control,² there was almost no substantive discussion. In fact, we didn't get around to the agenda until three-quarters of the hour was gone but rather spent the first three-quarters of the hour on pleasantries and the discussion of mutual friends, such as Frank Carlucci's new job at Sears and so forth.³

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union]

The people in the State Department concerned with arms control met with the Secretary this morning to review where we stand in light of yesterday's NSPG meeting. The Secretary is now convinced that it is unrealistic to expect us to present a great deal on arms control to Gromyko when he is here, because no President is going to be willing to overrule his Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a major issue involving national security just before an election.⁴ Therefore, the tack we are now on is to pull out of previously cleared guidance the most forthcoming positions that the President has taken, such as in the talking points that Shultz never used at the meeting with Gromyko in Stockholm⁵ and the exchange of communications with the Soviets as we were negotiating

about having a Vienna ASAT negotiation, and then using those as a basis for the Presidential talking points and what Shultz will say to Gromyko in New York.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984, No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on September 19 and September 22.

² See [Documents 277](#) and [278](#).

³ Frank Carlucci, who served as Deputy Secretary of Defense from February 4, 1981, until December 31, 1982, joined Sears World Trade as Chairman and CEO in 1983.

⁴ The U.S. presidential election took place on Tuesday, November 6.

⁵ Shultz's talking points titled "New START Framework" were found in his preparation packet for a different meeting, his September 21 meeting with the President. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 18, 1984 Sept. 21 Mtg w/ the Pres)

280. Letter From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Wick) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Dear Bud:

Washington, September 19, 1984

My staff and I have had time to reflect more fully on Professor Tumarkin's remarks on war psychosis in the Soviet Union,² and I am sending a somewhat fuller reply than my brief note of last week.

The Tumarkin essay was particularly informative about ordinary, everyday Soviet citizens who—all our information indicates—do not take an active interest in international politics, do not actively seek out knowledge about it, and are probably the most susceptible to Soviet government propaganda. While we are of course very concerned with this group, it is clear that the opinion of military, party, industrial, cultural, and scientific cadres as well as what we in this country call the “informed public” is more important to the Soviet leadership because these groups are critical to the functioning of the regime.

We can best reach these groups as well as the general Soviet population by strengthening a number of programs already in progress, by pushing for continued innovation and upgrading of the means available to reach the Soviet population, and by refining our message to them. The themes you suggested in your note—our historical restraint in using force, the defensive nature of our military modernization, our good will toward the Russian and other

Soviet peoples—are all themes we invoke constantly and will continue to invoke. We should also draw upon the substantial reservoir of good will that most Soviet citizens hold toward the U.S. as part of shared experiences such as World War II. We should reassert that our extensive net of bilateral contacts with Soviet citizens and institutions, particularly in the U.S. private sector, and our efforts to conclude a comprehensive exchanges agreement are evidence that we have been and are ready to speak to one another. We should emphasize that we stand ready to expand such contacts.

We must continue to upgrade our facilities, especially VOA. We should strive to gain access to more of the people we wish to influence through exchanges, exhibits, and publications, all of which are part of the new exchanges agreement we are currently negotiating with the Soviets. We will continue to expose the cynical manipulation of their own people in which the Soviet leaders engage, and emphasize the open nature of our society where Soviet leaders at the highest levels can gain access to public media while our own Ambassador is prevented from making his traditional July 4 speech on Soviet television.³ Indeed, as our own media are being inundated with Soviet spokesmen, it would be useful to keep pointing out that Americans do not have similar opportunities to reach the Soviet people through their media.

Finally, we must be careful in our programs and products of the sensitivity of the Soviet people. It will serve our interests to explain that we share their fundamental desire for peace and cooperation to reduce international tensions, and that we appreciate the difference between Soviet leaders and the Soviet people.

As you know, we have been engaged in our own research on this subject for some time. We are planning and have under way several activities which bear on this problem as well as that of communicating with the Soviet peoples:

- We are discussing with NASA the possibility of coordinated direct satellite broadcasting with VOA.
- We have initiated discussions with Ford Aerospace about the development of low-cost consumer DBS antennae and other ways to broadcast to Soviet listeners how dishes can be constructed cheaply and easily. We recognize that there are diplomatic and legal problems here, but we are nonetheless proceeding on the technical front. We understand that “home-made” dishes developed by Ford’s space group are being used in India.
- We will be coming out shortly with the latest in our series of analyses of Soviet perceptions which includes information on the issue of war psychosis in the Soviet Union.
- We are keeping a close watch on Soviet media in order to track trends in the propaganda campaigns which encourage war fears.
- We will be in contact with FBIS on the importance of keeping this issue high on their watch list.
- Our media elements will be extensively covering the President’s UNGA speech and his meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko with the goal of conveying to the Soviet people our peaceful intentions. Of course, all of the Agency’s assets, including Worldnet and VOA, will be used to transmit the President’s speech to the world.

- Soviet war psychosis will be discussed at the next IIC meeting, tentatively planned for early October.
- We are reactivating our New Directions Advisory Committee, chaired by Norman Podhoretz, to discuss these issues. In addition to Mr. Podhoretz, this group includes prominent writer and social commentator Michael Novak, the noted historian Gertrude Himmelfarb, former Executive Director of the American Political Science Association Evron Kirkpatrick, and one of the outstanding experts on democratic philosophy Robert Nisbet.
- We are working on USIA's response to the NSDD 130⁴ section on communicating with closed societies, which will explore the political and technical opportunities and obstacles, particularly regarding television, for us to get our message across to the Soviet peoples.

As always, I encourage my staff to examine its work and to seek out new approaches. I can assure you that we will continue to study the challenge the Tumarkin piece raises and consult closely with the NSC and the Department on what to do about it. You will be receiving our analyses and recommendations.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick⁵

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Matlock Files, Chronological File 1980-1986, Matlock Chron, September 1984 (2/5). Secret.

² In an August 24 memorandum to McFarlane, Matlock forwarded an article by Professor Nina Tumarkin entitled “Does the Soviet Union Fear the United States?” Matlock wrote: “Tumarkin, a member of the history department at Harvard who has specialized on Soviet internal propaganda, sent me an article she wrote following a trip to the Soviet Union this summer.” The article examined “the question of Soviet fear of the U.S., and comes to the conclusion that while ordinary citizens fear our military might (as the result of regime propaganda), the Soviet rulers, on the other hand, fear our culture—while respecting our military strength.” McFarlane passed the article to President Reagan who wrote in the margin of the covering memorandum: “Bud—this is very revealing & confirms much of what I’ve been trying to say but didn’t have the knowledge or the words. RR. P.S. Maybe Charlie Wicks outfit should see this.” In a PROFs message to Kimmitt on August 30, McFarlane wrote that after reading Tumarkin’s paper, Reagan wanted to “have VOA (and putatively RFE/RL) focus on making clear our peaceful purposes to the Russian people.” (Ibid.) Matlock prepared a package, including the article, which was forwarded to Wick. (Ibid.)

³ See [footnote 2, Document 207](#).

⁴ Documentation on NSDD 130 “US International Information Policy,” March 6, is planned for publication in [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. XXXIX, Public Diplomacy](#).⁴

⁵ Wick signed “Charlie” above his typed signature.

281. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 21, 1984

SUBJECT

Gromyko Meeting: Setting, Objectives, Tactics

Though, in his UN speech, Gromyko may present a re-mix of typical Soviet propagandistic fare in a fresh wrapping, he is most unlikely to be bringing any significant new proposals with him.² Nevertheless, your meeting will be of great importance as the Soviets sort out how they are going to manage their relations with the United States over the next four years. This will be the first time since you took office that any Soviet leader of Politburo rank has had the opportunity to meet you personally and take your measure. The conclusions Gromyko draws, and the impressions he chooses to convey to his colleagues, will influence their subsequent decisions.

Our Objective

We should aim to have the meeting encourage the following conclusions on Gromyko's part: (1) You are confident of your political position in the United States and feel no need to make concessions to the Soviet Union to shore up your popularity; (2) You recognize that the power of the Soviet Union requires you to deal with it, despite your ideological distaste, and as a pragmatic statesman, you are prepared to do so; (3) You feel that you have made substantial moves to improve the relationship, and do not seem inclined to move further until the Soviets demonstrate a willingness to

engage you in a realistic give-and-take; (4) Your positions are not rigid, and in a negotiating context could be brought sufficiently in line with Soviet needs to permit some agreements; and (5) You would be willing, in fact, to implement any major agreements if the negotiations were successful.

We cannot expect a single meeting, no matter how persuasive, to achieve these objectives, given the heavy burden of resentment and suspicion that beclouds Soviet judgment, and their assumption (a mirror-image of their own habit) that we never state what is really on our minds directly. Nevertheless, the meeting can provide an important stimulus toward the sort of conclusions which can facilitate realistic negotiations in the future.

The Obstacles

Specifically, the most important psychological obstacles on the Soviet part to entering into comprehensive negotiations are: (1) A conviction that we have used negotiations in the past not to reach accommodation, but to keep Congress and the public at bay while you proceed with your defense modernization program—and that this is your intent in the future; (2) The fear that when you are reelected, whatever interest in accommodation you profess now will disappear; and (3) The strong suspicion that your real goal is to bring down the Soviet regime (synonymous in their mind with their personal rule), which is, naturally, a non-negotiable proposition for them.

There are things we can do to diminish these specific obstacles, and the second will disappear after the election if you sustain your current policy, but we must recognize that these psychological obstacles stem from a more

fundamental cause which we must do nothing to alter. While the Soviets talk a lot about the damage done by “rhetoric,” this is not at the root of their problem. What is at the root of it is the alteration in the balance of power which your policies have brought about. The Soviets feel it keenly, do not like it (and cannot be expected to), and are squirming to find a way to cope with it. So far with notable lack of success—and they know that too. In fact, they confront a pair of extremely uncomfortable policy options, both of which have serious dangers from their point of view.

In broad terms, they face the choice between accepting our offer to negotiate an accommodation and reduce arms, and that of hunkering down, tightening up further internally, and trying to limit the accretion of U.S. strength by encouraging public opposition here to key defense programs and instigating allied disaffection. Both courses present large risks for the Soviet leaders.

They know that accommodation with the U.S. would require more restrained behavior abroad, limitations on their use of military power for political purposes, and very likely some loosening at home, which leads to “contamination” by Western values and disaffection. This would be true even if the policy worked and produced limitations on U.S. military programs, better access to Western technology, and more somnolent Western publics as regards the Soviet threat to their security. And if it didn’t work—if the U.S. proved too intransigent to allow any substantial Soviet benefit—then it could be a disaster for them.

On the other hand, the “hunker down” option also has serious dangers for them: the technological race with the U.S. would be in an area where Soviet performance is weakest and their confidence low; increased repression

might not produce the required sacrifice without public unrest and further economic malaise; fearful Western publics might not, in fact, successfully force their Governments to abandon defense programs. In this case, the Soviet Union would end the decade in a more disadvantageous position, and possibly even with strategic military inferiority just at a time when the U.S. would be poised to add effective defensive systems to its offensive strategic arsenal.

Nevertheless, in the Soviet mind, the first option is likely to seem the more risky, because it would require some genuine accommodation on the U.S. part. Many Soviets will argue that the second, bleak as it is, is the safer because it does not depend on partnership with an adversary, and besides, the adversary has never been known to stick to a given policy for very long, so the threat may dissipate of its own accord.

What all the Soviet leaders clearly understand is that *if they accept your overtures to negotiation and enter upon a course of strategic arms reduction, they will have validated your policy of dealing from a position of strength*, and thus contribute not only to the survival of that policy beyond your incumbency, but probably also to a stiffening of the posture of many of our Allies. The Soviets obviously will not want to do this. Our task is to encourage the thought that the price is acceptable, given the long-term dangers of rejecting our offers.

Succession Struggle

On top of this dilemma, the Soviet leadership is beset by weakness at the top, and very likely, a struggle to determine Chernenko's successor. Gromyko himself

doubtless is playing a major role in this drama, though it seems unlikely that he could aspire to the top Party post himself. (He could, however, be named Chief of State if there is a decision not to combine this post with the Party general secretaryship—a practice for which there is plenty of historical precedent.)

We cannot know what role, if any, disputes over policy toward the U.S. play in the succession struggle. Normally, Soviet leadership struggles are not based so much on policy disputes as on a raw jockeying for power. Policy issues are used, however, as weapons in this process, and can be affected by the outcome.

Even if we knew more about infighting in the Soviet leadership, it would be a delusion to think that we could manipulate this process to our advantage. What we can and should do is to see to it that our policy is crystal clear, so that Soviet decisions are not based on misperceptions of it. Your meeting with Gromyko can contribute importantly to this goal.

Getting Your Point Across

Although it will be important to stress your commitment to peace, to arms reduction, and to your other ultimate objectives, Gromyko is likely to receive such statements with great skepticism. A cynic himself and a master at holding his cards pressed to his chest, he will be wary of taking your general statements at face value. What he will be looking for is concrete indications of the direction your policy will take over the next four years, to contribute to an assessment of whether the possible payoffs to the Soviets will justify the risks involved.

Given these circumstances, some might advise using the meeting to advance a bold, new substantive initiative, or highly specific negotiating positions on matters known to be of interest to the Soviets. I think they are wrong. Until the Soviets have made a fundamental decision to negotiate on the major issues—or at least until you have been reelected so that they can no longer suspect that the proposal is a political gesture and a trick—highly specific proposals regarding nuclear weapons, ASAT or missile defense would be untimely.

However, you will need more than general pledges of good will if you are to be convincing. I believe the most effective way to do this is to suggest, as part of your discussion of the issues, how in broad terms you think the problem might be resolved. These suggestions should not be so specific or detailed that they could simply be pocketed, and should be made contingent on a change in the Soviet stance regarding the issue. I will forward to you shortly a list of candidates for this sort of treatment.³

Sizing You Up

An important part of Gromyko's mission will be to size you up as a person. They know very well that you are a strong, charismatic leader of the American people. But they don't know you personally, and this is important to them. Paradoxically—since they are Marxist-Leninists and should theoretically believe that personalities do not play a key role in history—they actually put great stock in the personal characteristics of their interlocutors.

Aside from trying to determine whether you are serious about negotiation, Gromyko also will be forming judgments on such questions as whether you are really in command of

your administration or are subject to manipulation by advisers and whether you are a pragmatic politician capable of making deals and holding to them or an ideological zealot who is out to bring the Soviet system down. They are convinced (however mistakenly) that there are important members of your Administration who fall into the latter category and wonder whether you would be willing and capable of overruling them if the Soviets take the plunge and set their policy on a negotiating track.

These are of course questions which are not amenable to direct discussion—and even if they were, Gromyko would not be persuaded by anything you said about them. What he will be looking for is indirect evidence. He will note how many assistants are in the room, who they are, and what role they play. Do you often turn to them for prompting (on other than detailed, technical issues), or have you mastered your brief? Are you willing to concentrate on practical ways to get from here to where you say you want to go, or are your fine-sounding objectives just a smokescreen for policies designed to put the Soviets at a disadvantage?

Your most powerful ally is, of course, the truth. You need take note of the sort of questions Gromyko may have about you personally only in order to make sure that nothing in the arrangements unwittingly contributes to a false impression.

Gromyko's Tactics

Although Gromyko is famous for his pugnacious approach to negotiation, he is unlikely to come on as strong with you as he would, for example, with a foreign minister. He will defend Soviet policies and attitudes vigorously, and is much given to irony and even sarcasm, but will likely refrain from

the sort of emotional pyrotechnics he used on George Shultz in Madrid after the KAL shoot-down.⁴ Nevertheless, his presentations will be blunt, will be supported by a host of allegations about American “transgressions” and “unreasonableness,” and he is unlikely to give an inch on standard Soviet positions in his initial presentation.

Obviously, you will not want to spend much time in the meeting scoring debating points. But it is important to nail the more egregious of Gromyko’s false statements before turning constructive. This is important for two reasons: you thereby win Gromyko’s respect (despite his dour demeanor, he seems to enjoy a good debate), and—more important than Gromyko’s personal opinion—you place on the record for his colleagues the U.S. point of view. (A detailed report of the conversation will doubtless be passed to the key decision makers on the Politburo, and Soviets consider an unanswered accusation as tacit admission of its accuracy.)

Your rebuttals can be brief, and should match Gromyko’s in tone. If his language is polite and tactful, yours should be the same, though equally firm. If, however, he should become strident and emotional, you should show a little passion.

Only when you have rebutted, briefly and pointedly, important false charges should you turn the conversation to the positive with a remark such as, “But we won’t get anywhere if we keep debating the past; let’s concentrate on where we go from here. Now it seems to me . . .”

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (07/27/1984–09/27/1984); NLR-362-3-22-7-5. Secret; Sensitive. Sent

for information. Prepared by Matlock. A copy was sent to Bush.

² See [footnote 4, Document 287](#).

³ This list was not found.

⁴ See [Documents 104, 105, and 106](#).

282. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 22, 1984

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Gromyko

In the NSPG meeting Tuesday,² you said you intend, in your meeting with Gromyko, to deal with arms control in broad terms, not to advance specific proposals. As I mentioned at the meeting, I very much agree with this approach.

You might wish to use the meeting with Gromyko to propose broad discussions on a framework for specific arms control negotiations, so that we can proceed with an agreed road map.

In line with such an approach, you might find the following talking points useful:

- The time has come for our two countries to agree on a fresh approach to arms control. I trust, we can overcome the present difficulties that are holding up progress.
- We have made clear our serious desire to reach agreement and have shown a great deal of flexibility, but unfortunately your side has walked out of two negotiations.
- In the 1970's, the United States placed great hope in the SALT process. But SALT has failed to stop increases in nuclear arms. As you know, we found it necessary to modernize our strategic defenses to

respond to the increases and new systems in your nuclear expansion.

- In addition, as we explained to your side, we have encountered serious problems regarding the compliance with existing agreements and the arrangements for verification. Arms control can prosper only in a climate that permits effective verification. We can agree, I am sure, that excessive, deliberate concealment practices will make progress in arms control impossible.
- We have to make a new start. We need a broader framework that will give our future negotiations and our specific proposals a sense of direction. We want to move together with you toward a safer peace at much lower levels of armaments. But we cannot take this long journey together unless we are both agreed on where we are going. As the Ancient Greeks said, if you don't know where you are sailing, every wind will take you there.
- Thus, we need to map out a common approach to arms control. What can our two countries do together to reduce the risk of crises and accidents? What can we do together to reduce the danger of nuclear war and begin to eliminate nuclear weapons as we look ahead to the next century? Your side has expressed concern about our research program on ballistic missile defenses. But we are prepared to discuss the role of offensive and defensive nuclear forces and how they will fit into a program leading to reductions and to greater stability. We are concerned, as you know, about your chemical weapons programs and the danger of biological weapons, and have found that this is an area where concealment and secrecy

exacerbates the danger. And how should we both cope with the risks of nuclear proliferation that may well increase over the next twenty years?

- *With these questions in mind, I want to propose that we agree to undertake a fundamental discussion between our two sides, to develop a larger consensus on arms reduction and to chart a course for our negotiators that will permit them constructively to work out specific measures that will reduce arms on both sides to achieve parity at much lower levels, and that will be fully verifiable. We should develop objectives that we want to reach, and a framework for specific issues on which we must follow-up.*

- But the United States cannot accept negotiations with pre-conditions set by your side, any more than you would accept pre-conditions established by us. What we must do is to work together to create agreed objectives and procedures that will make success possible.

Cap

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, USSR: September Meeting President/Gromyko Meeting September 1984 (3). Secret. In a covering memorandum to McFarlane, Matlock wrote: "Secretary Weinberger has sent a memorandum to the President recommending certain talking points for his meeting with Gromyko. I believe the points he proposes are sound and deserve a place in the President's presentation to Gromyko." There is no evidence Matlock's memorandum went forward to the President.

² September 18. See [Document 277](#).

283. Memorandum From the National Intelligence Officer for the Soviet Union (Ermarth) to the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (Gates)¹

NIC #05512-84

Washington, September 25, 1984

SUBJECT

Upbeat View On Gromyko's Mission

1. Ray McGovern, who has been serving as A/NIO/USSR pro tem, has developed the attached interpretation of the Gromyko visit, which is decidedly more optimistic than the mainline of the material we have been sending forward, and my own view. He makes a significant case that Chernenko is leading a contentious effort toward a new opening. As indicated by his remarks at the staff meeting, George Kolt is leaning a bit in this direction.
2. On the totality of evidence, I continue to believe that the best case is as we have made it. There may be an exploratory element in the Gromyko mission, but his main aim is to try to put the Administration on the defensive. The Soviets may still not appreciate how unlikely they are to be really successful at this.
3. Ray's argument has merit, however. Thus I want to send it forward to you. At the same time, I'll stick by the more pessimistic prognosis. Moreover, I still would not absolutely rule out some sort of negative surprise.
4. At this point, it seems fruitless to anticipate Gromyko's performance over the next three days unless we get some truly dramatic reporting about his script. There are doubtless a variety of high-level US-Soviet interactions now

taking place in preparation for the meetings with Gromyko that give the policymakers a better insight into the immediate future than we can. If Gromyko comes in more amiably than we have forecast, the President will have the instincts and time to pick up his cue, I would bet. What I'm afraid of is he'll make some "sneaky", unacceptable proposal which we've failed to warn about.

Fritz W. Ermarth

Attachment

Memorandum Prepared in the National Intelligence Council²

Washington, September 25, 1984

SUBJECT

Further Thoughts on Gromyko Visit

1. The very fact of Gromyko's visit here marks an important tactical turn in the Soviet approach to the US—a turn spearheaded by the ailing Chernenko and supported by what appears to be a fragile consensus that could evaporate with his passing from the scene.
2. We have only an imperfect understanding of how this change came about. The Soviets may indeed have concluded that Mr. Reagan will be President for four more years and are moving now to lay the groundwork for a better working relationship. The political benefit accruing to President Reagan, while presumably undesirable in the Soviet leaders' eyes, may have been played down in their deliberations, with the rationalization that he is going to win anyway—with or without a boost from Moscow.
3. We are not fully persuaded.

—It would seem, for example, totally out of character for the Soviets to believe that they can expect to win concessions from a formidable, committed opponent by doing him a gratuitous favor—in this case a benign visit by Gromyko.

—For the four-more-years argument to prevail in Kremlin councils, the burden of proof would have to be on those arguing that the advantages of trimming sails before the US election (virtually ensuring a Reagan victory) clearly outweigh the merits of hewing to the more obdurate, waiting policy of the past spring and summer.

—The Soviets normally have a price (they don't put much stock in credit cards), and Gromyko presumably has his. And there is still an outside chance that if he does not get satisfaction, the Soviets will try to use Gromyko's talks here to create a political "defeat" for the President.

4. Most of the recent signs point in the opposite direction, however, with Chernenko himself spearheading Moscow's more flexible, conciliatory approach. While he continues to cast aspersions on Washington's motives, his recent statements are a marked departure from the acerbic rhetoric earlier this year.

—On 5 September, shortly after the decision to send Gromyko, Chernenko talked about the need "to infuse Soviet-US relations with the elements of mutual trust that are so missing at present."

—In his Pravda "interview" on 2 September,³ Chernenko for the first time raised the possibility of a connection between progress on arms control in

space and progress on other issues, including INF and START. (Chernenko and his Politburo colleagues have passed up several recent opportunities to reiterate Moscow's standard formulation about INF missile deployment being the obstacle to resumption of talks.)

—Inserted into Chernenko's otherwise uninteresting speech today⁴ is the assertion that "there is no sensible alternative" to the normalization of Soviet-US relations, phraseology remarkably similar to President Reagan's statement yesterday that "there is no sane alternative" to negotiations on arms control and other issues between the US and USSR.⁵ Chernenko went on to make an unusually explicit allusion to the costliness of the arms race. (Radio Moscow, in its initial reaction to the President's speech, took a much more negative line, claiming that he continues to insist on US military superiority.)

5. Turns in policy toward improving relations with the US have historically been highly controversial among Kremlin leaders—and particularly when high-level meetings are involved. The decision to send Gromyko was probably no exception.

—It may, in some Byzantine way, have cost Ogarkov his job.⁶ (Ukrainian leader Shelest lost his in 1972 after he objected to the decision to go ahead with the first Nixon summit just a few weeks after the US started bombing Hanoi and mining Haiphong.)

—The fact that Soviet media have still not mentioned that Gromyko will talk with the President on Friday suggests that the subject remains contentious. Soviet

media also ignored the encounter at the reception on Sunday evening.

—The bizarre way in which the Soviets handled the issue of ASAT talks over recent months also suggests high-level division.

—In a recent conversation with a Western diplomat, a Soviet official indicated that there are differences in Moscow on dialogue with the US, and that the decision to send Gromyko to meet with the President was a particularly difficult one.

—Where Gromyko himself stands in the apparent debate is not clear; most of the reporting has him favoring a hard line.

6. If you think these musings are useful enough to send forward, we could provide a version for the PDB to carry tomorrow morning before Secretary Shultz meets with Gromyko.⁷

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 86M00886R: Subject Files (1984), Box 6, Folder 7: B-257, Hostile Intelligence Threat Analysis Committee. Secret. In a covering note forwarding this memorandum and its attachment to Casey, Jay Rixse wrote: "Bob Gates sent the attached memo up to John [McMahon] as a matter of interest. As it represents a different interpretation of the Gromyko visit, John thought you should see it also." Gates wrote in the margin: "ADCI—FYI. RG."

² Secret.

³ See [footnote 2, Document 273](#).

⁴ Reports from the Embassy in Moscow on Chernenko's remarks are in telegram 12312 from Moscow, September 25, and telegram 12375 from Moscow, September 26. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840609-0847 and D840613-0307)

⁵ See [footnote 7, Document 267](#).

⁶ Soviet Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov was replaced on September 6 by Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev. See [Document 270](#).

⁷ Paragraph 6 is crossed out. Rixse wrote in the margin: "not being done per DDI—JR."

284. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 26, 1984, 9:45 a.m.-12:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US

Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman
Assistant Secretary Richard Burt
Jack F. Matlock
Dimitry Zarechnak, Interpreter

USSR

Foreign Minister Andrey A. Gromyko
First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy M. Korniyenko
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Aleksey A. Obukhov
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

After some preliminary greetings, *Secretary Shultz* began the substantive discussion by proposing to Gromyko to agree on an agenda for the meeting, as they had done in the past. He said that he would like to begin by mentioning the fact that when they had met in New York a few years ago they had tried to identify areas of mutual interest and constructive work.² One such area was the area of non-proliferation. Gromyko had passed on instructions to the Soviet side and the Secretary had passed on instructions to the U.S. side, after which Ambassador Kennedy had met with his Soviet counterparts. The U.S. side had felt that those meetings had proved very useful and the two sides cooperated on this issue in the IAEA.³ The result of this cooperation was a stronger posture within that agency. The Secretary added that in reviewing this issue, it was interesting to observe that fifteen years ago experts in the field said that by now there would be many states with nuclear weapons. But with all the difficulties and problems

we have today, the number of states having such weapons has been well contained. Therefore, this effort was a very worthwhile one, and the Secretary wanted to use it as an example of the fact that the possibility exists for constructive cooperation on substantive matters, which would contribute to results beneficial to both sides and to other nations as well. The Secretary went on to say that this is the spirit in which he was approaching today's talks, and he was sure that the President approached his upcoming meeting with Gromyko in the same spirit.

The Secretary indicated that he had reflected on the meeting with Gromyko in Stockholm, where Gromyko had said, and the Secretary had agreed, that the meeting was a useful one.⁴ The Secretary would now review what had happened since then and where the sides stood. While he could point to some progress, basically the situation between the countries has not changed. However, there have been good exchanges on many questions. A meeting on MBFR is now taking place. We have concluded an agreement to update the Hotline. The two sides are meeting within the CDE context, although, unfortunately, no progress has been made.⁵

The Secretary continued that on the whole there have been a number of meetings in a confidential and private atmosphere, and this has been good. In Washington, leaks sometimes occur, but the U.S. felt that it could keep the situation under control. Gromyko had had a number of meetings with Ambassador Hartman, and the Secretary had met with Ambassador Dobrynin. Last July, before Dobrynin returned to Moscow, the Secretary had an in-depth review of U.S-Soviet relations with him, which the Secretary felt had been very useful.⁶ The two sides could review some questions here with the purpose of normalizing the relationship, that is, have more useful

meetings and more constructive relations. This did not mean that there would be no competition between us, since our systems are different, and would continue to be so. But given that fact, we can channel this competition and find areas of constructive cooperation. The Secretary indicated that he would like to touch upon a few such areas, and then lay out the proposed agenda for the meeting.

The saddest aspect of our relationship was that we have made no progress and there seems to be no prospect of making progress in the area of offensive nuclear arms. This was the most important question.

Secondly, the U.S. had noted the Soviet proposal about demilitarization of outer space, and had tried to reply to this proposal. Nothing has come of this reply, but the U.S. agrees that this is an important area.

The Secretary continued that the U.S. had made proposals concerning conventional forces in Vienna and proposals concerning CBMs and non-use of force in Stockholm. The President, in his speech in Dublin, supported the concept of non-use of force.⁷ Since the Soviet side had spoken of this in Stockholm, he felt that he was responding to comments made by President Chernenko in his correspondence, and the U.S. side was disappointed that this had not brought any results.

On regional issues, there had been brief exchanges in Stockholm, specifically concerning South Africa and the Mideast, but there are no such exchanges taking place today. The U.S. has tried to lay down an appropriate basis for this, and has made corresponding proposals.

On the bilateral side of the relationship, there are a number of areas where progress has been achieved, for example,

upgrading of the Hotline, some consular matters, discussions on the Pacific Ocean boundary.⁸ Although there has been no agreement on the latter, there has been movement. The sides have also discussed search and rescue operations at sea, and naval contacts have been good.

In the economic field, we have extended our long-term agreement and we are moving towards convening a meeting of the Joint Commission, which would be the first such meeting in many years.

We have extended our fisheries agreement, have expanded our joint venture in this area, and the U.S. has given the USSR a specific allocation.⁹

The U.S. has facilitated the sale of grain to the Soviet Union,¹⁰ and the two countries have had discussions on improved safety for north Pacific air routes.¹¹ The sides have extended some agreements in other areas, and have agreed to high-level meetings in some of them. One of these areas is the environmental agreement in which the head of the EPA, Ambassador Ruckelshaus, has met with Soviet counterparts.

Therefore, the Secretary continued, in the bilateral relationship, some steps have been taken, but much still remains to be done.

The Secretary pointed out that the area of human rights was an important one, and that when Gromyko meets with the President, the President will want to talk to him about this, specifically, to explain why this issue is so important to the U.S. In discussing these matters, the U.S. prefers quiet diplomacy. It considers that the issue of the Pentecostals was handled in a constructive way on the Soviet part,

following discussions between Ambassador Dobrynin and the President.¹² This was done privately, without public fanfare. But we now see the very harsh treatment of Sakharov and Bonner and we think that Shcharansky has been placed under a stricter regime.¹³ We do not see any prospects of increase of Jewish emigration, and there seems to be no regard for the constitutional rights of people in the Soviet Union. Any positive steps in this area would be a great help in improving our relations. These matters are questions which Gromyko should examine and perhaps Ambassador Hartman could hand Minister Korniyenko appropriate materials subsequently. Such issues include binational marriages and a number of claims by Soviet citizens to American citizenship.

The Secretary indicated that this was the overall review of relations as the U.S. saw them, and now he would propose the agenda for this meeting.

The first question on the agenda should be the question of arms control, a very important one for the two sides. The second one could be regional issues, where the sides could discuss both substantive matters and procedural questions on arranging meetings. The third item on the agenda could be bilateral relations, to see what could be done to improve them.

Gromyko indicated that the questions which the Secretary had touched upon were questions which were on the Soviet agenda as well. There were, of course, some questions not mentioned by the Secretary which should also be discussed. He would touch upon some of these matters in the present discussion, and would save some for discussing with the President. The question of questions in our relations is the question of where the U.S. and the USSR are to go in their relationship. Will we take the path of

increasing tension and preparation for war, or will we take the path of peace? Competition exists between us, and will continue to exist between the two socioeconomic systems. This cannot be denied.

The Secretary interjected that he agreed with Gromyko that we should move toward peace. The U.S. does not want to increase tension which would lead to war or create a psychology of war.

[Sukhodrev continued to interpret Gromyko's initial remarks]:

Gromyko stated that history will have the final verdict. History is the best judge, better than any other judge, and self-appointed judges do not count. So the sides should talk about where they are to go in their relations.

The Secretary interjected that the President also wished to discuss this issue with Gromyko.

[Sukhodrev continued to interpret *Gromyko's* initial remarks]:

Of course, in the exchange of opinions which we have, we have to evaluate, as time permits, present U.S. policy. This policy has existed now over a number of years.

Gromyko continued that the second question should be nuclear arms. This is also the question of questions. It does not occupy fifth, tenth, or twentieth place in importance. It is a question which occupies first place, and if one of the sides participating in these discussions were to forget this, it would need to be reminded that it has a bad memory. This issue should be discussed between the governments and, of course, for reasons which were obvious, between the leaders of the U.S. and USSR.

The Secretary interjected that he agreed, and that he was sure Gromyko noticed that in his own review of the relationship he had said that matters of nuclear arms should get priority.

[Sukhodrev continued to interpret Gromyko's initial remarks]:

Gromyko repeated that the question of nuclear arms and what to do with them and whether people will control them or they will control people, and whether people will control them in such a way that we would subsequently not find ourselves in a situation where we would not even be able to determine who was at fault, was a question which should be on the agenda as one of the first ones, or even the very first one. This was a very basic question. But Gromyko did not want the Secretary to think that the Soviet side wanted to continue negotiations or to begin negotiations about some variations of what had already been discussed sufficiently in fora such as Geneva. No. The principal question was how our leaders should approach the question of dealing with nuclear arms. There was a genius who lived in the United States, Einstein, who said a very intelligent thing. He said that after the creation of nuclear weapons, man changed, he was no longer the same, and he needed to find solutions to problems which would bring about a situation in which such weapons would no longer exist. Today, science has given us an even clearer answer to what nuclear war would mean and what would happen if mankind does not find solutions to these questions which concern his very existence.

The Secretary interjected and asked if Gromyko was proposing that in the end there should be total elimination of nuclear weapons. *Gromyko* replied that this was indeed the ideal solution. *The Secretary* remarked that he hoped

that Gromyko would clearly indicate this to the President. *Gromyko* replied that he would do his best. *The Secretary* said that Gromyko would be interested in the President's views on this, which the President had voiced in Tokyo, in Dublin, and elsewhere, that his dream was the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. The Secretary said that if Gromyko considered this to be the key question of principle, and that today we need negotiations to show how we can get there, then the President would be very responsive. *Gromyko* said that he would remind the President of this, and that since the Secretary had now interjected this thought, he had to say that there were different paths to achieving this end. The American approach was to amass nuclear weapons, which was not compatible with such an aim. The Soviet approach, on the other hand, was to reduce these weapons, with a view to finally eliminating them. These were different approaches.

[Sukhodrev continued to interpret *Gromyko's* initial remarks]:

This question should be on our agenda. If we have closed our eyes to this, then we should ask someone from the outside, and they would say that we cannot close our eyes to this. Of course, many other questions exist. All of the questions mentioned by the Secretary were on the Soviet agenda as well.

At this point in his initial remarks, Gromyko indicated that he should let Sukhodrev interpret, and *the Secretary* joked that he felt bad that he would not be able to correlate Sukhodrev's words with the facial expressions of Gromyko that he had been observing.

Gromyko continued that in examining specific questions of Soviet-American relations, it does not hurt to talk about

such matters of principle, and how we are to proceed in our relations. The present U.S. administration has rolled up its sleeves and is working yearly, monthly, daily to bury, tear apart and overturn all the good that has been so far in Soviet-American relations. The result is that relations are at their lowest point since they were normalized in 1933.¹⁴ This is what the U.S. side has brought about. That is why the Soviet side wants the U.S. to clarify the question of where we are to go in our relations. Should we bury them even farther, or does the U.S. side think that we should seek better and more constructive relations? The Soviet side does not see very much of the latter desire.

Gromyko indicated that he had already said that there should be an exchange of views about the questions which the Secretary had mentioned. But before getting a clearer idea of what we should talk about, Gromyko wished to indicate what he did not plan to talk about. *The Secretary* interjected that he did not think that needed to be translated. *Gromyko*, continuing, said that the Secretary would not be surprised that Gromyko was not planning to talk about Sakharov, Shcharanskiy and other questions of the same nature which the U.S. side perhaps had in reserve. The Secretary was familiar with Gromyko's views on these points from the Madrid meeting and other meetings. Gromyko said that the Secretary wished to discuss questions of human rights without taking into account differences between social systems, and by naming names of individuals. The question of human rights was a very broad one, and the Soviet side was not afraid to discuss it. It could discuss how human rights are not respected in the U.S. But, frankly, there were more important questions to discuss, such as those which Gromyko had mentioned, and others as well. So there was no need, even in principle, to discuss this matter, and,

anyway, the time was limited. The question of weapons in outer space was an important one.

The Secretary said that before leaving the subject of human rights, he wanted to ask Gromyko to listen to the President when he explains why this question is so important to the U.S. and has such an impact on our relations. Just now Gromyko had talked about how our relations were to proceed, and this issue has a bearing on that, as do Soviet arms increases and Soviet behavior in general. The Secretary indicated that the President would speak of these issues, and the Secretary was sure that Gromyko would listen.

Gromyko said that he would, of course, listen. He then went over the items proposed by the Secretary for the agenda, i.e., space weapons, the Middle East, South Africa, and nonproliferation. He agreed with these items, but thought that they could be discussed in a different order. He also agreed to include bilateral economic relations.

Gromyko also indicated that he wished to touch upon other subjects, i.e., the Far East, the Caribbean and, if time permits, terrorism—certain aspects of that problem. In addition, the sides should also discuss the conferences now taking place in Stockholm and Vienna, as well as the present situation in Europe. Then the sides would see how they should proceed after that. Obviously, the sides would not be able to cover all these matters in the detail that they should.

The Secretary indicated that the list Gromyko had proposed was a good one and compatible with the U.S. list. He felt that it would be best to group the questions in the categories he had mentioned, i.e., arms control, regional issues and bilateral questions.

Gromyko thought that the sides should not take a bureaucratic approach, but rather a political one. The sides probably would not be able to cover all aspects of all the questions.

The Secretary agreed and thought that he and *Gromyko* should go through the basic aspects, and the fact that there would be no time to go into as much detail as they would like meant that the sides should look at procedures for discussing this in greater detail than such meetings during the UN General Assembly permit. He believed that *Gromyko* had referred to talks on the political level rather than the technical level. Should the sides now begin talking about space weapons?

Gromyko said he wished to return to the first question which he had raised, i.e., where is the United States heading? The Soviet side feels that the U.S. is doing everything to prepare for war. It has a program for manufacturing nuclear weapons, and various doctrines for using nuclear weapons. It has refused to take upon itself the obligation of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. It has not agreed to Soviet proposals which would establish parity between the U.S. and USSR in nuclear weapons and in the military strategic area. What should the USSR then think of U.S. policy? The USSR has thoroughly analyzed the statements of policy which the U.S. President and others have announced, as well as the practical steps which the U.S. has taken in international fora with regard to the Soviet Union and other countries. This was not the first time that the Soviet side had made these observations. This had been mentioned by Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko, so the U.S. was familiar with Soviet views. But since the U.S. was continuing these policies, the Soviet side had to again call its attention to this, and the Soviet leadership had to make the appropriate conclusions

regarding U.S. policy. Soviet policy was made in reply to U.S. policy. If the U.S. were to change its policies with regard to the Soviet Union, the USSR would, of course, change its policy as well, including its policy on nuclear arms. The USSR has clearly indicated this, and Gromyko was saying it today, and indicated that he would repeat it to the President in Washington. The Soviet side would be prepared to listen to U.S. comments about this if the U.S. was ready to make them.

The Secretary said he thought Gromyko had presented a gross misreading of U.S. intentions. The U.S. is not a warlike country. In no way is the U.S. preparing for a major war. The United States is fully aware of the possible horrors and the catastrophe of a nuclear exchange. So Gromyko's notion that the U.S. is preparing for a war is not correct. Gromyko had spoken of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, and the U.S. has indicated that it does believe in no-first-use of force. With regard to the U.S. posture in NATO, the U.S. believes in having a flexible potential response to the Soviet Union, but NATO has never had an aggressive posture. It is only a defensive alliance. The U.S. does not reject proposals if they lead to a decrease in arms. Historically, the U.S. has always proposed to decrease arms, and this is especially true for the Reagan administration. There is no area of arms (nuclear, conventional, chemical, CBMs, etc.) where the U.S. has not wanted discussions. We are looking for results.

The Secretary continued that the U.S. looks for ways to reduce arms which would leave deterrence intact, but it has no warlike intentions or hostility toward the Soviet Union or other countries. He hoped that Gromyko would raise this question with the President, because the President is likely to point out how the U.S. views the Soviet Union.

The Secretary noted that the U.S. sees a great arms increase in the Soviet Union, and is taking steps in response to this. The U.S. sees very aggressive behavior in various areas of the world by the Soviet Union, and this makes us say to ourselves that the Soviet Union is increasing its arms in order to use them. So the Soviet concern about the U.S. (which the U.S. feels is unjustified) is mirrored in U.S. views of Soviet intentions.

The Secretary indicated that Gromyko had said that the question of where Soviet-American relations were going was one of first priority, and the Secretary agreed with this. If this was Gromyko's view, he should invest some time in discussing it with the President. The U.S. does not have any aggressive intentions, but does intend to protect its interests and values. We do not intend to get into a situation which would endanger those values.

Gromyko asked how the USSR should view U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons first, which the U.S. sometimes says with regard to Europe, sometimes not, in response to a mythical aggression by Warsaw Pact countries. The U.S. knows that the Warsaw Pact is not planning any aggression, and will not carry out any aggression, either against NATO or against the U.S. Such concepts are purely theoretical exercises on NATO's part.

Gromyko said that the U.S. was aware of the actions that Hitler's Germany took on the eve of the Second World War to create the impression that military activity was being carried out against it. The present situation should not be equated, of course, with that one. But the USSR has noticed that the NATO countries, especially the U.S. administration, allow for the possible first use of nuclear weapons. And this is the basis for U.S. policy with regard to various proposals made by the Soviet Union and the

Warsaw Pact countries. This was the first thing that Gromyko wished to say. The second was that for some reason the U.S. and the others who talked of this matter have glided over the indisputable fact that even without the additional U.S. arms in Europe, the NATO countries already had one and a half times more nuclear weapons there.

Gromyko continued that the Soviet Union has spoken of approximate parity. The word “approximate” was not used accidentally, since there was no real equality—NATO had superiority. Of course, the Soviet Union was counting the nuclear weapons of all the NATO countries, as well as all the delivery vehicles, including aircraft. But the U.S. keeps saying over and over again that the USSR poses a great threat with its buildup of weapons. Even today the West has superiority, although the Soviet Union still speaks of approximate equality. This is done in order to lay a better foundation for a possible agreement, but strictly speaking, the Soviet side could propose to first eliminate such superiority, and then to negotiate about subsequent reductions.

Gromyko indicated that he had noted the Secretary’s words that the U.S. has no bad intentions with regard to the Soviet Union. However, there is a difference between words and actions, and U.S. actions say that it is preparing for war. If the U.S. could objectively look at the situation through Soviet eyes, it would see things in the same light, but this is difficult to do.

Gromyko noted that if the sides were to discuss this question in detail today, there would be no time for other questions, so he proposed to switch to the question of space weapons, and then see how to proceed from there.

The Secretary replied that before doing that, he would like to respond to what Gromyko had said. He wished to repeat again that the U.S. has no warlike intentions regarding the Soviet Union. Competition between our countries and our systems will continue. We think our system is better and you think your system is better. History will judge. But this is different from the development and use of weapons. The U.S. has no aggressive intentions regarding the Soviet Union in that area.

The Secretary pointed out that the number of nuclear weapons in Western Europe has been diminishing. He could not give the exact decrease in weapons over the past five years; Rick Burt could, but he would stress only that there was a program for further decreases.

The Secretary said that the Soviet Union had first spoken of rough equality under Brezhnev, and since that time a great number of SS-20s had been deployed, whereas the number of weapons in the West had been decreased, so such a statement is not logical. But what is needed is a reduction of forces to agreed levels, and not arguments concerning previous levels of forces. For example, the MBFR negotiations have been going on for so long that not only have people made careers in MBFR, but their children and grandchildren were beginning to do the same. There have been difficulties about data, and so forth. The U.S. feeling is that it is time to come to grips with the problem and to reduce forces to agreed levels. At this point the Secretary proposed that the question of space weapons be discussed, and Gromyko agreed.

The Secretary stated that, recognizing the importance of Gromyko's point that discussions of particular items should take place within a general framework of relations, we

should aim for establishing broad discussions of issues at the highest political levels.

Gromyko said that he would touch on this question in Washington, of course, and that this would be one of the main questions.

He went on to say that he had listened carefully to what the Secretary had said, but wished to stress that it was not words that the Soviet Union feared so much as U.S. actions in Europe and in other areas. There did not exist an area where U.S. actions were not directed against the Soviet Union. It was the Soviet Union's opinion that even when it was clear to the U.S. that the Soviet Union was not involved in something, this was boring and the U.S. looked to find Soviet involvement even if there was none. So all U.S. activity is focused against the USSR.

The Secretary interjected that this was an exaggeration, but that the U.S. did see evidence of Soviet aggression in many places around the world. The U.S. did see the Soviet Union as the other superpower, and treated it as such.

[Sukhodrev continued to interpret Gromyko's previous remarks]:

Gromyko said that such an attitude was one of the things that explained the U.S. military buildup. The U.S. was determined to be the dominant force in both the military and political sphere worldwide. Gromyko said that he did not know how to express how appalled the Soviet Union was when it heard certain people (without naming names) say that any means were justified if they were aimed at extending the American model of society and way of life throughout the world. And in the military area, the U.S. always said that it wanted to be number one, whereas the

Soviet Union felt that there should be equality between it and the U.S. For this reason it supported the principle of equality and equal security. Such a principle should apply both in the military area with regard to nuclear and conventional arms, and in the political area as well. There should be no interference in the internal affairs of other nations, and there should be no policy which states that everything is permitted in order to impose the American model of life on others.

The Secretary said that he wished to dwell on the word “impose”. There were no examples of the United States imposing its system on others. There is competition between our systems, as the sides have agreed. This is legitimate and will continue. But it should not be by military means. This is different from imposition. There is no history of imposition by the United States.

Gromyko asked whether what was going on in Nicaragua was peaceful competition. The U.S. was indirectly and officially saying that Nicaragua had to have the same social structure as the United States. He could give other examples, but then the sides would never get to the other questions. But what he had said is part of the question about whose acts constitute a source of danger.

The Secretary indicated that he wished to say a few things about Nicaragua, but he agreed that the sides might not get to the other questions. The U.S. viewed Nicaragua as a country which for years has been engaged in aggressive acts with respect to its neighbors, specifically El Salvador. The U.S. has seen military supplies shipped from Nicaragua and its allies directly or through Cuba. The U.S. has seen these arms used by guerrillas in El Salvador to blow up bridges and plants—in a country that is waging a heroic struggle for its political and economic development. Thus,

Nicaragua by so building up its arms, has an extraordinary level of them for a Central American nation, and has become a threat to the region. He wanted to reaffirm that the emergence of jet fighters in Nicaragua simply would not be acceptable to the United States.

Gromyko said that the U.S. could not really believe that the arms in Nicaragua were a threat to the region and to the U.S. Nicaragua could not pose a danger for anyone. It is a small country. The U.S. could not say it was a danger to its neighbors. The U.S. was demanding that Nicaragua change its internal structure, and Nicaragua is not the first country to which the U.S. has said this. But perhaps he and the Secretary could get to this item later in the agenda. Now it would be better to talk about space weapons.

The Secretary responded that he did not want his failure to respond to what Gromyko had said to be taken as agreement, but he thought it would be good to proceed to the topic of space weapons.

Gromyko noted that the Soviet government thought that the U.S. was making a big mistake in aiming to put nuclear weapons in space. The Soviet Union thought that space should be free of weapons, nuclear or otherwise. For many years, the U.S. had also thought this along with the Soviet Union. Statements to this effect were made in the United Nations. But now the U.S. has drastically changed its position and wishes to militarize space, so the arms race will be extended to space. If this happens, the chance of nuclear war will increase manifold. Within the U.S. administration, and not only there, you are engaged in elaboration and building-up of a large-scale ABM system. This would in fact lead to the militarizing of outer space. It is a serious step directed against the Soviet Union and its allies, as well as a serious step against peace. It is a step

that increases the threat of nuclear war. The Soviet Union would like to believe that the U.S. administration will think seriously about this and will change its mind and agree to keep weapons out of space.

Gromyko continued that the Soviet Union had made specific proposals to meet in Vienna to discuss the prevention of the militarization of space. When the USSR made these proposals, it had certain doubts, since it was aware of U.S. plans, which the U.S. had made no secret of for some time. But the Soviet Union hoped that the voice of reason would prevail and that the U.S. would agree to discuss the issue. Unfortunately, the U.S. administration gave a negative reply to the Soviet proposal. The situation is made no different by the fact that for public consumption the U.S. says that it has accepted the Soviet proposal. In reality, it has refused it. The U.S. says that it is ready to negotiate, but it links this issue with other questions about nuclear arms, such as those which were discussed in Geneva, concerning strategic arms, medium-range nuclear arms, etc. What is this? The Soviet Union wishes to talk about how to prevent the placement of nuclear arms in space, and not about how to militarize space. It very much regrets the U.S. response. What the U.S. is saying is for the consumption of the public which does not understand the issues. The U.S. says that it hopes the Soviet Union will change its position by the end of the year and agree to the U.S. approach. Obviously, there is no chance of this. The USSR cannot change its position on the prevention of the militarization of space. Our position will be the same in September, October, November and December. The Soviet Union believes that it is in the mutual interest of the two countries to free space of nuclear strike weapons. Gromyko indicated that he wished to say this so that the Secretary and the President would clearly understand it before the meeting in Washington.

Expanding on the same question, Gromyko said that it was enough to look only at the economic aspect of the matter. It would cost an enormous amount of money to create a large-scale ABM system. Has the U.S. considered that it would be merely increasing tensions and throwing away hundreds of billions of dollars? If the U.S. did not change its approach, the USSR would have to take it into account as it does in other areas, and do everything necessary to provide for its security and the security of its allies. But this would not be done by Soviet choice. It would be caused by U.S. actions. So the Soviet Union hopes that a lot of thought will be given to this in Washington and that this path will not be taken.

Gromyko stressed that the Soviet Union is very much in favor of an agreement on space weapons, and such an agreement might open the way for better relations and for agreements in other areas as well.

The Secretary noted that the difficulty of saying that we do not want the militarization of space was that space was already militarized, since ballistic missiles fly through space and since both sides have and will continue to have satellites in space for surveillance purposes. Moreover, the USSR has already tested and deployed an ASAT system. Therefore, space has already been militarized, and the question is one of finding ways of not increasing this militarization and coping with the already existing militarization.

With regard to what Gromyko had spoken of first, the Secretary wished to say that he did not know where Gromyko had gotten his information. Perhaps he had better knowledge of U.S. plans than the U.S. did. The U.S. has no plans to deploy nuclear weapons in space. The U.S. has a research program, but as far as it knows, is behind the

Soviet Union. The Soviet Union already has a system in place, and the U.S. does not. As an old engineering and construction specialist, the Secretary was impressed by how the Soviet Union learned by doing, and considered that the U.S. should do the same. It would be foolhardy for the U.S. not to do anything in the ABM area when the USSR already has such a system. The U.S. has no desire to spend resources on this that could be used for other things. But as he had already said, the U.S. would not let itself get into a situation where it was not able to defend its interests and values.

The Secretary continued that the U.S. was very disappointed in the results of the exchanges concerning the Soviet proposal about negotiations in Vienna. The U.S. had felt that it had replied favorably to that proposal, and was prepared to go to Vienna or some other place to discuss questions of the militarization of space without any preconditions. The President had spoken of this in his speech at the UN and will speak of this in Washington. It is an important question and has many ramifications. Difficulties exist from the point of view of verification. There are many questions which need to be explored. But it has been difficult to engage the Soviet Union on this. In any case, the sides should not go into this without a clear recognition that space is already being used for military purposes.

The Secretary repeated that the U.S. has no plans for putting nuclear weapons other than ballistic missiles into space. As he had indicated, the U.S. feels that offensive weapons are the principal threat to the future of the world, and that the sides should deal with them.

The Secretary noted that whether we were discussing space weapons or other issues, it would be good to have a

forum for such discussions, and the U.S. had made some procedural suggestions on how this could be done. We thought the Soviets' Vienna proposal provided a good way to proceed, but we were open to Soviet proposals. So if the Soviet Union was ready for talks on this, the U.S. was also ready.

Gromyko stated that he had described the Soviet position, and there was nothing he could add. If the U.S. would spread information to the effect that the Soviet Union is ready to come to such negotiations by the end of the year, the Soviet Union would have to deny it, and would indicate that the U.S. administration had given a false impression.

The Secretary interjected that he had not said such things. He had indicated that he spoke for the United States, and he had indicated that the Soviet Union would indicate what it would do. He had not predicted what the Soviet position would be, so the Soviet Union should listen to what he and the President were saying. *Gromyko* replied that he had referred to what others had said about the matter.

[Sukhodrev continued to interpret *Gromyko's* preceding remarks]:

Gromyko noted that the Secretary's statement about the fact that space was already militarized was a recent thing, although ballistic missiles have existed for many years. The U.S. has to make up arguments, since it has no real ones. The argument about the fact that space is militarized because ballistic missiles travel through space is sophistry, and the U.S. knows it. The USSR could logically show that such statements are absurd. Arguing along such lines, it could be said that before going into space, missiles must be deployed on earth, and that before they are deployed they must be manufactured, and that before they are

manufactured, the equipment and plants which produce them must be built, and so forth. That would bring you to the point that, in order to prevent the militarization of space, you would need to destroy all the links on earth. It is absurd to say that space is already militarized. The U.S. knows that this is not so. This is a very serious issue. If space becomes militarized, the situation will become much more dangerous. Americans, Soviets and people throughout the world will feel much less comfortable, since a nuclear sword will be hanging over their heads. So the Soviet Union hopes that the U.S. administration will give this question very serious thought.

Since time was running out, Gromyko wanted to take five minutes to “headline” some issues:

Non-proliferation. Gromyko indicated that an agreement on this had been in force for many years. The Soviet Union was in favor of implementing the non-proliferation treaty, and against an increase in the number of nuclear states. *The Secretary* replied that the U.S. agreed with this and that bilateral cooperation and consultations should continue. *Gromyko* agreed and Korniyenko noted that the next such consultations were scheduled for December. Gromyko agreed they should be held in December or brought forward.

CDE. Gromyko noted that work could proceed in a constructive fashion only if there was movement on Warsaw Pact proposals and not just those raised by the West. If there was no movement on Warsaw Pact proposals, then, frankly speaking, it would be a deadlock. There could not be a program of legalized espionage. *The Secretary* replied that the U.S. was ready for constructive results in Stockholm, and that the President felt that he was replying directly to Chernenko in his letter when he proposed non-

use of force, looking to combine that with Western CBM proposals. The agreement to have U.S. and USSR representatives meet in Stockholm had formed a good basis for contacts, and the U.S. is urging the Soviet Union to use it to achieve satisfactory results.

Middle East. Gromyko stated that the Soviet Union wishes only for peace. It is protecting the Arab position since it considers it to be a just one. However, the Soviet Union supports the existence of an independent Israel, and Gromyko had confirmed this to Foreign Minister Shamir in his meeting with him. Why should there not be an international conference on this issue? The U.S. has not been enthusiastic about this, but such a conference would not hurt the U.S. or Israel, since it could not force them to do anything which was not acceptable to them. Decisions could be reached only by agreement of all countries involved. Perhaps the U.S. would give more thought to agreeing to such a conference, and perhaps the two sides would learn to talk on other issues at such a conference as well.

Southern Africa. Gromyko stated that the Soviet Union was aware of what was happening with regard to contacts between nations in the region, but did not believe in the purity of South Africa's intentions. The U.S. was in fact an ally of South Africa on the basis of U.S. actions. The Soviet Union did not believe that South Africa would act as aggressively against its neighbors if the U.S. were not supporting it. The Soviet Union was for peace in the area, but on the basis of non-aggression against Angola and on the basis that Namibia receive its independence in accordance with the relevant UN resolution.

Gromyko proposed to end the meeting at this point since time had run out, and remaining questions could still be

discussed in Washington.

The Secretary indicated that he wanted to touch upon two areas which Gromyko had mentioned, as well as one additional one.

The Secretary welcomed Gromyko's meeting with Foreign Minister Shamir, calling the fact that it had occurred constructive. However, the U.S. did not think that an international conference on the Mideast at this time would be constructive. On the other hand, the U.S. side had again stated, as the President noted in his UN speech, that it was ready to discuss these issues on a bilateral basis with the Soviet side. The Soviet side had not yet responded to this proposal.

Gromyko interjected—on a bilateral basis? *The Secretary* responded, yes, and on other regional subjects as well, including southern Africa. The U.S. is observing South Africa, and it does not like its apartheid policy, but to get a more stable situation in southern Africa, you have to work with South Africa. It interacts in important ways with other countries in the region, and its economy has a central significance to the region. The U.S. would like to see Namibia independent, but considers that the obstacle to this is the presence of the Cuban forces in Angola. As long as these forces are present, the U.S. believes it will be difficult to persuade South Africa to go along.

The additional area which the Secretary wished to raise was the area of the Pakistan border. The U.S. supports Pakistan. The recent crossborder raids into that country were unwarranted and could lead to trouble.

The Secretary concluded by saying that he was sorry that time had run out, and they had not touched on issues in the

detail which they deserved. That is why the President felt that some of their discussions should be devoted to developing procedures so we would have a chance to deal with these issues, and he would speak of this himself.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D188, Reagan/Bush/Shultz/Gromyko/Dobrynin in New York and Washington September 1984. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Zarechnak; cleared by Palmer, Butler, and McKinley. An unknown hand initialed for the clearing officials. The meeting took place in the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York. Brackets are in the original. In preparation for this meeting with Gromyko, Burt provided Shultz with a 36-page briefing packet on September 22, prepared by Simons and cleared by Palmer. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, March 1984 Super Sensitive Documents Super Sensitive July 1-Dec 31, 1984)

² See [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 217](#).

³ For summaries of some meetings between Kennedy and his Soviet counterparts see the following telegrams: Telegram 55033 to Mexico City, March 19, 1982, Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820112-0524; telegram 7317 to Moscow and all NATO capitals and various posts, January 11, 1983, Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830016-0316; telegram 7652 from Moscow, June 16, 1983, Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830343-0176; and telegram 7676 from Vienna, June 7, 1984, Department of State,

Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840371-0965.

⁴ See [Document 159](#).

⁵ After several sets of discussions, the U.S. and Soviet delegations reached an agreement to upgrade the “hotline” (formally known as the Direct Communication Link or DCL) on July 13. “The delegations agreed on the text of an exchange of notes to add a facsimile transmission capability to the Direct Communication Link (DCL). After the Soviet delegation received Moscow’s approval of the texts, Acting Secretary Dam and Soviet Charge D’Affairs Isakov initialed the notes on July 17 in the presence of the two delegations.” (Telegram 236476 to Moscow, August 10; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840512-0983)

⁶ See [Document 73](#).

⁷ See [footnote 4](#), [Document 266](#).

⁸ In telegram 213951 to Moscow, July 20, the Department reported: “Since 1981, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have held three rounds of discussions on our maritime boundary off Alaska, in November 1981, May 1983 and January 1984. A fourth round of talks will be held on July 23-24 in Moscow. These discussions have focused on differences between the two countries over the manner in which the line established by the 1867 convention ceding Alaska should be depicted. Our differences result in the existence of an area in the Bering Sea which each country considers to be under its exclusive maritime resource jurisdiction.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840467-0125)

⁹ In telegram 226966 to Moscow, August 2, the Department reported: “On July 31, Soviet Minister-Counselor Sokolov informed DAS Mark Palmer that the USSR had completed its internal review and accepted the extension of the Governing International Fisheries Agreement until

December 31, 1985. In response to Department's note of July 20, Sokolov gave Palmer a diplomatic note stating that the extension was effective immediately." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840491-0737)

¹⁰ See [Document 76](#).

¹¹ Discussion of the Pacific Air routes was directly related to the downing of the KAL 007 in August 1983. The talks were ongoing at the ICAO in Montreal. See [footnote 8](#), [Document 185](#).

¹² See [Document 10](#).

¹³ See [Document 213](#) and [footnotes 2](#) and [4](#), [Document 219](#).

¹⁴ The United States broke diplomatic relations with Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. After a period of non-recognition, diplomatic relations were established with the Soviet Union in November 1933.

285. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the White House¹

New York, September 27, 1984, 0105Z

Secto 11010. Subject: Memorandum to the President on Meeting With Gromyko.

1. S—Entire text.

2. Begin text:

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

FROM: George P. Shultz

SUBJECT: My Meeting With Gromyko

—As I told you over the phone,² my three hours with Gromyko were relatively free of polemics, but did not surface anything new on the Soviets' part. Gromyko blamed us for all the problems in the relationship, and said that our behavior had to change before things could improve. The message, thus, was unyielding, although the tone was calm and even philosophical. It seemed that Gromyko wanted to concentrate more on where the overall relationship was heading than on specific issues.

—This emphasis on what Gromyko called the “principles’ for US-Soviet relations may foreshadow Gromyko’s approach to his meeting with you on Friday.³ If so, this would dovetail nicely with your plans to take a similarly philosophical approach.⁴ Of course, Gromyko’s attitude may also indicate that he simply has nothing concrete to say, and that Soviet policy toward the U.S. remains on

automatic pilot, with the leadership either unwilling or unable to make the decisions needed to move forward. In this regard, Gromyko's responses on most issues seemed unusually stale, involving largely canned language.

Highlights of the Conversation

—I opened the meeting by reviewing the modest progress we had made since our Stockholm meeting⁵ on a range of bilateral issues, along with the areas where progress had been disappointingly slow or non-existent. I stressed that what was now needed was to move forward on the larger questions, such as arms reductions, and that this was what you planned to focus on in your Friday meeting. I also emphasized at the outset the significance of human rights to the overall relationship, noting that you would want to explain why this was important to the American people. I cited the difficulties created by the many backward steps the Soviets have taken in this area, including their treatment of Sakharov and Shcharanskiy, and urged Gromyko to consider positive action in a number of human rights categories.

—Gromyko's opening remarks focused on what he termed the "question of questions"—whether we want to lead the world toward peace or toward war—and on the equally important question of whether we will be able to control nuclear weapons. He repeated familiar charges that the U.S. was preparing for war and unwilling to accord the Soviets "equality." He effectively dismissed the significance of the many small steps forward we have taken on bilateral issues, alleging that we were bent on destroying everything positive that has been accomplished in our relations. Echoing Soviet propaganda, he said relations were at their lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic ties in

1933, and asked whether the U.S. wanted to “bury them still deeper” or to make a “turn for the better.”

—Turning to the question of the agenda for the rest of the meeting, Gromyko stressed that human rights was one subject that he was not prepared to discuss. I told him I hoped he would nevertheless listen carefully to your explanation of why this was so important to us, and reiterated the point that human rights can have a major bearing on the course of our relations.

—After an exchange on the allegedly aggressive character of U.S. and NATO policy, we turned to arms control. Gromyko agreed with me that there was no more urgent task than reducing nuclear arms. He paraphrased Einstein in arguing that mankind needed to get rid of all nuclear weapons—to which I responded that you have many times stated the very same thing; Gromyko replied by suggesting that the U.S. approach—piling up nuclear weapons—was incompatible with this goal. He said he was not prepared to go into the specifics of negotiating positions. I suggested that we try to use political-level exchanges to get the process moving again, but Gromyko did not respond.

—Gromyko went on at length about the need to “prevent” the militarization of outer space, and repeated the claim that we had rejected their June 29 offer by linking space weapons to offensive nuclear systems. He accused us of planning to deploy a space-based ABM system and even space-based nuclear weapons. I told him that we had no plans to deploy nuclear weapons in space, and that the SDI was strictly a research program at this stage and, in fact, less intensive than Soviet efforts in the ABM area. I also pointed out that it was the Soviets, with an operational ASAT, who had already “militarized” space.

—Gromyko’s bottom line on the Vienna talks was that the U.S. would have to change its “negative” position before talks could take place. Interestingly, however, he did not mention the question of an ASAT moratorium, and he repeated Chernenko’s formulation that progress on space could make it easier to move on other arms control subjects.

—We discussed other arms control issues only briefly. Gromyko was sharply critical of Western confidence-building proposals in the CDE, which he termed a plan for “legalized espionage” with respect to Warsaw Pact military activities. I expressed our disappointment at their failure to respond to your offer of a trade-off between non-use of force and concrete CBMs, which was a direct response to the views expressed by Chernenko in his letters to you. I closed the arms control discussion by underscoring the need to find new procedural mechanisms to give momentum to our negotiating efforts—the broader “umbrella” to which you referred in your speech.⁶ On this as on the rest of your UNGA initiatives, Gromyko did not respond.

—We did not have sufficient time to cover regional issues in much detail. Gromyko did not pick up on our call for expanded consultations on regional problems, and made the expected pitch for the Soviets’ warmed-over Middle East conference proposal. He said that while Moscow supports the Arab position because it was “just,” the Soviets were firmly committed to Israel’s existence as a Jewish state. (It is interesting to note that he spent some two hours with Shamir.)⁷

—For my part, I reiterated our warning that provision of jet fighter aircraft to Nicaragua would be unacceptable, and affirmed our support for Pakistan in the face of increasingly

threatening Soviet tactics along the Afghan-Pakistani border. I told Gromyko we continued to see no promise in the idea of a Mideast conference, but reiterated our readiness to hold more detailed bilateral exchanges on that region as well as on Southern Africa.

—Time ran out before we could get into questions of bilateral cooperation. Gromyko indicated that he had more to say on several other subjects and, intriguingly, he mentioned international terrorism as an item on his list. As the meeting broke up, I told Gromyko that we might want to consider a second meeting on Saturday,⁸ prior to Gromyko's departure for Moscow. But we will want to wait and see how your meeting goes before making a decision.

End text.

Shultz

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840011-0169. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to the Department of State. Repeated as telegram 293390 to Moscow, October 2. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840011-0327)

² No record of this telephone conversation was found. Reagan spent most of the day on September 26 campaigning in Ohio and Wisconsin. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

³ September 28.

⁴ See [Document 277](#).

⁵ See [Document 159](#).

⁶ See [footnote 7, Document 267](#). For Reagan's September 24 speech, see [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. I](#),

[Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 206](#) .

⁷ Shultz and Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir met on October 1 in New York. During their meeting, the two men discussed their respective meetings with Gromyko. Shultz reported to Reagan: “Shamir said Gromyko’s manner seemed slightly more moderate in their bilateral, although his pitch to Israel to accept a peace conference and his stonewalling on Soviet Jewry were entirely negative in substance.” (Telegram Secto 11041 from New York, October 2; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840011-0296)

⁸ September 29. See [Document 288](#).

286. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 28, 1984, 10 a.m.-noon

SUBJECT

The President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko of the Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt
Jack Matlock, NSC
Dimitry Zarechnak, Interpreter
Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko
First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko
Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Aleksy Obukhov, Notetaker
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

After several minutes wait, as journalists came through for photographs, the *President* opened the meeting at 10:20 a.m.² He said that he was pleased that Foreign Minister Gromyko had been able to come to Washington to meet with him and he hoped that he could demonstrate to Gromyko that he was not the sort of person to eat his own grandchildren.

The President pointed out that our political systems are very different and that we will be competitive in the world. But we live in one world and we must handle our competition in peace. He emphasized that the United States will never start a war with the Soviet Union. He added that they did not have to take his word for that but only look at history. For example, after World War II when

the United States was the predominant military power in the world, we did not use that power to force ourselves on others. Instead we set out to help—allies and one-time enemies alike—to restore their economies and to build a peaceful world. We have been trying to reduce stocks of nuclear weapons and today have only two-thirds as many as we had in 1967.

Of course, we are now rebuilding our military strength, but we are doing this because of the massive Soviet buildup. We feel this is a threat to us. Soviet leaders have proclaimed their dedication to revolution and to our destruction. And we have experience with Soviet aggression: the Cuban missile crisis, the attempts to extend Soviet influence in Africa, their efforts elsewhere. Throughout, the Soviet Union seems to consider us the enemy to be overcome.

The President said he mentioned this only to explain why we feel threatened—not to debate the matter—but he wanted to make it clear that while we do not intend to be vulnerable to attack or to an ultimatum that would require us to choose between capitulation and annihilation, we have no aggressive intent toward anyone. He added that we are willing to accept Soviet concerns for their own security. We understand the loss of life in World War II, and we understand their feelings based on a number of invasions of their country over the years. But the problem is that we are mutually suspicious; both sides are fearful. The time has come to clear the air, reduce suspicions, and reduce nuclear arms.

As the two superpowers, we must take the lead in reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons. If the two of us take the lead, the rest of the world would have to follow.

And this applies not only to nuclear weapons, but also to such weapons as biological and chemical as well.

The President mentioned that the Soviet Union had proposed negotiations on weapons in space. He said that we are ready for this. But we also feel that offensive weapons must be a subject of concern and a subject of negotiation. And he wondered if we could not consider concluding an interim agreement with restrictions on anti-satellite weapons, and also agreement on a process of reducing nuclear arms.

The President also suggested that we need to have representatives of senior levels meet to discuss the whole situation and to try to find ways to negotiate these problems. A private channel would be useful. For example, someone here and a counterpart there could take up contacts privately in order to consult confidentially and give direction to negotiations. The President stressed that we both have confidence in our Ambassadors and should use them more, but there may also be a need for confidential contacts without the formality of more official channels.

The President then referred to the American commitment to human rights. He said that he understands the Soviet feeling that these questions impinge upon their sovereignty, but they must understand that the United States is a country of immigrants, and that many ethnic groups in the United States maintain an interest in ties with their home country. They take a great interest in human rights questions, and they insist that their government be responsive to these concerns. The fact is that it would be much easier for the United States to make agreements with the Soviet Union if there is improvement in this area. As an example, he cited the resolution of the case of the

Pentecostalists who took refuge in the American Embassy in Moscow, and said that we treated their permission to leave the Soviet Union as a generous act on the part of the Soviet Government.³ We never attempted to portray it as an arrangement between our two governments, but did attempt to respond and ease relations by, for example, concluding the long-term grain agreement.⁴ The President added that although the Foreign Minister knows the United States fairly well, some of his colleagues may not, and the Soviet leadership should understand that the President cannot simply dictate to the Congress or to the public. The atmosphere must be right if the President is to be capable of carrying out and implementing agreements with the Soviet Union.

The President stressed that peace is our greatest desire and we are prepared to move in a peaceful direction and to discuss how we can reduce arms and set a goal of ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

Foreign Minister Gromyko responded that the President had touched on many problems and he thought it was necessary to set out their policy. He realized that the President had heard and read many authoritative statements from the Soviet leadership, including Chernenko's letters and public statements. He observed that it cannot be questioned that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are of tremendous importance for the entire world. Indeed, this is axiomatic and no one in the world would deny it. The conclusion he would draw from this is that the leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union must see to it that both bilateral issues and international questions that concern us are conducted in full accord with the responsibilities which the leadership of both countries carry.

Gromyko said that he did not know how the President got the idea that the Soviet Union set for itself the goal of demolishing the American system, or that the Soviets think about that at all. The Soviet Government has no such goal, and the U.S. has no basis for making the accusation.

Gromyko stated that in accord with the philosophy held by the Soviet leaders, the course of historical development is unavoidable, and just as they believe that the sun will rise tomorrow, they also believe that the capitalist system will be followed by a socialist system which in turn will be followed by a communist system. But that is not a goal. And, indeed, "volunteerism"—attempts to force historical developments—is alien to their philosophy. It is, he said, "anti-scientific." Therefore, there is no goal of undermining the social and political system in the United States. He felt that if some of the President's statements have been motivated by such a misunderstanding, the President would do well to correct his comments. He would not use the word "insult" to characterize these accusations because it is too mild. The fact is, the Soviets have a philosophy of historical processes, but not a goal of changing or replacing the political and economic systems in other countries.

Gromyko continued that it was not the first time that they had heard that the United States had acted generously after World War II and that the U.S. had possessed nuclear weapons, but had not used them. He observed that it is true that the United States acted wisely in not using nuclear weapons, saying in passing that the U.S. had only a negligible number, of course, but he wouldn't emphasize that. He continued by saying that at the end of the war, if the Soviet leaders had waved their armies to the West, no force could have stopped them. It would have been like a tidal wave. Yet, they did not do it; they were loyal to their

agreements with the Allies, to their agreements with the United States and the United Kingdom. France, of course, later joined as an ally, but principally with the United States and the United Kingdom. The USSR was true to its word and did not move beyond the boundaries specified in the post-War agreements. The President would recall that President Truman signed the Potsdam Accord along with Churchill and Stalin. The Soviet Union had lived up to this agreement.

Gromyko continued that in the President's observations, he detected the thought that the Soviet Union is a threat to the West. The fact is, Gromyko said, that after the war when the guns fell silent, all the military bases which had been set up by the United States throughout the world were retained. They were kept and even increased; new ones were built. Arms were increased as well. He asked, rhetorically, if the Soviet Union should have taken this into account, and answered "of course," and said that these events were still fresh in their memories.

Gromyko went on to charge that the United States had built a wall—a barrier—against all attempts to reduce arms. He said he would remind the President that after the war ended in 1945—and he digressed to say that the Soviet Union had entered the war against Japan precisely in accord with its commitments—and nuclear weapons appeared on the scene, it had been no miracle for the Soviet Union to acquire them. All nuclear weapons require is a certain technological potential and funding decisions. But Gromyko claimed that at that time the Soviet Union had proposed a permanent ban on nuclear weapons, and a commitment to use nuclear power solely for peaceful purposes.

He recalled that he himself had introduced in the United Nations in New York a draft convention for the permanent prohibition of nuclear weapons.⁵ The United States Administration (Truman was then President) rejected this idea. So what was the Soviet Union to do? They had to reconsider their position. They had to draw conclusions from the path the world was taking.

Gromyko then stated that the West always raises questions of verification. It does this as if the Soviet Union doesn't do all it should do in carrying out its commitments. But the Soviet proposal was a very comprehensive one. It was for both nuclear and conventional disarmament, and as for verification at that time, they had proposed "a general and complete verification." And what was President Truman's response? He refused. He refused because the United States simply wanted more and more and more arms.

Gromyko then observed that we now have at our disposal mountains of arms. It's not a very pretty picture. We're sitting on mountains of nuclear weapons. We must ask how far we want to go in this direction.

He then recalled that when President Nixon came to Moscow in 1972 and entered Brezhnev's office, he observed that we both have enough nuclear weapons to destroy each other nine times over.⁶ And Brezhnev replied, "You are right. We have made the same calculation." So both came to the conclusion that it would be senseless to continue piling up these arms, and the result was the SALT II Agreements—the ABM Treaty, and the interim agreement on offensive weapons. These are historic agreements and they are still alive.

Gromyko continued by saying that the question now is which direction we will go: toward a further accumulation

of nuclear weapons or toward their reduction and elimination? This is indeed the “problem of problems.” It is a question of life and death; it is a problem which must be overcome.

He suggested that a helpful step to start us on the right direction would be to freeze nuclear weapons where they are. He added that he wanted to say directly to the President that the Soviet Union is not threatening the social system of the United States. Indeed, the Soviets have great admiration for the talent of the American people, for its technology, for its science, for its vitality. They want to live in peace and friendship. And, he believes Americans want the same. Everyone wants trade, and trade can be mutually beneficial. The USSR needs the more advanced American technology and Americans can make a profit from it to the benefit of its own society. In short, Gromyko said, “we are offering peace as we have always offered peace. We will extend our hand if you extend yours.”

Gromyko continued by observing that the President could say that the Soviet Union has more arms than the United States. That is not true, he said, the USSR does not have more. The United States and its allies have more, but an approximate equality exists. The Soviets say an “approximate equality” because it is not exact and the advantage is actually on the Western side. But, they are willing to say equality in order to move things forward.

In Europe, for example, NATO has fifty percent more weapons than the Warsaw Pact yet the Soviets have declared that this is approximately equal. In counting, of course, they take into account tactical and theater weapons, British and French systems and aircraft, including carrier aircraft.

So this is the situation as the Soviets see it. They do not wish to follow the course the United States has set of adding to the weapons in Europe. Of course, they are determined not to stay behind if the U.S. moves ahead.

Gromyko observed that one thread that ran through some of the argumentation he had heard was the contention that the Soviet Union cannot keep up in an arms race, and it is true that an arms race would cost the Soviets much in the way of material, intellectual and financial means. But they would do it. They were able to develop nuclear weapons even after their economy had suffered the colossal losses in World War II, and they will be able to keep up in the future regardless of the sacrifice required.

Gromyko added that he had heard some good words in the President's statement. He agreed that the United States and the Soviet Union must deal as equals and he wanted the President to know that the Soviet Union is seeking peaceful relations. The United States has advanced technology and can profit from trade with the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union felt that it is better to trade than to compete in nuclear arms. Trade could be to the mutual benefit of both countries.

As far as outer space is concerned, the problem, according to Gromyko, is that we already have arms competition on the ground, under the water, on the water, in the air, but not yet in space, and we should prevent its spread to space. The Soviet Union, he said, is against the American plan to extend the arms race into space. They condemn it and if the effort continues it will be irreversible. Tremendous resources will be spent, and yet there will be no advantage gained in this field. Look at it coolly, he said. We are fed up with the competition in nuclear arms. Why involve space as well? Think it over calmly and coolly, he repeated.

He noted that the United States had taken a negative attitude toward the Soviet proposal for negotiations in Vienna. It would have been better, he said, if the United States had not proposed its formula at all. It is clear the United States wants the militarization of space, which the Soviet Union opposes.

Gromyko continued that a freeze of weapons is not a reduction and they would like to reduce nuclear weapons, but that a freeze would improve the atmosphere for reduction and might make it possible. He believed that no nuclear power would be hurt by a freeze. He went on to say that the average person in the United States knows very little about the Soviet Union but does know that he wants peace.

Gromyko continued by saying that the President's speech at the United Nations spoke of contacts and consultation.⁷ These are not contrary to Soviet desires; they are not bad. The Soviets do not reject the President's proposal at all. What disturbs the Soviets is that everything seems to be reduced to the question of contacts, and they wonder if this is something just to make people think that something is happening. If nothing, in fact, happens, then that would be an incorrect impression.

Gromyko stressed that we need a constructive goal for these meetings. We need to decide what they will lead to. One cannot combine arms reduction with the current American policy of increasing military budgets and increasing the arms buildup. So long as American arms keep growing this is inconsistent with reductions or a mutual goal that can be set. He added that this may be unpleasant to hear but he felt he must explain it.

Gromyko concluded his initial presentation by saying that the entire leadership of the Soviet Union and the General Secretary personally wanted to find a common language with the United States. We must find a way to put our relations in motion. It must be understood that they are not trying to undermine the American social system. The U.S. must seriously and coolly analyze the current situation. The Soviets will defend their interests, but want peace and cooperation. The choice is up to the United States, but it should be understood that the Soviet Union wants good relations with the United States.

The President stated that he could not agree with many of the things which Gromyko had said. First, the idea that Soviet policy is not directed against our system is inconsistent with many statements made by Soviet leaders over the decades. The President quoted from Lenin and from others to make his point, but then said that there was no point in continuing citations and that what is important about all of this is that it is evidence of the high level of suspicion that exists between us.

As for American behavior at the end of the war, he recalled that one of the few things that Stalin said that he agreed with was that the Soviets would not have been able to win the war without American help. Gromyko had said that we had retained our bases at the end of the war. This is simply untrue. The United States had demobilized its forces. The Soviet Union did not.

As for arms control Gromyko had spoken of “a wall constructed against arms and troop reductions,” and of the Soviet proposal for a nuclear weapons ban. He had not mentioned, however, the U.S. proposal for international control of all nuclear weapons and activity—the Baruch Plan—which the Soviet Union turned down.⁸

Gromyko had also mentioned the U.S. concern for verification, and the President commented that yes, this is a U.S. concern and should be the concern of the Soviet Union and of other countries. He recalled that President Eisenhower had made his “open skies” proposal, which would have allowed each country to inspect everything that went on in the other, and the Soviets had rejected that.⁹ In addition, the United States had made at least nineteen proposals regarding nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union had been unresponsive.

The President then turned to Gromyko and said, “You say you want to eliminate your weapons. Fine. We’ll sign an agreement on that right now.” He pointed out that the U.S. has already made proposals in that direction. For example, in the INF negotiations, the U.S. proposed that all INF systems be eliminated from Europe. When the Soviets did not accept that the U.S. proposed the lowest possible levels, and the Soviet Union still did not accept. As far as the START negotiations are concerned, the United States at first concentrated on ICBM’s because they are the most frightening and the most destructive of the weapons. But the United States is prepared to include also submarines, aircraft, and other strategic systems.

The President noted that Gromyko had mentioned President Nixon and the SALT I Agreement and pointed out that the Soviet Union has deployed 7,000 warheads since the SALT I Agreement, and since the SALT II Agreement, has deployed 800 ballistic missiles. So far as INF is concerned, he showed Gromyko a chart depicting SS-20 deployments and noting the statements of various Soviet leaders that there was a balance, while each year the Soviet total mounted and the U.S. was making no deployments in Europe.

The President added that the United States had taken many tactical weapons out of Europe, whereas the Soviet Union had not, but has been adding to them. He said that so far as our armies are concerned, the United States has seventeen divisions and the Soviet Union 260 divisions.

The President then pointed out that the Soviets are saying they want peace and we are saying the same, but we need deeds. He agreed that there is a mountain of weapons, and made clear that the United States will keep pace with the Soviet buildup. But he asked what the purpose of a continued buildup can have, and suggested that we start reducing. He observed that reducing equally and verifiably would produce just as effective a defense for both countries as they have now.

The President pointed out that the United States does not have more warheads than the Soviet Union. In fact, the Soviet Union had developed several entire families of nuclear weapons, while the U.S. was developing only one. He noted that Gromyko had mentioned the cost of the competition, but referred to the U.S. experience when the previous administration had cancelled systems, but the Soviet Union did not reciprocate and slow its buildup.

In regard to anti-satellite systems, the President pointed out that the Soviets had a tested system and the U.S. did not, and therefore calls for a moratorium before the U.S. has tested a system and is on an equal basis were one-sided and self-serving. He added that his criticism of SALT II was that it simply legitimized the buildup of arms.

The President stressed, however, that we want peace and that we are willing to believe that the Soviets want peace. But the fact is that the United States did not walk away from the negotiating table. He agreed that we need deeds

and specifically to resume negotiations on nuclear weapons.

Gromyko referred to the President's opening remark and said he wanted to assure the President that they did not believe he ate his own grandchildren or anyone else's.

Then Gromyko referred to the table the President had shown him of the buildup in Soviet nuclear weapons. He said that one should remember the way our respective nuclear weapons systems developed. At first the United States had a superior Air Force and the Soviets began to develop missiles. The United States then developed submarines and so the two systems developed in parallel, but resulted in structures that are quite different.

The President pointed out that the Soviets had gone on to outbuild the United States in submarines, to build more modern aircraft while the United States was still flying B-52s which are older than the pilots that fly them, and in addition, had developed several new missiles. The President added that in the START negotiations we did propose to concentrate initially on ICBM's, but that this was not a take-it-or-leave-it proposal and was simply based on the consideration that the land-based missiles are the most threatening. But we have agreed to talk about all the systems and to take them into account.

What we want, the President pointed out, is reductions. He recalled a statement by President Eisenhower that modern weapons are such that nations possessing nuclear weapons can no longer think of war in terms of victory or defeat, but only of destruction of both sides. We bear that in mind and want to reduce as much as possible. The President then asked why, if we both are of this mind, we cannot proceed to agree on the reduction of weapons.

Gromyko said that he wished to recall a few facts. At Vladivostok, the question of Soviet heavy missiles had been raised along with the question of the U.S. forward-based systems, and at that time, President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger had agreed that if the Soviet Union dropped its insistence on including forward-based systems, the United States would drop its insistence on restricting Soviet heavy missiles.¹⁰ If now the United States insists upon raising the question of restraints on heavy missiles, the question of forward-based systems immediately arises.

Gromyko then turned to the British and French systems and asked how the Soviet Union could leave them out of account inasmuch as Britain and France were allies of the United States. He added that President Carter had a different opinion from President Reagan and recalled that once when he was at lunch at the White House, President Carter had said that in principle these systems should be included.¹¹

With regard to nuclear weapons, Gromyko said that he could give an answer as follows: "as soon as the United States corrects its position." He then asked rhetorically whether the U.S. considers the Soviets to be such frivolous people as not to know of American aircraft carriers and what they mean to the Soviet Union. According to Gromyko, each carrier has 40 planes which can carry nuclear weapons. Six times 40 equals 240 nuclear launchers which the U.S. is not willing to count at all.

The President interjected that the U.S. is willing to put this on the table in negotiations, but he pointed out that Gromyko seemed to forget that their SS-20s were targeted on our allies and even if NATO carried through all of its planned deployments, they would amount to only a fraction of the Soviet missiles targeted at Europe.

Gromyko then asked if we were willing to include tactical and theatre weapons, and whether the British and French systems were included.

The President stated that, no, we would not be willing to count British and French systems. In fact, he pointed out, there had been a net decline of nuclear weapons in Europe available to NATO.

Gromyko asked if the U.S. would include carrier-based aircraft, and the President, referring to the U.S. START position, reiterated that we had started by concentrating on ICBM's but that we were willing to consider aircraft and other systems in the overall negotiations.

Gromyko stated that there is no question of excluding carrier-based aircraft from the negotiations.

Secretary Shultz pointed out that the Soviet Union has a greater number of nuclear-capable aircraft than the United States, that so far as British and French systems are concerned, we had made it clear that when strategic levels were reduced substantially, there would be a time to consider British and French systems in the negotiations. The main point, however, is that the U.S. fully recognizes the differences in the structures of the nuclear forces of our two countries. We have been trying to generate a discussion which recognizes these as asymmetries. To search for a framework is a necessary ingredient in this process.

Gromyko asked if we were saying that the Soviet Union is concealing its aircraft.

Shultz said no, not concealing aircraft, but simply that they have more nuclear capable aircraft than the United States.

Gromyko retorted that that was incorrect, that we seemed to be counting cargo planes and other aircraft which do not carry nuclear weapons and observed that this was not serious reasoning.

Gromyko continued by saying that the U.S. position is that we should simply sit down, but the Soviet Union has experience with that. So far no one had mentioned the improper use of the language of ultimatums in these negotiations. Gromyko claimed that the U.S., in effect, said, "This is our plan, accept it. If not, there is a deadline that has to be met and we will deploy." In fact, that is what happened.

So, the U.S. must liquidate the results of that decision. The Soviet Union does not see any point in continuing negotiations otherwise.

The President asked how it would have been possible for NATO not to deploy under the circumstances of the SS-20 threat and the Soviet rejection of our zero proposal and also U.S. proposals to negotiate lowest possible equal levels.

Gromyko claimed that NATO now has 50 percent more nuclear weapons.

The President said that the proper procedure is to count each other's systems.

Gromyko then asked specifically about British and French systems and carrier-based aircraft. He asserted that if we count all of these systems and then compare, we will find that NATO is ahead.

The President disputed this, but noted that the time for lunch had come and invited Gromyko to stay a few minutes

for a private conversation.¹²

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, President-Gromyko Final Papers (5). Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Matlock. This meeting took place in the Oval Office. According to the President's Daily Diary, from 3:03 to 3:54 p.m. on September 27, the President participated in a briefing for Gromyko's visit. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) McFarlane also briefed Reagan for the meeting with Gromyko at 9 a.m. on September 28. (Ibid.) No record of these meetings has been found.

² On September 28, Reagan wrote in his diary: "The big day—Andrei Gromyko. Meeting held in Oval office. Five waves of photographers—1st time that many. I opened with my monologue and made the point that perhaps both of us felt the other was a threat then explained by the record we had more reason to feel that way than they did. His opener was about 30 min's. then we went into dialogue. I had taken notes on his pitch and rebutted with fact & figure a number of his points. I kept emphasizing that we were the two nations that could destroy or save the world. I figured they nurse a grudge that we don't respect them as a super-power. All in all 3 hrs. including lunch were I believe well spent. Everyone at our end thinks he's going home with a pretty clear view of where we stand." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, pp. 386–387)

³ See [Documents 34](#) and [74](#).

⁴ See [Document 76](#).

⁵ See [footnote 3](#), [Document 273](#).

⁶ For the private meeting between Nixon and Brezhnev in Moscow on May 22, 1972, see [Foreign Relations, 1969-](#)

[1976, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1972, Document 257](#).

⁷ See [footnote 7, Document 267](#).

⁸ See [footnote 5, Document 267](#).

⁹ See [footnote 6, Document 267](#).

¹⁰ Ford and Brezhnev met in Vladivostok November 23-24, 1974, to discuss arms control. For documents related to this summit, see [Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974-December 1976, Documents 83-95](#).

¹¹ Carter met with Gromyko on September 23, 1977. For their discussion of SALT, see [Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972-1980, Document 183](#).

¹² No official account of this private meeting was found. However, in his memoir, Shultz wrote: "As we were about to leave for lunch, the president took Gromyko aside and had him stay back in the Oval Office, where the two of them conversed in English without interpreters. The president later told me that in their private conversation he had been struck by Gromyko's description of the two superpowers sitting on top of ever-rising stockpiles of nuclear weapons and by Gromyko's statement that the Soviet Union wished to reduce the size of those piles. 'My dream,' Reagan had told him, 'is for a world where there are no nuclear weapons.'" (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 484) Dobrynin also wrote of this private conversation: "Reporting later to us about the brief conversation, Gromyko observed that he did not quite understand what the excitement was all about. The president emphatically told him, as if this was a big secret, that his personal dream was a 'world without nuclear weapons.' Gromyko answered that nuclear disarmament was the 'question of all questions.' Both agreed that the ultimate goal should be the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. And that was about all

there was to the private meeting.” (Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, p. 556)

287. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 28, 1984, 12:30-1:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

President's Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at White House Lunch

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan
Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger
Edwin Meese III, Counselor to the President
James A. Baker, III, Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President
Michael K. Deaver, Deputy Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John M. Poindexter, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR
Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Burt
Jack F. Matlock, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director European and Soviet Affairs, NSC
Dimitry Zarechnak, State Department Interpreter
Foreign Minister Andrey A. Gromyko
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Foreign Minister
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Aleksy Obukhov, Notetaker
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter
Ambassador Vasiliy Makarov, Chief Aide to Foreign Minister Gromyko
Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov, USSR Embassy
Minister-Counselor Viktor Isakov, USSR Embassy
Ambassador Albert S. Chernyshov, Member of the Foreign Minister's Staff
Vladimir B. Lomeyko, Press Spokesman for the Foreign Minister

After a fair amount of preliminary informal conversation at the table, *Vice President Bush* asked Minister Gromyko whether he thought there was any hope for a solution to the Iraq-Iran war.

Gromyko replied that he did not see any hope. He indicated that the Soviet Union had spoken several times with the participants, but they were not listening. It seemed as if the Iranians were planning a major offensive, but the Iraqis were confident that they would once again withstand it.

Vice President Bush commented on the tragic loss of life in the war and *Gromyko* agreed.

Secretary Shultz indicated that one of the difficult problems of the war was the attempt to disrupt shipping in the Gulf. Such attempts had not been very successful so far. *Gromyko* agreed with this.

Shultz compared the present situation with the one in 1973, indicating that the situation was much easier now since the U.S. had one hundred days worth of oil reserves in case anything should happen, and the oil market was much softer now than it was then.

Gromyko asked if Israel would withdraw from Lebanon.

Shultz pointed out that a senior U.S. diplomat, Dick Murphy, was in the area working on the situation. *Shultz* indicated that he thought it was clear that Israel wished to withdraw. Israel is concerned with southern Lebanon since it is the base from which guerillas attacked northern Israel. In *Shultz*' conversations with Assad and others it was clear that there was a recognition of the legitimacy of these security interests. The question was how to solve the problem. *Shultz* felt that it was quite clear that the present government of Lebanon could not assert enough authority to do this, and that Syria would have to be involved. UNIFIL would also have to play a role. As *Gromyko* was aware, Israel had dropped its requirement that Syria withdraw simultaneously. Israel would be ready to

withdraw if appropriate security arrangements could be made.

Shultz continued that, however, just as when Israel wanted to withdraw from other parts of Lebanon, it was asked not to for fear that this would bring about communal violence, there was a similar fear about Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. He felt that the role of UNIFIL was a very important one, and that Israel would withdraw if it felt that northern Israel was secure. What did Gromyko think of strengthening UNIFIL's role?

Gromyko replied that the UN Security Council would meet on this question.

Shultz noted that the Security Council would not be able to make a decision without seeing the options available. As the parties tried to work out a solution, they would ask whether a possibility exists to augment the UNIFIL role. If such a possibility exists, this would be one course of action. If it does not, then different options would have to be considered. But the general attitude is that the role of UNIFIL would be important.

Gromyko indicated that he had met with the Israeli Foreign Minister three days before, and that the latter was optimistic about southern Lebanon.² However, the Security Council would have to decide the issue. Without UN Forces there would be no possibility of resolving the situation.

Shultz indicated his agreement.

Gromyko stated that if there is agreement on the part of Syria and Lebanon, and if other countries agree to send forces, then there would be good reason to take this course of action. But such a solution could not be a permanent

one. It could not be in effect “until the second coming of Christ.”

Shultz joked that the latter could happen soon. He added in a more serious vein that he was pleased to hear this comment of Gromyko’s, and noted that he and Gromyko had spoken of the importance of comparing notes on the Middle East. The U.S. would like to broaden its discussion with the Soviet Union with regard to the role of UNIFIL in the Mideast.

Gromyko stated that he wished to say something in the presence of the President. The Soviet Union had proposed to convene a conference on the Middle East, and all the Arab countries had agreed to this. Gromyko had spoken about this to the Israeli Foreign Minister, who had indicated that he thought it would be better to convene such a conference after normalization of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Israel. Shamir did not flatly say that such a conference was a bad idea.

Gromyko continued that no one at such a conference could force his views on anyone else, and that at such a conference, perhaps the United States and the Soviet Union would also learn how to talk to one another. Perhaps the President would consider to agreeing to such a conference.

Shultz stated that on the basis of his conversations with the Israeli Foreign Minister, he learned that Israel felt that such a conference would not be constructive, but would be used as propaganda by the participants. For this reason, the Israelis prefer direct negotiations with other countries, or negotiations through intermediaries.

Gromyko confirmed that the Israelis told him that they were concerned that the Arabs would use such a conference for propaganda. However, he felt that if the United States and the Soviet Union were to approach such a conference seriously, the Arab States would also take it seriously. He felt that Israel would have nothing to lose by participating in it. Israel did not wish to be in a state of war forever with the Arabs.

Shultz agreed that it was very important for Israel to find a solution which would bring peace to the region. Since the Soviet Union had contacts with the PLO, and the U.S. did not, and since the question of the PLO was at the center of much of the Mideast difficulties, PLO views would need to be reflected. What did *Gromyko* think of the coherence of the PLO (e.g., Arafat's "war" with Syria)?

Gromyko stressed that before such a conference could begin, the parties would have to agree that the Palestinians needed to have a territory to create their small independent state. Without such an agreement, the conference could not begin. A great deal of the terrorism in the Mideast is nourished by the fact that the Palestinians have no home. *Gromyko* described the terrible conditions that he observed in the camps in Syria.

The President noted that one of the problems was that the Arab States did not want the Palestinians to have their own state. Hundreds of thousands of the Palestinians live in other areas. If the Arab States could give these Palestinians citizenship, then one would only have to deal with those Palestinians that had left the area. These could settle in the West Bank. However, there would not be enough room for all the Palestinians to live there.

Gromyko noted that there were about two million Palestinians.

The President observed that if all of Israel were given to them, they would not be able to live there.

Gromyko said that it would not be practical to try to assimilate them in the Arab countries.

Shultz observed that the U.S. felt that the West Bank would not be appropriate as an area for a national entity since there would be no possibility of having an adequate economic basis there, and there were other limitations. Such an area would need to be associated with another State, and be a part of it, as California is a part of the United States. Such an area could be identified with Jordan. But the Palestinians living in other Arab countries should be encouraged to assimilate themselves in those countries, and those countries should be encouraged to take them in. For this reason, the President made a proposal a few years ago on creating a Palestinian unit affiliated with Jordan but with enough of an identity to satisfy the Palestinians' need to have a "passport," so to speak.

The President repeated the comparison to the status of California, which has its own government, within the United States.

Gromyko indicated that he had told Shamir that the Soviet Union considered that Israel had a right to exist as a State. The Soviet Union stuck by the 1947 UN Resolution to create two independent states in Palestine—one Israeli, one Palestinian. The Soviet Union did not agree with Arab extremists who felt that Israel ought to be eliminated and pushed into the sea. The Soviet Union would stick by this

position even if Israel would not ask it to. But Israel must free the territories it has occupied. This occupation is a source of permanent hostility and war. At the moment the Arab States are weak and disunited. But who knows what will happen in the future? Israel should normalize its relations with the Arab States. It could serve as a good example to them in the area of economic development and science. It does not need to rely on aggression in order to have a firm basis for existence.

The President stressed that the nub of the problem was that the Arabs say that Israel does not have a right to exist, and that they will not recognize it.

Gromyko replied that Syria would be ready to recognize Israel's existence.

The President stated that perhaps a solution could be found, in that case.

Gromyko noted that Libya might not want to go along, but added that it would if all the others agreed.

The President noted that time was running short, but said that he would like to return to the idea of an umbrella arrangement for continuing discussions of issues between the two countries.

Gromyko replied that the Soviet Union was not against having consultations, discussions and meetings, including along the lines proposed in the President's UN speech.³ But this is not what is needed if we approach the subject seriously. Consultations are needed which lead to practical results. If it is the Middle East that we are discussing, we need to arrive at agreed solutions; if it is nuclear arms, then we need to work out a plan. It is not enough to talk

and have exchanges of opinions. The same applies to space weapons. The sides have not even begun to discuss the latter. If they do begin to discuss the issue, one will pull one way and the other will pull the other way, and the result could be a negative one. The U.S. has a rigid position which is a mistaken one, aimed at militarizing space. The Soviet Union would like to ask the U.S. not to take that route, but rather to change its policies in order to arrive at peaceful relations between the two countries as well as to create an overall peaceful atmosphere. The sides should not talk of eliminating each other, but rather of finding ways to peacefully coexist.

The President stated that he has long believed that difficulties arise when countries talk *about* each other rather than *to* each other. He wished to comment about Gromyko's reference to "rigid positions." On this issue there were two positions, one on each side. The Soviet Union wished to talk about space weapons, and the U.S. wished to talk about nuclear arms, which, as Gromyko had said, it would be better to rid the world of. The United States also wished to talk about space weapons, but the Soviet Union said that if we do not first talk about space weapons, there can be no negotiations on other subjects. However, a formula could be found covering all of the issues and the sides could thus rid themselves of the suspicions which each has of the other. The best way of allaying such suspicions is to have such talks as well as corresponding actions. The two countries should find a way to discuss both space weapons and nuclear weapons.

Gromyko stressed that there needed to be precise agreement on what prevention of militarization of space means. The other issues the President had mentioned were equally important, and ways needed to be found to have serious negotiations on them. But the Soviet Union was

afraid that the intent of the U.S. was to make a sort of “layered pie” where space weapons would only occupy an incidental place, and strategic and medium range nuclear forces would be the most important thing. The Soviet Union could not agree to this. It could not agree to negotiate along the lines laid down in Geneva, and the Soviet Union had explained why, namely, because the U.S. had already deployed the first part of its new group of nuclear weapons in Europe, thus creating an artificial obstacle to negotiations.

Gromyko continued that the sides should think about how to deal with strategic and medium range nuclear weapons, but if the U.S. had not changed its position on them, there would be no use in talking. Therefore, these issues should be separated from the question of space weapons.

The President emphasized that the U.S. felt that all of these questions were equally important, and that space weapons would not be treated as a sideline. He imagined that there could be separate concurrent negotiations on these issues. He was proposing to establish a framework where serious senior officials could talk about the militarization of space in one set of talks, and equally important people could discuss other questions at other talks, to work on them simultaneously. Gromyko had said in his UN speech that the Soviet Union wished to rid the world of all of these weapons, including space weapons.⁴ The U.S. says the same. If the sides agree about the desired results, they should be able to find a method of discussion which would lead to such results. Each side would send its representatives and would “ride herd” on them.

Gromyko stated that it should not be a case of all these people sitting down at one table to discuss all of the issues.

The President stressed that it would not have to be discussed all together at one table. He also believed that those who were expert in questions of strategic arms need not necessarily be the best qualified to discuss space weapons. He envisioned these as separate negotiations. But the Soviet Union should not ask the U.S. to discuss only the one issue without the other two. Both countries should have their way by discussing all three issues.

Gromyko stated that all three issues were important, but the two sides had no common ground on the other two issues, and therefore, could not move forward on them. Because of this, the third issue would suffer, especially if the first two were tied to it. The sides would find themselves in a thick forest from which they would not be able to get out. The Soviet side had proposed a more practical path. The U.S. was saying that the sides should resume the Geneva negotiations, but this would not be possible unless the U.S. changed its position at those negotiations. The crux of the matter was the deployment of U.S. missiles. The President should ask his technical and political experts to reexamine their views and change the U.S. position, and to tell the Soviet Union once this had been done. Moreover, development of a broad scale ABM system would kill all such negotiations, and would waste hundreds of billions or maybe even trillions of dollars. If such developments went forward, even a hundred wise men might not be able to reverse the process.

The President noted that it was late, but stressed that the U.S. could not agree to talk only on one of these issues without attempting to find solutions to the others—issues which Gromyko himself had emphasized at the UN. The U.S. felt all three of these issues were important. Perhaps there could be agreement not to implement solutions on any of the issues until all three had been agreed. But the

main thing would be to continue contacts at levels where such results could be achieved.

Gromyko noted that the Soviet Union was not against contacts and meetings, but meetings were not a substitute for negotiations. He had already indicated that each of these subjects should be treated separately.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials President-Gromyko—Working Papers (7). Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Zarechnak. This lunch took place in the State Dining Room at the White House. In his memoir, Dobrynin recalled of the reception and lunch: “Nancy Reagan appeared during the cocktail party before lunch. Gromyko, after the introductions, proposed a toast to her. He had cranberry juice, her glass was filled with soda water. ‘We both are certainly fond of drinking,’ he remarked with characteristic dry humor. Gromyko had a short chat with the president’s wife. ‘Is your husband for peace or for war?’ he asked. She said that he of course was all for peace. ‘Are you sure?’ Gromyko wondered. She was one hundred percent sure. ‘Why, then, does not he agree to our proposals?’ Gromyko insisted. What proposals? she asked. Someone interrupted the conversation, but right before lunch Gromyko reminded Mrs. Reagan, ‘So, don’t forget to whisper the word “peace” in the president’s ear every night.’ She said, ‘Of course I will, and I’ll also whisper it in yours, too.’ I must report that Gromyko got a kick out of this exchange and recounted it to the Politburo with great animation.” (Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, p. 555)

² See [footnote 7, Document 285](#).

³ See [footnote 7, Document 267](#)

⁴ Gromyko addressed the UNGA on September 27. Telegram 2345 from USUN, September 17, provided an

analysis of the speech. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840617-0023) For the full text of Gromyko's speech, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVI, No. 39 (October 24, 1984), pp. 1-6. Key sections of the speech were printed in the *New York Times*, September 28, 1984, p. A12.

288. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 29, 1984, 10 a.m.-12:20 p.m.

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After a few introductory remarks, *Secretary Shultz* suggested to Foreign Minister Gromyko that perhaps Gromyko would like to begin by giving his impressions after yesterday's meeting,² and he would also say a few words. He had the impression from the message from the Soviet embassy that Gromyko's time was limited. Therefore, the sides should get down to discussion of substance.

Gromyko began by noting that the sides had spoken about contacts, consultations and meetings at various levels. The Soviet side considers that each time a meeting comes up the subject and the level of each should be the subject of prior arrangements between us. If both sides desire it, representatives of the sides could then meet. Clarity is

needed on this. It did not mean that there should be a whole string of meetings, like a conference broken at various intervals. Gromyko felt the US had the same approach, and the USSR was not against it, for reasons that he had explained. But a specific task should be set for such meetings; there must be prior agreement on the subject matter and personnel for each. This was the first thing that he wished to say.

Gromyko continued that he thought the sides could make more intensive use of their diplomatic channels. At present, they are not being used with sufficient intensity. Of course, this is not the fault of the channels or the diplomats. It is up to those who give diplomats their instructions to make better use of them. An example of where such channels could be used much more effectively was the area of regional issues.

Gromyko indicated that one specific question of a regional nature was the Middle East. The sides should not have to wait for meetings on the ministerial level or other high levels to discuss the issue. Surely we are not limited to this. A simpler way would be to use diplomatic channels for a more extensive exchange of views. The reservations which the US had about starting a dialogue with the USSR on the Middle East are not justified. The US seems to think that its ties with Israel give it a very secure footing, along with contacts with one or two other countries. Of course, the Soviet side is not begging; it is up to the US to decide, but common sense should prevail. It would be acting correctly for the US to have an exchange of views and to seek mutual solutions in the Middle East. The same could apply to other areas as well.

Gromyko recalled the Secretary's statement in Stockholm where he said that it is unfortunate that Europe is divided.³

It was clear that the Secretary had in mind the results of World War II. Why was such a statement made? It was shocking. How could something like that have been said? The US and USSR fought on the same side in World War II. The USSR was also allied with England. France—although it had no organized military force—and other countries had come in, but the real alliance was this triad. The results of that war have been written into history. They are firm and permanent. What does it mean to speak of “division?” What does the US not like about the situation there? What about the agreement signed in Potsdam? This was one of the greatest events of history, where the Soviet Union, the US and England confirmed the results of the war in writing. Pre-war Germany was no more. Now there are two German states. There are fixed post-war borders between the two countries, as in the rest of Europe.

Gromyko continued that the USSR, the US, Great Britain and other countries must and do respect what was written into history by the blood of those who perished. The USSR was more than shocked to hear the US say at Stockholm that the “division” of Europe was an unpleasant thing. This view was repeated in subsequent NATO statements. The USSR noted how the US, if it had truly thought through its position, looked at the common victory, the results of the war, and the obligations which it had taken upon itself as a result of conferences during and after the war. When they read about this, surely people in the Soviet Union wonder how this could be so, how to deal with a country which had radically changed its position on the obligations it had assumed.

Gromyko continued that the USSR would like the US to know that no one—no one—can change the reality of the situation in Europe. But such statements as the one to which he had referred poison the atmosphere and cast a

dark shadow over relations between the two major powers. So the USSR asks for realism on the part of the US. We should cherish what has been achieved, and not make statements which poison our relations, where there is already enough disarray.

The US was certainly aware of West German reactions to such US statements, Gromyko went on. There are people in the FRG who reach out and grasp at such things for nationalistic aims, not unlike those expressed by the Nazis before the war. Gromyko mentioned that he had spoken recently with Foreign Minister Genscher.⁴ The West Germans do not like it when the representatives of the USSR talk of this matter. Genscher said that there was almost no one in Germany who believed in this. Gromyko had said that Genscher should look around him more attentively, and then he would see that there were such people. This, too, is an obstacle to our relations, and it would be good to remove it.

The Secretary said that he would talk about Europe in reference to what Gromyko had said; that he would then like to use the technique which Gromyko had used last Wednesday,⁵ i.e. to “headline” certain questions; and finally that he would return to some of Gromyko’s thoughts about how to conduct relations between the two countries.

On Europe, the Secretary said the US does not want to change the treaties Gromyko had referred to. It wants to see those treaties implemented, just as it wants implementation of the Helsinki accords. But it was descriptively true to say that Europe was divided. Arrangements and symbols exist which demonstrate that. For example, the leading countries of Western Europe belong to the NATO alliance, and the leading countries of Eastern Europe belong to the Warsaw Pact. This is a

symbol of division. The wall in Berlin is a symbol of division. It is difficult for people to travel between countries, which also shows the same thing. The fact of division is simply an observation. The US thinks it is not a desirable situation. There should be an easy flow of people throughout Europe, as there is in Western Europe. This would not change the national identity of countries; but it would increase the sense of ease in relations among countries. A division does exist in Europe, and the Secretary had simply wanted to call attention to it, and to the fact that things would be better if it were not there.

The Secretary continued that if events should ease this division and if all the things which Gromyko had mentioned, as well as the Helsinki accords, are implemented by the decision of our governments, and there is more freedom for people to move around, it would be so much the better. Our objective is not to call for a change in borders or for a change of the treaties concluded after the war. It is simply to call attention to the fact of division and to say that it would be better if such a division did not exist. To some extent, the kind of measures he and Gromyko had mentioned in Stockholm were one way of resolving this issue. The same applied to the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, as well as to other negotiations.

The Secretary said he was glad to have a chance to talk about what he had meant regarding the division of Europe, which was that it was simply a description of what is so, and the fact that it is undesirable.

The Secretary then proceeded to “headline” certain issues.

On arms control, the Secretary said he wished to explain once again what the President had in mind. What he was about to say was the result of many hours he had spent

alone with the President struggling together to see how we could find ways to produce forward movement in relations with the USSR.

As he saw it, we have Gromyko's "question of questions." The President had thought this description quite apt. After Gromyko had left, he had mentioned it several times. Then we have nuclear arms as the preeminent question, and here the President felt that the US had made a number of good proposals. From the time he put them forward, he had thought a lot about the issues from both standpoints. He also even asked that a group of experts be assembled who would play the role of Soviet experts thinking from the Soviet viewpoint, in order to be able to understand it better.

Gromyko asked in English how they had behaved. *The Secretary* replied that they were much tougher than *Gromyko*. *Gromyko* smiled and said in English that he would have to take this into account.

The Secretary continued by saying that the President had struggled with this question of questions. He felt that there was a lot of US thinking which the Soviet Union was not aware of. We see, as *Gromyko* had noted, that in the area of space weapons and in the general area of defensive weapons there is a great deal of technological development, as there is in the area of offensive weapons. A lot of research is going on. We do not yet know where it will go, but it will change things. This is related to the interaction between offensive and defensive systems, and the President feels this should be worked on.

The Secretary continued that the President feels, as the Soviets feel, that there was a possibility of chemical and biological weapons getting loose, and this would pose a

great threat. We need to do everything we can to get it under control. He was often asked about the Iran-Iraq war, and he replied that it has nothing to do with Soviet-American competition. But it was the bloodiest conflict going on today, and the use of chemical weapons in it was very bad. *Gromyko* interjected that this was true. This was an example of the threat of chemical warfare, *the Secretary* went on, and the US had warned Iraq about this.

The Secretary continued that these things frustrate the President. He takes the Stockholm negotiations very seriously. In his Dublin speech and privately through our Stockholm negotiator he tried to be responsive to the Soviet proposal on non-use of force.⁶ In the field of nuclear testing, which is a sort of sub-set of offensive weapons, the President is also anxious to see us capable of moving things forward. As we see it, we could do better in calibrating the levels of tests, and that is why the President suggested that we invite Soviet experts to witness a test in our country, and that the Soviets invite ours to theirs. This would give us more confidence about what's going on, so we can get on with it.

The Secretary commented that the President says to him, "George, there's all this substance out there, and we have other ideas, but we don't seem to be able to get to it." That was where the idea of an umbrella came from. Maybe the way to get at these issues is not to go back to Geneva, but we need a forum we can both agree on, where we can talk about how to get all these things moving along, how to divide the parameters and perhaps to give our negotiators a kick in the rear end to get on with it. The Secretary concluded that he had wanted to explain how the concept had emerged from the President's frustration.

Continuing with his "headlines," the Secretary noted that Gromyko had alluded to the Far East in New York, and that he wanted to talk about the tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Both sides would like to ease these tensions. The US felt that the best way to do that would be to have more talks between the two Koreas. The relief which North Korea is now providing to South Korea is a good thing. The Secretary could assure Gromyko that South Korea wants to have a dialogue with North Korea. He had met with the South Korean Foreign Minister, who had told him that South Korea would like to be admitted to the UN, and hoped that the Soviet Union would not stand in the way of this. He also wants the Soviets to know that South Korea will not stand in the way of North Korea's membership either. If the two Koreas were both members of the UN, this could provide a good setting for contacts between them.

The Secretary said he wanted to say two things about bilateral US-Soviet relations. These were issues which were not directly involved with the "question of questions," but did reflect life. The Secretary indicated that he had a long list of such questions before him, but he wished to especially point out two.

The first was that the US is supporting the revival of exchanges of young political leaders. He understood there is a visit planned soon in this connection, and we support that. The second issue was that the two sides had begun negotiations on a new exchanges agreement, and that this was a good thing. As the President had said, exchanges among people are among the most constructive things we can achieve.

The second thing was in the economic area, the Secretary went on. He said that whenever a meeting was scheduled between him and Gromyko, he was flooded with letters

requesting various things. He had gotten one such letter from the Secretary of Commerce, and all Secretaries of Commerce want to do business. He especially wanted the Secretary to tell Gromyko that the proposed economic meeting in December should go forward. He was sending a good man, Lionel Olmer, to head the US side, and he hoped this would lead to a meeting on the ministerial level.⁷ The aim of such cooperation would be to stimulate non-strategic trade. The Secretary of Commerce is a former businessman and is serious about what he speaks of.

The Secretary said that he would now like to turn to the question of contacts and exchanges between our countries. If he had understood Gromyko correctly, his idea had been that meetings on various subjects need to be monitored and controlled through our foreign ministries, and that there should not be meetings for the sake of meetings. He agreed with that, and we should be able to organize our respective governments accordingly. There would also need to be a process by which to decide on the level and subject of such meetings, and we should be able to achieve that.

Gromyko had touched upon regional issues, including the Middle East, the Secretary went on. We had discussed this topic the day before at lunch, and he thought the discussion had been very worthwhile. We have had the US specialist handling the Middle East, Ambassador Murphy, out in the area, and he was due back that afternoon. We also have on the table a proposal he had made to Ambassador Dobrynin that two or three experts on the Middle East on the US side get together with about the same number of Soviet Middle East experts to discuss this issue. Ambassador Murphy would be our designee for such talks, and the Secretary said he would like to sit in himself. These discussions ought to be confidential. The Secretary did not know what results would come from such meetings,

but at a minimum there would be an exchange of views. Moreover, each side would then understand better the thinking of the other side, so that there would not be any miscalculations, and perhaps areas of mutual interest could be found and ways to achieve results. For example, on Lebanon, both countries would like to see Israel withdraw, both would like to see more stability, and are supportive of the role of UNIFIL. The Soviet Union has contacts with Syria, and the US also has some contacts with Syria. There are ingredients for some understanding of what needs to be done. If the Soviet Union is ready for such a meeting, the US is also ready.

The Secretary noted that the US had also spoken about similar meetings on Southern Africa, and as the President had said, we would also be ready for meetings on various other areas. Discussions did not necessarily need to be conducted only in connection with trouble spots. Sometimes trouble can be avoided by timely discussions. There are only two countries that are genuinely world powers, and if we can compare notes on a systematic basis perhaps we can get something out of it.

The Secretary said we wanted to stress that the US was not interested in empty talk. Such talk can be counterproductive, since people can expect too much and feel that something is being accomplished, whereas actually nothing is. The US is interested in moving things along in many areas. Sometimes meetings can be about important subjects such as arms control. Sometimes, meetings on a lot of little things can create a better environment for things to happen in other areas. An example of this is the economic field, to deal with the Don Kendalls of this world.⁸ The US is for discussions but the form will vary with the subject matter, and if there is no movement in one specific discussion, it could be decided to

terminate them and to move to discussions in a more fruitful area.

The Secretary said he wished to return to the essential importance of arms control, and to convey again the President's sense of frustration that no progress is being made. The President believes that there is lots of room for substantive discussion, but none is taking place. He's looking for some way to solve this. He has made proposals, but he's willing to listen to other proposals; the question is how to bring about forward movement.

Gromyko said he was glad to note what the Secretary had said about the fact that the US remains dedicated to the obligations it had assumed during and after the war regarding Europe, and that the Soviet side had misinterpreted what had been said at Stockholm and in other statements. At the same time, when the Secretary had made that statement, and there were subsequent statements by the US and its Allies about this subject, these statements were not accompanied by the type of explanation that the Secretary had just given, i.e., the obligation to abide by former agreements. If it is true that the US and its Allies feel this way, why is it necessary for the US alone and subsequently together with its Allies to make statements that it is necessary to seek to bring about a unified German state? What prompted this? Such statements are picked up by certain forces in West Germany which *Gromyko* had spoken of, and interpreted by them in a very definite way.

Gromyko said he would not want to see a contradiction in the US position between loyalty to post-war agreements and how we see the future of Europe. Statements should not be made indicating the goal of a unified German state; otherwise, contradictions would exist. *Gromyko* repeated

that he was glad to hear the Secretary's statement about US loyalty to the obligations it undertook as an ally. Perhaps the Secretary underestimated the significance of what he had said. But everything that runs counter to it should fall away. The Soviet Union for its part has been loyal to the spirit and letter of the Allied agreements, and will observe them scrupulously.

Gromyko observed that the Secretary had said that there should be recognition that a division exists between the countries of Europe, citing Berlin as an example, where everything was not as it should be. This was an exaggeration. The Soviet side felt that the Berlin Agreement was being well implemented on the whole, and that the parties to it had not raised serious complaints. Of course, there are differences in Europe. The US and its allies and the Soviets and their allies had many differences on Europe, and on international affairs generally, including those discussed forcefully and vigorously the day before. There are many divisions in the world, in many regions, for example in the Middle East, in the Far East, in Southern Africa, in the Caribbean. So things do not always go smoothly, but should we call these differences "divisions?" Of course the US can use the words it wants, but it is important to understand what each side means. The most important thing is that the US remains faithful to the agreements it signed as an ally, and that would be no sense in attempting to unify Germany. Such an attempt is a chimera, an illusion, and it would be better for the US as well as the USSR not to build policies on illusions, but on reality. If we build our policies on reality, relations between our two countries and with other countries are bound to improve.

With regard to chemical weapons, Gromyko indicated that the Secretary had read his thoughts, for he also wished to

speak about this subject, since it was indeed an important one, and the Soviet side attached great importance to it. A great amount of chemical weapons is being produced. The USSR knows that the US is producing them, and the Soviet Union is not a saint either, and needs to think about these things. So it would be good if our countries stopped the production of chemical weapons and instituted an effective ban on them. This would be a good step forward in the struggle to achieve peace. It would be important in itself, and a successful resolution of this issue would also make it easier to examine other issues, perhaps even the question of nuclear arms. So the USSR asks the US Government to seriously look at this issue. These weapons are not needed by the interests of the US, the USSR or any other state.

Gromyko observed that both sides had made proposals on verifying a ban on chemical weapons. But on verification he had one remark: he did not think anything would come of proposals that seek to trick or outsmart the other side. There was something of that sort in the US proposal in Geneva, where the US indicated that everything government-owned should be open to verification. It was clear that this was aimed at the Soviet Union and other states with public ownership of property. Verification would be different in the US and other countries, where ownership of property is not in the hands of the State. Such an approach will not work. It is artificial, and it has made the US look the worse for proposing it. The USSR has been told by other countries that the US proposal was made with the purpose of not having an agreement. But it would be good to have an agreement.

Gromyko said the next question he was going to raise was not one which he often spoke about with the Secretary. The US was aware of the Soviet Union's relations with Japan, just as the Soviet Union is aware of US relations with

Japan. The Soviet Union wants only good relations, good-neighborly relations, with that country. This is an obligation that comes from history itself. However, the USSR has been observing how relations between the US and Japan have been developing over a long period of time, and this has led the USSR to conclude that the US wishes to increase Japanese military power—at a level that is senseless because it is simply not needed for a country that wishes to live in peace with its neighbors, including the Soviet Union.

Gromyko continued that some circles seeking to formulate Japanese policies have perhaps concluded from this US support that they can increase Japan's military expenditures and harden its foreign policy. But this is not at all necessary. The Soviet Union is not against having good relations with Japan. The US is demonstratively showing that in Japan a new hostile anti-Soviet force is being born. This is a strange thing to see. The events of the last war have not yet receded that far into history. How often the US asked for Soviet assistance in the war against Japan! This was done in Tehran, Potsdam and Yalta, at the level of principle and with an increasing level of intensity. Sometimes it was just Roosevelt and Stalin alone. The Soviet Union promised to help the United States and kept its promise. The main Japanese land force in the Far East was essentially defeated by the Soviet Union, and Pentagon specialists can indicate how much this cost the Soviet Union.

Gromyko continued that the Soviet Union respects its obligations, and did not understand why Japan had to be militarized, why the US was attempting to foster hostile attitudes against the Soviet Union. It would be in the US interest to encourage Japan to be friendly with the USSR. The Soviet Union is not against friendly relations between Japan and the US, but if this is aimed against the Soviet

Union, the latter would have to and does take this into consideration, including in its military policies, for the sake of self-defense. From the standpoint of future policy, the US should perhaps examine all of this from a higher, longer-term vantage point.

The Secretary said he wanted to speak about the three questions Gromyko had raised.

On Germany, he said that the question of reunification was not a contemporary question for the US. The US is not against this, but it is not pushing for it. It would be determined in the future. It is not a contemporary issue. That was not the point. The point we do pick up, and favor, is that contacts between the two Germanies can be expected to increase. This is inevitable; they have a similar culture and language, and there are many family ties. Such contacts should be encouraged. But this is completely separate from the question of reunifying Germany. No one is pushing that except maybe a few people in Germany.

On chemical weapons, the Secretary indicated that the US was interested in bilateral dialogue on this with the USSR. There had been some bilateral talks in Geneva within the multilateral framework. This is an area where the US is ready to push its negotiators to get ahead to an agreement to rid the world of these weapons, which we agree should be the objective. With regard to Gromyko's assertion that the US proposal is deceptive or tricky, since it did not take into consideration the difference between different social and economic systems, he wanted to say that the US had no such intention. The US would be glad to sit down with the Soviet Union and explain how it sees the matter. For the US, private companies doing business with the government would be part of the system subject to verification. They would not be exempted if they did

business with the government. But to achieve progress, we need to look at the words of the proposal, or at other wordings. We agree on the objective, and on the importance of verification. It is not only important but difficult, in many ways more difficult than verification of major nuclear offensive weapons. But the US is ready to work with the Soviets to find an answer.

The Secretary wished to say something with regard to Japan, and Asia in general, since he had spent a lot of time there both as a private businessman and as a government official. Japan is seeking to build a defensive force. It did not want to build up an offensive machine, and he did not think Japan's neighbors would want that. But Japan needs to have a defensive capability. What affects Japan's thinking is the great volume of Soviet ships passing by, of aircraft which it observes, and the SS-20's within range of Japan. It finds these things disturbing. The Secretary said he knew the Soviets did not like to hear about the northern islands, but both the USSR and the US know that the northern islands are a very big issue in Soviet-Japanese relations, and will continue to be one.

The Secretary observed more generally with regard to Asia that it was a place of great dynamism. The people there are smart, they have drive, they are industrious, with strong goals. They are ingenious. He felt that we would hear more and more from them. We already see this in Japan, the most developed of the Asian nations. It has the most creative technical economy, and the US is competing with it in all technical fields. The other nations of the area are also very industrious; this is true of the Koreans and the Chinese too, whether they are on the mainland or in Taiwan or in other places, even San Francisco. So the US and USSR should pay attention to Asia, and if a fruitful pattern of regional

discussions could be established between them, Asia should get due attention.

With regard to Japan, the Secretary indicated that yes, that country should be able to defend its territory and territorial waters and waters nearby. We think it should have the capacity to be less dependent on us. The US is working to have strong and friendly relations with Japan. Japan is a tough competitor, but the US is nevertheless improving the climate for friendly relations.

Gromyko pointed out that a great deal of attention had been paid the day before, by the President, the Secretary and *Gromyko* himself, to what both sides considered the most important question of nuclear arms. This was justified, since it was the main axis around which many other issues turned, both of a bilateral and international nature. For this reason, he had tried to stress both the acute nature of the issue and the urgency of our considering and trying to resolve it while it was not yet too late.

Gromyko said he wanted once again to emphasize the tremendous importance of seeing this issue resolve. He asked the Secretary to tell the President on behalf of the entire Soviet leadership and *Konstantin Chernenko* personally that they consider it the most acute question in the world today. It hangs over the world and all other unsolved issues like an evil dark cloud.

Gromyko said he had had the impression that the President had once or twice been close to saying, as had the Secretary, that the principle of equality and equal security was acceptable to the US. If this was so, then practical policies should be built on this principle. But he had not discerned any commitment by the US to follow up and

observe this principle in terms of practice. The Soviet Union would like the US to seriously analyze this question and other similar ones which depend on it. Perhaps conclusions could be arrived at which would help us to consider and ultimately to solve these issues. The Soviet Union considers that the question of nuclear weapons is the key to the possibility of preserving peace, and even life on earth. Many people are speaking this way these days, both ordinary people and political leaders, but they give different contents to their words. This is an issue on which we should work night and day, and our practical policies should be aimed at resolving it. There should be not only good words, but political deeds to resolve the question of nuclear arms, be they strategic, medium range or designed for outer space. Gromyko stressed that his hope was that the President would pay great attention to this very important and urgent issue.

Gromyko asked the Secretary to convey to the President his thanks for his courtesy in receiving him, and concluded that if it appeared appropriate for him and the Secretary to have a subsequent meeting, they could be in touch.

The Secretary said that on the last question Gromyko had raised, he wanted to indicate that the US did not seek domination or superiority over the Soviet Union. As the President had said, nuclear arms is the main question and the proper ultimate objective should be to eliminate them altogether. This means that our course should be toward reducing them, along with working on non-proliferation. The two sides should find a pattern to reduce their nuclear arsenals that keeps them in equality as reductions take place and sufficiently strong to maintain deterrence. That is what the President is aiming at.

On Gromyko's last point about meetings of foreign ministers and others, the Secretary said we think such meetings could be useful if the groundwork were to be prepared in a good way. He also wanted to return to what he had said in response to Gromyko's point about better use of diplomatic channels to identify subjects and people for meetings where fruitful discussions can take place, and to encourage that.

The Secretary said that he would think over everything which Gromyko had said, would carefully review the notes in order that there be no misunderstanding, and talk over things with the President. He would then be in touch with Ambassador Dobrynin to review where we are, and he hoped that Gromyko would do likewise with Ambassador Hartman. Perhaps the sides could see if they could not come up with a plan to move things forward. Any plan which would be even remotely adequate would have to deal with the question of questions, i.e., nuclear arms, as well as with outer space.

The Secretary concluded by saying that he felt that the combination of meetings with Gromyko had been the most worthwhile that he had had with him, and he had some sense that the two sides might possibly be seeing genuine dialogue that could lead again to some real interaction. The US intends to pursue things in this light. The day before, Gromyko and the President had agreed "to stay in touch." The Secretary planned to say he and Gromyko had agreed to the same thing, namely, that he expects to keep in touch, not casually but carefully, through diplomatic channels.

Gromyko concluded by saying that the Secretary would understand that the Soviet side would not make any references to persons in order that its words not be

misinterpreted, at least in this country, in the political context.⁹

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, President-Gromyko Final Papers (6). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Zarechnak; cleared by Simons. The meeting took place at the Department of State. In a September 29 memorandum to Reagan summarizing his meeting with Gromyko, Shultz wrote: "I sensed somewhat more flexibility on his part concerning how to get going, and I think that hearing your candid and intense views probably helped." He continued: "Looking over our meetings with Gromyko this week, I think they are the most lively and genuine dialogue we have had with the Soviets for many years. We are addressing real issues, and even—in Gromyko's case—revealing sensitivities that the Soviets usually conceal, on Germany and Japan and the fear of losing what they achieved in the War. This kind of frank discussion on substance cannot help but be useful, in contrast to talking past each other. Moreover, in today's meeting, Gromyko began to display a measure of genuine interest in the expanded dialogue you have proposed. On the other hand, because he was so defensive, he revealed no new substance at this time." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, President-Gromyko—Working Papers (2))

² See [Documents 286](#) and [287](#).

³ See [footnote 5, Document 159](#).

⁴ Genscher and Gromyko met in New York on the afternoon of September 25 during the UNGA session. Earlier that day, Genscher and Shultz had a breakfast meeting and a discussion about German-Soviet and U.S.-Soviet relations. (Telegram Secto 11006 from the Secretary's delegation in New York to the Department and sent for information

Immediate to Bonn; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840011-0153)

⁵ September 26.

⁶ Gromyko proposed a non-use of force pledge in his January 18 speech at the CDE. See [footnote 3, Document 159](#). For Reagan's speech in Dublin on June 4, see also [footnote 3, Document 224](#). On September 11, the opening day of the third round of the CDE, Reagan made the following statement: "The U.S. and other Western Nations have proposed at the Stockholm conference a series of concrete measures for information, observation, and verification, designed to reduce the possibility of war by miscalculation or surprise attack. These measures would apply to the whole of Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has taken a more rhetorical approach to the Conference, seeking the adoption of declarations which are embodied in other international agreements. In an effort to bridge this difference in our approaches, I made it clear in my address to the Irish Parliament in June that the U.S. will consider the Soviet proposal for a declaration on the nonuse of force as long as the Soviet Union will discuss the concrete measures needed to put that principle into action. This new move on our part has not yet been met with a positive response from the Soviet Union." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book II, pp. 1271-1272)

⁷ Lionel Olmer, the Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade, was the head of the U.S. working group of experts set to meet in Moscow in January 1985 to prepare for a possible meeting of the Joint Commercial Commission. See [Document 351](#). The following telegrams provide additional information: Telegram 318911 to Moscow, October 26; telegram 15041 from Moscow, November 27; telegram 15504 to Moscow, January 17, 1985. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File,

Electronic Telegrams, D840685-0192, D840756-0771, and D850037-0152, respectively)

⁸ Donald Kendall was the CEO of PepsiCo, Inc.

⁹ In his September 29 memorandum to Reagan summarizing his meeting with Gromyko, Shultz concluded: "I think we can afford to hope that Gromyko will carry an accurate account of his talks here back to his colleagues in the leadership, and that it will make an impression that will be useful as they review our relationship in the months ahead. Our election will obviously be one factor they will take into account, and the substance of what we are proposing will be the best demonstration to them that we mean serious business. But their own leadership situation will also be a primary, if not the primary factor, in whether and how they move; there we know only that the picture is uncertain, and we do not know when it will become clear enough for them to move strongly in any direction. As before, therefore, our policy should continue to be quiet, consistent, and steady-as-you-go." See [footnote 1](#), above.

289. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 2, 1984

SUBJECT

Art Hartman's 10/1 Lunch with Dobrynin

Art had another good session at lunch yesterday with Dobrynin who probed for our ideas on follow up on the meetings with Gromyko. Below is a fairly full rendition of the topics covered.

View of the Meetings: Dobrynin led off by asking Art about our sense of the meetings with Gromyko. Art said that they had come out pretty much as we had expected. The TASS statement on the last day noting the two sides had agreed to procedures for further discussions seemed about right. Dobrynin confirmed that Gromyko had instructed the wording of the TASS item.² While the timing just before the elections had been bad from the Soviet point of view, they had not wanted to miss the opportunity to talk. They too felt the talks had resulted in agreement on a way to manage things at this point. In an aside, Dobrynin described Gromyko's UN speech as "about the same as usual."³

Germany and Japan: Art expressed concern that Gromyko seemed to be nostalgic for turning the clock back to the forties in his comments on Germany and Japan. Dobrynin responded that Gromyko was a member of the older generation and felt strongly about this issue. Saying he did

not doubt their sensitivity on the subject, Art said that it nevertheless seemed divorced from reality. If the USSR is run by people in this frame of mind, it could be dangerous. Dobrynin again laid the problem to age, noting people in Moscow were concerned about groups in Germany and Japan who seemed to support the Nazis and wanted to overturn our agreements. Art emphasized that the number of Nazi supporters was very small, adding that the real point was that the Soviet leadership seemed not to understand the present-day situation of two of the most powerful countries on the world scene. He reaffirmed our long-term position that does not oppose but puts off the question of a German reunification until the completion of a peace treaty and suggested the Soviets should also work out something on the Northern Territories with Japan.

U.S. Sincerity: Dobrynin then said that his leaders were not sure if our talk about better relations might not just be pre-election rhetoric, and that we would return to trying to force the Soviets to bend to our will after November. He added that they know what the President said in the meeting; they will now be looking at what he says after the election. Art replied the President was, of course, talking about policy after the election and asked what kind of affirmation the Soviets were expecting. Dobrynin said he was not suggesting anything specific, but that they would be looking for some sign post-election. Dobrynin then said that if confirmation was forthcoming after the election that the Presidents wants to move in the direction he outlined, then there would be a positive response from the Soviet side. Underscoring the election point, Dobrynin said at another juncture that they wanted the exchanges talks to move forward but would not sign anything until after the election.

Interim Restraint: Dobrynin brought up interim restraint, asking what the President had in mind in his reference. He read from the Soviet notes of the meeting to the effect that the U.S. might consider an interim agreement that provided a certain restraint on ASAT and simultaneously beginning discussion of strategic offensive weapons. Art promised to check our record and get back to him on the exact wording.⁴

Next Steps: Dobrynin then asked about next steps. Did we plan to send a group of people to Moscow or what? Art responded that this had not been decided, noting you had suggested it might be useful to have a group sort out the issues of arms control. Such a group could talk less formally than in an actual negotiation and avoid getting bogged down in details. Dobrynin pointed to Gromyko's preference for diplomatic channels.

Dobrynin followed up by asking if we had in mind for you and Gromyko to get together again in the near future. Art referred to your comment that you would meet with Dobrynin and he would meet with Gromyko in the weeks ahead. He also suggested that it might take several meetings to decide what to do next. Art offered his personal view that we should not be too quick in this process—there would need to be some sorting out on both sides—and commented that we had the impression that there was some confusion on the Soviet part over the issues. He suggested that the discussions in the weeks ahead could be beneficial in moving toward a meeting between you and Gromyko early next year. Dobrynin conceded that there had been confusion in the Soviet proposal for outer space talks, adding that he himself had advised against putting a date in the Soviet proposal.⁵ But the Politburo had decided otherwise. He seemed to agree that it would be best to

have some time to sort out our respective positions on the issues.

Upcoming Plenum on Agriculture: In response to Art's query if he planned to return to Moscow for the upcoming Central Committee Plenum, Dobrynin said that he would not since it would be devoted to Soviet agriculture problems. He added that the USSR's agricultural situation was not good. They were becoming convinced that much more needed to be done with irrigation and some heads might roll in this area. He also mentioned the possibility of other personnel changes, including specifically the Minister of Foreign Trade Patolichev who is in very bad health.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, October 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons and Hartman. Forwarded through Armacost. Printed from an uninitialed copy. McKinley's handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on October 2.

² For the September 29 TASS statement, see the *Washington Post*, September 29, 1984, p. A11.

³ See [footnote 4, Document 287](#).

⁴ In his September 28 meeting with Gromyko, Reagan "wondered if we could not consider concluding an interim agreement with restrictions on anti-satellite weapons, and also an agreement on a process for reducing nuclear arms" (see [Document 286](#)). Reagan also addressed this in his UNGA speech: "We've been prepared to discuss a wide range of issues of concern to both sides, such as the relationship between defensive and offensive forces and what has been called the militarization of space. During the talks, we would consider what measures of restraint both

sides might take while negotiations proceed. However, any agreement must logically depend upon our ability to get the competition in offensive arms under control and to achieve genuine stability at substantially lower levels of nuclear arms." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book II, p. 1360)

⁵ Dobrynin was referring to the June 29 Soviet proposal for negotiations in Vienna. See [Document 233](#).

290. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the White House¹

New York, October 5, 1984, 1754Z

Secto 11088. Subject: Memorandum for the President: Follow-up to Gromyko Meetings—Letter to Chernenko (Super Sensitive—S/S 8427391).

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

FROM: George P. Shultz

SUBJECT: Follow-up to the Gromyko Meetings As I told you in my report on Saturday's meeting,² our exchanges with Gromyko were the most lively and genuine dialogue we have had with the Soviets for many years, and may have opened the door a little wider to progress on the major issues over the next four years. At the same time, Gromyko broke no new ground, and did not indicate whether the Soviet leadership will, in fact, be capable or willing to make the decisions needed to move forward. While their internal leadership situation will be the decisive factor in this regard, their response will turn in part on whether we are able to continue conveying the message you successfully delivered to Gromyko last week, and to put some specific substance into our arms control positions, particularly on nuclear arms.

Therefore, I believe we should be thinking about steps we could take before the end of the year to stress the continuity of our approach and our readiness to back up words with deeds. The most important would be a letter to Chernenko providing a comprehensive restatement of our

approach to the relationship, together with suggestions for some concrete steps both sides could take in arms control and bilateral relations. Another step we might also want to consider would be for you to give a speech toward the end of the year putting our basic approach to US-Soviet relations on the public record. You will recall that Lord Carrington suggested that such a reaffirmation of our interest in improved relations would also have a positive impact in Western Europe.³ We will be giving further thought to the contents of such a letter and speech, and I will be prepared to discuss our recommendations with you when we are further along.

In the near term, I believe it would be useful for you to send a shorter letter to Chernenko that gives your personal assessment of the results of the Gromyko meetings, and reaffirms your desire to move forward in all areas of our relations—above all on the priority question of nuclear arms reductions. In this connection, the letter could also reiterate your expressed readiness to talk about outer space weapons, and your proposal concerning an interim agreement that would both restrict ASATs and begin the process of reducing nuclear arms.

Sending such a letter now would ensure that your basic message got through to Chernenko, and lay the groundwork for a more comprehensive letter later. It would also set the stage for the meeting I plan to have with Dobrynin in about ten days' time to review where we stand and where we go from here (and for Art Hartman's next exchange with Gromyko in Moscow).

A proposed draft of a letter to Chernenko is attached.⁴ You will note that the language on the interim agreement indicates that we envisage limits on ASAT and offensive

arms as a single package, but without defining the linkage too explicitly.

ATTACHMENT: As stated

[Omitted here is the text of the draft letter to Chernenko.]

Shultz

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840011-0446. Secret; Nodis; Immediate. Sent for information to the Department of State. An October 3 State Department draft of this memorandum indicates it was drafted by Vershbow on October 3; cleared by Simons, Palmer, Dobbins, and Kanter. In a covering note to Shultz, Armacost wrote: "Mr. Secretary: My only reservation is to the formation of an interim restraint agreement. The linkage proposed is ambiguous. We could agree that 'being the process of reducing . . .' means some actual reductions. But another interpretation is possible. In the initial bargaining stage I would think a more straight-forward linkage is desirable bureaucratically, politically, and for negotiating purposes. I recognize the President's words impose some constraint, but if we want to establish a tougher linkage—as I think we should—this letter offers an opportunity." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, October 1984 Super Sensitive Documents) A typed note in the margin of the draft reads: "memo revised by S and dispatched from NY 10/5. bdf."

² See [footnotes 1](#) and [9, Document 288](#).

³ According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan met with Lord Carrington in Washington on September 11, shortly after Carrington's election as Secretary General of NATO.

(Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) [4](#) The draft letter was not sent to Chernenko.

291. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, October 9, 1984

SUBJECT

Suggestion for Presidential Letter to Chernenko

Secretary Shultz has forwarded a memorandum to the President recommending that a short letter be sent to Chernenko reaffirming his basic approach to the relationship and proposing "an interim agreement including provisions that would both place restrictions on anti-satellite weapons and begin the process of reducing offensive nuclear arms."²

I do not believe that a letter at this time would be particularly useful and also doubt that we should put the proposal mentioned in writing at this time. If the Soviets are interested in such an arrangement, we can be confident that they will respond in some fashion to the hint the President dropped in his presentation to Gromyko.³ But at the moment, I believe they are still digesting the material from Gromyko's visit, as they grapple with their own leadership situation. Trying to force the pace of their deliberations at this time may do more harm than good.

My recommendation would be to wait until *after* the election for any further initiatives, and then to attempt to convey any substantive ideas we may have privately and informally in the first instance. If the Soviets are by then moving in the direction of establishing a broad dialogue,

this would permit some adjustment of proposals on both sides to make them as palatable as possible to the other.

State's proposal seems based on the assumption that the Soviets are looking for something in the ASAT area as an excuse to reopen negotiations on offensive weapons. Conceivably this is the case, but I frankly doubt it. In my judgment, INF is still the key question so far as they are concerned, and though they worry about SDI, they are not particularly nervous about the ASAT program as such. Of course, I may be wrong, but I doubt the wisdom of proceeding down a particular track (especially one which we would not have chosen as optimum from our point of view) unless we are more certain than we can be at the moment of the Soviet reaction.

I have attached a Memorandum to the President pointing out these considerations.⁴

Ron Lehman concurs.

Recommendation:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at TAB I.⁵

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Umbrella Talks 10/05/1984-10/15/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

² See [Document 290](#).

³ See [Document 286](#).

⁴ Neither tab is attached; the Shultz memorandum, listed as Tab A, is [Document 290](#).

⁵ McFarlane did not check the Approve or Disapprove options, but he wrote on the first page: "Jack/Ron, Pls staff

fwd promptly a decision paper on option 1½. Bud.” On October 15, Linhard, Lehman, and Kraemer sent McFarlane a memorandum on “Decision Paper on Option 1½.” On October 26, McFarlane sent Reagan a revised version of the memorandum for decision. See [Document 297](#).

292. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, October 15, 1984

SUBJECT

Menshikov Message on Meetings with Gromyko and Future Steps

Jim Giffen, President of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council took me aside at a conference in Vermont Saturday evening² to pass on some comments he had received from Stanislav Menshikov, Zagladin's assistant on the Soviet Central Committee staff. (You will recall my conversation with Menshikov in New York last March.)³ Giffen was in Moscow last week and saw Menshikov during the latter part of the week. Menshikov asked him if he knew me and when Giffen confirmed that he did, asked Giffen to pass on the following (which Giffen read from his notes):

"Tell Matlock," he said, "to review the transcript of the meetings with Gromyko and pay particular attention to Gromyko's references to the need for 'adjustments' in U.S. policy." Menshikov went on to say that they considered the conversations very useful and had noted the "eight-minute private session with the President."⁴ On the latter, he commented that the "words were fine," but that we should not expect an "experienced diplomat" like Gromyko to take them at face value unless he saw corroborating evidence.

Menshikov then said that we should also pay attention to what Chernenko had said about a "Code of Conduct of Nuclear Powers,"⁵ and implied that this could be an avenue

for face saving on their part to get back into broader negotiations. He then commented that the basic Soviet requirement is that we “show some respect,” and went to great lengths to describe a scene from Puzo’s novel *The Godfather*, when a person went out of his way to accommodate the Godfather on a small matter once he learned who the Godfather was.

Though not part of Menshikov’s “message,” several other topics of interest arose in his conversation, according to Giffen.

—Giffen received the impression that the Soviets were frustrated by the absence of any means of discussing problems privately and confidentially. Menshikov, for example, observed that they cannot talk to anyone in the State Department without it appearing in a Gwertzman or Gelb story in a few days.

—When Giffen asked about the possibility of reviving Jewish emigration, Menshikov said that this could be a matter for negotiation “at the proper time.” (Arbatov, who was asked the same question, simply said that “This is not the right time.”)

—Menshikov told Giffen, in response to his direct question, that Gorbachev is now in fact the “number two” official in the Party. He refused to confirm that Gorbachev would be Chernenko’s successor, however, stating that “even we at the Central Committee don’t know what is going on in that sphere.”

—Regarding Scowcroft’s trip last spring,⁶ Giffen said that he had asked Alkhimov, Chairman of the USSR State Bank, why the Soviets had refused to see him. (Alkhimov’s position is a “cabinet level” one and he is usually well

informed regarding US-Soviet relations, in which he has a personal interest.) Alkhimov told Giffen that he himself had been dismayed to learn that Scowcroft was not received and had “checked it out.” The explanation he had received was that they had been willing to talk to Scowcroft, but were surprised by the attempt to see Chernenko, and that if Scowcroft had taken the appointment with Komplektov, Chernenko might have seen him subsequently. Alkhimov then observed that an outsider cannot just go to Chernenko directly, but must have a sponsor in the Soviet system and that the “worst way” to arrange the meeting was through the Foreign Ministry. “Next time,” he advised, “do it through the Central Committee, or—if you wish—I could probably arrange it if you let me know in advance.” [Note: There, as here, everybody wants to get into the act!]

Comments

1. While I would not consider Giffen an appropriate or reliable “messenger” from our point of view (he has a record of taking Soviet statements too much at face value, and even of defending their positions in trade matters), I have no reason to doubt that he has reported accurately what he was told.
2. I have examined the memcons of the meetings with Gromyko and find that Gromyko’s references to “adjustments” or “corrections” in U.S. policy arose in at least two contexts. In regard to resuming negotiations on offensive nuclear weapons, he stated that this could happen “as soon as the U.S. corrects its position,” then made his claims regarding the alleged relevance of carrier-based aircraft. He repeated this statement toward the close of the lunch, when he said that the President should ask his experts to reexamine their views and change the U.S.

position, and when this was done, to let the Soviets know. The second context was that of the Soviet proposal for negotiations on space weapons, when he also said that the U.S. should review the situation calmly and change its position. *At no time, did he define precisely what he meant by a changed position, however.*

3. By mentioning Chernenko's proposal for a "Code of Conduct," Menshikov *may* have been implying that agreement to address this seriously could represent a "changed position" from the Soviet point of view. (In speaking to Giffen, he was doubtless being deliberately cryptic to avoid revealing details about the meetings with Gromyko.) The allusion to the Godfather was probably intended to convey that the Soviet leaders must be made to feel that we take their proposals seriously. What is most interesting about it is the obvious implication that they have the mentality of mobsters—which, in my view, is right on the button.

4. Though we cannot be sure what sort of "adjustments" of U.S. policy the Soviets are looking for, I believe that this rather laconic message clearly indicates two things: First, that Soviet policy makers are still frustrated by what they perceive as the absence of a means of communicating privately and informally with us,⁷ and second, that they are not at this point looking for the sort of concrete moves on specific issues that State habitually pushes. What I infer from this is that they are searching for a *conceptual framework* for interaction with the U.S. during the second term, which would provide the basis for resuming negotiations without seeming to be backing down to US demands. Since they do not want to discuss their real aim on the record (or have it bandied about in the press), they are resorting to indirect "messages" to see if we are willing

to respond and engage them in an informal, non-binding and totally private dialogue.⁸

5. This also reinforces my previous conviction that further proposals (except for procedural ones) are premature until we have the benefit of some informal discussion. The fact is that in devising various responses, we are really shooting in the dark until we have a firmer grasp of what exactly the Soviets are looking for at this point. Their formal diplomacy often focuses on issues which are not really central to their real concerns. And although they will never bear their souls totally even in a private conversation, they are more likely to provide valuable indications privately than in formal interchanges. For example, it may well be that talking about a “Code of Conduct” is more important to them than agreement on an ASAT moratorium. And if this is the case, then the former step could be less damaging to U.S. interests than the latter.

6. Regarding the “Code of Conduct” idea, it occurs to me that it *could* be a key element in getting our “umbrella” concept off the ground. While I am dubious about the value of such declaratory statements in and of themselves, they can provide a rationale and framework for a change in Soviet policy. It seems to me that a carefully worded “Code” could be a cheap price to pay for successful negotiations on reducing offensive weapons. Even a statement which does not go beyond past commitments could be important to the Soviet leaders since it would “show respect” (it is *their* proposal, after all), and could be used publicly to argue that the U.S. position has changed in a way that permits the resumption of negotiations.

7. These, however, are only possibilities. We really cannot know without talking it over with them privately—and under conditions that they are confident provide assurance

against leaks. Unless and until we establish a private dialogue, anything we (or they) propose will really be a form of blind man's bluff, but in this case, with both sides blindfolded.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (10/15/84–10/23/84). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Brackets are in the original. McFarlane wrote at the top of the page: “Mr. President, I thought you would find this interesting. It reinforces the value of bringing Paul Nitze into the White House. Bud.” In an attached handwritten note on Air Force One stationery, Reagan wrote: “Very interesting and if I’ve read it correctly affirms something I’ve felt for some time; namely that part of their problem is their inferiority complex. They want to feel we see them as a superpower. I’m willing to look at a pvt channel but believe this would have to have Georges approval. If he, you & I were the only team in on it at this end with someone like Nitze the channel—talking only to us—why not? To bypass George would be a personal humiliation I wouldn’t want to inflict. RR.”

² October 13.

³ See [Document 195](#).

⁴ See [footnote 12, Document 286](#).

⁵ See [Document 187](#).

⁶ See [Document 193](#).

⁷ This sentence had two vertical lines drawn in the margin, likely by McFarlane.

⁸ This sentence had two vertical lines drawn in the margin, likely by McFarlane.

293. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 16, 1984

SUBJECT

Chernenko's October 15 *Washington Post* Interview

Embassy Moscow called about 12:30 p.m. to say that *Post* Moscow correspondent Dusko Doder had an interview with Chernenko this morning and had called to inform Art Hartman about it.² Subsequently, *Post* Managing Editor Len Downie informed EUR Deputy Jim Dobbins at lunch that most of the "interview" had been written answers to written questions, but that Chernenko had called Doder in this morning to hand it over and talked to him for 20 minutes. Mike Armacost was later told that Doder reported that Chernenko had appeared vigorous, and that his breathing problem was not as severe as usual.

Matlock asked Tom Simons to try to get a copy, but Downie—an old colleague of Simons from London—refused to give him one, and referred him instead to Lou Cannon, who is soliciting comments from around town, including Sims and McFarlane at the White House. As Cannon described it, Chernenko did not repeat the precondition that Pershings be withdrawn before negotiations could be resumed, but otherwise all his written answers tracked with Gromyko's UNGA speech. Simons warned him that the precondition on Pershings flits in and out, but the general umbrella precondition has been "removal of obstacles" for some

months. Cannon found that in the text, so it appears the written formulations were standard.

In the 20 minutes of verbal exchange, Chernenko answered Doder's questions:

—On the US elections, he said that whoever is President of the USA, Soviet peace policy will remain the same.

—Asked if he were optimistic, he said there were “considerable” possibilities, “very considerable” ones, in US-Soviet relations, and Soviet proposals proved it. Silencing his key advisor Aleksandrov, he went on to reiterate the standard line that Gromyko originated with you, and had repeated by the Politburo, that the Soviets thus far see no businesslike shifts toward practical steps in our policy. The Washington talks need to be translated onto practical tracks, he said, and if the President's current approach is not just tactical, “I will not be found wanting.”

—Asked about small steps, he said they are okay, but cloud people's minds. He then referred back to his written answers concerning four areas where the USSR had made proposals which the US had turned down: 1) space arms control (Cannon said the written answer used the June 29 proposal formulation); 2) nuclear freeze; 3) finalizing the 1974/1976 nuclear testing treaties; and 4) non-first-use of nuclear weapons (Cannon said he did not mention conventional weapons).

After we notified Matlock of the interview, the NSC staff met with Poindexter and will have met with Bud at 5:00 p.m. Poindexter's inclination was to try to defer a substantive response till Sunday,³ but Matlock agreed with us that this would probably be untenable. They are recommending to Bud that he call Cannon, tell him we will

study the interview and may respond, but respond only to the accusation that we have made no practical proposals for forward movement (we have put language that tracks with this approach up front in the draft Department press guidance, attached).⁴ Meanwhile, they will prepare White House press guidance for noon tomorrow, to be adjusted once we have the text of the interview in hand. Our draft guidance is subject to similar adjustment.

From the Soviet point of view, the timing of the interview obviously has something to do with the President's debate with Mondale this Sunday.⁵ Former Carter NSC staffer and Mondale operative Bob Hunter, who was also at the lunch with *Post* editor Downie, was excited to get the news to Mondale, and eager to answer any questions the *Post* might have. Chernenko's giving the nuclear freeze second billing behind space arms control is also internal evidence that they have the debate in mind in putting out this interview in Washington now, since they know the freeze is a non-starter with the Administration.

At the same time, Chernenko's specific formulations appear to have been very standard indeed, and the Soviet domestic policy ramifications of putting him forward at this time are probably even more interesting than the foreign policy angle. After his hospitalization in August, evidence pointing toward early retirement started to multiply, but he has been making a comeback since early September: first a whole series of public appearances, domestic and with foreigners; then rumors that the "extraordinary" Central Committee plenum at the end of this month would be marked by publication of a new draft party program and announcement of a party congress next year rather than as scheduled in February 1986; now this interview. You will recall that Gromyko spoke to both you and the President in the name of the entire leadership "and Chernenko

personally;” now he himself has said that if the President is willing “I will not be found wanting.” So although early retirement is still a possibility, it would be unwise to write Chernenko off at this point.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, October 1984. Secret. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Dobbins and Niles. Shultz’s handwritten initials are on the memorandum, indicating he saw it. McKinley’s handwritten initials are also on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on October 16. In a covering note forwarding the memorandum to the White House, McKinley wrote: “Paul, The Secretary wanted Bud to have this internal memo. Brunson.”

² See Dusko Doder, “Chernenko Says U.S. Holds Key to Arms Talks,” *Washington Post*, October 17, 1984, p. A1; and “The Chernenko Interview,” *Washington Post*, October 18, 1984, p. A20.

³ October 21.

⁴ A copy of the October 17 draft Department of State Press Guidance is located in Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, Oct 1984. The White House Statement issued on October 17 is in *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 734–735.

⁵ On October 21, President Reagan and Democratic Presidential candidate Walter Mondale held a debate focused on foreign policy in Kansas City, Missouri. For the full text, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book II, pp. 1589–1608.

294. Memorandum From Robert Linhard, Ronald Lehman, and Sven Kraemer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, October 24, 1984

SUBJECT

Draft NSDD on Pursuing the Umbrella Talks

The basic issue addressed by this package is whether the US should, for the time being, continue to pursue a more general approach to the "umbrella talks" (along the lines of NSC developed *Option 1½*)² or should now (perhaps in the context of the upcoming Shultz-Dobrynin and Hartman-Gromyko meetings) supplement the "umbrella talks" concept with additional and more specific initiatives (along the lines of State's *Option 3*).

Per guidance provided by Admiral Poindexter, *Tab I*³ provides a memorandum for the President which frames the issue and recommends a draft NSDD, provided at *Tab A*,⁴ for the President's approval.

The text of the draft NSDD has not been discussed with anyone outside of the immediate NSC staff. The publication and normal distribution of an NSDD on this subject could quickly become a matter of public record and trigger unproductive speculation just prior to the election. The recent SACPG tasking ensures that the appropriate staffs have the guidance needed to pursue the approach recommended.⁵ Therefore, we would recommend that after the President's review and approval, the NSDD be very

closely held and used only as needed and with appropriate discretion.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum for the President (*Tab D*) and forward the draft NSDD (*Tab A*) for his consideration and signature. If possible, that you personally walk the President through the issues involved.⁶

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Umbrella Talks 10/24/1984–11/04/1984. Secret. Sent for action. Matlock concurred. On a routing slip attached to this memorandum, Poindexter wrote: “I think the NSDD is good. You may feel you are a little beyond the point of the cover memo, although everything that has been done is consistent with it. JP.” McFarlane then wrote: “Pls run my proposed chgs by Ron Lehman.” On the draft of the NSDD, McFarlane made substantial changes to the last paragraph, which were reflected in the final version signed by Reagan. See [Document 298](#).

² See [footnote 1, Document 277](#), and [footnote 5, Document 291](#).

³ See [Document 297](#).

⁴ See [footnote 1](#), above, and [Document 298](#).

⁵ Presumably a reference to McFarlane’s October 12 memorandum to the SACPG members that provided instructions for taskings related to the Umbrella Talks. (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Umbrella Talks 10/24/1984–11/04/1984) See also [footnote 6, Document 305](#).

⁶ McFarlane did not initial his approval or disapproval of the recommendation; however, a signed copy of the

memorandum went forward to Reagan. See [Document 297](#).

295. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 25, 1984

SUBJECT

Soviet Embassy Views on US-Soviet Relations

Soviet Embassy Minister-Counselor Isakov invited Mark to a working lunch today. Isakov's main point seemed to be a desire to explore our thinking on the general direction of the relationship after the elections. In preparing for your meeting with Dobrynin tomorrow, I thought it might be useful for you to know the points Isakov made today.

Isakov said that Gromyko had concluded after his talks here that there is now a bridge to the future, an opening for progress. He said that Moscow wants to move ahead. As one indication, he provided the dates for our next round of non-proliferation talks in Moscow (November 28-30, which are acceptable to Ambassador Kennedy).

Isakov said that Moscow was not clear what we had in mind with the umbrella talks. For example, he asked "on a personal basis", could there be umbrella space talks, while offensive arms and other matters were being addressed in diplomatic channels. Mark responded that our concept of umbrella talks was broader than just space, but that we were in general flexible about how to proceed and in particular that you would be prepared to discuss with Dobrynin how we could use diplomatic channels to move ahead with more concrete discussions on arms control.

Isakov drew particular attention to the recent *Pravda* editorial which noted that our INF deployments are a barrier to INF negotiations.² He said that this is a problem for them, how could we get started when they have stated publicly for so long that the deployments make negotiations impossible. For that reason, Chernenko had proposed that we get started first on some lesser, easier matters. Moscow could not understand why it was so difficult for the United States to state it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Obviously, in an actual war, regardless of what it had said, each side would use the weapons necessary if it found itself losing. In response, Mark said that this was a nonstarter but of the items Chernenko mentioned, TTBT was possible if the Soviets were prepared to show some flexibility.

Finally, Isakov noted that the United States had said a number of times that we have ideas on offensive arms but we never say what they are. He noted that it is difficult to move ahead on the basis of the previous US positions as set forth in Geneva because they are so unacceptable. If the US side has ideas, it should give the details to the Soviets and this would make a major difference. Palmer explained that it was not reasonable for the Soviet side to ask us to show our cards before it was clear that the Soviet side was ready for serious detailed talks. Isakov then asked what would be the Secretary's response if Dobrynin asked for our specific ideas. Mark said that he did not know, but that it would be better if Dobrynin said that Gromyko and the rest of the Soviet leadership were prepared for serious talks and wanted to know our specific ideas.

Mark asked whether we might begin to see some progress on such human rights concerns as Shcharanskiy and Sakharov. Isakov noted that he is not in the KGB and therefore did not know anything about these matters. He

indicated that it would be better for us to pursue this through our channels to the KGB like Vogel in Berlin.³ Max Kampelman was also told recently in Moscow that it would be better not to work through Dobrynin and the Soviet Foreign Ministry but rather through special channels.⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, October 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. A more complete account of this meeting is in telegram 325166 to Moscow, November 1. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840700-0675)

² In telegram 13761 from Moscow, October 25, the Embassy reported: "An authoritative unsigned article in *Pravda* October 25 justifies Soviet refusal to resume nuclear arms talks. It claims that Western leaders are talking about negotiation in order to deceive the public but are doing nothing to 'clear away the obstructions' to those talks. It stops short of calling directly for withdrawal of NATO LRINF missiles, but maintains that changes in Western policies are needed before negotiations can resume." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840682-0817)

³ Reference is to Wolfgang Vogel. See [footnote 5, Document 219](#).

⁴ Kampelman met with human rights activists, dissidents, and refuseniks in Moscow from September 15 to 19. While no record of this message regarding Dobrynin and a private channel was found, it seems likely that a message could have been conveyed during this September visit to Moscow. (Telegram 12028 from Moscow, September 20; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840600-0727) During September, October, and November

1984, Kampelman visited European capitals to discuss Soviet human rights violations. See [*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. XLI, Global Issues II, Document 74*](#) .

296. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, October 26, 1984

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Dobrynin October 26

My meeting this morning with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin lasted an hour and a half and confirmed that the Soviets are looking at our relationship in a new light after your discussion with Gromyko.² Yesterday, his second deputy Isakov told Rick Burt's deputy Mark Palmer that following his talks with you Gromyko reported to his Moscow colleagues that there is now a bridge to the future and an opening for progress that means that we should move ahead.³ Dobrynin's approach appeared to confirm this. He said that if some names were changed in my speech at RAND,⁴ Gromyko could have given it himself, and he meant it as favorable comment.

In his meeting with me, Dobrynin had very little new to offer, but it was clear that he had instructions to probe as deeply as he could for specific ideas from us, especially on arms control and the umbrella concept. I led off by saying that any meeting prior to the election had by definition to be exploratory, but it is important to begin reviewing the issues between us as soon as possible. I told him I had sent instructions to Art Hartman to meet with Gromyko in the next few days and that I hoped to meet with Dobrynin again soon after the election.

To underscore its importance, I moved right to a discussion of the Berlin Air Corridors issue, pointing out that the current situation was unsatisfactory and that our British

and French colleagues shared our concern.⁵ I emphasized that Berlin was a very sensitive issue that could easily spill over into the rest of our relationship. Dobrynin said he had no new information on this subject but would look into it and get back to me.

I noted that since Gromyko's visit we had taken some further small steps, including the agreement to meet in November to discuss nuclear non-proliferation and in January to hold talks between experts on naval search and rescue and economic relations. I added that we hoped they would sign the common understanding on concurrent operation of ABM and air defense components at the SCC, as Commissioner Ellis has proposed.⁶ Turning to the meetings with Gromyko, I said we had come to some agreement, especially on the "question of questions," the importance of nuclear arms issues and the need eventually to eliminate them. I underlined your firm desire to move toward this goal. We had also agreed to discuss regional issues, I noted, and the discussion on the Middle East, particularly Lebanon and the question of UNIFIL, had also been useful.

Turning to subjects on which we did not agree, I noted human rights and then moved on to the relationship between outer space and offensive nuclear weapons arms control. Overall, I said our assessment of the meetings was that they were positive without any concrete outcome. Dobrynin said their view of the meetings "more or less" coincided with ours. The talks had made each side's views clearer, but there was nothing concrete on the "question of questions," beginning with nuclear weapons. I noted that there had also been some factual discrepancies on numbers of nuclear weapons and the purposes of the Strategic Defensive Initiative. I told him you wanted SDI to play a constructive role in strengthening deterrence. I noted that

our research program is fully consistent with the ABM treaty to which we remain committed. But while our commitment to the treaty is strong, I said, we are concerned with Soviet violations of arms control agreements, and hope the radar issue will be clarified in the SCC.

Dobrynin then conducted some intensive probing of our ideas for nuclear discussions. He reiterated the Soviet offer of June 29, and said that SDI should be included under their proposal to discuss the “demilitarization of outer space.” I told him we were prepared to discuss the militarization of space without preconditions, but he insisted that although there were no preconditions in their offer we had to agree on an agenda first. I noted that you had put forward a number of ideas for breaking the deadlock that resulted from their Vienna offer, including a readiness to explore the possibility of an interim agreement that would place limits on anti-satellite weapons and at least begin the process of reducing offensive nuclear arms,⁷ adding that we were willing to discuss these subjects and others.

Dobrynin also probed on the concept of umbrella negotiations. I told him that our suggestion was that we appoint a small group of people⁸ to explore the question of arms control at a certain philosophical level which Gromyko and I would monitor. He asked if we were talking only about space. I said that the discussions could explore the relationship between offensive and defensive weapons as well as other issues. It stemmed from our desire to sort out the issues and get moving on arms control talks. Dobrynin, as a “personal view,” said he had “some doubts” about the concept, since it seemed very abstract. He thought there was a danger that the issues could become “mixed up.” When I suggested that it was sometimes useful

to rearrange the furniture and try new things, he commented that useful things sometimes got lost that way. He suggested again a preference for traditional negotiations in which differences could then be resolved in discussions between the two of us or with Gromyko.

I also affirmed our interest in cabinet or ministerial-level meetings and joint commission sessions under our cooperation agreements. I did reaffirm our marker that movement in the health area depended on progress on the treatment of the Sakharovs. He responded with the standard disclaimer that they would not accept conditions on Sakharov. I also underlined our interest in regional discussions and on meetings between defense officials. I emphasized the importance of your proposal for direct measurement of nuclear tests, which could take place independent of the two unratified treaties on testing.⁹ Dobrynin responded that the concept might be possible after ratification of the treaties. I urged that they move on some other of the smaller issues, noting in particular the exchanges agreement and the opening of consulates. He predictably brought up Aeroflot which I affirmed depended on progress on the Northern Pacific safety proposals and equitable commercial arrangements. I also pressed for positive Soviet actions on the CDE, MBFR, and human rights in general.

All in all, I think it was a useful review of where we stand, and its usefulness includes Dobrynin's active probing, as a sign of positive Soviet interest. Art Hartman will probably see Gromyko early next week, and I plan to see Dobrynin shortly after the election.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (10/25/84-

10/30/84); NLR-748-25A-36-3-7. Secret; Sensitive. An October 26 covering memorandum from Burt to Shultz indicates the memorandum was drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons and Palmer. A handwritten note on this covering memorandum reads: "Orig. Sent by Courier 10/26." Reagan initialed Shultz's memorandum on October 30, indicating he saw it.

² See [Document 286](#) and [287](#).

³ See [Document 295](#).

⁴ On October 18, Shultz gave an address at the opening of the RAND/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior. In his memoir he wrote: "I used my speech to develop the larger conceptual issues that faced us in managing U.S.-Soviet relations over the long term and to make an important conceptual point: I put aside the Nixon-era concepts of 'linkage' and 'détente,' and set out a new approach that I hoped would prove more effective and that reflected the reality of what we were in fact doing." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 487-488) See also [footnote 5](#), [Document 262](#), and [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 209](#).

⁵ In 1983 and 1984, the Soviet Union unilaterally made changes to U.S., British, and French use of air corridors from West Germany flying into West Berlin. A series of Soviet restrictions on the "length-of-the-corridor" led to several "political-level demarches and discussions, both in Berlin and in the capitals, and intense technical-level talks in the Berlin Air Safety Center." (Telegram 2674 from the Mission in Berlin, September 5; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840564-0523)

⁶ Richard Ellis was the U.S. Commissioner on the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission, which met in Geneva October 2-December 12.

⁷ In an October 22 memorandum to McFarlane and Poindexter, Matlock wrote: “I received informally from EUR the memo sent up to Secretary Shultz regarding a meeting he plans to schedule with Dobrynin Wednesday, October 24 [which occurred on October 26]. Basically, it looks all right to me, except for some items on page 4. The important ones relate to mentioning an ‘interim agreement’ and the wording of the presentation on reciprocal visits to testing sites. I suggested to Mark Palmer that these sections should be cleared by you before their use.” He continued: “I am sending this as a ‘heads up.’ *Please protect me as the source*, since it was provided informally before Shultz saw it. Jack.” Poindexter wrote in the margin: “Bud, You need to talk to George about this. John.” McFarlane wrote in the margin: “Put in my lunch folder for tomorrow.” (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, President-Gromyko Final Papers (6))

⁸ Matlock underlined the phrase “appoint a small group of people” and wrote in a note at the bottom of the page: “This is *not* our concept. The Soviets will never take seriously a ‘small group of people’. Your concept—which you stated to Gromyko—was to involve high-level, even White House discussions. That was to convey your personal intention to be involved. I’m afraid this has set us back considerably.”

⁹ Matlock underlined the phrase “independent of the two unratified treaties,” meaning the TTBT and PNET, and wrote at the bottom of the page: “It is *not* independent. It is designed to lead to agreement on improved verification which will make possible ratification of the treaties.”

**297. Memorandum From the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane) to President Reagan¹**

Washington, October 26, 1984

SUBJECT

Decision Paper on Next Steps in the US/Soviet Nuclear Arms Reduction
Process

ISSUE

Should the US, for the time being, continue to pursue a more general approach to the “umbrella talks” *or* should the US now (perhaps in the context of the Shultz-Dobrynin and Hartman-Gromyko meetings) supplement the “umbrella talks” proposal with an additional, more specific initiative?

BACKGROUND

On June 29, the Soviets proposed that we meet with them in Vienna to discuss the prevention of the militarization of space. Shortly thereafter, a special interagency group was tasked to develop US options for such a meeting. Various options were developed. While intended as approaches to handling a Vienna meeting, these options also framed the major schools of thought concerning where the US should go next in pursuing progress in major nuclear arms reductions.

One of the interagency options developed was a proposal that the U.S. offer the Soviets a comprehensive proposal involving two phases. The *first phase* would be an interim

accord involving both (1) a 3 year moratorium on ASAT interceptor *testing*, and (2) an interim limitation on offensive forces (which could take the form of a Vladivostok-type agreement on subsequent negotiating objectives). The *second phase* would involve (1) a long term ban on ASAT testing and deployment requiring the dismantlement of the existing Soviet system, (2) an “Incidents-in-Space” agreement, and (3) major reductions in offensive forces with consideration of limits on defensive systems based upon progress in negotiating offensive force reductions. *This option was strongly supported by the State Department, but opposed by all other agencies and by Ambassadors Rowny and Nitze.*

After evaluating the three interagency options, an alternative, more general approach was developed. Under this approach the U.S. would propose that U.S. and Soviet representatives meet for “Umbrella Talks” designed to provide a new forum for discussing issues of concern to both sides. For its part, the U.S. would indicate that it is prepared to begin discussions aimed at exploring mutually acceptable approaches to initiating negotiations on the limitation of the anti-satellite capabilities of both sides and the more general topic of the militarization of space, and to resuming negotiations on the reduction of offensive nuclear arsenals. The U.S. would also indicate that it is prepared to discuss the nature and purpose of the US Strategic Defense Initiative and Soviet ballistic missile defense programs, and the relationship between the limitation of offensive and defensive capabilities.

The U.S. would also keep open the option of regularizing these talks. If held on a regular basis, these talks would complement ongoing negotiations and activity in regular diplomatic channels by providing an additional forum to discuss issues which are not yet at the stage at which

substantive negotiations could begin; to bring such issues to the point where formal, substantive negotiations could begin with some likelihood of success; and, to assist when existing formal negotiations have broken down. In short, it would provide a mechanism for us to sit down with the Soviets and discuss broader strategic concepts, and, on this basis, lay the foundation for more concrete negotiations on specific issues.

Your UNGA speech and follow-up meeting with Gromyko reflected this more general “umbrella talks” approach. However, some (Department of State) feel that we should now supplement the “umbrella talks” proposal by also offering to pursue the specific initiatives suggested by the State Department-supported option described earlier but strongly opposed by all other agencies and Ambassadors Rowny and Nitze (i.e., a 3 year moratorium on ASAT testing associated with an interim agreement on offensive arms and a commitment to further progress in a second phase of arms reduction activity). State has suggested that we use the upcoming Shultz-Dobrynin, Gromyko-Hartman meetings for this purpose.

DISCUSSION

It is highly unlikely that the Soviet Union will embrace any new, substantive initiative offered by the US at this time. This being the case, we must continue to husband carefully our limited negotiating leverage with the Soviets for a time when it can be used with substantive effect. But beyond this, the Soviet Union is well aware of the current, unique US domestic political situation. We must assume that the Soviet Union will assess this situation and use it to its maximum advantage.

If the Soviets choose to make the proposed additional US initiative suggested by the Department of State public, it will likely generate questions and intense partisan domestic debate on the elements of the proposal. For example:

—Is the proposed interim agreement a freeze? If not, why not? Will it be at SALT II levels? If so, why not just ratify SALT II?

—How does this track with the Administration's START/INF positions? Doesn't this argue that the Administration approach over the last three years was wrong?

—Does the proposed interim agreement on forces merge START and INF? If yes, why? If no, why?

—Does the proposed temporary ASAT moratorium reward Soviet intransigence in START and INF? Why is the ASAT moratorium temporary? What made the Administration flip-flop on the ASAT moratorium now?

Such debate will cause us to negotiate these elements with ourselves, doing the Soviets' work for them, with the Soviets silently watching, and with the Soviets gaining in the process by the corresponding loss of US negotiating capital on the issue without any cost to them. This strongly argues that it would be unwise to supplement your "umbrella talks" proposal with another, more specific initiative at this time.

RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION

We have recently tasked the Senior Arms Control Policy Group (SACPG) to begin the longer lead time interagency

staff work necessary to support a rather fundamental assessment of the US approach to the arms reduction process to begin during the first weeks of the next term. The staff work now in progress focuses on a reevaluation of Soviet military force and arms control goals, and an assessment of how current Soviet leadership perceives corresponding US goals. We believe that it would make most sense to continue to pursue a more general approach to the “umbrella talks” proposal and not to supplement it with additional specific initiatives at least until we have the benefit of that review and have moved beyond the pre-election political environment.

A draft NSDD which reflects this recommended course of action is attached at *Tab A* for your consideration.

RECOMMENDATION

That, pending further Soviet reaction to your “Umbrella Talks” proposal, and review of additional work recently tasked to the Senior Arms Control Policy Group, the US *not* offer to the Soviets the additional specific proposals suggested by the Department of State as described above.²

That you review and approve the draft NSDD attached at *Tab A*.³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives (NSDD): Records, 1981-1987, NSDD 148 [The U.S. Umbrella Talks Proposal]; NLR-751-7-33-2-2. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Linhard, Lehman, and Kraemer (see [footnote 5, Document 291](#)). A stamp on the memorandum reads “signed.”

² Reagan approved the recommendation.

³ The draft NSDD is attached but not printed. Reagan approved the recommendation and signed the NSDD. See [Document 298](#).

298. National Security Decision Directive 148¹

Washington, October 26, 1984

THE U.S. UMBRELLA TALKS PROPOSAL (U)

Over the past four years, we have made numerous attempts to get the Soviet Union to join us in the serious negotiation of equal and verifiable agreements involving the significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides. To increase our prospects of success in this critical endeavor, I am convinced that we must find new ways of addressing broader strategic concepts and, on this basis, creating a firmer foundation for negotiations on the full range of specific issues involved in the process of reducing nuclear arms and increasing stability. (C)

Building upon my speech presented at the opening of the UN General Assembly, I have decided that we should pursue the proposal that our representatives meet for "Umbrella Talks" designed to provide a new forum for discussing issues of concern to both sides. For our part, we should indicate that we are prepared to begin discussions aimed at exploring mutually acceptable approaches to initiating negotiations on the limitation of the anti-satellite capabilities of both sides and the more general topic of the militarization of space, and to resuming negotiations on the reduction of offensive nuclear arsenals. We should make it equally clear that we are also prepared to discuss the nature and purpose of the US Strategic Defense Initiative and Soviet ballistic missile defense programs, and the relationship between the limitation of offensive and defensive capabilities. (S)

We should keep open the option of regularizing these talks. If held on a regular basis, the talks could complement ongoing negotiations and activity in regular diplomatic channels by providing an additional forum: to discuss issues which are not yet at the stage at which substantive negotiations could begin; to bring such issues to the point where formal, substantive negotiations could begin with some likelihood of success; and, to assist when existing formal negotiations have broken down. (C)

The Secretary of State is requested to solicit a Soviet position concerning the U.S. proposal to open "Umbrella Talks." The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is requested to conclude promptly work already in progress and any additional work needed to support the conduct of these talks. The consideration of any further elaboration of our position in this or in related substantive areas should be addressed only after the completion of this work. (S)

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives (NSDD): Records, 1981-1987, NSDD 148 [The U.S. Umbrella Talks Proposal]. Secret. In a memorandum on October 27, McFarlane forwarded the signed NSDD to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Stockman, Casey, Vessey, and Adelman.

October 1984-January 1985

“An iron-ass Secretary of State”: Shultz and Gromyko in Geneva

[299. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs \(McFarlane\)](#)

Washington, October 29, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron September 1984 (3/5). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Not for System. Sent for information. In a note on the attached routing slip, Poindexter wrote: “Bud, I asked Jack to put this package together. I recommend you discuss with George and try to get him to agree. You could also make the point about future Amb. to Moscow. I think this contact should be made before the Arms Control person is named just so they have a heads up and understand context. JP.”

[300. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan](#)

Washington, October 31, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (10/31/84); NLR-748-25A-37-6-3. Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed this memorandum on November 2, indicating he saw it.

301. Memorandum From Ronald Lehman, Sven Kraemer, and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, November 3, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Reference 09/17/1984-11/17/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Lehman signed “Ron,” Kraemer initialed “SK,” and Linhard signed “Bob” above their names in the “From” line. None of the tabs is attached; however, they are attached to a copy in the Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Umbrella Talks 10/24/1984-11/04/1984.

302. Memorandum of Conversation

New Delhi, November 3, 1984, 7-7:34 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, US-Soviet Diplomatic Contacts 8/8. Secret; Nodis. The Secretary was in New Delhi for the funeral of Indira Gandhi, who was assassinated on October 31. In telegram Secto 16040 to the White House, November 4, Shultz reported on the funeral and his various meetings in

New Delhi. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840013-0071)

303. Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, November 7, 1984, 1529Z

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (11/01/84-11/07/84); NLR-748-25A-38-7-1. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

304. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, November 8, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons. Forwarded through Armacost.

305. Message From the White House to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Hill)

Washington, November 13, 1984, 0059Z

Source: Department of State, A Records, Miscellaneous Papers of Secretary Shultz and Charles Hill, Lot 89D250,

Misc File 6/84. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. This message was sent electronically to Charles Hill in Brasilia, Brazil, for delivery to Shultz, who was in Brasilia from November 10 to 13 for the OAS General Assembly meetings.

306. Editorial Note

307. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, November 16, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8491175). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed this memorandum, indicating he saw it. A November 16 State Department covering memorandum from Burt to Shultz indicates the memorandum was drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons and Palmer.

308. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko

Washington, November 16, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52,

November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret. The Department of State sent the letter in telegram 339906 to Moscow, November 16, with instructions that the “Ambassador should seek meeting with Gromyko to present text of the President’s letter to Chernenko.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8491139) (1/2))

309. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, November 16, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.

310. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, undated

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (11/16/84–11/25/84); NLR-748-25A-41-3-1. Secret; Sensitive. Shultz gave McFarlane this memorandum on November 17 to give to the President in California (see footnote 2, Document 309).

311. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Santa Barbara, California, November 18, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (11/16/84-11/25/84); NLR-748-25A-41-1-3. Secret; Sensitive. Poindexter wrote in upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: "President has seen. JP." McFarlane was in California with Reagan from November 17 to 25.

312. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, November 18, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt. Although Shultz did not sign it, a typed note on the upper left-hand corner of the memorandum reads: "Sent by special courier 11/18/84 1735 SWO." In a covering memorandum to Shultz, Burt reported: "Following our discussion at your residence earlier this afternoon, I have prepared the attached memorandum to the President. (I originally prepared it as a memorandum to Bud McFarlane, as you instructed, but changed it to a memo to the President at Jock Covey's request.) Jack Chain has read it and concurs fully with it. With your approval it will be sent to Bud McFarlane in Santa Barbara this evening. Separately, we have instructed Art Hartman along the lines we discussed earlier today."

According to handwritten notations on the covering memorandum, it was “pouched to Secretary 1650 11/18”; “Approved by Sec and sent to WH (McFarlane and Kimmit) 1730 11/18”); and “McFarlane (in California) has this document.”

313. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, November 19, 1984, 1347Z

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (11/16/84–11/25/84); NLR-748-25A-41-6-8. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

314. Minutes of a Senior Arms Control Group Meeting

Washington, November 19, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Reference 11/18/1984–11/20/1984. Secret; Sensitive. An unknown hand wrote: “Bob [Linhard]—Close Hold,” “Draft,” and “Ron—Bob L has cy” at the top of the page. The unknown hand put brackets around Linhard’s last name. No final version of the minutes has been found. Handwritten notes, likely Lehman’s, correspond to this typed draft. (Ibid.)

315. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, November 19, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Palmer. Forwarded through Armacost. McKinley's handwritten initials are on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on November 19.

316. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, November 19, 1984

Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 11/15-30/84. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Kaplan and Kagan. Kaplan initialed the memorandum for Rodman. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. McKinley's handwritten initials also appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on November 19.

317. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, November 20, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1984, 4001158. Secret. Weinberger wrote "Bud" next to

McFarlane's name on the memorandum. In a note on a covering memorandum, Kimmit wrote: "Per RCM, Weinberger memo only put in 11/30 PDB. RMK 11/30." Reagan initialed another copy of the memorandum on December 2, indicating he saw it. (Ibid.)

318. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, November 27, 1984, 1527Z

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Geneva Arms Control Talks I (01/05/1985-01/07/1985); NLR-362-1-35-14-5. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. A stamp indicates McFarlane saw the telegram. Poindexter wrote in the margin: "Bud, I think Art is way off base in this cable. See my note next page. JP." See footnote 2, below. In a covering memorandum to Shultz on the Department of State copy of this telegram, Burt wrote: "Mr. Secretary: I wanted to be sure you had seen the cable Art sent in on the Geneva talks. He gave it relatively wide distribution in an effort to be helpful around town. Art asked today if it would be useful for him to come back at this point for consultations. He could be here as long as you thought necessary up to December 17. His conversations around town have been quite useful in the past, and his being here would probably have value now. I will get back to Art in a few days after we have had time to discuss this." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, November 1984, #39)

319. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Chain) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, November 27, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Tefft, Vershbow, Dobbins, and Markoff (PM/SNP) on 11/24; cleared by Pascoe, Palmer, J. Gordon (PM), A. Kanter (PM), W. Courtney (P), and Timbie. Vershbow initialed for Dobbins, Markoff, Pascoe, Palmer, Kanter, Courtney, and Timbie.

320. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, November 28, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, Arms Control—USSR (3). Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. In a December 1 covering note to Shultz on another copy of this memorandum, McFarlane wrote: "George: Attached is a very thoughtful memo from Jack Matlock. I must ask that you protect Jack on this and not share the memo with others. As an aside Jack is truly one of the most thoughtful men I have ever met on the Soviet Union. I agree with Jack's views with the exception of one idea on the last page [see footnote 8, below]. But I send this along in the hope that after you have read it we might be able to discuss whether/how we might try to

implement some of his ideas. Bud.” (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 21 (2 of 4).

321. Note Prepared in the White House Situation Room

Washington, November 29, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (11/27/84-12/04/84); NLR-748-25A-42-3-0. Confidential. This note is based on reporting from the CIA on November 27.

Poindexter wrote in the margin: “Bud, You probably saw this last night. One of the dangers we face in not taking them up on this is that the Soviets may begin to think we are not serious. JP.”

322. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 30, 1984

Source: Department of State, Paul Nitze Files, 1953, 1972-1989, Lot 90D397, 1984. Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. “Only copy” is typed and underlined in the upper right-hand corner of the first page.

323. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting

Washington, November 30, 1984, 1:45-2:45 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Chronological File, Chron File 12/15/1984 (2). Secret. The meeting was held in the Situation Room. On November 30, Reagan wrote in his diary: "An N.S.P.G. meeting about forthcoming arms talks with the Soviets. I made it plain there must be no granting of concessions (one sided) to try & soften up the Soviets." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 402)

324. Memorandum From Ronald Lehman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, December 1, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Reference 11/29/84–12/2/84–12/2/84. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. "No log" is typed at the top of this memorandum, indicating it was not entered into the NSC system. In a covering note to McFarlane, Lehman wrote: "Bud, Attached is an 'eyes only' on Shultz's views of Geneva. Also, we are preparing a package on the Geneva decision-making process. Attached is a first draft of a schedule. While we work the decision-making paper, you may find this useful. It doesn't deal with the punchline, however,—how we finalize the position & what it is. Ron."

325. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Chain) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, December 4, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, December 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive; King. Drafted by Vershbow; cleared by Simons, Palmer, Markoff, and J. Gordon (PM). Forwarded through Armacost. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on this packet, indicating Shultz saw it. McKinley's handwritten initials are on the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on December 4.

326. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting

Washington, December 5, 1984, 2-3 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Chronological File, Chron File 12/15/1984 (2). Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

327. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, December 7, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (12/05/84-12/13/84); NLR-748-25A-43-7-5. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that it was received in the White House Situation Room on December 8. Reagan initialed the memorandum on December 11, indicating he saw it.

328. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko

Washington, December 7, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8491237). Secret. Burt forwarded a draft letter to Shultz on November 28; Matlock made some revisions. McFarlane forwarded the revised letter and a memorandum from Shultz to Reagan on December 7. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) December 1984) According to an information memorandum to Shultz on December 7, Burt delivered the letter for Chernenko to Sokolov later that afternoon. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 12, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (12/05/1984-12/07/1984))

329. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)

Washington, December 8, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1984–June 1985. No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on December 10.

330. Paper Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, December 10, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (12/05/84-12/16/84); NLR-748-25A-43-8-4. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Defense Spending Branch, Econometric Analysis Division, Office of Soviet Analysis. Reagan initialed the paper on December 12, indicating he saw it. In an undated handwritten cover note to Poindexter, Matlock wrote: "The attached analysis is worth a quick glance, since it deals with an interesting comment by a Soviet 'scholar' which would indicate that the CIA may have been underestimating the real impact on the Soviet economy of the Soviet defense effort. I have personally long thought that this was the case, and that the Agency, relying greatly on Soviet published statistics, underestimated the real impact. Since much of the latter is qualitative, it is difficult to quantify in the statistical terms the Agency uses. Jack." Poindexter wrote in the margin: "Thanks. I gave this report to the President yesterday. I agree with you. JP." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron December 1984 (2/5))

331. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting

Washington, December 10, 1984, 2-3 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Chronological File, Chron File 12/15/1984 (2). Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Lehman. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

332. Memorandum for the Record by Ronald Lehman of the National Security Council Staff

Washington, December 13, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 12/13/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. The memorandum for the record is unsigned. In a covering memorandum to McFarlane, Lehman wrote: “Attached for your information is a Memorandum for the Record of our conversation with Paul Nitze with a copy of his paper that I have annotated.”

333. Memorandum From Ronald Lehman of the National Security Council to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, December 13, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 12/13/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. McFarlane wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “Good work Ron.”

334. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting

Washington, December 17, 1984, 11 a.m.-noon

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Chronological File, Chron File 12/22/1984-12/27/1984. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. A set of handwritten notes of the

meeting, likely Lehman's, are in the Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 12/14/84-12/20/84. Another set of handwritten notes of this meeting are in the Reagan Library, Fred Ikle Files—Arms Control, 1983-1985. In his diary entry for December 17, Reagan wrote: "We had an N.S.P.G. meeting again on our negotiating posture in the upcoming meeting with Gromyko & the arms talks. I believe the Soviets have agreed to the talks only to head off our research on a strategic defense against nuc. wpns. I stand firm we cannot retreat on that no matter what they offer." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 408)

335. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, December 21, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, December 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. According to a December 21 covering memorandum from Burt to Shultz, the letter was drafted by Pascoe and cleared by Palmer. A typed note indicates the package was "Delivered to WH Sit Room at 2100 hours per S/S."

336. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko

Washington, December 21, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, E.3, President/Chernenko Correspondence (2/2). No classification marking. Shultz sent Reagan a first draft of this letter with a covering memorandum on December 3. The letter went through several rounds of revisions by the State Department and the NSC Staff. In a memorandum forwarding both the revised letter and Shultz's memorandum to Reagan on December 17, McFarlane wrote: "Shultz has sent over a memorandum recommending that you reply to the letter, keeping this subject separate from your correspondence regarding the Geneva meeting and other subjects. I agree with George's recommendation, particularly since I believe that Chernenko's letter gives you an opportunity to reiterate in the most authoritative fashion the unacceptability of supplying jet aircraft to Nicaragua which could be used for combat." Reagan approved the recommendation to sign the letter to Chernenko. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) December 1984)

337. Memorandum of Conversation

Camp David, Maryland, December 22, 1984, 10:40-11:10 a.m. and 11:20 a.m.-1:25 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Thatcher, 1984. The morning private meeting took place in the Aspen Lodge. The expanded meeting and working lunch took place in the Laurel Lodge. Reagan wrote in his diary entries for December 22-23: "Sat. dawned clear & bright which was fine because P.M. Margaret Thatcher was coming in for a visit. I met her in a golf cart & took her to Aspen where she & I had a brief visit in which I got a report on her visit with Gorbachev of Soviet U. In an

amazing coincidence I learned she had said virtually the same things to him I had said to Gromyko. In addition, she made it clear there was no way the Soviet U. could split Eng. away from the US. Then we joined the others— Ambassadors, Shultz, McFarlane, Bush, et al at Laurel for a plenary meeting & working lunch. Main topic was our Strategic Defense Research (“Starwars”) I believe [we] eased some concerns she had.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 411)

338. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan

Washington, December 22, 1984

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 88B00443R: Box 16, Folder: DCI Memo Chron (1-31 Dec '84). Top Secret; Sensitive. In a covering note to McFarlane, Casey wrote: “The attached is in response to your request, of 20 December, for my views on the upcoming Geneva Talks. There is a copy for you, as well as the original for the President.” The words “GENEVA TALKS” are typed and underlined in the upper right-hand corner of the page.

339. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Vessey) to President Reagan

Washington, December 22, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chron, Geneva Prep III—December 1984 “Geneva—NSDD Instructions” (2). Top Secret; Sensitive; King. A

copy was sent to Weinberger. In a handwritten covering note to McFarlane, attached to another copy of the memorandum, Vessey wrote: "Bud—The JCS views in response to your 20 Dec memo. I have sent a copy to Cap. Jack." (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 12/21/1984-12/26/1984)

340. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan

Washington, December 24, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSDD Package, 12/31/1984-01/01/1985 (3). Top Secret; King.

341. Memorandum From Peter Sommer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, December 24, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Reference 12/20/84-12/24/84. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Matlock and Lehman.

342. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan

Washington, December 27, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSDD Package, 12/31/1984-01/01/1985 (3). Top Secret; King.

343. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, December 27, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSDD Package, 12/31/1984-01/01/1985 (3). Secret; Sensitive; King. According to another copy, the memorandum was drafted by Vershbow and Pifer; cleared by Nitze, Gordon, and Courtney. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, December 1984 Super Sensitive Documents)

344. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, December 28, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron December 1984 (5/5). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Not for System. Sent for information.

345. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Palm Springs, California, December 30, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Chronological File, Sensitive Chron 1985; NLR-362-7-38-4-7. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. According to the President's Daily Diary, McFarlane was with Reagan in Palm Springs from December 29 to January 2. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

346. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Palm Springs, California, undated

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 01/01/1985-01/03/1985. Top Secret. Sent for action. According to the President's Daily Diary, McFarlane was with Reagan in Palm Springs from December 29 to January 2. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) The memorandum is unsigned. In a December 28 memorandum, Kraemer, Linhard, and Lehman forwarded to McFarlane this memorandum and a "proposed decision package for the President's use in making final decisions and in providing instructions to the delegation for discussion of arms control issues in Geneva on January 7 to 8, 1985." They continued: "The cover memorandum from you to the President outlines the contents of each of the three major tabs and portrays the fundamental consensus and differences of principals and agencies on the substantive and procedural issues resolved in the Decision Directive." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 153, [Shultz-Gromyko Meeting in Geneva, 01/01/1985]).

347. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Palm Springs, California, January 1, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Chronological File, Sensitive Chron 1985; NLR-362-7-38-3-8. Secret. Sent for information. According to the President's Daily Diary, McFarlane was with Reagan in Palm Springs from December 29 to January 2. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

348. National Security Decision Directive 153

Palm Springs, California, January 1, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, Shultz-Gromyko—January 1985 [Final NSDD—Geneva Instructions 01/01/1985] (1). Secret. According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan was in Palm Springs, California, from December 29 to January 2 (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) so presumably signed the NSDD in Palm Springs. Reagan also initialed at the top of the first page. In a January 1 PROFs note, McFarlane wrote: "At the conclusion of a one hour, forty-five minute meeting with Cap, George and me, the President approved the instructions for Geneva subject to a few minor edits." McFarlane listed the changes, which were incorporated into this final version. McFarlane instructed: "With these changes, the President has signed it. Please have a smooth prepared but do not distribute it." (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSDD Package, 12/31/1984-01/01/1985 (1) In an undated handwritten note to Reagan

on “Aboard Air Force One” stationery, likely written during their January 2 return trip to Washington, McFarlane wrote: “Mr. President, This is a ‘smooth’ version of the NSDD you’ve already signed after your meeting with Cap and George Jan 1 at Annenberg’s. Could you please sign this ‘original’. It is a verbatim reprint. Bud.”

349. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, January 2, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 13, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (1/1/1985-1/17/1985); NLR-775-13-1-1-5. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow on December 31, 1984; cleared by Simons, Palmer, Pifer, Timbie, and Courtney. Forwarded through Armacost. A handwritten note in the margin reads: “Text same as State 004 (Tosec 200055).”

350. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, January 3, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1985, 400005. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action. The memorandum is incorrectly dated January 3, 1984. In a handwritten cover note to Poindexter dated January 3, Matlock wrote: “John—this report reached me only this afternoon. I am not sure that either you or Bud have seen

it. It is of sufficient importance and sensitivity that I think Bud should discuss it with the President—privately if possible—tomorrow. I believe that it should not be disseminated to members of the SACG at this point since it requires the most delicate—and confidential—handling—Jack.”

351. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, January 4, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, Roger Robinson Files, Chronological File, Robinson Chron January 1985–February 1985; NLR-487-11-29-3-5. Sent for action. Prepared by Robinson. Poindexter initialed the memorandum for McFarlane.

352. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, undated

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz-Gromyko at Geneva, January 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow on January 5; cleared by Simons, Palmer, Pifer, Schwartz (PM/SNP), Chain, Nitze, and McFarlane. Palmer initialed for all clearing officials. This memorandum was the first document in the

Secretary's briefing book for his trip to Geneva. The book also contains schedules and other papers to prepare for Shultz's meetings with Gromyko.

353. Memorandum From President Reagan to Secretary of Defense Weinberger

Washington, January 5, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, December Chron File. Top Secret; King. A copy was sent to Shultz. In a January 5 covering memorandum to Reagan, McFarlane wrote: "Mr. President, the plain facts are these. You, I, George and others have stated publicly that we will be going to Geneva with new ideas; that we will be flexible and constructive. If we arrive and simply restate our existing position without even an explanation of what we are talking about, we face the high likelihood that the Soviets will make that public, charge us with bad faith, and we will be held responsible for the impasse." Additional passages from McFarlane's memorandum are provided in footnotes below.

354. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State

Geneva, January 6, 1985, 2208Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850001-0117. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Shultz arrived in Geneva on January 6.

355. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, January 7, 1985, 9:40 a.m.-1 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron March 1985 (2/4)). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Matlock and Arensburger. The meeting took place in the Soviet Mission. Brackets are in the original.

356. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the White House

Geneva, January 7, 1985, 1347Z

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, Geneva Meeting: Shultz/Gromyko 01/07/1985 Morning (1). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman; cleared by McFarlane, Hill, M. Bova (S/S), and K. Clark (S); and approved by Shultz.

357. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, January 7, 1985, 3:35-6:55 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron March 1985 (2/4). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Matlock and Carolyn Smith. The meeting took place in the U.S. Mission.

358. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the White House and the Department of State

Geneva, January 8, 1985, 0206Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850001-0159. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to Moscow. In his diary for January 7, Reagan wrote: "Only 1st reports from George S. & Bud in Geneva & not much to talk about. I'll try to remember 'no news' may be good news." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 414)

359. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State

Geneva, January 8, 1985, 0305Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850001-0161. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

360. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, January 8, 1985, 9:30 a.m.-noon

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron March 1985 (2/4). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Matlock and Arensburger. The meeting took place in the Soviet Mission in Geneva.

361. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the White House

Geneva, January 8, 1985, 1234Z

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, Geneva Meeting: Shultz/Gromyko 01/08/1985 Morning. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman; cleared by McFarlane, M. Bova (S/S), Hill, and K. Clark (S); approved by Shultz. Sent for information Priority to Moscow.

362. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, January 8, 1985, 3:35–7:55 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron March 1985 (2/4). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Matlock and Smith. This meeting took place in the U.S. Mission in Geneva. The memorandum of conversation mistakenly identified the end time of the meeting as 6:55 p.m. Brackets are in the original.

363. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, January 8, 1985, 9 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 22A, 1985 Arms Control, Geneva. No classification marking.

299. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, October 29, 1984

SUBJECT

Thoughts on a Private Channel to the Soviet Leadership

I have compiled some thoughts on the whys and hows of a private channel which may be useful to you in further discussions with Secretary Shultz and the President. They are at TAB 1. Also, I have made an initial stab at describing what I would recommend discussing in a private meeting, if it is decided to arrange one (TAB 2).² The latter is very preliminary and is meant to be indicative of the way the issues would be discussed. Some of the talking points need to be elaborated in more detail (particularly those for contingency use), and some key points are subject to decision and guidance. (The more important of these are underlined.)

Even if the Soviets accept a request for a meeting, we should not expect immediate results. They will doubtless wish to feel their way a bit and to gain some experience before they rely totally on the pledges of confidentiality. But even in the early stages, it would provide them a vehicle for conveying messages if they choose to send some. The most useful thing we are likely to obtain initially, however, will be comments which will improve our ability to assess Soviet priorities among the various proposals they have made, as well as hints as to how some of our proposals could be framed to make them more palatable.

I am not sure of the reasons for Secretary Shultz's caution. If it is a fear of offending Gromyko, I would argue that the fear is misplaced: if Gromyko does not want the meeting to occur, it will not. It is more likely that he would find it acceptable since it does not violate jurisdictional distinctions as the Soviets interpret them. In any event, requesting the meeting will do nothing to complicate anything we have proposed.

If it would be helpful for me to be present when the matter is discussed (to answer questions about how it could be done and the way the Soviets look at the various issues involved), I of course will be glad to join you.

Tab 1

Paper Prepared by Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff³

Washington, undated

A PRIVATE CHANNEL TO SOVIET LEADERSHIP: *Some Basic Considerations*

Reasons for Channel:

- Need for mechanism to consult privately, informally, and off the official record.
- Need for a better feel for the factors entering into Soviet decision-making.
- Need for conveying our views to the Soviet leadership without the Foreign Ministry filter.

—Need for *total* confidentiality, the best insurance for which is that the public and the bureaucracy be unaware that the channel exists.

Possible Modes:

—Use of Ambassadors in both capitals.

[While this is probably the best arrangement in theory, it is not immediately available to us because of Soviet bureaucratic hang-ups. It would, additionally, require an Ambassador who is and is believed by the Soviets to be an “insider” in the decision-making process and who can deal with all the issues comfortably in Russian—some important Soviet interlocutors are not comfortable in English and introducing interpreters undermines the informality necessary and discourages candor.]

—Use of someone thoroughly familiar with the President’s thinking and the decision-making process in Washington, but outside the normal structure for diplomatic contact.

[The first qualification is necessary to ensure the reliability of the messages we send, and the accuracy of feed-back; the second to get around Soviet “turf” considerations. The latter are minimized when the contact appears to be “counterpart to counterpart.”]

—Use of a “special negotiator” from outside the USG.

[Potentially useful for discussions in a particular, well-defined area, but less so for broader discussions since a person not a part of the policy-making machinery would be hampered in interpreting and reacting to comments on the whole range of

problems. It also runs a greater risk of becoming public knowledge.]

—Use of intermediaries for specific messages.

[Useful in arranging specific deals which are delicate for one or the other side (e.g., a prisoner exchange), but of limited utility for a broader discussion since it does not provide direct contact with persons active in the decision-making process.]

Soviet Attitudes

—They understand the need for confidential and informal consultation and will desire it if and when they are serious about solving problems.

—They would probably prefer to establish Dobrynin as the sole interlocutor, since this would serve their interest by giving them access to our decision-making process but denying the same to us.

—Since we have made it clear that an *exclusive* role for Dobrynin is not acceptable, there are indications that the Soviets will probably accept informal contacts in another form.

—“Knowledgeable” officials have been suggesting such since the beginning of the Reagan Administration (several approaches in 1981).

—Central Committee officials have periodically sent “messages” via third parties, implicit invitations to initiate a dialogue.

- We were informed earlier this year that White House/Central Committee contacts had been approved by the Politburo, including Gromyko.⁴
- The Soviets doubtless feel “burned” by some of the earlier efforts to communicate unofficially by other means.
 - The contact with Kampelman backfired for reasons which are unclear, but our selective briefing of Allies may have played a role, since knowledge of the contact was spread very widely among NATO delegations at Madrid, their home capitals and even their Embassies in Washington.⁵
 - Publicity given the “walk in the woods” and the subsequent informal conversations between Nitze and Kvitsinsky is likely to make the Soviets hypercautious for some time to come in dealing with U.S. negotiators on the private level.⁶
 - The facts that the abortive Scowcroft mission became public knowledge and that private comments by Soviet diplomats in Washington to senior U.S. officials reach the press rapidly also act to reinforce Soviet doubts of our ability or willingness to keep any contact completely private.⁷
- Once the election is over, the Soviet suspicion that we seek contacts for their own sake (i.e., just to *claim* that we are negotiating for a public impact) will be attenuated. If we judge that a private channel would be useful to us, it would be a good time to try again.

Basic Operating Principles

—A private channel should not be used as a substitute for any other mode of communication, but rather as a supplement which may help both sides to make formal channels as productive as possible.

—Both sides must insure that everything discussed in the channel, and knowledge of its very existence, is kept scrupulously confidential.

[On our side this will require direct knowledge of the channel to be limited to a *very* small number of the most senior officials, probably designated by name, and with a strict injunction against mentioning it to anyone not on the list, including personal aides and secretaries. Illustratively, such a list might include, in addition to the President, the Vice President, the National Security Adviser and his deputy, the Secretary of State and the Undersecretary for Political Affairs, and our Ambassador in Moscow.]

—It should be used for tactical policy guidance, not concrete negotiations or precise commitments. At most, commitments should be in contingent form (e.g., “if you do x, we will respond with y”). Any general understandings reached would be subject to confirmation and detailed negotiation in formal channels.

—All positions taken in the “channel”—including general guidelines for “personal remarks”—should be cleared in advance by the Assistant to the President for National Security and the Secretary of State, and as regards the more important issues, by the President personally.

—A clear understanding should be reached on these matters (except those relating to internal USG procedures) at the outset, and it should be made clear that establishing

the “channel” does *not* imply an effort to bypass any principal policymaker in either country.

Steps Necessary to Activate

If we decide that we wish to explore whether the Soviets are willing to allow private contacts between the White House staff and the Central Committee staff, we can initiate the matter as follows:

—Request Ambassador Hartman, *by secure telephone*, to pass a message to Zagladin that we do not fully understand some of the comments passed by his staff recently to us, and if he agrees, we feel a meeting might be useful.

—If the Soviets want to pursue the contact, he will respond favorably and set a date; if he does not we will know that the time is not ripe from their point of view.

—If Zagladin accepts, arrangements could be made to travel to Moscow for consultation with the Embassy (perhaps as part of a trip with other stops).

—If he prefers to meet here or somewhere in Western Europe, that also could be arranged.

—After setting a date, the talking points could be developed, discussed, and cleared in detail.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron September 1984 (3/5). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Not for System. Sent for information. In a note on the attached routing slip, Poindexter wrote: “Bud, I asked Jack to put this package together. I recommend you discuss with George and try to

get him to agree. You could also make the point about future Amb. to Moscow. I think this contact should be made before the Arms Control person is named just so they have a heads up and understand context. JP.”

² The talking points are attached but not printed.

³ Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Brackets are in the original.

⁴ See [Document 195](#).

⁵ See [footnote 4, Document 295](#).

⁶ See [footnote 3, Document 6](#) and [footnote 4, Document 137](#).

⁷ See [Document 193](#).

300. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, October 31, 1984

SUBJECT

Art Hartman's Talk Today with Gromyko

Ambassador Hartman reported to me that he had a cordial session today with Foreign Minister Gromyko.² The news of Mrs. Gandhi's assassination had just arrived, and Art got Gromyko's agreement that we should work to keep the situation calm in the sub-continent during this traumatic period.³ To hold them to this and avoid inflaming the situation in India, we have been pressuring the Soviets all day here and in Moscow to back off from blaming us for the tragedy.

The bulk of the meeting was devoted to arms control issues. Gromyko predictably said there should be changes in the US approach and complained about our intentions in space. He said we were agreed on the need for dialogue, contacts and negotiation, but complained, as usual, about the substance.

The most striking element of the talk was Gromyko's request for the first time that we give them our "specific ideas" to move forward. He also suggested that all critical arms control issues should be discussed at the same time, noting it was not possible to single out one issue such as space, strategic systems, or tactical nuclear weapons while leaving the others "on the side." Finally, Gromyko agreed with Art that the immediate problem before us was to determine "how" to conduct further exchanges, clearly playing off the points we have been making on the need to

define a new concept to get back to serious arms control talks.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (10/31/84); NLR-748-25A-37-6-3. Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed this memorandum on November 2, indicating he saw it.

² In telegram 14011 from Moscow, October 31, Hartman provided a detailed account of his meeting with Gromyko. (Ibid.)

³ In a separate telegram on Gandhi's assassination, the Embassy reported that the death of Indira Gandhi had been confirmed minutes before Hartman's meeting with Gromyko: "The Ambassador noted that the assassination was a tragedy and that India was in for a bad time in its wake. While he had no instructions from Washington, he was certain that the USG would view it as in the interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States that the situation in India remain calm. The USG wanted a unified India, an India at peace with its neighbor. We were prepared to do all we could toward those ends. Gromyko responded with the hope that the Indian people would be able to deal with Mrs. Gandhi's death in a way which served their interests. He agreed that her assassination was a 'grave loss', interrupting his interpreter to add that 'it would be well' if things remained calm." (Telegram 13974 from Moscow, October 31; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840012-0530)

301. Memorandum From Ronald Lehman, Sven Kraemer, and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, November 3, 1984

SUBJECT

The Timing of Arms Control Decisions

Purpose. This package has two objectives:

(1) It recommends a specific course of action and pace for decision making related to arms control.

(2) It provides reading material that we feel it would be useful for you to have with you for your immediate reference as needed during the upcoming California trip.² This includes:

- *Tab A:* a copy of NSDD 148 and the previous SACPG tasking memorandum referenced in the NSDD;³
- *Tab B:* a copy of the various cables and reports provided on the recent Shultz-Dobrynin/Gromyko-Hartman discussions;⁴ and
- *Tab C:* a short package of summary reading material on the Umbrella Talks concept and how it could be implemented.

The Current Status of Arms Control Issues. NSDD 148 (*Tab A*) provided sufficient basic guidance on the Umbrella Talks concept to carry us forward until additional SACPG work is

completed. It directed that further elaborations of the US position on this and related arms control initiatives not be made pending the completion of the work program currently in progress. The SACPG is scheduled to conduct what amounts to a mid-term review of our arms control positions and options, beginning with its next meeting on November 20.⁵ A major Intelligence Community assessment of Soviet force structure and arms control objectives is already in progress to support this review, and it will be completed by November 15.⁶

Considerations for US Movement. The Shultz-Dobrynin/Hartman-Gromyko meetings have just recently taken place. The reporting record on those meetings is provided at *Tab B*. It appears that in the Gromyko-Hartman meeting, Gromyko may have left an opening for the US to explain its ideas more fully. Some are likely to argue that we should move on this opening rather quickly by providing to the Soviets the details of our Umbrella concept or even details supporting a new initiative like the State proposal that we offer an ASAT moratorium coupled to an interim agreement on offensive forces. However, NSC staff feel that there are compelling reasons why we should not go into details on this until we have properly laid both the substantive and political groundwork. We should be able to address the substance of a US response during the planned SACPG review. Some may also argue that there will be a special window of opportunity for progress with the Soviets immediately after the election and that we need decisions made now to be in a position to exploit it. However, even if this were the case, the Soviets will likely first want to determine if the President's position of the past year, elaborated in his UNGA speech and in the meetings with Gromyko, will still hold after the election. While NSC staff feel that (1) we do need to decide how and what type of signal to give the Soviets promptly on this score after the

election, and (2) the President should use certain themes in his post-election remarks to begin sending appropriate signals, NSC staff feel that such a signal need not, and should not, involve making immediate decisions on substantive policy choices.

What we should not do. No immediate events (not even the recent Gromyko comments) should force premature White House decisions on issues of either form or substance. NSC staff feel that we need the scheduled SACPG activity in the last two weeks of November to conduct as fundamental a review and staffing of options as desired. We do not have to rush into difficult and controversial choices before they are needed (e.g., who would be a US arms control “special envoy” before the Soviets have even bit on the idea of Umbrella Talks or the implied format for such talks). Nor do we need to press the pace of interaction with the Soviets literally the day after the President’s reelection (e.g., to draft a hurried response to the potential opening offered by Gromyko to Hartman). On the contrary, such precipitous moves (1) would reduce the quality of the policy review, (2) would limit US flexibility on future options, and (3) could, if leaked, create lightning rods for criticism of particular choices made even before these choices could be implemented in dealing with the Soviets.

What we should do. We should take certain definite actions:

1. *Start sounding the themes of US bi-partisanship and the desire for progress with the Soviet Union on peace/stability issues.* It is important that, at the earliest opportunity, we set the new Administration’s tone towards its relationship with the Soviet Union and towards the way it will approach the national security policy development process. Therefore, we should begin immediately to weave three

principal themes into whatever remarks the President has the opportunity to make following the election:

- a. bi-partisanship, especially on national security matters (“Let us move forward together”);
- b. a balanced, long-term program involving (1) offensive force modernization as needed, (2) research into the increased contribution of defenses, and (3) equitable, mutual and verifiable arms reductions—all designed to work together to enhance stability now and into the next century; and
- c. a renewed offer to the Soviets to join with us in building a better foundation of understanding upon which a more stable peace at lower levels of nuclear arms can be built.

We can begin sounding these themes in a coordinated fashion and with an air of quiet resolve (which would also signal seriousness of purpose) in post-election Presidential statements. We can then build gradually and effectively to a crescendo in the State of the Union address.

2. *Protect a range of options for the President’s decision at the appropriate time.* Among the options that should be protected are the following:

- a. the creation of a *Presidential Board on Strategic Stability* (bipartisan, but along the lines of the PFIAB model without Congressional confirmation) chaired by a distinguished figure and chartered to advise the President on strategic programs and arms control—with special attention to SDI, MX, the offense-defense relationship, the Umbrella Talks, and related issues;

b. *Presidential meetings with key Members of Congress*, supported by comprehensive Administration briefings to members (which the NSC staff is now coordinating), to both demonstrate and implement his desire to rebuild the bipartisan basis for our foreign and national security policy;⁷

c. if the Soviets bite on the Umbrella Talks, the appointment of a distinguished figure as *ambassador or special envoy* reporting to the President through the National Security Advisor and guided/supported on policy issues out of the White House via a modified SACPG chaired by the National Security Advisor (the National Security Advisor in effect becoming the policy “czar”);⁸

d. *modification of the GAC*, providing for overlapping terms, but ensuring that its role in the arms control process is clearly defined;⁹ and

e. some *reorganization of the arms control policy generation process* within the Executive Branch with greater responsibility for management and direction of the process moving back to the White House through the SACPG and the NSC staff. (This reorganization, as well as all the other options listed above, should be cast in a positive light as a step to unite and build upon our strength, and not as a repudiation of any individuals or past policy.)

3. *We also must anticipate possible alternative scenarios:*

a. The Soviets could accept the Umbrella Talks idea in concept and request specific details on the agenda and timing of the US proposed Umbrella Talks and who would negotiate for the US. (In this case, we

would accept, focus on the arrangements for beginning the talks, but withhold any discussion of the substantive details until we complete the work now in progress, and with no additional new US initiatives—if any—being presented before the talks actually begin.)¹⁰

b. The Soviets could repeat their June 29 proposal that we meet to discuss the prevention of the militarization of space, but avoiding reengaging us on a debate about preconditions. (In this case, we should probably promptly accept and accelerate work on a strategy to both exploit the opening and move the discussion in the direction of the Umbrella Talks concept.)¹¹

c. The Soviets could make a concerted effort to press us for more details on the “example” used by the President and Shultz/Hartman of an interim agreement covering both ASAT testing and offensive forces. (In this most dangerous case, until we can complete our anticipated review, we should respond that such details would be presented only once formal discussions are underway and use this as a lever to move the Soviets towards implementing the US Umbrella Talks proposal.)¹²

As indicated above, anticipating these scenarios *should not, however, require us to take immediate decisions*. Instead, it should provide a context for refining our existing options and developing others as needed.

The “Bottom Line”. With the exception of the items cited above, what we most need to do right now is to keep our options open while we implement our gameplan and strengthen our position.¹³

—We need to keep in mind that a clear picture of *what* we want should be developed before we take decisions on *how* we go about getting it (e.g., desired output should drive selection of input, substance should drive form).

—We now need to take the time we have to ensure we understand fully the desired output and to take whatever time we need to refine the options we have developed or generate new ones as needed. We must ensure that we start the next four years on a sound basis. Serious mistakes now could cause exceptional damage to US interests for the next four years and well beyond.

—We must stay flexible and agile. On most issues, taking immediate decisions would be unnecessary, premature, and counter-productive.

Recommendations

That you:

- (1) counter arguments for premature decisions and support the course and pace of action outlined above;
- (2) read carefully the summary material provided at *Tab C*; and
- (3) keep the other material provided in this booklet available for immediate reference as needed.^{[14](#)}

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Reference 09/17/1984-11/17/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Lehman signed “Ron,”

Kraemer initialed "SK," and Linhard signed "Bob" above their names in the "From" line. None of the tabs is attached; however, they are attached to a copy in the Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Umbrella Talks 10/24/1984-11/04/1984.

² McFarlane traveled with Reagan to California. According to Reagan's diary, after several campaign stops on November 4, he went to Sacramento, California. After a stop in Los Angeles on November 5 and 6, he remained at his ranch until returning to the White House on November 11. (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, pp. 394-396) According to McFarlane: "In keeping with the permanent requirement that the administration be at all times prepared for nuclear attack, I accompanied the President wherever he went." (McFarlane, *Special Trust*, p. 285)

³ See [Document 298](#). This tasking memorandum was not found, but see [footnote 6](#), [Document 305](#).

⁴ See [Documents 296](#) and [300](#).

⁵ Draft minutes of an SACG meeting held on November 19 (rescheduled from November 20) are printed as [Document 314](#). On November 3, Hill forwarded four papers to McFarlane entitled: "SACPG Follow-Up: Tactics and Strategy" dated November 1, "US-Soviet Exchange of Defense Plans" dated November 2, "Exchanges of Observers at Exercises and Other Military Locations" dated November 2, and "Nuclear Testing Initiative" dated November 2. In a covering memorandum dated November 3, Hill wrote: "In response to your October 12, 1984 memorandum to the Senior Arms Control Policy Group, an ad hoc interagency group has developed four papers following-up specific initiatives cited in the President's UNGA speech." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Arms Control File, Proposals)

⁶ Not found.

7 McFarlane put a check mark in the margin beside this paragraph.

8 McFarlane put a check mark in the margin beside this paragraph.

9 McFarlane wrote in the margin: "Use GAC if it can be done." Above this in the margin, he wrote: "Pls find specific proposals now."

10 McFarlane wrote "agree" in the margin.

11 McFarlane put a check mark in the margin beside this paragraph.

12 McFarlane wrote "agree" in the margin.

13 McFarlane put check marks next to this paragraph and each of the three points below.

14 McFarlane initialed his approval of these recommendations and put a check mark in the margin next to recommendations one and two.

302. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New Delhi, November 3, 1984, 7-7:34 p.m.

The Secretary's Meeting with USSR Council of Ministers
Chairman Tikhonov, November 3, 1984

The Secretary met with USSR Council of Ministers
Chairman Tikhonov, November 3 (1900-1934). Participants
were:

U.S. SIDE

Secretary Shultz
Senator Baker
Senator Moynihan
Assistant Secretary Burt
Executive Assistant Hill
Deputy Assistant Secretary Palmer

USSR SIDE

Chairman Tikhonov
Deputy ForMin Maltsev
Interpreter Sukhodrev

The Secretary began by saying that the funeral had been moving and different than anything he had experienced. Tikhonov replied that it was also the first time he had been to such a funeral. These were tragic circumstances, almost incredible that one of her own bodyguards had hit her with eight bullets. She was a wise, great woman, with a high degree of erudition. India took its right place in the world under her, almost like a great power. Of course, they have their problems. But she continued the cause of her father Nehru. Now Nehru's grandson is the leader. The Soviet Union will do all it can to ensure that India remains stable, to help. India has many problems: housing, cultural level,

educational level, and external problems. All these are big matters which must be resolved.

The Secretary said he agreed that the assassination seemed incredible. We were shocked in the United States by radio Moscow's statements suggesting that somehow the United States was behind this event.² We believe it is important to develop constructive dialogue on regional problems involving instability and danger such as Pakistan and India, and Afghanistan and the Soviet forces there. So we were very upset at Soviet suggestions that the United States would have anything to do with such a shocking event.

Tikhonov replied that he was not in Moscow at the time (of these reports). But he had looked into it especially, and the Soviet media reference was to a source not in the Soviet Union, to a report of some agency. The Soviet Union has not made and does not intend to make a statement that the U.S. is connected to this tragic event. "It's out of the question—it is excluded that the United States was related to this event in any way." The region is dangerous, Tikhonov continued, and "ample fuel" has accumulated. Such things must be judged soberly and great powers need to do all they can to see that it develops in calm and tranquility and without aggravation.

Secretary Shultz thanked Tikhonov for his statement. Tikhonov interjected that even before he knew that he would be meeting the Secretary, he had looked into the matter and the reference was not to a Soviet source.

The Secretary said he had a report for Tikhonov, who said he would be happy to accept it if it was pleasant. The Secretary said he hoped it would be.

The Secretary said that last Wednesday he had spent an hour talking alone with President Reagan just before his last campaign swing.³ The President is superstitious, and does not believe in acting as though the election has been won—and in our country elections are never won until the votes are in and counted. But the President did talk to the Secretary at some length about the President's plans. The President had reflected on his meetings with Mr. Gromyko and on our own thinking about relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. And since Mr. Gromyko had been in Washington, the Secretary had met with Ambassador Dobrynin and Art Hartman had talked further with Mr. Gromyko.⁴ We had all the reports.

The Secretary continued that this discussion with President Reagan had not been in preparation for his coming to Delhi, but just a private chat in general about the outlook as we see it. The President had expressed his determination if elected to do everything he can to help bring about a relationship with the Soviet Union that would be a problem-solving relationship. So the Secretary was reporting to Tikhonov, as a statement, that the President Reagan you see before the election will be the same President Reagan you will see after the election. The efforts he has been making to improve our relationship will continue.

Tikhonov responded that if the President remains the same Ronald Reagan it would not be that good. But if he were to change course and really seek solutions to problems that would be good. Now the U.S. and the Soviet Union have very different points of view on practically all issues between us. The questions of armaments are not stabilizing, just growing. All other areas such as the economic field are in stagnation. "So is this talk not just a pre-election tactic?" Tikhonov continued by saying he had

visited the United States twice during the Eisenhower presidency. He remembered walking streets absolutely freely, he had even been a guest in homes and had been pleased. But today probably no one would invite him to their home. He hoped that all this is temporary.

The Secretary said Tikhonov missed the point. Insofar as events in U.S.-Soviet relations could influence our election, the campaign is over. Nothing would happen now to affect an outcome only 2-3 days off. The Secretary's point was that as the post-election period, he spoke privately to the Secretary—not in front of the TV cameras, and not as a public statement. He spoke of improved relations, if possible.

The United States, the Secretary said, sees strains in the relationship as principally due to positions the Soviet Union takes. If there is no give on the part of the Soviet Union, then there can be no improvement. "But I can assure you," the Secretary said, "that President Reagan will be working towards constructive ends."

The Secretary noted that Chairman Tikhonov might be interested in hearing the views of the two Senators in our bipartisan delegation—the Majority Leader and a leading democrat, Senator Moynihan.

Senator Baker said he wanted to underline what the Secretary had said. The President will be re-elected and is sincerely anxious to pursue a dialogue with the Soviet Union that will lead to better understanding and concrete results. Senator Baker said that he knew the mood of the Senate and it would welcome and would participate in improving relations. So he hoped that the Soviets would take at face value the statement that the Secretary had just made. The U.S. and the Soviet Union have an obligation to

each other to try to accomplish peaceful objectives together.

Tikhonov said he could only say one thing. If President Reagan does indeed move not towards talks for the sake of talks, but towards solutions, the Soviets “will not be found wanting for reciprocity.” Then he could say without reservation that the U.S. may rest assured the Soviets would make their own contribution.

Senator Moynihan mentioned that when he had served as American Ambassador he had spent pleasant evenings in this house.⁵ He recalled that when Brezhnev visited Delhi in 1973 he had made the strongest statements about improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations.⁶ Senator Moynihan warmly recalled that the Soviet translator then, as today, was Mr. Sukhodrev. He made no mistakes then, and would not surely make any today in conveying the Secretary’s point. Certainly President Reagan will have the support of the Senate for what he proposes. But both sides in Congress fail to understand why the Soviets have been so unforthcoming in recent years when he believed progress was being made ten years ago. The Senate will support constructive measures to help progress and improve relations.

Tikhonov said he could only say he did not know anyone in his right mind in the Soviet Union who was against better U.S.-Soviet relations. Tikhonov did not want to get into a polemic about who is to blame for the past. Soviets have their opinion and the U.S. has its. But if President Reagan wants better relations, then he will find that all on Soviet side are prepared to return the favor. The Secretary concluded by saying the two should shake hands on that note.

(Comment on Tikhonov. Tikhonov entered the room with a show of energy, looking quite healthy and smiling. Throughout he was alert and making a clear effort to be pleasant, without giving an inch on substance. Given his extensive travel and work in the preceding few days—he had just come from a trip to Cuba and had been holding extensive talks in Delhi—he looked in remarkably good shape for a man of 79 fast approaching 80.)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, US-Soviet Diplomatic Contacts 8/8. Secret; Nodis. The Secretary was in New Delhi for the funeral of Indira Gandhi, who was assassinated on October 31. In telegram Secto 16040 to the White House, November 4, Shultz reported on the funeral and his various meetings in New Delhi. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840013-0071)

² In telegram 324156 to Moscow, November 1, the Department reported on Palmer's telephone call to Isakov "to protest Radio Moscow statement that Mrs. Gandhi's death was due to 'world imperialism.'" The telegram continued to report: "Shortly after the Palmer-Isakov exchange, FBIS reported Radio Moscow commentary alleging that 'ideological inspiration' for the Gandhi assassination came from CIA. In addition, TASS report of Moscow press briefing on U.S. policy of 'state terrorism' quoted MFA spokesman Lomeyko as condemning the 'criminals' who had killed Gandhi and 'their inspirers'—the implication being that the U.S. was responsible." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840012-0534)

³ According to the President's Daily Diary, Shultz and Reagan met in the Oval Office at 1:30 p.m., on Wednesday,

October 31. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No substantive record of this meeting was found.

⁴ See [Documents 296](#) and [300](#).

⁵ Moynihan served as U.S. Ambassador to India from 1973 to 1975.

⁶ Brezhnev visited India in November 1973.

303. Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, November 7, 1984, 1529Z

14297. For the President and the Secretary. Subject: National Day in Moscow—Your Message. Ref: State 330956.²

1. (S—Entire text).
2. I used the occasion of the National Day reception to present to General Secretary Chernenko and First Deputy Prime Minister Gromyko your oral message sent after the election results were known. I explained that you wished them to know immediately the seriousness with which you approached the difficult problems of our relationship and the great importance you personally attach to reaching an agreement to reduce substantially the stocks of nuclear weapons. I stressed our understanding that this would not be an easy task but that both sides must devote the utmost to the effort.
3. Both leaders asked that their best wishes be passed to you. And this was echoed by many others at the reception. The news of your massive win and the statements you had made during the course of the election evening were well known and greeted as hopeful signs.³ I told Gromyko that his speech last night had been much too negative and that serious, non-polemical talks were necessary.⁴
4. The downside of today's events from the Soviet point of view was obviously the absence of one of their stalwarts—Marshal Ustinov. He has been absent from public view

since September and to have missed this event he must be very ill indeed.⁵ Chernenko was treated almost like an invalid. For the first time it was visible that he and 79-year-old Prime Minister Tikhonov sat through the parade. When Chernenko made his one short speech of the day to the assembled throng at the reception, it was even more labored and halting than usual. The embarrassment was palpable as he sometimes waited to catch his breath a full 30 seconds between phrases. Eyes among the loyal crowd lowered and feet shuffled as they waited for the painful episode to end.

5. In talking with foreign policy advisor Aleksandrov and First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko I had the impression that, while there is expectancy and modest hope, they still put things in terms of waiting for us to change. I tried to disabuse them of this and explain that they will find you and your administration calm, confident and generous in the propositions we will consider but we must find a balance that leads to real stability and not a false sense of euphoria that will quickly be dispelled by ugly facts.

6. The head of the U.S. Department of the Foreign Ministry, Bessmertnykh, had one positive note—although it was said in a slightly ambiguous way. He said apropos our demarche last night on the possible delivery of jet aircraft to Nicaragua that quote our fears were groundless unquote.⁶ Since he did not specify what he thought our fears were and I had no time to clarify, I am still not wholly reassured. I did say to all who would hear me that this is no time to do something stupid or thoughtless that would interfere with the chances of our approaching the vital issues of our relationship with the utmost seriousness.

7. Needless to say, I join all here in congratulating you and sending you and Mrs. Reagan our very best regards and hopes for turning this sow's ear of a relationship into something a little more safe and stable if not aesthetically more beautiful.

Hartman

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (11/01/84-11/07/84); NLR-748-25A-38-7-1. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² In telegram 330956 to Moscow, November 7, the Department instructed Hartman to pass along this oral message from Reagan to the Soviet leadership during a reception at the Kremlin: "With my reelection as President, I want to reaffirm my conviction that there is no more important task before us than for the United States and the Soviet Union to redouble efforts to ensure the peace and security of all mankind. This will require a serious commitment by both of us, but I am convinced we can and must establish a more stable and constructive relationship for the long term. We need to begin moving forward to diminish the burden of armaments, to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons, and to build a new measure of trust and confidence. I, and my administration, will be working to this end in the weeks and months ahead." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840013-0125)

³ Speaking in Los Angeles after his re-election on November 6, Reagan stated: "By rebuilding our strength, we can bring ourselves closer to the day when all nations can begin to reduce nuclear weapons and ultimately banish

them from the Earth entirely.” (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book II, pp. 1801–1802)

⁴ For the full text of Gromyko’s speech, given on November 6 during the celebration of the 67th anniversary of the October Revolution, see the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVI, No. 45 (December 5, 1984), pp. 5–8. For extracts of the address, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 784–785.

⁵ In telegram 14291 from Moscow, November 7, the Embassy reported: “While we have no solid information on Ustinov’s condition, the fact that he missed this most obligatory of leadership appearances—after an absence from public view for more than a month—would seem to indicate that he is seriously ill.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840712–0951)

⁶ In his memoir, Shultz wrote that on November 6: “a report came in that a freighter bearing twelve crates thought to contain MIG-21s was off the northwest coast of South America headed for Nicaragua. If they were MIG-21s, we would take them out. The Soviets knew I had laid that marker down. The next morning, the ship was said to be 225 miles out of port and to have slowed to eight knots. By midday, the ship was off the Pacific Coast port of Corinto. Our ambassador in Nicaragua, Harry Bergold, dispatched some embassy people to snoop around the port town. They reported no unusual activity. ‘Look,’ I told Motley, ‘I’m making you responsible for determining whether those crates contain lawnmowers or MIGs.’ We made our concerns known to the Soviets: they said our worries were groundless. Ortega declared, ‘It is not the policy of the revolutionary government to announce the type of weapons we receive.’ He continued, ‘All of the

weapons that we receive are for the defense of the revolution.’”

Shultz continued: “When the ship docked and the crates were opened, they contained high-performance helicopters, not MIGs. ‘Voila,’ said Motley.

“‘Voila?’ I asked. ‘Motley, you’ve been in the State Department too long.’ I told deputy CIA director Bob Gates that the whole episode, from the standpoint of the intelligence community, had not only been a failure but had been very costly: it revealed to the Soviets how much we *don’t* know and how much we *do* know.

“The Soviets and Nicaraguans had outmaneuvered us: they had lured us into visible protests in opposition to MIG-21s and then supplied the kind of aircraft that, ironically, would do far greater damage to the Contras in the field than would jet fighters. Then, in the United Nations, they had pointed to our statement that we would not tolerate MIGs as evidence of aggressive intent. The trouble with drawing red lines, as with the MIG-21, is that everything not over the line is taken to be okay.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 424-425)

304. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, November 8, 1984

SUBJECT

My Meeting Today with Soviet DCM Sokolov

I got together for a lunch and a subsequent meeting this afternoon with Soviet Embassy DCM Sokolov to follow up on your last session with Dobrynin.² Sokolov brought along an “oral reply” from Chernenko to the oral message Art passed along to the leadership in Moscow early yesterday.³ The text is attached. In handing over the reply, Sokolov said he wanted us to note two things: first, it was quite unusual that they could get us a reply so quickly during a holiday in Moscow, and second, it was a “very positive” message that he himself was quite happy about.

I told him that it did indeed seem positive and suggested that we move on from these atmospheric to a discussion of the substance. We then went over four different aspects of arms control:

—We first talked about their space arms control proposal. Sokolov seemed somewhat confused about our position on whether a discussion of offensive weapons was a precondition for discussions on outer space. I told him we thought it made sense to discuss offensive weapons in the context of discussions of outer space, but that it was not a precondition. He said he welcomed that statement.

—Second, we discussed the Soviet proposal for an ASAT moratorium. Sokolov asked if we had changed our position on agreeing to a moratorium. I told him this sounded like a precondition to us, but we were willing to discuss it when negotiations were underway on space. When I pointed to the President's comment on the question in his UNGA speech, Sokolov appeared not to understand that this language referred to our willingness to discuss an ASAT moratorium when we were in negotiations.⁴

—Third, we talked about offensive nuclear forces. Sokolov asked about the President's reference to an interim agreement during his meeting with Gromyko at the White House.⁵ I told him we had some ideas about such an agreement that we would be prepared to discuss in the context of negotiations.

—Fourth, Sokolov said that in the Soviet version of the Reagan-Gromyko memcon, the President had suggested that a high-level confidential discussion on arms control could be conducted between someone in Moscow and someone in the White House. Sokolov asked what individual in the White House was to carry out these discussions. I told him our version of the memcon showed that the President did not refer to the White House specifically but merely said "here." I said our position on carrying out a confidential discussion was flexible and that we did not have precise ideas about channels. However, as the President and the Secretary had indicated in the discussions with Gromyko, we were prepared for high-level confidential talks that would involve the two Foreign Ministers and possibly others. Sokolov seemed satisfied with this answer.

Finally, I took advantage of the meeting to press Sokolov on the two Berlin issues—the air corridors (following up on your last meeting with Dobrynin) and the closing of the Glienicke bridge threatened for November 15.⁶ I also asked him if he had anything for me on Nicaragua. He had nothing on Berlin. However, on Nicaragua he said that the Soviet government “stands by” the statement of the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister that the Soviet ship at Corinto contains no combat aircraft.⁷

Attachment

Oral Reply From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan⁸

Moscow, November 8, 1984

Thank you for the oral message transmitted through Ambassador Hartman. I would like to take this opportunity personally to congratulate you on your reelection to the post of President of the USA.

I want to reaffirm that I and my colleagues in the Soviet leadership come out firmly for reversing the present unfavorable trends in the international situation and in Soviet-American relations. We take note of your statement about the possibility and necessity of establishing more stable and constructive relations between our two countries for the long term.

The main thing there, in our view, is to begin in practice movement forward, to act in specific ways to stop the arms race, to establish the necessary level of trust, and to build our mutual relations on the basis of equality, non-interference and respect for each other's interests.

For our part, we are prepared to search on this path for solutions to the problems that stand before the Soviet Union and the USA, above all the task of eliminating the nuclear threat.

I would like to hope for corresponding reciprocal action in this on your part.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons. Forwarded through Armacost.

² See [Document 296](#).

³ See [Document 303](#).

⁴ See [footnote 7, Document 267](#).

⁵ See [footnote 4, Document 289](#).

⁶ See [Document 296](#). In telegram 2983 from the Mission in Berlin, October 3, the Mission reported: "The GDR has told the Berlin Senat that as of November 15 it will close the Glienicker Bridge between the American sector of Berlin and the GDR (near Potsdam). The principal users of the bridge are members of the three Western Military Liaison Missions to the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840630-0006)

⁷ On November 7, Nicaraguan Foreign Minister d'Escoto made an official statement denying that Nicaragua "was about to obtain advanced fighter aircraft from the Soviet bloc." He reported that the cargo of the Soviet freighter unloading in the port of Corinto "contained nothing that would endanger the peace of nearby nations." (Stephen Kinzer, "Nicaragua Says No Jet Fighters Are Being Sent,"

New York Times, November 8, 1984, p. A1) See also [footnote 6, Document 303](#).

⁸ Secret. The text of the oral statement, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy. Reagan initialed another copy of this oral message from Chernenko, indicating he saw it. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8498292)) The text of Chernenko's message was sent via telegram to Hartman in Moscow. (Telegram 334288 to Moscow, November 9; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])

**305. Message From the White House to the
Executive Secretary of the Department of State
(Hill)¹**

Washington, November 13, 1984, 0059Z

WH9034/6970. Please Deliver the Following Message to Charlie Hill in a Sealed Envelope Marked for the Secretary Eyes Only.

FROM: Robert C. McFarlane

TO: Secretary Shultz

November 12, 1984

Mr Secretary,

With apologies for intruding on your extremely busy schedule, there are two or three items which I have wanted to convey concerning pending business here and matters discussed with the President on the way back from California yesterday.² While some of the more sensitive points can wait until your return, I believe we both want to move the Chernenko letter as soon as possible and your own guidance would be most welcome.

1. Chernenko letter. John and Mike³ have exchanged views on the three basic differences which exist on the current State text (forwarded in Hill-McFarlane memo of November 9).⁴ The most significant in my judgment concerns the language you propose on the interim agreement. As you know, the President treated this in the Gromyko meeting as follows: "(The President) . . . wondered if we could not

consider concluding an interim agreement with restrictions on anti-satellite weapons, and also agreement on a process of reducing nuclear arms.”⁵ There was no reference to a time period e.g., three years, or to a moratorium. First, I don’t know with certainty what motivated the President to raise this. You had discussed it with him but it was not in the material he developed personally. From talks with him I believe he was thinking conceptually of what it would take to demonstrate U.S. flexibility generally rather than to make a specific substantive proposal. For as you know, the President has always refused to depart from our current position before negotiations resume and the content of an interim agreement as you propose it has not been approved. Indeed the President directed me to set as the first priority, conclusion of ongoing preparations for the “Umbrella Talks” before exploring any new proposals such as the moratorium and I put that in writing to the community in late October.⁶ More to the point, however, it seems to me unwise on the merits to sign up now to a general moratorium on ASAT testing (not even limiting it to interceptors) before you have had a chance to see the pitfalls of that through a brief at the Pentagon. There are truly significant problems in such a course—difficulties in verification and real questions as to how we husband the leverage represented by ASAT and SDI systems (which are largely indistinguishable) in the long-term negotiations we envision will take place. In short to ignore those issues with a unilateral concession at this point—a concession the President did not make explicit in the Gromyko meeting—would be against our interest. Finally it is essential to recognize that neither the Joint Chiefs nor OSD would support such a position.

My own recommendation—and in my honest judgment, the President’s intention during the Gromyko talks—would be to focus on the Umbrella Talks as the way to convene an

overall review of the bidding in START, INF, MBFR, CD, CDE and space systems. Our goal would be to spin off renewed talks in either existing form or new ones as conceptual agreement emerges during the Umbrella Talks. I expect that we can conclude the pending umbrella analysis by the end of November so as to be ready for talks to start anytime thereafter. But there is no need—and indeed it could damage our position in those talks—to make preemptive concessions at this time.

2. The channel for conducting the Umbrella Talks. I am afraid I have been misunderstood as to my motive for leaving the institutional element general. My pledge to you that any senior associate you might choose would work for and through you is firm. That is also clearly the President's commitment although here again, he views the concept as nothing more than an idea that might appeal to the Soviets, but which if not, can be set aside. Its treatment in general terms in the letter is Soviet-oriented not US-oriented. Specifically, history as well as current Soviet practice suggests that the arms control portfolio in the Kremlin is not dominated by the Foreign Ministry and for us to so suggest is gratuitous. The more general formulation leaves them the latitude to decide how they want to put their team together which may turn out to be to repose control in the Foreign Ministry, but that is not for us to prejudge. I would propose that we focus on the Umbrella Talks as follows
“One possible approach would be for special representatives (if you wish: ours under the guidance of the Secretary of State), to sit down and discuss the conceptual issues that need to be addressed, such as the relationship between offensive and defensive forces and the nature of the strategic relationship our arms control efforts should seek to establish. Such talks could help expedite the search for agreement on the objectives and structure for specific negotiations in individual areas.”

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

4. My talk with the President. As we discussed when last we talked, I talked with the President on the plane yesterday about the next four years. I had sent him our joint cover memo with your changes included and he had read it.⁷ I began with an enthusiastic view of the substantive opportunities before him and expressed your own concurrence on the important ways in which U.S. leadership could be applied to the resolution of tough issues from arms control to the Middle East to Asia, Europe, etc. Then saying that I was speaking only for myself I stated that I perceived significant obstacles to the smooth functioning of the policy machinery for as long as personal and ideological differences persisted as I expected that they would. I touched on how these have impeded progress in the past in three specific areas—Central America, the Middle East and arms control. I went over what I viewed his goals and strategy to be in each area and explained where I believed there were disagreements in each.⁸ I said that it was possible that a written statement of goals and policy in the leading areas might overcome some of the disagreements and get those concerned to pull together, that I remained worried about disharmony within the community. The President's response was to go over how he wished to proceed in each area. He reaffirmed his sense of the need to negotiate seriously for arms reduction. He does not dismiss the failures of the past but simply believes we are better positioned to negotiate and keep our self-interest in the forefront and not be stampeded into a bad agreement. Similarly in Central America, he sees the risks but believes there would have been little chance of getting as far as we have in gaining congressional approval without the approach we have taken to negotiations, but he does feel that we must achieve our four objectives in the process. He didn't comment on the disagreements. I never

made explicit my personal sense of what it will take to solve the problem but it was strongly implicit in my remarks. It seems to me that unless you wish to broach this directly (with my reinforcement if you wish) we can expect Jim Baker's assessment to you on the phone last Friday to materialize.⁹ I've done a lot of soul-searching on the implications of such a scenario which I can wait to discuss until you return.

Warm regards,

Bud

¹ Source: Department of State, A Records, Miscellaneous Papers of Secretary Shultz and Charles Hill, Lot 89D250, Misc File 6/84. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. This message was sent electronically to Charles Hill in Brasilia, Brazil, for delivery to Shultz, who was in Brasilia from November 10 to 13 for the OAS General Assembly meetings.

² The President remained at his ranch in California after the November 6 election, returning to Washington on Sunday, November 11. In his memoir, McFarlane wrote: "With the election behind us, and the President's mandate revealed to be the most impressive any modern chief executive had ever been granted, I was eager and anxious to get started on all the work there was to do in the second term." He continued: "The President had been in California for the election, and on the following Sunday we headed back to Washington. On Air Force One, he and I sat down together for a long session, one-on-one. I told him about my planning for the second term, and the detailed issue analyses that were being prepared for his consideration, from which I hoped he would select the two issues on

which we would focus for the next four years.” (McFarlane, *Special Trust*, pp. 285-286)

³ Reference is to John Poindexter and Michael Armacost.

⁴ Not printed. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) November 1984 (1/3))

⁵ See [footnote 4, Document 289](#).

⁶ In NSDD 148 (see [Document 298](#)), Reagan tasked McFarlane with completing preparations for the Umbrella Talks. In an October 12 memorandum to the SACPG members, McFarlane provided instructions for near and long-term taskings related to the Umbrella Talks and the production of four working papers for the group’s November meeting. (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Umbrella Talks 10/24/1984-11/04/1984) Regarding the four papers, see [footnote 5, Document 301](#). Although no late October tasking memorandum from McFarlane was found, the November 3 memorandum from Lehman, Kraemar, and Linhard (see [Document 301](#)) responds to the tasking for arms control and the SACPG specifically. The SACPG met on November 19. See [Document 314](#).

⁷ Not found.

⁸ See [Document 306](#).

⁹ No record was found of a phone conversation.

306. Editorial Note

On November 14, 1984, from 1:30 to 2:45 p.m., President Ronald Reagan met with Secretary of State George Shultz and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane in the Oval Office. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) The purpose of this meeting was twofold: to discuss the global agenda and foreign policy for the second term, as well as to address the growing divisions within the administration, specifically between Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger over the Soviet Union, arm control, and various other issues. In his November 14 diary entry, Reagan wrote: "A long meeting with Sec. Shultz. We have trouble. Cap & Bill Casey have views contrary to George's on S. Am., the middle East & our arms negotiations. It's so out of hand George sounds like he wants out. I cant let that happen. Actually George is carrying out my policy. I'm going to meet Cap & Bill & lay it out to them. Wont be fun but has to be done." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981-October 1985, page 396)

In his memoir, McFarlane recalled discussions with Reagan in the lead-up to this November 14 meeting. During their return trip from California (see [footnote 2, Document 305](#)), McFarlane brought up the sensitive issue of disagreements between Shultz and Weinberger with Reagan: "I must tell you, Mr. President,' I said, 'that I fear that nothing can get accomplished if you don't recognize that you face paralysis within your administration owing to the largely personal animus that exists between Cap and George.'

"I told him I believed he would find that the process would work more smoothly if he built his team around one or the other of these two men, but that together, they were like oil

and water. If he insisted on keeping them both, I said, 'then you're going to have discord, and you're going to have to be the arbiter and be much more active.'

"These were thoughts I had been having for a long time, and it was time to air them. The need for constant mediation between Shultz and Weinberger was exhausting, pointless, unworthy and immensely frustrating, and although I felt I handled it well, I felt it was important to make this pitch to the President and that he either change the configuration or become more actively involved and in control of his own administration." (McFarlane, *Special Trust*, page 286)

Once back in Washington, McFarlane met with Shultz: "I told Shultz about the discussion. George and I had discussed the problem he had with Cap on a couple of occasions, and he professed himself perplexed by Weinberger's apparently deep-seated hostility and jealousy of his role. He immediately agreed to broach the subject with Reagan himself. At my instigation, Shultz regularly came to the White House twice a week for private meetings with the President. At the next one of these meetings, he picked up the thread of discussion I had had with Reagan on Air Force One." (Ibid., page 287)

Although no notes of this meeting were found, Shultz discussed the meeting in detail in his memoir. (His account corresponds to his talking points and preparatory meeting papers in the Department of State, A Records, Miscellaneous Papers of Secretary Shultz and Charles Hill, Lot 89D250, Misc File 1984.) Shultz wrote: "I asked Bud McFarlane to attend that key meeting, at 1:30 in the afternoon on Wednesday, November 14, at which I would give my detailed views to the president. We talked for a full hour, after which I spent another half hour with Bud. I told

the president that his administration was deeply divided and that I wanted to set my views out for him. 'Standing still with the Soviets is not an option. The choice is to negotiate new agreements or enter a world with no arms limitations. Opponents of negotiations are not troubled by the disappearance of arms control. They argue that nothing useful has resulted, that agreements will undermine public support for defense, and that arms control should be an exercise in public relations.' In fact, I said, 'negotiations have produced security-enhancing agreements.' I called attention to the Austrian State Treaty, the Berlin Accords, the Atmospheric Test Ban, the Nonproliferation Treaty, and the Outer Space Treaty as examples. I pointed out that the SALT I Treaty put a cap on further growth in the number of Soviet launchers at a time when we had no program to increase ours and that the ABM Treaty prevented costly deployment of systems that would not have yielded reliable defense, given the technology at the time.

"I had asked the CIA to tell me what a world without current nuclear arms limits and with no arms control agreements in force would look like down the line. I got back the view that in such a scenario Soviet missile warheads would likely double over the next ten years. I noted to the president that this doubling did not assume any vast new commitment of Soviet resources but that the effort to keep pace with them on ballistic missiles was very costly for us, politically as well as financially. An 'unconstrained environment,' I argued, 'is detrimental to the security interests of the United States.

"We need to do better than existing agreements,' I said, 'and seek reductions in the numbers of warheads, as you have proposed.' I also argued that the opponents of arms control misread the key relationship between arms control efforts and public support for defense spending. 'Congress,'

I argued, 'will not support key weapons systems without meaningful negotiations. Similarly, allied support will be problematic if arms control efforts unravel. Extreme positions and inflexibility will not enhance our position but undermine it. Thanks to your policies, the United States is confident and strong and the question now is whether we use strength to achieve significant new accords with the Soviets or see an unlimited increase in nuclear weapons, along with greater tension. Most people in your administration are quite comfortable with the present situation,' I said, 'and are doing all they can to block any effort to engage with the Soviets and achieve arms control agreements.'

"The president interjected frequently as I talked, and it was clear he had thought all this through. His point of view mirrored my own. It troubled him that people within his administration opposed the kind of arms control agreements he had advocated and even opposed an attempt to build a constructive relationship with the Soviets.

"At the end of our discussion, I told the president, 'To succeed, we have to have a team: right now there isn't one. Cap Weinberger, Bill Casey, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and I just don't see things the same way.' Leaks, end runs, cutting people out, refusing to follow through on decisions—all these tactics were constantly in use. 'I have always been able to develop a team wherever I have worked,' I said. 'Here I have been unable to do it. I can't produce a team for you. I'm frustrated and I'm ready to step aside so you can put somebody else in at State who can get along with them. You will see no results without a team.'

The president told me he wouldn't stand for any thought that I would leave. 'I'm not ducking out,' I said. 'There's

nothing I'd rather do than stay here with you and work out these problems. I have no hidden agenda.' I left it at that." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pages 496-498) Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam's November 14 note recounts Shultz's report of this meeting, noting that "the Secretary laid it on the line that the reason we were having problems was that people were not working together as a team and that with respect to arms control agreements with the Soviets and a negotiated settlement in Central America, people failed to agree with the President's policy." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1984-June 1985)

According to Shultz, McFarlane informed him the following day that the "president intended to speak personally to the others involved to get them to pull together and that Meese, Baker, and Deaver had asked Vice President Bush to weigh in after that. I had stirred things up, and that was to the good, but I had no illusions that the battle would end." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 498) In his November 15 diary entry, Reagan wrote: "Cap W. came in re some defense problems. I didn't take up the Sec. St. problem with him—pending a session with the V.P. who has some input on that matter." The following day he wrote: "Tomorrow morning I'm meeting with Cap W. & Bill Casey to iron out (if I can) some difficulties involving George S." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981-October 1985, page 397) According to the President's Daily Diary, he met with Casey and Weinberger on the morning of Saturday, November 17 from 10:28 to 11:21 a.m., before leaving to spend the Thanksgiving holiday in California. No record of this meeting was found. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

307. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, November 16, 1984

SUBJECT

Dobrynin's Call to Deliver A Letter From Chernenko on Nicaragua

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin called on me today to hand over a letter to you from Chairman Chernenko complaining about our policy in Nicaragua. In it Chernenko argues that tension is being whipped up around Nicaragua without justification and warns that it could affect US-Soviet relations. But the letter also includes an emphatic denial that Soviet combat jets have been shipped to Nicaragua.² It is interesting that he seeks to apply linkage to us by using our desire for improved relations to moderate our Nicaragua policy, since this implies he thinks that desire is sincere. But his warning that our actions against Nicaragua could spoil prospects for better US-Soviet relations is also a reflection of the weakness of the Soviet position in the area.

In handing over the letter, Dobrynin said it was a private message which they did not intend to publish. He also pointed to Chernenko's statement that we should work towards straightening out our relations and his recognition that you are "having thoughts along similar lines".³ He noted that his deputy Sokolov had just been in to see Deputy Assistant Secretary Palmer to inform him that they are ready now to discuss dates and agenda for sessions of the joint US-Soviet commissions on cooperation on agriculture, the environment, and housing and to suggest

(albeit in a tortured, roundabout way) that they may be ready to talk with us on southern Africa.⁴

We do not believe it necessary to revise the letter from you to Chernenko which Art Hartman is scheduled to hand over to Gromyko on Tuesday morning.⁵ I will also give Dobrynin a copy of it here. We will shortly be forwarding to you our suggestions on how to respond to Chernenko on Nicaragua.

Attachment

Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan⁶

Dear Mr. President,

Moscow, November 16, 1984

I deemed it necessary to write to you on a subject which is of growing concern to us and, as you evidently know, not to us alone. I have in mind the policy and practical actions of the USA with regard to Nicaragua.

I will say it right away: the dangerous tension being whipped up around that country has no justification whatsoever.

Indeed, can one seriously believe that Nicaragua is threatening anyone, especially the United States of America. On the contrary, the people of Nicaragua and its leadership by their concrete actions show their desire for peace and a willingness to have normal good relations with neighboring and other countries. The Nicaraguans are extending their good-neighborly hand to the United States as well.

All they want is to be left alone and be given the opportunity to live and work in the conditions of peace. It is a natural and inalienable right of every people and this right must be respected.

Any attempts to deprive the Nicaraguan people of this right, the policy of pressure and of military threats against Nicaragua are inadmissible, no matter how one may look at it.

The creation of a crisis situation around Nicaragua cannot serve anybody's interests. The way the further developments would go, and it depends above all on the USA, will undoubtedly have an impact not only on the situation in that region, but also on the international affairs in general. A further escalation of tensions there and its consequences cannot but also affect Soviet-American relations.

We are convinced that this cannot be allowed to happen if there is to be an intention to work towards straightening out the relations between us. We do have such an intention. And we made it known to you personally, did so again quite recently. Judging by some of your statements, you are also having thoughts along similar lines.

We urge you, Mr. President, to weigh all this up very carefully. It is necessary to give the countries of Central America a possibility to settle their affairs peacefully and not to impede the achievement of a just political settlement which is the focus of the efforts of Nicaragua and of the Contadora group countries enjoying a broad international support.

For its part the Soviet Union is strongly in favor of the above. We pursue no other goals. We categorically reject

the attempts to cast aspersions on our policy, to ascribe to us some sort of malicious designs, as was the case, for example, with the far-fetched story about Soviet combat jets being shipped to Nicaragua. It is well known that there occurred nothing of that kind. The Nicaraguan government also made an official statement to that effect.

Mr. President, I trust you will understand correctly the motives for my writing to you. It is a serious issue. The further US behavior in this case will inevitably lead to a conclusion also with regard to its general intentions in international affairs.

Sincerely,

K. Chernenko

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8491175). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed this memorandum, indicating he saw it. A November 16 State Department covering memorandum from Burt to Shultz indicates the memorandum was drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons and Palmer.

² See [footnote 6, Document 303](#) and [footnote 7, Document 304](#).

³ See attachment to [Document 304](#).

⁴ In telegram 342385 to Moscow, November 17, the Department summarized the Sokolov-Palmer meeting on November 16, which covered the Gandhi assassination, South Africa, and joint commissions. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840013-0377)

⁵ Tuesday, November 20. For the text of this letter, see [Document 308](#).

⁶ No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy.

308. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko¹

Dear Mr. Chairman: Washington, November 16, 1984

Thank you for your reply to my oral message transmitted through Ambassador Hartman and for your congratulations upon my reelection.² I am especially pleased to note that we are both prepared to search for solutions to the problems that stand before us and to address the task of eliminating the nuclear threat. I would like to convey some of my thoughts about what we can do to bring this about.

As I prepare to embark on the next four years of my presidency, I see no more important task before me than ensuring peace and greater security, not only for the United States, but for all countries of the world. It is a fact of life that our two great countries share in responsibility for making mankind more peaceful and more secure. Neither of us alone can succeed in this task.

Of course, we will continue to have fundamental differences in our political beliefs, and both of us will defend the interests of our countries vigorously. Nevertheless, I am convinced that our divergent interests need not—and *must* not—bring us into conflict. We have an obligation to act to put our relationship on a safer and more constructive course, and to expand cooperation as much as circumstances permit.

The world has undergone profound changes over the last four decades, and you and I have witnessed both the best and worst times in Soviet-American relations. The two of us

today have not only the power, but the responsibility, to bring about constructive changes in our relationship. Indeed, we owe it to the entire world to do all we can to seek peaceful resolution of our differences and opportunities for cooperation wherever possible.

I have studied carefully our previous correspondence and your recent public statements. The discussions Secretary Shultz and I had with Deputy Prime Minister Gromyko in September, as well as the subsequent exchanges between Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Shultz with our respective ambassadors, have been most useful.³ Secretary Shultz has also reported to me on his necessarily brief but encouraging meeting with Prime Minister Tikhonov in New Delhi.⁴

In reviewing this record, I have been looking to the future rather than to the past, since my approach is strategic rather than tactical. The conclusions I would draw from these various communications and meetings is that we are in agreement on a number of basic principles which should govern our relations, but that we have not yet found the practical means to move our relationship beyond useful small steps on bilateral issues toward a more productive overall course. On such important matters as the objective of peace and the goal of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons, we have a common view. But at this point, it seems to me, we must concentrate our attention on how to move forward in practical ways.

Experience shows, I believe, that we cannot do this if either of us demands concessions of the other in advance. I am convinced that we will not be able to find a solution to the problems our two countries face if we should require Soviet concessions prior to negotiations. We pose no such requirement, and if you can adopt an analogous position,

this would open the way for finding realistic solutions to real problems.

The suggestions I made in my address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 24 reflected my desire to find means acceptable to both of us for addressing the issues before us. I kept my suggestions general, because I wished to preserve the possibility of consulting with you privately and thus developing ideas cooperatively. But let me take this opportunity to give you my current thinking on them.

One question that must be addressed is how we go about the task of negotiating new arms control agreements. I think our Foreign Ministers, both directly and through ambassadors, should play an increasingly active role, as was the practice in previous years. In this context, I have suggested that we initiate talks which address broader strategic concepts than do the fora available to us up to now. The objective would be to create a firmer foundation for negotiations on the whole range of specific issues involved in the process of reducing arms and increasing stability. I visualize such talks as providing an "umbrella" under which specific arms control negotiations could be planned, and suggestions from both sides could be examined, with the goal of finding mutually acceptable approaches for negotiation.

George Shultz has suggested to me that one way to test this concept would be for both of us to designate a representative who is thoroughly familiar with the strategic thinking of his highest political authority and who would meet with his counterpart with a mandate to develop specific proposals for submission to us for consideration.⁵ Of course, their consultations and recommendations would be totally confidential. If initial experience with this

procedure should be positive, we could consider the possibility of carrying it forward as a continuing means of contact to provide advice and guidance to the total arms control negotiating process.

If you agree that the idea has merit, I am prepared to appoint a person of national stature in the arms control area to work with George Shultz and me.

In our correspondence and in your public statements, you have placed great stress on the question of negotiations on "preventing the militarization of outer space." In his discussions here, Mr. Gromyko reaffirmed the importance the Soviet Union attaches to this issue. As I said in our meeting, the United States is ready to meet with you to discuss space weapons, and we have no preconditions as to the form or scope of the discussions. At the same time, we believe that the most pressing issue is how to begin the process of reducing offensive nuclear arms. I think your own experts would agree that these two areas are inherently related, even though we may ultimately choose, as was the case in the past, to discuss them in separate negotiating fora. The broader, "umbrella," consultations I have suggested could give us a vehicle for agreeing on approaches to the interrelated issues.

Nuclear and space weapons are not the only arms control areas in which we should strive to make progress in the coming years. Nuclear testing is another. I have taken note of your suggestion that ratification of the 1974 and 1976 treaties would contribute to progress on other subjects. In this regard, you are aware of the suggestion I made in my United Nations address that we each invite experts from the other country for direct measurement of upcoming underground nuclear tests.⁶ There have been uncertainties on both sides about whether the yields of certain tests have

been below the 150-kiloton limit established in the 1974 treaty. The direct measurement I have suggested, while separate from the treaty ratification issue, might reduce those uncertainties in reliable fashion to the point where the path to ratification would again be open.

Another area where positive results could be achieved is that of measures to enhance confidence and reduce the risk of conflict arising through accident or miscalculation. At the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe, we have agreed to your proposal to discuss non-use-of-force commitments, in the context of negotiations on measures to give that principle concrete new meaning. With political will on both sides, this should provide the basis for an agreement that meets both sides' interests. Bilaterally, we have agreed on steps to improve our Direct Communication Link, and there are further ways to improve communication that I would hope we could explore in the coming year.

I also hope you will give serious consideration to the other suggestions I have made concerning ways of moving forward not only in arms control but in other fields.

Meetings at the ministerial level are one example. Our ministers of agriculture met in 1983 and will be meeting again soon. We would like to see discussion of bilateral cooperative activities in a number of other fields progress to the point where we could envisage joint commission meetings at the ministerial level next year. In the defense field, too, our ministers have met in the past, and the talks between our navies in the context of the Agreement to Avoid Incidents at Sea have been useful. I think further exchanges between senior officials on various defense issues would be a promising way of reducing misunderstanding. This is the context in which I suggested such possibilities as exchanges of observers at military

exercises and exchanges of five-year defense procurement plans.

Regularized meetings at the policy level on regional issues would be another appropriate way to enhance our dialogue. The danger of turbulence and instability in various regions reinforces my conviction that it is important for us to be explaining our policy approaches concerning regional issues to each other more systematically than in the past. Placing our discussions of regional issues on a more systematic basis would help us to understand more fully each other's approach and would at least reduce further the danger of miscalculation in times of crisis. We have made specific offers for experts' talks on the Middle East, southern Africa and Afghanistan, and hope you will be able to respond positively to these proposals.

Questions in our bilateral relations have not figured prominently in our correspondence, but I would like to emphasize that I am strongly in favor of concrete steps to increase cooperation in the cultural, economic and scholarly fields, and to expand contacts to the mutual benefit of our peoples. I hope that we can find ways to give new momentum to an invigoration of activities in these areas. In this connection, let me say once again that steps by the Soviet Union to resolve pending humanitarian issues can have a very important positive influence in every other field of our relationship, for the reasons I explained to Foreign Minister Gromyko.

So that we can move from consultation to action—the concrete deeds we both want—I hope that we can implement these ideas as rapidly as possible.

Our Foreign Ministers can follow up in greater detail on all the various issues between us, and I believe that an early

meeting between them might be useful.

Let me say once again that I value our correspondence, and I look forward to receiving your reaction to my thoughts and proposals.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret. The Department of State sent the letter in telegram 339906 to Moscow, November 16, with instructions that the “Ambassador should seek meeting with Gromyko to present text of the President’s letter to Chernenko.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8491139) (1/2))

² See [Document 304](#).

³ See [Documents 284](#), [286](#), [287](#), [288](#), [296](#), and [300](#).

⁴ See [Document 302](#).

⁵ In his memoir, Shultz recalled: “In the president’s postelection letter to Chernenko, he suggested that we each appoint a high-level official, in whom we had special confidence, to deal with arms control. I was determined that Paul Nitze should be our man and that the chain of command should run from Nitze to me to President Reagan. Interagency committees would meet, and NSC members would fight for their views, but ultimately the decisions would be made through the Nitze-Shultz-Reagan lineup. This idea, I knew, would evoke more protest: Nitze had been considered ‘soft’ and ‘uncontrollable’ by many

hard-liners in the administration ever since his walk in the woods.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 498–499)

In his memoir, Nitze wrote: “It was about this time that Bud McFarlane decided that the work in Washington on arms control matters needed greater centralization and coordination. He asked me whether I would take on the job, reporting to both the President and to Secretary Shultz. He suggested that I have an office with the NSC staff in the Old Executive Office Building, as well as an office in the State Department.

“I was tempted by the offer, although I had had bad experiences before when I had tried to work simultaneously for two bosses. Secretary Shultz vigorously opposed my shuttling between offices in State and the White House. He wanted me to move my office from ACDA on the fifth floor of the State Department building to the seventh floor in an office adjacent to his. I agreed to his proposal.” (Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost*, pp. 402–403)

⁶ In his speech to the UNGA on September 24, Reagan stated: “We would also welcome the exchange of observers at military exercises and locations. And I propose that we find a way for Soviet experts to come to the United States nuclear test site, and for ours to go to theirs, to measure directly the yields of tests of nuclear weapons. We should work toward having such arrangements in place by next spring. I hope that the Soviet Union will cooperate in this undertaking and reciprocate in a manner that will enable the two countries to establish the basis for verification for effective limits on underground nuclear testing.” (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book II, pp. 1360–1361).

309. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Mr. Secretary:

Washington, November 16, 1984

We have received very good news from Chernenko. I have attached his letter and a memorandum from you to the President commenting on it.² In my view our response should be positive.

I briefed Bud on the content and we discussed handling. Bud asked that you call the President tonight. He will be at the ranch after 6:00 p.m. our time. (I've attached at Tab 1 some points you might make to the President.)³ Bud is going out to California tomorrow and will take the memorandum from you to the President with the Chernenko letter (Tab 2) once you have approved it. Bud agrees that we need to think about public handling. It would be unfortunate if it leaked right away. What I think we should consider is a joint announcement by the two sides early next week that we have agreed to begin negotiations on key arms control issues and that the two foreign ministers kick off this process in early January.

Let me just point out a couple of things about the letter itself:

—The Soviets are clearly calling for “negotiations”, not just discussions.

—They are also continuing to use the term “non-militarization of space”.

I don't consider either of these points to be important problems. But others in the interagency community will. The main point is that the Soviets have accepted the President's and your position, and have abandoned their preconditions.

This Soviet response, in my view, immeasurably strengthens your position both because it is substantively forthcoming and because they have invited you to Moscow to begin the process. I hope we can take advantage of this to remove the impediments in the interagency process to decision making on arms control.

We have reread the President's letter to Chernenko which Art is scheduled to deliver to Gromyko Monday morning in Moscow.⁴ The substance is still on target and it is worth conveying to the Soviets. We would have Art explain that it was drafted prior to receipt of Chernenko's two letters and that we will be responding to these letters shortly.

It's quite possible the Soviets purposefully delayed receiving Art so that they could get their letters in first. Nonetheless, it will be clear to everyone that they're accepting our positions.

In light of the above, I have decided that it would be best for me to cancel my plans to leave for London tomorrow morning, where I was going to meet with the Quad political directors, and to send my deputy, Jim Dobbins, instead. I will therefore be in town all day Sunday and Monday and available if you would like to follow up with me on these matters.

Richard Burt⁵

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.

² Attached at Tab 2. See [Document 310](#). A handwritten note on Burt's memorandum reads: "Original memo (Secpres) given to Mr. McFarlane by the Secretary 17 Nov."

³ The talking points are attached but not printed.

⁴ See [Document 308](#).

⁵ Burt signed "Rick" above his typed signature.

310. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Soviets Agree to Negotiations on the Basis of Your Proposal

In a major move in our relations with the Soviet Union, Chairman Chernenko has sent you the attached letter which accepts your approach of negotiations on both space weapons and offensive weapons, including both strategic weapons and what they call medium-range weapons or in other words INF. But he says “productive” talks on nuclear arms control cannot take place “without the two sides deciding what measures they intend to take to prevent the spread of the arms race into outer space.” The implication is that agreement on space arms restrictions must precede conclusion of an agreement on nuclear arms, though not necessarily negotiations themselves. Chernenko’s letter in fact specifically acknowledges “an organic” and “objective relationship” between space weapons and offensive systems.

Chernenko’s new position represents a major concession by the Soviets, since they have abandoned their earlier precondition that the US INF be withdrawn from Europe before negotiations could begin. The meaning of all this is quite clear. When Viktor Isakov, the Minister-Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, delivered the letter to Rick Burt this afternoon he explicitly noted how pleased he was to be delivering this message since “for the first time in four years we can say we may be in business.”²

Chernenko also says that it is “especially important” for the sides to go to the negotiating table “with a clear and mutually arrived at understanding as to the subject and objectives of such negotiations.” (You’ll recall that last summer one of the Soviet demands for the Vienna talks was that the U.S. agree in advance to “objectives” which predetermined the negotiating outcome.) To “settle these matters” Chernenko has suggested that I meet in early January with Gromyko. Chernenko indicates that the Soviets are prepared to host the meeting in Moscow but they would also be willing to meet in a mutually agreed third country.

We need to develop our public position on this major development. It will be necessary to do this in a coordinated and disciplined manner in order to preserve confidentiality as we enter a new era of arms control negotiations. In the first instance we may want to consider a joint public statement with the Soviets to announce agreement on the resumption of negotiations and pre-empt leaks.

Attachment

Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan³

Dear Mr. President,

Moscow, November 17, 1984

In my oral message to you on November 8,⁴ I already briefly expressed our view in what way it is possible and necessary to reverse the current unfavorable trends in Soviet-American relations and in the international situation as a whole.

I believe, Mr. President, there is no need to go back to the question what caused the present state of Soviet-American relations and the general aggravation of tensions in the world. We set forth our assessments in this regard on more than one occasion.

The main thing now, in our view, is to join our efforts in stopping the world from edging towards a dangerous line. For this, resolute and immediate practical measures are required.

In this letter I would like to express the thinking of the Soviet side as to what exactly the USSR and the USA could do in a practical way in order to alleviate and, in the long run, to remove altogether the danger of a catastrophe.

Specifically, we propose that the Soviet Union and the United States of America enter into new negotiations with the objective of reaching mutually acceptable agreements on the whole range of questions concerning nuclear and space weapons.

For objective reasons, the resolution of the issue of space weapons in this regard is of key importance, since, should the space arms race start, it would not only preclude any serious talk about the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, but would inevitably become a catalyst for the arms race in other directions as well. To put it briefly, a productive discussion of nuclear arms limitation issues, and above all strategic arms, is impossible without the two sides deciding what measures they intend to take to prevent the spread of the arms race into outer space.

There is an organic, and I would say, objective relationship between these issues and it is precisely in this way that

they should be treated at the negotiations we are proposing.

In other words, such negotiations must encompass both the issue of non-militarization of space and the questions of strategic nuclear arms and medium-range nuclear systems. In all these directions we are prepared to seek most radical solutions which would allow movement toward a complete ban and, eventually liquidation of nuclear arms.

Considering the significance and the nature of the issues to be discussed, it is especially important for the sides to go to the negotiating table with a clear mutually arrived at understanding as to the subject and the objectives of such negotiations.

In order to settle these matters we propose that A.A. Gromyko and George Shultz meet, let's say in the first half of January, 1985. We would be prepared for this purpose to receive the Secretary of State in Moscow, or such a meeting could be arranged in a third country as may be agreed by the sides.

In our opinion, achieving agreement on the beginning of new Soviet-American negotiations on space and nuclear weapons, and a clearly expressed intention of the sides to solve these issues would have a positive impact on the situation in the world and could provide an impetus for the straightening out of the relations between our countries.

We await, Mr. President, a constructive reply from you.

Sincerely,

K. Chernenko

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (11/16/84-11/25/84); NLR-748-25A-41-3-1. Secret; Sensitive. Shultz gave McFarlane this memorandum on November 17 to give to the President in California (see [footnote 2, Document 309](#)).

² See [Document 309](#).

³ Secret; Sensitive. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy.

⁴ See attachment to [Document 304](#).

311. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Santa Barbara, California, November 18, 1984

SUBJECT

Renewed Talks With the Soviet Union

Yesterday, George Shultz advised you of Soviet willingness to renew talks on strategic and intermediate range nuclear weapons as well as space systems. The text of the Chernenko letter is at Tab A.² At Tab Bis a memo from George providing his views.³ This morning before leaving Washington, I met with George, Cap and Bill Casey. While all recommend that you accept the Chernenko proposal Cap was chary about getting into a "negotiation" of space systems for reasons he has explained to you.⁴ With respect to strategic and intermediate range nuclear systems, all agree that we can easily be ready to pick up where we left off in Geneva, especially given the additional flexibility we have developed through interdepartmental analytical work in the intervening months.

The first step is to get Soviet agreement on an announcement. All of us agree that we ought to try to avoid a long drawn out argument over the text of the announcement (as occurred during the abortive "Vienna" discourse last summer). Within our own government the only snag I expect will be on the above point as to whether or not we characterize this session in January as negotiations (on space systems as well as the nuclear issues—Cap will have a problem with this). In the view that we ought, in any event, to move quickly I will ask John

Poindexter to convene a hand-picked group of four or five from State, Defense, the JCS and CIA to meet on this tomorrow morning so as to have a draft proposed announcement to you by early morning California time. George's proposed announcement is at Tab C.⁵

After the announcement is made we will need to turn our attention right away to finalizing our position in each area—strategic, intermediate range and outer space systems. As I have mentioned the first two are essentially on the shelf—we finished this work in May.⁶ The work is also near-finished on outer space but the results do not contain much to negotiate about. In order to accelerate this work I believe it would be useful for me to return to Washington as soon as we have an agreed announcement put together for your approval. This would probably be on Tuesday.⁷ We could then have a finished paper for you to consider upon your return to Washington.

As a separate but related matter, I believe we gained Cap and Bill's approval for Paul Nitze to accompany George to the January sessions so as to be able to handle the technical issues and stay in place should George and Gromyko have to turn to other duties. In essence, the Soviets seem headed toward acceptance of what amounts to your umbrella talks proposal. This is an enormous achievement Mr. President. There will be hitches but we are on our way. Finally your Ambassador in Moscow, Art Hartman, will deliver tomorrow the long letter to Chernenko you approved last week (the Soviets could not receive him until now).⁸ As you recall, it goes well beyond arms control and both George and I believe it is still very relevant. I will keep you informed and will pay close attention to assuring that Cap and Bill, as well as the JCS, are on board.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (11/16/84-11/25/84); NLR-748-25A-41-1-3. Secret; Sensitive. Poindexter wrote in upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: "President has seen. JP." McFarlane was in California with Reagan from November 17 to 25.

² The letter is not attached, but is attached to [Document 310](#).

³ The tab is not attached, but is printed as [Document 310](#).

⁴ Not further identified; however, see [Document 282](#).

⁵ Tab C is not attached.

⁶ In a December 6 memorandum, Chain forwarded three papers in preparation for a SACG meeting on the Geneva negotiations: "The May 1984 Review of START Concepts;" "The May 1984 Review of INF Concepts;" and "The March 1984 ASAT Report to Congress, Interagency ASAT Studies and Preparations for Vienna." (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Chronological File, Chron File 12/15/1984 (1))

⁷ November 20.

⁸ See [Document 308](#).

312. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, November 18, 1984

SUBJECT

Response to Chernenko

I met today with Rick Burt and Jack Chain to discuss our response to the proposal in Chernenko's latest letter.² We think the way to proceed now is for either me or Rick to call in Dobrynin or Sokolov on Monday³ to propose that we agree on a joint statement which would announce the two sides' willingness to begin negotiations and name a date in January and a place in which we would meet. Below is our proposed draft statement.

The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to enter into new negotiations with the objective of reaching mutually acceptable agreements on the whole range of questions concerning nuclear arms and outer space. To that end, Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko will meet in _____ on January _____.⁴

There are several things to note about this proposed statement. First of all, the first sentence draws heavily on the language of the Soviets own proposal contained in Chernenko's most recent message. However, rather than use the Soviet phrase "nuclear and space weapons," as Chernenko does, our draft statement talks about "nuclear arms and and outer space" so as to protect SDI.

Despite this small change, we do think it important to stick to language in Chernenko's letter to avoid a long drawn out discussion of a joint statement. And this means it seems to me, that we would in our statement talk about entering "negotiations" and not just "discussions."

As for the venue of my meeting with Gromyko, I would propose Geneva. It is possible that the Soviets will not agree because this was the locus for START and INF. Thus if this becomes a problem, I propose to fall back to Vienna. I will need to check my own calendar for a date; the Soviets have proposed the first half of January. I will propose something like on or about January 10.

The Soviets may not, at this stage, want to agree to a joint statement that we have agreed to enter into negotiations. In that event I believe that we should just announce that the two foreign ministers have agreed to meet to cover the whole range of nuclear and space arms control issues in order to initiate negotiations.

Art will be meeting with Gromyko tomorrow morning Moscow time.⁵ And we should thus have his report first thing tomorrow morning and can factor any results into our thinking. I would hope, however, we could work out a joint statement with the Soviets by Monday or Tuesday to preempt any leaks. I have asked Rick and Jack Chain to keep only a minimum number of people involved in this process to guard against leaks. It will be vital as we begin putting together our thoughts for the meeting in January that the President's options not be circumscribed by untimely leaks. So we need to give thought to how to organize efforts to insure confidentiality.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt. Although Shultz did not sign it, a typed note on the upper left-hand corner of the memorandum reads: "Sent by special courier 11/18/84 1735 SWO." In a covering memorandum to Shultz, Burt reported: "Following our discussion at your residence earlier this afternoon, I have prepared the attached memorandum to the President. (I originally prepared it as a memorandum to Bud McFarlane, as you instructed, but changed it to a memo to the President at Jock Covey's request.) Jack Chain has read it and concurs fully with it. With your approval it will be sent to Bud McFarlane in Santa Barbara this evening. Separately, we have instructed Art Hartman along the lines we discussed earlier today." According to handwritten notations on the covering memorandum, it was "pouched to Secretary 1650 11/18"; "Approved by Sec and sent to WH (McFarlane and Kimmit) 1730 11/18"; and "McFarlane (in California) has this document."

² See attachment to [Document 310](#).

³ Sokolov and Burt met on November 19. See [Document 315](#).

⁴ Blanks are in the original. In a November 19 PROF's note to Poindexter, McFarlane wrote: "The President has approved the draft text as proposed. He wants us to seek Geneva or another third country site as our going in position but is willing to accept Moscow if considered necessary. Launch." (Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Geneva Arms Control Talks I (01/05/1985-01/07/1985))

⁵ Hartman met Gromyko in Moscow on November 19. See [Document 313](#).

313. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, November 19, 1984, 1347Z

14653. Subject: November 19 Hartman-Gromyko Meeting.
Ref: A. State 339906 B. State 342494 C. State 342498.²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary: I spent forty-five minutes with Gromyko today going over the President's letter to Chernenko and Chernenko's weekend messages to the President.³ In hopes of eliciting some reaction, I had the President's letter read in Russian to Gromyko. Gromyko made several points in reply which amounted to an interim response. While his mood throughout was cordial, I sensed in what he said a strong lingering concern that we are more interested in creating the appearance of talks than in what he called "serious negotiations in good faith". This caution at one point manifested itself in a denial that our two approaches coincided on the desirability of a meeting of Foreign Ministers to start a broader arms control discussion. I did not press Gromyko on this for fear he would get even more negative, but suggested Korniyenko and I follow up our talk once the Soviets have had time to digest the President's letter.

3. Gromyko's suspiciousness suggests that we may want to be more specific in future diplomatic exchanges leading up to a Shultz-Gromyko meeting. As the process unfolds, it will be more important to exercise close discipline over leaks to avoid being whip-sawed. End summary.

4. Gromyko was accompanied by his top deputy, Korniyenko; the head of his USA Division, Bessmertnykh; and an interpreter. I brought my DCM and Political Counselor to the meeting.⁴ As in our last exchange, Gromyko welcomed me warmly, joking about my punctuality, and emphasizing that he was “all ears” to hear what I had to say.

5. I opened by referring briefly to Chernenko’s letters to the President on Nicaragua and arms control over the weekend, noting that the pace of bilateral communications appeared to be picking up. After explaining that we had initially sought to deliver the President’s letter before receipt of Chernenko’s latest correspondence, I noted that we had concluded after reading the General Secretary’s letter that we should deliver our text as planned, especially as there appeared to be certain parallels. I then asked my DCM to read an informal Russian translation of the President’s letter in hopes of prompting some reaction from Gromyko. When the text had been read, I went through the talking points provided Ref B⁵ (deleting the reference to our willingness to meet in a third country per Ref C). Gromyko listened impassively to the President’s letter, but more attentively to the talking points. At one point he interrupted to seek clarification as to the level at which we envisioned follow-on exchanges to an initial meeting of Foreign Ministers.

6. After hearing me out, Gromyko indicated he would not be able to respond to the substance of the President’s letter to Chernenko, but assured me it would be carefully studied and that a reply would be forthcoming. He was nonetheless prepared to make some “general observations”.

—Gromyko first found “positive” and welcomed the fact that the President’s letter and the proposals contained

therein showed a willingness to remove the threat of war. He reminded me, however, that the Soviets had often affirmed (as, he said, Chernenko had personally and as he had in Washington “in the name of the leadership as a whole”) that the main task was translating such propositions into practical deeds. The Soviets were for serious negotiations on nuclear arms and other important questions of international security and the security of each country. The proposals made by Chernenko in his most recent letter were designed precisely to lead to such negotiations. It was natural that there should be “stages” to such a process. But the Soviets saw no need to use special terms such as “umbrella”. They did not want to be tied to such “romantic formulae”. When the President talked about negotiations, Gromyko hoped he had in mind “serious negotiations in good faith”.

—As to the specifics of how to set in motion a negotiating process, Gromyko noted, the Soviet position was as outlined in Chernenko’s letter to President Reagan. That remained the Soviet position and he hoped the US would give Moscow’s proposals serious attention. While this was not the time or place to get into a discussion of substance, he concluded, “it appears from the President’s letter and your comments that our views do not coincide”. (sic)

7. A bit puzzled by Gromyko’s final remark, I commented that while there were clearly areas where the approaches outlined in the President’s and Chernenko’s letters did not coincide, it appeared to us that there was agreement at least on the notion that whatever process was ultimately set in motion should be inaugurated by a meeting of Foreign Ministers. Thinking that there may have been an error of translation, my DCM asked for clarification as to whether it was Gromyko’s view that our approaches did or did not coincide on this point.

8. Amid some confusion on the Soviet side of the table, Gromyko stated clearly that they did not coincide. He then went on to complain that the President's letter contained ideas which the Soviets had already rejected, noting specifically the President's proposal for exchanging observers to verify nuclear test thresholds. The proposal was unacceptable to the Soviets, Gromyko emphasized, and he could not understand why it continued to pop up in various US proposals. The problem was not one of exchanging observers but of ending testing. Warming to the subject, but not willing to prolong the exchange, Gromyko prefaced additional gripes about US use of the term "arms control" instead of "disarmament" with the injunction that they should be considered to have been lodged "after getting up from the table". The points were semantic ones, he acknowledged, but were of significance nonetheless.

9. I told Gromyko that, at the risk of saying something he did not want to hear, I thought he sounded much like President Reagan. One of the President's major concerns was precisely that previous arms control agreements had allowed major increases in armaments. That was why he was in favor of reducing stockpiles to the lowest possible level.

10. Sensing that it would be unfruitful to press Gromyko further, and unwilling to risk eliciting further negativism on the substance of the President's proposals, I decided to end the meeting on that note. As we got up, however, I suggested it might be useful for Korniyenko and me to meet at some point after the Soviets have had a chance to digest the President's letter. Gromyko readily agreed.

Comment

11. Gromyko's off the cuff reaction to the President's proposals suggests he remains suspicious that we are more interested in getting arms control talks started for their own sake than for whatever may come out of them. He clearly views his next meeting with the Secretary as the start of a negotiating process, and he will be out to pin down in as much detail as possible the substance—and even the outcome—of possible follow-up talks. I sensed he was not comfortable with the concept of a special negotiator or the notion that the initial meeting of Foreign Ministers will be a preliminary step essentially dedicated to setting an agenda. We may be able to allay these concerns a bit in subsequent exchanges by being more specific about what we have in mind for the Foreign Ministers' meetings.

12. One parting thought. It is clear from the exchanges of the last few days that the relationship is entering a more active and volatile phase. This will make it even more important than it has been in the past to prevent leaks on matters relating to our dialogue. Giving the Soviets a peak at our thinking is simply asking to be whip-sawed as we try to put together an agenda. Specifically, it enables the Soviets to turn down proposals which are only newspaper speculation and not even up to the point of having become official government proposals.

Hartman

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (11/16/84-11/25/84); NLR-748-25A-41-6-8. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² Telegram 339906 to Moscow, November 16, transmitted Reagan's November 16 letter to Chernenko. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File,

USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8491139) (1 of 2)
See [Document 308](#). Telegrams 342494 and 342498 were not found.

³ See attachments to [Documents 307](#) and [310](#).

⁴ Warren Zimmermann, DCM, and Curtis Kamman, Political Counselor.

⁵ The talking points were not found.

314. Minutes of a Senior Arms Control Group Meeting¹

Washington, November 19, 1984

SUBJECT

Minutes of SACG Meeting, November 19

John Poindexter chaired the meeting with the following attendees: Fred Ikle, Richard Perle, Art Moreau, Jack Matlock, Doug George, Ron Lehman, Paul Nitze, Rick Burt, Jack Chain, and Ken Adelman.²

John Poindexter began by passing around a letter dated November 17 from Chernenko to the President.³ Everyone read the letter and, at the end of the meeting, JP took back all copies. JP asked Richard Burt to set the stage on events.

Richard Burt indicated that Chernenko had sent a congratulatory letter to the President after the election and that Art Hartman had tried to deliver the President's response last week, but that the Soviets obviously deliberately delayed Hartman until this week so that Chernenko's letter could be delivered first. In previous meetings between Gromyko and Hartman, Gromyko had indicated that the Soviets did not like the phrase "Umbrella Talks" and Burt expressed the view that "this is in contrast with real negotiations." Gromyko told Hartman that "our thinking did not coincide on how to begin."⁴ Hartman responded that perhaps our position is closer than people think. Burt then characterized the November 17 letter as a significant movement by the Russians and a significant victory for the President's strategy. The Soviets have dropped their INF preconditions and have even agreed to negotiating on INF. Burt believes that they have accepted

our linkage on offense and defense, and that the magnet that drew them into the talks was the strategic defense initiative. In short, they have accepted the Umbrella Talks without the phrase. Burt expressed the view that the Soviets are sobering up in the post election period and have agreed to pursue other open issues as well, such as exchanges. Jack Matlock added that Chernenko's oral congratulations to the President were very positive.⁵

Fred Ikle noted that the focus of the letter was on militarization of space and that this was comparable to the period in 1970 when the Soviets got the US to agree that we would conclude an ABM Treaty first while we sought a freeze on offensive arms.

Jack Chain argued that this was a very positive development. Ron Lehman cautioned that while the new Soviet formulation can be read by us to accommodate our position, it remains completely compatible with the Soviet position of July requiring preconditions including an ASAT moratorium. Lehman expressed the view that it is in our interest to get negotiations going but it is not in our interest to agree to preconditions. Ron Lehman argued that we had made a mistake in July by attempting to negotiate a detailed agenda. This only encouraged the Russians to demand preconditions and made us more vulnerable for pressures from Congress and our Allies. Ron Lehman expressed the view that our objective should be to get talks underway with a minimum amount of prenegotiations. Burt expressed agreement. With respect to the text, Burt noted that the words "what" and "between" were missing from Page 1 and that this was an unofficial translation. A formal translation is being prepared. JP indicated that Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, and Director Casey had read the letter and Art Moreau was permitted to take a copy to the Chairman of JCS. JP indicated that Shultz and Bud

McFarlane have talked to the President that our focus should be on a joint announcement which could be made on Wednesday.

Burt indicated that the message had been brought in by Mr. Isokob. Isokob had been very brief and very buoyant, stating that he was "very pleased" and that "for the first time in four years, we may be in business." Perle commented that the most significant part of the letter was the sixth paragraph where the linkage was not clear and where preconditions were implied. Art Moreau added that INF was included, but Paul Nitze noted that the Soviets used their term of art, namely, medium range systems. Jack Chain indicated that they had dropped their insistence on preconditions.

Nitze argued that we would want to talk about arms control in the context of world issues and the overall state of relations but Burt and Adelman disagree. Lehman commented that it was not clear that the Soviets had backed off preconditions and that one should expect in a meeting between Shultz and Gromyko the Soviets would press to urge as much of their July package as they could.

JP passed out a draft joint statement to be worked and cleared for a SACPG meeting, again early on Wednesday.⁶ Burt noted that an AP story originating out of Yugoslavia suggested that Shultz has been invited to go to Moscow. In response to a JP question, there was agreement that we might expect a Soviet answer on our joint statement on Tuesday so we should plan on the announcement being made Wednesday. NSC was tasked to prepare guidance for a backgrounder probably to be given by Bud McFarlane, and Qs and As. Burt would prepare draft messages for the Allies. From a Public Diplomacy point of view, the emphasis

should be “no comment” and we should develop a “short call” list for Congress.

Conversation turned to the specifics of the joint statement. Ken Adelman suggested that the Soviets want to go to talks with a clear agenda and Paul Nitze emphasized the importance of getting agreements and ground rules that are to our advantage. Lehman responded that it is our advantage to get the negotiations going without too much negotiation on specifics so as to avoid preconditions. Nitze agreed but added that we needed to put down a marker to make it clear that we are not accepting as an agenda the Soviets interpretation of their letter. Perle stressed again that the Soviets would try to get a handle on SDI/ABM and then focus on a nuclear freeze as they did in 1970. Burt agreed. Lehman commented that, more specifically, they would focus on an ASAT moratorium immediately in January. Perle asked if a Presidential letter could be proposed. JP suggested they should work the statement first and only after that should we prepare a Presidential letter.

Ikle noted that the Soviet Union offered us an option of Moscow or a third country. JP stressed Geneva in consideration of the symbolism of returning to the talks and consideration of the bad symbolism of going to Moscow. Burt emphasized that the Soviet Union wanted to go to Moscow and the fact that they are making this gesture would help Shultz to meet with Chernenko himself. Lehman suggested that it is important that we get the talks established with a minimal amount of preconditions and argued in favor of a third country, especially Geneva. Lehman offered a compromise that we suggest to the Soviets that the foreign ministers meet in Moscow in January to begin talks which would end up in Geneva. Burt, Adelman, and others countered that this was too complex.

Chain argued that we should alter the statement to indicate that Shultz and Gromyko would meet to agree to arrangements or to facilitate the beginning of talks. This was rejected on the grounds that we would want to make clear .⁷ Perle proposed the phrase “to that end” so that it was made clear that the Soviets had no negotiating mandate in January. Burt countered that we might want to leave that implication in order to attract the Soviets. It was agreed that we would leave the phrase in, but that a second option would be that we would drop the phrase altogether. It was agreed that Burt would present the agreed statement to Shultz this afternoon, once a decision had been made as to location and date.⁸

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Reference 11/18/1984–11/20/1984. Secret; Sensitive. An unknown hand wrote: “Bob [Linhard]—Close Hold,” “Draft,” and “Ron—Bob L has cy” at the top of the page. The unknown hand put brackets around Linhard’s last name. No final version of the minutes has been found. Handwritten notes, likely Lehman’s, correspond to this typed draft. (Ibid.)

² In a PROFs note to Poindexter on November 18, McFarlane wrote: “On the announcement I would like for you to convene a very restricted SACG (I’ve dropped the word “Policy” to change the acronym) consisting of you, Chain and Burt from State, probably Ikle and Perle from OSD (I will have informed you after talking to Cap as to who he wants to work the issue, Doug George or Bob Gates (your call), Art Moreau and Ken Adelman plus Paul Nitze, Ron and Jack. On specifics, Cap will have a problem with cloaking all of the issues—START, INF and Space—as ‘negotiations’. I think we ought to be able to finesse this by simply using George’s alternative formulation in his memo

to the President which states that the foreign ministers will meet to address all the arms control issues. It would be good if that meeting could be convened early your time so that we have something out here for approval and release by noon. Many thanks.” (Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Geneva Arms Control Talks I (01/05/1985–01/07/1985)) For the Shultz memorandum, see [Document 312](#).

³ See attachment to [Document 310](#).

⁴ See [Document 313](#).

⁵ See attachment to [Document 304](#).

⁶ November 21. The draft is in [Document 312](#).

⁷ Blank is in the original.

⁸ On November 22, McFarlane made the official announcement: “The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to enter into new negotiations with the objective of reaching mutually acceptable agreements on the whole range of questions concerning nuclear and outer space arms. In order to reach a common understanding as to the subject and objectives of such negotiations, Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko will meet in Geneva on January 7 to 8.” (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book II, p. 1834)

315. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, November 19, 1984

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Sokolov November 19

Sokolov came in at my request at 3:30 p.m. today, and I gave him a copy of the draft text of a joint communique approved this morning by the President.² I added that we are proposing Geneva as the venue for your meeting with Gromyko. I pointed out that our text was brief and factual, and drew on the language of Chernenko's message.³ I told him we wished to move quickly in order to release a text before there were leaks and distortions, if possible by Wednesday,⁴ so that we would appreciate a response to our proposal by tomorrow.

Sokolov said the Soviets can move quickly when the will is there, but he had two questions:

—Would there be an answer from the President to Chernenko's message? I assured him there would be, although precise timing was as yet unclear.

—Was Moscow excluded as a venue? I replied that our preference was for Geneva.

On substance, Sokolov said he of course had no instructions, but on a personal basis he would suggest drawing on the Chernenko message to add language defining the objective of your meeting with Gromyko, along

the lines of “In order to have a mutual understanding of the objectives and subjects of such negotiations.” We should anticipate that the Soviet response will include such a suggestion—which should not raise a big problem for us. On the way out, Sokolov explained to Tom Simons that he had asked about the Moscow venue because the Soviets are thinking in terms of having at least the initial meetings alternate between capitals, i.e. along the same lines as you. Tom replied that I had accurately stated our position on venue.⁵

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Palmer. Forwarded through Armacost. McKinley’s handwritten initials are on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on November 19.

² See [footnote 4, Document 312](#).

³ See attachment to [Document 310](#).

⁴ November 21.

⁵ According to telegram 345921/Tosec 180011 to Shultz, November 21, Sokolov provided Burt with the following Soviet draft text: “The Soviet Union and the United States have agreed to enter into new negotiations with the objective of reaching mutually acceptable agreements on the whole range of questions concerning nuclear and outer space arms. In order to reach a common understanding as to the subject and objectives of such negotiations, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Secretary of State George P. Shultz will meet in on January 7-8, 1985.” (Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840013-0458; blank is in the original) For the final text of the November 22 announcement, see [footnote 8, Document 314](#). In Moscow

the same day, the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman also announced that talks would begin in January in Geneva. (Dusko Doder, "Moscow Optimistic About New Arms Talks," *Washington Post*, November 23, 1984, p. A20)

316. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, November 19, 1984

SUBJECT

SDI and the Prospects for Arms Control

Nobody yet knows the full potential of the President's SDI initiative. What we do know, is that the Soviets are concerned that U.S. technology in strategic defense could undermine the nuclear assets (and political influence) Moscow has purchased at great cost over the past twenty years. This Soviet apprehension may offer the best chance to restore a serious arms control dialogue. Eventually, of course, we will face tough decisions on whether to proceed with it or trade some limitations on it. In either case, however, it is essential in the meantime that we maintain a positive public posture on the merits of the potential contribution SDI can make to our security.

I am concerned that we are at the beginning of a period of negotiating with ourselves over SDI. The Democrats in Congress are certain to oppose the program in every aspect. For now, the political attractiveness of fighting against the "militarization of space," a new and expensive defense program, not to mention preserving the ABM Treaty, will be too strong for Democrats to resist. House Democrats, as well as Senate Democrats *and* many Senate Republicans, have only resisted the temptation to oppose all things military on those occasions when there has been overwhelming public support for a given initiative. Grenada, for example.

The Administration, therefore, should avoid making public statements that question the feasibility or desirability of SDI, or framing the issue publicly as one of using SDI only as a “bargaining chip.” Such statements will likely begin to erode public support for the program. They will only put us on weaker ground in the domestic debate. Congressional opposition will likely center on the technical arguments, i.e., how feasible *is* SDI, how many Russian missiles are too many, how much SDI is worth exchanging for a certain reduction in Russian missiles, etc. Conducting the debate on this terrain will likely open the door to a series of compromises of the Aspin/Pressler variety while the Soviets sit back and wait. The public, at best, will lose interest in this new, complicated issue, preferring to leave it to the “experts.” At worst, they will be persuaded by the cost/benefit arguments advanced by the Democrats, and the program will be undercut.

The best arguments we have going for us are the kinds of arguments the President has been making—for example in the second debate.² These arguments have a strong public appeal.

It is not in the interest of arms control that the SDI program be undermined. Even from the point of view of those who may want to trade some limits on SDI, it is essential that the program survive or else the whole offense/defense bargain with the Soviets will collapse.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 11/15-30/84. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Kaplan and Kagan. Kaplan initialed the memorandum for Rodman. A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum,

indicating Shultz saw it. McKinley's handwritten initials also appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on November 19.

² Reagan and Mondale fielded several questions related to SDI during their October 21 Presidential debate. See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book II, pp. 1601-1602 and 1606.

317. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, November 20, 1984

I found the attached [*less than 1 line not declassified*] interesting because it highlights the extent to which the Soviets will go to defeat our Strategic Defense Initiative. I believe defeat of SDI has become their fundamental arms control objective. You will also note in the penultimate paragraph their desire to see the replacement of certain U.S. officials—including, obviously, yours truly—as another way of gaining their objective. While this goal seems to be denied to them, I imagine they will continue to try on all fronts to block our strategic defense plan.

I would appreciate it very much if you would send the attached paper to the President.

Sincerely,

Cap

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Defense Intelligence Agency²

Washington, November 20, 1984

1. *SOVIETS TRY TO PRESSURE US INTO SPACE TALKS*
(S/[*handlingrestriction not declassified*])

REF: (S/[*handling restriction not declassified*] CIA [*number not declassified*], 15 Nov 84.³

After his return from Moscow in late October, First Secretary Rogov of the Soviet Embassy in Washington discussed several issues [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. The question of space talks dominated his comments, which he probably expected to be relayed to the US Government.

The Soviet diplomat contended Foreign Minister Gromyko's impression was "negative" about his September meeting with President Reagan.⁴ Gromyko believed Reagan was interested in holding space talks but not on substantive issues. Moscow insists, according to Rogov, that unless space talks materialize, nothing else is important enough to negotiate. Space talks could "pull along" other negotiations that were halted. He also said Moscow will watch national security appointments in Reagan's second term; unless the US makes personnel changes, the Soviets have little hope of "doing business."

Rogov threatened that Soviet policy toward the US could get worse. He thinks, however, that US hostility toward the USSR has reached rock bottom and Washington is moving into a more pragmatic, less ideological stance. Thus, Moscow still sees the possibility of fruitful space negotiations. Rogov admitted that space tests and R&D already underway could not simply be abandoned; but a range of space weapon issues, in which only limited R&D had occurred, could. The USSR was ready to negotiate on this range without demanding the elimination of concepts and research.

COMMENT: The Soviet campaign against a US space program, including a strategic defense, is intensifying.

Rogov's comments reflect some aspects of this multifaceted effort.

The Soviets are trying to entice the US with hints that discussions on START and INF-related forces can eventually be held, if the US agrees to space talks on their terms. Although Rogov does not refer to these terms, other Soviet statements indicate they expect a US moratorium so long as the talks go on. Thus, they can hold hostage the development of US strategic defenses and ASATs. Rogov's threats that superpower relations will deteriorate further are aimed at putting the US on the defensive, so that Washington will make concessions to Moscow.

Rogov's remarks also reflect Moscow's demand for the appointment of US officials whom it views as more ready to compromise than incumbents in key positions dealing with arms control. This point has been made by other Soviets, notably by members of Moscow's Institute of the USA and Canada to prominent American visitors. The Soviets clearly have their own candidates. They are frustrated that their successful techniques of the 1970s are failing with the current US administration.

The defeat of a US strategic defense in whatever mode—traditional ABM or as part of SDI—has overwhelming priority for the Soviets. They are concerned that such a US capability would undercut their strategy based on a preemptive first-strike potential. Moscow's obsession with SDI stems from its fear that decades of investments in its strategic offensive forces would be jeopardized. [*1 line not declassified*]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1984, 4001158. Secret. Weinberger wrote "Bud" next to

McFarlane's name on the memorandum. In a note on a covering memorandum, Kimmit wrote: "Per RCM, Weinberger memo only put in 11/30 PDB. RMK 11/30." Reagan initialed another copy of the memorandum on December 2, indicating he saw it. (Ibid.)

² Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

³ Not found.

⁴ See [Documents 286](#) and [287](#).

318. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, November 27, 1984, 1527Z

15040. Subject: Looking Toward Geneva.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. As we make our preparations for Geneva, I wanted to make a few points which may be more apparent here than in the Washington fray.

3. The jury is still out on why the Soviets have come back to arms control as quickly as they have. I doubt they expect early or dramatic progress, and they can hardly believe that a second Reagan administration will be more susceptible to pressure than the first. On the other hand, the Soviets presumably know that they will need some degree of credibility if they are to reap the public affairs benefits of having returned to the negotiating table in the first place. This suggests they may ultimately be more willing to bargain seriously than the last time around. Time will tell.

4. As welcome as their willingness to talk is, however, it brings to an end the free ride we have had for the past year on arms control policy. From now on, much more public scrutiny will be focused on our positions, and the Soviets will regain great latitude to manipulate public opinion at our expense.² Unless we are careful, in short, the Geneva meeting could result in our loss of the tactical high ground on arms control which we have held since they broke off negotiations last November.

5. The best way to prevent this is to ensure we have a credible substantive brief when we sit down across from Gromyko January 7. The language of last week's joint announcement was broad enough to allow for a wide range of outcomes.³ The best from our standpoint would be an agreed framework and set of objectives for follow-up talks. I believe this is an achievable goal, but it will not come easily. Having turned a fresh page, we stand at a crucial point not unlike Glassboro or Vladivostok.⁴

6. The problem—as has been made clear to me in my discussions here with Gromyko and in Soviet media commentary on the Geneva meeting⁵ —is that the Soviets remain highly skeptical that we will be prepared to negotiate agreements they can live with. Gromyko will therefore be determined in Geneva to commit us in advance to principles governing future negotiations, and even the outcomes of such negotiations, which will guarantee Soviet desiderata. Unless we can find some means of reconciling such an approach with our own preference for defining agenda and procedural questions, the Geneva meeting could well end in stalemate amid Soviet charges that we are seeking simply to “talk about talks”.

7. To avoid this,—and to maximize chances that whatever negotiations flow from Geneva will achieve results—we will need to be prepared to give Gromyko a fairly clear, cogent idea of where the process we have in mind may lead in specific areas. This doesn't mean we should telegraph our negotiations strategy or positions. It does mean that, as regards strategic arms, for example, we should be able to sketch convincingly our views of the parameters of an equitable agreement. Giving Gromyko something concrete to focus on could well make it easier for him to give ground on such “procedural” issues as the shape of future agenda,

which might otherwise become bogged down in semantic arguments (a la “militarization” vs. “demilitarization” of space). More important, it would preempt charges that our approach was not a serious one.

8. I realize that a decision to be more concrete on the substance of our positions will not be an easy one to make in Washington, and that whatever course we choose will be the subject of spirited bureaucratic debate. I only hope we can do a better job of keeping that debate in house than we have thus far. When the Soviets are able to read in detail who is doing what to whom in our internal struggles over policy, they are able to fine tune their negotiating positions and propaganda for maximum effect. As the saying goes in bridge, “one peek is worth a dozen finesses”. Gromyko will be a tough enough adversary in Geneva without our playing from an open hand.

Hartman

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Geneva Arms Control Talks I (01/05/1985-01/07/1985); NLR-362-1-35-14-5. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. A stamp indicates McFarlane saw the telegram. Poindexter wrote in the margin: “Bud, I think Art is way off base in this cable. See my note next page. JP.” See [footnote 2](#), below. In a covering memorandum to Shultz on the Department of State copy of this telegram, Burt wrote: “Mr. Secretary: I wanted to be sure you had seen the cable Art sent in on the Geneva talks. He gave it relatively wide distribution in an effort to be helpful around town. Art asked today if it would be useful for him to come back at this point for consultations. He could be here as long as you thought necessary up to December 17. His conversations

around town have been quite useful in the past, and his being here would probably have value now. I will get back to Art in a few days after we have had time to discuss this.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, November 1984, #39)

² Poindexter wrote in the margin: “Why does it have to be public. The whole point of Pres. talks proposal was that they be private. If the Soviets won’t agree to that, there is little chance of success—*unless* we can get some intelligence ahead of time on what they are after thru a private channel. JP.”

³ See [footnote 8, Document 314](#) for the official announcement.

⁴ Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Premier Kosygin met at Glassboro State College in Glassboro, New Jersey from June 23 to 25, 1967. Ford and Brezhnev met in Vladivostok November 23-24, 1974, to discuss arms control.

⁵ See [Document 313](#).

319. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Chain) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, November 27, 1984

SUBJECT

Strategy for Your January Meeting with Gromyko

We have sent you separately a paper describing the approach we recommend the United States adopt next year on nuclear and space arms control.² This step-by-step approach—which you originally approved in preparation for the never-held September meeting in Vienna—remains, we feel, the most effective means of interrelating our various arms control and defense objectives in these fields.

Securing Soviet acceptance to such a new framework for US-Soviet negotiations will obviously require more than the two-day session between yourself and Gromyko currently scheduled for Geneva. In this memo we thus address preparations for the conduct of a succession of encounters with the Soviet Union on these issues. In addition, we have attached talking points for your use with the President that set forth the rationale for our proposal.³

The Soviet Approach to Geneva

The Soviets have so far only consented to discuss the subject and objectives of new negotiations, and they remain extremely skeptical about our intentions. As Gromyko's

meeting with Art Hartman demonstrated,⁴ the Soviets are suspicious that we are only interested in the appearance of an arms control dialogue. It is likely that they will want to ascertain whether the U.S. has serious, substantive ideas that could plausibly be the basis for an agreement before they agree to resume formal negotiations. The Soviets are unlikely to commit themselves to a continuing dialogue unless they are convinced that we are prepared to address seriously the full range of their concerns, including limitations on space weapons. Gromyko's objective, therefore, will be to secure some measure of agreement regarding the priorities and objectives for new arms control talks.

We therefore expect Gromyko to pursue in Geneva certain familiar Soviet themes. Specifically, he is likely to seek:

- some modification in NATO's INF deployment program, if not a total withdrawal of all cruise and Pershing II missiles, then at least a moratorium on future deployments;
- U.S. agreement that the object of ASAT negotiations should be a ban, as opposed to limits on ASATs, as well as a U.S. commitment to cease ASAT testing upon the opening of negotiations;
- a U.S. commitment to negotiate limitations on the SDI that reinforce or go beyond those contained in the ABM Treaty, as well as on ASAT systems; and
- more broadly, an agreed formulation on the principle of "equality" which bolsters the Soviets' claim for compensation for the capabilities of U.S. allies.

The U.S. Approach

As the Geneva meeting approaches, we will be under growing political pressures from many quarters. There will be rising public and Allied expectations of early results, while other pressures will intensify for the Administration to “hang tough” on our existing positions. The best way to deflect such pressure is by putting forward serious, concrete ideas from the outset that offer the basis for an agreement with the Soviets that would be in our security interests.

We should look at the Geneva meeting as the kickoff for a renewed negotiating effort. We will want to demonstrate that we are indeed serious about negotiations on these issues and are ready to move forward toward a mutually-acceptable agreement. Thus, we will want to describe for the Soviets the implications of what we have in mind—not only conceptually, but in terms of its concrete impact on the two sides’ forces and programs.

Specifically, we will need to illustrate for the Soviets the possibilities inherent in our step-by-step approach: a first-stage accord limiting ASAT testing for three years and beginning reductions in offensive nuclear arms; to be immediately followed by negotiations on longer-term arrangements in both these areas. Such an approach should have several attractions for the Soviets:

—The proposal for a first-stage accord on nuclear arms—designed as the President told Gromyko, to “begin the process of nuclear arms reductions”—is a clear signal that we will not, in this initial stage at least, seek the major restructuring of Soviet strategic forces that characterized our START proposal.

—The offer of a temporary halt on testing of current ASAT systems, tied to this first-stage nuclear arms accord, is evidence that we are willing to negotiate meaningful limitations in the space area.

—U.S. expressed readiness to include INF systems in the package (either as an integral element or as part of some parallel arrangement) would demonstrate U.S. flexibility on this most neuralgic of Soviet concerns.

—Making the relationship between offensive and defensive forces a topic for consideration in the second stage of negotiations holds open for the Soviets the possibility of substantive negotiations over SDI at some future point.

Despite its attractions, we must also recognize that a new U.S. approach along these lines will require substantial revision in the way both sides have traditionally approached these various issues. Thus, we must not expect that the Soviets will be prepared to react immediately to our thinking on the inter-relationships among these issues.

Tactics for Geneva

Optimally, you would like to gain Gromyko's agreement in Geneva on a mandate or an agenda for formal negotiations, to begin shortly after the Geneva meeting. More realistically, however, the Geneva discussions should be viewed as the first in a series of ministerial meetings that will lay the groundwork for formal talks. These follow-on sessions could best be held in Moscow and Washington. In the former you could expect to have access to Chernenko. In the latter, the President could again participate directly in the dialogue.

You raised the question of the *composition of your party* for the Geneva meeting. In our view, it would be a mistake to include representatives from all the other agencies. This would set a bad precedent for meetings with Gromyko, and would risk turning the Geneva session into the sort of sterile set-piece exchanges that have characterized the START and INF talks to date. There is, of course, a precedent for including an NSC representative among your party, and if Bud McFarlane wants to send Ron Lehman in addition to Jack Matlock, this would be acceptable. If a special representative has been named by the President by the time of the Geneva meeting, he could be a member of your party as well, just as U.S. SALT negotiators participated in meetings with Gromyko in the past. But otherwise, we strongly recommend that you not go beyond the traditional support from within the Department.

In the longer term, we will need to consider whether a series of meetings between yourself and Gromyko could be usefully supplemented by discussions between specially-designated representatives. So far the Soviet reaction to the term "umbrella talks" and to the concept of special negotiators has been skeptical and generally negative. There are probably several reasons for this: They may be concerned that once we achieve the appearance of negotiations we will lose interest in substance. In addition, Gromyko wants to control both the pace and content of our dialogue, and to communicate as directly as possible with key U.S. decision-makers. Moreover, the Soviets' experience with U.S. negotiators in recent years has not led them to believe that such individuals can either shape U.S. policy in important ways, or even necessarily represent it in an authoritative and reliable manner. Finally, they may reserve their position until they know who the U.S. envoy would be.

It seems likely, therefore, that the Soviets will continue to put off any definitive decision on the designation of special representatives until they gauge the results of one or more meetings between yourself and Gromyko. Thus, while we may want to include our representative among your party for Geneva, we should recognize that the Soviets may not agree to appoint a counterpart until a concrete negotiating agenda is agreed upon.

Preparing for Geneva

As noted above, we should seek to be in a position at Geneva to set forth our step-by-step negotiating framework in conceptual terms, and to lay out the specific elements of our first-stage proposals for reductions in offensive forces and limits on ASAT testing. While you would not, of course, reveal our bottom line in your presentation to Gromyko, the goal would be to give the Soviets a clear understanding of the impact of the constraints we have in mind. Thus, we would want to have internal USG agreement on our specific objectives by the time of the Geneva meeting.

Although the President briefly raised with Gromyko the concept of an interim agreement,⁵ our approach remains highly controversial with the interagency community. Indeed, members of the NSC staff have asserted that U.S. policy in this area is undecided, and have told us that no special weight should be attached to these remarks by the President to Gromyko.

The Geneva meeting is still six weeks off, but some of this time will be occupied by your trip to Europe, and the Christmas holidays. We may want to consider whether it would be desirable to notify the Soviets in advance of our intentions. This would allow for a more considered reaction

by Gromyko in Geneva. Given the time constraints, however, and the formidable bureaucratic hurdles we confront, this may not be possible.

In the forthcoming interagency discussions we can expect the following positions to emerge:

—OSD will strongly oppose our step-by-step approach, probably arguing that all we should do is go back to the Soviets with, at best, slightly modified versions of our current positions on START and INF. They may, alternatively, argue for an approach to Geneva focused upon securing Soviet agreement to a broad set of principles for arms control. These principles will be the same as those which shaped our START positions, and will thus not be especially attractive to the Soviets. OSD will oppose any limitations whatsoever on ASAT as well as SDI. Finally, if they perceive the President moving toward our approach, OSD may well come forward with some new, attractive, plausible, simple but wholly non-negotiable proposal for nuclear and space weapons, akin to the “zero option.”⁶

—ACDA is also likely to oppose agreements that would place meaningful limits on space weaponry, and thus will be hostile to State’s overall approach, although ACDA’s views on strategic arms may parallel our own. We must also expect ACDA to come forward with some version of “arms control without agreements”⁷ in the INF and ASAT fields.

—JCS may be sympathetic to elements of the State position and perhaps to the approach as a whole. We should not, however, expect visible support from the

Chiefs, especially given the certain opposition to our ideas by OSD.

—The NSC staff is already arguing that we need to base new US-Soviet arms control negotiations upon a mutual recognition of the inevitability of a shift from an offense-dominated to defense-dominated strategic environment (a highly questionable assumption on technical grounds alone, at this early stage of the SDI). Once the Soviets accept the inevitability and, indeed, desirability of strategic defenses, a new arms control framework for the 1990s can be designed. Your task in Geneva, according to this view, will be to begin the process of Soviet conversion. (In reality, the Soviets have not the slightest incentive to “legitimize” our SDI program, and will not therefore accept it as a premise for arms control. Any such effort with them will prove to be a sterile waste of time, at best, and could undercut our ability to engage the Soviets in serious bargaining over offensive arms reductions.)

Presenting the Case for Our Approach

There are several strong arguments you can use in arguing for our proposal with the President, and subsequently with the Allies and public. Above all, we will want to emphasize the important military benefits flowing from even the first-stage accord we envisage:

—In addition to forestalling the accelerating erosion of the existing arms control regime, our first-stage accord would, for the first time ever, actually reverse the nuclear arms buildup.

—It would limit the number of strategic warheads to below current levels, and reduce the number of Soviet missiles and bombers by 30 percent.

—It would cut the number of Soviet heavy ICBMs by 20 percent and overall missile throw-weight by 25 percent.

—It would represent a reduction by 20 percent from the Soviet warhead level projected for 1988 and 50 percent from that projected for 1995 (in the absence of any constraints).

—The proposal would not adversely affect SDI research, and protect long-term options; indeed, without constraints on warhead growth, the task of defending against a Soviet ballistic missile attack will be even more formidable.

—It would allow *all* ongoing U.S. strategic modernization programs to continue, subject to the numerical ceilings of the first-stage accord.

—The three-year ban on ASAT testing would impede Soviet development of systems that would pose a significant threat to high-value U.S. satellites, while leaving open our longer-term options in the ASAT field.

In presenting our new step-by-step approach to the Soviets, we will want to stress the less ambitious initial cuts it implies for their strategic forces and the trade-offs it embodies between areas of relative advantage. In order to highlight the positive and significant nature of the initial accord we are seeking, we might begin speaking of these as the “START I” negotiations.

We also believe that we should consider seeking agreement with the Soviets that our common objective should be to conclude a first-stage accord in 1985. Such a timetable is feasible. Committing to it publicly will, of course, put pressure on both sides. But the history of arms control and US-Soviet relations over the past twenty years suggests that results seldom come, and accords are seldom achieved, except under the pressure of such deadlines.

Clearly we have our work cut out for us. In addition to arguing our position through the interagency process over the coming weeks, it will be important for you to continue your discussions on these issues with the President. In these discussions we believe you should argue that early progress toward a new arms control regime is urgently needed, in view of the erosion of existing arrangements, and that such progress is possible if the U.S. offers concrete proposals at the Geneva meeting. Indeed, given Chernenko's uncertain physical and political health, the period during which progress can be made, before a new succession crisis hits the Soviet Union, may be brief.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Tefft, Vershbow, Dobbins, and Markoff (PM/SNP) on 11/24; cleared by Pascoe, Palmer, J. Gordon (PM), A. Kanter (PM), W. Courtney (P), and Timbie. Vershbow initialed for Dobbins, Markoff, Pascoe, Palmer, Kanter, Courtney, and Timbie.

² See [Document 267](#).

³ The talking points are attached but not printed. On the afternoon of November 28, Shultz met with Reagan to discuss these issues. (Reagan Library, President's Daily

Diary) Reagan wrote in his diary for that day: “Met with Geo. S. re the upcoming arms reduction talks. We agree that since Chernenko has talked as I have of total elimination of nuclear weapons that should be our goal in the negotiations.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 401)

⁴ See [Document 313](#).

⁵ See [footnote 4, Document 289](#).

⁶ See [footnote 2, Document 2](#).

⁷ In a November 8 memorandum to Reagan, Adelman advocated for “arms control without agreements.” He wrote: “in simple terms, under this approach, we and the Soviets would take measures to enhance the strategic stability and reduce nuclear weapons in consultation with each other, without necessarily consummating them in a signed agreement. Those measures could be enunciated as national policies and could be confirmed in mutual understandings or exchanges.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents) Adelman outlined his position in the *The Wall Street Journal* on November 12 (David Ignatius, “Reagan Official Stresses ‘Basics’ In Arms Talks,” *The Wall Street Journal*, November 12, 1984, p. 29), and in more detail in the *Foreign Affairs* Winter 1984/85 issue. In a November 13 memorandum to Shultz, Burt argued: while “some informal steps are potentially very useful,” “Ken’s approach would be seen and, in fact, would become an excuse for not even attempting to achieve negotiated agreements. This would not only endanger prospects for arms control in areas where agreements are possible. It would also risk throwing away past agreements and negotiating history, including very important agreed definitions and understandings.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive

and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents) In his memoir, Shultz explained that Adelman “had shown me an article he had written and proposed to submit to *Foreign Affairs*, and I had told him that would be ‘very unwise.’ This was a topic for internal discussion. He went ahead and published it anyway. It was outrageous that one of the president’s appointees should argue in public for a major policy shift without putting it first to the president. This was a presidential-level decision, and the article sent an erroneous signal that the president was not interested in arms control negotiations.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 496)

320. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, November 28, 1984

SUBJECT

CIA Analysis of Soviet Arms Control Policy and How to Prepare for the January Talks

I believe that the CIA report prepared for the SACG is basically sound in its analysis of the Soviet attitude toward specific issues, and also in its description of the basic thrust of Soviet policy.² However, I believe it is weak on the predictive side for two basic reasons:

—By treating Soviet arms control policy largely in isolation from other issues confronting the Soviet leadership, it neglects the possible impact of internal Soviet factors on overall arms control policy.

—While describing accurately the Soviet reaction to past U.S. proposals, it does not really address the question of the role any future U.S. proposals might play in the Soviet decision-making process. (An understandable omission since we have not yet decided what sort of proposals we will make.)

Domestic Factors and Soviet Arms Control Policy

While the Agency is doubtless right in observing that no Soviet leader is likely to see it in his interest to push for policies agreeable to the U.S., and also that economic

considerations have not in the past had a noticeable impact on Soviet arms control policy, both of these issues deserve more searching examination.

—It seems clear that, important as the military is to the Soviet leadership, its overriding priorities at the moment are issues related to the succession and issues related to management of the domestic economy—and society as a whole. They are doubtless struggling over resource allocation for the five-year plan beginning in 1986, are working to revise the Party statutes for the first time in decades, and must have a Party Congress by February, 1986.

—It is difficult to predict exactly what impact new U.S. proposals would have on the debates on these issues, and on which issues various aspirants in the succession struggle would choose to use. Major changes in the past—for example, Khrushchev's anti-Stalin speech³—have never, to my recollection, been predicted by foreign intelligence agencies, including our own. While I do not profess an ability to make such predictions myself, experience tells me that it is *not* wise totally to discount the possibility in advance.

—Certainly, no Soviet leader will wish to appear pro-U.S., nor will any argue that *necessary* military expenditures give way to non-military ones. These are truisms and require no particular insight to state. There may well be an argument over which military expenditures are necessary, however. And if we suppose that the issues are discussed not simply as pro or anti-U.S., or as necessary guns versus desirable butter, but in a much more complex policy-making environment, possibilities emerge. For example, what about an American proposal which offers the prospect of alleviating some of the pressing domestic concerns? Or

the consideration that whatever the sacrifices they make, they may not be able to keep up with the U.S. technologically should there be no agreed restraint on U.S. options?

—Although the whole Ogarkov affair is still murky,⁴ it is very likely that it was related both to succession maneuvering and to resource allocation questions. Clearly the Soviets are wrestling with a very real dilemma. There is no way they can be sure we will not achieve a technological breakthrough which leaves them behind in some key area, and they are unable to do *all* things at once. There are, therefore, more potential Soviet incentives for a more controlled development of technological change than are apparent in the CIA analysis.

Impact of U.S. Proposals

One important factor which the CIA study could not address is the potential impact on Soviet policymaking of U.S. proposals. The “key judgments” in the paper might lead one to conclude that *no* responsible U.S. proposal is likely to be successful. This could be right, but it is not necessarily the case. For the fact is that our proposals, if offered in the proper way—confidentially and initially without publicity—will themselves be factors influencing Soviet policy decisions. If there is something in them for the Soviets, then there will be those tempted by them, not because they want to do us a favor, but in their own self interest.

For this reason—and a number of others—I believe we should take Art Hartman’s observations seriously (TAB I).⁵ As he points out, the resumption of negotiations by the Soviets will require us to present proposals which

ultimately are defensible both at home and among the Allies. Otherwise we risk losing the high ground we have occupied for the past year.

Unfortunately, I do not see emerging from the interagency process the sort of comprehensive thinking that will be required for this. *The sort of proposals State is toying with seem to me simultaneously too much and too little: too much in the sort of specifics which could handicap us in future negotiations, and too little as regards definition of what our overall objectives are.* So far as DOD and ACDA are concerned, I have noted even less in the way of realistic ideas. *I believe it is clear that the interagency process cannot produce the sort of proposal we need.* Even if it miraculously should, the ideas would probably leak before we took them up with the Soviets, which would militate against serious Soviet consideration.

What We Need for Geneva

We need to engage the Soviets in a frank discussion of the *objectives* of our arms reduction efforts over the next four years. The purpose would be to develop the “road map” the President spoke of in his UNGA address.⁶ The initial step should be to try to get some general agreement on where we want to arrive; mapping the course over the terrain could be a job for the umbrella talks to follow. One of our objectives in the initial meeting should be to get Soviet agreement on these talks by special representatives of both sides.

This will require, in the first instance, *decisions by the President of what our objectives are, and then decisions regarding the best intermediate steps to achieve them and finally, the way our initial proposals should be formulated*

to attract serious Soviet attention. It will be imperative to develop these plans with a very small circle of advisers with absolute security against leaks.

Given the long history of negotiations on many of the separate issues and the relatively frozen attitudes which have developed on both sides, our effort will have a better chance of success if we can come up with an innovative conceptual framework: one that will allow both sides to claim a fresh start. For us, this would have the advantage of accentuating the specific Reagan stamp on our approach; for them it could provide the means to finesse (at least initially) some of their more persistent hang-ups with our proposals up to now. This, of course, cannot be done simply by fiddling with proposals now on the table (though these of course involve real issues which must be addressed). It will require, at a minimum, recasting our approach in a framework which at least *looks* different. We need an approach which does not look like a return to 1972 detente; they need an approach which does not look too much like a return to the Geneva of 1983.

Modalities

For obvious reasons, we normally give more thought to substance than to modalities and tactics. However, I cannot stress too much the vital role that appropriate modalities play in successful implementation of a sound strategy. In the past, the U.S. has frequently handicapped itself by using tactics which doomed its proposals to failure—or had the effect of diluting them and delaying implementation.

The Carter-Vance proposal of March, 1977, is a classical example of using counterproductive tactics.⁷ There were two basic mistakes in the tactics used then: Carter went

public with his new proposals before they had been discussed with the Soviets; and the proposals were suddenly presented to the Soviets without any advance discussion. The combination of these two factors (plus Soviet annoyance at a noisy human rights campaign) caused immediate, emotion-laden Soviet rejection, and doomed the deep cuts idea for the balance of the Carter Administration. (One of our major achievements, by the way, has been to gain Soviet acceptance of the idea that there must be substantial cuts in the future.)

We should absorb the lessons of the past and make sure the mistakes are not repeated. This means, in regard to our upcoming talks, the following:

—We should not actually name publicly our special representative for the umbrella talks until the Soviets have accepted the idea and have been informed of the person involved. (Since this will be a form of diplomatic negotiation, we should go through a quasi “agrément” process in advance, to make sure both representatives are acceptable to both sides.)⁸

—We should take extraordinary steps to make sure that our proposals do not leak before they are presented to the Soviets, or even thereafter for a reasonable period of time (say, a couple of months).

—We should make some effort to convey to the Soviet leadership, entirely privately and informally, the drift of our thinking, in advance of submitting formal proposals. Unless we develop a mechanism to do this, it is more than likely that we will soon find ourselves in an acrimonious public dispute which will greatly complicate our ability to manage Congress, the Allies and the Soviets simultaneously.

—We should not expect to be able to work out agreed approaches in a series of meetings of the foreign ministers. These meetings may well be desirable for a number of reasons, but unless they are supplemented by informal, preparatory discussions—both by special representatives on arms control issues and by broader informal discussions—progress will be slow, if it occurs at all.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, Arms Control—USSR (3). Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. In a December 1 covering note to Shultz on another copy of this memorandum, McFarlane wrote: “George: Attached is a very thoughtful memo from Jack Matlock. I must ask that you protect Jack on this and not share the memo with others. As an aside Jack is truly one of the most thoughtful men I have ever met on the Soviet Union. I agree with Jack’s views with the exception of one idea on the last page [see [footnote 8](#), below]. But I send this along in the hope that after you have read it we might be able to discuss whether/how we might try to implement some of his ideas. Bud.” (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 21 (2 of 4).

² The CIA report was not found. See [Document 323](#).

³ A reference to Khrushchev’s February 1956 “secret speech” which denounced Stalin’s harsh policies and tactics and led to uprisings in Hungary and Poland.

⁴ See [Document 270](#).

⁵ Tab I is not attached. See [Document 318](#).

⁶ See [footnote 7](#), [Document 267](#).

⁷ See [Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Documents 156](#) and [157](#).

⁸ An “X” appears in the margin on another copy of this memorandum, indicating the point McFarlane disagreed with. See [footnote 1](#), above.

321. Note Prepared in the White House Situation Room¹

Washington, November 29, 1984

Kremlin Desires Backchannel Link with Washington

[1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

- According to Chetverikov, the request for a backchannel message had been made by representatives of Chernenko's office. Chetverikov stated that messages relayed through unofficial channels were becoming increasingly important to the Soviet leadership.
- Dobrynin said he viewed the present as the most crucial time in recent U.S.-Soviet relations, and suggested that all forms of communication be pursued to assure continuation of a warming of relations between the two nations.

Dobrynin suggested that improved U.S.-Soviet relations were largely due to Secretary Shultz's effort to facilitate arms talks.

- The Soviet ambassador said Shultz's work has brought about a marked change in attitudes by Soviet leaders toward the U.S. administration.
- The source noted Dobrynin was considerably optimistic over the prospects for a second term for the President—in stark contrast to the ambassador's dismal attitude prior to the President's re-election.

Dobrynin also outlined the current protocol when calling on top leaders in the Politburo, i.e., call on Chernenko first and ask him about the advisability of meeting with Gorbachev et al.

- Dobrynin stated there was considerable animosity between Chernenko and Gorbachev due to worldwide speculation about the Soviet succession issue.
- Dobrynin speculated that Chernenko might be offended if any invitation to visit the U.S. were extended to any ranking Kremlin leaders without first inviting Chernenko—who will decline but suggest officials who would be willing to travel to Washington.
(C)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (11/27/84–12/04/84); NLR-748-25A-42-3-0. Confidential. This note is based on reporting from the CIA on November 27. Poindexter wrote in the margin: “Bud, You probably saw this last night. One of the dangers we face in not taking them up on this is that the Soviets may begin to think we are not serious. JP.”

322. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 30, 1984

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH ROBERT C. McFARLANE

After meeting with Shultz on the afternoon of November 29, Nitze placed a call to McFarlane to debrief on that meeting. McFarlane returned the call at Nitze's residence in the evening, but the latter was out. The telephone conversation was finally completed on the morning of November 30. The main points are as follows:

—Nitze said he had been asked by Shultz to help prepare him for his meeting with Gromyko. Shultz also asked Nitze to accompany him to Geneva for the January 7–8 meeting. Nitze said he would be prepared to help the Secretary in any way he could prior to the Geneva meeting as well as aid Shultz during the meetings with Gromyko.²

—McFarlane said he was happy Nitze had agreed to undertake the job; McFarlane was confident the President would also be pleased.³

—McFarlane outlined his thinking on scheduling in Presidential preparation for the Geneva meeting: today was to be a discussion on Soviet long-term objectives; perhaps Wednesday (December 5) there could be discussion on Soviet immediate objectives at Geneva. (Nitze suggested there should also be discussion of US objectives for Geneva in the context of possible Soviet proposals, e.g., what do we want?—McFarlane agreed). Without tying specific agenda to specific meeting dates, McFarlane suggested December

10 and 17 for discussion of “format” or “process” as well as substance. There would have to be subsequent meetings where McFarlane hoped to get Presidential decisions on substance as to INF, START and space.⁴ McFarlane opined that most of the work in this regard had been completed; there remained, however, decision as to how to handle the offense defense relationship.⁵

—McFarlane thought the best approach for offense/defense relationship would be to impress on Gromyko the usefulness of strategic defense vis-a-vis strategic offensive weapons; this would keep SDI alive and provide US leverage in continuing negotiations. McFarlane was having a paper prepared in this regard.⁶

—Nitze questioned that approach. He referred McFarlane to his memo critiquing the “gang of four” article on SDI: McFarlane said he had seen Nitze’s memo and approved of it.⁷ Nitze then went on to say that one of the foundations of the ABM Treaty was to prohibit a nationwide defense and to guard against “breakout” to provide such defense. One of the ways to hedge against this breakout was to place severe restrictions on long-lead-time items—namely large-phased array radars, which take five to ten years to build, and to prohibit mobile ABM interceptors and engagement radars. Moreover, the ABM Treaty was to be accompanied by a parallel treaty of indefinite duration.

—Now, Nitze said, these foundations of the ABM Treaty have become of uncertain validity; the Krasnoyarsk radar certainly appears to be usable as part of a base for nationwide ABM defense (if not explicitly so), the Soviets have built ABM interceptors which, if not wholly mobile, are then readily transportable, and no treaty of indefinite duration on offensive systems has been negotiated.

—Nitze said our approach should be to challenge the Soviets on this offense/defense relationship. If they want to join us in “fixing” this problem and revalidating the foundations of the ABM Treaty, we should do so even if it means forgoing some aspects of SDI.

—McFarlane said he did not disagree with Nitze’s approach. Nitze replied that McFarlane’s original approach had not seemed consistent with his; who was preparing McFarlane’s offense/defense paper? McFarlane replied Nitze should talk to Ron Lehman; Nitze said he would do so.

—McFarlane would give Lehman a “heads up.”

¹ Source: Department of State, Paul Nitze Files, 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1984. Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. “Only copy” is typed and underlined in the upper right-hand corner of the first page.

² In a memorandum of conversation of the meeting on November 29, Nitze wrote that Shultz wanted “someone with background and expertise” in arms control and “in whom he had confidence to help him in preparing for his meetings with Gromyko in January as well as to be with him during those meetings. Shultz believed Nitze to be that person and asked Nitze to join him. Nitze said he would be glad to help in preparing for the Geneva meetings and be present during the meetings to aid the Secretary in any way.” (Ibid.)

³ See [footnotes 5](#) and [6, Document 308](#).

⁴ In the November 29 memorandum of conversation with Shultz, Nitze wrote: “Shultz implied he was getting a little nervous over Geneva and how preparations would come

out. He implied the interagency community may come up with a game plan, but he was not sure it would be consistent with the objective the President had articulated—to get meaningful arms control agreements.” See [footnote 2](#), above.

⁵ In the November 29 memorandum of conversation with Shultz, Nitze wrote: “Shultz then enumerated several questions which needed to be addressed in preparation. How to space out the two days; arms control/bilateral issues; the talks, social occasions, communique. Soviet view—what is Gromyko likely to come with? Questions and proposals to determine whether the US is prepared to come to a conclusion on space.” See [footnote 2](#), above.

⁶ Not found.

⁷ See attachment to [Document 343](#) and [footnote 2](#) thereto.

323. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, November 30, 1984, 1:45–2:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

Soviet Defense and Arms Control Objectives

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE:

Admiral Daniel J. Murphy

OSD:

Deputy Secretary William Taft

CIA:

Director William J. Casey

Mr. Douglas George

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN:

Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick

JCS:

General John W. Vessey, Jr.

ACDA:

Director Kenneth Adelman

CHAIRMAN, U.S. INF DELEGATION:

Ambassador Paul H. Nitze

CHAIRMAN, U.S. START DELEGATION:

Ambassador Edward Rowny

OMB:

Alton Keel

WHITE HOUSE:

Mr. Edwin Meese, III

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane

NSC:

Dr. Ronald F. Lehman, II

Minutes

Mr. McFarlane opened the meeting by discussing our schedule for dealing with preparations for the Geneva talks. We would begin by updating the foundation of information upon which we would build our approach. Today we would discuss the Soviet strategy on arms control and look at the status of Soviet forces and what we expect them to look like in the future. On Wednesday, we would focus more specifically on US objectives in January in contrast to Soviet objectives.² Following that, we would review substantive options including questions of how to approach START, INF, space systems, and related issues. We will also look at how to present the United States' view of the relationship of offense and defense. We will stress how strategic defenses can be stabilizing and "why they ought to learn to love defense." He noted that our basic analytical work is complete on START and INF and that our thinking on space had come a long way. He indicated that the participants would receive a decision paper only after we had conducted these foundation meetings. He then turned to CIA Director Casey who introduced Mr. Doug George, noting that Mr. George's presentation had been developed along with Mr. Larry Gershwin. (S)

Mr. George introduced his presentation using a series of viewgraphs. The presentation would describe the Soviet approach to arms control talks, taking into account military considerations, arms control policy, political considerations, and economic considerations. He would then brief conclusions of the CIA paper that had been prepared for today's session.³ He turned to the question of Soviet offensive systems, noting that the Soviet Union has over 2,500 SNDVs and has a vigorous development and deployment program underway. He noted that the centerpiece of Soviet offensive systems is the large MIRVed

ICBM force, especially the heavy missiles such as the SS-18, and he noted that the Soviet Union has a follow-on missile under development for each of their existing types including the SS-18. He stated that the Soviet Union is removing SS-11s, apparently to make room for the addition of new ICBMs, probably the SS-X-25. He noted that the Soviet Union will replace most of its strategic offensive systems in the early-to-mid 1990s, addressing survivability through mobilized ICBMs such as the train-mobile SS-X-24 and the land-mobile SS-X-25. In addition to greater emphasis on survivability, the Soviets will place greater emphasis on diversity, especially in developing a modern bomber force which includes the B-1 equivalent BLACKJACK bomber and the modern AS-15 air-launched cruise missile. He noted that the Soviet Union will continue its build-up of SS-20 missiles and deployments of the SS-21, SS-12 mod 2, and SS-23 in Europe. He stressed that 1985 is a year of decision for the Soviet Union, based on the schedule of their five-year plans. He pointed out that the Soviet Union can live within the SALT II limits for at least another year, but because of their hot production lines, are well positioned to move beyond those limits in the future. Mr. George illustrated this portion of his briefing with photographs of the BACKFIRE and the SS-20 TEL. (S)

Mr. George continued his briefing by focusing on strategic defense. He noted that the Soviet Union desires to preserve its near-monopoly in strategic defense capabilities; he noted that recently the Soviet Union has been upgrading the Moscow ABM system and has the potential for widespread ABM defenses in the 1990s. It has improved its air defenses and indeed, the Soviet SA-X-12 surface-to-air missile blurs the differences between air defense and ABM. Mr. George stressed that the Soviet Union is doing vigorous research on direct energy and anti-submarine warfare technology. In ASW they are using their manned space

mission. He noted that at the present time they have some difficulty countering cruise missiles and advanced bombers, especially Stealth weapons. (S)

Mr. George then turned to a discussion of the Soviet space program, which is large and involves many programs including the Soviet space shuttle. He noted that the Soviet Union has an operational ASAT interceptor which can be launched in as little as sixty minutes after preparations begin. He noted that the Soviet Union has an advanced SDI program of its own, but would likely also respond to the American SDI program with greater resources and offensive counter-measures, including decoys and missile hardening. (S)

Mr. George then turned to the strategic challenge which US programs present to the Soviet Union. The Soviets, he said, are afraid that US gains will erode the advantages which they have achieved. He stated that the Soviet Union has a launch-on-warning capability which the P-II puts in jeopardy. He stressed that the Soviet Union recognizes that no amount of capital that the Soviet Union can invest would permit them to compete successfully with the United States in terms of SDI, because of their inability to develop modern computers at the rate at which they are being developed in the United States. Stealth, B-1, the cruise missiles, the Pershing II, all present problems for the Soviet Union. (S)

He then turned to Soviet arms control objectives. The Soviet Union wants to continue to negotiate but wants progress on Soviet terms. SALT I and SALT II accepted the status of the Soviet Union as a superpower equal, but the Soviet Union retains as its goal compensation for all of the forces of all its opponents, e.g., the British and French. Their goal is to protect their strategic gains while delaying

the US strategic response and especially to undercut ICBM modernization and SDI. Mr. George noted that ASAT is the stalking horse for SDI. Mr. George noted that Moscow remains committed to the principle of "equality and equal security," which means that they will continue to focus heavily on the INF issue, particularly this year when the Belgian and Dutch deployment decisions are pending. He noted that Soviet leaders plan numerous visits to include a visit by Chernenko to Paris this year and that these will be used for the propaganda purpose of stopping the US INF deployments. He also said that it was quite possible that the Soviet Union would manipulate its SS-20 bases in order to get the Dutch to pause in their decision on deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles. (S)

Mr. George emphasized that the Soviet leadership has agreed on a new course for US-Soviet relations but that Chernenko or his successor will have little leeway to alter the thrust of Soviet strategic programs and arms control policies. The Soviets do not expect major agreements soon, but will use the arms control process to pursue political goals. One can expect the Soviet Union to be very active in trying to influence US policy through allies, our publics, and the Congress. They may well prove quite sophisticated in exploiting differences within the West and in encouraging restraints on US defense spending. Moscow also hopes to inhibit US actions elsewhere, such as in Nicaragua. In Geneva, Gromyko will have a political agenda of setting the stage for the Soviet European visits in early 1985, and his announced goal will be to halt the arms race, especially in space. Gromyko's substantive agenda will focus on stopping SDI through an ASAT moratorium and trying to get an INF moratorium as well. He will be looking for unilateral restraint by the West but will attempt to use SALT II as the point of departure in the strategic area, and again will focus on British and French systems. On

modalities, the Soviets probably will have a plan for Geneva but they are likely to expect the US to take the lead in proposing modalities. (S)

Mr. George then turned to economic factors influencing Soviet behavior. Despite difficult economic times, the economic situation is not likely to cause the Soviet Union to forego strategic programs or make concessions. On the other hand, they have an interest in slowing down the pace of strategic arms competition; in particular because they cannot compete with the United States in an open-ended high-technology competition such as would be associated with SDI. (S)

In conclusion, Mr. George noted that the Soviets appear to have achieved successful re-entry into strategic arms control talks. He noted that they believe the process is beneficial to their interests, although they have stated that they do wish to achieve agreements. Clearly, they view the talks as a means to influence US and Allied behavior. These talks in the next year take place as the Soviet Union is deciding on the size, composition and capabilities of forces planned for the 1990s. The Soviet Union looks to arms control to slow down US technological development, while it protects advantages they have achieved. The Soviet Union can live with SALT II for at least another year, and they are well positioned to go beyond its limitations in the near future. (S)

Mr. George then repeated that the Soviet Union is gearing up for a major public affairs battle, that their emphasis on ICBMs has not changed, and that they are well positioned to go beyond existing agreements in both offensive and defensive systems, and that they have a vigorous space program. He noted that the Soviet Union had just launched their own version of the KH-11. (S)

Secretary Weinberger stressed that it is strategic defense that gives the United States its leverage on the Soviet Union and may prove to be our very best response. (S)

General Vessey emphasized that the Soviet Union gets a tremendous amount of military leverage from its ICBM force and it is important that we develop a counter to that. At the same time, he noted that the Soviet Union is developing diverse strategic forces such as the United States has done. (S)

Mr. McFarlane suggested that we should set aside the detailed discussion and focus on the "big picture." He called upon the President to recall his policy of commitment to a military force structure which the Soviet Union would respect. He noted that the President had in 1980 drawn the nation's attention to the window of vulnerability, and he noted that the American people can see that we have a program. However, he noted that we are still faced with problems in resolving the threat. For example, our problem in getting Congressional support for MX. He noted that today, the Soviet Union has 6,000 ICBM warheads to our 2,000, and all of ours are vulnerable. The Soviet Union has done all that it could to derail the President's efforts, but we have tried to get everyone to recognize the trends. The President's program in arms control has been to restore a stable balance, but we still have a long way to go, even though we are better off than we would have been had we continued the policies of four years ago. (S)

Mr. McFarlane stated that as bad as it is today, it is going to get worse, and asked what that means for arms control. He stated his view that either you must persevere in getting offensive reductions, or you must defend the United States. It is imperative that the Soviet Union understand that.

What the Soviet Union wants is high levels of re-entry vehicles and no defenses for the United States. Mr. McFarlane stated his view that the notion that you must choose between arms control and the strategic defense is nonsense. Strategic defense gives us the capability to restore stability in this century. The other point about SDI is that it permits us to move away from emphasis on nuclear weapons, and this is most appealing to publics. SDI is defensive and it is non-nuclear. (S)

The President asked whether or not the Soviet Union fears our economic capability. (S)

Mr. McFarlane responded saying that this was different from World War II and that in World War II Congress was on our side. (S)

General Vessey noted that the Soviet Union has a greater military and industrial base but pointed out that we have the lead in high technology. (S)

Secretary Weinberger added that SDI is the key, and that we don't have the time to mobilize an industrial base the way we did in World War II. (S)

The President said that he had one other question. He wondered whether or not deterrence would be enhanced if we made clear to the Soviet Union that we might launch-under-attack, but wondered whether we had the warning capacity to be certain that we would have warning and that we would not be caught by surprise. (S)

Secretary Weinberger noted that there were certain gaps in our radar coverage. (S)

General Vessey added that the gaps referred to attack by SLBMs. (S)

Mr. McFarlane said that we had no ability to rely on launch-under-attack because we do not have the kind of attack assessment capability that we would need to rely on such a policy. (S)

Director Casey noted that launch-under-attack would make SDI look very good indeed. (S)

Secretary Weinberger noted that submarines are very close to our shores and would make it very difficult to execute. (S)

General Vessey indicated that the JCS felt it was difficult to rely on launch-under-attack. (S)

Ambassador Nitze asserted that launch-under-attack is a policy of weakness. (S)

Mr. McFarlane again stressed that we don't have the right kinds of capabilities for such a policy. We don't have the ability to distinguish between attacks on military facilities and attacks on our cities. (S)

Secretary Weinberger said that SDI was the best response to the Soviet threat. (S)

Ambassador Rowny stated his belief that a Soviet attack would be against our missile bases. (S)

The President interjected that the Soviet goal is to protect the motherland while developing military power that they can use to blackmail the West. (S)

Secretary Shultz suggested that we consider the implications of the briefing. The Soviet Union has developed an impressive array of ballistic and cruise missiles. There is an asymmetry. Theirs are much more

survivable and they have a big production base. The Soviet Union doesn't have the political problems of deployment that we have. The United States must deal with the problems of the Congress and the social-environmental problems. These all give the Soviet Union an advantage. Therefore, it is important that we get a respectable arms control agreement. We are, however, faced with a dilemma: the Soviet Union is interested in stopping SDI, as Mr. McFarlane and Mr. George have pointed out; they want to stop the R&D component which we want to protect. Mr. Shultz indicated that SDI is being referred to as leverage, but if there is a lever there, nobody seems to want to pull it. He believes that the basic answer to a defensive system is to flood the system and to overwhelm the defense with an offense. And that is our problem. Mr. Shultz indicated that if we don't limit the offense we can't have a defense, but if we press for the defense now, the Soviet Union won't agree to limit the offense. (S)

Secretary Weinberger indicated that the Soviets could flood and overwhelm traditional defensive systems but SDI is a system that would be in space that can't be flooded, and that is the reason that we should proceed with it. (S)

General Vessey noted that in the future both sides will have to deal with offenses and defenses but also we must take into account the fact that there is an asymmetrical target base. (S)

Director Adelman agreed that there was an asymmetry between US and Soviet forces and asked, "How do you put a stop to a strategic build-up when we want 5,000 warheads and they want 10,000 warheads?" (S)

General Vessey indicated that we do have a leverage to handle such an issue. (S)

Ambassador Rowny stressed that we do have leverage for trade-offs in our START proposals. (S)

Secretary Shultz interjected that we need something to trade. (S)

The President noted that he had another meeting to attend, and Mr. McFarlane concluded the meeting. (S)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Chronological File, Chron File 12/15/1984 (2). Secret. The meeting was held in the Situation Room. On November 30, Reagan wrote in his diary: "An N.S.P.G. meeting about forthcoming arms talks with the Soviets. I made it plain there must be no granting of concessions (one sided) to try & soften up the Soviets." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 402)

² This was the first of four NSPG meetings scheduled to plan for the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Geneva and the subsequent arms control negotiations. The next meeting was on Wednesday, December 5. See [Documents 326](#), [331](#), and [334](#).

³ Not found. See [Document 320](#).

324. Memorandum From Ronald Lehman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, December 1, 1984

SUBJECT

Shultz and Geneva

I understand that you have spoken with Secretary Shultz after his Wednesday meeting with the President and I understand there may have been another meeting on Friday.² I did not know of these meetings and thus the following information may be OBE. This information is not based upon the existence of a single "deep throat" in State, but is based on rather extensive discussions with a number of State officials. I am confident that it is fairly accurate, but I would caution that it represents the understanding of the Department as to what their Secretary believes—not necessarily his exact views.

Secretary Shultz has been concerned about his role in Geneva and his role in the preparations leading to Geneva. He wants strong personal involvement and has said that he will go to the President to get it. His view is that he should be given a complete substantive package to present to the Soviet Union in Geneva. He does not favor a prior presidential announcement as at Eureka,³ but he does want an approved, formal package. He believes strongly that Geneva is a Foreign Minister's meeting and that it should not involve any real delegation and is not happy about ideas of a special envoy. Rather he believes that he should be given extensive flexibility to reach agreement on a

Vladivostok-type package,⁴ the outlines of which he would negotiate himself with Gromyko. Agreement on the agenda and objectives, in his view then, is outlining the package and setting up subsequent technical negotiations simply for the completion of the basic package. Indeed, he has spoken of the possibility of keeping all major substantive negotiation within a series of Foreign Ministers meetings until a basic substantive package has been agreed to, thus, possibly delaying the actual beginning of regular negotiations in Geneva.

Shultz's own view is that our basic proposal should be along the lines of Option 3;⁵ namely, agreement to a 3 year ASAT moratorium in exchange for an interim agreement placing a cap on ballistic missile RVs and ALCMs and using the Soviet SNDV numbers. He is prepared to pay lip service to protecting SDI, but does not believe in the program. He received what he believed was a very negative briefing on SDI from Jim Thomson at the recent Rand Conference on US-Soviet relations⁶ and was disappointed in Jim Abrahamson's recent SDI brief, commenting "Is that all there is?"⁷ He believes that emphasis on defense by the US will only provoke an offensive response from the Soviet Union and looks at SDI as a source of leverage more in the sense of a "bargaining chip" to be traded away rather than a factor influencing Soviet behavior. He is not that much concerned about the details, but he was very upset that we are not moving quickly to make a decision by December 10th on some detailed package.

Shultz has never liked the Interagency Process even though State chairs nearly all the groups. He believes that flexibility is reduced and good ideas are sandbagged. He has tolerated the SACPG and SACG because he has believed that they have forced decisions which are stalemated in the Interagency Process. He holds some

resentment that junior officials debate some of the great issues in the SACG, but at the same time believes that the SACG is a good handholding exercise so that other Departments and Agencies can know that their views were expressed. He does not believe that the SACG should be the fora for selling his ideas. His own view is that as Secretary of State and spokesman on arms control, he is most effective when he deals with the President directly. Still, he does not believe that he should constantly have to take up these issues with the President. Thus, Jack Chain's effort to take your instructions on U.S. objectives and turn it into an Option 3 decision paper⁸ was apparently based on specific instructions from the top of the State Department which in turn is said to be related to the Secretary's displeasure at the reports he received about Monday's SACG.⁹

Shultz was unhappy after receiving his briefing on Monday's SACG particularly about 3 points. It was reported to him that you had stressed (1) calling the Soviets to task for leaving the talks originally, (2) not getting into substantive negotiations during the Shultz/Gromyko meeting in Geneva, and (3) selling the Soviet Union on the idea that SDI is good for them. My own memory and notes indicate that this is a significant distortion of your focus and tone, but the fact that the distortion has taken place does point to some of the important issues where, in the end, you may decide to differ.

With respect to the first point, because Shultz believes that we need to break the ice with the Soviets in a single bold stroke with major movement toward a new, compromise position, he is not anxious to revisit disruptive issues. He will not likely want to mention old talks much less even suggest that we "resume" those old talks. Whereas, it might be possible to gain some negotiating flexibility and

leverage by raising a number of “compliance” issues such as the Abalakovo Radar during the Geneva Talks, the current State approach dictates minimal discussion of compliance so as not to disrupt the climate necessary for movement on their big package which does not address compliance issues.

On the second point, Shultz does not like the idea of umbrella talks but tolerates the concept because the President is associated with it. State’s view is that such discussions can be done by exchanges of experts, perhaps with panels of Assistant Secretary level people. In any case, Shultz’s view is that umbrella discussions should not really lead to an agreement on the outlines of a package, but rather follow once we have a breakthrough. He has no objection to laying out American thinking to Gromyko, but he doesn’t want such discussions to take too much time away from negotiations on a specific package.

The third point illustrates the real problem. Because Shultz does not believe that there is much to SDI, he doesn’t think we should spend too much time and effort protecting it if we can use it to get an interim agreement on offensive arms. He doubts that the Soviets are interested in what role defenses could play in enhancing stability in the future. He will make the argument, but not devote too much time to it. Shultz recognizes that he is isolated within the Administration on this issue, but he believes that he has the complete support of his own building for his package and truly believes that the President has agreed already to the concept of trading off an ASAT moratorium for an interim agreement on offensive arms. Thus, believing that he has won on the moratorium issue, Shultz views further discussion of that issue as basically handholding on SDI, but he is afraid that in the process of this handholding his desire to get instructions to put down a comprehensive

package along the lines of Option 3 might be undercut. There is some evidence that he has become increasingly hostile to SDI as it is viewed as an obstacle to his package approach. His concern about our last SACG has resulted in visible concern about the direction in which you are headed. In each and every effort taken on the new “Objectives” paper, State has fought hard to put in either reference to the revised Option 3 or a placeholder for insertion.

I appreciate your PROFs note on your thoughts on how to proceed. Before Monday’s NSPG,^{[10](#)} I will detail for you some further thoughts in that regard.

^{[1](#)} Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Reference 11/29/84–12/2/84–12/2/84. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. “No log” is typed at the top of this memorandum, indicating it was not entered into the NSC system. In a covering note to McFarlane, Lehman wrote: “Bud, Attached is an ‘eyes only’ on Shultz’s views of Geneva. Also, we are preparing a package on the Geneva decision-making process. Attached is a first draft of a schedule. While we work the decision-making paper, you may find this useful. It doesn’t deal with the punchline, however,—how we finalize the position & what it is. Ron.”

^{[2](#)} According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan and Shultz met at the White House on Wednesday, November 28 from 1:34 to 2:20 p.m. See [footnote 3, Document 319](#). Although no record of a similar meeting on November 30 has been found, Shultz attended two meetings at the White House that day: the morning national security briefing and an afternoon NSPG meeting on preparations for the Geneva

meetings. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) See [Document 323](#).

³ On May 9, 1982, Reagan gave the commencement address at his alma mater, Eureka College. He used this speech to announce his intention to initiate "formal negotiations on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms, START, at the earliest opportunity." For the full text, see, [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 99](#).

⁴ See [footnote 4, Document 318](#).

⁵ An interagency working paper for the possible Vienna meetings, prepared during the summer, included three options. Shultz and the Department of State supported Option 3. An NSC staff compromise led to a paper on Option 1½. See [Document 277](#) and [footnote 5, Document 291](#).

⁶ James Thomson, a nuclear physicist and former member of Carter's National Security Council Staff, was Vice President of RAND's research division, Project AIR FORCE. Shultz gave a speech on U.S.-Soviet relations at the opening of the RAND Center at UCLA in October. See [footnote 4, Document 296](#).

⁷ Not found. Lieutenant General James A. Abrahamson was Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization.

⁸ In a November 29 memorandum, Chain distributed a "draft of the strategy for Geneva paper tasked at the November 26 SACG meeting" for use at the December 5 NSPG meeting. (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Reference 11/29/84-12/2/84-12/2/84) In a memorandum to McFarlane on December 1, Kraemer, Lehman, Linhard, and Matlock forwarded the paper and wrote: "a special interagency group working under General Chain has completed the discussion paper at Tab C focused on US and probable Soviet objectives at the January 7/8 Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Geneva. In

addition, the paper takes up some of the chief elements of U.S. arms control policy concerning specific arms control areas and contains a brief, and controversial, section on the proposed process in Geneva and beyond. The bulk of the paper (Sections II-V) reflect some 14 hours of interagency meetings featuring intense deliberations and occasional compromises.” (Ibid.) See also [Document 325](#) and [footnote 4](#) thereto.

[9](#) November 26.

[10](#) December 10.

325. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Chain) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, December 4, 1984

SUBJECT

NSPG Meeting on Preparations for Geneva, Wednesday December 5, 1:00 pm, Situation Room

Setting and Objectives

The NSPG will convene to continue discussion of our strategy for the Geneva meeting.² The focus of meeting will be the attached SACG paper,³ which is the first of a series of papers designed to lay the basis for Presidential decisions on your position at Geneva. The contents of the paper are summarized below. Your goals for the meeting should be:

—to indicate that we are satisfied with the paper, and believe it provides useful *preliminary background* to inform decisions later this month on our strategy for Geneva;

—to stress the importance of expediting work on the more important papers setting forth *concrete options* that you could present at Geneva; and

—to reiterate our view on the critical importance of *substance* to the success of the Geneva meeting, and

to challenge the prevalent view that making a proposal would represent a U.S. concession.

SACG paper: "Strategy for Geneva"

The interagency paper (tab 1), produced in a week of marathon drafting sessions chaired by Jack Chain, was reviewed by the SACG on Monday.⁴ It has five sections:

I. An OSD-drafted opening section describes our *arms control objectives over the next ten years*. Following our comments, this section has been revised to reflect the fact that, while we hope to deploy strategic defenses in the 1990s, it is too early to determine whether such a shift in the basis of deterrence will be possible. Thus, our near-term objective should be to protect long-term SDI options, engage the Soviets in a conceptual discussion of the potential role of strategic defenses, while pursuing further reductions in offensive arms. The concluding part of this section ("Where we want to be three years hence") is generally consistent with our option (see page I-3 and 4).

II. A CIA-drafted section describes the *Soviet approach to Geneva*. The paper makes the point that the Soviets will be looking for substance from us before engaging in serious talks. It notes that while they have cast space arms control as the most *urgent* task, they continue to see nuclear arms reductions as the most *important* question.

III. Section III is a brief rendition of *consensus objectives for Geneva* (engaging the Soviets in

serious talks, follow-on Ministerial meetings as necessary) and general U.S. arms control goals.

IV. Section IV is a straightforward catalogue of the “*elements of U.S. arms control policy.*” This section reviews our current positions on strategic forces, INF, ASAT, SDI, nuclear testing, CW, CDE/MBFR, ostensibly to set forth the “building blocks” for Presidential decisions. Issues where we might reconsider our current position are identified at the end of each sub-section, but no agency views are indicated.

Despite our amendments, the section comes down fairly hard against the possibility of devising concrete ASAT limitations that would be in the U.S. interest (a view we do not share). It also does not consider combined options, such as our own offensive arms/ASAT package.

V. Section V describes in preliminary terms *how you would structure the Geneva meeting.* The discussion here is fairly rudimentary. We will be providing you our detailed thinking on this in an internal memorandum.⁵

Work Program

Attached at tab 2 is the timetable for further interagency work presented by Bud McFarlane at Monday’s SACG.⁶ The goal is to complete substantive work by December 21, with a paper on substantive options ready for the President at that time.

The big question mark is whether there will be adequate opportunity to develop concrete options within the

interagency process. Most of the upcoming series of papers to be drafted seem to side-step this task, focusing on the separate building blocks that will go into our position, but without tying them together into a coherent negotiating position for you to take to Geneva. As a matter of interest, the attached SACG paper included a section on options in its first draft; however, Bud directed that this section be expurgated.

Thus, we recommend that you emphasize that need to assign higher priority to drafting an options paper well in advance of the December 22 deadline for completing substantive work. You will also, of course, need to meet privately with the President and Bud McFarlane to make the case for our recommended approach.

Talking points are attached, which cover four areas:⁷

—*SACG paper*: good first step, but real options paper needed.

—*SDI/Offense-Defense Relationship*: should explain to Soviets our view that defenses could be beneficial in future, but not expect to “sell” Moscow on SDI now.

—*ASAT arms control*: State believes there are limited approaches which are in our interest, and which could provide leverage for offensive arms reductions.

—*Overall Objectives for Geneva*: Without substantive ideas, won’t be able to engage Soviets in serious bargaining, and could lose public-diplomacy offensive.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, December 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive; King. Drafted by Vershbow; cleared by Simons, Palmer, Markoff, and J. Gordon (PM). Forwarded through Armacost. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on this packet, indicating Shultz saw it. McKinley's handwritten initials are on the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on December 4.

² See [Document 326](#). The NSPG met on November 30 to begin these discussions; see [Document 323](#).

³ The paper is attached but not printed. It is summarized in this briefing memorandum as well as during the December 5 NSPG meeting.

⁴ November 26. See [footnote 8, Document 324](#).

⁵ An undated memorandum from Burt to Shultz noted: "Gromyko is coming to the Geneva meeting with his tactics and goals fairly well thought out. Having decided to reverse their failed 'no-negotiations' approach, the Soviets now presumably feel they are positioned to profit in Geneva regardless of the U.S. position. In fact, the decision to come back via the 'new negotiations' route was probably sold to the skeptical in Moscow precisely on that basis. At the same time, they are emphasizing a desire to return to 'détente,' and probably recognize that reaching arms agreements could facilitate this and perhaps slow US and NATO defense programs." (Department of State, EUR Records, Arthur Hartman Files, Lot 03D314, US-Soviet Relations 1985)

⁶ The timetable is attached but not printed.

⁷ The talking points are attached but not printed.

326. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, December 5, 1984, 2-3 p.m.

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Arms Control Objectives

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE:

Admiral Daniel J. Murphy

OSD:

Deputy Secretary William Taft

CIA:

Director William J. Casey

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN:

Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick

JCS:

ADM J. D. Watkins

ACDA:

Director Kenneth Adelman

CHAIRMAN, U.S. INF DELEGATION:

Ambassador Paul H. Nitze

CHAIRMAN, U.S. START DELEGATION:

Ambassador Edward Rowny

OMB:

Alton Keel

WHITE HOUSE:

Mr. James Baker, III

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane

NSC:

Dr. Ronald F. Lehman, II

Minutes

Mr. McFarlane opened the meeting, indicating that our purpose is to discuss US and Soviet objectives for the arms control process that will begin in January in Geneva. The Senior Arms Control Group has prepared a paper on this subject.² *Mr. McFarlane* indicated that it would be useful to summarize key points of that paper. He said that we should first come to understand our long-term objective. We are meeting with the Soviet Union in order to begin the process of reducing nuclear arms and also to begin the process of discussing how we can in the years ahead use strategic defense to make the world safer. He indicated that SDI is most likely to be successful in achieving greater stability if the United States and the Soviet Union conduct a dialogue which would continue through the transition to the use of strategic defenses. He cautioned, however, that during that process we must protect our SDI options and in particular avoid unilateral restraint and moratoria. He reminded everyone that SDI is not only important to our future, but it provides a hedge against a Soviet breakout of the ABM Treaty. He indicated that a major public affairs program on SDI is essential to explain to people that this is a prudent, sensible and moral program. He noted that one of the options before us is to look at smaller steps in the reductions of offensive arms but before we decide what specific approaches we should take, we should have a clear understanding of Soviet objectives. He noted that the Soviets will seek to put the onus on us in order to make the U.S. grant concessions. The Soviets will test us to determine whether or not we will agree to concrete limitations on space weapons and will try to draw out new proposals. They will attempt to protect existing Soviet advantages and superiority while preventing the U.S. from gaining advantages for its technologies. In particular, they will try to stop SDI R&D. Clearly, their top priority will be

to seek limitations on SDI through a moratorium on ASAT. They will probably argue that we must agree to limitations on space systems first. They will attempt to avoid compliance issues in this forum and are unlikely to show great flexibility on offensive systems. (S)

Mr. McFarlane then turned to the overarching US interests in the Geneva talks. Our goal is to get a useful process going and to achieve formal negotiations on offensive systems while we discuss the relationship of defense to offense. We must protect and support our options to shift to greater reliance on defense, and we must seek equal and reduced levels of offensive arms, while protecting options for our modernization program. In summary, our objective is to enhance stability by altering the existing imbalance through our own programs and through arms control. Mr. McFarlane noted that we would deal with issues of format and specific issues of substance in subsequent meetings, including a review of our approaches to START, INF, umbrella talks, and space. (S)

Director Casey interjected that we should also review certain difficulties associated with verification. He stressed the importance of the discussion of offense and defense, and noted that either we must teach the Russians to like defense, or else we must prepare our publics very carefully. He noted that defense is the only alternative to getting stabilizing reductions. (S)

Secretary Shultz indicated that he had come to this meeting more prepared to listen than to speak, but he thought he should raise some important questions. Is our agreement to discuss defense an agreement to negotiate on defense, and isn't it the case that the Soviet Union already likes defense because they have a large air defense network, and it is clear that defense of the homeland is

dear to the Soviet Union. They are likely to say that they already know that defense is important. Mr. Shultz added, "I am the person who is going to do the talking, but I don't know what it is that I am supposed to say. We need to find some things that both sides are prepared to talk about." (S)

The President stated his belief that we and the Soviet Union may be coming together more than many people realize. He noted that we have never believed that we would find ourselves at war with Russia except to defend ourselves against attack. We have to look at defensive measures just the way the Soviet Union does; we have to look at civil defense and air defense and ABM. He noted the significance of the Moscow subway to civil defense. The President noted that everything they have says that they are looking at a first-strike because it is they, not we, who have built up both offensive and defensive systems. He noted that we could build on the Soviet preoccupation with protecting the homeland by making clear that we have no intention of starting a nuclear war, that it is our view that they may want to make war on us. We have no objections to their having defenses, but we have to look at defenses for ourselves and we need to look at reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons. He indicated that relative to the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, an initial reduction of 1,000 is meaningless. He noted that both sides have indicated that they would like to get rid of nuclear weapons entirely, but they are afraid of SDI. We must show them how defenses are not threatening. The President noted that the Soviet Union is ahead of us in ASAT capability and indicated that we should first talk about getting rid of these offensive arms like this F-15 ASAT. We must make it clear that we are not seeking advantage, only defense. (S)

Mr. McFarlane stated that stability is the theme that we must develop, and we must make clear that we are looking to defense to counter offensive systems and we must talk with the Soviet Union because it would be helpful to have an agreement on how we can proceed towards this goal on both sides. (S)

Secretary Shultz applauded the President's notion of setting our goal of zero nuclear weapons. He believes that it is important that the President said that, and we must move towards the basis for the elimination of nuclear weapons. He indicated that his instincts tell him that unconstrained offensive systems can overwhelm a defensive system and therefore without constraint on offense, there can be no successful SDI. (S)

Mr. McFarlane noted that stability is a Western concept and it is imperative that we not forget that we need to deal with the Soviet effort to gain superiority. (S)

The President interjected that it would be silly if we go into these talks without being realistic. He noted the quotation which is attributed to Brezhnev in Prague, namely, that the Soviet Union has gained a great deal from detente and that therefore, in 1985, the Soviet Union should have its way around the world. The President doubted that they had in mind Pearl Harbor but rather expected that they believe that they would be so powerful that they could coerce us into achieving their objectives peacefully. (S)

Admiral Watkins indicated that we must work hard to prepare for strategic defenses. They are an important hedge against verification and compliance difficulties and they provide the basis for greater stability and reductions in arms controls. He indicated that it is the time now to articulate our approach to SDI, and to make a statement

that makes clear the role SDI plays in achieving stability. We must make certain that SDI is not made analogous to ASAT. We need to have SDI well underway. There is a solid case for SDI, but we will always have problems in dealing with public opinion on space and ASAT. We must link research on SDI to making nuclear weapons obsolete. (S)

The President again interjected that it was important to link research on SDI to making nuclear weapons obsolete. He noted that we are behind in ASAT, which is the ability to knock down satellites, but we are willing to negotiate the end of ASATs because they are offensive weapons. SDI is a non-nuclear defensive system. The President wondered still whether or not we could give them the technology. (S)

Admiral Watkins cautioned that ASAT, Stealth technology and SDI are all inter-related; that we must move carefully. The F-15 system is not the answer to the military's prayer, and the MV could be given up, from a military point of view, but it must be remembered that this is closely related to SDI. (S)

The President asked again if we couldn't distinguish between offensive and defensive systems, and perhaps limit ASAT as an offensive system. (S)

Mr. Meese interjected that the technology is the same; a treaty on ASAT testing could kill both ASAT and SDI. (S)

Director Casey noted that we must focus on the difficulties of definition and verification in space arms control. (S)

Secretary Shultz noted that we could try to limit testing to just those existing systems and to try to protect our research and development. (S)

Admiral Watkins responded that an ASAT moratorium would inevitably create difficulties for SDI. (S)

Deputy Secretary Taft stressed the importance of our making the case for SDI and its role in maintaining the peace, and that we should do nothing in the negotiations which would prejudice the development of SDI. (S)

Director Adelman stated that the elimination of nuclear weapons should not be considered a near-term goal; rather, we should focus on the goal of reducing the number of nuclear weapons. However, an important question is, how ambitious should our arms control objectives be? How deep should the reductions we seek be, and how much verification should we require? On SDI he noted that Congress had cut our program by one-third, down to a level of spending below what had been planned even before the President's speech. Adelman stressed the need to mention the goal of reinforcing deterrence as we know it. (S)

The President noted that SDI gives us a great deal of leverage on the Soviet Union. (S)

Mr. McFarlane indicated that the Russians may bet that the United States cannot sell its SDI program. We need to get support for strategic defenses. (S)

The President responded that we could start by cancelling our subscriptions to the *Washington Post*. (S)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Chronological File, Chron File 12/15/1984 (2). Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² See [footnote 8, Document 324](#) and [Document 325](#).

327. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, December 7, 1984

SUBJECT

My Meeting Today with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin

I met for an hour today with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to discuss preparations for the Geneva meeting. I began by emphasizing the seriousness with which you and I are preparing for the meeting, noting that while we don't underestimate the difficulties, we are ready to move ahead as rapidly as possible.

Dobrynin gave me the list of the Soviet delegation. It will consist only of Gromyko, his deputy Korniyenko, Dobrynin, Karpov (their seasoned arms control negotiator), Foreign Ministry specialist Obukhov, and Gromyko's interpreter. I told him that I would be bringing a large group with me to Geneva to be available for consultations there, but that my negotiating team in the meetings would include Paul Nitze and not be larger than theirs. While the Soviets had earlier said Gromyko wanted to leave on the afternoon of the second day, Dobrynin told me that Gromyko now is prepared to remain for a meeting that afternoon (January 8th) if it would be useful.

On substance, Dobrynin said Gromyko is planning to concentrate primarily on arms control and does not want a lengthy discussion of the overall relationship. However, when I suggested that V-E Day events in Europe might be the kind of bilateral issue that would be worth discussing, he seemed to welcome the idea, noting that Moscow was also reviewing this issue and it might be worth some

preliminary discussion even before Geneva. Dobrynin also inquired about the status of any replies to the two outstanding Chernenko letters.² I told him we were working on responses. Your reply to Chernenko's November 15 letter on the overall relationship arrived later in the afternoon and we passed it to Dobrynin's deputy Sokolov.³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (12/05/84-12/13/84); NLR-748-25A-43-7-5. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that it was received in the White House Situation Room on December 8. Reagan initialed the memorandum on December 11, indicating he saw it.

² See attachments to [Documents 307](#) and [310](#).

³ Chernenko's letter was dated November 17. For Reagan's reply, see [Document 328](#).

328. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko¹

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Washington, December 7, 1984

Our two countries have now announced the beginning of new negotiations on the whole range of questions concerning nuclear and outer space weapons,² as you proposed in your letter of November 17.³ The common ground reflected in your letter and mine of November 15⁴ encourages me to hope for substantial progress in the difficult task we are undertaking together. Let me comment briefly on those areas where there appears to be a coincidence of views.

First, we agree on the objective of eventually liquidating nuclear arms, as you put it. It seems to me that this common objective should stimulate and guide the effort to begin the process of reducing these arsenals.

Second, we agree on the need to negotiate what you call resolute and immediate practical measures to move forward on the real issues we are facing. Such measures, and, in particular, good results in the negotiations we have now agreed to undertake, would have a positive impact on the world situation and our relations, as you say. As Secretary Shultz and I explained to Foreign Minister Gromyko here in Washington,⁵ the suggestions which I made in my United Nations address were developed to meet this need, and I recalled them in my letter for that reason.

Third, having referred in my letter to the fact that space weapons and offensive nuclear arms are “inherently related,” I was struck by your statement that “there is an organic, and I would say, objective relationship between these issues.” I believe it will be important, as we proceed, to seek better understanding of precisely how they are related, in order to permit productive negotiations.

George Shultz will go to Geneva prepared to negotiate a mutual understanding on the subjects and objectives of follow-on negotiations. I therefore hope that the Geneva meeting will set in motion negotiations which will result in mutually acceptable agreements to begin reductions. This is a crucial first step toward the objective of reducing the threat of nuclear weapons and ultimately eliminating such weapons entirely. The Geneva meeting will begin the process. It must deal with procedural issues, but I believe it important that we also get down to real substance.

Secretary Shultz will have concrete ideas to present in Geneva. I hope that you share my view of the urgent need to focus on the substance of the critical issues to be covered, and that Foreign Minister Gromyko will be prepared to explain your own thinking on strategic and intermediate-range weapons and on outer space as well. I would envisage following up on the January session during subsequent meetings between our Foreign Ministers. This could assist us in moving the negotiations forward quickly.

I have recently designated Mr. Paul Nitze to work with George Shultz as he prepares for the meeting in Geneva.⁶ Depending on the results of the Geneva meeting, we might find that it would be useful for Mr. Nitze to meet periodically with a counterpart from your side to develop specific proposals or resolve problems in the various arms control negotiations underway at a given time. This is a

matter that can be discussed during the January meeting, but if you have any immediate thoughts on the idea, I would of course welcome them.

I hope that our agreement to begin arms control negotiations will have a favorable effect on our efforts to achieve progress in other areas of our relationship. As I noted in my letter of November 15, I think it could be useful for both our countries to establish a more intensive dialogue on regional issues, including regularized meetings at the policy level. Similarly, more active cooperation in the cultural, economic and scholarly fields, and to expand contacts between our peoples, would be of mutual benefit, and is worthy of our best efforts. In this latter connection, I am encouraged by the Soviet Union's expressed readiness to join with us in discussions designed to lead toward meetings of the joint commissions established under our bilateral cooperative agreements in the areas of agriculture, housing and the environment.⁷ And here I should say once again that steps by the Soviet Union to resolve outstanding problems in the humanitarian field could have a positive impact on our effort to improve relations in every other area.

In closing, let me state as strongly as I can my personal commitment to make the results we have agreed to seek as productive, as concrete and as beneficial as possible. I intend to give my personal attention to the arms control negotiations that our Foreign Ministers will seek to launch in Geneva. I will wish to use our correspondence to discuss particularly difficult issues with you, and I hope you will feel free to do the same.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8491237). Secret. Burt forwarded a draft letter to Shultz on November 28; Matlock made some revisions. McFarlane forwarded the revised letter and a memorandum from Shultz to Reagan on December 7. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) December 1984) According to an information memorandum to Shultz on December 7, Burt delivered the letter for Chernenko to Sokolov later that afternoon. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 12, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (12/05/1984-12/07/1984))

² See [footnote 5, Document 315](#).

³ See [Document 310](#).

⁴ See [Document 308](#).

⁵ See [Documents 286, 287, and 288](#).

⁶ On December 5, Reagan announced: "At the recommendation of the Secretary of State, I have today asked Ambassador Paul Nitze to serve as adviser to the Secretary for the Geneva talks. Ambassador Nitze has a long history of distinguished service to his country, and I am very pleased that he has accepted." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book II, p. 1866)

⁷ In a December 3 information memorandum to Shultz, Burt provided an assessment of U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations and the agenda: "With careful development, the bilateral agenda can continue to provide a steady base for the relationship as we tackle more difficult problems in these other areas in the months to come." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 12, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (12/05/1984-12/07/1984))

329. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, December 8, 1984

I attended several lengthy meetings today with the Secretary and our State Department working group on the upcoming Geneva arms control talks. The group is composed of Paul Nitze, who has been named as the Secretary's special adviser and who will be attending the talks with him, as well as Mike Armacost, Rick Burt, and Jack Chain. We went over several papers that had been prepared, primarily by Nitze, on the relationship of offense and defense, which is rapidly becoming the key idea behind a new approach to arms control.² The Secretary is obviously trying to build on two ideas of the President's. The first is that it would be desirable to do away entirely with nuclear weapons. The second is that the way to get there is through a strong defense, namely the SDI program. These are radical ideas in view of the fact that deterrence, and specifically mutual assured deterrence, has been the reigning doctrine since the advent of intercontinental nuclear weapons.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1984–June 1985. No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on December 10.

² For the final version of Nitze's paper see [Document 343](#).

330. Paper Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency¹

SOVM-84-10200X

Washington, December 10, 1984

Assessment of a Recent Unofficial Soviet Statement on Defense Spending SUMMARY

[*4½ lines not declassified*] knowledgeable Soviet officials—albeit probably not privy to the tightly held actual cost data—are concerned about the impact of the defense burden on the overall Soviet economy. Neither official gave precise figures, instead they couched their statements in terms of general orders of magnitude. Consequently, it is impossible to compare directly our estimates of Soviet defense costs with the number they implied. Moreover, the wording used [*less than 1 line not declassified*] leads us to believe he intended a broad definition of defense burden that would include the costs of activities indirectly supporting defense and not counted in our conventional estimates of Soviet defense spending. [*portion marking not declassified*]

[Omitted here is the remainder of the paper.]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (12/05/84-12/16/84); NLR-748-25A-43-8-4. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Prepared in the Defense Spending Branch, Econometric Analysis Division, Office of Soviet Analysis. Reagan initialed the paper on December 12, indicating he saw it. In an undated handwritten cover note to Poindexter, Matlock wrote: “The attached analysis is worth a quick glance, since it deals with an interesting

comment by a Soviet 'scholar' which would indicate that the CIA may have been *underestimating* the real impact on the Soviet economy of the Soviet defense effort. I have personally long thought that this was the case, and that the Agency, relying greatly on Soviet *published statistics*, underestimated the real impact. Since much of the latter is *qualitative*, it is difficult to quantify in the statistical terms the Agency uses. Jack." Poindexter wrote in the margin: "Thanks. I gave this report to the President yesterday. I agree with you. JP." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron December 1984 (2/5))

331. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, December 10, 1984, 2-3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Discussion of Geneva Format and SDI (S)

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE:

Admiral Daniel J. Murphy

STATE:

Secretary George P. Shultz

OSD:

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

CIA:

Director William J. Casey

JCS:

ADM J.D. Watkins

ACDA:

Director Kenneth Adelman

CHAIRMAN, U.S. INF DELEGATION

Ambassador Paul H. Nitze

CHAIRMAN, U.S. START DELEGATION

Ambassador Edward Rowny

OMB:

Alton Keel

WHITE HOUSE:

Mr. Edwin Meese, III

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane

NSC:

Dr. Ronald F. Lehman II

Minutes

Mr. McFarlane opened the meeting, noting that we had discussed previously U.S. objectives for Geneva and our defense program as well as Soviet objectives and their program.² Today we would be getting down to specifics concerning the first of two baskets of outcomes, namely, what do we want in the way of continuous negotiations. The second basket, substance, will be dealt with next Monday when we go over the nuts and bolts of START, INF, ASAT, etc.³ The paper for today's discussion presents six options on format although these options can be reduced to a number of questions.⁴ Do we want separate START and INF negotiations or should they be merged? What shall we do about Space—negotiations or discussions only? Should Space issues be dealt with separately or merged with START and INF? Should we combine everything together in one large negotiation, perhaps having separate working groups? How do we deal with the objectives of Umbrella discussions? Should we view these as "Umbrella Talks" or perhaps "Stability" talks? In discussing format, we must remember that the US/Soviet announcement gives us some guidance.⁵ The meeting in Geneva is to set the subject and objectives and we should remember that we and the Soviets have agreed to the "new negotiations" in general terms. In the short term, our objective is reduction of offensive nuclear arms. Our long term objective is the elimination of nuclear weapons. (S/S)

The *President* interjected: Yes, that's right. (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane continued, noting that we would discuss the significance of SDI after our discussion of format. Turning to Option 1 (separate START and INF and Space discussions only), *Mr. McFarlane* noted the advantages and disadvantages. As advantages, *Mr. McFarlane* noted that

Option 1 would not reward the Soviets for their walkout, could build upon established delegations, would be easier, would be better for Allied consultations, and would give us an opportunity to exchange views without committing to negotiations on Space. As a disadvantage, Mr. McFarlane noted that it would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union and would draw charges of bad faith, perhaps even a walkout because the Soviet Union is under the impression that we had agreed to new negotiations which include Space negotiations. (S/S)

The *President* interjected that we should take the Options one at a time and noted that he didn't think that Option 1 would be acceptable to the Soviet Union. The *President* asked Secretary Shultz his view. (S/S)

Secretary Shultz responded that the Soviet Union would be upset if there were no space negotiations at all. Indeed, they believe that that is what we had agreed to. (S/S)

Secretary Weinberger noted that we can deal with Space but we must look out for preconditions, especially moratoria. (S/S)

Secretary Shultz said that we need to consider the possibility that the Soviet Union might walk out of these talks and we must consider our response. He added that he would hate to go to the meeting having to reach an agreement—we should avoid a walkout but be prepared to try again if we don't reach an agreement. (S/S)

The *President* noted that Chernenko and Gromyko had quoted his words supporting the goal of the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. *Mr. McFarlane* noted they have agreed to negotiation on "nuclear and space arms." First of all, they have agreed to negotiations and we must

hold them to that. Second, this includes negotiations on space arms. (S/S)

The *President* asked if, on space arms, we couldn't discuss only offensive and not defensive arms. *Secretary Weinberger* responded that it is important to talk about the relationship of offensive and defensive arms but that ASAT could be defined so broadly that SDI would be impossible. The *President* asked again whether we could oppose the offensive systems that attack satellites while protecting defensive systems. *Secretary Weinberger* responded that we should discuss all of these issues but we must recognize that the Soviet Union will call for a moratorium on ASAT in order to undercut SDI and our efforts to get reductions in offensive systems. He reminded everyone that the Soviet Union has an ASAT system whereas the United States does not. (S/S)

Director Adelman raised three problems with an ASAT moratorium: first, any SDI deployment would be an ASAT, therefore, SDI research could be hurt; second, the Soviet Union has an ASAT already tested; and third, ASAT arms control involves extremely difficult verification and defense issues, all of which means that the Soviet Union will retain an ASAT capability. He concluded that there are not many areas in space arms control in which we want to negotiate. The real incentive for Space talks comes from publics, Allies, and in providing trade-off incentives to the Soviets. (S/S)

The *President* noted that we don't need SDI if the Soviet Union agrees to zero except for security because of verification uncertainties. The *President* then suggested that we move on to the other options. (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane recommended that the discussion move directly to Option 4 which deals with the question of START and INF merger and provides a negotiating forum for space. He noted that a START and INF merger has been finessed in our discussions of Umbrella Talks. The disadvantages of a merger are that it makes negotiations more complex, could result in undue influence by the Allies in negotiations less central to their interests, and might permit the Soviets to divide us from our Allies through proposals to trade off START and INF issues. (S/S)

The *President* stated that the Soviet Union cannot justify not counting the SS-20. (S/S)

Secretary Weinberger responded that with a merger, the Soviet Union would focus more on the British and French systems. He noted that the SS-20 is mobile and with the removal of just one of its warheads, could strike the U.S. *Secretary Weinberger* sought to turn the discussion to Option 5, a combined negotiation, noting that it was complex and might bring great pressure on defensive systems. (S/S)

The *President* returned to discussion of INF, noting that the Soviets have warheads in Eastern Europe and that the Allies requested our deployments. (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane noted that under the Soviet definition of strategic systems, they consider our systems in Europe strategic, but do not consider their systems, which cannot hit the U.S., strategic. The *President* responded by pointing out that the P-II is really for our Allies. *Director Adelman* noted that the SS-20s were not, in fact, in Eastern Europe but could reach all of Europe, that SS-12s, 22s, and 23s (*sic*) have been moved into Eastern Europe. (S/S)

Secretary Shultz added that the SS-20 was a terrific weapon, that we need to deal with these issues and that we need to manage our Allies. The *President* told *Secretary Shultz* that he should be on guard for what the Soviets want and what we want. *Secretary Shultz* responded that substance and procedure are interrelated. He noted that the Soviet Union has many advantages in offensive systems and that those advantages are unlikely to diminish. Soviet forces are destabilizing and threatening and we need to get some limitations on that threat. (S/S)

The *President* interjected that, therefore, we cannot exclude SS-20s. The *President* asked whether or not there was a consensus on Option 4, perhaps going in with Option 2. *Secretary Shultz* responded that Options 2, 4 and 5 are similar and that they involve Space negotiations and would inevitably involve separate working groups. *Secretary Shultz* noted that Option 2 and Option 5 would be quite similar as long as there is someone over all to deal with all the questions and make tradeoffs. (S/S)

Ambassador Rowny agreed that there was much to be said for opening with Option 2 and then having Option 4 as our fallback position. *Secretary Weinberger* said that Options 5 and 6 would be difficult to manage, stressing that we need to find out what the Soviet Union wants. He believes that formal negotiations are acceptable but we need tight rules. *Ambassador Rowny* noted that Gromyko would bring his START representative, Ambassador Karpov and Deputy Obukhov, but not anyone from INF. *Secretary Weinberger* said the question is do we want to deal with procedure only or do we have to deal with substance. (S/S)

Admiral Watkins stated that the Chiefs were united in the view that we should keep space negotiations separate because Option 5 would give the Soviets too much of a

handle on SDI. The Chiefs could support a merger such as Option 4 but would prefer to keep START and INF separate. We should consider a procedure merger before a merger on substance. (S/S)

Director Casey stressed that we must protect our intelligence assets and the Soviet ASAT talks present a specific danger for sensitive sources and methods. He noted that during the talks in Helsinki in 1979 and 1980 (*sic*),⁶ special rules were established including no use of non-secure phones and no post-plenary sessions. He noted that Ambassador Buchheim had carefully protected U.S. intelligence interests.⁷ He added that SDI should be dealt with in the offensive negotiations. (S/S)

Director Adelman agreed with this point and with the suggestion that we go in with Option 2 because of the concern over complexities and Allied consultations, but Option 4 is acceptable. He believes that Umbrella Talks should continue at the Foreign Ministers level. He stressed that the Soviets had mentioned "medium range" systems in their proposal and this means that we can hold them to this. (S/S)

Secretary Shultz agreed that we need Umbrella Talks to discuss what Heads of State had agreed, namely, that there is an organic relationship between offense and defense and other issues. (S/S)

Secretary Weinberger interjected that discussion of these organic relationships was mainly something we needed to do internally. (S/S)

The *President* interjected that we need talks which can eliminate suspicions, noting that he is willing to admit that the USSR is suspicious of us. (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane noted that our presentation for the January 7 meeting must include a discussion of offense and defense and how to achieve a more stable world in the future. Both sides must reconsider the postwar history of strategic defense. We must explain the role of defense, both to the publics and to the Soviets. We must discuss why we agreed in the past to mutual vulnerability; namely because we had no other option and because we lacked confidence in defense. That is why the ABM Treaty constrained defense. Our view then was that vulnerability was not only desirable but that basic assumption would reduce pressures to insure offensive arms. In SALT I, we expected a limitation on offensive arms that would leave both sides vulnerable to counter city attacks but not vulnerable to first strike counter-military attacks. Instead the Soviet Union has invested heavily in achieving a first strike capability and has worked on improving defenses as well. Not only were our assumptions wrong, but circumstances have changed and now technologies are available to increase the possibilities of defense. We must review the foundations of our thinking, indeed, we may be where the Russians were 15 years ago, looking at defense. (S/S)

Director Adelman noted that the Soviet Union is not abiding by the ABM Treaty. Adelman again suggested that we go in with Option 2 and fall back to Option 4 with Secretary Shultz continuing general discussion at the Foreign Ministers' level. *Secretary Weinberger* agreed. (S/S)

The *President* noted that life in the U.S. was too good for anyone to consider starting a war and joked that he hoped life doesn't get so boring in Russia that they would consider starting a war. (S/S)

Secretary Weinberger stressed that we must focus on reducing offensive systems and reminded everyone that the ABM Treaty was supposed to make it unnecessary for the massive Soviet buildup in offensive systems. (S/S)

The *President* agreed that there should have been reductions in weapons in conjunction with the ABM Treaty. *Secretary Weinberger* added that now there had been a breakthrough in defense technology and that we have moved away above the old systems of defense that were 50% effective and ground based. The *President* interjected that we are now talking about non-nuclear systems. *Secretary Weinberger* said that we are talking about non-nuclear systems that are very popular because people can understand about destroying weapons and not people. (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane noted that even if we had never heard of SDI, we would have had a problem—the American people don't like land-based missiles and this presents a military problem. We need another solution other than simply building up land-based missiles. (S/S)

The *President* turned to Secretary Shultz and said that he wanted to make sure that Shultz had the Brezhnev quotation from Prague in which he said that because of detente, by 1985 the Soviet Union would have their way in the world. They were wrong. *Secretary Shultz* agreed. (S/S)

The *President* noted that the situation today is like a duel between two gunfighters. Our policy of MAD could get us both killed. It is just too dangerous. The *President* added, however, that that is the situation today and asked whether or not deterrence would be strengthened if we told the Soviet Union that we would not wait out an attack. *Director Casey* suggested that that was what the Soviet Union would say. *Director Adelman* noted that all warning

systems would have to be fool-proof. *Mr. Meese* said that is if you are talking about launch on warning (LOW), but what we are talking about is launch under verified attack (LUVA) which is quite a different thing. (S/S)

Secretary Weinberger said that the Soviets know that this might be an appropriate response. *Director Adelman* quoted Paul Nitze in saying that this was a policy of weakness, a policy that we would adopt only if we were driven to it. *Mr. McFarlane* raised the question of whether attack assessment capabilities were sufficient for a LUVA policy and concluded that we would meet on Monday on the specifics of the negotiations. (S/S)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Chronological File, Chron File 12/15/1984 (2). Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Lehman. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² See [Documents 323](#) and [326](#).

³ December 17.

⁴ The paper was not found attached to any of the preparatory materials for the December 10 NSPG meeting. However, in a December 9 memorandum to McFarlane, Linhard, Kraemer, and Lehman wrote: "We have received the revised version of the SACG 'format issues' paper for Monday's NSPG. General Chain has circulated it through SACG members to the NSPG principals for their reading prior to the meeting." Attached to this memorandum were talking points for McFarlane's use during the meeting, which note: "the paper examines six alternative formats: — Separate START and INF negotiations and discussions only on Space issues; — Separate negotiations on START, INF and Space; — Merged START and INF negotiations and discussions only on Space issues; — Merged START and INF

negotiations and separate formal negotiations on Space; — Merger of all three subjects (START, INF and Space) into one formal negotiation; and —Continuation of Umbrella Talks—overarching discussions from which individual negotiations could be spun off later when appropriate.” (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 12/09/1984-12/11/1984))

⁵ See [footnote 6, Document 314](#).

⁶ As several different U.S.-Soviet negotiations were ongoing at that time in Helsinki, Casey’s reference is unclear.

⁷ Robert W. Buchheim served as U.S. Commissioner on the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission from 1977 to 1981.

332. Memorandum for the Record by Ronald Lehman of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, December 13, 1984

SUBJECT

Shultz, Nitze, McFarlane, Lehman Conversation

Following the December 10 NSPG,² Paul Nitze indicated that Secretary Shultz wanted me to join in on a meeting with Bud. Shultz began describing a concept for dealing with Geneva. The basis of his concept which he called the "Christmas Tree" was to begin with general discussions which would lead to the formation of branches. Shultz indicated that Nitze had prepared a short paper on the basic presentation and asked Bud to take a look at it. Nitze noted that it was the same paper that he had given me earlier. I responded that it was similar in focus to ideas which Bud and I had discussed. Nitze said that this was because it had been my idea and that he had simply fleshed out what I had told him. I responded that it was close to our thinking but that there were some problems with the approach.

Shultz added that we need a program for dealing with the Allies and Congress and we need a Public Diplomacy strategy. We need to know in advance what we will say in Geneva to the press. Shultz had wanted to take Nitze to Europe with him for consultations but it was more important for him to stay here with Jack Chain to complete the work that must be done. Shultz indicated that Nitze had been talking with various officials around town and he hoped that by working with Cap and the Chiefs, we could get a consensus. Bud responded that would be very constructive and that the whole purpose of the SACG was

to make certain that everyone was heard and that we could draw from best ideas. Bud noted that we were working on clear decisions on objectives for Geneva and instructions which set boundaries on what should and should not be done. Such instructions should be to the President by January 1. We will have to deal both with format and with substance to include tradeoffs and incentives. We need to know how and when to deal with Shultz' proposals.

Shultz indicated that the magnitude of Soviet buildup provides us with major incentives to reduce and with respect to START and INF, mutual threats provided them an incentive to come back to the talks, however, we have more incentives to come back than they do. The Soviets have studied defense longer than we have. Shultz could imagine a very good defense compatible with little offense but we have to reduce the offense otherwise we could never do defense. The President was correct in pointing out the value of new technology but if we are not careful, SDI will only encourage the Soviets to build up in ways that we cannot match. SDI also doesn't address defense of their air-breathing systems. I responded that possible high leverage defenses could permit the defense to negate even very large forces. Shultz said that could be true but that in Geneva, we need to find a way to present SDI that doesn't exacerbate the problem. He indicated that he thought Paul's paper could do that by focusing on immediate and long term goals that would protect R&D but not deployments. I responded that we must be very careful with such phasing because it could result in undercutting the SDI program. I thought we could work these problems if we were careful but we must not lose sight of our objectives. Bud commented that I should work with Paul to improve the paper. Attached is a copy of Paul's draft with my immediate comments.³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 12/13/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. The memorandum for the record is unsigned. In a covering memorandum to McFarlane, Lehman wrote: “Attached for your information is a Memorandum for the Record of our conversation with Paul Nitze with a copy of his paper that I have annotated.”

² See [Document 331](#).

³ The attached paper is a draft; the final version is printed as [Document 343](#).

333. Memorandum From Ronald Lehman of the National Security Council to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, December 13, 1984

SUBJECT

Conversations with Paul Nitze

During a discussion of Geneva formats,² Paul Nitze indicated to me that he could serve for only three or four days every few months and for that reason, would not be able to head a permanent combined negotiation. He admitted that Shultz favored Option 5,³ a combined negotiation, but pointed out that Shultz had not objected during the last NSPG when the President noted that there seemed to be something of a consensus to go in with Option 2 (3 different talks) and fall back to 4 (merge Start and INF and have a different space negotiation). Nitze said that Shultz's reluctance may have been related to the difficulty of finding someone to head the combined talks. Nitze made clear that, because of his wife's health, he would not be available. He believes that he has made that very clear to Secretary Shultz and to you.

Nitze had met with Ken Dam to review a list of possible candidates for formal space talks.⁴ Paul flashed the list in front of me pointing out that no one was satisfied completely with anyone on the list. Some of the names had checks by them, but it was not clear what that meant. He noted specifically that Ed Rowny is supported by the President, but was not on the list. Paul noted that Bill Hyland was on the list, but considered very far down (no

check), and that Larry Eagleburger was on the list but “uncertain” (no check). Bob Buchheim had been ruled out for health reasons.

Beyond that, the names I can remember are John Tower (check?); Warren Zimmermann, former DCM in Moscow (check); Roger Kirk, FSO (check); Mike Glitman, MBFR (check); John Woodworth, OSD representative to INF (check); Brent Scowcroft (check); General Lew Allen, Ken Adelman (check); Jim Goodby, CDE (?); Dave Emery (check); Hal Sonnenfeldt (check), Johnny Foster, TRW (?); Bob Plunkett, Hughes Aircraft; General William Y. Smith (?); and about five others. Paul noted that my name was on the list, and I saw that there was a check by it.

I pointed out to Paul that option 5, more than with options 1 through 4, requires a very distinguished negotiator, someone of his stature. Again, he responded adamantly that his wife’s health would not permit it. This may explain in part why he has not been pressing for early establishment of formal negotiations. His own participation is enhanced, absent his ability to chair formal negotiations, by continuation of the talks at the ministerial level because this is likely to be periodic rather than continuous.

Prior to my private discussion with Paul, Bob Linhard and I joined Paul and Jack Chain in a discussion of Paul’s Offense/Defense paper. We offered a few changes having to do with leak-proofing it on the issue of the circumstances under which we might “strike the first blow,” and offered to send further changes over in writing (Tab A).⁵

We then had a discussion of some basic substantive questions which Paul and his group had not answered. We pointed out to Paul that the Soviets are not opposed to defense, or even ABMs, per se. Rather they are focusing on

space which gives them a handle on our ASAT and key SDI elements such as boost-phase kill and exoatmospheric intercept, while not interfering with their predominately ground-based BMD. I pointed out to Paul that it is the Soviet Union, not the United States, which is now in the best position to break out of the ABM Treaty. Citing the Beecher interview,⁶ I noted while it is imperative that we link offense to defense, there is a possibility that the Soviets might be willing to agree to expanded ground-based BMD, as long as space-based BMD research were further restricted. Clearly, it is the space-based technologies which give us the most military and negotiating leverage and it is in space that we can most easily compete with the Soviet Union.

((Note: Paul has himself indicated that he falls into that school which is most comfortable with ground-based systems and once said to me that he thought we might look at temporary limitations on space systems in order to reach agreement with the Soviet Union. It was for that reason that Bob and I thought it wise to stress the importance of protecting space options in order to protect the President's vision and US leverage.))

I explained to Paul that while it is likely that the Soviet Union would attack SDI as a threat to the ABM Treaty, it was not at all implausible that the Soviets might offer, at some point in our negotiations, a compromise designed to exploit differences within the US. I gave a hypothetical example. While it is wise for us to address the offense/defense relationship by talking near-term versus far-term, with the near-term focus on compliance and limiting offensive arms and the long-term focusing on transition to defense, the Soviets could give us a package which does that in a way harmful to SDI. Suppose for example the Soviets said that for the near-term both sides

will agree to tighten up the ABM Treaty to include much tighter restrictions on space R&D contained in a protocol that would expire in 1990, and a commitment not to deploy nation-wide or space systems contained in a protocol which would expire in the year 2000. Furthermore, suppose that they agree that we should re-establish in the near-term the relationship between offense and defense, as called for in the ABM Treaty, but require that we do it not by any significant reductions in existing offensive forces, but rather by increasing ground-based defenses of limited areas such as capitals and ICBM fields. Their approach to the Krasnoyarsk radar compliance question would then be to make it legal as part of an expanded ABM deployment made legal by amendment to the treaty. Such a proposal would look very attractive to those in the US who want to get us started with interim defenses, especially the ICBMs. However, it could work against the US in a number of ways. First, it is the Soviet Union, not the United States which is in the best position for near-term, ground-based ABM deployments. Second, effective use of BMD for ICBM survivability requires an MX and could be helped by improved basing modes not yet available. Third, keeping offensive forces at high levels is easier for the USSR than for the US and reduces the usefulness of ground-based BMD to us. Fourth, such a package would simply result in diverting funds and political support away from the high technology approaches to defense in which we excel, and push us toward the need for more traditional BMD deployments which are both expensive and politically controversial.

Bob Linhard was very successful in reminding Paul of the different legal and social problems we face with respect to land-based deployments of anything. He noted that political guerilla warfare and socio-environmental challenges stand in the way of any extensive deployment of small mobile

missiles or ground-based BMD. This does not mean that we cannot do such things, but it does mean that it is important to us to avoid placing ourselves at a competitive disadvantage during the transition to defense.

I pass all of this on to you simply because I know you have given a great deal of thought to these issues and may be faced with near-term decisions that have enormous impact on the future. We remain available to talk to you about these and other issues.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 12/13/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. McFarlane wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “Good work Ron.”

² See [Document 332](#).

³ See [footnote 4, Document 331](#).

⁴ In a personal note on December 12, Dam wrote: “I had an interesting luncheon today with Paul Nitze and Jim Timbie to go over ideas about negotiators for the upcoming arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union and to discuss Nitze’s general philosophy with respect to arms control negotiations. Nitze’s main substantive point was that he was opposed to interim agreements, or indeed even a permanent agreement, that did not go all the way that we wanted to go in achieving reductions. His view is that the United States made a very serious mistake in entering into the offensive weapons interim agreement in 1972 and we should not make that mistake again. In fact, he went so far as to argue that SALT II was defective in large measure because the 1972 agreement left us in a position of inequality.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files: Lot

85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1984–June 1985)

⁵ See [Document 343](#).

⁶ William Beecher, “Soviet Softening on Arms is Seen,” *Boston Globe*, October 25, 1984.

334. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, December 17, 1984, 11 a.m.-noon

SUBJECT

Discussion of Substantive Issues for Geneva (S)

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE:

Admiral Daniel J. Murphy

STATE:

Secretary George P. Shultz

OSD:

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

CIA:

Director William J. Casey

JCS:

General John W. Vessey, Jr.

ACDA:

Director Kenneth Adelman

CHAIRMAN, US INF DELEGATION:

Ambassador Paul H. Nitze

CHAIRMAN, US START DELEGATION:

Ambassador Edward Rowny

OMB:

Alton Keel

WHITE HOUSE:

Mr. Edwin Meese, III

Mr. James Baker

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane

NSC:

Dr. Ronald F. Lehman II

Minutes

Mr. McFarlane opened the meeting, noting that it was one of four or five meetings in preparation for the Geneva talks in January.² Previous meetings had dealt with US objectives and Soviet objectives and the format of the talks. The last meeting dealt with questions of whether to keep START, INF and Space issues separate, or whether to merge all or some of them. Today we would be dealing with a discussion of the substantive content of the Geneva talks, to include START, INF, Space, and the relationship between offense and defense. Our immediate objective is to set into motion formal negotiations and discuss the relationship between offense and space generally. The Soviet Union will try to prevent US SDI research and will urge various moratoria. They will seek to get commitments from us in advance not to develop SDI. The question before us, therefore, is how to sustain SDI, especially with publics, in the face of sustained pressure from both the Soviet Union and the Congress. Thus, the Soviet Union is returning to the talks because they have seen the success we have had in getting through the President's modernization program, including MX, TRIDENT, and SDI. They also have come back to the table to block the Belgian and Dutch INF deployments. They expect to block those deployments by being at the negotiating table. They believe that there is an impulse on the Left, perhaps in the Congress, to stop programs and have a moratorium, as long as the superpowers are talking. They fear that the deployments will upset the talks. (S)

Mr. McFarlane then turned to the specific recommendations, recalling that in START we have sought deep reductions to the level of 5,000 ballistic missile warheads and to stress movement away from destabilizing systems, particularly emphasizing the importance of slow-flying systems such as bombers, as opposed to fast-flying

ballistic missiles. He noted that in the past year we have done an enormous amount of work and that in Geneva we may wish to be in a position to discuss the trade-offs between areas of US and areas of Soviet advantage, i.e., between fast-flying and slow-flying systems. He noted that Ambassador Rowny has done much work in this regard. For Geneva, Secretary Shultz will need instructions which permit him to discuss our ideas on trade-offs. (S)

Mr. McFarlane then turned to a discussion of INF. Again, he raised the question of the Belgian and Dutch deployments and the important role that Ambassador Nitze has played. Mr. McFarlane noted that we have a solid position and that we are prepared to agree to any number between zero and 572. He noted that our current proposal has demonstrated our flexibility in our readiness not to deploy our complete entitlement under an equal global ceiling in Europe. In agreeing to reduce both P-II and GLCM, and in our willingness to discuss aircraft limitations, these all addressed Soviet concerns. (S)

Mr. McFarlane made clear that the most difficult issue would be space. There is a close relationship between ASAT and SDI research; unfortunately, we have had the statements by Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Mitterrand in France accusing us of over-arming and of needing to avoid the space arms race.³ He noted that both France and Great Britain have independent nuclear deterrence based on SLBMs and they are afraid that SDI will be viewed as negating their independent forces. There is a genuine ignorance of what SDI is all about. He reminded everyone of the importance of stressing our interest in a non-nuclear system. We need to make the case for SDI not only to our Allies but to the American people and to the Russians themselves. He noted that we have been living under a concept of deterrence based on the threat of massive

offensive retaliation. For twelve years, really longer than that, this concept of deterrence has continued, but has been influenced by certain assumptions which are no longer true. First is the assumption that we can't build effective defenses. The second was the notion that if we agreed to limit defensive systems, we would be able to get limitations on offensive systems. The third was an assumption that the Soviet Union would limit their defensive systems as well. Fourth, there was a commitment that neither side would seek unilateral advantage over the other. However, that commitment has been violated by the Soviet Union in a quest for both offensive and defensive superiority. In defense they have continued to modernize their ABM system and air defense system; indeed, two of their air defenses, the SA-10 and the SA-12, may be dual-capable. They have also built an ASAT system. Therefore, it is imperative that we make the case that Soviets have violated these basic premises and therefore they must reduce offensive systems or else we will have no choice but to deploy defenses. In addition, however, we must persuade the Soviet Union that it is good to deploy defense, to move away from our total reliance on offensive systems. We must recognize that the Soviet Union will not take easily to this view, so we must show them that we are headed in the right direction. He indicated that we all agree on the necessity of putting down a marker on SDI. He concluded that in the next week or two we would be making decisions on the substantive issues. (S)

The President interjected at this point. He wanted to put something forward without pride of authorship concerning what had been said by Mitterrand on outer space. The President had been reading what Gorbachev and Thatcher had been saying. The President stated his belief that the US and USSR should join in discussions of ASAT and weapons in space that can be directed at earth, such as

nuclear weapons. His goal is the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and he believes that we are not saying anything that they have not also said recently. He noted that SDI is the main target of the Soviet Union in Geneva. He stated his belief that they are coming to the table to get at SDI, and that we need to stay with our SDI research program no matter what. He stated his belief that international control for world protection might be possible at some point with SDI, and that SDI would help alleviate the dangers associated with the impossible job of verification. He noted, for example, that someone like Qadhafi could develop nuclear weapons and perhaps smuggle them into the United States. Therefore, he said, we would need a wide range of measures to handle the threat of a covert nuclear weapon, to ensure that outlaws or other nations cannot gain advantage. He noted that people now understand how to build nuclear weapons and that you cannot make mankind unlearn what it already knows. He referenced the test flight recently of an SS-X-24 with ten warheads. He again emphasized that there is no price on SDI and we must be frank with the Soviet Union on the need to go down the path towards defense, to eliminate nuclear weapons, but clearly we are not going to give up SDI. (S)

Secretary Shultz agreed that defense is important and added that it is important even if you don't have the elimination of nuclear weapons. He even cited an example where nuclear weapons are eliminated but conventional systems exist. He noted that we must also deal with cruise missiles and bomber defenses and expand our program beyond the current SDI effort. He reminded everyone that he had just spent 2½ hours with British Foreign Minister Geoffrey Howe and that Howe had the same views as Mrs. Thatcher.⁴ Nevertheless, he indicated that his meeting with NATO Foreign Ministers had gone extremely well and that

he had used the formula that Paul Nitze had developed.⁵ He was confident that we would have no difficulty in persuading people of the value of SDI if we put the right twist on it, as he had done at NATO, where he said that nobody gave him a counter-argument. The Secretary welcomed Bud's emphasis on public diplomacy and noted that we have agreed on a forum which includes ASAT and weapons in space. He noted that there *is* an overlap between ASAT and SDI, and this means we must be careful. He noted also that Geneva is going to be a public diplomacy event, whether we like it or not. Some one thousand reporters are expected to be there along with the anchor people from the three networks. The State Department reporters are very unhappy because they will not now be the primary reporters for their news services. Shultz's view is that there actually will not be much of a story for them in Geneva because we will hope to keep some element of confidentiality. He noted that we must be prepared that the meeting may break up, and we must be ready, right there immediately, to deal with this situation. We need to sound an appealing note to protect ourselves from a possible Soviet walkout. Therefore, we need to lay out our position quite clearly. It must have content, and we must go beyond a "bull session." He recognized that there is a lot of content in the area of offensive systems negotiations, but also that there is content in the space area. He agreed that it is important to bring up the issue of how we will be evolving towards defenses. We must go out and make clear our position. (S)

The President interjected that we must stress that in a context of the Soviets' having already said that they want to give up nuclear weapons, if they walk-out of Geneva because of SDI, we can emphasize that they are not serious. We must be prepared to make clear to the American people that this is a system which does not kill

people; that it would free the world from the threat of nuclear weapons. Again, he stressed the importance of SDI to deal with the problem of verification and again noted that SDI could be put in international hands to protect the whole world. He stated his belief that the Soviet Union will have difficulty walking out when we have made a sound case. (S)

Secretary Shultz suggested that we should not assume failure; that would only lead to failure. Instead, we need to look at our position so that we are not afraid of failure. (S)

Director Casey noted that we must be ready nevertheless for the prospect that they will put us on the defensive and even walk out. (S)

Secretary Shultz responded that we have the basis for avoiding that possibility if we make the right decisions. (S)

Mr. McFarlane noted that there is in existence a public diplomacy plan being prepared by the NSC staff and that the central element is the so-called SDI bible.⁶ This book would be available within a couple of weeks and would be made public before the negotiations in Geneva. He added that public speaking engagements will help us in our effort to promote SDI and that the President should give a speech on SDI sometime after the Geneva talks and address it in the State of the Union message as well. Mr. McFarlane said that it was important that everyone get out on the stump to speak for SDI. (S)

Mr. Meese indicated that we must distance the space issue from the SDI issue, that they are not the same, and that the President's idea is not simply a space question. (S)

The President added that we are looking to see what these technologies can do. (S)

Mr. Baker indicated that there was confusion about SDI along the lines which had been discussed that morning. (S)

Secretary Weinberger stated that there is confusion about SDI because many people have not examined the issue carefully and because of the Soviet disinformation campaign. He stressed that ours would be a non-nuclear system. He noted that we don't have SDI technology available yet, but we need to work on it. Some people say that it is expensive, but Secretary Weinberger expressed his view that it would not be as expensive as all of the offensive systems that we would need, absent SDI. It might cost one-tenth as much. Many people are not aware of the consequences of not having defenses. He believes that SDI is in the same position with respect to negotiations as was the Pershing-II. The Soviet Union fears it and will do everything they can to encourage delay and to try to stop the program. Instead we have to make the case that SDI will even encourage reductions. (S)

The President indicated that he had been reading about the phenomenon of nuclear winter, and of the volcano Timbora which erupted in 1816, creating a cloud which created winter conditions—snow and ice—around much of the world there was no summer. Nuclear winter ought to encourage reductions. (S)

Director Adelman indicated that nuclear winter should also increase support for SDI. Also, SDI is important to prevent horrible consequences from an accidental war, such as described in the novel *Fail-Safe*.⁷ He agreed that it was important to distinguish SDI from space, and that we could do that by negotiating rules of behavior for anti-satellite

systems and satellites themselves. That gives something to us to negotiate about. Our theme would be that we need to make the world safer through the controlled use of space, that negotiations along these lines were better than doing nothing. He then noted that the Defense Department had generated some interesting statistics noting that since the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union has spent more money on defense than on offense, while the United States spent six times as much on offense as on defense. (S)

Mr. McFarlane interjected that we still don't have an ICBM in the ground. (S)

The President built on that theme, noting that many of those who are for the small ICBM now will turn against it after they have killed MX, when they hear complaints about missile trains and missile trucks moving around the United States. He can imagine what the environmental complaints would be. That is another reason why we must have SDI. (S)

Secretary Weinberger noted that the Soviet Union has the mobile SS-X-24 and SS-X-25, and that the Soviets have come close to stopping the mobile Pershing-IIs and GLCMs, and indeed have not given up trying to stop them. They are continuing to try to stop our MX system, despite the fact that they have three or four similar new missiles. He made clear that the Soviet Union will try to blame us for a breakup in the talks if we don't agree to give up SDI. He also said that we must be careful about ASAT. The Soviet Union has an ASAT system, and they are trying to prevent us from developing one. If we have a moratorium, our scientists will drift away from the project and we will become further and further behind. A moratorium is bad, and in any case, it is not verifiable. With respect to space, he said that we should take the affirmative position, that

we are going ahead with SDI and that we are not going to be stopped. He argued that we should be prepared to talk about permissible changes to the ABM Treaty and concluded by saying that there are worse things than signing a bad agreement, and that it is no victory to sign a bad agreement. (S)

The President interjected that he had been talking with a number of experts who are critical of SDI, and they all seem to think that it is a nuclear weapon. We need to explain to them that it is not a nuclear system we seek. (S)

Secretary Shultz questioned whether SDI was truly a non-nuclear program. (S)

Secretary Weinberger noted that certain types of terminal defense based on older technologies were still nuclear, but that he hoped to move beyond these. (S)

Director Adelman said that terminal defense could be non-nuclear but that the older systems were nuclear. (S)

Ambassador Nitze asked what about EXCALIBUR?⁸ (S)

Secretary Shultz said that he had thought that some of these systems were nuclear. (S)

Secretary Weinberger said that the defenses against ballistic missile systems that were space-based were intended to be non-nuclear. (S)

Director Adelman noted that some of these space-based systems might be powered by nuclear reactors. (S)

Secretary Weinberger indicated that we must stress that these are systems to defend the United States. He is often asked whether we are defending cities or weapons and his

answer is that we are defending the United States by destroying the weapons. (S)

Ambassador Rowny noted that we are not talking about putting nuclear weapons in space, only nuclear reactors. (S)

Mr. McFarlane stated that in fact that was not the case, that approximately \$200 million was in the DOE budget for EXCALIBUR, which involves a nuclear explosion in space. (S)

Secretary Weinberger responded that this was not the kill mechanism. (S)

Mr. Meese said that Secretary Shultz was correct, and that we did not want to prematurely limit the technologies involved. (S)

Secretary Shultz indicated that he had thought that there were nuclear weapons involved.

Secretary Weinberger said that what we were seeking is a non-nuclear system, i.e., non-nuclear kill. (S)

Mr. McFarlane indicated that we can describe the program as heavily focused on non-nuclear systems. (S)

Secretary Weinberger made clear that our theme must be to reduce offensive systems as we evolve towards defensive systems.

The President interjected and turned to Secretary Shultz, noting that we should get the Soviet Union to agree to work towards the elimination of nuclear weapons and then throw this commitment back at them if they stand in the way of strategic defenses. (S)

The President stated his desire to get this process of reductions going. (S)

Ambassador Nitze indicated that we might make progress in INF towards reductions if we would begin with a proposal of equal reductions on each side. (S)

The President responded by noting that the Soviet Union had been continuing to build up their forces. (S)

Secretary Weinberger indicated that what we are in favor of is not equal reductions but reductions to equal levels, and asked Paul Nitze if he meant reductions to equal levels. (S)

Nitze responded that he indeed meant equal reductions. (S)

The President interjected that he thought proportional reductions were acceptable. (S)

The Vice President asked the President if he had not in fact proposed to Gromyko proportionate reductions. (S)

The President said that it seemed to him that if we were willing to live with 572 for us and over 1,000 for the Soviets, then we ought to be able to live without equal numbers on both sides. (S)

Mr. McFarlane commented that we are looking for a definition or approach that makes a compromise look better; e.g., the Pershing-II has one warhead on its launcher; the GLCM has four warheads on its launcher; and the SS-20 has three warheads on its launcher. We are looking for a formula which might describe an equal reduction in launchers that would also result in a equal warhead outcome. (S)

Ambassador Nitze indicated that that was correct. (S)

The President stated his view that we needed to emphasize the idea of elimination of nuclear weapons and in the end, the zero option for INF would be a great step in that direction. (S)

Ambassador Nitze indicated that we may need to make specific proposals to the Soviet Union. It would be useful if we could make general statements, even if we don't present specific proposals. For example, we could say that we would accept in principle equal reductions even if we don't give them the details. (S)

Director Adelman made a similar point, arguing that we will need a response to charges that we are not serious about negotiating on space issues either. (S)

Secretary Shultz said that it is important that we not get into the lingo of simply protecting SDI; we need to word it in the right way, as, for example, Paul Nitze has suggested. He indicated that we need to find a way of defending SDI without appearing inflexible. (S)

The President interjected that whatever we do, we must be resolved among ourselves that SDI is not the price for reductions. (S)

Secretary Shultz noted that the problem of MIDGETMAN and railroad cars had made one thing clear, and that is that arms control is important to the United States. He stressed that we must reach arms control agreements because it is not clear that we can contemplate an unrestrained race with the Soviet Union. We need reductions and we need to trade for them; they won't come for free. (S)

Mr. McFarlane indicated that we would prepare instructions for a decision by the President over the next couple of weeks and that Mr. Casey would prepare a presentation on the problems of verification. (S)

Director Casey said that verification has been built up as an absolute, and we need to prepare public opinion for what it is that we are likely to achieve. (S)

The President concluded with a joke about an American in the Moscow subway who, when shown the beautiful marble work, asked, "Where are the trains?" He was given no answer but only more demonstrations of the beauty of the marble. Finally, after asking, "Where are the trains?" several times, his Soviet counterpart responded, "What about the Negro problem in the South?"

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Chronological File, Chron File 12/22/1984-12/27/1984. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. A set of handwritten notes of the meeting, likely Lehman's, are in the Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 12/14/84-12/20/84. Another set of handwritten notes of this meeting are in the Reagan Library, Fred Ikle Files—Arms Control, 1983-1985. In his diary entry for December 17, Reagan wrote: "We had an N.S.P.G. meeting again on our negotiating posture in the upcoming meeting with Gromyko & the arms talks. I believe the Soviets have agreed to the talks only to head off our research on a strategic defense against nuc. wpons. I stand firm we cannot retreat on that no matter what they offer." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 408)

² For previous NSPG meetings on preparations for the Geneva talks, see [Documents 323](#), [326](#), and [331](#).

³ On December 18, the *New York Times* reported: “British spokesmen were quoted in some news reports this morning as saying that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher shared the views of a high visiting Soviet official, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, that weapons in outer space should be banned. President Francois Mitterrand criticized the American program, calling it overarming, and said France supported talks to prevent the militarization of space.” (“Reagan Confers on Arms Talks,” Special to the *New York Times*, December 18, 1984, p. A1) Thatcher and Gorbachev met at Chequers on December 16. When Thatcher visited Reagan at Camp David on December 22, she reported to him her impressions of Gorbachev and the content of their meeting, as well as her ideas about SDI (see [Document 337](#)). In telegram 47853 from Paris, December 17, the Embassy reported on Mitterrand’s December 16 television interview, in which he stated: “the West’s goal should be to seek stability at the lowest possible level, and this US proposal” meaning SDI, “is moving in the opposite direction.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840806-0125)

⁴ Shultz recalled in his memoir: “On the way to the annual meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Brussels, I stopped on December 11 at Chevening, the British Foreign Office’s country estate in Surrey.” He continued: “We arrived in the evening as fog enveloped the mansion. Geoffrey Howe welcomed me and soon squired me into the library, showing me an autographed first edition of Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations* and a note from Benjamin Franklin describing his stay at Chevening. My staff went to the nearby village for a pint at the local Frog and Bucket while Geoffrey and I reviewed Soviet affairs.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 506)

⁵ The morning of December 12, Shultz traveled from Chevening to Brussels to meet with the NATO Foreign

Ministers, where discussions of his upcoming meeting with Gromyko and U.S.-Soviet relations continued. In his memoir, he wrote: “I found the Europeans relieved that a U.S.-Soviet relationship was in the offing, but they revealed little confidence that we could make progress on any arms control initiative. SDI baffled them. I disagreed politely with my colleagues. I could sense that a new era in East-West relations was possible—not only because of the changes that we were inducing in the Soviet Union, and which their own foundering political and economic system was imposing on them, but because of the realities of the ‘information age.’ I outlined the U.S. approach to the Gromyko meeting, promised full consultation as we proceeded, and welcomed their advice. The communiqué stressed the allies’ ‘determination to continue [INF] deployments’ in the absence of a ‘concrete negotiated result’ and welcomed the Gromyko meeting as part of an effort ‘to bring about an improved East-West relationship.’” (Ibid.; brackets are in the original.)

⁶ The White House released a pamphlet, “The President’s Strategic Defense Initiative,” on January 3, 1985. The full text is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, March 1985, pp. 65–72.

⁷ Reference is to the 1962 novel by Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler.

⁸ Excalibur was a vital component of the SDI research program. The April 1985 issue of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* described it: “the most publicized third-generation program is the H-bomb-boosted X-ray laser, code-named ‘Excalibur.’ Part of Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, Excalibur has been most actively boosted by Edward Teller, who has been campaigning for defensive nuclear weapons for more than two decades. Excalibur—named, appropriately enough, after a mythical sword—is being crafted by Teller’s protégés at Lawrence Livermore.”

(David Morrison, "Energy Department's Weapons
Conglomerate," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, April
1985, pp. 33-34)

335. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, December 21, 1984

SUBJECT

Chernenko's Letter of December 20

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin came in this evening to give me another letter to you from Chairman Chernenko. As you will see from the attached Soviet Embassy translation, its tone is positive and it looks toward the Geneva meeting.

The main substantive point that emerges from the letter is the centrality of space arms control for making headway on arms control generally. Chernenko says that the "emergence and deployment of strike space systems would make it impossible to conduct serious negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms." I noted to Dobrynin that both you and Chernenko now have talked about the desirability of eliminating nuclear weapons. I added that you take this issue seriously and said that if both sides agreed on this as their goal, this would create a new setting for arms control negotiations. Then I asked if Chernenko is serious about taking "radical steps" to eliminate nuclear weapons.

Dobrynin responded by saying "basically yes." He said the goal is clear, but the road will have to be charted by Gromyko and me in Geneva. He continued that this also raises the question of how the three aspects (space, INF, START) are going to be treated, in particular whether the U.S. is willing to negotiate on outer space or will continue to pursue its "cosmos phantasy."

You will also note in the letter that Chernenko says they are prepared to go ahead with talks on regional issues, and also agrees on the importance in moving ahead on bilateral issues in the relationship as well.

Attachment

Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan²

Dear Mr. President:

Moscow, December 20, 1984

First of all I would like to express gratification with regard to the agreement reached between the USSR and USA to enter into negotiation on nuclear and outer space arms.

The meeting between Andrei A. Gromyko and George Shultz set for January 7-8 is to play an important role in putting these negotiations on track as a practical matter.

An opportunity is opening now both for the straightening out of Soviet-American relations and the improving of the international situation as a whole. This opportunity should not be lost.

Recently you have spoken on more than one occasion, also in your letters of November 16 and December 7³ and earlier in your conversation with Andrei A. Gromyko,⁴ in favor of moving along the road leading eventually to the liquidation of nuclear weapons, completely and everywhere. We, of course, welcome that. The Soviet Union, as is known, as far back as the dawn of the nuclear age came out for prohibiting and liquidating such weapons. We also made specific proposals as to how it could be achieved. At that time, given the goodwill on the part of the

US, it would have been, of course, much easier, than it is now, to resolve the task of liquidating nuclear weapons. But even today it is not yet too late to start practical movement toward this noble objective.

To continue the accumulation of nuclear weapons, to multiply their types and kinds, to expand the arms race to new spheres—means moving away from the said objective rather than nearing it. What is required is different—to reduce on a mutual basis the nuclear weapons, to block securely all the channels of the arms race and to forego forever futile attempts to seek unilateral advantages.

The forthcoming new negotiations which will encompass both the issue of the non-militarization of outer space and the questions of the strategic arms and medium range nuclear systems in Europe, can and, we are convinced, must become a major step along this road. There exists between those weapons an organic relationship which requires to have a comprehensive approach to discussing and resolving the relevant issues.

In my letter to you of November 17⁵ I noted the objective fact that the key link in this whole chain is the question of strike space weapons, and to be more precise, the question of neither side having such weapons. To be quite frank: emergence and deployment of strike space systems would make it impossible to conduct serious negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms.

What is involved here is precisely this kind of relationship between these issues. And I must say clearly that the statements coming from the White House, and in the most recent days, too, with respect to the intention to continue the implementation of the earlier announced space plans

regardless of the negotiations, are not encouraging at all. Quite to the contrary.

It depends on the outcome of the Geneva meeting of the Ministers whether from the outset a constructive orientation will be given to the negotiations on nuclear and outer space arms. In other words, whether they will be given correct guidelines in the form of an agreed understanding of the subject and objectives of those negotiations.

Andrei A. Gromyko will be prepared to conduct a substantive discussion with Secretary of State George Shultz of all the questions pertaining to the task set before them. That will require, of course, addressing also the content, in principle, of those questions, while their detailed consideration will, naturally, be the task of the negotiations that will follow.

It is important that such negotiations begin without unjustified delays and without unnecessary intermediate stages, and the main thing is that both sides have constructive positions at the negotiations themselves. This is precisely our approach.

In connection with the thought contained in your letters, Mr. President, regarding the desirability of a more intensive dialogue between our two countries on regional problems, I would like to reaffirm that the Soviet Union is in favor of looking jointly for peaceful ways to a just resolution of the existing international, including regional, problems. Our countries can—we are convinced of that—interact with benefit for themselves and for other peoples, in the interests of removing the dangerous hotbeds of tension and of preventing the emergence of such new hotbeds in various regions of the world. In such context we

are prepared to exchange views at various levels both on the Middle East and other regional problems.

Quite consonant with our intentions is also your statement in favor of revitalizing bilateral Soviet-American relations, including the resumption of the work of the joint commissions on cooperation in various economic scientific and cultural fields, which were set up some time ago. So far only the first steps in this direction have been taken, but if the artificial obstacles which were put on this road are removed, such cooperation would be of practical benefit to both countries, and, which is no less important, would facilitate the improvement of the relations between them in the political field as well.

In conclusion I would like once again to express the confidence that there exist opportunities for a turn for the better in the relations between the USSR and the USA. To translate those opportunities into reality all that is necessary is to have the political will and realistic approach, the willingness to resolve all the issues in the spirit of equality and mutual account of the legitimate interests of the sides. It is all the more so when it comes to the building of confidence, lowering of the level of military confrontation, also in Europe, and, generally, cessation of the arms race and joint steps aimed at strengthening the peace.

Sincerely,

K. Chernenko

1 Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, December 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret;

Sensitive. According to a December 21 covering memorandum from Burt to Shultz, the letter was drafted by Pascoe and cleared by Palmer. A typed note indicates the package was "Delivered to WH Sit Room at 2100 hours per S/S."

² No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy.

³ See [Documents 308](#) and [328](#).

⁴ See [Documents 286](#) and [287](#).

⁵ See [Document 310](#).

336. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko¹

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Washington, December 21, 1984

In response to your letter of November 16,² I want you to know that I, too, believe that an escalation of tension serves no one's interest and that such an escalation, if continued, would inevitably affect relations between our two countries.

Our policy toward Nicaragua is clear. We will not sit by idly while the Sandinista regime, aided by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other states which maintain close relations with your country, provides materials and other support to insurgent and terrorist groups in the region. Neither can we and other countries whose interests are affected fail to be concerned by the massive and destabilizing amount of weaponry which Nicaragua itself has acquired or by the presence of large numbers of foreign military advisors. It is particularly clear that recent arms shipments to Nicaragua have exacerbated an already tense situation. The supply of advanced weaponry or large quantities of weapons gives Nicaragua a substantial offensive potential against its neighbors and constitutes a threat to peace in the area.

A subject of grave concern to us in recent weeks has, of course, been the question of combat aircraft for Nicaragua.³ As we have informed the Soviet Union on several occasions, the acquisition by Nicaragua of jet fighter aircraft would be unacceptable to the United States. I was therefore pleased to see from your letter that

malicious designs involving shipment of Soviet combat aircraft to Nicaragua are not part of Soviet policy, and welcome this clarification as a useful step forward in our relations.

I agree with you that the Nicaraguan people, as all people, must be given the opportunity to live in peace and exercise their inalienable rights. The Sandinista junta, therefore, owes it to its citizens and to the international community to fulfill the commitments which it undertook in its July 12, 1979, statement to the Organization of American States.⁴ It is unrealistic to expect other interested states to have full confidence in Nicaragua's intentions until those commitments are observed.

I wish to reaffirm to you my strong conviction that the Nicaragua problem should be resolved in the context of a negotiated settlement. The Contadora group of nations has defined the problems of the region and has made substantial progress in developing a treaty to meet these concerns. I applaud these efforts and give them my unqualified support. In the period ahead, we should know whether they will succeed. Much will depend on Nicaragua's willingness to moderate its behavior of the past five years. I am sure that you join me in the hope that the Contadora effort will bear fruit. It is clearly in both our interests to see reduction, rather than escalation of tensions in Central America.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, E.3, President/Chernenko Correspondence (2/2).

No classification marking. Shultz sent Reagan a first draft of this letter with a covering memorandum on December 3. The letter went through several rounds of revisions by the State Department and the NSC Staff. In a memorandum forwarding both the revised letter and Shultz's memorandum to Reagan on December 17, McFarlane wrote: "Shultz has sent over a memorandum recommending that you reply to the letter, keeping this subject separate from your correspondence regarding the Geneva meeting and other subjects. I agree with George's recommendation, particularly since I believe that Chernenko's letter gives you an opportunity to reiterate in the most authoritative fashion the unacceptability of supplying jet aircraft to Nicaragua which could be used for combat." Reagan approved the recommendation to sign the letter to Chernenko. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) December 1984)

² See [Document 307](#).

³ See [footnote 6, Document 303](#) and [footnote 7, Document 304](#).

⁴ In the statement, the Sandinista junta declared its intention to seek a peaceful transition toward a democratic Nicaragua. The text of the Junta's message was transmitted in telegram 184216 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, July 16, 1979. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D790321-1203)

337. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Camp David, Maryland, December 22, 1984, 10:40-11:10 a.m. and 11:20 a.m.-1:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (U)

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Price
Assistant Secretary Burt
Peter R. Sommer, NSC
Mrs. Thatcher
Ambassador Wright
Robin Butler, Principal Private Secretary to Mrs. Thatcher
Charles Powell, Private Secretary to Mrs. Thatcher

PRIVATE MEETING: THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. THATCHER, PLUS NOTETAKERS:

After exchanging pleasantries, *Mrs. Thatcher* praised the President's reelection, calling it a fantastic victory. She asked him how it felt to win by such an overwhelming margin. *The President* said it was an honor to win by such a margin and joked that someone had said there is only one thing he could ask for from Santa Claus—it was Minnesota, the only state he had lost. (U)

Mrs. Thatcher emphasized that the President's victory was even more impressive given that he had so significantly changed U.S. policies. Such a wide victory was an endorsement of the President's policies and a clear call for a continuation of these policies. She was pleased the President was keeping his same foreign policy, noting it

made no sense to break-up a good team. *The President* agreed and observed that many serve at considerable personal and financial sacrifice. (U)

Turning to Gorbachev's visit to the UK,² *Mrs. Thatcher* said he was an unusual Russian in that he was much less constrained, more charming, open to discussion and debate, and did not stick to prepared notes. His wife was equally charming.³ The Prime Minister noted that she often says to herself the more charming the adversary, the more dangerous. Over the private lunch at Chequers, she had raised a number of pointed questions. She asked Gorbachev why the Soviet Union denies its people the right to emigrate. She had underlined that the West simply cannot understand or accept the Soviet policy of refusing people the right to leave. She contrasted the Soviet policy with the situation in the West, where many countries have had to stop people from coming in. Gorbachev replied that 89 percent of those who applied for permits to leave receive them. Noting that she had no way to cross-check Gorbachev's statistics, she told the President that Gorbachev's claim clearly conflicted with information she receives from British Jewish groups. She commented that she had further suggested to Gorbachev that it was a sign of weakness to feel the need to keep one's people in. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher contrasted Gorbachev with Gromyko, whom she observed would have sharply replied that emigration was an internal matter and not open for discussion. Gorbachev was not willing to debate the point, but he did allow her to discuss it without cutting her off. He also avoided the usual Soviet reaction of citing lengthy positions of principle. The Prime Minister said she also questioned Gorbachev about the Soviets providing financial assistance to Britain's striking miners. Gorbachev replied "this has nothing to do with us." *Mrs. Thatcher*, however, observed

that in a centrally controlled system like the Soviet Union there is no way funds could pass to British trade unions without government knowledge. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher then expanded on what she called the government's total control of the Soviet economy. She had the impression that Gorbachev, like Andropov, was an advocate of economic reform and was willing to slacken government control over the Soviet economy. Gorbachev was clearly worried, said the Prime Minister, about the Soviet Union's poor economic performance. She had made a point to contrast Soviet control over its economy with the free societies in the West, where a number of governments have recently been elected because of their promise to restrict government interference in domestic economic affairs. Despite Gorbachev's professions about lessening government control, in reply to her question about how does a Russian factory decide how much to produce, he said, "we tell them." (C)

Indicating she wished to reiterate what she had told the Vice President over breakfast, *Mrs. Thatcher* underlined that she told Gorbachev there is no point in trying to divide Britain from the United States. This ploy will never succeed.

Britain is part of the Western Alliance of free nations and the Soviets should drop any illusions about severing Europe or Great Britain from the United States. She also told Gorbachev that she and the President have known each other since long before they assumed their current positions and dividing Europe from America is simply "not on." (C)

Gorbachev had made a special effort, said *the Prime Minister*, to cite Chernenko's name as a source of authority

for his remarks. She then turned to what she had told Gorbachev about the Geneva talks. She emphasized that the Soviet Union and the West had entirely different ways of life and government. You don't like ours, we don't like yours. But it is in our common interest—indeed it is our duty—to avoid a conflict. We in the West, including the United States, accept that there can only be real security through military balance. She had underscored to Gorbachev that the Soviets must rid themselves of the belief that the U.S. is not sincere about disarmament. Gorbachev had replied that even public documents now show that the U.S. had targeted the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons in the 1950's. Mrs. Thatcher said she had replied, "of course the U.S. had targeted the Soviet Union—who was preaching a political credo of world communism—what else did they expect?" And she asked Gorbachev rhetorically if it wasn't true that the Soviets targeted the U.S. during that same period and continued to do so now. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher then contrasted the Soviet Union with the U.S. which had not used its great nuclear monopoly in the immediate post-war years to seek expansion. The U.S. is a former colony and knows what it is to be dominated by others. There is no other example in history of a great power using its military strength so sparingly to advance political goals. She had also emphasized to Gorbachev that the President is an honorable man who sincerely wants to improve relations with the Soviet Union. She was struck that when she mentioned that the President had sent a personal handwritten letter to Brezhnev shortly after assuming office, Gorbachev did not appear familiar with it. She made a point of telling Gorbachev that the President had put his heart and soul into his letter and after months of silence received only a pro forma typed reply. Again, Gorbachev did not react. (C)

The President said he was pleased that, without exchanging a word in advance, Mrs. Thatcher had taken the same line with Gorbachev as he had followed in his September meeting with Gromyko.⁴ He had spoken about the communist desire to dominate the world. In reply, Gromyko suggested that the Soviets had acted with constraint since they could have, but did not send a mass of men into Western Europe after World War II. The President noted that in reply he had referred to Stalin's remarks that there would have been no victory without the U.S. The President also referred Gromyko to quotations from Lenin and Stalin about world domination by communism. This time, Gromyko did not reply but quickly changed the subject. (C)

Turning to the Geneva talks, *the President* said since the Soviets had fared so poorly in recent months in the propaganda battles associated with disarmament talks, he feared that they were looking at Geneva as mainly a propaganda forum. This is one of the reasons they launched such an attack against what has become commonly known as "Star Wars." He emphasized that Star Wars was not his term and was clearly not what he had in mind. He continued that there has never been a weapon for which another weapon against it had not been developed. Therefore, in view of all the advances in technology, he asked for a study of new defensive systems. Its aim would strictly be to strengthen deterrence. So far, initial research has been promising and, as he had stated many times, if it proves successful he would be willing to put this new technology into international hands. The President said we are not violating the ABM treaty and have no intention of doing so. The new Strategic Defense Initiative also had a moral context. We must search for ways to build a more stable peace. Our goal is to reduce, and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. Chernenko now claims that this

is also a Soviet goal. We have told them if they are really serious about reductions, we are ready. Gromyko had told him, said the President, that we cannot continue to sit on two mountains of weapons. The President said he replied, "let us then begin to lower and eventually eliminate these mountains." (C)

Mrs. Thatcher noted that Gorbachev had implied returning to Geneva was not an easy decision for the Soviets. He also indicated the Soviets would come to Geneva with serious proposals. The President replied, "we hope so." She continued that she had emphasized to Gorbachev that Britain supports the U.S. SDI program and told him it was not linked to a first strike strategy. (C)

The President continued that he was simply amazed how closely Mrs. Thatcher's remarks to Gorbachev had accorded with what he told Gromyko. He had made similar points, said the President, on immigration restrictions, underscoring that these restrictions make it especially difficult for the U.S.—with its many political groups with ties to the old country—to improve relations with the Soviets. He had made it clear to Gromyko that he could better deal with the Soviets with the support of the American people. The President then returned to his concern that the Soviets will use the Geneva talks primarily as a propaganda forum. He hoped, however, that the Soviets would treat these talks seriously; as he had told Gromyko the U.S. and the Soviet Union have a joint responsibility to see that war does not happen. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher noted that she had a special interest in learning more details about the U.S. SDI program. Gorbachev had told her "tell your friend President Reagan not to go ahead with space weapons." He suggested if you develop SDI the Russians would either develop their own,

or more probably, develop new offensive systems superior to SDI. General Keegan (former head of USAF Intelligence), whom she had seen several times, had informed her about Soviet advances and she was interested in learning more about SDI. *The President* noted it was time to join the others at Laurel Lodge. (C)

The private meeting ended at 11:10 a.m.

Expanded Session in Laurel Lodge

In opening the expanded session, *the President* said he thought it would be appropriate to quote a remark the Queen had made to him during the course of the campaign. When the Queen was in Canada and he was in Michigan, the Queen had called to say she was sure there will never be a wider divide between the U.S. and Great Britain "than the river that currently divides us." Smiling, *the President and Mrs. Thatcher* both agreed with the Queen's remark. (U)

Noting that it was her first visit to Camp David, *Mrs. Thatcher* said it was marvelous to be here and a privilege as well. She said she and the President had discussed at some length her impressions of Gorbachev. It is clear that basic Soviet policy has not changed, but Gorbachev was both willing and able to openly discuss and debate issues. He did not cry or complain when she discussed the human rights situation within the Soviet Union. She had emphasized to Gorbachev that it would be a futile effort to try to divide Great Britain from the U.S. We have a common heritage and are part of the same Western Alliance system. (C)

The Prime Minister continued that Gorbachev had spent an inordinate amount of time on SDI. He had asked me to tell

the President to stop the militarization of outer space. She had replied that Britain supports the U.S. SDI research effort and it was the Soviets who had been the first to develop an anti-satellite capability. The West was also trying to keep up with Soviet research into laser weapons. She had told Gorbachev that there must be balance in research and the U.S. SDI research program must go ahead. (C)

Saying he wished to extend Mrs. Thatcher a special Christmas welcome to Camp David, *the President* said he was pleased with Mrs. Thatcher's support for the oft misunderstood SDI program.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Thatcher, 1984. The morning private meeting took place in the Aspen Lodge. The expanded meeting and working lunch took place in the Laurel Lodge. Reagan wrote in his diary entries for December 22-23: "Sat. dawned clear & bright which was fine because P.M. Margaret Thatcher was coming in for a visit. I met her in a golf cart & took her to Aspen where she & I had a brief visit in which I got a report on her visit with Gorbachev of Soviet U. In an amazing coincidence I learned she had said virtually the same things to him I had said to Gromyko. In addition, she made it clear there was no way the Soviet U. could split Eng. away from the US. Then we joined the others—Ambassadors, Shultz, McFarlane, Bush, et al at Laurel for a plenary meeting & working lunch. Main topic was our Strategic Defense Research ('Starwars') I believe [we] eased some concerns she had." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 411)

² Gorbachev met with Thatcher at Chequers on December 16. See [footnote 3](#), [Document 334](#) and [Document 341](#).

³ Raisa Gorbacheva.

⁴ See [Documents 286](#) and [287](#).

338. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan¹

Mr. President,

Washington, December 22, 1984

Bud has asked that I provide you with some of my personal observations on the upcoming Shultz-Gromyko talks in Geneva. As I have indicated in a separate and more detailed memo to you,² I am convinced that verification will be a pacing factor in any future strategic arrangement with the USSR and has to be an integral piece of our planning. I want, in this memo, to focus on the instructions that George will be taking with him and on what we can hope for when it comes to prospective arms control negotiations.

We have had no direct reporting on what Gromyko will propose, or be prepared to offer, in response to any US proposals at Geneva. Senior Soviet officials, including Politburo member Gorbachev, have indicated that Moscow views any agreement on strategic nuclear arms as largely dependent on some agreement on space weapons.³ Chernenko said, on 26 November, that the demilitarization of outer space and the reduction of nuclear arms were interconnected questions. Chernenko told visiting British Labor Party officials in early December that Moscow was particularly interested in an ASAT test freeze.⁴ These are really all primarily meant to get at the SDI program. US space technology worries the Soviets. [*3½ lines not declassified*]

Because the Soviet Union is so intent on stopping US SDI efforts, Gromyko is likely to push for an agreement on the

demilitarization of space and a reaffirmation (or expansion) of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Gromyko is also likely to take a tough position on INF issues, even though the Soviets no longer make the removal of US missiles from Europe a precondition for the January talks. Reporting indicates that the USSR wants to take UK and French forces into account and that recent “counterdeployments” by Moscow in Eastern Europe could be designed to set the stage for a mutual moratorium on further US and Soviet deployments.

The principal objective Gromyko will be tasked with in Geneva is to find out whether there are any real prospects for constraining those US programs—and in the first instance, this will be SDI—that the USSR is most concerned about. He will, of course, also be seeking details of our policy positions but not really expecting to be able to delve very deeply into those kinds of niceties.

Renewed negotiations in the year ahead will be conducted while Soviet military planners are making decisions that will determine to a significant degree the capabilities, size, and composition of the USSR’s strategic forces in the 1990s.

—We already see evidence of programs aimed at more survivable weapons systems through increased mobility and more flexible and sophisticated operational planning.

—The Soviets will not let any arms control agreement slow their research and development efforts, nor will they accept an agreement which would prevent a significant level of force modernization.

Soviet military planners must contend with various ongoing or projected military efforts by the US and NATO that

challenge the USSR's ability to continue to meet its strategic force objectives in the 1990s. These challenges include: MX, the small mobile ICBM ("Midgetman"), Trident II missiles, the B-1B, Stealth bombers, Pershing IIs in Europe, and the SDI. These new programs, now underway or planned, pose major challenges to Soviet political and military strategy. From the Soviet perspective, if the planned US strategic and intermediate force programs go forward, there will be an erosion of the gains the Soviets have made during the past ten years, even as they deploy new offensive and defensive systems of their own. The Soviets obviously hope some, or all, of the new US weapon systems will be delayed, or not go forward at all, without the Soviets having to give up much, if anything of real significance, in arms control negotiations.

A salient feature of Soviet arms control policy in the years ahead will be its emphasis on trying to delay or undercut the US SDI program. We do not believe they will offer a major concession to halt the SDI program as long as it remains in the research stage and is strongly susceptible to unilateral US restraint.

Moreover, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] warn Soviet leaders about the prospect of further strain on the technology sector of their economy, and additional competing resource demands stemming from a prospective open-ended high-technology arms competition with the US (especially SDI). Soviet interest in slowing the pace of this competition through arms control negotiations is likely to increase with the slowdown in their economic growth.

The Soviets will replace most of the weapons in their strategic offensive forces with new or modernized weapons by the early-to-middle 1990s. These weapons are now being deployed, are in flight-testing, or are in preflight

development. Major features of the Soviet strategic force of the early 1990s will include:

- Continued reliance on the ICBM force as the backbone for intercontinental strikes and on the SS-20 force for meeting nuclear mission requirements on the periphery.
- Significantly greater survivability, including more warheads on submarines, and deployment of road-mobile and rail-mobile ICBMs.
- Major improvements in manned bombers and deployment of long-range, land-attack cruise missiles.

The Soviets will significantly improve the capabilities of their strategic defensive forces over the next ten years:

- Vigorous pursuit of advanced defensive technologies (directed energy, antisubmarine warfare).
- Increased emphasis on air defense to counter bombers and cruise missiles that fly at low altitudes and those that have very small radar cross sections.
- Continued research and development efforts that give the Soviets the potential for widespread ABM deployments during the next decade.

In particular, Moscow will not agree to steps that would significantly detract from the key elements of Soviet nuclear strategy: counterforce strikes against enemy nuclear forces and limiting damage to the Soviet homeland. Thus, deep reductions in the Soviet ICBM force, especially heavy ICBMs, remain unlikely. A realistic appraisal of our arms control prospects has to conclude that large enough

reductions in Soviet offensive weapons to make the world significantly safer is not likely to occur as a direct result of the arms control efforts in the near-term; rather, we must look at this as a long-term proposition at best.

You are likely to encounter great pressure from the public and from within the US Government to offer up your SDI research program in order to demonstrate US seriousness. You ought not to yield to this pressure; I believe it is vital to pursue SDI research for all the reasons you have previously stated. In my view, it would be a tragic mistake to abandon the SDI research program, or to restrict necessary development or testing, in order to get an arms control accord with the Soviets. There is no way such concessions on SDI can produce reductions in Soviet offensive forces of commensurate value in long-term stability and safety.

But I do think we could reach an agreement, when George meets with Mr. Gromyko two weeks from now, on scope and format matters.

The Soviets have forewarned us that they will be looking for some solid agreements out of Geneva, not just an exchange of views. What this means is that they will press us to sign up to some declaration or communique which prejudices the future negotiations in terms of their own rhetoric; e.g., "offensive force agreements based on equality and equal security," meaning some inclusion of UK and French systems, and "prevention of the militarization of space."

We should resist such one-sided gambits at all costs because we shall, for political reasons, find it far more binding on us than on them as the actual negotiations proceed. In fact, we should bluntly call them on their penchant for vague but prejudicial language which does

not conform with realism; e.g., that “prevention of the militarization of space” by itself is not a realistic goal as the world now stands.

We are not ready to engage in substantive negotiations in January; if agreement can be reached on the scope and objectives of these new negotiations, we are going to have to reconsider the details of our positions for these new talks.

I believe that our principal concern in the format area will be how to ensure that negotiations on offensive and defensive forces remain in tandem. We need to be certain that the Soviets cannot force the pace of negotiations in areas where the US possesses actual or potential strengths, while they manage to draw out the negotiations in those areas where they possess strengths that represent principal US concerns. Therefore, my sense is that what we ought to be seeking is a single set of negotiations for offensive (START and INF) and defensive (air defenses and ballistic missile defenses) systems so that the two can, to the extent possible, be kept in harness. I would prefer that ASAT negotiations be kept separate [4 lines not declassified]. But this may not work and I can foresee ASAT being tied in directly as well. The worst thing of all would be to have a separate forum where SDI, or SDI and ASAT together, is the only subject.

If we agree to space talks with ASAT and SDI, in a forum apart from other offensive or other defensive missiles (as it is implied we may do in the December 18 paper that I just saw entitled “Geneva Roadmap”),⁵ we will have given the Soviets a propaganda and negotiating edge of immense value.

There appears to be a distinct preference in our bureaucracy for three separate tables for intercontinental, INF, and space issues, or perhaps for two tables; e.g., offensive and space, or offensive and defensive. As among these, there is much to be said for the latter. As Paul Nitze argues it will tend to make SDI a less accessible target and bring out in negotiations on defensive weapons the large superiority the Soviets now have in air defense, some of it possibly adaptable to ballistic missile defense, as well as ballistic missile defense itself.⁶

We ought to weigh carefully the merits of delaying the splitting of these negotiations into separate tables until the political and substantive thrust of the whole process becomes clearer, on both sides. The Soviets will have a much easier time of keeping multiple tracks in political tandem than we. They will work hard to exploit the inevitable divergence of interests among the supporting casts behind these separate tables on the US side.

There is a case to be made for keeping one umbrella process going under Nitze, perhaps with periodic meetings at the foreign minister level, and one coherent management process back home until we have decided what specific agreements are really feasible and are able to table drafts or at least very specific proposals on the separate issues. Then separate tables can be set up.

I think that the broad message George should be taking with him to Geneva is one of continuing US willingness to be serious, flexible and ready to negotiate in good faith. That is what the American people hope for, what the Congress expects, and what our European Allies want. The Soviets have no intention of rolling over and playing dead because they have, in essence, been forced to return to the negotiating table. But they are probably on the fence with

respect to whether or not they believe that the US intends to approach these talks with an intent to produce some type of real agreement. It is in our mutual interests to strengthen the perception within the USSR and throughout the world that we are "serious."

Still, there is no guarantee that either the 7-8 January talks, or those that follow, will be productive. To keep the Soviets from getting the rhetorical high ground, we should be prepared to go somewhat beyond a discussion of how we see things. For this purpose we might have at hand in Geneva a general but substantive set of propositions that state what we shall be driving for in the subsequent negotiations, inviting but not insisting that the Soviets sign up to them in Geneva, but using them in any case as a way of dealing with Soviet generalities.

I hope this has been helpful to you. By the middle of this next week, about 26 December, I may send you some additional thoughts on Paul Nitze's concept of the offensive-defensive relationship that we should be striving for, and perhaps other ideas as well.

Respectfully yours,

William J. Casey

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 88B00443R: Box 16, Folder: DCI Memo Chron (1-31 Dec '84). Top Secret; Sensitive. In a covering note to McFarlane, Casey wrote: "The attached is in response to your request, of 20 December, for my views on the upcoming Geneva Talks. There is a copy for you, as well as the original for the President." The words

“GENEVA TALKS” are typed and underlined in the upper right-hand corner of the page.

² Not found.

³ During his trip to England, Gorbachev addressed the House of Commons on December 18, stating: “The Soviet Union has recently advanced an initiative for holding talks with the USA on a package of issues concerning nuclear and space armaments. On the basis of this initiative, an agreement has been reached with the U.S. administration to start entirely new talks which would embrace the question of non-militarization of space and the questions of reducing nuclear arms, both strategic and medium-range. All these questions are to be considered and resolved in their interconnection. Of key importance in all this is prevention of a space arms race.” (Telegram 27684 from London, December 19; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840812-0145) In telegram 16110 from Moscow, December 19, the Embassy provided the following analysis: “Gorbachev has made the clearest public statements to date that nuclear arms control in the upcoming US-USSR negotiations depends on space arms control. This signal of Soviet priorities is consistent with other public and private statements. Gorbachev states the issue categorically, referring to the need ‘to prevent an arms race in space,’ without indicating specific limitations on space weapons which might allow progress in the nuclear area. Behind statements of Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders lies concern over the possibility of a U.S. breakthrough in defenses against ballistic missiles which could be facilitated by tight restrictions on offensive strategic weapons.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840811-0619)

⁴ Casey’s December reference is incorrect. British Labor Party leaders Neil Kinnock and Denis Healey met with

Chernenko and other Soviet leaders on November 26. In telegram 15032 from Moscow, November 27, the Embassy reported that during these discussions, Chernenko stressed the connection between space and offensive nuclear weapons reductions: "Chernenko told Kinnock that the Soviet Union favors good relations with the United States and an end to the arms race. For that reason, it had agreed to 'negotiations on the whole complex of mutually related questions concerning the non-militarization of space and the reduction of strategic nuclear arms and medium-range nuclear weapons.'" (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840756-0667) In telegram 15002 from Moscow, November 27, the Embassy reported: "The Soviets, particularly Chernenko in a written statement which he read, said that they considered the first session to be quote talks about talks unquote. They indicated their principal interest was to head off the competition in space, concentrating on an ASAT test freeze. Healey said that the Soviets also now see the logic in treating all offensive weapons (INF and strategic) together." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840755-0802)

⁵ In a December 19 memorandum, Linhard, Kraemer, and Lehman informed McFarlane that the SACG, under guidance from McFarlane, developed a "Geneva Roadmap Paper," which was distributed for discussion at the December 20 SACG meeting. (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Chronological File, Chron File 12/19/1984) The Geneva Roadmap Paper is attached but not printed.

⁶ See [Document 343](#).

339. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Vessey) to President Reagan¹

JCSM-350-84

Washington, December 22, 1984

SUBJECT
Geneva (S)

(TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe we need a clear, consistent strategy for the upcoming talks in Geneva. Our approach should strive for significant reductions in offensive nuclear forces, particularly in those forces which are the most destabilizing. Our position should protect our own capability to conduct those actions essential for our own defense, including continued modernization of our strategic forces and your Strategic Defense Initiative. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed to you last week,² strategic modernization, arms reductions, and a shift to strategic defense are integrated components of our deterrent nuclear strategy. These essential elements of an effective nuclear deterrent will deny the Soviets the confidence to either attack or coerce the nations of the free world.

(TS) To achieve these goals we must gain and maintain the moral high ground going into Geneva and coming out of Geneva, no matter what the results in Geneva may be. This is especially important since the Soviets use arms negotiations as one component of an integrated diplomatic, military and propaganda strategy. We will, in effect, be negotiating with our allies, our public, and the Congress as well as with the Soviets during the talks. We must maintain Congressional and allied support. We must not allow the

Soviets to create a situation in which either strategic modernization or SDI is delayed through Soviet negotiating tactics and resultant false public perception.

(TS) It is clear that the Soviets fear the renewed interest in national defense which you have set in motion. They will, therefore, seek to curtail or eliminate United States' strategic defense efforts while continuing their own massive program. To defuse this, we should use the negotiations, particularly those concerned with space, to discuss the entire offense-defense relationship. We should reaffirm that SDI has never been intended to place in space nuclear weapons which could be brought down upon the world population. And we should continue the efforts begun this week by Secretary Weinberger to set forth a clear explanation that strategic defense initiatives offer a defensive shield with long-term benefits for ourselves and our allies.³

(TS) Because we consider the preservation of your Strategic Defense Initiative to be essential, we wish to make certain the links between ASAT and SDI are well understood. Substantive limits on ASAT will inevitably affect SDI, since SDI will have the intrinsic capability to destroy satellites. Since SDI, in its current phase, is essentially an R&D program, and since the technologies involved are highly similar, limitations on ASAT could inhibit early development of SDI alternatives. This argues for extreme caution in accepting any specific agreements on ASAT.

(TS) In the short term the free world's continued security depends on completing your strategic modernization program. In the long-term the Strategic Defense Initiative offers the vision of a safer, more stable world. To achieve our goal through these short-term and long-term

objectives, it is essential to act now and seize the public diplomacy high ground. We must explain to the allies and to the American people the wisdom of our present course and the necessity of approaching arms control, strategic modernization and strategic defense as integrated components of our deterrent nuclear strategy.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

**John W. Vessey, Jr. General, USA
Chairman**

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chron, Geneva Prep III—December 1984 “Geneva—NSDD Instructions” (2). Top Secret; Sensitive; King. A copy was sent to Weinberger. In a handwritten covering note to McFarlane, attached to another copy of the memorandum, Vessey wrote: “Bud—The JCS views in response to your 20 Dec memo. I have sent a copy to Cap. Jack.” (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 12/21/1984–12/26/1984)

² According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan met with the JCS in the Cabinet Room on December 18 from 11 a.m. to 12:08 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No record of this meeting was found, but Reagan noted in his personal diary: “A meeting with the Joint Chiefs re our mil. force compared to that of the Soviets. In strategic weapons when the Soviets refer to maintaining stability they mean superiority & they have it. More & more I’m thinking the Soviets are preparing to walk out on the talks if we wont give up research on a strategic defense system. I hope I’m wrong.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 409)

³ During the December 17 NSPG meeting (see [Document 334](#)), McFarlane noted that the NSC Staff was working on a public diplomacy plan for SDI. During a press conference on December 19, Weinberger stated: “I think it’s vital that we continue to pursue the research program on which we’re now embarked to see if we can’t hold out a far better future for mankind.” He continued: “the strategic defense initiative of the kind we’re planning will be equally effective and perhaps can secure earlier success in dealing with intermediate range missiles than strategic range weapons. There’s not the slightest possibility that America would be decoupled from Europe by the pursuit of this vital initiative.” Gwertzman, who reported on the press conference in the *New York Times*, commented: “Mr. Weinberger’s strong defense of what the Administration refers to as the ‘strategic defense initiative’ what others call ‘Star Wars’ weapons came as Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the high-ranking Soviet official, was warning on a trip to London, that Moscow was giving priority in next month’s negotiations with the United States toward negotiating a curb on development of defensive weapons in space.” (Bernard Gwertzman, “Weinberger Calls U.S. Space-Arms Effort ‘Vital,’” Special to the *New York Times*, December 20, 1984, p. A7)

340. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan¹

Washington, December 24, 1984

SUBJECT

The Geneva Talks

I believe Geneva offers some hope that we can secure genuinely useful agreements with the Soviets; but there will also be considerable risks for us at Geneva.

Everything depends upon the ultimate attitude and goals of the Soviet Union, and these will be very hard to discover, at least in the early phases of the negotiations.

The opportunities that we hope for at Geneva would develop if the Soviets have indeed concluded that (a) they cannot achieve a sufficient degree of military superiority to enable them to impose their will on the world; and (b) if they conclude that, at least for now, the best policy for them to pursue is to try to strengthen their economy and the quality of life for their people, and thus to reduce significantly the major increases and strength they have added every year to their military.

However, it will I think, be some time, probably several months or perhaps even a year or more into the negotiations before they would disclose any such intentions, or express any willingness to reduce significantly their offensive systems.

I believe it is more likely that they will continue to test us by any one of a number of means, including demanding either a moratorium or a permanent ban on anti-satellite

weapons, and either a moratorium or a permanent ban on any more work on space-based strategic defensive systems as the price of either their remaining at the talks, or willingness to discuss offensive systems, etc.

The Soviets believe that they can always win in negotiations with “impatient democracies”. They know that our press and the great bulk of the so-called “arms control community”, as well as most of the columnists, commentators, etc., measure success in negotiations by whether or not we get an agreement. These same groups are strongly against our insisting on any position by us that might block “an agreement”, no matter what are the contents of an agreement.

There is a remarkably revealing paragraph in Tom Wicker’s column which appeared in the *New York Times* on Friday, 21 December.² I attach the column, but the critical paragraph comes after Mr. Wicker’s comments that our Administration has “insisted publicly that it has always sought balanced and verifiable arms control agreements”. Mr. Wicker then goes on to say “Within the Administration, however, a powerful faction—possibly Mr. Reagan himself—has been suspicious of arms control on principle; some officials fought hard to establish U.S. negotiation positions that would be either unacceptable to the Russians or, *if accepted would yield advantage to the U.S.*” In short, we stand convicted of this serious offense of supporting agreements that would be of advantage to the U.S., presumably unlike the Soviets who have only the broad world interests at heart.

This impatience of democracies and the natural desire of most negotiators to achieve a “success”, that is “an agreement”, will be played upon by the Soviets. They will, I am sure, try to make us appear both stubborn and “lacking

sincerity” as we maintain our positions that we should not give up the SDI or agree to banning or moratoria on anti-satellite weapons.

That is why I think it is so critically important and beneficial that you, and others in the Administration, have said that the Strategic Defense Initiative will not be given up, that it offers the most, indeed the only, hope of any of the strategic arms proposals; that it is not designed to protect any particular target, but is designed to destroy weapons and not people; and that it is not the militarization of space, but on the contrary, the use of space to keep the earth free of nuclear holocausts.

In other words, we should put them in the position of trying to block the one system that offers hope of a nuclear free future to all mankind.

Incidentally, I think it is most important that we continue to present and discuss the Strategic Defense Initiative in terms of seeking “a thoroughly reliable defense against Soviet missiles whether of intermediate range or of strategic range.”

Any discussion of “setting our goal aside” while we work to develop an interim system to “protect our missiles”, or to “protect our cities” simply gives substantial comfort to those many opponents of Strategic Defense who say it cannot be done at all.

The conventional wisdom insists on knowing whether we are trying to protect our cities or our missile systems, and builds a lot of specious arguments as to what the Soviets would then do to *their* plans, etc. I think we should insist at all times that we are trying to destroy Soviet missiles *before* they get near *any* target, and we are trying to

protect the world by *destroying* Soviet missiles *before* they get near any target. That is our goal. It may be we can deploy that kind of system on a phased basis if our research so develops, but anything short of our goal is indeed only a piece of the ultimate system we want. We should not allow our energies or the momentum, or indeed the great public support which I am convinced SDI now enjoys, to be diluted or diverted into anything less than securing the ultimate goal.

As you know, and as the Joint Chiefs have mentioned to you many times, there is a major link between anti-satellite weapons and the capabilities we may ultimately need to secure a thoroughly effective Strategic Defense Initiative. Therefore, it is vital that we not accept any bans or moratoria on anti-satellite weapons, either as the Soviet price for continuing the discussions or for any other purpose.

Also as you know from various briefings, there are other compelling reasons for not agreeing to what will undoubtedly be as a general rule the Soviet demand for a ban or a moratorium on ASAT or related weapons. I am always most reluctant to give up anything the Soviets make a special point of demanding we give up such as the Pershing, and SDI and ASAT are no exceptions to my general rule.

I firmly believe that only if we are strong, united, and completely determined about the above positions, will we bring home to the Soviets that they cannot block our Strategic Defense Initiative, and that they will then conclude, probably several months later, that it is indeed in their interests to discuss seriously, and ultimately to agree to, major reductions in offensive systems.

On offensive systems, I believe we can and should present, at a very early stage in the negotiations, proposals continuing the pattern of your past proposals on both the intermediate and strategic range weapons that call for sharp reductions down to equality at much lower levels by both sides, and that we argue strongly for effective verification.

I have read Bill Casey's very good paper on verification,³ and we are working to produce studies of the kind called for by Bill, that in effect will tell "how much cheating by the Soviets can we accept." Nevertheless, I think both substantively and as part of our attempt to retain the moral high ground in the court of world opinion, we should continue to seek, publicly and strongly, on-site verification, recognizing it is certainly not a perfect or a fool-proof method of verification, but far better than relying on satellite photography. We could also suggest on-site verification by international teams of observers, or other ways of improving on-site and other verification methods.

The critical point of all of these recommendations is to urge as strongly as possible that we not be an "impatient democracy" playing into the Soviet hands by being unable to hold out long enough for worthwhile agreements.

There were many so-called "victory celebrations" when SALT I and SALT II were agreed upon, but it is very important to bear in mind the lesson that neither those agreements, nor the ABM agreement, nor indeed any other agreement with the Soviets, have slowed the growth of Soviet military power. They continue to deploy far more than we, measured by numbers, varieties, continuing modernization and improvements of short, intermediate, and long range missile systems, and they continue their

major attempts to defend themselves by all available systems, as they have for the past two decades.

I personally want, more than anything else, to secure agreements that are genuinely verifiable, and that make major reductions in offensive systems so that we can secure deterrence at vastly lower levels while we pursue the goal of achieving the thoroughly reliable strategic defense you proposed nearly two years ago that would be effective against intermediate as well as long range missiles.

We must constantly emphasize the nobility, and the morality of that goal, and the hope it offers the world.

Cap

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSDD Package, 12/31/1984–01/01/1985 (3). Top Secret; King.

² Not found attached. Reference is to Tom Wicker, "A World Concern: Focus on Geneva Arms Talks," *New York Times*, December 21, 1984, p. A35.

³ See [footnote 2, Document 338](#).

341. Memorandum From Peter Sommer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, December 24, 1984

SUBJECT

The President's Meeting with Mrs. Thatcher: Gorbachev

During the private, te[^]te-a`-te[^]te session, Charles Powell the British notetaker passed me the attached paper outlining Mrs. Thatcher's impression of Gorbachev and Soviet attitudes toward the Geneva talks (Tab A). Mrs. Thatcher made a number of these points during the private talks, but the British paper is more specific and goes into greater detail than Mrs. Thatcher did with the President.²

Powell enjoined me not to give the British paper wide circulation within the USG. The British paper contains such interesting points as "Gorbachev made much of the difficulties the Soviet Union had faced in deciding to go to Geneva" and "he claimed the Russians would be ready to come to Geneva with serious new proposals."

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the British paper:³

Tab A

Paper Prepared by British Prime Minister Thatcher⁴

Undated

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN: GORBACHEV

I spent about five hours with Gorbachev last Sunday.⁵ He gives the impression of confidence and authority. He is relatively open in manner and intelligent. He is affable and has some charm and humour. He listens carefully to what the other person says. He talks readily and, in contrast to the stultified manner of Soviet leaders, does not just stick to prepared statements. He picks up points made in discussion and responds to them. He was clearly not used to the sort of rigorous questioning which he got from me on things like human rights in the Soviet Union and Soviet payments to our mine-workers' union. But he kept cool and avoided the usual Soviet reaction of reciting lengthy positions of principle. He went to great pains to invoke Chernenko's name frequently in discussion as a source of authority for his remarks. I certainly found him a man one could do business with. I actually rather liked him—there is no doubt that he is completely loyal to the Soviet system but he is prepared to listen and have a genuine dialogue and make up his own mind.

I got the impression that in some ways he was using me as a stalking horse for you. He questioned me very closely on American motives and intentions for the Geneva talks and was clearly interested to obtain a first hand and informed impression of you and your main colleagues and of your policies. At the same time, he was on the look-out for possible divergences of view between us which might be exploited to Soviet advantage. I made it absolutely clear to him that we are loyal members of the Alliance and right behind you.

On the substance of my talks with him—and those which Geoffrey Howe had the following day⁶—the most striking point was the amount of time devoted to the threat of an

arms race in outer space. His line was that if you go ahead with the SDI, the Russians would either have to develop their own or, more probably, develop nuclear weapons that would get past your SDI defences. He made much of the role of the ABM treaty as the key stone to arms control negotiations and said that if events proceeded to the point where the ABM treaty was irrevocably undermined, the prospect of any further agreements thereafter would be minimal.

He was not very precise on the scope of the negotiations which he expected to emerge from the Geneva meeting, but *seemed* to expect them to cover space, strategic nuclear weapons and INF. He made much of the difficulties which the Soviet Union had faced in deciding to go to Geneva.

On the other hand, he showed a keen awareness of the penalties of spending yet more resources on defence and agreed with the concept of achieving balanced security at lower levels of weapons. He claimed that the Russians would be ready to come to Geneva with serious new proposals and referred to Chernenko's remark that the Soviet Union would be ready to agree to the most radical measures. He appeared at one point to be saying that the SDI was simply an attempt by the United States to establish a bargaining position and that if that was the case, the Soviets could play the game and bargain as well as anyone. But the over-riding impression left was that the Russians are genuinely fearful of the immense cost of having to keep up with a further American technological advance and are therefore prepared to negotiate seriously on nuclear weapons if they believe that you are politically committed to reductions.

I left him in no doubt that we did not see SDI in the same light as he does: still less did we see it as linked in any way

to a US first strike strategy. I stressed your profound sincerity in the search for balanced arms control and a reduction in nuclear weapons. I warned him of trying to drive wedges between the Allies: we were at one on this issue.

These were the main points which arose in his talk with me. He also saw Geoffrey Howe the next day and I understand that Geoffrey will be sending George Shultz a message giving his impressions and details of other steps which they discussed in rather more formal surroundings.⁷

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Reference 12/20/84-12/24/84. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Matlock and Lehman.

² See [Document 337](#).

³ McFarlane did not check the Approve or Disapprove options.

⁴ Confidential.

⁵ Gorbachev met with Thatcher at Chequers on December 16. See [footnote 3](#), [Document 334](#).

⁶ Howe and Gorbachev met for formal talks on Monday, December 17.

⁷ Howe's report of his meeting and impression of Gorbachev was sent in telegram Tosec 200005/377159 to Shultz, December 24. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840015-0118)

342. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan¹

Washington, December 27, 1984

SUBJECT

The Geneva Talks (U)

(TS) In my memorandum to you of December 24,² which concerned broad policy themes, I did not address several narrower issues with which I know you will be concerned. One point in my earlier memo, however, is worth repeating: because of the major link between anti-satellite weapons and the capabilities we may ultimately need for a thoroughly effective Strategic Defense, I know of no potential ASAT limits, including moratoria, that would not also significantly and negatively affect our SDI.

(TS) Here are some thoughts on the more immediate issues you face in preparing for Geneva:

(TS) 1. *Soviet Violations*. Our efforts to elicit Soviet compliance with arms control agreements will be seriously set back, unless we reinforce our position that the Soviets cannot expect to continue "business as usual." I believe we should stress to the Soviets at Geneva that we are very seriously concerned about the expanding pattern of Soviet violations and the problems that this poses for the negotiation of new arms control agreements. The Soviets should be put on notice that there are limits to our tolerance of such activities.

(TS) Indeed, Soviet violations bring home the point that any arms control agreement will entail risks for the United States. This is because, as their behavior proves, the

Soviets are unlikely to be deterred from military activity merely because they would be violating agreements. Verifying Soviet compliance with our START and INF proposals will be exceedingly difficult; we cannot prevent some forms of Soviet cheating, even with the most stringent verification measures. But most of the difficulties we would face, we face now under SALT II; at least our current proposals would improve on SALT II by requiring militarily significant reductions in offensive nuclear forces and attempting to tighten up some of the existing verification loopholes, such as the SALT II provision allowing the Soviets to encrypt part of their missile test data. Alternatives to the current U.S. proposals, ostensibly designed to solve our verification problems, will not solve those problems but could lull us into falsely believing that Soviet military capabilities have been limited.

(TS) 2. *Procedural Objectives.* For now, I believe we should be more concerned with establishing the appropriate structure, venue and timing for future negotiations, and less concerned with substantive negotiating issues. Our immediate procedural objectives for the January meeting should be to seek Soviet agreement on the establishment of three separate negotiating fora: (1) on reductions of strategic offensive arms; (2) on limitation of intermediate-range nuclear forces; (3) on the offense/defense relationship and military uses of space. There is particular merit in having separate negotiations on strategic and intermediate-range forces; separate talks will help us carry out more effective consultations with our Allies, who have a special interest in intermediate-range forces, and who understand and support our position as it evolved in INF.

(TS) I do not think it is necessary, for our purposes, to have an agreed statement with the Soviets setting forth the precise purposes and objectives of these various fora. If the

Soviets insist, however, then the objectives should be stated substantially as follows:

(1) To reach a long-term agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive forces to agreed, equal, far lower levels, in a manner that enhances strategic stability;

(2) To reach an agreement limiting intermediate-range nuclear forces to the lowest possible agreed equal levels;

(3) To reach understandings on:

- the relationship of offensive and defensive forces (both ground-based defenses and space-based defenses against aircraft/cruise missiles and against ballistic missiles);
- the use of space for military purposes so as to enhance strategic stability by fostering conditions conducive to preventing the military uses of space for offensive purposes (including uses by ICBMs);
- a possible phased move to greater reliance on strategic defenses and lesser reliance on offensive forces, including the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons. Your SDI proposal actually could accomplish this, and so it must not be given up.

(TS) The main Soviet objective will be to halt or severely constrain our SDI program. They have elected to approach the task through a combination of a concerted propaganda campaign against “the militarization of space” and specific, unverifiable proposals, the effect of which would be to halt or cripple our SDI without limiting their ballistic missile defense. Therefore, we would make a grave mistake if we accepted any procedural arrangements that might help the Soviets hold arms reduction agreements hostage to

“progress” on stopping our SDI, or our willingness to delay or stop work on ASAT, just as we would make a mistake to convey any impression that SDI is only a “bargaining chip” for obtaining offensive force reductions.

(TS) 3. *Things to Avoid*. Given our overall objectives, I believe we should:

(a) Avoid any commitments, either on form or substance, that would foreclose or hamper the possibility of a transition by both the United States and the Soviet Union to a strategic relationship dominated by defensive rather than offensive forces;

(b) Avoid creating inflated expectations about the pace or scope of future negotiations; those expectations inevitably lead to such situations as Congress’ holding the Peacekeeper hostage to “progress” in negotiations;

(c) Avoid any understanding with the Soviets or any agreed statement indicating a U.S. willingness to halt or modify our SDI research program, to accept restrictions (beyond those already contained in the ABM Treaty) precluding the eventual deployment of SDI types of ballistic missile defense systems, or to cancel scheduled tests of the ASAT MV;

(d) Avoid accepting any agreed statement suggesting that space is not now militarized (by ballistic missiles), or implying that possible uses of space are of greater, or equal, concern with offensive forces;

(e) Avoid a moratorium on ASAT testing.

(TS) Any moratorium on ASAT testing will restrict our ASAT more than the Soviets’ because of the state of our program (it is still in development), whereas they have already

proven their system. Furthermore, ASAT limits of virtually any type will limit our SDI program; and the more restricting those limits would be on ASAT, the more they would also restrict SDI, and some of our other activities.

(TS) 4. *Things to Seek.* There are several modest but useful steps we might take to try and reach some early agreement with the Soviets, in order possibly to create a more conducive climate as we tackle the harder issues. For example, we could:

(a) Pursue your proposal to establish a dedicated U.S.-Soviet communications channel for the exchange of military-technical information. The negative Soviet response to our earlier proposal on this point can be attributed to the strained political environment; they might react differently were the atmosphere better. Moreover, when dealing with those in Congress who advocate more far-reaching proposals, we might want to be able to state the Soviet view on our more modest proposition.

(b) Follow up your offer in your UNGA speech of September 24 for an exchange of experts at each other's nuclear test sites to measure directly the yields of nuclear weapon tests.³ We could attempt to begin this exchange by inviting the Soviets to send a team of experts to our Nevada Test Site.

(c) Seek agreement on additional confidence building measures such as more detailed notification of, and even exchange visits to, our respective maneuvers and troop exercises, etc.

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¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSDD Package, 12/31/1984-01/01/1985 (3). Top Secret; King.

² See [Document 340](#).

³ See [footnote 6, Document 308](#).

343. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, December 27, 1984

SUBJECT
Strategy for Geneva

Central Concept

We need a clear central concept to guide our planning for the Geneva meetings and subsequent negotiations—and our program for handling Congress, Allies and publics. I suggest the following:

For the next five to ten years our objective should be a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms as well as stabilizing the relationship between offensive and defensive nuclear arms, whether land-, sea-, air- or space-based. We should even now be looking forward to a period of transition, beginning possibly five or ten years from now, to effective non-nuclear defensive forces, including defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This period of transition should lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A nuclear-free world is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.

US Objectives for Geneva

Our strategy should aim to keep the Soviets on the defensive at both the private and public levels:

—We want to put the onus on Moscow to negotiate seriously by setting forth ideas that could form the basis of meaningful agreements.

—And we want to deny them any basis to charge in public that we had no constructive ideas to present at Geneva, and were unwilling to consider any limits on space arms.

Proceeding from the above, our specific objectives at Geneva are twofold:

—Looking to the future, we want to begin to engage the Soviets in a dialogue on the possibility of a shift away from “mutual assured destruction” to a more stable situation in which both sides rely more on defenses and in which nuclear arms are significantly reduced and, eventually, eliminated.

—In the near term, we want to establish a productive negotiating process that will, for the first time, begin the process of reducing offensive nuclear arms. We would like to open formal negotiations at an early date, but further meetings with Gromyko and/or special representatives may well be needed before we are able to identify enough common ground on which to begin serious give-and-take.

In the long run, these goals are mutually reinforcing: the effectiveness of SDI technologies may depend on our ability to reach agreements that reverse the Soviet offensive build-up; this will constrain them from trying to overwhelm future US defenses.

In the near term, however, there will be tension between these two goals. The Soviets have set as their top priority the “prevention of the militarization of outer space”—which means stopping SDI as well as ASAT. They will link progress on nuclear arms reductions to progress on limiting space weapons; in bargaining over nuclear arms they will almost certainly resist substantial reductions in order to hedge their bets against future US defenses.

We can still hope to accomplish important objectives in renewed negotiations with the Soviets. We may have a window of opportunity to make progress toward agreements that would be in our interest and a big improvement over SALT II. The Soviets, while trying to pressure us in the public arena, will also want to explore the possibilities of achieving mutually beneficial agreements. They likely see negotiated limitations as a way of slowing our strategic programs, and gaining the political and economic benefits that would come with improved East-West relations. For our part, we have a strong interest in preventing the Soviets from gaining the strategic arms advantages that would probably emerge absent any limitations.

Thus, I think we should devote our energies to negotiating agreements that will begin reducing offensive nuclear arms. Broad limits on space weapons are not in the US interest because of SDI. However, in the event it is needed to secure Soviet agreement to offensive arms reductions, we should be prepared to negotiate short-term limits on anti-satellite systems that would have only a minimal impact on our SDI research program.

US Ideas for Geneva

Format

The foregoing objectives could be pursued in a variety of negotiating fora. The important thing is that we avoid a “space” only forum in which the sole subject matter is SDI and ASAT, issues on which we will be on the defensive. I suggest I be authorized to tell Gromyko that we want to address defensive arms, whether based in space or elsewhere (including Soviet defensive nuclear systems) as well as offensive nuclear forces, regardless of basing. As a result of the exchange in Geneva, I would expect there to emerge a general formulation on the order of “defensive and space arms” if there are two negotiating fora, or “nuclear and space arms” if there is a single, combined forum. I would like to be authorized to accept either formulation.

The Offense-Defense Relationship

The most difficult and important subject for us to handle at Geneva may be the discussion of the relationship between offense and defense in the nuclear area as we see it evolving over time. The following approach would allow us to lay down a marker with the Soviets that both sides should consider the possibility of increased reliance on defenses in the longer term, while deflecting Soviet attacks on SDI by raising their actions that have undermined the ABM Treaty (a full version of this presentation is attached).²

I would begin by making clear to Gromyko that we have no aggressive intentions against the USSR but are concerned by the expansion and modernization of their nuclear forces, which force us to keep up our capabilities. Under today’s conditions, each side has incentives to act quickly and

decisively with its military power, particularly in a crisis—a very unstable situation.

I would remind Gromyko how we tried in 1972 to address this problem by establishing a regime limiting both defensive and offensive capabilities, but the assumptions underlying that regime have been undermined. On the defensive side, the Soviets have done things we believe are not consistent with the ABM Treaty. More importantly, the comprehensive agreement on offensive arms that was to accompany the ABM Treaty has not been achieved.

I would tell Gromyko that, at least for the near term, we are ready to work with the Soviets to restore the regime that was thought by both sides to be our common objective in 1972. I would stress that SDI is a research program—consistent with the ABM Treaty—and note that in the long term we should recognize that, as we seek to eliminate nuclear weapons, both sides may have an interest in pursuing new defensive technologies. Such a relationship would be more stable than the current one.

Substance

In addition to presenting the conceptual basis for the US approach, Geneva is also an opportunity to demonstrate to the Soviets—as well as Congress, Allies and western publics—that we are, as you have stated many times, prepared to negotiate seriously and constructively. To this end, I should be in a position to preview for Gromyko the general direction in which we are prepared to go in new negotiations. This would follow through on your pledge to Chernenko in your December 7 letter that I will have “concrete ideas” to present at Geneva.³

Thus, I would want to begin laying out an approach that would lead to agreements that begin reducing nuclear arms. This approach would build on the ideas you approved for my Stockholm meeting with Gromyko last January, but which I chose not to lay out because he was unprepared for serious negotiations.

In specific terms, I would like to be authorized to indicate US readiness to move forward in several areas:

—On START, I would like to test Soviet seriousness by suggesting the “common framework” for reductions you approved last January. This would combine elements of the two sides’ previous positions—limiting missiles and bombers together, as the Soviets prefer, in return for their agreement to the real reductions we seek in destabilizing ballistic missile capabilities.

—On INF I would also like to indicate a readiness to consider new approaches consistent with the basic concerns of the US and our allies. One possibility, which would reduce SS-20s while allowing substantial US deployments, would be equal percentage warhead reductions from current Soviet global levels and from planned US European levels, with the US having equal rights on a global basis.

—On space, I would make clear that we are not prepared to accept any new constraints on potentially stabilizing SDI technologies. I would point out to Gromyko that SDI is at present a research program permitted by the ABM Treaty; if, at a future time, testing or deployment of systems not now permitted by the Treaty were contemplated, it would be a matter for negotiation. I would express a readiness to

negotiate seriously on space issues, but point out that space is just one aspect of a broader “defensive and space arms” question, and that existing Soviet defensive systems—particularly nuclear defensive systems—need to be addressed as well. If appropriate, I would also like to be in a position to reiterate your September suggestion to Gromyko that we consider short-term limits on ASAT testing in conjunction with Soviet agreement to limits that begin reducing nuclear arms.⁴ (In order to minimize the impact on SDI, I believe such limits should be restricted to existing US and Soviet ASAT systems.)

Attachment

Paper Prepared by Paul Nitze⁵

Washington, undated

A SUGGESTION AS TO HOW TO PRESENT THE OFFENSE-DEFENSE INTERACTION TO GROMYKO

A. General Considerations

The United States has no territorial ambitions. It is inconceivable that the US would initiate military action against the USSR or the Warsaw Pact unless it or its allies were to be directly attacked. We hope the USSR comparably has no intention of initiating an attack on the US or its allies.

The United States is determined to assure itself and its allies of a high-quality deterrent to an attack by anyone on our vital security interests. We expect that the Soviet Union intends to maintain a similar capability.

B. Tendencies toward Myopia

But it is hard to understand why the USSR places so much emphasis upon massive expansion and modernization of its nuclear forces, both offensive and defensive. The US is forced thereby not to neglect its own offensive and defensive capabilities. Perhaps the explanation is to be found in the fact that each side looks at the nuclear strategic situation primarily from the viewpoint of its own security. Each must assume that at some time a situation may arise in which the risk of war in the immediate future cannot be dismissed. In that situation each side will carefully analyze what it must do to deny the other side a meaningful military victory. Under today's conditions and those of the foreseeable future, both sides have certain incentives to act quickly and decisively with their military power, both nuclear and conventional. This creates an unstable situation which could make crises more difficult to manage and, if conflict breaks out, makes rapid, perhaps immediate, escalation to high levels of destruction more likely.

C. The Dangers Inherent in the Current Situation

This is a dangerous situation. It is one we must address both together and unilaterally. The political and military measures necessary to do so will be difficult for both sides. But we must tackle this problem; the danger must be defused.

D. Offense-Defense

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, we hoped that both sides would be able to agree on measures which would be helpful to the security of each of us. It was accepted that each side

should have rough equality in the aggregate power of its nuclear weapons systems, that if defensive capabilities were to be limited, there should be comparable limitations on offensive capabilities, and that limitations should preclude break-out, circumvention or failure to adhere to the letter and spirit of the limitations agreed upon.

For a time it appeared that we had made some progress in the direction I have outlined. As one looks at the situation today, it appears that U.S. anticipation of such progress may have been illusory.

You would agree, I am sure, that both sides have today substantially greater offensive nuclear capabilities than we had in 1972.

And on the defensive side, you at least have also continued to improve your capabilities. You have done everything permitted by the ABM Treaty, and you have also taken steps we believe may not be consistent with it.

The ABM Treaty rested on the agreed assumption that the principal limitation should be the limitation on Large Phased-Array Radars; these radars took five to ten years to build and were easily identifiable. The limits on such radars would assure each side against break-out or circumvention in less time than would be required for the other side to take offsetting actions. Allowance was made for early warning radars, but these were to be on the periphery, outward looking and should not be defended, and for radars required for space track and for national technical means of verification. It was also agreed that ABM interceptors, launchers, and radars should be non-mobile, non-transportable, i.e., fixed to the ground. It was further agreed that other systems, such as anti-aircraft systems, should not be given ABM capabilities, i.e., that the line

between AA defenses and ABM defenses should be kept clear and unambiguous. Finally, it was agreed that the ABM Treaty should be accompanied by a comprehensive treaty on offensive nuclear forces of indefinite duration to parallel the ABM Treaty; it was hoped that such a treaty could be agreed in two years, and certainly within five years.

Today all of those assumptions appear questionable. The five Soviet early warning radars and the Krasnoyarsk radar (which appears to be identical in physical characteristics to those for detecting and tracking ballistic missile RVs) can, if interconnected, provide a base for a nationwide defense. The SH-08 ABM system with its Flat Twin radar seems to be transportable. We have seen it erected and made operational in about a month. The SA-10 and SA-X-12 anti-aircraft systems seem to have a capability against certain RVs in an intercontinental trajectory, thus blurring the distinction between AA systems and ABM systems. You are pursuing active research programs on more advanced technologies, which have a direct application to future ballistic missile defense capabilities, and most importantly, there has been no treaty of indefinite duration on offensive arms to parallel the ABM Treaty.

For the immediate future we wish to work with you to restore and strengthen the regime for stability which, in 1972, was thought by both sides to be our common objective. We must negotiate the follow-on effective limitations on offensive systems called for when we signed the ABM Agreement in 1972, in order to remove the inherent instability in the present and projected array of offensive systems on both sides, and we must reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty which has taken place. The research, development, and deployment programs of both sides must be consistent with the ABM Treaty. Ours are. Yours should be. If either side ever wishes to amend the

Treaty, then there are provisions for discussing that. In our view, such discussions should precede action by sufficient time so that stability is guaranteed.

Our concurrent SDI research program is fully consistent with the ABM Treaty. Your country has had a large SDI program of its own for some years. We do not believe that either country wants at this time to ban research and concept development permitted by that Treaty. We doubt an effective ban on such activities could be designed even if we wanted to.

For the long run we should have bolder and more radical objectives. Both sides seem to be agreed that with respect to nuclear weapons as a whole, the objective should be their total elimination. This should be worldwide and agreed to by all nations. At the same time, we both recognize that we must find a safe path down the road of reductions toward disarmament. We believe that during the transition from reliance on the retaliatory capability of massive forces of offensive arms it could be extremely useful to move toward a more and more effective defense on both sides. It appears that new technologies may open possibilities of assuring the security of both sides through a substantial improvement in our respective defenses. To us high-confidence defenses would appear to be a sounder approach to peace and security than equal and high-confidence vulnerability to every manner of nuclear strike by the other side, and could produce a more stable offense-defense relationship. We recognize that arms control and other forms of cooperation could play an important role in creating and sustaining such a more stable, less threatening environment. We believe that the security interests of both sides could be served by such an evolution. While the possibilities of such a development could be realized in the fairly distant future, we are

prepared to initiate a continuing discussion with you now, not only on future roles for strategic defense, but also on other steps we can take to enhance strategic stability while reducing nuclear arms.

Rationale:

The approach outlined above positions the Secretary to defuse SDI as an issue by linking it to our concerns regarding Soviet defensive programs and compliance with the ABM Treaty and the absence of a comprehensive agreement limiting offensive arms, i.e., it is unreasonable for the Soviets to press for new constraints on SDI—a research program permitted by the ABM Treaty—when the assumptions, letter and intent of that agreement are not being lived up to. (This, by the way, may be a more productive manner to raise our concern about Krasnoyarsk than as purely a compliance issue.) It is unlikely the Soviets will be ready to comply with the ABM agreement in this manner, which we can use to counter their anti-SDI efforts.

At the same time, this approach raises the possible transition to a defense-dominant relationship in the long run as something which both sides would be interested in and that we are prepared to discuss.

This approach, particularly the linkage of our view on SDI to Soviet compliance with the assumptions and letter of the ABM Treaty, will also prove useful in defusing SDI with publics, Allies and Congress, as well as refocusing their attention on our concerns about Soviet compliance with the ABM agreement.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSDD Package, 12/31/1984-01/01/1985 (3). Secret; Sensitive; King. According to another copy, the memorandum was drafted by Vershbow and Pifer; cleared by Nitze, Gordon, and Courtney. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, December 1984 Super Sensitive Documents)

² Nitze drafted this presentation on the relationship between offense and defense. On December 7, he sent Lehman a draft, and the NSC Staff reviewed the paper. Shultz, Nitze, McFarlane, and Lehman discussed the paper and other approaches for Geneva in a meeting on December 10 (see [Document 332](#)). On December 15, in a memorandum to McFarlane, Lehman wrote: “The paper is intended to be a guide to our initial presentation in Geneva and does not reflect all of the factors related to offense and defense which we must take into account. My own view is that distinguishing between the near-term and the far-term will help up greatly by increasing pressure on the Soviets and by reducing political pressures on us.” (Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks Background Notebook)

³ See [Document 328](#).

⁴ See [Document 286](#).

⁵ Secret; Sensitive; King. The SACG was scheduled to meet December 26 to discuss Nitze’s paper. In a December 24 memorandum, Lehman, Linhard, and Kraemer informed McFarlane: “Based on your guidance, the Chain group did draft a paper evaluating the Nitze idea. The paper was reviewed at a Chain Group IG on Saturday [December 22] and then circulated to SACG principals later that afternoon.” They continued: “The paper is a reasonably good effort. One issue that has surfaced is how integral to

the Nitze idea of shifting to an emphasis on defense (vice space) is the focus on *nuclear* defensive systems.

“—Nitze feels that it is unlikely that the Soviets will agree to a focus on limiting *nuclear defenses* and that we should be prepared to fall-back to a characterization of this area as a discussion of ‘defenses’—or if ultimately necessary, ‘defenses and space.’ He feels that the nuclear spin is necessary to get the Soviets to move from their position (space only) and join us in agreeing to discussions about defenses. Once talks began, he would return to press a primary U.S. concern for limiting nuclear defenses and tactically use this throughout the talks.

“—Some (OSD) feel that the US focus on *nuclear* defenses should be maintained from the very start of discussions (with no fall back to discussion of defenses—and certainly not to ‘defense and space’) to provide maximum protection to non-nuclear SDI options.

“—Others (perhaps JCS) like the idea of the shift to defenses but don’t like the focus on *nuclear* systems. They are concerned that we will unnecessarily alienate those who support nuclear SDI options (i.e., Teller), and that we may be foreclosing such options prematurely.

“It would be useful to explore this issue a bit on Wednesday to make sure we fully understand how principals feel about *both* the attempt to shift to an offense/defense formulation *and* the tactic of focusing on limiting nuclear defenses.”

(Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, SACG 12/14/1984-12/24/1984)

344. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, December 28, 1984

SUBJECT

Geneva and Beyond: Your Discussions with Secretary Shultz

Following our brief chat this afternoon regarding your going to Geneva and your dinner with Dobrynin, I have the following thoughts which you may wish to consider as you think through your discussions with Secretary Shultz next week. (I am sharing them *only* with John Poindexter, and of course will not mention them to anyone else.)

Your Participation in Geneva Meetings

—Although, so far as I can recall, it is unprecedented for the President's Assistant for National Security to attend a meeting with the Soviets not chaired by the President or himself, I believe the Secretary's action in inviting you is a good thing and that your presence will add a lot to the meeting if your role is properly defined.

—The fact is that you know the arms control issues more thoroughly than anyone else in the USG, and furthermore, have discussed them in greater depth with the President, so that you are in the best position to know his mind.

—It is precisely the latter, the President's intentions, which the Soviets will be looking for, and your

comments will carry great weight in this regard.

—The Soviets are likely to interpret your participation as either (1) an indication of the President's seriousness and commitment; or (2) a sign that there is division in the USG and that the Secretary must be watched.

—We need, therefore to make sure that they draw the first rather than the second conclusion. (The presence of a large, multi-agency delegation at Geneva, though not at the actual table, tends to encourage the second.)

—To do this, it will be important that you play a prominent role in the conversation, but one in complete harmony with what Shultz has to say.

—I believe, therefore, that you should have a clear agreement with the Secretary regarding who covers what, and that you should aim to present roughly 40% of the U.S. position in terms of time actually spent speaking.

—As soon as you are sure you will be going, the Soviets should be notified. This will give them an opportunity, if they choose, to add a senior official to their delegation. (They may have trouble, however, deciding just *who* is an appropriate counterpart, so we should give them as much time to think it over as we can.)

—The notification can be done most rapidly by Secretary Shultz telephoning Dobrynin to say that he has persuaded you² to go, and that he would appreciate his notifying Gromyko. (He should not suggest any change in the Soviet delegation, since

they will make up their own minds on this in any case.)

The U.S. Delegation

—We must make every effort to keep our group at the table as small as possible. We have already been told that Gromyko's group will be five plus interpreter (Gromyko, Karpov, Korniyenko, Dobrynin, Obukhov and Sukhodrev). We should make every effort not to exceed this.

—On our side, Shultz, you and Nitze provide the core. We can add two more and still be in balance with the Soviet side.

—At the risk of seeming self-serving, I would also suggest that my presence would be useful in several respects: I am the only one of our group who knows Russian well and can detect nuances left out of the translation (or asides which may not be translated). Additionally, I have observed Gromyko at some 40 or 50 meetings over a 12-year period and can provide some historical perspective to his approach and mannerisms. Finally, my presence would underscore—in a perhaps minor, but significant sense—your status as co-interlocutor, along with Shultz. The others will be *his* subordinates, and you should have a member of your staff at the table as well.

—This leaves one slot, and I believe it should be filled by Hartman. This is important both for protocol (since Dobrynin will be there) and to maintain the reciprocal status of our Ambassador in Moscow. If he is excluded, then the Soviets will tend to disregard him as an *interlocuteur valable*.

Scheduling the Work

—The presence of a large U.S. delegation, many not participating in the talks, as well as the horde of media representatives will greatly complicate budgeting the time of the participants. There will be an immediate requirement after each session to prepare a report to the President, to brief the full U.S. delegation, and to decide on next steps. After the final meeting, the Secretary must also brief the press. Since there may be only 2–3 hours between the morning and afternoon sessions, you might wish to discuss with the Secretary what procedures will be followed to ensure that everything gets done in an orderly fashion.

—I would suggest that the Secretary plan to caucus with meeting participants immediately after each session in order to assign work responsibilities and also to decide whether any aspects of the meeting should *not* be conveyed to other members of the U.S. delegation. (Though I doubt this will prove necessary, there should be a fail-safe mechanism to ensure that those in the room are aware of any details which should not be discussed with colleagues.) Alternatively, the rule could be established in advance that *only* the Secretary and you will brief *anyone* until written guidance has been prepared and approved by the two of you.

—I would also recommend that sufficient time be left following the last meeting to get all ducks in a row before Shultz's departure. I believe that a second session on the 8th is a virtual certainty, and am concerned that a departure early that evening could unnecessarily compress the time available to wrap up everything. In addition to briefing the press, you and the Secretary will have to devote time to deciding in detail on the content of the briefings Nitze will provide the Allies at Brussels, and we

should make sure that time is available for due reflection before everyone rushes off.

Your Trip to London

—The idea of your stopping by to brief Thatcher on SDI is an excellent one, assuming that a private meeting with her can be arranged.

—The only potential problem I can see is that, if your trip to London is widely known, it could give some offense to the other Allies, who might assume that the purpose is to give her preferential treatment in briefing on Geneva.

—It will be difficult to keep the London trip secret, since it will be known that you were with Shultz in Geneva, and that you did not return with him. (His arrival at Andrews will presumably be covered by the media.)

—A possible alternative would be for you to brief Thatcher on the way to Geneva—which could possibly be done without attracting public attention—and even if it did, would be less likely to cause offense to the other Allies than a private meeting just after Geneva. This would require an appointment on Saturday the 5th and departure for London the night of the 4th. Such a schedule would allow you to arrive in Geneva the night of the 5th or the morning of the 6th to participate in any last-minute discussions with Shultz before the Monday meeting.

Beyond Geneva: A Confidential Channel

—Dobrynin was right in his comments to you at his dinner that we need a private channel if we are to make any real progress in resolving important problems with the Soviets.

—However, we should continue to refuse it if it involves Dobrynin alone. This simply gives the Soviets too many advantages. A reciprocal arrangement, however, could be most beneficial to both sides.

—If the Soviets are serious about negotiating, they will accept a reciprocal arrangement, despite their obvious and understandable preference for an arrangement which gives them access to our policy makers and denies us the same to theirs.

—Ideally, we should arrange to use both our Ambassadors in this capacity, with each having access comparable to the other. Achieving this should be an operational objective for 1985.

—At present, however, this will be difficult to arrange, since our Ambassador does not speak Russian, and to be effective these contacts should be one-on-one. (Several potential Soviet interlocutors know little English and those who have some rarely speak and understand it well enough to use it confidently without help.)

—In the interim we might wish to consider a discreet offer to resume the conversations started earlier this year, but not pursued since March.³

Beyond Geneva: Organizing for Coordinated Negotiations

—Although Nitze is now installed to keep an eye on the arms control process, I still feel that we will be in a better

position to see that the overall relationship with the Soviets is pursued vigorously, consistently and with appropriate discretion but effective public diplomacy, if a senior officer is designated at State to coordinate and supervise the whole process and report directly to the Secretary. I have previously offered some ideas on this,⁴ which you might wish to discuss with Shultz if you find them reasonable.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron December 1984 (5/5). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Not for System. Sent for information.

² The phrase "persuaded you" was underlined twice, likely by McFarlane.

³ Matlock is likely referring to his March 14 meeting with Menshikov. See [Document 195](#).

⁴ See [Document 320](#).

**345. Memorandum From the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane) to President Reagan¹**

Palm Springs, California, December 30, 1984

SUBJECT

Preparations for Geneva

We have reached the climax of our preparations for Geneva. As a footnote, looking back on other preparations during the Nixon and Ford Administrations, this has been by far the smoothest. This hasn't had anything to do with me; it has been the consequence of your willingness to invest a substantial amount of time in listening to opposing viewpoints among your Cabinet officers as they arose, and providing firm guidance on your thinking. This means that today we have put behind us virtually all of the problems. It is true that a few remain but I expect we can resolve these here in Palm Springs. (S)

As you know, we have two purposes at Geneva. First, we want to get Soviet agreement to open formal talks within a month or so on the entire family of nuclear arms control issues; in short, to establish the format or procedures under which we will do business in the coming months. Second, we want to begin a process of education and persuasion with regard to your view of how together we can agree on a road which will lead us toward less reliance on offensive systems and more on defensive systems. This latter goal represents a truly historic initiative. For a generation the world has lived under the surreal notion that we are better off being unable to defend ourselves under a balance of terror. Your concept of changing that

has provoked enormous public interest and criticism. But there is no question that you have the moral high ground with the American people. In order to assure that we keep it that way, we have been preparing a “public affairs blitz” involving your speaking to the nation, and a widespread campaign involving dozens of spokesmen inside and outside of government who will carry the gospel into the 14 major media markets in the next three months. I intend to meet with the network news directors next week to state plainly that this issue is of such historic importance as to warrant a truly vigorous national debate and that you have directed me to make available to them our full cooperation in presenting our rationale and technical concept (within obvious limits). As a separate but related matter, you have thrown the left into an absolute tizzy. They are left in the position of advocating the most bloodthirsty strategy—Mutual Assured Destruction—as a means to keep the peace. (TS)

In helping you to reach final decisions, it seems to me that two stages are in order. First, last week at the conclusion of our work, I invited your Cabinet officers to submit their final views to you. This was as much to assure that everyone felt comfortable that they had been heard and to help to minimize guerrilla press warfare. Those views are attached.² There is nothing particularly new in them but I would recommend that you scan the highlighted portions. I should call to your attention Bill Casey’s rather bearish memo on how verification problems are going to grow worse in the years ahead (Tab 4).³ That is not central to the Geneva work, but is an issue we must give quite a lot more attention to in the months ahead and I have set work in motion to do this. (TS)

The second stage will be your actual review of a Decision Directive which I will have ready for you tomorrow

morning. In it I have tried to capture compromise positions which will minimize the margin of disagreement between Cap and George. I have sent it to George today in draft and will try to get it to Cap as soon as he arrives tomorrow.⁴
(TS)

There is one important change in the game plan we are proposing, Mr President. It concerns our preference for the forum in which we talk about strategic defense. Under the Soviet formulation, "Preventing the Militarization of Space" we would be left on the defensive with the entire focus being on our space research while they get off relatively scot free. But, as you know, they have had a far more ambitious "defensive" effort underway than we have for the past 15 years. It just so happens that most of theirs has been on ground-based air defense and ground-based ABM systems. All of us think it would be far wiser not to agree to "space talks" but rather to broaden the scope to deal with "nuclear defensive systems." This would put the Soviets in the box since they have a number of ground-based nuclear defensive systems, while most of our research is on non-nuclear systems. It would enable us to point out publicly that the defensive balance favors the Soviets rather dramatically. In sum, instead of proposing three fora—START, INF and SPACE—as we discussed three weeks ago, we now propose that you approve our proposing two—nuclear offensive (which would encompass both START and INF), and nuclear defensive—negotiations. (TS)

After you review these two documents—this package containing the views of your Cabinet officers—and the draft decision document I will send you tomorrow morning, I would appreciate the opportunity to meet with you tomorrow (Monday⁵ —tentatively set for 11:00 a.m.) to get your reactions. Then if you wish, you could also meet with

George and Cap on Tuesday morning before signing the directive. I am at your disposal. (TS)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Chronological File, Sensitive Chron 1985; NLR-362-7-38-4-7. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. According to the President's Daily Diary, McFarlane was with Reagan in Palm Springs from December 29 to January 2. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

² The memoranda are not attached but are printed as [Documents 338](#), [339](#), [340](#), and [343](#).

³ See [footnote 2](#), [Document 338](#).

⁴ See [Document 348](#).

⁵ December 31. See [footnote 2](#), [Document 346](#).

**346. Memorandum From the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane) to President Reagan¹**

Palm Springs, California, undated

SUBJECT

Geneva Arms Control Talks, January 7-8, 1985—Decision Package

ISSUE

Whether or not to approve the attached Decision Directive setting the context and providing specific instructions for Secretary Shultz and the US delegation at the forthcoming talks in Geneva.

BACKGROUND

In preparation for the January 7-8, 1985, US-Soviet arms control talks in Geneva, the National Security Planning Group (NSPG) and the Senior Arms Control Group (SACG) have deliberated in a step-by-step process leading up to the decisions to be made by you on instructions for the US delegation headed by Secretary Shultz.²

The attached package provides the major elements necessary to your decision as follows: Tab A—A Draft Decision Directive (prepared by NSC staff on the basis of the above deliberations); Tab B—Views of Agency Principals; Tab C—Summary of START, INF, and ASAT Arms Control Studies (prepared by SACG).³

DECISION DIRECTIVE (TAB A) The proposed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) provides the overall national security and arms control context, as well as specific objectives and instructions for the Geneva talks. It provides our best recommendation on how, on a consistent basis, to resolve a number of interrelated issues, and it provides a coherent approach. It is this NSDD (Tab A) that we are asking you to review and approve. The other elements of this package are intended to provide you the counsel of your principal advisors and to inform you of the status of interagency work as you consider the NSDD.

VIEWS OF PRINCIPALS (TAB B) Views on substantive issues in Geneva are as follows: US/Soviet Objectives. All principals and agencies agree that hard bargaining lies ahead in Geneva in the search for constructive US/Soviet dialogue and that the priority US arms control objectives there should be both the resumption of negotiations on nuclear arms reductions and protection of the Strategic Defense Initiative. They agree with US intelligence assessments that Soviet priorities in Geneva are to block SDI and limit US ASAT capability by bans or moratoria and, in addition, to block further NATO INF deployments while avoiding Soviet reductions. They agree also that the Soviet Union will pursue a vigorous propaganda campaign aimed at publics, our Allies, and to Congress.

START and INF. There is general agreement among agencies and principals that the baselines, tradeoffs, and flexibilities inherent in the current US positions (as spelled out in the SACG's summary paper at Tab C) offer a sound basis for future talks. However, for *START*, Secretary Shultz seeks additional authority to table a controversial "common framework" package he privately developed a year ago for use in his meeting with Gromyko at the

Stockholm Conference (CDE), but which was opposed by other agencies and was subsequently overtaken by additional interagency work. Also for START, Ken Adelman proposes that if the Soviet Union “seems serious,” we should express willingness to agree to higher levels of warheads (7,000 v. 5,000) and a specific tradeoff of limiting heavy bombers plus heavy missiles to a total of 400 on each side, with no more than 200 of these to be heavy missiles. For *INF*, both Shultz and Adelman propose to change from the US position of insisting on equal global limits and rights to a concept of equal *percentage* reductions in *deployed* Soviet missiles globally and planned US European deployments, so long as an equal global ceiling is retained. In addition, Adelman (and Paul Nitze) favors renewed consideration of the walk-in-the-woods formula which would eliminate any US Pershing II missiles and which is opposed by all other agencies.

ASAT. The Interdepartmental Group could not come up with any limitation proposal (whether short- or long-term) that was agreed to be verifiable or compatible with SDI research or the US national interest. However, the Secretary of State believes that a “temporary” testing moratorium might be appropriate, and the Director of ACDA believes that talks on limiting “incidents in space” may be appropriate and that after substantial additional US ASAT testing has taken place, it might become possible to consider a future ASAT testing moratorium.

Format. Almost all believe it appropriate to consider proposing a division of talks in Geneva into discussion of *offensive* systems, on the one hand, and *defensive* systems on the other hand, regardless of basing mode, with space not designated as a separate category. However, Ambassador Rowny prefers to discuss all strategic defense-related issues within the START framework.

Verification and Compliance. Most principals (e.g., Weinberger, Casey, Vessey, and Adelman) raise these as areas of special concern impacting upon Geneva.

Individual views are as follows:

1. *George Shultz.* Secretary Shultz's comprehensive memorandum generally reflects interagency views developed through the Senior Arms Control Group process, and by Paul Nitze, concerning objectives and offense/defense format.⁴ However, Shultz differs substantially from others' views in recommending: (1) that the US be prepared to negotiate "short-term" limits on testing existing ASAT systems that would aim to have "only a minimal impact" on our SDI research program; (2) a START "framework" package he initially proposed privately to you a year ago, but which was opposed by other agencies and was subsequently overtaken by additional interagency work; and (3) consideration of equal percentage US and Soviet reductions in deployed INF missiles.

2. *Cap Weinberger.* In two memoranda, Secretary Weinberger expresses profound concern about Soviet violations of arms control agreements and counsels patience and persistence in the talks focused on deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions in offensive weapons.⁵ He particularly stresses that the US should not give up the SDI or agree to bans or moratoria on anti-satellite weapons. On SDI he urges that it be presented as the best hope for mankind and for arms control; as designed to protect not any particular target (such as missile bases or cities), but as a reliable shield to protect all; as destroying weapons, not people; and as causing not the militarization of space, but as using space to keep the earth free of nuclear holocausts. On ASAT he shares the concern

expressed by the Joint Chiefs that there is a major link between anti-satellite weapons and the development of SDI capabilities, and that it is therefore vital that we not accept any bans or moratoria on ASAT weapons. Concerning verification, he stresses the importance of on-site inspection and international observer teams and other cooperative measures as a means of providing verification assurance not available from satellites.

3. *John Vessey*. On behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Vessey expresses the importance of approaching strategic modernization, arms reductions and a shift to strategic defense as integrated components of our deterrent nuclear strategy.⁶ The Chiefs consider the preservation of SDI to be essential and stress the inherent links between ASAT and SDI research. They point out that substantive limits on ASAT will inevitably affect SDI (since SDI will have the intrinsic capability to destroy satellites). Further, since the technologies involved are highly similar for ASAT and SDI, limitations on ASAT could inhibit the early development of SDI alternatives. The Chiefs cite these facts as arguing for extreme caution in accepting any specific limits on ASAT. The Chiefs support the proposed offense/defense format.

4. *Ken Adelman*. ACDA Director Adelman joins an emerging consensus on seeking two sets of talks, one on offense (with separate working groups on START and INF), and one on defense, which Adelman believes could be “coordinated” by Umbrella discussions. On START, however, he proposes to consider raising the warhead limit from 5,000–7,000 and a specific heavy bomber/heavy missile tradeoff, a concept derivative of an idea studied earlier but not used. On INF he proposes the “walk-in-the-woods” formula rejected by all other agencies and joins Shultz in considering possible equal percent reductions rather than equal levels for

deployed Soviet and planned US missile forces. On space and ASAT, he also goes beyond the general consensus by supporting space “rules of the road” or “incidents in space” negotiations and by supporting consideration of a possible future ASAT moratorium following further US tests.⁷

5. *Ed Rowny*. START Negotiator Rowny strongly supports the current START position as a basis for sound negotiations on offensive arms reductions and generally shares the consensus of other principals and agencies concerning the US approach to the Geneva talks. However, he strongly opposes the consensus of others who favor proposing future negotiations divided into fora on offensive and defensive arms. For reasons cited in his memorandum, he believes it wiser and safer to set the basic categories as those of “nuclear arms” and “outer space arms,” respectively, with the latter category to be negotiated only upon prompt Soviet resumption of START and INF negotiations. Additionally, he proposes to keep strategic defense-related items within the framework of START (wherein missile and bomber defense issues and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty have been the subjects of prior discussions).⁸

6. *Bill Casey*. Director Casey, in the first of two memoranda, points to severe limitations upon existing and prospective National Technical Means (NTM) in assuring compliance with arms control agreements, limitations which are increased by Soviet deception practices, missile mobility, and new offensive technologies.⁹ He thus concludes that verification will be a pacing factor in any future strategic arrangement with the USSR and must be an integral (and even more important) part of our planning. In a second memorandum, Casey assesses Soviet objectives and programs, noting that while the Soviets are determined to block SDI and to constrain US strategic modernization

programs, they will not accept significant arms reductions, nor let any arms control agreement slow their own research and development efforts, nor accept an agreement preventing a significant level of Soviet force modernization. Casey strongly urges you to resist pressure from the public and within the US Government to offer up the SDI research program or to restrict necessary development or testing in an effort to get an arms control accord, since he believes there is no way such concessions on SDI can produce reductions in Soviet offensive forces of commensurate value in long-term stability and safety. He also counsels against any concessions (in a Geneva communique following the Geneva meeting) on including UK and French systems or on accepting Soviet definitions of "prevention of militarization of space."

SUMMARY OF START, INF, AND ASAT ARMS CONTROL STUDIES (TAB C) In summary, the interagency positions for these three areas are as follows: START

- Ceiling of 5,000 ballistic missile warheads;
- Ceiling of 850-1,250 deployed ballistic missiles;
- Ceiling of 400 heavy bombers, including Backfire;
- Maximum of 20 ALCMs per heavy bomber;
- Throw-weight limit on ballistic missiles either direct, or through an acceptable Soviet offer, or indirect (2,500 ICBM warhead subceiling, and 210 heavy/medium ICBMs, including no more than 110 heavy ICBMs); —Willingness to trade off between areas of US and Soviet interest and advantage; — Build-down of ballistic missile warheads and heavy bombers; and —Study of alternative approaches.

INF

—Five US criteria include: (1) equal rights and limits; (2) US/Soviet systems only; (3) global limits; (4) no adverse effect on NATO's conventional deterrent capability; and (5) effective verification; —Zero US/Soviet LRINF missiles is preferred outcome; — Interim equal global limit on warheads and launchers; —Possible limits on specific LRINF aircraft;

—Consider not offsetting entire Soviet global LRINF missile deployment by US deployment in Europe; — Distribute future US reductions from planned Pershing II and GLCM levels appropriately; —Accept an equal global ceiling of 420 LRINF missile warheads; and —Study of alternative approaches.

ASAT

—The President's March, 1984, report to Congress reported on a one-year interagency examination of five potential ASAT arms control approaches and concluded that: (1) ASAT and SDI technology overlap is pervasive and any effective ASAT limitation would restrict SDI aspects; (2) no verifiable, equitable, and consequential limitation that does not restrict SDI has been discovered; (3) an ASAT test ban would impact on SDI schedules and costs and leave Soviets with an ASAT advantage; and (4) while a comprehensive ASAT ban is clearly not feasible or in the US interest, the Administration would continue to seek to develop specific limits on specific systems.

—Subsequent to the above report, agency views diverged sharply on the feasibility and impact of

possible ASAT limitations, with some (Defense, JCS, and CIA) holding to the above views and with some (State and ACDA) believing a “temporary” testing moratorium (State) or a future moratorium and “incidents in space” talks (ACDA) could be considered.

—During the summer, three sharply contrasting alternative approaches to discussion of space arms control issues were considered by agencies, with very strong disagreements reflecting different agency views.

Recommendations

In view of the above considerations, I recommend:

That you consider the proposed Decision Directive at Tab A on the context and instructions for the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Geneva, giving it your final approval (with appropriate revisions, if required) following further discussion with principals.

That you review the messages from principals at Tab B.

That you review, as time permits, the summary of START, INF, and ASAT arms control studies at Tab C.¹⁰

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 01/01/1985–01/03/1985. Top Secret. Sent for action. According to the President’s Daily Diary, McFarlane was with Reagan in Palm Springs from December 29 to January 2. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) The memorandum is

unsigned. In a December 28 memorandum, Kraemer, Linhard, and Lehman forwarded to McFarlane this memorandum and a “proposed decision package for the President’s use in making final decisions and in providing instructions to the delegation for discussion of arms control issues in Geneva on January 7 to 8, 1985.” They continued: “The cover memorandum from you to the President outlines the contents of each of the three major tabs and portrays the fundamental consensus and differences of principals and agencies on the substantive and procedural issues resolved in the Decision Directive.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 153, [Shultz-Gromyko Meeting in Geneva, 01/01/1985]).

² The package (see [footnote 1](#), above) was likely used during Reagan’s December 31 meetings with McFarlane, Shultz, and Weinberger to finalize the plans for Geneva. In his diary, Reagan wrote: “This New Year party at Lee & Walter Annenbergs house is tradition. It’s also become my once a year golf game. With all the socializing, had time for meetings with Bud, George S. & Cap pinning down approach George will take with Gromyko in Geneva Jan. 7 & 8. Then Jan. 2nd it was back on A.F.1 & the White House.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 412) In his memoir, McFarlane wrote of the Geneva preparations: “In California, I had a long session with the President to go over this material and then moderated sessions with Reagan, Shultz and Weinberger. On the afternoon of New Year’s Eve, we met at Sunnylands, the estate of Walter Annenberg, founder of *TV Guide* and a well-known philanthropist and friend of Reagan’s. We sat in the library, and everyone was in casual attire. Cap, predictably, wanted the line held on one or two levels of force, but the arguments were not shrill, and within 24 hours we had all come to an agreement on the

language to be approved by the President as the instructions Shultz would carry to Geneva to negotiate with the Soviets.” (McFarlane, *Special Trust*, p. 303) In his memoir, Shultz recalled: “The struggle now centered over my instructions for the upcoming Gromyko session in Geneva. While the focus would be on the scope and structure of renewed arms control talks, the underpinning, I persuaded the president, should be the substantive positions we had developed in 1983 on INF and the flexibility worked through on START over the past year but never presented to the Soviets. Beyond that, we had a philosophy to present about the emerging strategic reality and the need for a shift of emphasis toward defense. The final product—16 tightly packed pages—was discussed carefully with the president on December 31. Cap Weinberger, Bud McFarlane, and I were present. Cap argued. Bud and I met his points. The president approved the document, which carried the recommendations of all three of us. I finally had the negotiating room I needed.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 510-511) ³ Tabs A, B, and C are not attached but are summarized in this memorandum. Tab A, NSDD 153, is printed as [Document 348](#).

⁴ See [Document 343](#).

⁵ See [Documents 340](#) and [342](#).

⁶ See [Document 339](#).

⁷ Adelman’s December 26 memorandum is not attached. A copy is in the Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, NSDD (National Security Decision Directive) & Talking Points [Shultz-Gromyko Meeting in Geneva] (1/2).

⁸ Rowny’s December 28 memorandum is not attached. A copy is in the Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Geneva Arms Control Talks I 01/01/1985–01/07/1985 (1).

⁹ See [Document 338](#) and [footnote 2 thereto](#).

¹⁰ There is no indication of Reagan's approval or disapproval of the recommendations but see [footnote 1](#), [Document 348](#).

**347. Memorandum From the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane) to President Reagan¹**

Palm Springs, California, January 1, 1985

SUBJECT

Instructions for the Geneva Talks

Following our session yesterday,² I had a two-hour meeting with Cap and George to review the draft instructions.³ On the whole it went well, although George is concerned that he is not given sufficient authority to advance new proposals in the START and INF areas. Cap is leary of getting too detailed with new ideas at Geneva since it will reward the Soviets for walking out. George recognizes the problem but believes that if the Soviets walk out again and we have not presented some sign of flexibility, our own press and congress will criticize our "lack of seriousness," and perhaps impose conditional authorities on our systems (e.g. MX) unilaterally. (S)

To try to meet the threshold of what it takes to appear reasonable but without giving anything of consequence away which could be better used later, I have expanded the sections on START and INF (pp. 13-14). My purpose is to spell out just what is meant by the "tradeoffs" you told Gromyko we would be willing to talk about in START. I have simply stated that we can envision trading some of our advantages in Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) for their agreement to lower levels of ballistic missiles. I don't get into specific numbers, although even that would be within the bounds of what we have already committed to. (S)

With respect to INF, I have added a reference at the end of the paragraph authorizing a rhetorical example of how we might provide a face-saving way for the Russians to reduce to an equal level of warheads. This would be through the adoption of “equal percentage cuts.” Under this concept both of us would cut launchers—not warheads—by the same percentage. Since they have three warheads on each SS-20 launcher, they would end up cutting more warheads than we would. We must be careful in pursuing such a course since not all “equal percentage cuts” would be in our interest. For example, our GLCM launchers have 4 warheads each. I have added a cautionary note to the instructions as well so that your delegation will be careful in this regard. (S)

With these changes and a few other editorial changes which Cap suggested (and which are marked in red in the left margin), I expect George and Cap to be comfortable with the instructions. (S)

We will join you at 4:15 today to go over this final draft prior to your reaching decisions. Both of them have copies of this new draft.⁴ (S)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Chronological File, Sensitive Chron 1985; NLR-362-7-38-3-8. Secret. Sent for information. According to the President’s Daily Diary, McFarlane was with Reagan in Palm Springs from December 29 to January 2. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary)

² See [footnote 2, Document 346](#).

³ The draft NSDD was in the decision package prepared by Kraemer, Linhard, and Lehman. See [footnotes 1 and 3, Document 346](#).

⁴ See [footnote 1, Document 348](#).

348. National Security Decision Directive 153¹

Palm Springs, California, January 1, 1985

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING IN GENEVA

The Situation Today. We find ourselves at a unique point in the history of U.S.-Soviet relations. In 1981, we embarked on two major efforts. First, we initiated a military modernization program determined to reverse a long period of decline and apparent unwillingness in this country to invest in our own security in the face of the unprecedented Soviet military buildup of the last decade or more. This modernization program was specifically designed to garner sufficient strength to ensure Western security through deterrence and to provide the incentives necessary to cause the Soviet Union to join us in negotiating significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides. Second, we committed ourselves to seeking equitable and verifiable agreements which would increase stability and security, reduce the risk of war, and lead to significant reductions in nuclear arsenals. (C)

Over the past four years, the United States has been able to sustain support for its strategic modernization program. With continued resolve, this program promises to restore the nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United States by the end of the decade. During this same period, with a firmness of purpose, the NATO Alliance stood solidly with us. Despite an unprecedented Soviet propaganda campaign, NATO began the deployments of Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles necessary to modernize NATO's LRINF missile force and

redress the balance in this area also. At the same time, we offered a range of concrete proposals to the Soviet Union aimed at permitting each government to move to much lower levels of both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces. (C)

In response, the Soviet Union has focused primarily on intimidation to move us off our sound course, including implied threats, blatant attempts to drive wedges between ourselves and our allies, and the abandonment of ongoing negotiations. However, it is now clear that these efforts have failed. This has been an important factor in influencing the Soviet Union to alter its approach and agree to join us, once again, in negotiations aimed at reducing nuclear arms. While the Soviet Union can be expected to continue its extensive propaganda efforts, we must hope that the opportunity for real movement is better today than in previous years. (C)

The Soviet Union and SDI. Another important factor influencing Soviet behavior, especially in returning to nuclear arms reduction negotiations, is the Soviet desire to block our Strategic Defense Initiative as soon as possible. The Soviet Union knows that the SDI represents a major U.S. resurgence of interest in strategic defense. The USSR has long had a vigorous research, development and deployment program in defensive systems of all kinds. In fact, over the last two decades the Soviet Union has invested as much overall in its strategic defenses as it has in its massive strategic offensive buildup. As a result, today it enjoys certain relative advantages in the area of defenses. The Soviet Union will certainly attempt to protect this massive, long-term investment. (C)

The Soviet Union fully recognizes that the SDI program—and most especially, that portion of the program which

holds out the promise of destroying missiles in the boost, post-boost, and mid-course portions of their flight—offers the prospect of permitting the U.S. technologically to flank years of Soviet defensive investment and to shift the “state-of-the-art” in defenses into areas of comparative U.S. advantage. This is one of the reasons that the primary Soviet focus has not been on attacking the idea of the increased contribution of defenses to deterrence, which lies at the heart of the SDI program; but rather, on “preventing the militarization of space.” While the Soviet Union may also be concerned about other potential “space weapons” programs, in large part, its focus on space reflects an attempt to confine future U.S. defensive activity within more traditional areas which are consistent with the long-term pattern of Soviet investment and where the Soviet Union now holds a competitive advantage. (C)

The U.S. Rationale for SDI. For our part, we approach SDI from a different perspective. (C)

For the past twenty years, we have based our assumptions on how deterrence can best be assured on the basic idea that if each side were able to maintain the ability to threaten retaliation against any attack and impose on an aggressor costs that were clearly out of balance with any potential gains, this would suffice to prevent conflict. The notion of the costs needed to deter aggression have changed over time. For example, we have moved away from simply holding at risk significant portions of Soviet industry and population. Today, we don't target population. Instead, our current strategy focuses on being able to deny basic Soviet war aims by destroying the forces and leadership needed to exploit aggression. Nevertheless, our basic reliance on nuclear retaliation, provided by offensive nuclear forces, to deter aggression has not changed over this period. (C)

This basic idea—that if each side maintained roughly equal forces and equal capability to retaliate against attack, stability and deterrence would be maintained—also served as the foundation for the U.S. approach to the SALT process. At the time that process began, the U.S. concluded that offensive deterrence was not only sensible, but necessary, since we anticipated that neither side could develop the technology for a defensive system which could effectively deter the other side. The ground-based, terminal, anti-ballistic missile systems then under consideration were both expensive and uncertain, and attacking ballistic missiles during any other phase of their flight was technically infeasible. Further, we lacked the basic computational capability to process the information needed quickly enough to manage a defense against a large number of inbound warheads. (C)

Today, however, the situation is different. Emerging technologies offer the possibility of defenses that did not exist before. Of equal importance, the trends in the development of Soviet strategic forces, as well as the problems of Soviet deception and non-compliance with existing agreements, will, over the long-term, call into question the fundamental assumptions upon which our current strategy is based. (S)

The Soviet Union's relentless improvement of its ballistic missile force, providing increased prompt, hard target kill capability, steadily attacks the fundamental survivability of our land-based retaliatory forces and the leadership structure that commands them. At the same time, the Soviet Union has continued to pursue strategic advantage through the development of active defenses with increased capability to counter surviving U.S. retaliatory forces. Further, it is spending significant resources on passive defensive measures aimed at improving the survivability of

its own forces, military command structure, and national leadership—ranging from providing mobility for its latest generation of ICBMs, to constructing a network of super-hard bunkers to protect its leadership—thus further eroding the effectiveness of our offensive deterrent. (S)

These trends indicate that continued long-term U.S. dependence on offensive forces alone for deterrence will likely lead to a steady erosion of stability to the strategic disadvantage of the United States and its allies. In fact, should these trends be permitted to continue and the Soviet investment in both offensive and defensive capability proceed unrestrained and unanswered, the resultant condition will destroy the foundation on which deterrence has rested for several decades. (C)

In the near term, the SDI program directly responds to the ongoing and extensive Soviet anti-ballistic missile effort, which includes all the actual deployments permitted under the ABM Treaty. It provides a powerful deterrent to any Soviet decision to rapidly expand its ballistic missile capability beyond that contemplated by the ABM Treaty. This, in itself, is a critical task. (U)

However, the overriding importance of SDI to the United States is that it offers the possibility of radically altering the dangerous trends cited above by moving to a better, more stable basis of deterrence, and by providing new and compelling incentives to the Soviet Union for seriously negotiating reductions in existing nuclear arsenals. The Soviet Union is correct in recognizing the potential of advanced defense concepts—especially those involving boost, post-boost, and mid-course defenses—to change existing, and increasingly destabilizing, aspects of the strategic competition. This need not lead to a decisive U.S. unilateral advantage—and that is certainly not our goal.

However, if the promise of SDI is achieved, the Soviet advantage accumulated over the past twenty years at great cost will be largely neutralized. And, in the process, we will have enhanced deterrence significantly by turning to a greater reliance upon defensive systems—systems which do not threaten anyone. (C)

The Expected Soviet Approach. Over the next year, the Soviet Union may wish to shift its tactics and offer the prospect of a better U.S.-Soviet relationship in return for constraints on specific U.S. programs. However, no matter how the rhetoric may soften as the prospect of renewed negotiations looms, we should expect to be tested in different, more subtle, but just as serious ways. As a minimum, the Soviet Union will certainly continue to attempt to exploit any vulnerabilities they perceive to undermine public, allied and Congressional support for the general U.S. approach and for specific U.S. positions. (S)

The Soviet Union will likely continue to emphasize its theme of desiring to “prevent the militarization of space.” In doing so, it will attempt to block advanced technologies associated with SDI in an attempt to confine defensive developments to areas of Soviet advantage and, thus, to slow the entire thrust of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Soviet Union will also propose restraints on U.S. anti-satellite capability to inhibit or block related SDI technologies. Finally, it will likely continue to resist U.S. attempts to negotiate deep reductions in existing offensive forces, especially ballistic missiles and warheads. (S)

Expected Soviet Approach in Geneva. At the upcoming meeting in Geneva, there is a possibility that the Soviet Union will seek to be very reasonable and will take the opportunity offered by the meeting to lay the groundwork for serious negotiations in a range of areas. The U.S.

delegation will be prepared to encourage the Soviet delegation to do so. On the other hand, we should anticipate that the Soviet Union desires, at that meeting, to get an agreement on modalities and the procedures for subsequent negotiations, as well as on the subject and objectives of those negotiations, that protects existing Soviet areas of advantage and, consequently, prejudices U.S. long-term interests. The Soviet Union has already launched a sophisticated propaganda campaign designed to support this goal. (S)

The U.S. Approach. For our part, the thrust of the U.S. effort for the foreseeable future will be as follows.

1. We will continue to pursue the negotiation of equitable and verifiable agreements leading to reduction of existing nuclear arsenals, and to seek other complementary means (including cooperative and confidence-building measures) of enhancing stability and reducing the risk of war. (S)
2. As we do so, we will protect the promise offered by the ASAT/SDI program to alter the adverse, long-term prospects we now face and to provide a basis for a more stable deterrent at some future time. This specifically involves protecting those SDI technologies that may permit a layered defense, including boost, post-boost, and mid-course elements. (S)
3. Complementing this, we will also protect the U.S. strategic modernization program which is needed to maintain existing deterrence, to restore the balance of offensive forces, and to provide incentives for negotiating real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals. (S)

Characterizing the U.S. Approach. To support this approach publicly, the following paragraph can be used to characterize to the Soviet Union, the Congress, our Allies, and Western publics the basic, central concept that the U.S. is pursuing at the Geneva meetings and in subsequent negotiations. (C)

“During the next ten years, the U.S. objective is a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between offensive and defense nuclear arms, whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon an increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This period of transition could lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.” (U)

Specific U.S. Goals for the January Meeting in Geneva. The following are the specific U.S. goals for the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva in January.² (C)

1. Establish, without concessions or pre-conditions, a sustained, formal negotiating process with the Soviet Union on offensive nuclear arms which would permit us to pursue our goal of achieving deep reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. (S)
2. Keep START and INF issues substantively separate, and preferably procedurally separate if possible. (S)

3. Shape the nature of future discussions or negotiations in other areas to support U.S. interests by:

a. proposing negotiations on nuclear defensive forces, which complement those on offensive nuclear forces, with space weapons being included in both forums as appropriate;

b. avoiding a "space only" forum;

c. specifically protecting the SDI program and, thus, the promise offered by SDI; and

d. providing for future discussions about the long-term maintenance of stability and the transition to deterrence based on the contribution of defenses. (S)

4. Keep the Soviet Union on the defensive at both the private and public levels with special attention to:

a. keeping the onus on Moscow to resume serious negotiations; and

b. denying the Soviet Union a sustainable basis for charging that a "failure" of the Geneva meeting was the responsibility of the U.S. (C)

5. Avoid public negotiation with the Soviet Union. (C)

6. Lay the groundwork necessary in the discussions with the Soviet delegation to provide the basis for later garnering public and Congressional support for the U.S. position. (S)

Addressing the Offense/Defense Relationship. Early in the discussions, the U.S. delegation will provide to the Soviet delegation our conceptual thinking about the

offense/defense relationship. This presentation is critically important since it sets the stage for the U.S. proposals about format, object and substance which follow. It also should permit the U.S. to preempt Soviet charges about the U.S. SDI program by citing the record of Soviet actions which have called into question the fundamental assumptions underlying the ABM Treaty and which have contributed to the growing instability in the current situation. (S)

This presentation should make the following points:

—The United States has no territorial ambitions. It is inconceivable that the U.S. would initiate military action against the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact unless it or its allies were to be directly attacked. The U.S. hopes the Soviet Union comparably has no intention of initiating an attack on the United States or its allies.

—The United States is determined to assure itself and its allies of a high-quality deterrent to an attack by anyone on our vital security interests. The U.S. expects that the Soviet Union intends to maintain a similar capability.

—It is hard to understand why the Soviet Union places so much emphasis upon massive expansion and modernization of its nuclear forces, both offensive and defensive. The U.S. is forced thereby not to neglect its own offensive and defensive capabilities.

—Perhaps the explanation is to be found in the fact that each side looks at the nuclear strategic situation primarily from the viewpoint of its own security. Each

must assume that at some time a situation may arise in which the risk of war in the immediate future cannot be dismissed. In that situation each side will carefully analyze what it must do to deny the other side a meaningful military victory.

—Under today's conditions and those of the foreseeable future, both sides have certain incentives to act quickly and decisively with their military power, both nuclear and conventional. This creates an unstable situation which could make crises more difficult to manage and, if conflict breaks out, makes rapid, perhaps immediate, escalation to high levels of destruction more likely.

—This is a dangerous situation. It is one the U.S. and the Soviet Union must address both together and unilaterally. The political and military measures necessary to do so will be difficult for both sides. But we must tackle this problem; the danger must be defused.

—In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the U.S. hoped that both sides would be able to agree on measures which would be helpful to the security of each nation. It was accepted that each side should have rough equality in the aggregate power of its nuclear weapons systems, that if defensive capabilities were to be limited, there should be comparable limitations on offensive capabilities, and that limitations should preclude break-out, circumvention or failure to adhere to the letter and spirit of the limitations agreed upon.

—For a time it appeared that we had made some progress in that direction. As one looks at the

situation today, it appears that U.S. anticipation of such progress may have been illusory.

—Since that time, your building program—in both offensive and defensive systems—has violated any reasonable sense of strategic balance.

—And on the defensive side, the Soviet Union at least has also continued to improve its capabilities. It has done everything permitted by the ABM Treaty, and it has also taken steps we believe are almost certainly not consistent with it.

—The ABM Treaty rested importantly on the limitation of large Phased-Array Radars; these radars took five to ten years to build and were easily identifiable. The limits on such radars would assure each side against break-out or circumvention in less time than would be required for the other side to take offsetting actions.

—Allowance was made for early warning radars, but these were to be on the periphery, outward looking and should not be defended, and for radars required for space track and for national technical means of verification.

—It was also agreed that ABM interceptors, launchers, and radars should be non-mobile, non-transportable, i.e., fixed to the ground.

—It was further agreed that other systems, such as air defenses, should not be given ABM capabilities, i.e., that the line between air defenses and ABM defenses should be kept clear and unambiguous.

—Finally, it was agreed that the ABM Treaty should be accompanied by a comprehensive treaty on offensive nuclear forces of indefinite duration to parallel the ABM Treaty; it was hoped that such a treaty could be agreed in two years, and certainly within five years.

—Today all of those assumptions appear invalid.

—The five Soviet early warning radars and the Krasnoyarsk radar (which appears to be identical in physical characteristics to those for detecting and tracking ballistic missile RVs) can, if interconnected, provide a base for a nationwide defense.

—The SH-08 ABM system with its Flat Twin radar seems to be transportable. The United States has seen it erected and made operational in a relatively short period of time.

—The SA-10 and SA-X-12 anti-aircraft systems seem to have a capability against certain ballistic reentry vehicles in an intercontinental trajectory, thus blurring the distinction between air defense systems and ABM systems.

—The Soviet Union is pursuing active research programs on more advanced technologies, which have a direct application to future ballistic missile defense capabilities.

—And, most importantly, there has been no treaty of indefinite duration on offensive arms to parallel the ABM Treaty.

—For the immediate future the United States wishes to work with the Soviet Union to restore and

strengthen the regime for stability which, in 1972, was thought by both sides to be our common objective. We must negotiate the follow-on effective limitations on offensive systems called for when we signed the ABM Agreement in 1972, in order to remove the inherent instability in the present and projected array of offensive systems on both sides, and we must reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty which has taken place.

—The research, development, and deployment programs of both sides must be consistent with the ABM Treaty. The U.S. SDI program is. The Soviet program should be.

—If either side ever wishes to amend the Treaty, then there are provisions for discussing that. In the U.S. view, such discussions should precede action by sufficient time so that stability is guaranteed.

—The U.S. SDI research program is fully consistent with the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union has had a large SDI program of its own for some years. We do not believe that either country wants at this time to ban the research and concept development permitted by that Treaty. We doubt an effective ban on such activities could be designed, even if desired.

—For the long run we should have bolder and more radical objectives. Both sides seem to be agreed that with respect to nuclear weapons as a whole, the objective should be their total elimination. This should be worldwide and agreed to by all nations.

—Whenever research validates that a defensive technology can make a contribution to strengthening

deterrence, the United States would expect to discuss with the Soviet Union the basis on which it would be integrated into force structures.

—At the same time, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union recognize that we must find a safe path down the road of reductions toward disarmament. The U.S. believes that during the transition from reliance on the retaliatory capability of massive forces of offensive arms it could be extremely useful to move toward a more and more effective defense on both sides.

—It appears that new technologies may open possibilities of assuring the security of both sides through a substantial improvement in our respective defenses. To the U.S., high-confidence defenses would appear to be a sounder approach to peace and security than equal and high-confidence vulnerability to every manner of nuclear strike by the other side, and could produce a more stable offense-defense relationship.

—The United States recognizes that arms control and other forms of cooperation could play an important role in creating and sustaining such a more stable, less threatening environment. We believe that the security interests of both sides could be served by such an evolution.

—The United States also recognizes that, as Mr. Chernenko recently noted, there is an organic relationship between offensive and defensive forces. While the possibilities of a development as I have just described could be realized in the fairly distant future, U.S. is prepared to initiate a continuing

discussion with the Soviet Union now, not only on future roles for strategic defense, but also on other steps we can take to enhance strategic stability while reducing nuclear arms. (S)

The Issue of Negotiating Fora. While we should seek that negotiating approach which gives the United States the best possible negotiating leverage, in order to reduce pressure for concessions and agreement to preconditions, the immediate tactical objective of the U.S. is to obtain from the session in Geneva an agreement to begin formal negotiations on terms which do not prejudice the United States and its allies and key defense initiatives such as SDI and INF deployments. To achieve this objective, we should characterize agreement on basic negotiating structure(s), title(s), short statements describing the subject of the negotiations/discussions, starting date(s), and location(s) as a basic and necessary first step and measure of the seriousness of our mutual purpose. (S)

a. *Structure.* With respect to negotiating structure, basic U.S. objectives are: (1) to enter negotiations on nuclear offensive forces while keeping START and INF issues substantively separate, and, preferably procedurally separate as well; (2) to propose corresponding negotiations on nuclear defensive forces, which complement those on offensive nuclear forces, with space weapons being included in both forums, as appropriate; (3) to avoid a "space only" forum; and, (4) to provide a forum for future discussions about the long-term maintenance of stability and the transition to deterrence based on the contribution of defenses. (S)

The preferred U.S. negotiating structure would consist of three formal fora: separate START negotiations and INF negotiations (with these two negotiations addressing

nuclear offensive forces); and negotiations on nuclear defensive forces. In addition, the U.S. would also prefer to supplement this negotiating structure with agreement to begin ongoing discussions about the long-term maintenance of stability, the offense/defense relationship, and the transition to deterrence based on the contribution of defenses. This structure would permit us to build upon the work previously accomplished at START and INF as quickly as possible while establishing a new negotiating forum to deal with nuclear defenses and a new discussion forum to deal with related issues of concern to both sides. (S)

Should the Soviet Union not agree to this approach, the U.S. Delegation is authorized to alter the U.S. proposal along the following lines and in the following order of U.S. preference:

1. Separate negotiations on START, on INF, and on defensive forces with the latter to include nuclear and non-nuclear defenses. In this latter category of negotiations, the U.S. would continue to focus its efforts to constrain nuclear defenses.
2. Separate negotiations on nuclear offensive forces and nuclear defensive forces. Under this structure, the U.S. would seek separate START and INF subgroups to keep START and INF issues substantively separate,
3. Separate negotiations on nuclear offensive forces and on defensive forces.
4. A single negotiation on nuclear forces including nuclear offensive and defensive forces and related issues. (S)

Each of the above should also protect the U.S. desire for a forum for continued discussions about the long-term maintenance of stability, the offense/defense relationship, and the transition to deterrence based on the contribution of defenses. (C)

b. *Titles.* The preferred titles for such negotiations are implicit in the descriptions provided of the preferred negotiating structures. (C)

The Soviet Union will desire to include “space” in the title of one of the established fora. The word “space” should not appear in the description of any negotiations or discussions in a manner prejudicial to the U.S. For example, negotiations entitled Offensive and Defensive/Space Arms would be unacceptable. The title “Nuclear and Space Arms” for a single negotiation would be undesirable, but acceptable as a last resort if the Soviet Union insists on the word “space”. (S)

Difficulty with respect to titles could be resolved by avoiding agreement on specific titles, referring only to the locale such as “Geneva Talks.” (C)

c. *Describing the Negotiations/Discussions.* The preferred U.S. short descriptions of the negotiations are also implied in the discussion of structure. In descriptions of agreed fora, the delegation is authorized to include reference to space in a manner which does not single out space and which makes clear that space issues apply to both offensive and defensive systems. For example, descriptions of separate negotiations on offensive forces and on defensive forces which described as subjects of the separate negotiations “nuclear offensive forces” and “strategic defenses and space arms”, respectively, should be avoided in favor of formulations such as “strategic and

intermediate-range nuclear arms, whether based on earth or in space” and “defensive arms, whether based on earth or in space.” (S)

Other formulations which are *not* acceptable include the following:

—formulations which accept the Soviet definition of strategic arms, i.e. weapons capable of hitting Soviet territory by virtue of their location rather than their range, including third-country as well as intermediate-range systems;

—formulations which accept Soviet demands for compensation for third-country forces;³

—formulations which exclude non-European based INF systems from limitation, which accept limitations on our carrier-based aircraft or other dual-capable aircraft with a radius of action less than that of the F-111, or which remove shorter-range INF ballistic missiles from at least collateral constraints;

—formulations which accept a substantive merger of START and INF;

—formulations which would imply that the relationship between offensive and defensive systems can only be addressed in the defensive forum or that space can only be addressed in the defensive negotiations;

—formulations which accept the Soviet objective of “preventing the militarization of space”, which restrict the subject matter to just the space issues of SDI and ASAT, which imply the necessity of additional restrictions beyond those in existing treaties and

agreements on US activities in outer space, or which prejudice U.S. freedom to pursue SDI and ASAT; and,

—formulations which use the SALT II phrase “equality and equal security.” In recent weeks, some Soviet statements have used a different formulation, “equality with due account taken of the legitimate interests of parties.” While not preferred, this formulation is acceptable in the context of a general agreement which meets other primary U.S. objectives. (S)

d. *Starting Dates.* The US should seek the opening of formal negotiations during the month of March, preferably between March 5 and March 19. Selection of these dates is not essential, but is useful to permit preparation, delegation selection, and consultations with allies and the Congress. (C)

e. *Location.* The US should seek a common location for all formal negotiations, preferably in Geneva. Separate locations could be acceptable in the context of an overall package which meets primary U.S. objectives. (C)

Substantive Presentations. We are on record as being prepared to engage in substantive discussions during the Geneva meetings, and to have concrete new ideas to present at that time. Our intended presentation on the U.S. concept of the offense/defense relationship certainly provides the basis for substantive discussion; and our proposal to open negotiations on nuclear defensive systems and to continue discussions on stability are specific, concrete new ideas worthy of note. (C)

During the discussion of negotiating fora, the Soviets may attempt to initiate discussion on the substance of the

negotiating approaches the U.S. would intend to use in various fora or they may present substantive proposals of their own. In general, discussion of the substantive aspect of future U.S. negotiating positions should await the beginning of formal negotiations. Agreement to pre-conditions or substantive concessions for the purpose of reaching agreement to begin formal negotiations is not authorized. To the extent possible, we should attempt to maintain the best possible climate for entry into the formal negotiations or, if agreement is not reached on formal negotiations, to protect our leverage for continued discussions. In addition, we must be prepared to protect ourselves against Soviet accusations that the Geneva talks failed because the U.S. had nothing new to offer. (S)

The following guidance is provided on the treatment of the substantive detail associated with various issues. (C)

a. *START*. On *START*, the delegation should stress the basic flexibility and reasonableness of the elements of the current U.S. *START* position—flexibility which could not be implemented in the face of the Soviet departure from Geneva. In addition, the delegation should indicate U.S. readiness to move beyond where the last round of *START* talks were left in Geneva and to explore trade-offs between relative U.S. and Soviet advantages. (S)

With respect to *START* trade-offs, the delegation is authorized to indicate to the Soviet Union that we have extensive flexibility with respect to both structure and content of the trade-offs, so long as the outcome meets our basic standards with respect to equality, verifiability, stability, significance, and alliance security. In the context of formal negotiations, the U.S. is prepared to propose trade-offs and, in doing so, consider the use of asymmetrical limits and/or different aggregations of the

elements of an agreement in an effort to reach a satisfactory outcome. (S)

As an example of the above, the delegation is authorized to suggest that, recognizing the Soviet Union's preference for certain types of forces, the U.S. is prepared to consider a trade-off between their areas of advantage and ours. The delegation can explain that one way this could be achieved is by adding to the current U.S. proposal a specific limit on the number of air launched cruise missiles permitted to each side. The U.S. limit would be well below the number of such missiles that could be deployed on the U.S. bomber force if the Soviet Union were to agree to commensurate reductions in the destructive capability of their ballistic missiles. However, in recognition of the Soviet preference for ballistic missiles, the corresponding limit on Soviet air launched cruise missiles would be lower than that permitted the U.S. (S)

The delegation should stress that this is one example, that the U.S. has additional ideas, and that the U.S. is prepared to use these ideas to meet both Soviet and U.S. concerns in the context of formal negotiations. The delegation should again reemphasize the point that, in the context of such negotiations, the U.S. is prepared to consider the use of asymmetrical limits and different aggregations of the elements of an agreement in an effort to reach a satisfactory outcome. (S)

b. *INF*. The delegation should stress to the Soviet Union that major progress in negotiations across the board and in areas of interest to both sides would prove easier if an early breakthrough were possible in the area of INF. The delegation should also stress that we and our allies remain committed to our basic standards for evaluating an INF agreement:

- equal rights and limits expressed globally, with no export of the SS-20 threat from Europe to Asia;
- no compensation for British and French nuclear forces;
- no reduction in NATO conventional force capability; and
- effective verification. (S)

At the same time, the delegation should point out that we have demonstrated flexibility and have sought to address Soviet concerns. We believe that an agreement is possible on the basis of the September, 1983, U.S. proposals which would have provided for an equal global limit under which the United States would have considered not deploying its full global allotment in Europe.⁴ At that time, the United States also indicated its willingness to consider reductions in Pershing II missile deployments and limitations on aircraft, two major concerns of the Soviet Union. The delegation should stress that within these basic principles, and in the context of formal negotiations, the U.S. is prepared to show considerable flexibility with respect to formulation and trade-offs. For example, the U.S. can imagine an approach through which equal warhead levels could be reached through equal percentage reductions on both sides (i.e., the U.S. reducing from its planned levels of deployment—224 GLCM and Pershing II launchers carrying 572 missiles/warheads). (S)

In introducing the equal percentage reductions example, the delegation should take care not to indicate to the Soviets any acceptance of the principle of equal reductions or equal percentage reductions per se. When used in situations where there is not a beginning balance, or where

there is not agreement that the reductions will ultimately lead to equal levels of forces (as is the case in the U.S. START build-down proposal), equal percentage reductions do not lead to equal force levels. If applied in different contexts, the principle of equal reductions or equal percentage reductions could damage U.S. interests. If pressed for an endorsement of the general principle of equal reductions or equal percentage reductions, the delegation should note that while the U.S. cannot endorse the general principle, the LRINF missile issue has some unique features that, in the interest of making progress on this important issue, may make the use of the certain specific equal percentage reduction approaches acceptable to the United States and its Allies within the limited context of the LRINF missile agreement under discussion. (S)

c. Space Arms Control. In response to initiatives from the Soviet Union involving space arms control, the U.S. delegation should remind the Soviet delegation that an extensive body of international law and treaties exists with respect to space, including the Outer Space Treaty and the ABM Treaty. Further, the delegation should point out that it is the Soviet Union which has the largest number of warheads which would transit space; it is the Soviet Union which has an existing ASAT system, and it is the Soviet Union which has a deployed ABM system which can attack objects in space. The delegation should explain that the United States is prepared to consider Soviet proposals related to space during the course of formal negotiations. However, because issues involving space cannot logically be separated from the major areas to which they relate, we are only prepared to deal with these proposals in the context of nuclear offensive and defensive negotiations as appropriate to each. (S)

d. *ASAT Limitations.* The U.S. will not propose substantive ASAT initiatives at this time. If pressed by the Soviet Union for agreement to an immediate ASAT moratorium, the delegation should point out that, as the U.S. has consistently made clear, while the U.S. will not agree to such a proposal as a precondition for negotiations, in formal negotiations on the full range of nuclear arms control issues, the United States is prepared to consider areas of mutual restraint which might be negotiated in the context of a broader range of agreements which would provide for stabilizing reductions in nuclear arms. (S)

e. *Other Areas.* In other arms control areas (e.g., nuclear testing, MBFR, CBW, CDE, CD, and the full range of U.S.-proposed confidence building measures), the delegation is authorized to restate, reaffirm and explain the U.S. positions in each of these areas as appropriate. The delegation should stress the need and the U.S. desire to make progress, where possible, across this full spectrum of issues. (S)

f. *Verification and Compliance.* The delegation should stress the importance the United States attaches to effective verification of, and compliance with, arms control agreements. Further, the delegation should note that, for this reason, we have proposed specific verification, inspection and confidence building measures and have sought to have the Soviet Union resolve our very serious concerns about Soviet non-compliance. (S)

In addition, the U.S. delegation is authorized to draw upon current guidance on arms control related issues, as supplemented by this directive, to respond as necessary and appropriate, within the terms of such guidance, to serious Soviet proposals or use such guidance in countering the development of a situation which could

create a serious setback for the United States in its effort to gain support among allies and within the United States.
(C)

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, Shultz-Gromyko—January 1985 [Final NSDD—Geneva Instructions 01/01/1985] (1). Secret. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan was in Palm Springs, California, from December 29 to January 2 (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) so presumably signed the NSDD in Palm Springs. Reagan also initialed at the top of the first page. In a January 1 PROFs note, McFarlane wrote: “At the conclusion of a one hour, forty-five minute meeting with Cap, George and me, the President approved the instructions for Geneva subject to a few minor edits.” McFarlane listed the changes, which were incorporated into this final version. McFarlane instructed: “With these changes, the President has signed it. Please have a smooth prepared but do not distribute it.” (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSDD Package, 12/31/1984–01/01/1985 (1) In an undated handwritten note to Reagan on “Aboard Air Force One” stationery, likely written during their January 2 return trip to Washington, McFarlane wrote: “Mr. President, This is a ‘smooth’ version of the NSDD you’ve already signed after your meeting with Cap and George Jan 1 at Annenberg’s. Could you please sign this ‘original’. It is a verbatim reprint. Bud.”

² Shultz and Gromyko were set to meet January 7–8, 1985 in Geneva.

³ During the previous INF negotiations, the Soviet delegates argued that British and French systems should factor into reduction totals. The U.S. countered that they

had no control or negotiating power over the systems of their NATO Allies.

⁴ NSDD 104, “U.S. Approach to INF Negotiations—II,” September 21, 1983, laid out these proposals.

Documentation is scheduled for publication in [*Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. V, European Security, 1977-1983*](#).⁵

349. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 2, 1985

SUBJECT

Gromyko's Brief for Geneva

In preparing ourselves for Geneva, I thought it would be useful to put ourselves in the Soviets' shoes. Accordingly, before leaving for my wedding in Rome, I asked my Soviet experts to do a mock memorandum from Gromyko's own experts to him on strategy for the Geneva meetings. Attached is the result of this effort. I have had a chance to review and comment on it, and have added my own comments. I believe you will find it both informative and entertaining.

In undertaking this project, we contacted former Gromyko advisor (and subsequent defector) Arkadiy Shevchenko,² to learn how Gromyko's position for a meeting such as Geneva is actually developed. Shevchenko told us that Gromyko tends to work out a basic strategy on his own, without sharing his full thinking with his staff. Before a Ministerial meeting, he traditionally sends a memorandum to the Central Committee setting forth the position he intends to take in general terms, together with the texts of any formal statements he intends to make. Gromyko generally works out in advance the fallback positions to which he will be prepared to move in the course of a meeting. He decides on his own, often on the spur of the moment during the meeting itself, if and when to use these fallbacks.

In the package of draft talking points for Geneva that we provided prior to your departure for California, you have a set of contingency points for responding to arguments and proposals that Gromyko may advance.³

Attachment

Mock Memorandum for the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs⁴

“Moscow,” December 31, 1984

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Shultz

With Comrade Chernenko’s November proposal,⁵ we have abandoned our policy of shunning dialogue with the United States on the central arms control issues and made a strategic decision to reengage the Americans in negotiations. Our earlier policy, while administering the necessary shock treatment to some forces in the West, did not prove effective enough to halt the deployment of new US missiles in Western Europe. Having regained the initiative on Soviet-American arms control negotiations, we are now better positioned to achieve our objective of blocking US efforts to reverse the trends in the correlation of military forces and achieve superiority through the deployment of a large-scale, space-based ABM system.

The fact of Soviet-American negotiations has already raised expectations in the West of early progress, and this will by itself lead to Allied and Congressional pressures on the US Administration to adopt realistic positions in the talks. Our policy should therefore proceed, as in the past, on two tracks: using active measures and diplomatic contacts with healthy forces in the West to reinforce these pressures; while at the same time making a serious test in the

negotiations themselves of US readiness to move toward mutually acceptable agreements.

As is well known, the Americans have proven extraordinarily skillful these past four years in using propaganda as a device for avoiding realistic negotiating positions and for sustaining funding for new weapons programs. Thus we must be vigilant in guarding against any repetition of our experience of 1981-1983, in which the Americans used the facade of the Geneva negotiations to implement the deployment of new missiles in Western Europe. In concrete terms, this means that the USSR should resist the opening of formal negotiations unless and until there is concrete evidence that the Americans are prepared to address our concerns in a serious and equitable manner.

As their response to our June 29 Vienna Talks proposal illustrated, the Americans' priority objective at Geneva will be to reach agreement at the earliest possible date on renewed talks in separate fora on strategic and medium-range nuclear forces. They will try to avoid any commitment to serious negotiations on space weapons, and to steer the agenda of any space forum away from discussion of their "Star Wars" defense system toward, at best, cosmetic constraints on anti-satellite systems. Your goal is to foil this strategy, and specifically:

- to secure US agreement to negotiations on space arms whose "subject and objectives" are consistent with our concept of preventing the militarization of outer space;

- to consent to new talks on offensive nuclear arms only after having received satisfaction on space weapons;

—to determine, once and for all, whether the Americans are prepared to accept a ban on space-strike systems or, at a minimum, a ban on anti-satellite systems;

—to ensure that new negotiations on offensive nuclear arms take place in a forum or fora clearly distinct from the previous Geneva talks, and with an agenda that has been altered to take into account the deployment of new US medium-range missiles and our own counterdeployments;

—to determine whether the US has abandoned its pursuit of unilateral Soviet nuclear disarmament and does, in fact, have new proposals consistent with the principles of equality and equal security;

—to ensure that the responsibility for a possible failure to reach agreement at Geneva on the subject and objectives for new negotiations clearly lies with the US.

Setting

Your meeting follows a year in which, on the one hand, American propaganda and diplomatic statements have claimed that the US favors arms control, while on the other hand, the pace of the US military build-up has continued to accelerate: Pershing II and GLCM deployments continue to proceed in the UK, FRG and Italy; the first of thousands of long-range ALCMs have begun to be deployed on US heavy bombers, while work proceeds on the B-1 and “Stealth” bombers; despite Congressional pressures, the MX program continues, and new first-strike missiles (Midgetman, Trident II) are in active development; and

hundreds of nuclear-armed SLCMs have begun to enter the US naval fleet.

Most importantly, despite US denials, it is clear from the US defense budget that President R. Reagan has decided to lay the basis for deployment of a large-scale ABM system in space. To camouflage US intentions, the US has launched a hypocritical, slanderous campaign regarding alleged “violations” of existing agreements by the Soviet Union.

In his meeting with you in September, and in his letters to Comrade Chernenko, President Reagan has sought to put a positive face on these contradictory actions, resorting to the traditional “positions of strength” logic of the arms race. It is, of course, possible that his expressions of interest in reaching arms control agreements are sincere—most American Presidents want to leave a “peacemaker” legacy for the historians. Moreover, in his meeting with you he seemed to have a greater grasp of arms control issues than we anticipated.

But the fact remains that the US Government is deeply divided, and that the competing schools of thought documented by American journalist S. Talbott in his book *Smertel 'niye Proiski* remain entrenched in the Departments of State and Defense.⁶ There is no evidence that the President has decided to overrule the opponents of arms control headed by C. Weinberger and R. Perle in favor of the realistic forces headed by G. Shultz and R. Burt. If anything, the evidence points the other way:

—Although R. Reagan, in his meeting with you, broached the idea of an interim agreement that would constrain ASATs while beginning a process of reducing nuclear arms, this proposal was not reaffirmed in subsequent communications with

Chairman Chernenko, and seems to have been contradicted by US public statements since then.

—Despite repeated hints since your Stockholm meeting with G. Shultz that the US has “new ideas” on strategic arms reductions, these ideas have never materialized. According to S. Talbott, the President’s approval for the so-called “framework” proposal—which might have provided the basis for an agreement—was rescinded after Stockholm once the Pentagon discovered the State Department’s gambit.

—Recent efforts at manipulating the US press by a “senior Administration official” (R. McFarlane), as well as speeches by C. Weinberger and others, have conveyed the clear message that the US is committed to deployment of its “Star Wars” defense system, and is not prepared to put it on the bargaining table in new negotiations.⁷

—Perhaps most importantly, despite encouraging rumors that circulated in Washington immediately following the US elections, there have been no personnel changes in the arms control policy apparatus. Among the President’s senior arms control advisors remain R. Lehman, formerly R. Perle’s senior deputy, and K. Adelman, who has just published a notorious article advocating “Arms Control Without Agreements.”⁸

Your interlocutor at Geneva, G. Shultz, is a man of good will, according to Ambassador Dobrynin, but we should not overestimate the differences between his views on dealing with the USSR and those of President Reagan or C. Weinberger. In any case, his flexibility is likely to be severely constrained, as the entire “Senior Arms Control

Policy Group” will be traveling with him to monitor his behavior. Moreover, Shultz has appointed P. Nitze as a Special Advisor on arms control: while Nitze was an energetic and intelligent interlocutor for Comrade Kvitsinskiy in the medium-range missile negotiations, he is also the spiritual father of the infamous Committee on the Present Danger and, as such, close in outlook to the Pentagon.

Thus, the prospects for the Geneva meeting are not bright. You should be prepared for hard bargaining over the subject and objectives of new negotiations. It is very possible that the Americans will not be prepared for talks on terms that we can accept, and therefore that we will not be able to announce agreement on the opening of formal negotiations at Geneva. Given the Reagan Administration’s demonstrated capacity to hoodwink the American public and its overseas allies as to its true aims and purposes, it is not advisable to exclude the possibility of another meeting at foreign ministers’ level sometime in the future. But you should be prepared to defer agreement on a date for another meeting if you judge the American position to be wholly without substance.

Our Strategy

Lack of progress at Geneva may work to our advantage: If we can convince Western publics and US Allies that the US refused to follow through on its November 22 commitment to begin serious negotiations on space arms,⁹ then pressures will grow in the weeks following Geneva for the US to take a more reasonable stance. In fact, it is possible that the US Congress will do some of our work for us, curtailing funds for ASAT and SDI, as well as MX and other strategic programs.

To ensure that this is the case, we should coordinate the efforts of our propaganda apparatus and those of the fraternal countries in order to expose the duplicitousness of US policy and to refute the likely charges that the USSR has set preconditions for beginning talks. (The Warsaw Pact summit in Sofia, now scheduled for the week following the Geneva meetings, will provide an occasion to set forth the agreed line we expect our allies to follow.)

At the Geneva meeting itself, this means that you should take a resolute stance at the level of principle, while showing just enough tactical flexibility to keep the onus on G. Shultz to come forward with ideas that meet our concerns. Thus, your position should be based on the following elements:

—The *central message* you will want to get across is that the Soviet Union is now ready for serious negotiations, that we have made a forthcoming gesture in proposing the Geneva meetings, and that it is therefore incumbent on the United States to make the first move on substance.

—As your *basic themes*, you should stress how US plans to deploy a space-based ABM system are the principal threat to peace and strategic stability, that preventing the militarization of outer space is the most urgent question before us, and that US refusal to negotiate seriously on space arms will render pointless efforts to negotiate reductions in nuclear arms.

—On *outer space arms*, you should press for acceptance of the goal of banning all space-strike systems, and denounce US attempts to establish a more vague or narrowly-focused agenda as inadequate, and as a cynical scheme to deceive public opinion.

—We must recognize that we are unlikely to get a US commitment to stop its “Star Wars” program in its tracks, although we should try to create as many obstacles as possible. Thus, as a fallback, you should be prepared to accept a negotiation whose stated objective is to ban ASAT systems (and does not explicitly address space-based ABM systems), but only on the following conditions:

—that the US publicly reaffirm the commitment it made to British Prime Minister M. Thatcher that it will continue to adhere to the ABM Treaty and that any changes will be a matter for negotiations;

—and that the US renounce all plans to deploy nuclear arms in space.

—If the US is not prepared to agree to anything but the most general formulation of subject and objectives for space negotiations, you should withhold agreement to beginning new offensive arms negotiations.

—On *offensive nuclear arms* per se, you should stress the unacceptability of previous US proposals, and the need to respect the principle of equality and equal security. Any formulation of subject and objectives for offensive arms talks should at least implicitly reflect this principle, and avoid language that would imply a change in our principled positions on forward-based and third-country systems, or on the geographic scope of limits on medium-range systems.

—You should also make clear that US Pershing II and GLCM deployments have altered the strategic situation, and that any future agreements should have as their objective restoring the balance through removal of these new US first-strike weapons; in that context, Soviet

countermeasures could be withdrawn, and SS-20s reduced to the level of British and French systems consistent with previous proposals. As a first step, you should propose an immediate freeze on US deployments and Soviet counterdeployments.

—By the same token, you should state that, absent US agreement to remove its Pershings and GLCMs, the USSR would have to reconsider its offer in START to reduce strategic forces to 1800 launchers. (Ultimately, we may decide to enter into an agreement that would formally permit some US deployments to remain; there is no reason to reveal any flexibility on this question, however, until there is evidence that the US is prepared to address our concerns in other respects.)

—On format for new negotiations, the Americans will likely seek separate fora to address nuclear and space arms; in the case of the former, they will seek to reconstitute the Geneva “START” and “INF” negotiations that they torpedoed through deployment of Pershing II and GLCM in Western Europe. Your position should be that it is impossible to treat offensive nuclear arms and space-strike systems in isolation from one another; they are organically linked, and thus should be addressed in a single framework.

—If, however, the Americans prove willing to accommodate our concerns on the subject and objectives of space arms negotiations, you could as a gesture of good will agree to separate fora for nuclear and space arms. In this case, however, you should make clear that agreements cannot be reached in the former absent achievement of a ban on space-strike systems in the latter.

—You should also resist the reestablishment of separate negotiating fora to address strategic nuclear arms and medium-range systems in Europe. This would contradict our principled position that US deployments made the previous Geneva talks impossible, and obscure the fact that we are commencing *new* negotiations.

—Again, however, if the American position on space arms negotiations is reasonably forthcoming, you should be prepared to suggest flexibility in fora for nuclear arms negotiations, as long as the agreed subject and objectives make clear that the agenda is different from that of the former Geneva talks.

In short, you will want to make clear that the Soviet Union has made a decision to reengage the United States in negotiations, but at the same time hold out as long as possible to see what concessions can be squeezed out of the Americans.

Non-Arms Control Subjects

G. Shultz has suggested that time be set aside to discuss topics other than those agreed on in the November 22 joint statement. You have deflected this suggestion, but he may raise it again, since he undoubtedly feels pressure to say he has raised humanitarian issues with you. You should make a judgment at that time as to whether such discussion at Geneva would be to our advantage.

—On the one hand, it is sure to be unpleasant, and the Americans tend to advertise exchanges on such topics to deflect attention from their unwillingness to treat the arms race seriously.

—On the other hand, having no discussion on these topics weakens G. Shultz personally. Allowing relations in these areas to move forward with some normality in fact focuses attention on the abnormal situation in the disarmament field resulting from the American search for military superiority.

Press Handling After the Meetings

We will want to issue a TASS Statement providing our post-mortem assessment as soon as possible after the meetings, since the Americans are likely to try to shape the Western press's accounts through a "backgrounder." Such a statement would emphasize that the Soviet Union came to Geneva prepared for radical steps, but the Americans did not, and announce whatever follow-up meetings may have been agreed.

In the event the meeting ends with matters at a complete impasse, you might want to consider holding a press conference in order to make clear that the failure of the meeting was the result of US intransigence, and to encourage other western governments and publics to put pressure on the Americans to rethink their position.

Informing the Central Committee

If you agree with the approach outlined above, we will turn the preceding points into a memorandum to the Central Committee informing them of the approach you intend to take at Geneva.¹⁰

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 13, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (1/1/1985-1/17/1985); NLR-775-13-1-1-5. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow on December 31, 1984; cleared by Simons, Palmer, Pifer, Timbie, and Courtney. Forwarded through Armacost. A handwritten note in the margin reads: "Text same as State 004 (Tosec 200055)."

² Shevchenko defected to the United States in April 1978, the highest-ranking official to leave the Soviet Union.

³ This draft of the talking points was not found; however, the final briefing book for Shultz is in Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz-Gromyko at Geneva, January 1985.

⁴ Secret; Sensitive; Czar. Drafted by Vershbow; cleared by Simons, Palmer, and Pifer. As Burt explained to Shultz in his covering memorandum, this is a "mock" memorandum by Vershbow who used the name A.A. Vershbovich of the fictitious "USA Department" as the sender of the memorandum.

⁵ See [Document 310](#).

⁶ Strobe Talbott's book, *Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control*, was published in September 1984.

⁷ See [footnote 3, Document 339](#). See also Leslie Gelb, "Space Arms: The Choices: U.S. Bargaining Chip or Essential Defense," *New York Times*, December 26, 1984, p. A1.

⁸ See [footnote 7, Document 319](#).

⁹ See [footnote 8, Document 314](#).

¹⁰ Since this was a mock memorandum, Gromyko did not indicate approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

350. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, January 3, 1985

SUBJECT

Gorbachev Accepts Invitation to Visit U.S.

The attached report from Clair George (TAB II)² indicates that Gorbachev has accepted an invitation from a U.S. business executive to visit the U.S. during March-April, 1985.³ It states further that the business executive was informed indirectly that during his trip he would like to meet privately with U.S. officials, but would not request such meetings through official channels because of the private nature of his trip. Finally, it specifies how the message should be answered: by Shultz indicating to Gromyko that he understands Gorbachev is planning a private trip to the U.S. and that he and other U.S. officials would like to invite him for discussions in Washington.

Though the report is not specific on this score, the business executive involved is obviously Dwayne O. Andreas, President of Archer Daniels Midland Co. and U.S. Co-Chairman of the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council (USTEC). According to Jim Giffen, President of USTEC—who contacted me when they returned from their trip to Moscow—Andreas extended the invitation to Gorbachev during their meeting with him in early December, at which time Gorbachev refused to commit himself, joking about American impatience when he was pressed for a reply.⁴

Comments:

1. The message conveyed appears authentic, and the manner of its conveyence is typical of the way the Soviets go about these things.
2. It would appear that, buoyed by the “success” of his visit to London,⁵ Gorbachev moved quickly to pick up an invitation to the U.S., but did so in a way which permits us to propose whatever official level we desire. At the same time, it relieves us of the concern that a direct invitation to Gorbachev could be construed as an attempt to bypass either Chernenko or Gromyko.
3. It should also be noted that, in handling the invitation in this fashion, Gorbachev still retains some options. He could, for example, pull out if something goes wrong from the Soviet point of view, without having anything regarding the trip on the official record.
4. Nevertheless, his acceptance of the invitation is a signal that the Soviets expect some sort of agreement to negotiate arms control issues to emerge from the Geneva meetings. The Soviets are probably also aware that a visit at that time could affect Congressional consideration of MX and SDI funding—not to speak of scheduled ASAT testing. Given his performance in London, we can expect a much more articulate presentation of the Soviet point of view to the American public than we have had to face from senior Soviet officials in the past.
5. From an internal political point of view, this message is a solid indication that Gorbachev is at the moment riding high as heir apparent, and the leadership is willing to tolerate his taking on an increasingly high profile in foreign

travel. (Nothing could be higher profile than a trip to the U.S.)

6. Although we must be aware of the way the Soviets can use a Gorbachev visit to “humanize” and rationalize their policies with the American public, I believe that we really have no choice but to put out the welcome mat. (If word got out that we had turned off a desired visit, the impact could be devastating.) For that reason, I believe that you and Secretary Shultz should pass a message through Gromyko indicating that the President and other officials would be pleased to receive him when he visits. In fact, it would probably be desirable to indicate that if Gorbachev prefers to visit the U.S. officially, we would be pleased to arrange an official invitation. The advantage of an official invitation would be that it would act as some constraint on critical public statements.

There are potential problems with an official invitation, however. Gorbachev’s closest formal counterpart on the governmental side is the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations committee. In order to head off a possible move to invite him to address a joint session of Congress (crazier ideas than this repeatedly emanate from the Hill!), it would be preferable to have the Vice President invite him. Still, the President should see him, and probably should give him treatment at least on a par with that accorded Gromyko last November.⁶ Purists will object to according quasi chief-of-government treatment to a person who is, aside from his thin “parliamentary” cover, merely a senior Communist Party official. Nevertheless, the public and media will not see it this way—indeed, they will play it as virtually a summit meeting—and for this reason I believe we should not allow ourselves to be excessively hung up by protocolary considerations.

7. Finally, I would observe that, until we have worked out all the details with the Soviets, it will be imperative to keep this matter on the *closest possible hold*. Andreas, and perhaps Giffen, are already involved, outside the USG, but I believe we should not communicate our intentions to them until we have worked out the arrangements with the Soviets. The last thing we need is a lot of media speculation in advance.

Recommendation:

That the matter be discussed very privately with the President, the Vice President and Secretary Shultz, and if they concur, that the Secretary and you discuss the matter privately with Gromyko at Geneva, using the talking points at TAB I.⁷

¹ Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1985, 400005. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action. The memorandum is incorrectly dated January 3, 1984. In a handwritten cover note to Poindexter dated January 3, Matlock wrote: "John—this report reached me only this afternoon. I am not sure that either you or Bud have seen it. It is of sufficient importance and sensitivity that I think Bud should discuss it with the President—privately if possible—tomorrow. I believe that it should not be disseminated to members of the SACG at this point since it requires the most delicate—and confidential—handling—Jack."

² Dated December 21, 1984; attached but not printed.

³ Andreas had written to Gorbachev on November 18, suggesting that he visit the United States to tour various agricultural operations and facilities in the spring of 1985. See [Document 364](#).

⁴ Giffen met with Gorbachev on December 3 and gave him the letter from Andreas.

⁵ See [Documents 337](#) and [341](#).

⁶ On another copy of this memorandum, Matlock crossed out November and wrote "September" in the margin. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron January 1985 (1/4))

⁷ Tab I is not attached. McFarlane did not indicate approval or disapproval of the recommendation. No record was found of a discussion with Reagan, Bush, or Shultz. Shultz, however, raised the issue with Gromyko in Geneva. See [Document 362](#).

**351. Memorandum From the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane) to President Reagan¹**

Washington, January 4, 1985

SUBJECT

U.S.-USSR Economic Working Group of Experts Meetings in Moscow

Issue

Whether to approve a set of U.S. positions for the U.S.-USSR Economic Working Group of Experts meetings in Moscow (January 8-10) and to sign an NSDD which would establish specific guidelines for the U.S. delegation to Moscow.

Facts

In May 1984, you renewed for 10 years the U.S.-USSR Long-Term Agreement for Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation and approved resurrecting, under Article III of the agreement, periodic meetings of a bilateral working group of experts to exchange information and forecasts of basic economic, industrial and commercial trends. The meetings in Moscow scheduled for January 8-10 would be the first meeting of the working group of experts in six years. A major objective of these working level meetings is to determine if there are sufficient grounds for a meeting of the U.S.-USSR Joint Commercial Commission (JCC) which would be chaired on the U.S. side by Secretary Baldrige and on the Soviet side by Trade Minister Patolichev. The SIG-IEP has been responsible for

coordinating preparations for the working group meetings, identifying potential opportunities for expanding non-strategic trade relations with the USSR, and coordinating recommended agency positions for the U.S. delegation on five issues likely to be raised by the Soviets. In addition, it was agreed at the SIG that the U.S. delegation to Moscow should seek changes in discriminatory Soviet practices against U.S. firms.

The SIG-IEP concurred that the delegation should express a U.S. willingness to discuss possible resolution of five specific issues in the appropriate fora if there is a reciprocal Soviet willingness to improve prospects for expanded U.S. non-strategic exports to the USSR. These five issues are: the ban on Soviet furskins, a Cuban nickel certification arrangements, aeroflot landing rights, port access regulations, and the bilateral protocol tax treaty.

Discussion

The SIG-IEP has been effective in developing a consensus among the agencies on the positions the U.S. delegation should take on each of these five issues. Commerce, State, Treasury, NSC, Agriculture, Transportation, and USTR all concurred that the U.S. delegation should:

- Indicate to the Soviets a willingness to discuss options with the U.S. Congress to lift the furskins ban if the Soviets are prepared to improve business conditions and prospects for U.S. firms.
- Reiterate a recent Treasury offer to resolve the Cuban nickel certification issue.
- Indicate a U.S. willingness to begin discussion of civil aviation matters, but only after receiving a

favorable Soviet response to U.S.-Japan proposals on North Pacific safety measures, and with the understanding that any restoration of Aeroflot service would have to be part of a package offering a true balance of concessions for U.S. carriers.

- Respond to any Soviet inquiry on port access procedures by informing them of our willingness to discuss this question in our traditional maritime framework. (Transportation stressed that the Soviets must be told such discussions would have to encompass U.S. maritime industry interests.)
- Indicate to the Soviets a U.S. willingness to move forward on the unsigned 1981 tax protocol, but noting that changes may have to be made.

Defense did not provide specific views on these five issues. Instead, Secretary Weinberger sent a separate letter to Secretary Regan, in his capacity as Chairman of the SIG-IEP, expressing serious reservations about the merit of a U.S. trade mission to Moscow at this time. A number of valid cautionary points are made in Cap's correspondence in which he:

- Agrees with the general concept of promoting non-strategic trade but strongly doubts that the Soviets are really interested in aspects of trade other than strategic technology and that they will seek to turn this non-strategic U.S. trade initiative against us.
- Claims that a U.S. trade mission to Moscow is likely to stimulate political pressures, particularly among the allies, for more strategic trade despite the stated objectives of this mission.

- Indicates that even the prospects of U.S.-Soviet trade talks has already triggered a reaction among our COCOM partners unhelpful to our interest in strengthening the COCOM process and enforcement measures against the diversion of strategic technology.
- Expresses strong support for the U.S. delegation taking a firm position on human rights issues in its meetings with Soviet officials in Moscow.

In the initial planning stages for these Moscow meetings, Commerce, with the support of some other agencies, was interested in actively promoting expanded sales of U.S. oil and gas equipment to the USSR. This objective is being aggressively pursued by the Soviets as well as the U.S.-Soviet Trade and Economic Council (USTEC). Over the course of the preparatory meetings, it was pointed out to Commerce that we are walking a very fine line in the energy area between expanding U.S. energy equipment sales to the USSR and preserving the integrity of our security-minded allied consensus on the strategic aspects of East-West economic relations including a strict limit on Soviet gas deliveries to Western Europe (to interrupt the Soviet strategy of dominating European gas markets while earning large amounts of hard currency), the termination of subsidized terms on credits, and an overall strengthening of COCOM. It was agreed that to avoid sending inconsistent signals to the allies and the USSR, oil and gas equipment will not be an area in which the U.S. should agree to an active program of trade expansion pending further policy clarification by you. My staff is now preparing a policy assessment of a comprehensive CIA study on the strategic implications of the Soviet energy strategy toward the West as well as other key aspects of East-West economic relations. Finally, a strong U.S. position

on human rights issues has been formulated for inclusion in the U.S. delegation's discussion in Moscow. It should be recalled that controls on U.S. oil and gas equipment sales to the USSR have traditionally been linked to human rights conditions in the Soviet Union.

Recommendation

That you approve the U.S. positions on the five issues likely to be raised by the Soviets during the Moscow meetings (furskins ban, nickel certification arrangement, aeroflot landing rights, port access regulations and the protocol tax treaty). Commerce, State, NSC, Agriculture, Transportation, Treasury and USTR support approval. Defense takes no specific position.

That you sign the NSDD at Tab A which provides specific instructions and guidelines for the U.S. delegation to the Moscow meetings on January 8-10.²

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Roger Robinson Files, Chronological File, Robinson Chron January 1985-February 1985; NLR-487-11-29-3-5. Sent for action. Prepared by Robinson. Poindexter initialed the memorandum for McFarlane.

² Reagan approved both recommendations. He signed NSDD 155, "U.S.-Soviet Economic and Commercial Relations," on January 4. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 155, [U.S.-Soviet Economic and Commercial Relations])

352. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Gromyko—Revised Scope Paper

Your Objectives at Geneva

The November 22 Joint Announcement characterizes the main purpose of your meeting with Gromyko as reaching “common understanding as to the subject and objectives” for new negotiations on nuclear and space arms.² Your primary goal is to reach agreement on the fora, dates and locations for the new talks and, if possible, on agreed formulations regarding the agenda for the talks. You will also present U.S. views on how to move towards a safer future.

While we should not be overly optimistic, it may be possible by the end of your two days with Gromyko to reach agreement on a joint communique announcing the opening of new negotiations. As part of that process, it will also be desirable to reach agreement with Gromyko on your next Ministerial meeting, preferably in Moscow. He is likely to be interested, so you will probably not be in the position of demandeur on this. The only variable is the timing of such a meeting: if we have failed to agree on formal negotiations, it should take place fairly soon after Geneva (late February); if we have succeeded, however, it could take place somewhat later (late March).

In any event, we will want to be in a position to secure Allied, Congressional and public support for our position in the succeeding weeks, when the campaign will move from the diplomatic to the public arena.

Tactics for the Geneva Discussions

You should structure your presentation in a manner which supports our objective of reaching agreement by the end of the two-day meeting on the initiation of formal negotiations. Gromyko is likely to take up considerable time with his opening presentations, which are likely to be long-winded restatements of familiar arguments and positions; translation time will slow the pace of the discussions further (our side will be equipped for simultaneous translation, but the likelihood that Gromyko will acquiesce in it is remote).

Although we may wish to explore the Soviet presentations, if we are to move beyond set-piece presentations to actual negotiation of a joint communique the second day, we will need to put our positions—on both format and substance—on the table at an early stage in the discussions. This will give the Soviets time to consider our ideas overnight and to obtain any necessary guidance from Moscow to negotiate agreed formulations of subjects and objectives for new talks that would form the basis of a communique. The sequence recommended below is designed to ensure this is the case. In brief:

—At the *first session*, you would present our conceptual thinking on the offense/defense relationship, using the approach developed by Paul Nitze.³ Following Gromyko's initial remarks and your initial response to them, you would have the option of setting forth our opening position on the

format for negotiations (alternatively, this could be done at the beginning of the afternoon session—pros and cons are discussed below).

—At the *second session*, you would proceed from the discussion of format to a presentation of our substantive ideas on START, INF and defensive arms. In particular, you would highlight the positive new ideas embodied in your instructions:⁴

—readiness to go beyond where we left off in START through one or more of the following approaches: asymmetrical limits and/or new forms of aggregation, such as you suggested at Stockholm;

—readiness to explore various approaches in INF;

—readiness to address space-related issues in both offensive and defensive arms negotiations; and

—(if Gromyko has raised ASAT) readiness to consider mutual restraints on ASATs in formal negotiations in the context of stabilizing reductions in offensive forces.

At the end of the session, following Gromyko's remarks and his reaction to our ideas, you would return to the format question with the aim of moving toward agreement on the fora for new talks (presenting our fallback positions as necessary).

—Day one will, hopefully, have ended with a mutual understanding of each side's position and the extent of its flexibility. At the *third session*, therefore, discussion would move from prepared presentations to real give-and-take. Your aim would be to nail down agreement on dates and locations—and to the extent possible, agreed subjects and

objectives—for new negotiations, to reach accord on another Ministerial meeting, and to negotiate the text of a joint communique. You would also exchange thoughts with Gromyko on how each side intends to portray the meetings to the press.

The text of any communique will obviously have to be worked out on the scene (your talking points include notional drafts reflecting different possible outcomes, and these could be fine-tuned the night of January 7, based on that day's discussions, and negotiated with the Soviets on January 8). At an appropriate time (either at the close of the Monday afternoon session or mid-way through the Tuesday morning session), you could suggest that one or two members of each delegation split off from the group to begin drafting a communique as a basis for final negotiation by you and Gromyko.

Depending upon the need for continued discussion on the communique or other issues, you would have the option of continuing in a brief session in that afternoon.

Issue: When to present our opening position on format?

As noted above, you have the option of presenting our opening position at the end of the first session Monday morning, or at the beginning of the afternoon session (your talking points currently reflect the latter alternative). There are advantages to both approaches:

—Presenting our ingoing formula on format (START, INF, defensive nuclear arms) in the morning would give the Soviets the lunch break during which to consider the proposal. With their reaction in the afternoon, we would perhaps be able to get into some give-and-take on negotiating fora, drawing on our fallback formulations as

appropriate, so that the first day's discussions would end with both sides' cards all on the table. This would maximize the chances for successfully negotiating a joint communique the second day.

—Holding presentation of our ingoing formula until the afternoon session on Monday would ensure that there was plenty of time during the morning for an exhaustive exchange at the conceptual level on the offense-defense relationship. Moreover, presenting our ideas on format and substance at the same time could give the Soviets a clearer picture of where we are prepared to go in offensive and defensive arms talks. This could make them more receptive to an offense/defense format than they would be if they had heard only the procedural aspects of our approach.

Non-Arms Control Discussion

It would be extremely useful to be able in the aftermath of the meeting to point to exchanges with Gromyko on non-arms control topics, to counter the public perception that arms control is the whole US-Soviet relationship. (The President has asked that you reiterate his simulated space rescue mission proposal in Geneva, and we have included this under your defensive arms talking points).⁵

The two most urgent issues are Hebrew teachers, which you discussed with Shamir, and Shcharanskiy, which Mike Armacost has discussed with his wife here. Gromyko has been alerted that you may raise V-E Day commemorations, and he may well be interested. This could provide you some leverage to get such issues discussed, but since a heavy focus on arms control is at least partly to the Soviet advantage, Gromyko has so far deflected your suggestion that time be set aside for such exchanges on other topics.

Discussion will therefore be short in any event, and the best format would be the “headlines” you and Gromyko used in September. After the first morning session covering the two sides’ initial remarks on arms control, you will have the discretion of raising these non-arms control issues either at the second session that afternoon or at the third session on the following day at whatever point you believe it would be most appropriate.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz-Gromyko at Geneva, January 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow on January 5; cleared by Simons, Palmer, Pifer, Schwartz (PM/SNP), Chain, Nitze, and McFarlane. Palmer initialed for all clearing officials. This memorandum was the first document in the Secretary’s briefing book for his trip to Geneva. The book also contains schedules and other papers to prepare for Shultz’s meetings with Gromyko.

² See [footnote 8, Document 314](#).

³ See [Document 343](#).

⁴ See [Document 348](#).

⁵ Reagan made this proposal in his statement on signing into law P.L. 98-562, October 30, 1984, on cooperative East-West ventures in space. See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book I, p. 1687.

353. Memorandum From President Reagan to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

Washington, January 5, 1985

SUBJECT

JCS Views on NSDD-153 (U)

Bud McFarlane has provided me with General Vessey's memorandum to you concerning NSDD-153.² Throughout the preparations for Geneva, I have paid particular attention to the views of General Vessey and the Joint Chiefs. I continue to place great value in their opinions. And, for that reason, I thought it would be valuable to share with you my reactions to their memorandum. (U)

The original version of the NSDD which we initially discussed in California on December 31 did not contain the two examples in question.³ It was in the context of our follow-on discussion, that we reached the conclusion that we may need to be able to go a bit further than simply restating our current positions in START and INF. Only after discussing these additions with George, Bud, and you, did I approve that addition of the authorization to present the material cited by the JCS as examples of where the U.S. might be willing to go in the context of formal negotiations. (S)

The START example selected is an option that was suggested by Ed Rowny and that has been a part of our ongoing review since March 1984. Ed's proposal would have had us specifically propose limits on ALCM carrying aircraft as a means of limiting ALCMs. The JCS support limits on ALCM carrying aircraft, others oppose. When we included this example, we intentionally generalized the

idea a bit to talk about asymmetrical limits on ALCMs, without specifying how these limits would be imposed, so that we would not unnecessarily prejudge this issue.⁴ (S)

With respect to the INF example, the JCS express concern that the decision to use this example may not have been made with a full awareness of the potential risks involved. We discussed the idea of equal percentage reductions at the last NSPG on Geneva held prior to Christmas.⁵ I was able to draw upon this fully in understanding the disadvantages, as well as the advantages, of this approach.⁶ (S)

Would you please assure General Vessey and the Joint Chiefs that I am aware of the concerns expressed to you. I am confident that our delegation is also extremely mindful of the pitfalls we must avoid. Nevertheless, I am willing to modify my earlier guidance (as below) to take their concerns into account. But I must say that in so doing, I believe we have substantially increased the risk of an unsatisfactory outcome. (S)

The following instructions substitute for guidance contained in NSDD-153.⁷ (S)

—Delete the penultimate paragraph in subsection “a. START” on page 14 and replace with the following:

“Tradeoffs would involve an exchange between the area in which we hold an advantage (i.e., bomber systems) and the area in which they hold an advantage (i.e., ICBM systems). We can imagine a number of possibilities for specific tradeoffs between these areas and will be prepared to discuss them when formal negotiations convene.”

—Delete the balance of subsection “b. INF” after the last sentence which begins at the bottom of page 14 and replace with the following:

“We can imagine a number of ways through which we could arrive at equal global limits. We have considered equal percentage reductions applied to launchers, adoption of various absolute equal limits, asymmetrical reductions, and many others. Each of these have problems associated with them. But drawing on the work we have conducted in the past year, we believe a solution can be found, and we will be prepared to discuss the possibilities when formal talks are convened.” (S)

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, December Chron File. Top Secret; King. A copy was sent to Shultz. In a January 5 covering memorandum to Reagan, McFarlane wrote: “Mr. President, the plain facts are these. You, I, George and others have stated publicly that we will be going to Geneva with new ideas; that we will be flexible and constructive. If we arrive and simply restate our existing position without even an explanation of what we are talking about, we face the high likelihood that the Soviets will make that public, charge us with bad faith, and we will be held responsible for the impasse.” Additional passages from McFarlane’s memorandum are provided in footnotes below.

² For NSDD 153, see [Document 348](#). In a January 4 memorandum to Weinberger, Vessey wrote that the Joint Chiefs “believe that the section in the negotiating instructions entitled ‘Substantive Presentations’ should not authorize the delegation to provide examples of US

flexibility in either START or INF discussions.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 153, [Shultz-Gromyko Meeting in Geneva, 01/01/1985]. In his memoir, Shultz recalled: on “January 5, we were on board USAF 972 on the way to Geneva. The press dubbed us ‘the ship of feuds.’ Just before takeoff, Cap had given me a memo from the Joint Chiefs saying I should not draw upon any material from our agreed START and INF negotiating positions with Gromyko. That was absolutely contrary to my instructions from the president, to which Cap had agreed. Cap was trying to use the chiefs as a way to narrow my authorized running room. It was too late.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 512)

³ See [Documents 347](#) and [348](#).

⁴ In his memorandum to Reagan (see [footnote 1](#), above), McFarlane wrote: “Concerning START, the idea of our willingness to discuss ‘tradeoffs’ is not new. Ed Rowny made that offer before they walked out. Since the walk-out, we have stated many times publicly that we are willing to discuss tradeoffs. You told Gromyko that we would be ready to discuss tradeoffs. Our objective, then, is to be able to explain in general terms what we mean by tradeoffs without giving anything away or rewarding the Soviets for walking out.” He then agreed to new guidance on START (see [footnote 7](#), below) and commented: “Anything less than an expression like this—which gives absolutely nothing away—will leave us wide open to a charge of bad faith and give the Soviets an enormous propaganda advantage.”

⁵ See [Document 334](#).

⁶ In his memorandum to Reagan (see [footnote 1, above](#)), McFarlane wrote: “With regard to the INF example, again, we are very mindful of the pitfalls of choosing a particular path toward ‘equal global entitlements.’ The NSDD explains those pitfalls in great detail so that no one on the delegation could have any illusions about it. But if we only

restate our current position, without even explaining how we might make it work, we will be terribly vulnerable. I believe that the instructions you approved which mention 'equal percentage reductions' as an example of how to reach equality, provide the best course. But I am willing to accept a more general formula." (See [footnote 7, below](#).) He continued: "Again, this gives absolutely nothing away—indeed; there is a possibility that they may get up and leave at hearing such a thin explanation of the results of a year's work which we have characterized as 'new ideas' and 'flexibility.' Consequently, I recommend reluctantly that you approve the modified instructions to incorporate these formulations." Reagan agreed with McFarlane's recommendations, as he initialed his agreement to send the "short note to Cap" that "provides modified guidance" based on the JCS recommendations.

⁷ The changes are verbatim from Vessey's January 4 memorandum to Weinberger. See [footnote 2](#), above.

354. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State¹

Geneva, January 6, 1985, 2208Z

Secto 1010. For S/S only. Subject: Message for SecDef Weinberger From Richard Perle.

1. S—(Entire text).
2. Richard Perle delivered the message in para 3 to us for transmission to Weinberger.²
3. Begin text: To the Secretary of Defense From Richard Perle

Eyes Only for the Secretary.

Much of the time since departure, on the aircraft and since arrival, has been spent reviewing draft talking points.³ A meeting with Secretary Shultz and the delegation has just concluded. I would summarize developments thus far as follows:

—Tone of draft talking points struck me and some others as unduly defensive—too many claims to “seriousness” when it must be assumed that the United States is always serious. We protested too much. With revisions now adopted I believe that we have diminished that sense.

—Change to NSDD relieved the principal concern of the JCS.⁴ As I think we must have all sensed, it would have been easy to mistake an “example” for a proposal; and, indeed, in one place in the State-drafted talking points the

“example” on INF equal percentage reductions was characterized as an “offer.”

—In my view the talking points were breezy, almost casual, in laying out a cascade of fall-backs; and while all fall-backs were drawn from the NSDD,⁵ the drafting of the talking points conveyed a sense of skipping lightly from one to the next at the slightest resistance from Gromyko. In strategy session with SecState I urged that we try hard to achieve our preferred option and move only reluctantly to fallbacks in the face of motion on the other side. I understand Secretary Shultz believes that we ought to “get all our points out early,” which can, unless handled very carefully, mean virtual simultaneous setting out of our preference and our fallbacks. I did what I could to urge that

A the Soviets seldom make concessions except at the last minute hoping all the while that we will obviate their concessions by making ours first and

B if he insisted on laying out “all our points” at once we should at least indicate that Gromyko could not expect further U.S. proposals on structure and fora and would not agree to any others. The handling of this is now in Shultz’ hands and, having heard all views, I am confident that he will exercise all his skill in presenting our preferences.

—In meeting with Shultz I raised the point that some of the talking points appeared to imply that we were willing to volunteer restraints on the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems based on new physical phenomena that go beyond our treaty obligations. I will be checking further into our obligation, under the ABM Treaty, to consult and amend the treaty before deploying new “exotic” systems. Meanwhile I urged caution. Soviets may well seek to elicit rather more than is in the treaty—for example a pledge to

consult that would appear to vitiate our right to withdraw under the supreme national interests provision.

—Finally, I believe there was a sense in the talking points now somewhat diminished, and in the delegation discussions, that we have somehow to entice the Soviets back by holding out the prospect of proposals more to their liking when the talks resume. The now deleted examples would have accomplished that; and groping by Shultz for a way of elaborating what the President has meant when he has said that we would be prepared to “consider” interim restraints in the context of formal negotiations is of the same nature. I believe that State tends to underestimate the Soviet interest in resuming negotiations. I hope that we do not appear so eager that they are tempted to press for substantive concessions in the belief that we would suffer unacceptably and they would not from a failure now in Geneva to reach agreement on a resumption of formal talks.

End text.

Shultz

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850001-0117. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Shultz arrived in Geneva on January 6.

² Richard Perle was chosen by Weinberger to represent DOD in the Geneva delegation. In his memoir, Shultz wrote: “With the large delegation accompanying me to Geneva, pressure mounted over the question of who would actually sit in on the meeting for our side. Rowny wanted in and muttered threats. Adelman was in an uproar because he wanted a seat. Cap wanted Richard Perle. If Perle was in, Burt had to be in. I talked it over with the president. I told

him that if we had ten or so people at the table, the message to the Soviets would be that we did not have our act together and that extras were there as ‘political commissars.’ The president and I decided that I would be joined at the table by Bud McFarlane, Paul Nitze, and Art Hartman and that Jack Matlock, fluent in Russian, would be there to take notes.” Shultz continued: “Over the Atlantic, Richard Perle spent a long, long time visibly talking with *Washington Post* correspondent Don Oberdorfer in the back of the plane. This created a palpable tension all around, as everyone knew my instructions were that no one was to talk to the press except Bernie Kalb. After we arrived in Geneva, I called Perle to my room and told him he had violated my instructions and if he didn’t like them, he could get on a plane and go home. He said he had not talked to Oberdorfer about arms control. I told him the rule is ‘no contact’ about anything. He said okay. That cleared the air. He turned out to be one of the most helpful members of the delegation.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph* pp. 511-513)

³ See [footnote 1, Document 352](#).

⁴ See [Document 353](#).

⁵ See [Document 348](#).

355. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, January 7, 1985, 9:40 a.m.-1 p.m.

FIRST SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING Geneva, January 1985

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Jack F. Matlock, Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Dimitri Arensbürger, Interpreter

USSR

Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko
Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Foreign Minister
Ambassador Viktor Karpov
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
Alexei Obukhov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Gromyko opened the meeting with the observation that he and the Secretary were well aware of the problems which require discussion, and that it was not clear whether time would remain toward the end of the discussions to touch on other questions. Accordingly, he proposed that they proceed to the business at hand with a presentation by each side of the way, in principle, the problem should be addressed. These presentations, which need not be long statements, could be followed by a give-and-take discussion to get at the heart of the matter. Would such a working approach be acceptable to the Secretary?

Secretary Shultz observed that the evolution of the meetings between the two of them had been good in the sense that they had taken on an increasingly conversational cast as time had gone by. He cited in particular the meetings in New York and Washington last September as embodying more back-and-forth interchange,² and added that he believed that this method provided the best opportunity for developing individual subjects and therefore agreed with the proposal.

Secretary Shultz then said that since he had material which had been discussed with and considered by the President in detail, he felt it was important to lay it out for Gromyko carefully and thoroughly. This would take some time, but he thought it would not be excessive under the circumstances, since it is easy to understand the importance of these questions.

With respect to Gromyko's introductory comment about the questions to be discussed, the Secretary agreed that they had come to Geneva to concentrate on arms control questions. But, as the President had said in September, in a sense all questions between us are interrelated. If, toward the end of the discussions, time remained to discuss other questions, they could take a look at them. We continue to have major concerns in the human rights area and he would draw Gromyko's attention to them here. Perhaps there would be a chance to develop these matters in greater detail, but he wanted to point out their importance to us at this time. Just as other major issues between us throughout the world, they have an impact on the overall relationship. In this connection, the Secretary continued, we had received word that the Soviets accepted the idea of discussions on the Middle East and this made us hopeful, since discussion of other matters would doubtless follow.

The Secretary then proposed that they get down to business with a discussion of arms control questions.

Gromyko responded that, except for the Secretary's mention of a possible discussion of what he called human rights issues, they shared the same view. He had no intention of distracting the attention of participants in the talks with a discussion of human rights, and assumed that this would not surprise the Secretary. Other than that, their views coincided, and if the Secretary had no objection, he would present the introductory Soviet statement.

The Secretary agreed.

Gromyko then proceeded to make his opening presentation, which contained the following points:

—The world's public has been anticipating these meetings with a lively interest. This is the case because people and nations throughout the world fully understand the importance of searching for ways to end the arms race, achieve disarmament and avert a nuclear war. The press does not indulge in exaggeration when it says that the eyes of the entire world are focussed on Geneva. People are hungry for news of a constructive nature.

—It is a truism that relations between the USSR and the U.S. are bad. The Secretary is familiar with the Soviet view of what had caused this situation and also with Soviet policy. He (*Gromyko*) had set these forth on behalf of the Soviet Government in earlier meetings with the Secretary and also in his recent meeting with the President. He saw no need to repeat what he had said previously on this subject.

—He wished to stress most emphatically that if we do not find ways to halt the arms race and end the threat of

nuclear war, it will be impossible to correct our relationship. If this is not done, our relationship will heat up and this will affect the situation in the entire world.

—The Soviet Union is in favor of a relationship free of vacillations and one based on equality, mutual regard for each other's interests, and respect for and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. These thoughts were dominant in the messages from General Secretary Chernenko to the President and Gromyko had made every effort to emphasize them in his meeting with the President.

—It is important to take a principled approach—a correct approach in principle—in resolving problems in our relationship. He wished to outline in total candor how the Soviet side viewed such an approach.

—The upcoming negotiations, if they take place—and the Soviet side believes they must take place—must have as their ultimate objective the elimination of nuclear arms. In the final analysis this goal must be achieved if we are to have real security in the world as a whole and between our two countries in particular. The world today is not what it was 40-50 years ago. It has changed with the appearance of nuclear arms. Not everyone seems to understand this, because if it were understood, the question before us would be resolved. Those countries which possess nuclear arms are in the best position to understand. Therefore, we must make every effort to move toward this ultimate objective. Otherwise we will find ourselves in a situation whereby nuclear arms come to dominate people and people will find themselves caught in an irresistible current which drags them along. Where this would lead is clear. Science, and indeed, not just science, but all reasonable people in positions of authority recognize what might occur if nuclear arms remain in existence and if the nuclear arms race

continues. No matter how strong the words are which are chosen to emphasize the importance of this problem, none are adequate to express the dangers of continuing the nuclear arms build-up. Only ignorant people—and there are fewer and fewer of these—and dishonest individuals could treat such statements as propaganda and not a true reflection of reality. Both the Soviet and U.S. Governments must know that this is the case. It is the first point of principle he wished to make.

—The second point regards how we should proceed, both here in Geneva and beyond—indeed how to conduct our relations in general. The principle of equality and equal security is of exceptional importance. It is absolutely essential at every phase in our consideration of the problem and at every stage in our discussion of it. Absolute equality and equal security merit repetition a thousand times. All agreements connected with the resolution of the problem before us, a problem of vital importance to both our countries and to mankind in general, must be based on this principle. If we follow this principle, neither your security nor ours will be damaged; the security of both our countries and of the whole world will rather be stronger. We believe that if both sides act in an honest way, it will be possible to comply with this principle and find solutions to the nuclear arms problem and to other problems. It is within the realm of the possible to find mutually satisfactory solutions. There is no place here for fatalism. All problems in the world are created by human beings, and it is up to human beings to resolve them. All problems existing today can be solved if our two countries proceed along the same path. And if we do, others will follow. He emphasizes this point because one frequently hears statements almost to the effect that there is no opportunity for people, or even governments, to affect the process. All too often, when the modernization and development of

arms are considered (and this is especially true of space arms), it is suggested that there is no possibility of intervening to block such developments, as if it is written in the stars that it must happen. It is suggested that there might be some discussion of limitations—as if militarization has to continue. But this is inconsistent with human logic and with human capacities and must be rejected. We must believe in the possibility of human beings resolving this problem.

—The third principle pertains to outer space. We must set the goal of preventing the militarization of space. Questions of strategic nuclear arms and medium-range nuclear arms must be considered in conjunction with the problem of preventing the militarization of space. In other words, questions of space arms, nuclear strategic arms and nuclear medium-range arms must be resolved in one single complex, that is, comprehensively, in their interrelationship. He wished to stress comprehensively, since this is dictated by objective circumstances, and especially the requirements of strategic stability.

—He noted statements by U.S. officials at various levels, including the highest, which emphasized the importance of strategic stability, and pointed out that the Soviets believe that strategic stability requires such an approach. If the forthcoming negotiations are to be put on a practical track from the outset, there must be a specific, joint understanding regarding their ultimate objectives.

—In the Soviet view, the first such goal must be the prevention of the militarization of space. That is, there must be a ban on the development, testing and deployment of space attack arms [space strike weapons], along with the destruction of those already in existence. Given such a

radical approach, opportunities would emerge for far-reaching decisions in the other areas as well.

—By “space attack arms” the Soviet Union meant space arms based on any physical principle [literally: “principle of action”], regardless of basing mode, which are designed to strike space objects, objects in space and targets on land, sea or in the air from space, that is, targets on earth. This includes anti-satellite systems and relevant [or “corresponding”—sootvetstvuyushie] anti-missile systems.

—The second goal relates to strategic arms. Given a complete ban on space attack arms, the Soviet Union would be prepared to agree to a radical reduction of strategic arms accompanied by a simultaneous and a complete ban, or severe limitation, of programs to develop and deploy new strategic systems, i.e., long-range cruise missiles, new types of ICBMs, new types of SLBMs and new types of heavy bombers. However, all these measures with regard to strategic arms would be possible only if they were coupled with a complete ban on space attack arms.

—Additionally, the problem of strategic arms cannot be resolved separately from the problem of medium-range nuclear systems, that is missiles and aircraft, because the U.S. systems deployed in Europe are strategic systems with respect to the Soviet Union. This was emphasized in the past, particularly during the negotiations where Ambassador Nitze headed the U.S. delegation. To the Soviet Union these are strategic arms, even though in the past, for convenience, they had been called medium-range systems, taking into account only their range.

—The third negotiation would deal with medium-range nuclear arms. Its main aim would be an agreement to end the further deployment of U.S. missiles in Western Europe

coupled with a simultaneous cessation of Soviet countermeasures. This would be followed by a reduction of medium-range nuclear systems in Europe to levels to be agreed. Naturally, British and French medium-range missiles must be taken into account in these levels. He then repeated "they must be taken into account," and observed that talk to the effect that the UK and France are separate states, that they should be disregarded and that their arms should not be counted in solving the question of medium-range systems in Europe, did not impress anyone. Such talk did not make the least impression on the Soviet Union. The UK and France and their nuclear systems were on one and the same side with the U.S. This is true in fact as well as in formal, legal terms, no matter how the problem is addressed. Thus, at least in discussions with the Soviet Union, the U.S. should steer clear of the thesis that UK and French systems ought not be taken into account. Any talk along these lines is a waste of time.

—In summarizing the last portion of his statement, Gromyko reiterated the following. The problem of strategic arms and the problem of medium-range nuclear arms cannot be considered separately or in isolation from the problem of space arms, or more precisely, that of the non-militarization of space. The problem of strategic nuclear arms cannot be considered independently of the question of medium-range nuclear arms. All of this must be considered comprehensively [in one complex] if there is, in fact, a serious desire to reach agreement. The Soviet Union hoped that it could count on the U.S. Government's understanding of the Soviet position.

—Perhaps he was repeating it for the thousandth time, but the Soviet leadership would like to see serious progress toward agreement in order to reach the objectives which he had described at the beginning of his statement.

Agreements must be based on respect for the security interests of both the USSR and the U.S. The entire world would give a sigh of relief if this could indeed be achieved. Moreover, the Soviet Union has no negative aims with respect to the U.S. It wants a fair and objective agreement that meets the interests of both countries.

—The Soviet Union wants to live in peace with the U.S.. The USSR is aware that from time to time responsible officials in the U.S. make statements to the effect that the USSR poses a threat to the U.S. The Soviet Union tends to think that individuals who make such statements do not understand the situation. However, these statements are made so frequently that we cannot rule out the possibility that those who make them may come to believe in them. After all, some people still believe in the devil. But we believe that common sense and objective reasoning, if it is followed by U.S. policy makers, can make agreement possible.

—Could a country with hostile aims present proposals on eliminating nuclear arms, on no-first-use of nuclear arms, and insist that other nuclear powers follow the Soviet example? Could such a country present a proposal on the non-use of force in international relations? Could such a country make proposal after proposal aimed at curbing the arms race, disarmament and improving Soviet-U.S. relations? The Soviet Union has presented many such proposals. A country with hostile designs would not present these kinds of proposals. Could such a country harbor evil designs toward the United States? Surely it could not. He wished to stress that the Soviet leadership and the entire ruling party of the USSR, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, had no hostile designs against the legitimate interests or security of the United States. The USSR does

not pursue such a goal. Judge our policies on the basis of our statements and our specific proposals.

—The Soviet Union intends to pursue this course at the forthcoming negotiations. However, if common sense does not triumph at these negotiations—and he was not speaking of the Soviet side—then, of course, the USSR would be forced—he emphasized would be forced—to take appropriate steps to protect its security interests. However, it is in our mutual interest not to follow such a path. It is in our interest to follow the path of striving for an objective agreement which, he was convinced, is possible provided both sides advance objective and justified positions. If this were not the Soviet desire, it would have been pointless to hold these meetings here. In that case, we would be simply rolling down to the abyss. But the Soviets believe that an objective possibility of agreement exists. He could not speak for the Secretary on these points, and invited him to speak for himself.

The Secretary thanked Gromyko for his comprehensive introductory comments, and promised to be equally brief in presenting his views.

First, he remarked that during Gromyko's visit to the United States, especially during his conversation with the President, Gromyko had used the phrase "question of questions." This had caught people's attention. He had defined it as whether we would move toward peace or toward confrontation, and, especially, whether we would be able to resolve the overriding question of nuclear arms. Gromyko had said, and the President had agreed—in fact, the President had said several times—that our goal must be the elimination of nuclear arms. This was repeated in the letters exchanged between the two heads of state.

The Secretary noted that Gromyko, in his arrival statement, had spoken about advancing along a path of radical reduction of nuclear arms and the goal of eliminating them. We share that goal. If, as a result of these meetings, we can agree on a negotiating format, we should instruct our negotiators to work toward that aim.

The Secretary pointed out that the President views this meeting as a major opportunity to launch a new effort aimed at reaching arms control agreements that enhance the security of both our nations. Our principal task is to look to the future, to establish a more efficient process and more effective negotiating approaches for addressing critical arms control questions. He hoped the meetings today and tomorrow can lay the basis for progress toward that end.

The President had directed that careful and thorough preparations be made for the meeting, and he had personally taken an intensive role in them. Accordingly, the Secretary thought it important to set forth the President's thinking carefully and in detail. He would go through the President's views of the strategic situation as it had developed in the past and as he saw it developing in the future. He would then deal with the question of subjects and fora for the future negotiations, if we can agree on them.

The Secretary said that he would begin by setting forth our views on the future strategic environment, including the relationship between defensive and offensive forces. He then made the following points:

—Gromyko would agree that, as the President had said, the U.S. has no territorial ambitions. It is inconceivable that the U.S. would initiate military action against the USSR or the

Warsaw Pact unless we or our allies were attacked. We hope that the USSR has no intention of initiating an attack on the U.S. or its Allies, and the Secretary had heard this in Gromyko's statement.

—At the same time the U.S. is determined to maintain sufficient forces to deter attack against ourselves and our allies. This means forces of such size, effectiveness and survivability as to deny an opponent any possibility of gain from an attack. We expect that you wish to maintain similar capabilities.

—We will maintain a sufficient deterrent with or without arms control agreements. However, we believe, as Gromyko said this morning with regard to the USSR, that the strategic relationship can be made more stable and secure, and that stability and security can be maintained at significantly lower levels of armaments, if this relationship is regulated through effective arms control. We prefer that path.

—It is disturbing to us that the USSR has placed so much emphasis upon massive expansion and modernization of its nuclear forces, both offensive and defensive. In light of this, we are obliged to take some steps necessary to maintain our offensive and defensive capabilities.

—This interplay between us does create a dangerous situation. So it is one we must address. The political and military measures necessary to do so will be difficult for both sides. But we must tackle this problem; the danger must be defused.

—In preparing for this meeting and for renewed negotiations, the U.S. has conducted a review of our past arms control efforts. While some worthwhile agreements

have been reached, our efforts in the area of strategic arms have not fulfilled their original promise in terms of constraining the arms competition and enhancing stability. We believe you would agree.

—At any rate, in the late 1960's and early 1970's we negotiated measures that we hoped would be helpful to the security of each of us. Those constraints, as we reviewed the record, were based on three assumptions:

(1) with defensive systems severely limited, it would be possible to place comparable limits on strategic offensive forces, and to establish a reliable deterrent balance at reduced levels;

(2) the constraints on ballistic missile defenses would prevent break-out or circumvention; and

(3) both sides would adhere to the letter and spirit of the agreements.

—These premises, as we examined the record, have come increasingly into question over the past decade.

—Both sides today have substantially greater offensive capabilities than in 1972. Not only have the numbers of offensive weapons reached exceedingly high levels; of even greater concern, systems have been deployed on the Soviet side, in significant numbers, which have the capability for a devastating attack on missile silos and command and control facilities.

—On the defensive side, the Soviet Union has taken full advantage of the ABM Treaty—this was not criticism, just an observation—it has exploited technical ambiguities, and has also taken steps which we believe are almost certainly not consistent with the ABM Treaty.³

—The viability of the ABM Treaty was based on several key assumptions:

First, that large phased-array radars would be constrained so as to limit potential breakout or circumvention to provide the base for a territorial ABM defense. Allowance was made for early warning radars, but they were to be on the periphery and outward facing.

Second, that ABM interceptors, launchers and radars would be neither mobile nor transportable.

Third, that the line between anti-aircraft and antiballistic missile defenses would be unambiguous.

Fourth, that the ABM Treaty would soon be accompanied by a comprehensive treaty, of indefinite duration, on offensive nuclear forces.

—Unfortunately, today those assumptions no longer appear valid.

—The Krasnoyarsk radar appears to be identical to radars for detecting and tracking ballistic missiles, and could serve as part of a base for a nationwide ABM defense.

—The inconsistency of the location and orientation of this radar with the letter and spirit of the ABM Treaty is a serious concern, for it causes us to question the Soviet Union's long-term intentions in the ABM area.

—We are also concerned about other Soviet ABM activities that, taken together, give rise to legitimate questions on our part as to whether the Soviet Union intends to deploy a wide-spread ABM system. The SA-X-12 anti-air missile is one element of our concern; it seems to have some

capabilities against strategic ballistic missiles, and thereby blurs the distinction between anti-aircraft missile systems and anti-ballistic missile systems.

—The Soviet Union is pursuing active research programs on more advanced technologies, which have a direct application to future ballistic missile defense capabilities.

—Most importantly, as to offensive nuclear forces, it has not proven possible to work out mutually acceptable agreements that would bring about meaningful reductions in such arms, particularly in the most destabilizing categories of such forces.

—So, in our view, as we look back at that period when the strategic environment that we were hoping for was designed, we must say that the strategic environment has since deteriorated. But it is important to look today at the future. He therefore would offer some comments which would help Gromyko understand the conceptual and political framework in which we approach renewed negotiations.

—For the immediate future we wish to work with you to restore and make more effective the regime for reliable mutual deterrence which, in 1972, was thought by both sides to be our common objective.

—We must negotiate “effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament” called for when we signed the ABM Agreement in 1972. We are prepared to negotiate constructively toward this end.

—We must reverse the erosion which has taken place of the premises assumed when we entered into the ABM Treaty.

—The research, development and deployment programs of both sides must be consistent with the ABM Treaty.

—You may argue that it is the U.S., and not the Soviet Union, that has decided to embark on the creation of a nationwide ABM system, including the deployment of defensive systems in space. Certainly, your comments imply this. Therefore, I wish to explain the U.S. position.

—The President has set as a major objective for the coming decade the determination of whether new defensive technologies could make it feasible for our two countries to move away from a situation in which the security of both our countries is based almost exclusively on the threat of devastating offensive nuclear retaliation.

—We believe both sides have an interest in determining the answer to this question. Indeed, your country has historically shown a greater interest in strategic defenses than the United States, and deploys the world's only operational ABM system.

—A situation in which both of our countries could shift their deterrent posture toward greater reliance on effective defenses could be more stable than the current situation.

—It could provide a basis for achieving the radical solution both our leaders seek—eliminating nuclear weapons entirely on a global basis.

—Our effort to see whether this is possible is embodied in the Strategic Defense Initiative. This SDI is strictly a research effort and is being conducted in full conformity with the ABM Treaty.

—No decisions on moving beyond the stage of research have been taken, nor could they be for several years. Such research is necessary to see if it would be possible to move toward a world in which the threat of nuclear war is eliminated.

—Whenever research validates that a defensive technology would make a contribution to strengthening deterrence, the United States would expect to discuss with the Soviet Union the basis on which it would be integrated into force structures. If either side ever wishes to amend the ABM treaty, then there are provisions for discussing that. In the U.S. view, such discussions should precede action by sufficient time so that stability is guaranteed. The Secretary repeated: whenever research validates that a defensive technology would make a contribution to strengthening deterrence, the United States would expect to discuss with the Soviet Union the basis on which it would be integrated into force structures.

—The Soviet Union has been actively engaged for years in the sort of research being pursued under SDI.

—The Secretary doubts that either side is prepared to abandon its research efforts now, before we know whether there are defensive systems that could enhance rather than diminish the security of both sides. We doubt an effective and verifiable ban on research, as such, could be designed in any event.

—In the longer run, it appears that new technologies may open possibilities of assuring the security of both sides through a substantial improvement in our respective defenses. To the U.S., high-confidence defenses would appear to be a sounder approach to peace and security

than the current situation, and could produce a more stable environment.

—The United States recognizes that arms control and other forms of cooperation would play an important role in creating and sustaining such a less threatening environment. We believe that the security interests of both sides could be served by such an evolution and obviously we would have to move in stages.

—But we are prepared to initiate a continuing discussion with you now on the whole question of strategic defense (both existing and possible future systems), a discussion of reductions in offensive arms, and a discussion of the nature of the offense-defense relationship that we should be seeking to establish and maintain in the future. This was by way of saying that we fully agree about the relationship between offense and defense.

—In the context of negotiations on offensive and defensive arms, we are also prepared to address space arms issues.

—So we believe our negotiating efforts today and tomorrow should focus on the most urgent question before us: namely, how to begin the process of reducing offensive nuclear arms and enhancing the stability of the strategic environment.

The Secretary then turned to the way in which these comments lead us to suggestions regarding the subject and objectives of the future negotiations. Accordingly, he wished to offer comments on fora, subjects and objectives of the negotiations, as well as on their location and timing.

—With respect to offensive nuclear systems, he proposed that we begin where we broke off and capture the progress made in the START and INF negotiations. We believe that

much good work was done in both sets of talks, even though many issues remained unresolved.

—Moreover, while the issues involved are clearly related, we continue to believe it would be most practical to address strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces in separate fora.

—Thus, we propose that we begin new negotiations on strategic arms reductions, and a second set of new negotiations on reductions in intermediate-range nuclear forces.

—The subject of the first, strategic offensive arms—or, more precisely, intercontinental-range offensive nuclear forces—is fairly well established.

—We are prepared in step-by-step fashion to reduce radically, to use Gromyko's word, the numbers and destructive power of strategic offensive arms, with the immediate goal of enhancing the reliability and stability of deterrence, and with the ultimate goal of their eventual elimination.

—Thus, the subject of these negotiations would be reductions, radical reductions, in strategic offensive nuclear arms.

—I propose that the objective of renewed talks be an equitable agreement providing for effectively verifiable and radical reductions in the numbers and destructive power of strategic offensive arms.

—The second negotiation we envisage is on intermediate-range nuclear forces.

—Here, too, I think our previous efforts revealed a common emphasis on reducing longer-range INF missiles, with the ultimate goal of their total elimination.

—Moreover, we seem to agree that while systems in or in the range of Europe should be of central concern, any agreement must take account of the global aspects of the INF problem.

—Both sides have proposed that certain INF aircraft and shorter-range missile systems be dealt with in some fashion.

—We propose that the subject of the new talks be reductions in intermediate-range offensive arms.

—The objective of such talks should be an equitable agreement providing for effectively verifiable and radical reductions in intermediate-range offensive nuclear arms.

The Secretary then turned to our ideas for addressing the other aspects of “nuclear and space arms” on which we agreed in November to begin negotiations.

—In the early days of SALT I both sides agreed that a treaty limiting defensive arms should be paralleled by a treaty limiting offensive arms and vice-versa. For reasons including those the Secretary advanced earlier, we continue to believe there is merit in such an approach.

—We understand that the Soviet Union believes that controlling weapons in space should be a priority matter. Gromyko had emphasized this in his presentation. We believe, however, that a forum permitting negotiation of defensive nuclear arms would be a more appropriate

complement to new negotiations on offensive nuclear systems.

—In such a forum, we would be prepared to address the question of space-based defensive systems in a serious and constructive manner. Space arms questions could also be taken up in the offensive arms negotiations as well, as this might be appropriate.

—But we believe that it is important to address questions relating to existing defensive systems based on earth, as well as potential future space-based systems, and to restore and revalidate the assumptions on which the ABM Treaty was based.

—We therefore propose that we establish a third negotiating forum, in which each side could address aspects of the offense-defense relationship not dealt with in the two offensive nuclear arms fora.

—In making this proposal, we have taken careful note of the concern you expressed in our September meetings about the possibility of nuclear arms in outer space. Gromyko had referred to this subject several times.

—Given our shared objective of eliminating all nuclear weapons and the concerns you expressed, we believe that the negotiations should focus on defensive nuclear arms, including nuclear systems that would be based in space or detonated in space, as well as defensive nuclear systems based on the earth.

—Thus we propose that the subject of this third negotiation be defensive nuclear arms. The objective would be agreement on measures to enhance the reliability and stability of deterrence, and on steps toward the eventual elimination of all nuclear-armed defensive systems.

—As to the formalities, the Secretary suggested that the location of all three talks be Geneva and that, as a matter of urgency, the negotiations should preferably open in the first half of March.

—The most pressing task is to reach agreement on formal negotiations to address offensive and defensive forces. But the Secretary believed that it would also be useful to establish a senior-level process to complement the formal negotiations and to provide a channel for talking about broader problems. In these talks we might perhaps be able to provide the integrating process that Gromyko had referred to.

—What we have in mind is to have more unstructured, conceptual exchanges on the maintenance of strategic stability and the relationship between offensive and defensive forces.

—Continuing exchanges on these subjects between the foreign ministers should be part of this process. As the President has suggested, this might give some stimulation and act as an energizer to the negotiations. As he has further suggested, it might also be useful to have special representatives meet to address both conceptual and concrete ideas.

—Senior representatives could also play an important role in clarifying each side's conceptual approach to the negotiations, as well as in exploring the details of specific proposals.

—Moreover, as formal negotiations proceed in individual areas, senior representatives could meet periodically to help break logjams and coordinate our joint efforts in the various fora.

—We believe that the problem of getting control of the growing nuclear forces is of fundamental concern. Those countries with nuclear arms must take the leadership. Certainly, he would hope that we can make progress to prevent these systems from overwhelming our two countries. As Gromyko had suggested, if our two countries take the lead in this regard, others would follow. Gromyko had also said that the ultimate goal would be to eliminate nuclear arms. We had no reservations in this regard, though we recognized the difficulties involved.

—In this connection, the Secretary highlighted the importance of the non-proliferation regime and noted that their discussion in September 1982 had led to consultations on non-proliferation questions.⁴ From our standpoint, these discussions have been fruitful. However, further efforts are needed if we are to control nuclear arms, as we must—if we are to reduce them drastically and ultimately eliminate them.

The Secretary concluded by saying that he had described how we see future developments and had outlined our ideas for structuring the future negotiations. The Secretary remarked that earlier he promised to take as much time as Gromyko had. He had not quite fulfilled that promise, but considering the time devoted to interpretation, he thought that they had ended up about equal. The Secretary cited Gromyko's phrase about the need for respecting the security interests of both parties. He found this to be a very good phrase and intended to proceed on this basis. He also expressed appreciation for Gromyko's attempt to present his comments with as much precision as possible.

Gromyko, who had earlier waived translation from English to Russian, observed that the Secretary had just delivered a very important statement and asked for a translation so

that it could be given careful consideration. The Secretary's statement was thereupon translated in its entirety.

When the translation was completed, *Gromyko* observed that the statement was an important one dealing with fundamental principles, and said that he had two questions which arose from the Secretary's comment that at some stage the parties could enter into a discussion of the research the U.S. is doing and of ways it could be integrated into a system of strategic stability. His questions were: first, at what stage would this be discussed, and second, what specifically should be dealt with in the third forum, that is, the forum dealing with space matters, a forum to which we have not yet attached a label, because it is too early to do so.

Gromyko added that the Secretary's remarks on this subject had not been clear. The lack of clarity did not seem to be a linguistic problem but one rather in the U.S. position itself. What should be discussed in this third forum? Is this forum to discuss programs for large-scale space defense systems or not? And if this topic is discussed, what will be the angle of view applied? If your position is that space research programs are to be continued and sometime later can be discussed, then this is not acceptable. U.S. intentions to pursue such efforts were unacceptable, even though mention had been made that the U.S. might share some of the results. The Soviet position is that the topic should be discussed with the view of preventing the militarization of outer space. If this approach is taken, what is the point of such a large-scale program to develop ballistic missile defenses? What would happen if these two concepts collided? What would be discussed in this forum in that case? Perhaps this forum might hold only one meeting. What sort of negotiation

would that be? Where would that lead us? Since all three fora are interrelated, if the third forum bursts like a soap bubble, the other two would go down with it. It would be a different matter if the subject of the negotiations in that forum were to be the prevention of militarization of space. In that case, he could see the sense of that third forum.

Gromyko asked the Secretary to respond to his questions either then or after lunch, as he preferred. When the Secretary had done so, Gromyko would comment on other aspects of the U.S. position.

The Secretary promised to answer Gromyko's questions, but suggested that this be done after lunch since they were already running about an hour behind schedule. He also suggested, since time between meetings was useful to consider carefully and assess each other's comments, to move the afternoon meeting to 3:30 instead of 2:30, and put off the reception planned for the evening by one hour as well.

Gromyko agreed with this procedure.

Before departing, *the Secretary* said that he intended to say nothing to the press regarding the meeting and *Gromyko* stated that he, too, would follow a "no comment" policy.

The meeting adjourned at 1:00 P.M.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron March 1985 (2/4). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Matlock and Arensburger. The meeting took place in the Soviet Mission. Brackets are in the original.

² See [Documents 284](#), [286](#), [287](#), and [288](#).

³ The United States believed the Soviet Krasnoyarsk early warning radar system was a violation of the ABM Treaty, which allowed for a limited number of defensive systems in each country. Documents on these potential violations are scheduled for publication in [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985-1988](#) [↗](#).

⁴ See [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 217](#) [↗](#).

356. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the White House¹

Geneva, January 7, 1985, 1347Z

Secto 1015. For the President. Subject: Memorandum for the President on the Secretary's First Meeting With Gromyko, Monday Morning, January 7, 1985.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

FROM: George P. Shultz

SUBJECT: My First Meeting With Gromyko

1. We began our talks in what I believe was a constructive atmosphere with a three-hour exchange on strategic philosophy—on Gromyko's part—and a laying out in a very detailed form of our view of the strategic environment. Gromyko's manner was calm, businesslike and forceful. He read large portions of his presentation, indicating that these were agreed Politburo positions. He talked at all times as if the future negotiations were a fact but of course put great stress—as we expected he would—on the objectives and goals of such negotiations.

2. There was brief interchange on human rights at outset with me asserting their importance in the overall relation and Gromyko saying he would not discuss a matter of internal affairs.

3. My presentation of U.S. position closely followed agreed talking points (which we are sending separately in full)² covering:

- Evaluation of strategic environment
- Our view of the way it should evolve
- Our view of subject and objectives of subsequent negotiations

4. For his part, Gromyko, after a long plea for negotiations as the only way to head-off catastrophe, set several general conditions or principles. We should agree on the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. We should base negotiations on the principle of equality and equal security. The problems of strategic and intermediate forces cannot be settled in the absence of an agreement to prevent the militarization of space. Only this can strengthen strategic stability.

5. He went on to lay out specific goals for negotiations:

To prevent the militarization of space we must institute a ban on development, testing and deployment of attack space weapons and eliminate any weapons of that kind already deployed. He defined these weapons as anything based on any physical principle or basing mode to attack targets in outer space or from space to attack weapons on land, sea, in the air, or on earth. He included ASAT and relevant anti-missile systems.

6. On strategic arms, if there is a ban on space weapons, the Soviets are ready to accept radical reductions plus renunciation of new strategic systems, long-range cruise missiles, new types of ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers. He added that INF cannot be separated from strategic systems because the systems we have deployed in Europe can hit the USSR and are therefore, by definition, strategic.

7. On medium-range missiles there should be a goal to stop U.S. deployments and stop Soviet counter-deployments, followed by reductions to new lower levels which must take account of UK and French forces. Strategic arms cannot be settled in isolation from medium-range arms.

8. Gromyko concluded by saying that all these matters are linked and must be considered together. We want, he said, fair and objective agreements. We want to live in peace with you. We harbor no evil designs.

9. In an unusual move, Gromyko asked for my entire three-quarter hour presentation to be translated quote, because I understand it to be an important statement of principle, unquote.

10. Our preliminary conclusion is that the Soviets are driving for a single forum to discuss all subjects but perhaps with subgroups. On substance, there appears to be nothing new. We'll cable again after the afternoon session.

Shultz

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, Geneva Meeting: Shultz/Gromyko 01/07/1985 Morning (1). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman; cleared by McFarlane, Hill, M. Bova (S/S), and K. Clark (S); and approved by Shultz.

² Not found.

357. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, January 7, 1985, 3:35–6:55 p.m.

SECOND SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING Geneva, January 1985

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Jack F. Matlock, Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Carolyn Smith, Interpreter

USSR

Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko
Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Foreign Minister
Ambassador Viktor Karpov
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
A. Bratchikov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Secretary Shultz opened the meeting by saying that he would respond to the two questions Gromyko raised at the end of the morning session.² The first question concerned when the U.S. expects to discuss how strategic defense-type systems could be integrated into force structures. In one sense, there is nothing concrete on this subject to speak of at this point because we do not yet have an outcome from our research. When we get to something concrete, or reach a development with potential operational characteristics, when and if the research of both sides demonstrates that there can be a system which could usefully contribute to moving away from reliance on

offensive weapons, then we could discuss the strategic defensive forces. In other words, the discussion would be triggered by the emergence in U.S. or Soviet research programs of something with that potential. The U.S. also would be prepared—even in advance of any such positive research development—to discuss the ways such systems, if they proved feasible, could contribute to the goal of eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons, which is important in and of itself. This was the first question Gromyko had raised.

Gromyko's second question, the Secretary continued, concerned the subject matter of the third forum he had proposed, that of nuclear defensive systems. He expected this to be a forum in which both sides would feel free to raise whatever issues relating to defensive systems they wished to raise, including space-based or land-based systems, whether directed against weapons on the earth or in space. Nuclear offensive weapons in space are already banned by the Outer Space Treaty.³ Technical developments in recent years make it harder to draw certain distinctions between systems, for example, between ABM and air defense systems, between early warning, NTM, space track and ABM radars. Therefore, the U.S. believes there is much work to be done to reexamine, reevaluate and reinforce the fundamental ideas underlying the ABM treaty, as well as defensive systems in general. In addition, this would be an appropriate forum to discuss possible future arms, as he had mentioned earlier, and technical developments bearing on their future utility, to the ultimate objective of the total elimination of nuclear arms. The U.S. does not believe that research can be effectively or verifiably banned, nor does it believe that research which could, if successful, contribute positively to a reduction in the evils of war should be banned. This forum would be the appropriate one in which to raise

questions relating to space arms, including the space systems Gromyko had discussed this morning. He thought there was a full house here to occupy both sides.

The Secretary then said he wished to explain the essence of the idea he was trying to put across, since it related to his answer to one of Gromyko's questions. Gromyko had said that the questions being discussed here are interrelated. Although for the purpose of the negotiations these questions cannot be discussed all at once, the sides must find "bundles" of questions to discuss. In the end, of course, all these issues are interrelated, and he recalled that in a recent letter Chernenko had referred to the "organic link" between offensive and defensive weapons.

Secretary Shultz then said that what we have in mind is a concept of deterrence in which the greatest degree of stability and equal security is inherent. He suggested looking at two steps. First, to try to attain the strategic environment envisaged in the early 1970s—that is, reduction of offensive arms down to the levels contemplated at that time—and then, in light of technical developments, to look at the defensive environment. In the meantime, research proceeds on strategic defensive weapons; both the U.S. and USSR have such research under way. On the basis of U.S. research, he did not know what the answer would be, but if the answers are positive, he would envisage that the two sides would together try to create a regime with relatively greater emphasis on defense. Of course, if we are able to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely (and he hoped we would be able to) there would be less to defend against. But if a side feels it has a secure defense, it has equal security and stability in a less dangerous and less destabilizing mode. This is the concept on which the U.S. approach is based. It is not a concept that is being implemented now, but would emerge as time

goes on. The reductions in offensive arms to which Gromyko had referred must be consistent with this.

Gromyko said he would respond, taking into account the answers Secretary Shultz had given to his questions. He thought this would be useful so that the Secretary could more fully understand the Soviet attitude toward the American concept of a large-scale missile defense system. The U.S. calls this whole idea a defensive concept, but the Soviet Union does not share this view. The Soviet side sees it as part of a general offensive plan.

Gromyko then invited the Secretary to climb to the top of an imaginary tower and look at the entire situation through Soviet eyes. The Soviet line of reasoning is simple. Assuming the U.S. succeeds in developing this large-scale anti-missile defense, it will have created a shield against hypothetical Soviet missiles. U.S. assumptions of this threat are pure fiction and fantasy, but Gromyko would leave this aside for the moment. If the U.S. did have such a defensive system in place, it would have the capability to inflict a first nuclear strike against the USSR with impunity. One needs no special gift of perspicacity to understand this; it is clear almost to the point of being primitive. If the Secretary were to view this situation from atop the tower, he would reach the same conclusion.

The United States, Gromyko continued, reasons that the Soviet Union can also develop its own strategic defense. Then there would be two such systems, a Soviet and a U.S. one, and then both sides could consider how to reconcile and adjust them to each other and integrate them into the relative defensive complexes of both sides. But Gromyko wished to ask: why have these systems at all? After all, one side has nuclear arms and the other side has them too, so although it is possible to paralyze or neutralize these

weapons, why create a system to do so? Isn't it simpler to eliminate nuclear weapons themselves? Why should our two countries spend their material and intellectual resources developing such a system? Surely the reasonable solution would be to eliminate the weapons themselves. This is nothing more than the centuries-old question of the shield and the sword: Why have a shield to protect yourself from the sword if it is simpler to eliminate the sword? In speaking now of shields and swords, no one should be thinking of the weapons people used in olden times; the weapons now are terrible ones that threaten all humankind.

This, Gromyko stated, is the logic behind the Soviet reasoning. For this reason, the fact that the U.S. side calls its concept a defensive one makes no impression on the Soviet side. The U.S. must understand clearly that the USSR cannot be party, either directly or indirectly, to the development of such a system, either U.S. or Soviet. If the U.S. dismisses this reasoning and takes measures to develop such a system, the Soviet Union would decide on the counter-measures necessary to protect its own security. Gromyko wanted the U.S. administration to understand the Soviet position correctly. He was inclined to believe that Secretary Shultz understood this position.

Gromyko continued by stating that the U.S. seems to believe—indeed he would go further and say it does believe—that it would be able to create such a system and the Soviet Union would not, so the U.S. would be ahead. The U.S. thinks it would be in the dominant position and this tempts it. This is how the Soviet side sees the situation. The U.S. wants to gain advantage over the Soviet Union, and the defensive system if developed would be used to bring pressure on the Soviet Union. Let us not mince words,

Gromyko said, even if they are harsh ones: the system would be used to blackmail the USSR.

To be blunt, Gromyko added, this is not the right approach to take in relations between our two countries. It is not the path dictated by the interests of our countries and the whole world. If the U.S. does not change its line, the Soviet Union will reveal the full truth to its own people and to the whole world. He thought the U.S. government had surely noticed the restraint shown by the Soviet side in its official pronouncements on this issue, particularly with regard to these meetings in Geneva. However, if the situation makes it necessary for the Soviet side to comment in full on the U.S. line, it will do so. This is not the path that will lead to a peaceful solution on the basis of an accord between our two countries. As sure as we know that after the Geneva meetings both sides will return home and as sure as we know that tomorrow will be a new day, the Soviet side is convinced that the two countries will protect what they consider to be just and fair. Gromyko urged that the U.S. reappraise this concept which it has christened "defensive". There is nothing defensive in this concept, he added.

Gromyko continued that this would not mean that the U.S. would have to give in to the Soviet position. It would simply mean a change of U.S. policy in favor of peace. It would be in the interests of the U.S. as much as the Soviet Union. The U.S. has mobilized formidable official and propaganda resources in support of its policy. Practically every day one hears pronouncements by U.S. officials at all levels, as well as by members of the press, in defense of this concept. But all the U.S. is doing is taking some half-dozen arguments and juggling them around. One day, argument number one becomes argument number six, the next day argument number two becomes argument number three, and so on.

The U.S. changes the periods and commas, but the set of arguments is the same as it tries to prove that the concept is a defensive one. This is a non-viable concept and non-viable position.

Gromyko made bold to state that it gives rise to concern and alarm in Western Europe and in other countries, even those on remote continents. People today are not like they were 40 or 50 years ago, he said. Today they take to heart everything that bears on war and peace. Had the Secretary not noticed the mood of the world on matters relating to outer space? People want outer space to be a peaceful environment; they do not want the sword of war hanging over mankind's head and threatening space. Gromyko thought the U.S. should be aware of this and therefore he hoped the U.S. administration would take another look at the entire question of outer space.

Gromyko then stated that when he returned to Moscow after his last visit to Washington, he had reported in detail on his talks with the Secretary and with President Reagan in the White House. He informed his colleagues in the leadership, including Chernenko, what the President had said in their private conversation. He had, in fact, quoted verbatim from the President's words. Gromyko had told the President in response that he had spoken very good words but he wondered why the U.S. government made no changes at all in its practical plans for an arms race and in preparing for war. The President had not answered this question and Gromyko reported this also. All his colleagues liked the good words the President had spoken, but were disappointed that nothing positive was either done or promised to substantiate the words. This was the "political photograph" that he had brought back with him from his visit to Washington.

Since then, that is since September 1984, Gromyko continued, the situation had not changed, or had changed for the worse. Take, for example, outer space, which is of immense importance. The situation is also worse as regards medium-range nuclear weapons and in the arms race in general. The situation now is worse than it was in September, and in September it was worse than the year before. As the situation worsens, we sit at the table in Geneva and talk. People everywhere, even if they are not involved with politics, are aware that the problems under discussion here concern the fate of peace in the world. Let there be no false modesty—that is precisely what is at stake here. We are charged by our leaders to meet and exchange ideas on these questions. If there is a chance even to begin to turn this situation around, let us make use of this chance, because the situation today is worse than yesterday, yesterday was worse than the day before, and tomorrow will be worse than today. Perhaps the day would come when some political leaders will throw up their hands in despair, but we, the Soviets, will not be party to defeatism. We will continue to struggle to strengthen and preserve peace on earth.

Gromyko then asserted that it would be incorrect for the U.S. to construe his words as prompted by tactical or propaganda considerations. There is no room for propaganda here. We are talking here about high politics and questions of war and peace. Let us agree to discuss questions of outer space, the prevention of the militarization of outer space, strategic nuclear weapons and intermediate-range nuclear weapons (the Soviet side calls them medium-range weapons, but the name is not important). Let us agree upon the structure of negotiations and how to understand the interrelationship of the three elements, or triad. Let us decide how to breathe life into the negotiations.

As for the structure of the negotiations, Gromyko wished to address that separately. He had something more to add to his comments on what the Secretary had mentioned in justification of the so-called defensive concept. The Secretary had said that the Soviet Union almost has such systems now and is certainly working toward them. Secretary Shultz had stated that Soviet air defense systems are almost the same as the systems the U.S. plans to develop. While he did not choose to call this a distortion, it certainly is a mistake. Perhaps the Secretary's information is not correct; in any case there is nothing of the sort in the Soviet Union. Air defense systems carry out air defense functions and no others.

Gromyko continued, saying that Secretary Shultz often speaks of verification. Whenever there is talk of an agreement, understanding, or accord between the two sides, the U.S. always speaks of verification and monitoring. Gromyko supposed the U.S. did this in order to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet side, but there is no need to waste time in pressuring. The Soviet Union is in favor of verification, but it wants the degree and level of verification to correspond to the degree and level of the disarmament measure being considered. In the past, the U.S. has recognized this principle and on this basis the two sides have found a common language. Why is this principle unacceptable now? Gromyko called on all those present to consider this. He had the impression that the U.S. is afraid of verification since it always harps at length on verification, verification, verification.

The USSR has submitted a proposal that is now on the table in the U.S., West Germany, France, Britain and Italy, Gromyko added. This is the proposal for complete and general disarmament, coupled with a proposal for complete and general verification. The U.S. is prepared to discuss not

verification of disarmament and the elimination of arms, but verification of arms. The U.S. seems to think it is all right to produce ten times more weapons so long as there is verification. The USSR advocates disarmament and the elimination of nuclear and other weapons with complete verification. Once and for all, Gromyko stated, let it be known that verification does not frighten us in the least. Since we are speaking of various agreements, verification should be discussed for each one of them in a businesslike manner, without ascribing blame where blame is not due and without accusing a party where there are no grounds for accusation.

Gromyko then stated that a document had been submitted to the U.S. Congress (and the document came from the State Department) which alleges that the Soviet Union has violated some of its agreements.⁴ The Soviet Union has not violated any agreements. He added that he had taken note of the language in which the document was couched, that is, that there were “apparent” violations or “doubts” about compliance. But this is not enough to accuse the Soviet Union of violations. The Soviet Union implements its agreements and does not violate them. If the sides conclude an agreement, the Soviet Union will adhere to it strictly. The U.S. should not charge the Soviet Union with something of which it is not guilty. He was discussing questions of principle here. He wished to touch on how the Soviet side envisages the structure of negotiations, assuming the sides can agree on holding them, but first he wished to give the Secretary a chance to respond.

Secretary Shultz said that he appreciated Gromyko’s comments on the importance of verification and for his expressed readiness to provide measures for verification and make them consistent with the means and goals to be achieved. The questions he raised in regard to what is seen

as violations or misunderstandings highlight the complexity of these questions. This shows how important it is to discuss these developments, not only from the standpoint of violations but from the standpoint of what the sides can do to make the treaty regime clear and unequivocal. He raised this point now because this issue is so important. It is important because, if people have questions about compliance with obligations, they are likely to question the value of agreements in general. Therefore it is very important to answer these questions clearly so that the atmosphere of future relations is not poisoned.

The Secretary then returned to the beginning of Gromyko's comments about the central conceptual issues, since they are so important. Even if this meeting results in agreement on a set of negotiations, we must continue to work on the conceptual issues because they are of central importance. He would comment on the concepts and then would ask Mr. McFarlane to say a few words. After that, he would have a question to ask of Gromyko.

The Secretary continued by saying that perhaps his comment could be worded as follows: "Neither blackmailed nor a blackmailer be." He then invited Gromyko to climb to the top of the same tower Gromyko had imagined, and to look at the view before them. The two of them are men from Mars. When they look to the left, they see an impressive program of development of strategic and other nuclear programs. The drive, production capacity and destructive potential are most impressive. The two Martians cannot fail to notice that alongside this considerable effort in offensive arms, a comparable effort in defensive arms is underway—some of it legitimate in accordance with the ABM treaty, and some of it questioned in that regard. Taking into account the invasions of the Soviet Union in the past, it is not surprising that the USSR

is preoccupied with its ability to defend itself, but it still is an impressive display.

If the two Martians look to the right, the Secretary continued, they would also see an impressive offensive capability, as well as signs of renewed modernization of weapons. They could not fail to note that little attention is devoted to defense. And if they took a movie rather than a still photograph of this scene, they would remark that in the last three or four years someone had turned a light on this area, because now stirrings are visible. Although they are far behind what is seen on the left, they now understand that defense is important. The two Martians up on the tower would also observe on the left a certain amount of concern over the defensive activities starting on the right. They would not find this concern surprising because those on the left have much more experience with defense than those on the right. Having heard Gromyko's statement that a strong defense has offensive significance, the two Martians would observe together that the lower the offensive systems of each side, the less force there is to this argument. If the systems are reduced to zero, the argument loses its force entirely. The two Martians are struck by the fact that both sides are talking about drastic reductions. In this sense, the concept of a gradual evolution from offensive deterrence to defensive deterrence seems to create a less threatening rather than more threatening situation.

The Secretary then asked Mr. McFarlane to comment further on the President's concept of the role defensive systems could play in preserving strategic stability.

Mr. McFarlane stated that President Reagan had a number of influences and motives for proposing a research effort to determine whether defensive systems might be developed

which hold a promise of enabling us to move away from our historical reliance on offensive weapons to ensure deterrence. One of these came from his view of how the balance could become unstable by the turn of the century as a result of the nature of the offensive systems now being developed. Specifically, the emergence of offensive mobile and transportable systems, as well as cruise missiles, could lead us into a situation in which we are less certain of the characteristics and composition of systems on both sides. This would make a stable balance less stable.

Secondly, Mr. McFarlane continued, the President wished to find an alternative to offensive deterrence because of the Soviet Union's advantages in key areas, specifically ICBM warheads, which give the Soviet Union the capability to destroy the corresponding forces on the U.S. side which are essential for deterrence. The same asymmetry promises, through defensive systems on the Soviet side, to neutralize any retaliation the U.S. might undertake. The sum of Soviet programs in offensive and defensive arms undermines the traditional basis of deterrence that has existed for the past fifteen years.

Mr. McFarlane then pointed out that the psychological element was perhaps just as important in the President's mind as the military factor. Why should peace and deterrence depend on our ability to threaten someone else? Why not rely for peace and deterrence on weapons that do not threaten anyone? Since we are conducting research on essentially non-nuclear systems, this psychological factor is particularly relevant. Therefore the President decided to determine whether new technology could promise this. However, he made this decision with Soviet concerns about the appearance of a first-strike capability very much in mind. Surely, the development of defensive systems and their deployment while concurrently maintaining offensive

systems could present the appearance of an intention to develop a first-strike capability. This is not the plan of the United States. This is why the Secretary made clear at the beginning of this meeting that if the day arrives when any or all these technologies show that they can contribute to deterrence, the integration of these concepts into the force structure would be a subject for discussion with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union must agree that defensive systems play a role. Its own investment and success in developing defensive weapons are far advanced.

In sum, Mr. McFarlane pointed out, the President's view is that it is time for us to integrate defensive systems into the concept of deterrence in order to turn us to lesser reliance on offensive systems and greater reliance on defensive systems.⁵

Secretary Shultz then remarked that there was plenty of room to explore this deep and difficult question further, but he wished to ask some questions concerning something Gromyko had stressed in his remarks. In his comments in Washington and in his airport arrival statement in Geneva, Gromyko eloquently stated again and again that the Soviet Union is in favor of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and of radical steps toward that goal. The Secretary's questions concerned the program Gromyko had in mind to achieve this goal. If such a program is to be implemented, there must be a concrete expression of it. He therefore posed a series of questions:

- What kind of timing did Gromyko have in mind for the deep and radical reductions of which he had spoken?
- How far did he propose we go before the other must be engaged in order to move to zero?

—What if any changes must be made in the non-proliferation regime?

—How would we treat the variety of nuclear weapons that are not strategic?

The Secretary then observed that if the goal of this meeting is to move toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as Gromyko had stated upon his arrival in Geneva, they must put an explicit program behind that objective. They must define a clear and concise program to reach this goal and they must establish at the negotiations a means to achieve it. What does Gromyko have in mind that lies behind this general objective?

Gromyko replied that the Soviet Union had submitted a proposal on complete and general disarmament to the United Nations. It had submitted a detailed proposal for a program of nuclear disarmament and it had also advanced a proposal on nuclear arms in the relevant forum in Geneva. However, the U.S. and its NATO allies had refused to consider these proposals. It cannot be said that the Soviet Union did not make these proposals; they are well known and they are known to all the governments concerned. This program requires no changes or alterations. What is needed is the desire to discuss this question.

Gromyko continued, saying that the Secretary had made a half-dozen references today to the complete elimination of nuclear arms. If the Secretary believes that the U.S., USSR, and other countries should strive to achieve this goal, this is good and the Soviet side welcomes such a statement. They are in sympathy with it and are impressed by it. Practical steps, however, must be taken to implement this goal.

Part of the problem is the question of non-proliferation, as the Secretary had mentioned. Secretary Shultz had asked what we could do jointly to reinforce the non-proliferation regime. This question must be considered within the context of the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union believes that the proliferation of nuclear weapons, whether horizontally or vertically, must be prevented. If we lead matters to the step-by-step elimination of nuclear weapons, this could lead to acceptance by all states of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.⁶ If the U.S. and USSR can do that, he is sure that all countries would support it, including those that did not sign the NPT.

Both sides agree, Gromyko continued, that the question of non-proliferation is an important one. Non-proliferation must be ensured with no exceptions. He was gratified to note that the U.S. and USSR have almost always held the same view on this. Our two countries had created the treaty, and Gromyko recalled how he and then Secretary of State Rusk hung a map on the wall and referred to it when discussing specific areas. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was developed step-by-step through joint efforts. And so the policy of the U.S. and the Soviet Union coincides on this issue. However fast or however slow we work toward eliminating nuclear arms, the task of ensuring non-proliferation will remain an important one.

Gromyko then asserted that the Secretary had tried to substantiate his position that the new U.S. system is defensive. As Gromyko had already said, the Soviets are convinced that it does not pursue defensive aims, but rather is part of a broad offensive plan. He would not repeat this again because he had already said it. Mr. McFarlane had said that he, Gromyko, had talked about the threat of a first strike from the United States, but that the U.S. had no such intent. It would be going too far to ask the

USSR to rely on one person's word and conscience. In any case this thesis works both ways. This was his reply to Mr. McFarlane's remark. Mr. McFarlane had also said that nuclear technology is not connected with this concept. We know your side is talking more and more about non-nuclear technology. But the fact is that nuclear arms would be used whether or not some of the technology used is nuclear or non-nuclear. It makes no difference whether the technology is nuclear, or particle beams, or something else—this does not change the character of the system. It is important for you to understand our assessment of this.

Gromyko then turned to the structure of possible negotiations. He could not say more than *possible* negotiations because they are not yet in our pocket. He wished to speak of the objectives the sides should pursue in the negotiations. He had tried to explain this morning how all the issues are interrelated, that is, the issues of space weapons, strategic weapons and medium-range nuclear weapons. This would justify the establishment of three bilateral groups. Their work as a whole would embrace all three of these areas. Of course each group would have one area: one would deal with the non-militarization of outer space, one with strategic nuclear arms and one with medium-range nuclear arms.

Since the problems must be considered in their interrelationship, the three groups should meet jointly periodically to take stock of progress and to sum up the results of their work. Of course, it is difficult at this point to set up a precise calendar or schedule, but periodic joint meetings are necessary. The final result must also be a joint result.

There should therefore be a superstructure over all three groups, Gromyko continued. Each side would have a single

delegation or big group composed of three issue groups. They would look at where they stand, come to a conclusion, and then give recommendations to both governments. Each group would begin deliberations when the main content of its work is defined. All three groups together could begin work when agreement is reached on the main content of all three and on the aim of all three: space arms, strategic arms, and medium-range arms.

Gromyko then said that there must be an understanding on this point. If we begin work with our eyes closed we will get nowhere. We can reach agreement only when everything is acceptable to both sides. If this looks more complicated than previous negotiations have been, then perhaps that is true, but your policies on the space issue make it necessary.

In passing, Gromyko noted that some people in the U.S. have been saying, "We told you the Russians would come back to the negotiations and they did." He said he would not hesitate to call this propaganda. He did not wish to put the U.S. in an awkward position, but if need be the Soviet Union would speak its mind on this issue. What is being discussed here is not a resumption of previous negotiations. The negotiating table is a different one and the problems are not the same. Space has now appeared as a problem, and U.S. nuclear missiles deployed in Western Europe have created a new situation. So what we are speaking of here is the possibility of new negotiations, not resumption of the old ones. It is a cheap ploy to say: "You see, the Russians came back," and he would advise the U.S. side not to resort to such cheap ploys.

What he had said about the structure of possible negotiations, Gromyko continued, did not rule out agreements on separate elements of any of the three areas.

For example, he had in mind such things as a moratorium on testing space arms or certain confidence-building measures for strategic arms. Whenever such agreements deal with issues which are not organically linked to unsolved problems, they could enter into force without waiting for the final outcome of the negotiations. Otherwise implementation of agreements on separate issues would be postponed until an aggregate solution is found and negotiated. A comprehensive solution will be indispensable in that case. This relates to the possibility of reaching agreement on separate questions within each forum.

For the sake of clarity, Gromyko repeated: The Soviet side does not rule out the possibility of reaching separate agreements on some issues which go beyond the limits of these three areas. An example would be a commitment by all nuclear powers not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Another example would be a freeze of all nuclear arsenals. Here separate agreement is possible. A third example would be the entry into force of agreements previously signed, such as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions.⁷ A fourth example would be the cessation of all nuclear testing, that is, a comprehensive test ban. At present the ban on testing extends only to three environments. At one time we were near agreement on a comprehensive test ban. He recalled that when the SALT II Treaty was signed by Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna, Carter hosted a dinner during which he told Gromyko that he felt the CTB could be signed soon. These were trilateral negotiations involving the U.S., USSR and UK. Several points divided us, such as a question about monitoring tests in the UK, but Carter said we could reach agreement.⁸ Ask Carter, Gromyko said, he can confirm this. But afterwards the U.S. administration forgot about this conversation and no agreement was reached. Such an agreement if signed could be most promising.

Gromyko said he would now return to the issues at hand. Tomorrow they must take a look at where they stand, looking either from the tower or not, and reflect on what results would come from this meeting.

Secretary Shultz noted that time was running out and that people were waiting for them at a reception. But he had a question and a comment to make before ending. The question was whether he should consider what Gromyko had said about the structure of the negotiations to be a proposal.

Gromyko replied in the affirmative.

Secretary Shultz stated that his group would study this proposal carefully and would be prepared to discuss it tomorrow. He called Gromyko's attention to the fact that he had made a proposal this morning at the end of his presentation. He hoped Gromyko would study it carefully because it contains points similar to those in the Soviet proposal, although the Soviet proposal is more developed with regard to structure and relationship.

Gromyko replied that he had developed his proposal taking account of the Secretary's ideas. However, one point which they could not accept was the proposal to have meetings of special representatives or "wise men." In the past the U.S. called this an "umbrella" proposal. As Gromyko had already remarked to Hartman, umbrellas are very good against the rain.

Shultz interjected, "They also provide shade if the weather is hot."

Gromyko continued that if the Soviet proposal for three groups were adopted, each side could appoint anyone it wanted to guide their work. He could be a virtual dictator if

a side wished. Each side could appoint its wisest men for its own internal workings. Gromyko thought it most probable that on the Soviet side the head of one of the groups would be head of the whole delegation. This was the most probable solution, although a final decision had not been made. The normal mechanism that operates within any government would work as usual and, of course, the sides could always use diplomatic channels. Shultz and Gromyko would each have their advisers and right-hand men, and each would be free to designate his own wise man. This is an internal affair. Gromyko's preliminary thinking was that the man who would head the big delegation would participate in the negotiations. If the two sides set up a situation in which two, four, or six wise men worked in parallel, they might create the impression on the outside that the situation in the negotiations was unsatisfactory. The two, four or six wise men would be meeting confidentially, but this could be misleading in terms of public opinion and might be seen as a screen concealing the true state of affairs. This is unnecessary and would add an undesirable element because it would look as if work were proceeding on two different planes—the delegation on one hand and the wise men on the other. As for internal organization, this is a matter for each side to decide for itself. Gromyko was sure that both sides could find wise men, but from the point of view of principle, this was undesirable.

Secretary Shultz replied that his delegation would study these remarks and present its considered opinion tomorrow. By way of a preliminary comment he wished to say that he was not prepared to spin this question off into inner space where it would be conducted by itself and then return for review at some stage. Something so important and loosely defined must have constant interaction at high political levels in the two governments. He would want to

keep close track of the negotiations and would want a direct way to compare notes with Gromyko as to how they both assess developments. The effort to consider the relationship between these different sets of talks is a high political matter, not a technical one.

The Secretary pointed out that the phrase “non-militarization of space” is a difficult one for the U.S. First of all, outer space is already militarized. Secondly, neither side would want to dispense with some of the respects in which space is militarized, such as communications or NTM satellites. For this reason, this phrase causes a problem for the U.S. This does not mean that it would be difficult to include this subject in the forum. As he had stated this morning, it would be appropriate to discuss space arms, but there are other things to discuss too, in particular, land-based defensive weapons which have the potential of operating in space.

Secretary Shultz then said it would be necessary to give careful study to the way in which Gromyko put together these three sets of questions, which are in some ways separate and in some ways interconnected. He recognized that with or without a formal structure either side can pace the negotiations in one sector by what it wants in another. But he found it puzzling to establish in advance a ban on reaching agreement on something important that both sides might see as in their interest. He did not see why they would want to tie their hands in this manner. He would study this question carefully and respond to it and other questions tomorrow. He again drew Gromyko’s attention to the proposal he had submitted today.

In conclusion, Secretary Shultz recalled that during World War II he had fought in the Pacific as a U.S. Marine. McFarlane was too young to have fought in that war but he

fought as a Marine in another war. There was a saying that was common when they reached this stage and cocktails were waiting: “Stack arms and let’s get the hell out of here.”

Thereupon, the meeting adjourned at 6:55 P.M.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron March 1985 (2/4). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Matlock and Carolyn Smith. The meeting took place in the U.S. Mission.

² See [Document 355](#).

³ The Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and the Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies was signed in Washington, London, and Moscow on January 27, 1967, and entered into force on October 10, 1967.

⁴ Presumably the October 10, 1984, report on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. See [footnote 11, Document 159](#).

⁵ In his memoir, McFarlane recalled: “On January 7, George Shultz and I traveled with a small party to Geneva, Switzerland. I was anxious and expectant. We had reached a point where I felt our leverage was as great as it would ever be. I was confident that, after four years of increases, defense appropriations were going to start declining again. It was vital that we take full advantage of this optimal moment.” He continued: “Shultz had carried most of the talks, which had been fairly routine with no surprises. But on this sticking point of the meaning of ‘space arms,’ I intervened. The Soviets were essentially attempting to exclude a huge category of their weapons systems—nuclear systems—from negotiations, while insisting on the inclusion of SDI, which was almost entirely non-nuclear. ‘Let us be

clear,' I said. 'Are you willing to accept that the issue is what weapons are designed to defeat offensive systems, regardless of how they're based?' Gromyko's answer, in a nutshell, was 'no.' 'Well, then, we don't have a deal,' I said. 'That's out of the question.'" (McFarlane, *Special Trust*, p. 304)

⁶ The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed in London, Washington, and Moscow on July 1, 1968, and entered into force on March 5, 1970.

⁷ See [footnote 6, Document 31](#).

⁸ For discussions between Carter and Gromyko on the CTB, see [Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 115](#) and [150](#).

358. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the White House and the Department of State¹

Geneva, January 8, 1985, 0206Z

Secto 1018. For the President. Subject: Memorandum For the President of the Secretary's Second Meeting With Gromyko, Monday Afternoon, January 7, 1985.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

FROM: George P. Shultz

SUBJECT: My Second Meeting With Gromyko

1. Summary: We had another three-hour session this afternoon which began with my answers to Gromyko's questions on how we would handle space issues in a third forum. I was able to give, and Bud ably buttressed, a complete statement of your rationale for proceeding with SDI. This led Gromyko to a long and tortured response saying that they could only conclude that SDI was a prelude to a first strike strategy. I rebutted that position and also found an opening to state our strong view on the importance of verification. Both Bud and I tried to show how a defense integration with offense could at some point lead to greater strategic stability. I would have to say based on Gromyko's reaction that we struck out. He did, however, push on to outline in excruciating detail his plan for negotiation on all these issues. He outlined what he called an interrelated structure for discussing space, strategic arms, and medium range missiles which has a Rube Goldberg character about it. We will have to come up with

a tactic for dealing with this later this evening. End summary.

2. The meeting began with my answers to Gromyko's two questions at the end of the morning session dealing with the timing of any discussion on SDI. I emphasized that we have nothing concrete at the moment since our research is not far enough along, although we would expect to discuss such matters with the Soviet Union when and if the research efforts of either side demonstrated that there can be systems which could usefully contribute to a transition away from reliance on the threat of massive destruction. Nonetheless, I went on, we are prepared to enter into discussions even in advance of any positive research developments on how such defense systems could play a role in enhanced deterrence.

3. In response to Gromyko's request for clarification of what subject matter the third forum we had proposed would address, I noted that we would expect it to be a forum in which both sides would be free to raise whatever issues relating to defensive systems it wished to raise, including those based on Earth or space or directed against weapons either on the Earth or in space. I observed that nuclear offensive weapons in space were already banned by the Outer Space Treaty. At the same time, I went on, recent technical developments had made distinctions harder to draw both between ABM and certain anti-aircraft systems and between radars for the purposes of early warning, National Technical Means, space track, and ABM. There was, I observed, a good deal of work to be done in reexamining and reinforcing the fundamental ideas underlying the ABM Treaty and defensive systems in general. Additionally, such a forum would seem to be appropriate for the discussion of possible future systems and technical developments as they might bear on our

eventual goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. We did not think, I concluded, that bans on research could be verifiable or effective; indeed, if such research could contribute to lessening the dangers of war, it should not be banned.

4. I then gave a philosophical overview of how offensive and defensive systems related and drew the conclusion that the Soviets must agree since Chernenko said they were organically linked. I related this to assumptions of the early 1970's and the fact that we were both engaged in research in this area. I concluded by making the point that if nuclear arms are seriously reduced there is less to defend against and therefore an SDI role is more easily defined.

5. This led Gromyko to a long disquisition on how the Soviets view SDI as not defensive but offensive because it will become the basis for the first strike. He concluded that neither side needed SDI. We need to do away with sword and we don't need a shield, he said. We will not participate in the creation or justification of any such system. He called on us to end our SDI research program (we had already said that we would not do so, and why). If the U.S. creates it we will take measures to guarantee our own security, he said. He claimed they have been restrained in their criticism of SDI thus far but would really go to town on world opinion if we proceed. Therefore he urged us to reconsider. He digressed to say that he had reported faithfully to his colleagues the good words you had said to him, particularly in private in Washington, but they all want to know what this means in practice. Things today seem even worse than in September. He particularly denied that they had an important SDI program of their own. He said on verification that they are prepared to go for highly developed measures if an arms control agreement is really important and, by implication, the inverse.

6. I then gave a long pitch on importance of verification and our disappointment with past performance on their part. I then tried to contrast his view of our effort with what a neutral viewer might conclude: pointing to the sustained Soviet effort in both offensive and defensive fields and lagging U.S. effort. I again made the point that a serious reduction in offensive arms makes the argument on defensive effort leading to a first strike have much less force until nuclear weapons reach zero level when the argument has no force at all.

7. Bud gave an excellent presentation of your reasons for attempting to see through research on whether there is a role for defense to enhance deterrence. He emphasized the effect on deterrence if the offensive balance should become unstable through the growth of cruise and mobile missiles. Also that Soviet offensive and defensive programs could undermine offensive deterrence. He added the psychological problem of relying on massive offense versus systems that threaten no one. He also described why Soviets should have no fear of first strike.

8. I then asked a series of questions designed to get Gromyko to say how they would propose to get radical reductions. He was resoundingly unprepared or unwilling to give a credible response. But he went on to claim credit for a whole series of initiatives designed to make a more peaceful world.

9. Our final and most interesting exchange was on the structure of possible negotiations. He in effect proposed three fora—on space, strategic forces and INF—but gave it a complex overlay where a senior negotiator on each side would decide with his opposite number two questions: first, the terms of reference of each group; and, second, whether anything decided or negotiated in a particular group or fora

could be allowed to surface for decision by governments if its interrelationship with work in the other groups had not been approached. This is their way of applying the quote, organic link, unquote. Gromyko said that their senior man would also be the negotiator in one of the groups. Some things would not require the establishment of interrelationship, e.g. an agreement or moratorium on space weapons or certain CBMs in strategic talks. Anytime an agreement met the criteria it could be brought out and approved. At no time did Gromyko indicate that they had given up their demand that the objective for one of the fora was prevention of the militarization of space. He did say magnanimously that of course such matters as non-first use, freeze proposals, TTBT/PNE and CTB could be brought out and agreed at any time.

10. We ended with my expressing some skepticism that we could do this with any ambiguity remaining that we were proceeding with the third forum on the basis of their formula on the preventing the militarization of space. I also stressed that I would want to personally keep a close hand on any such talks as they proceed and would hope to have periodic reviews to move them along.

Shultz

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850001-0159. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to Moscow. In his diary for January 7, Reagan wrote: "Only 1st reports from George S. & Bud in Geneva & not much to talk about. I'll try to remember 'no news' may be good news." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 414)

359. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State¹

Geneva, January 8, 1985, 0305Z

Secto 1019. For S/S only. Subject: Message from Richard Perle to SecDef Weinberger.

1. (S—Entire text)
2. Richard Perle delivered the message in para 3 for transmission to SecDef Weinberger.
3. Begin text: To the Secretary of Defense Eyes Only From Richard Perle.

The hours since the first negotiating session have been spent evaluating the Soviet position and drafting additional material for Shultz.

My impressions are based on McFarlane briefing given to delegation following negotiating team's return from the Soviet Embassy, and while I believe his account was complete, I cannot be certain.

Gromyko was tough and demanding along expected lines. His emphasis on "preventing the militarization of outer space" was evident throughout. He sought to lay the foundation for Soviet insistence that the treatment of offensive arms is not only linked but actually conditional on the treatment of "space weapons."

Notetaker's account

On this point reads: “. . . it is impossible to consider the question of strategic arms and intermediate range missiles separate from the question of space weapons, and the demilitarization of space.”

I think it clear that Gromyko’s principal objective is to hold offensive weapon reductions hostage to agreement to negotiate [garble—far]-reaching limits, and ideally a total ban, on SDI (and most likely ASAT as well). I expect that the last issue to be resolved will be the agreed characterization of the “objectives” or “goals” of whatever negotiation deals with space.

The following “proposal” is taken verbatim from John Matlock’s notes. But while the notes deal separately with (1) space, (2) strategic arms and (3) intermediate-range weapons, McFarlane’s briefing stressed Gromyko’s insistence on the inter-relatedness of the issues which Gromyko proposed as a “complex”, saying that “all must be considered in one complex”.

Begin quote:

I. Space

—A ban on development, testing, or deployment of “attack space weapons” and the destruction of weapons of this type which already exist.

—“Attack space weapons”, to be defined as follows: space weapons based on any physical principle, regardless of the basing mode, which are designed to attack targets in space or to attack targets on earth (land, sea or air) from space. This includes ASAT’s and relevant anti-missile weapons.

II. Strategic Arms

If there is a complete ban on space attack weapons, the Soviet Union would accept a radical reduction in strategic arms and a complete renunciation, or strict limitations on, the development and deployment of strategic systems, including: long-range cruise missiles, new types of ICBMs, new types of SLBMs, and new types of heavy bombers.

III. Intermediate-Range Weapons (underline)

—At present, it is impossible to resolve the problem of strategic arms separately from the question of intermediate-range weapons, since those deployed in Europe are strategic in regard to the Soviet Union.

—The aim of the third set of negotiations, therefore, would be to agree on no further deployment of U.S. missiles in Western Europe, the ending of Soviet counter-measures, followed by reduction of intermediate-range nuclear systems in Europe to an agreed level. Those levels would take into account the medium-range missiles possessed by Britain and France. End quote.

As you will have observed there is not the slightest give in Gromyko's position on any of the three issues. Strategic arms are tied to a "total ban" on space weapons and the treatment of INF is unchanged from earlier Soviet positions: we would be left with zero (the French and British would use up our allotment) and the Soviets would merely reduce the level of SS-20s in Europe (last two words underlined). Shultz in discussing the morning found it remarkable that Gromyko was not interested in signs of movement from us on START or INF. So much for the theory that we needed to adopt new positions on START/INF to coax them back to the table.

In my view we should build on the inevitable division of subject matter into three distinct areas and, while picking up the Soviet notion of a “complex” of negotiations, stress the establishment of three “negotiating groups” without giving substance to the “complex” itself. While we will face a difficult negotiation over the characterization of the negotiating group that will deal with, in our formulation, “defensive nuclear and space arms,” we stand a good chance of emerging with three entities while reducing the “complex” to an insubstantial concept. At least that is what we have urged Shultz and McFarlane to attempt.

In drafting language that would carry this approach forward we prepared several formulations, one covering, in a single short statement, the “Subject and Objective: New Negotiating Complex,” and two others that deal with the subject and objectives of three negotiating fora. These are quoted below in order of preference:

Begin quote:

Subject and Objective: New Negotiating “Complex”

The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to begin a new complex of negotiations to address the interrelated questions of nuclear and space arms. To this end, three negotiating groups will be convened in Geneva, beginning on March 5, to begin the process of negotiating agreements on strategic offensive arms, intermediate-range nuclear arms, and defensive nuclear space arms. The objective of these negotiations shall be the reductions of nuclear arms and the enhancement of strategic stability with the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Subject and Objective: Three Negotiating Fora (Version I)

The subject of the first negotiation would be strategic offensive arms. We are prepared in step-by-step fashion to reduce radically the number and destructive power of such arms, with the immediate goal of enhancing the reliability and stability of deterrence, and with the ultimate goal of their eventual elimination.

The subject of the second negotiation would be intermediate-range nuclear forces. We propose that the objective of such talks should be an equitable agreement providing for effectively verifiable and radical reductions in intermediate-range offensive nuclear arms.

We propose that the subject of the third negotiation be defensive nuclear and space arms. The objective would be agreements on measures on Earth or in space to enhance the reliability and stability of deterrence, and to contribute to the use of outer space to ensure peace.

Subject and Objective: Three Negotiating Fora (Version II)

The subject of the first negotiation would be strategic offensive arms. We are prepared in step-by-step fashion to reduce radically the numbers and destructive power of such arms, with the immediate goal of enhancing the reliability and stability of deterrence, and with the ultimate goal of their eventual elimination.

The subject of the second negotiation would be intermediate range nuclear forces. We propose that the objective of such talks should be an equitable agreement providing for effectively verifiable and radical reductions in intermediate-range offensive nuclear arms.

We propose a third negotiation, the objective of which would be the achievement of equitable and verifiable

controls on defensive nuclear arms, including military systems based on Earth or in space. End quote.

You will note that the only difference between versions one and two of the three negotiating fora formulations is found in the final paragraph. You should know that version two of the three negotiating fora formulation was proposed by me as a “fallback”. Loathe as I am to propose fallbacks I believe that this protects our interests adequately and I succeeded in getting it adopted (by the advisory group).

I do not know how Shultz reacted to the versions above. They were hand-carried to him in the afternoon session. I will report further as soon as we are debriefed. (The session continues as I draft this message.)

I intend to resist vehemently any inclusion of the term “militarization of space” in any agreed statement. How far we travel down the path of burdening the forum in which space is discussed with language like “preventing the militarization of space”, or dealing with such issues as “the militarization of space” and the like will become the crunch issue and I doubt that it will be resolved before the last minute.

Rick Burt has prepared a memorandum for the President which I have not seen.² As soon as I obtain it I will send any necessary comment by message. Best regards. End text.

Shultz

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850001-0161. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

2 Presumably the memorandum transmitted in telegram Secto 1018, [Document 358](#).

360. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, January 8, 1985, 9:30 a.m.-noon

THIRD SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING Geneva, January 1985

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Jack F. Matlock, Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Dimitri Arensburger, Interpreter

USSR

Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko
Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Foreign Minister
Ambassador Viktor Karpov
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
Alexei Obukhov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Before proceeding with the formal meeting, the Secretary took Minister Gromyko aside and told him about U.S. concerns in the area of human rights. He named several individuals whose fate was of particular concern and mentioned repression of Hebrew teachers. Gromyko listened, but made no comments.²

Gromyko opened the formal meeting by suggesting that since they had no chairman, the discussions be conducted in a spontaneous manner which he found to be very good.

The Secretary said that the proposal submitted by Gromyko toward the end of the afternoon meeting yesterday was reasonable. In this connection, the first point he wanted to make was that having studied the Soviet proposal he could see that they were suggesting genuinely new negotiations. We accepted that it is new negotiations we are talking about.

Secondly, Gromyko had suggested that we proceed in terms of three different negotiating fora or baskets, or whatever they were to be called. The Secretary accepted that and viewed it as a kind of division of labor on the different subjects.

The Secretary's third point related to Gromyko's observation that the subjects to be dealt with in these three bodies were interrelated and that the three fora constituted one complex. He agreed with Gromyko's statement that the issues are interrelated and, therefore, consideration of these three elements in one complex is acceptable to us. However, Gromyko had made the point that an agreement reached in any one of the three fora would not be consummated until there was final agreement—in effect, until there was agreement in all three. At the same time, Gromyko had provided some exceptions to that rule and the Secretary understood Gromyko's point; Gromyko had stated his view on the relationship between the different fora. The Secretary pointed out that the U.S. approach is different in that we are seeking agreement in each of the fora, and if an agreement which is considered to be mutually advantageous is reached in a given setting, we will be willing to raise it as something that should be considered for consummation. But, perhaps this falls within the category of the exceptions that Gromyko had identified.

The Secretary then pointed out that we do not feel that we should be bound by a self-denying ordinance and refuse to conclude agreements which are in our mutual interest. He understood the Soviet position, but was explaining ours.

Regarding the subjects and objectives of the third forum, the Secretary observed that there is common ground in our approaches. As he had said yesterday, our views differed with regard to the third forum, but perhaps that difference is not so great in terms of what is to be discussed in it.

Gromyko interjected that what the Secretary was calling the third forum was really the first forum, and *the Secretary* indicated that he considered the number used not important and agreed to call it the first if *Gromyko* wished.

The Secretary went on to cite the second forum which would take up strategic nuclear offensive arms, and said that the subjects and objectives for that forum appear reasonable to us, and we agree. He noted that in this forum the U.S. is prepared to discuss trade-offs in whatever areas either the U.S. or the USSR has an advantage. This is in recognition of the fact that if we are to reach a reasonable agreement it will be most unlikely for it to be a mere mirror image of the force structures of the two parties. After all, we want to come out with a situation which reflects genuine equality.

Turning to the third forum, the Secretary noted that it concerns intermediate-range, or what the Soviets call medium-range, nuclear forces; either term is acceptable to us. The subject and objectives involved a problem that can be talked about. It seemed to him that in both cases *Gromyko* was looking to reductions, perhaps radical reductions. We agree with this. He added that *Gromyko*

was familiar with our principles and ideas. We are prepared to discuss different approaches toward working out an agreement within equal global ceilings.

Turning to the first forum, Secretary Shultz said that in some respects this is where the most difficult issues lie. At the same time, it seemed to him, as he had already said, that it might not be all that difficult to determine the subject matter of that forum. He had offered Gromyko an explanation in response to his perceptive question, and he had some further remarks.

Gromyko had suggested, Secretary Shultz continued, that the subject be non-militarization or demilitarization of space. (Gromyko interjected that he had not referred to demilitarization, but rather non-militarization.) The Secretary thought that such statements involved an overly narrow definition. There is no lack of willingness on our part to talk about and negotiate matters regarding space arms. But the Soviet definition is too narrow. What happens in space is a kind of abstraction, the result of something done with respect to offensive or defensive arms. He cited these two categories while recognizing that offensive and defensive arms are interrelated. If Gromyko would look at the subjects listed yesterday by the Secretary, he would recognize that they are related to this forum. For example, there are categories of anti-satellite systems which, though land-based, operate in space. Thus, to repeat, the Soviet concept is too narrow. Accordingly, we believe that this forum should deal with the full range of defensive systems, regardless of their basing mode. We are also prepared to deal with space arms questions as proposed by the Soviet Union.

The Secretary added that we had taken into account the concerns voiced by Gromyko several times last September

concerning nuclear arms and nuclear explosions in space. Thus we believe it would be appropriate if the discussions in this forum were to focus particularly on nuclear defensive systems, including existing systems. While he agreed with Gromyko that the ultimate goal should be the elimination of nuclear arms, he thought that this forum should include all such arms, whether offensive or defensive. We certainly agree that the elimination of the entire category of nuclear arms is desirable.

The Secretary continued by pointing out that the Soviet Union has the world's only operational ASAT system, and—as he understood it—had conducted some twenty tests of that system. Moreover, while this system is land-based, the original launchers intended for it could launch other systems. Since the ASAT system operates in space, this could be considered to be militarization of space. The U.S., in contrast, has not deployed ASATs and has yet to test the system it has under development against satellites. Thus, we are far behind the Soviet Union in this area. On the Soviet side, in contrast, we see something that exists. Beyond that he could mention a number of systems that are in space and have military uses, such as satellites for verifying compliance with agreements, for communications purposes and various other uses. To a very considerable extent we would not want to dispense with these systems because they are useful. Thus, the Secretary pointed out, “demilitarization” in one final sweep is not practical or verifiable. In looking through the record he had found, back at the ASAT talks in 1978 and 1979, a statement on this point made by the head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Khlestov, which ran as follows:

As for the concept of a ‘comprehensive agreement,’ the more we analyze it, the more doubts it causes us . . . From a purely technical point of view, it is

practically impossible to single out, with sufficient precision, from the whole complex of systems and services which we call space technology, only those systems which would be designed exclusively for countering satellites . . . we propose that in the future we continue to concentrate our efforts on the tasks which both sides recognize as realistic and feasible.³

The Secretary then turned to the matter of a space-based missile defense system, to which the Soviet Union had directed great attention, reviewing some thoughts he had tried to advance yesterday.

—First, U.S. scientists say that these systems are years off. He did not know what Soviet scientists have to say on the basis of their own research. One can never say what a “hot research group” might come up with. The Secretary had personal experience with many such research groups at the University of Chicago, at Stanford and at MIT. And though none of those research groups focussed on the subject under discussion here, he knew that it was impossible to tell in what direction such research efforts might lead. This effort, therefore, is long-term by its very nature.

—Second, deployment of these systems is covered by a number of existing treaties. The Limited Test Ban Treaty prohibits nuclear detonations in space, the Outer Space Treaty bans the deployment of nuclear weapons in space, while the ABM Treaty prohibits systems that are space-based, sea-based, air-based or mobile land-based. Thus, there is a whole body of treaty language that has been agreed upon in this area.

—Third, regarding research as such, the Secretary had two points. One, that an agreement on research, as we see it, is virtually impossible to verify for a variety of reasons. Much

relevant research stems from objectives unrelated to the question at hand. As an example he could point to advances in computational ability. We are both engaged in such research and this is impossible to stop. Beyond that—and this was his second point—we think that, in the end, if there is the possibility of defense, it would offer a more comfortable and secure form of strategic stability than the one now existing.

The Secretary recognized that Gromyko disagreed, but expressed the hope that the Soviets would study our thinking. There is much time to talk about this matter and to digest it. It seems to us that if it is possible ultimately to determine a basis where a major element of deterrence would be defensive, in contrast to preponderantly offensive elements of deterrence we have now, this might offer a more comfortable and more secure form of strategic stability. If this can be accomplished it is potentially desirable. Perhaps we will not be able to find a way to do so. Therefore, for both these reasons the U.S. believes that research should continue and in fact will continue. Even if we were to agree on some limitation, it would be impossible to verify it. If it should turn out that a particular technology seems feasible, the U.S. would undertake more direct discussions, as provided by the ABM Treaty. At any rate, this is a matter for the future.

The Secretary said that this brought him back to a point in connection with the first forum. The U.S. is fully prepared to discuss and negotiate matters involving space arms and to take up whatever proposals the USSR may make in this area. As he had said yesterday, we are prepared to take up space arms questions in either of the other two fora, if they are related to the context of discussions there. As Gromyko had said yesterday, the world is changing. Perhaps as the negotiations continue, even on familiar subjects, we may

want to approach them in different ways. Regarding further details and potential content of discussions in the first forum, the Secretary referred Gromyko to his comments on this subject the day before.

Finally, the Secretary returned to the question of structuring the negotiations. He recalled that Gromyko had said that they would appoint leaders for the three negotiating groups, and that, most likely, one would be named chairman of the overall delegation. Gromyko had also invited us to do as we wished in this regard. The Secretary observed that Gromyko's suggestion concerning the structure was novel. We had not heard such a suggestion previously and therefore we were still thinking about it. He did not know at this point where we would come out in terms of personnel appointments. To some extent he thought this would be a reflection of who would be "Mr. One," "Mr. Two" and "Mr. Three." Thus, this matter remained open so far as the U.S. is concerned.

The Secretary then said that his delegation had prepared a statement describing its proposals regarding the subjects and objectives of the whole complex of negotiations. This text could serve as a basis for discussion. He could give it to Gromyko now, or perhaps Gromyko preferred to make some comments before looking at the U.S. text.

Gromyko responded that indeed he had some comments. He was gratified to hear that certain aspects of the Soviet proposal regarding the structure of possible negotiations are acceptable to the U.S. On some other aspects of the Soviet proposal, the Secretary had voiced some doubts or reservations. He hoped that the Secretary would give added thought to these matters. It is good that the Secretary recognized the interconnection among the questions to be negotiated in the three groups.

Nevertheless, there is a difference in the Soviet and American understanding of this interrelationship. The U.S. should be aware of this.

In dealing with this concept, Gromyko observed, the Soviet side proceeds from the premise that the subject (“material”) of the negotiations compels us to consider the subject matter of the three groups as interrelated. That is why he had said yesterday that the problems must be solved in comprehensive fashion. In particular, he had explained why it would be impossible to make progress on some issues without agreement on space, more precisely on the non-militarization of space. He had also referred to a different interrelationship, namely that between strategic arms and medium-range nuclear arms.

When the Secretary referred to interrelationship, Gromyko continued, he was talking about a different kind of interrelationship—that of offensive and defensive weapons. The Soviet Union cannot accept this if for no other reason than because the USSR did not recognize the category which the U.S. called defensive systems. He had said clearly that these systems, these concepts and this U.S. program were offensive systems, offensive concepts and an offensive program. They are a component part of a whole. One had to look at things from the standpoint of their ultimate logic. He did not wish to repeat what it would mean if the U.S. proceeded to implement its plan.

The Secretary observed that Gromyko had made himself very clear yesterday.

Gromyko continued that accordingly, we are speaking different languages when we refer to an interrelationship. Nevertheless, the very idea of an interrelationship does exist and that in itself is a positive element. Still, the two

sides attached different meanings to it and this must be kept in mind.

The Secretary responded that, in practical terms, the question would present itself in terms of what would happen if, for example, we reached some kind of understanding in forum three or forum two. Would it be converted into a formal agreement or not? Under one interpretation of the interrelationship, the answer would be "no." Under a different interpretation the answer would be "yes."

Gromyko replied that this would not necessarily be the case. The point is that there are different interpretations of the concept of interrelationship. When we go beyond concrete specifics and relate these matters to high policy, we have to recognize that the foundations of your plan and our plan are different. Naturally, this is of major importance. Everything said and written in the U.S. attributes defensive aims to your program—as if everything in it is good and nothing bad. Even here in Geneva, though perhaps in a more restrained fashion, this has been the U.S. position. He, however, had told the Secretary that this is not the case, that the objective of the U.S. program is just the opposite. He had said this yesterday.

Gromyko then turned to the question of what agreements could be concluded in the absence of an overall agreement. As he had explained the day before, there are two groups of questions on which agreement is possible in the absence of an overall agreement. He did not preclude the possibility that it might be possible to reach agreement on individual questions in one of these groups which did not bear critically on the interrelationship. The number of such questions would be small. In this instance, there would be no need to await resolution of the other questions with

which the groups would be dealing. The other category involved those questions which could be resolved and agreed upon entirely independent of progress on any other issue or group of issues. He had cited examples such as a comprehensive nuclear test ban. This type of question could be singled out, agreed upon, and an accord signed and brought into force. There were also two agreements that had been negotiated in the past, but had not entered into force. They were part of the same category that Gromyko was talking about.

The Secretary said he understood.

Gromyko noted that he had listed them yesterday. He wanted to provide additional clarification on one point because he felt that the Secretary had not clearly understood the matter. Let us assume that significant progress had been made in one or more of the groups. As they saw it, it would not be necessary to wait for the other groups to finish their work before discussing the overall picture. The whole delegation should meet from time to time to review their progress. It would be good if everything could be completed at the same time, but this can hardly be expected. There should be a periodic overall analysis, and this would provide an organic connection of the work by all three groups.

For example, Gromyko continued, let us assume that group "x" had conducted ten meetings. At that point the delegation as a whole could meet to see how things were going. This should be standard practice. There would be one delegation that is split into three groups. Thus, there would inevitably have to be consideration of the interrelationship the ministers had talked about—provided, of course, both sides understood the meaning of the interrelationship in the same way. One should not rely

exclusively on the literal meaning of the word, and one should not impose a kind of law on the groups under which they had to finish their work and wash their hands before a decision is made how to proceed further.

Gromyko said he hoped this explanation would be useful. He offered it because he suspected that the Secretary had not fully understood the Soviet concept.

The Secretary replied that this was an important clarification which he found very interesting.

Gromyko then noted the U.S. concern over the concept of non-militarization of space. Of course, one could invent some kind of symbol to replace this word, but Gromyko did not believe that it would be helpful to resort to algebraic techniques. If anything, that could be harmful. He added that the Secretary knows what the Soviet side means in this regard, and the Soviet side knows what the U.S. has in mind. Gromyko reiterated that he was convinced that the U.S. and USSR can prevent the militarization of space. If such militarization were to occur, the USSR, the U.S. and mankind as a whole will be pushed further toward the abyss toward which we have been moving. This is what will happen unless we find a way to halt such movement. Thus, even though the U.S. might not like the term militarization and may on occasion scorn it, he would urge honesty and precision in dealing with this subject.

Secretary Shultz's statements, Gromyko continued, had been reminiscent of those appearing in the U.S. press to the effect that it is wrong to raise the question of the militarization of space because space is already militarized. There are no scales which would measure the falsity of this thesis. We all understand that this is not the case. If we look at steps taken by both countries, there are things we

can learn. For example, look at the U.S. space shuttle. If viewed in terms of its potential, one could conclude that under certain circumstances it could be used in ways in which no Soviet system can be used, and therefore that space is already militarized. But this would be an oversimplification. He did not want us to take this path since it would only make it harder to reach the goals before us.

Gromyko then reiterated what he had said the day before regarding space arms, or more precisely the non-militarization of space. The latter implies that there should be a ban on the development, testing and deployment of attack (or strike) space arms, accompanied by the destruction of existing systems of this kind. If such an approach is followed, far-reaching solutions to other issues would become possible as well. In order not to dilute the question of space arms by tangential issues, the Soviet side has proposed to talk about attack (strike) space arms. By attack space arms the Soviet Union means space arms based on any physical principle, regardless of basing mode, which can strike objects in space and which can strike objects on land, sea or in the air, that is on the planet earth, from space. Of course, this would include relevant anti-missile and ASAT systems.

Gromyko then said that, in referring to what he termed the U.S. defensive system, Secretary Shultz had spoken at length about research and about the difficulty in verifying a ban on research. To a considerable degree what the Secretary said about verifying a research ban is true. But let us assume that all this preparatory research should demonstrate that such systems can indeed be developed. The U.S. position is "if it's possible, then let's do it." The Soviet position is to exclude this possibility since it would be a boon to mankind if this system is never developed.

Gromyko continued that this situation reminded him of the story of two men visiting Monaco. One of them suggests going to the casino in the hope of winning something; the other one refuses since he does not want to risk losing what he has. This illustrates the difference between the U.S. and Soviet positions. The Soviets feel the wiser course is not to risk losing everything. This is not just the unanimous view of the Soviet leadership but is also shared by people everywhere. People instinctively feel that this path should not be pursued because it would generate a very great threat to peace and would intensify the arms race. Nothing would do more to enhance U.S. prestige than a decision to rule out that option. That was the way to reduce nuclear arms, a goal mentioned by the Secretary, the President, as well as the leadership of the Soviet Union. Specifically, General Secretary Chernenko had said this on numerous occasions and it had been repeated by Gromyko at this very table. Nuclear arms should be reduced down to their complete elimination from the arsenals of nations.

In the U.S., Gromyko continued, there is presently a popular thesis to the effect that one should switch the character and nature of deterrence and that instead of relying on strategic and medium-range nuclear systems for deterrence, one should rely on systems which the U.S. has baptized defensive systems. The Soviet Union believed that this would not serve the cause of peace, that this would increase the threat, that the threat would become awesome if the large-scale missile defense system was developed. Under such circumstances, the nuclear arms race would not be curbed by such systems but just the opposite would occur; it would acquire new momentum. The USSR can not understand how the U.S. fails to see this. It must be some kind of self-hypnosis. This plan will intensify the nuclear arms race.

Gromyko said that if the Secretary had no further comments on the substance, perhaps they should give some thought on how to conclude their meetings. Earlier, the Secretary had mentioned a draft which Gromyko assumed was a draft of a joint statement. The Soviet delegation would certainly take a look at this draft and consider it. The Soviet delegation, for its part, would present its own draft. Gromyko thought that at this point it would be advisable to have either a working break or to recess for lunch, after which they could see how to proceed with regard to the joint statement and consider where to go from there.

The Secretary replied that he liked Gromyko's procedural suggestion, but wanted to make sure he understood clearly Gromyko's description of how the set of negotiating groups in the delegation would work. Gromyko had mentioned a situation in which one of the three groups, Group X, had held ten meetings and had come up with something. It would then be appropriate—and in any event this would occur periodically—for the whole group to consider the results, and for Group X to report what it had agreed upon.

Gromyko confirmed that this was right.

The Secretary continued that he understood Gromyko had suggested that the whole group engage in a kind of summary review to judge whether this one thing that had been agreed upon could stand on its own or whether it should wait. This would be the function of such periodic meetings.

Gromyko again confirmed that this was correct; the overall delegation would make a judgment on how the agreement reached fits into the framework of the other questions being negotiated.

The Secretary noted that the structure proposed by Gromyko was unusual and imaginative and the Secretary would have to testify in Congress and explain how it worked. Thus, he added jokingly, he might ask Gromyko to write his testimony.

The Secretary then presented the U.S. draft text of a joint statement. (Attachment 1)

Gromyko simultaneously gave the Secretary the text of the Soviet draft (Attachment 2).

The Secretary suggested that they adjourn for lunch and reconvene at 2:30 P.M., which would give them the opportunity to study each other's drafts and to respond at the afternoon meeting.

The meeting adjourned at 12:00 Noon.

Attachment 1

TEXT OF U.S. DRAFT OF JOINT STATEMENT

The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to begin a new complex of negotiations to address the interrelated questions of nuclear and space arms. To this end, three negotiating groups will be convened in Geneva, beginning on March 5, 1985, to begin the process of negotiating agreements on strategic offensive nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear arms, and nuclear defensive and space arms. The objective of these negotiations shall be the reduction of nuclear arms and the enhancement of strategic stability, with the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Attachment 2

TEXT OF SOVIET DRAFT OF JOINT STATEMENT

As previously agreed, a meeting was held on January 7 and 8, 1985, in Geneva between Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and George Shultz, the U.S. Secretary of State.

During the meeting they discussed the subject and objectives of the forthcoming Soviet-US negotiations on nuclear and space arms.

The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space arms, as well as both strategic and medium-range nuclear arms; moreover, all these questions will be considered and resolved in their interrelationship.

The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space, limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and strengthening strategic stability.

The sides believe that ultimately the forthcoming negotiations, just as efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

The date of the beginning of the negotiations and the site of these negotiations will be agreed through diplomatic channels within one month.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron March 1985 (2/4). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Matlock and Arensburger. The meeting took place in the Soviet Mission in Geneva.

² Shultz's Geneva briefing book contained a section on human rights, with talking points and background information on specific cases and individuals. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz-Gromyko at Geneva, January 1985) In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "I took Gromyko aside and went over our human rights views with him at length. He raised both his hands as if to shield himself from me and flapped his palms to make me go away. But I kept him in a corner, and he had to listen even though he pretended not to." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 516)

³ The full text of Khlestov's statement was sent in telegram 4927 from Vienna, May 18, 1979. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D790226-0408)

361. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the White House¹

Geneva, January 8, 1985, 1234Z

Secto 1024. For the President. Subject: Memorandum for the President on the Secretary's Third Meeting With Gromyko, Tuesday Morning, January 8, 1985.

1. Secret—Entire text.
2. We spent another two-and-a-half hours this morning going over and clarifying our positions on the structure and content of possible future negotiations. Nothing very new arose from this discussion but it gave me the chance to explain clearly our view of what the three groups might discuss. Gromyko made an interesting clarification that in effect means that any agreements coming out of the groups can be called up and approved if both sides want it that way. At the end of our session both sides tabled a text of a draft joint announcement. (These texts are contained in the last paragraph of this message.)
3. Before we began the morning session. I took Gromyko aside and went through privately with him all of our human rights points including specific names and cases, as well as general points on emigration, Hebrew teachers, divided families and American nationals. He listened but took the predictable position that he would not comment.
4. I then began the meeting with a lengthy statement designed to put on the record or restate our views on the subject matters for the three fora: strategic arms, INF, and nuclear defensive and space arms. I restated what we

expected to take place in each and recalled particularly my list of subjects for the third fora which I laid out yesterday. I recognized that we have a different approach to the third fora and wanted that clearly understood. I expressed the hope that they would come to see the advantage of looking at defense in relation to offense. His long answer amounted to a negative answer on ever being persuaded that SDI was defensive. He insisted that they would always assume it to be offensive but that did not seem to deter him from wanting to get his complex of negotiations going. He even made absolutely clear that the complicated system of joint reviews of the work of the three groups was not designed to stop all agreements from emerging.

5. I made crystal clear that we would not agree to any proposition that appeared to rule out or control research in the space area. He did not appear to feel that they would stop their research, but rather stated that they hoped nothing would be allowed to the development stage.

6. Finally, we both tabled texts (which follow) and these will be discussed at our meeting beginning at 2:30 pm.

7. Begin text of U.S. statement:

The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to begin a new complex of negotiations to address the interrelated questions of nuclear and space arms. To this end, three negotiating groups will be convened in Geneva, beginning on March 5, 1985, to begin the process of negotiating agreements on strategic offensive nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear arms, and nuclear defensive and space arms. The objective of these negotiations shall be the reduction of nuclear arms and the enhancement of strategic stability, with the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

8. Begin text of Soviet statement:

As previously agreed, a meeting between Andrei A. Gromyko, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and George Shultz, Secretary of State of the USA, took place on January 7 and 8, 1985, in Geneva.

The question regarding the subject and objectives of the forthcoming Soviet-US negotiations on nuclear and space weapons was discussed during the meeting.

The sides agree that the subject of the talks will be a complex of questions pertaining both to space weapons and nuclear arms—strategic and medium-range—with all these questions to be discussed and resolved in their interrelationship.

The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, limiting and reducing nuclear weapons, and strengthening strategic stability.

Eventually, the two sides believe, the forthcoming negotiations as, generally, efforts in the field of limiting and reducing armaments should lead to the complete elimination everywhere of nuclear weapons.

The date of the beginning of the negotiations and their venue will be agreed through diplomatic channels within one month.

Shultz

1 Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, Geneva Meeting: Shultz/Gromyko 01/08/1985 Morning. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman; cleared by McFarlane, M. Bova (S/S), Hill, and K. Clark (S); approved by Shultz. Sent for information Priority to Moscow.

362. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, January 8, 1985, 3:35–7:55 p.m.

FOURTH SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING Geneva, January 1985

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Jack F. Matlock, Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Carolyn Smith, Interpreter

USSR

Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko
Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Foreign Minister
Ambassador Viktor Karpov
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
A. Bratchikov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Secretary Shultz began the meeting by saying that the two sides had reviewed each other's proposed press communiques.² He had some comments to make about the Soviet draft, but as Minister Gromyko was the guest, he should have the floor first.

Gromyko responded that, frankly speaking, it would be hard for the Soviet side to accept the U.S. text. For one thing the U.S. referred to a new complex of negotiations whereas the Soviet side felt the need to discuss the problems in a complex—or comprehensive—fashion. The two concepts are not identical. The U.S. draft then speaks

of the three groups meeting in Geneva on March 5 to begin work, although the sides had not yet agreed to begin negotiations. The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the possibility of holding negotiations. He had always taken care to say that if the sides can agree on the subject and objectives of the negotiations, then they could talk about the date and site of the talks. He always began his remarks with the words "if we agree on the subject and objectives of the negotiations."

The U.S. draft, Gromyko continued, then goes on to mention defensive arms. Perhaps this is good for the U.S., but it is unacceptable to the Soviet side, as he had already stated many times. The USSR has a wholly different evaluation of the arms the U.S. calls defensive. The only way to proceed here is to find mutually acceptable language, and this is a matter of principle. U.S. and Soviet assessments of the U.S. plans are diametrically opposed to each other, and this is why the sides must look in a different direction to find acceptable wording.

Gromyko then asked for the Secretary's reaction to the Soviet draft statement.

Secretary Shultz said that as far as a date and place for negotiations are concerned, he of course recognizes that this would come only after reaching an agreement on the substance of the negotiations. If agreement is reached on the substance, it would be worthwhile to set a time and place so as to be specific and leave nothing vague that could be clearly specified.

As for Gromyko's remarks about defense, the Secretary had carefully listened to everything Gromyko said yesterday and today, and he believed he completely understood what Gromyko meant. He hoped that with time he and Gromyko

would have an opportunity to continue exchanges on this subject because it represents a very deep issue.

The U.S. had identified one of the three fora agreed upon as “nuclear defensive and space arms,” the Secretary continued. He recognized that Soviet attention is very much focused on space arms, as signalled by statements made here and elsewhere by Gromyko and also by Chairman Chernenko. The U.S. understands this and is prepared to discuss space arms. But, as he had mentioned this morning, the U.S. sees this issue as essentially a broader one. There should be clarity about the defensive arrangements the Soviet Union now has underway (the U.S. at least would call them defensive). In the U.S. view this Soviet program is a massive one and should be discussed. The USSR has research programs in particle beams, directed energy and lasers, and has as well a deployed ABM system that is being upgraded. It also has a massive air defense infrastructure. The United States, for its part, has done very little in defense. So it is incorrect to discuss U.S. plans and research programs without looking at the large Soviet defense program. For this reason the U.S. believes that this negotiating forum should address the question of defense broadly speaking.

The structure of the Soviet draft statement, the Secretary continued, provides a basis with which to work, and so the U.S. side has made an effort to integrate its ideas into its two drafts. The U.S. draft adopts the first and second paragraphs of the Soviet draft without change. The third paragraph of the Soviet draft was slightly changed, and the last two paragraphs dropped in favor of a U.S. text. Shultz handed over to Gromyko a copy of the following statement:

As previously agreed, a meeting between Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central

Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and George P. Shultz, Secretary of State of the USA, took place on January 7 and 8, 1985 in Geneva.

The question regarding the subject and objectives of the forthcoming Soviet-US negotiations on nuclear and space arms was discussed during the meeting.

The sides agree that the subject of the talks will be those interrelated questions pertaining to nuclear and space arms with these questions to be discussed and resolved in a complex of negotiations.

To this end, the negotiating groups will be convened in Geneva, beginning on March 5, 1985, to begin the process of negotiating agreements on nuclear defensive and space arms, strategic offensive nuclear arms and intermediate-range nuclear arms.

The objective of these negotiations shall be the reduction of nuclear arms and the enhancement of strategic stability, with the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear arms.

Gromyko observed that the U.S. had added the phrase “defensive arms” and this was unacceptable. He did not want to get into polemics, but all the credit ascribed by the Secretary to Soviet activity in the field of defense is not true to fact. This is not acceptable wording, and any wording that is not acceptable to both sides must be dropped.

Secretary Shultz asked whether the main problem involved the word “defensive”, or was it something else?

Gromyko replied that “outer space” is absent from the U.S. draft as an objective of the negotiations.

The Secretary pointed out that the U.S. draft reads “negotiations on nuclear and space arms.”

Gromyko said that the concept of outer space must not get lost here. It must be put in first place.

The Secretary replied that the U.S. does not want to lose it, but wants to discuss outer space. He read out the following alternative to the last paragraph:

The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race, limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and strengthening strategic stability on earth and in space.

Gromyko objected that this means relegating space to the backyard. The U.S. could call its strategic defense plan a plan to strengthen strategic stability if it wished.

Secretary Shultz said that, just as in baseball the number four hitter is the “clean-up hitter,” he was saving the best for last. The phrase “strengthening strategic stability on earth and in space” could be interpreted in the Soviet way or in the U.S. way.

Gromyko said there should be no room for ambiguity here. He suggested taking a 15-minute break so that both sides could look over the drafts.

Secretary Shultz agreed, and the U.S. delegation left the room at 3:05 p.m.

At 3:25 p.m. the U.S. delegation returned and the meeting resumed.

Gromyko presented the following draft of a joint statement:

As previously agreed, a meeting was held on January 7 and 8, 1985, in Geneva between Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and George P. Shultz, the U.S. Secretary of State.

In accordance with the arrangement previously reached in principle between the USSR and the USA to enter into new negotiations on nuclear and space arms, the two sides focused their attention, as had been agreed, on discussing the question of the subject and specific objectives of these negotiations. The discussions were useful.

Both sides agreed that the ultimate objective of these negotiations, in the course of which all questions will be considered and resolved in their interrelationship as generally the two sides' efforts in the field of arms limitation and reduction, should be the gradual exclusion of nuclear weapons from the military arsenals of states until they are completely eliminated.

The exchange of views will be continued and the sides will seek to elaborate as early as possible an agreed approach to resolving the questions under question at this meeting.

Andrei A. Gromyko and George P. Shultz agreed to continue the exchange of views, for which purpose

they will meet again in early March. The date and venue of the meeting will be agreed additionally.

Secretary Shultz remarked that there was one place in the third paragraph that was unclear linguistically, but he did not disagree with the meaning of the sentence.

Gromyko explained that the Soviet side was referring to the ultimate goal of the negotiations and all actions taken to achieve that goal.

The Secretary said he wished to discuss this, but first he had a few questions. At this morning's meeting the two of them had discussed at length the Soviet proposal for structuring the negotiations in three groups. He thought they had made quite a bit of headway in discussing it. Essentially they were struggling with the description of one of the three fora, but now it seemed that the Soviet side was withdrawing this idea. He did not object, and in fact looked forward to another meeting with *Gromyko*, but why did *Gromyko* not now want to go ahead with this idea? The Soviet side had proposed and the U.S. had accepted the basic notion of a related complex of three negotiations.

Gromyko complained that he now had to repeat himself once again. He did not understand why the Secretary was not paying attention to him. He had stated the Soviet views on how to structure the negotiations, provided agreement was reached to hold them. Every time he mentions this, he makes this reservation because the two sides have not yet agreed on this. If we agreed when to meet next time to discuss the subject and objectives of the talks, he said, then everything he said about the structure would still be valid. He was not taking back a single word of what he had said.

The Secretary observed that there is a difference of view in how the sides interpret research on defensive measures. He doubted there would be any change in these views by early March, and he doubted it could be resolved by then. It was more likely to be resolved through the process of negotiations.

Gromyko said he did not wish to single out any one question. He would suggest just continuing these talks and see what the outcome would be. They had come to no final result here yet, and he would suggest continuing these conversations, if the Secretary found this acceptable.

Secretary Shultz suggested that the two delegations separate for a few minutes in order to caucus and look at the direction in which they were going.

The U.S. delegation left the room at 3:42 p.m.

At 4:28 p.m. the U.S. delegation returned.

Gromyko joked that he hadn't expected to see the Secretary again until the second crow of the rooster.

Secretary Shultz replied that if today had been Sunday, the U.S. delegation would have been busy watching football in the other room. He said he was puzzled and could not figure out what was causing Gromyko to draw back from what had already been agreed upon. Certainly the two sides disagree on how to characterize what seem to the U.S. to be defensive systems, and which the Soviet Union feels are offensive. He expected that if we met six months or a year from now they might well still disagree, although there would be time for reflection. Although they disagree on what to call these arms, they do not disagree that it is important to discuss them. The U.S. is prepared to discuss them and Gromyko has indicated the same. The Secretary

had developed in one of his presentations the sense in which technology is making certain distinctions in the ABM Treaty difficult to establish, and therefore there is a need to examine a variety of technologies.

The Secretary noted that he had already pointed out that the deployed Soviet ABM system depends on nuclear explosions in the upper atmosphere or space. And so the U.S. had tried to define the subject matter of the first working group or forum so as to include what the Soviets want to talk about in space as well as things on the ground that seem relevant or important to the U.S. If we do not agree on the content, that is one problem. But if we do agree on the content—and the U.S. has excluded nothing—then we should be able to find the words to express this. If Gromyko's problem concerns the word "defensive," the Secretary could suggest some alternative wording. But perhaps this is not the problem. The Secretary thought that if they could capitalize on the extensive discussions that have taken place here, they certainly should. He had other language to suggest, but observed that perhaps Gromyko was not interested and had already decided to back away from the direction in which he had been going.

"Don't try to pretend that you don't understand us," *Gromyko* rejoined. He categorically rejected the reproach that he had retreated from his position. Each word he had spoken was valid. "Have we reached agreement on the subject and aims of the negotiations?" he asked rhetorically. Each time he had spoken of the structure of the possible negotiations, he had said, "when and if we agree on the subject and objectives of the negotiations, this is the structure we envision." He had spoken of one delegation divided into three groups. Of course, the negotiations would deal with the subjects for discussion in each group. These three groups would take stock of their

progress and present reports on their work. This is how the Soviet side sees this issue. Let us talk seriously now. There would be one single negotiation made up of three groups working in three directions. Unfortunately, agreement has not yet been reached on this. Tell us, Gromyko asked the Secretary, if this proposal is unacceptable.

Gromyko said that the Secretary had again raised the subject of Soviet ABM systems and certain other issues. If the Secretary insisted on this, Gromyko would have to repeat all that he had already said. Is it really necessary to do so? If we could reach agreement on these questions, we could name the date for the negotiations to begin, i.e., March 1 or April 1, although the latter was not a very good date. But we are not in a position to do that now.

Secretary Shultz inquired what precisely was the essence of their disagreement. He thought it boiled down to the subject or way of describing the first group. If this is the problem, he had a proposal, but perhaps this is not the problem.

Gromyko responded that this is indeed the main issue. "You don't want to accept our proposal to deal with the militarization of space," he added. Whenever he had raised this question, the Secretary began to speak of research, U.S. plans and so forth. The Soviet side does not share the U.S. view that it is essential to carry out this research. This is the first stage of implementing the U.S. plan. The Soviet side proposes to continue discussing this important question, but here there is absolutely no agreement on it. They had touched on other important questions as well, but this is the main one. If they had reached agreement on questions related to space, they could now set the time and place of the new negotiations, but they have no such agreement now. If you think we cannot exist without a new

round of talks, then your idea is far from the truth. Such an exchange is in the interest of both sides. If this does not suit you, Gromyko said, tell us and we will not speak of it again. This was his short reply to the Secretary's remarks. He noted that time was running out and the sides should be brief.

The Secretary said he wanted to make sure he understood. Was Gromyko saying that they would establish these negotiating fora whenever the U.S. says that it will cease its research program on strategic defense?

Gromyko replied that he would not discuss that now. He proposed it for subsequent discussion. He wanted to discuss a whole series of questions by way of continuing the conversation here, but this would take several days. The Secretary certainly must understand, said Gromyko, that the Soviet side cannot accept the U.S. concept, point of view or policy on outer space. The U.S. must clearly understand the Soviet position on this. However, the Soviets are prepared to continue discussing all these issues. If a continued exchange does not suit you, Gromyko said, tell us. This is a proposal, not a request.

The Secretary replied that the U.S. would not stop its research program.

Gromyko commented that the Secretary had already said this. Secretary Shultz had said that if the essence is that the Soviet Union is waiting for the U.S. to stop its research program, this was useless because the U.S. would not stop. Gromyko repeated that the Secretary had already said this. He said that the Soviet assessment of the U.S. concept on space would not change, but the Soviet side is nonetheless prepared to continue the discussion.

The Secretary said he thought Gromyko had proposed that such a discussion take place in the first working group. This was implied by the draft joint statement Gromyko had presented at the morning meeting. This negotiating group would discuss the questions the two sides agree upon, but the U.S. wants it to discuss other questions too. This is what the sides should work toward, but this may not be acceptable to the Soviet side.

Gromyko replied that this problem would be discussed in one of the three groups.

Secretary Shultz said he agreed.

However, *Gromyko* continued, we have not yet cleared the way for the beginning of negotiations. If, for example, we agree now that this working group would meet on March 1, it would have the same problems at its first meeting that we are having here. What kind of negotiations would those be? At least one working group, or perhaps the whole delegation, would have to discuss this problem, and he thought it was better to discuss it at the ministerial level. It is not a question for a working group, but for a higher, more fundamental, level.

The Secretary remarked that he had given Gromyko a list of what he considered to be appropriate subject matter for this group, and it was a meaty set of material. Gromyko could see this in his notes. The Secretary thought this area is important to both sides and is negotiable.

Gromyko said it is not possible to begin discussing the work program of the working groups now. First they must agree on the objectives of the working group and when the negotiations would begin.

The Secretary asked whether Gromyko felt that further discussion of this question now would be fruitless.

Gromyko replied that he was not saying that; there was plenty of time left before tomorrow morning and of course they could sit here until then, but he thought it was hardly necessary to repeat what had already been said. There was no one but himself and the Secretary to discuss these questions. Their leaders had charged them with discussing them. Did he understand the Secretary to say that the idea of the two of them continuing their discussions was unsuitable? If so, one mode of action was indicated, but if not so, another mode of action was indicated.

The Secretary replied, "No, it is not unsuitable." But it is also suitable to get the negotiations going as soon as possible. As he had said, he thought that the negotiations, once begun, should be closely followed and discussed at a high political level. The two sides have much to discuss. He was striving to understand the reason Gromyko did not wish to begin the negotiating process. Gromyko had handed him a proposed communique announcing the beginning of negotiations. Although no date was set, the objective of the talks was stated. And now, apparently Gromyko did not want this to happen.

[At this point, Korniyenko remarked to Gromyko in Russian, "Then they should take our text."]

Gromyko said that they want the negotiations to begin. But, he said, it is impossible to agree on the timing because there is as yet no agreed understanding on the subject and objectives of the negotiations. We are speaking of a common objective: both sides agree to the goal of completely eliminating nuclear arms. But this is the only thing we agree on, and therefore it is too early now to talk

about a date for beginning the negotiations. He did not know whether at the next meeting they would be able to agree upon these questions and so he proposed to meet again in order to continue this discussion.

He said that the Secretary tried to interpret the fact that he would not agree to set a date for negotiations to mean that the Soviet side had changed its position and did not want to have negotiations. But Gromyko had said all along that they could not agree upon the date if they had not agreed on the subject and objectives of the negotiations. Don't try to pressure us, Gromyko warned, first of all, because we don't like it, and second, because it is hardly in either of our interests for our delegations to meet at the talks and immediately find themselves at an impasse so that the negotiations fall apart. This would be advantageous to neither side. Would it not be better to hold negotiations on a more reliable basis?

The Secretary noted that questions may arise over what is meant in the final sentence of the Soviet draft statement, which reads as follows: "The date of the beginning of the negotiations and the site of these negotiations will be agreed through diplomatic channels within one month."

Gromyko replied that he considered this normal. The sides could specify the month in which the talks would begin if the U.S. side feels this is important. They would not name a date, but would specify a month, or the 15th of a certain month. Gromyko had no desire to create any vagueness or uncertainty.

Korniienko asked whether the U.S. accepts the subject and definition of the negotiations.

The Secretary replied that the U.S. could not accept the Soviet draft but could use it as a basis for discussion.

Gromyko suggested that instead of a date we could say that a meeting and exchange of views would take place in March. If it is so important we could specify the first half of March. February would not be convenient for him for several reasons and March would be better.

The Secretary replied that he was trying to find a sense of direction, not to pin down a date. The Soviet draft implies that we agree there will be negotiations and that perhaps Hartman and Korniyenko or Dobrynin and he would discuss the time and place.

Gromyko asked whether this would be later on.

The Secretary said yes. If the date were to be in March, this would be settled by discussion between them. This was his understanding.

Gromyko rejoined that it would not be hard to agree to meet in March. It would, in any case, be easier than climbing Mont Blanc.

The Secretary concurred that it would be no problem to find a time and place. The problem was to work together and come up with a joint text of a statement.

Gromyko replied that they had drafted their text taking account of the U.S. position and the views the Secretary had expressed here. If the two of them are to work out an agreed text, everything in it must be acceptable to both sides since it will be made public.

The Secretary said that if the statement is made public, it would imply that the date and place of the negotiations

would be agreed upon through diplomatic channels. The two delegations would then meet and, having the benefit of our discussions, divide into three groups and get down to work. This is how Shultz understood the statement.

Gromyko said that if at the next meeting they reached a degree of mutual understanding that warranted beginning negotiations, they could agree on the date. They could name the month if this suits the Secretary more. If they agree to another meeting, it makes no sense to draw things out.

The Secretary said that *Gromyko* was in effect changing the Soviet text to read as follows: "The date of the beginning of the negotiations and the site of these negotiations will be agreed at the next meeting of foreign ministers in early March."

Gromyko replied that it is one thing to begin the negotiations and another thing to mention the date of another ministerial meeting. Either version would be all right with him. One version concerns the next meeting between himself and Secretary Shultz, and the other concerns the date on which negotiations would begin, although a month is not specified. Perhaps after the next meeting they would be in a position to specify the date and place of the negotiations. Alternatively they could set the date through diplomatic channels. He saw no big problem here, especially with the next ministerial meeting. This should be a simple matter and he asked Shultz to believe him that he had no tricks up his sleeve. He assumed that the most recent Soviet draft is acceptable to the U.S. side. It mentions the negotiations and the date of the next ministerial meeting, though no date is set for the negotiations. To state things more simply, two versions are on the table. Which is more acceptable to the U.S. side?

The Secretary answered that both versions are acceptable in the sense that it is important to get the negotiations underway if we can structure them properly. It is also important for the two of them to continue to talk, not only directly as during these two days, but also in March or whenever. They could be in touch through diplomatic channels in the meantime. The question now was whether to announce the beginning of negotiations or to announce another ministerial meeting. In response to Gromyko's question of which he prefers, he would answer in typical Washington fashion that he prefers both. He wished to point out that for the U.S. the beginning of negotiations involves many complications. The U.S. must decide upon a leader of the delegation. Under the structure proposed by the Soviets, who would be the leader of the leaders? The U.S. choice would be affected by what is intended for the negotiations. On the question of intermediate-range forces, Ambassador Nitze, who led similar negotiations in the past, prefers not to continue in this duty, although he had promised to stay on as the Secretary's left or right-hand man [Ambassador Nitze was sitting to the Secretary's left]. So another person must be found to take his place. The U.S. must prepare itself for the negotiations because they are new and embody changes. This cannot be done instantly because a position must be developed in order to be ready for the talks. The Secretary thought that early March might be a little too early. All this must be taken into account if the talks are to begin, and it is best to say so now. This merely emphasizes the importance of further discussions at the ministerial level.

Gromyko said that a clear statement is needed to resolve these questions, yet the Secretary had not yet made such a statement. Does he accept that the date of negotiations will be settled through diplomatic channels? This afternoon the

Secretary had remarked that he was puzzled by the Soviet draft. What in it was puzzling?

The Secretary replied that he was perplexed by the second Soviet draft, not the first. He was prepared to take the first draft as a framework and work through it. He was prepared to say that the time and place of negotiations will be agreed by diplomatic channels, although if we can set it ourselves, this would be preferable. He thought a few things in the draft could be changed or added to. At the same time, he thought the statement could say that he and Gromyko had agreed to another meeting in March.

Gromyko said that Shultz had still not expressed himself clearly. The Soviet draft was drawn up taking account of the U.S. position, and if it is accepted, the question of a ministerial meeting is no longer urgent. The Soviet side had put a reference to another ministerial meeting in the second text because the U.S. had not agreed to their morning text. Reference to the ministerial meeting could be pigeon-holed. Gromyko understood that the Secretary was hesitating between the two texts. In one text the idea is clearly stated that negotiations will begin. If another meeting between them should be necessary, there would be no problem—they can meet. World public opinion would be favorable to such a meeting. In fact, if such a meeting were announced, the U.S. delegation would probably be met with flags at the airport when it returned home.

The Secretary replied that first we must accomplish this between us and then the world could learn about it. He said he liked the implication in the first text that we have agreed to begin negotiations. While the structure of the Soviet text is acceptable to the U.S., there are a few aspects we wish to change. Although he could not accept the text in its present form, it deserves discussion. At the

same time, with or without this text, a further meeting between the ministers would be useful because there is much to discuss, and not only questions related to arms.

Gromyko said he was alarmed by the Secretary's statement that he wished to make some changes.

The Secretary asked if *Gromyko* really expected him to accept the Soviet text without comment.

Gromyko replied that the text had been drafted after yesterday's meeting, taking into account the remarks Secretary Shultz had made.

The Secretary said that his delegation had also drafted its text taking into account what *Gromyko* had said both yesterday and during his trip to Washington. They had tried to reflect in its text the views *Gromyko* had expressed.

Gromyko stated that everything he had said is based on the text the Soviet side had drawn up. He did not know what the Secretary might suggest now; perhaps the Secretary would make him want to hang the whole thing up.

The Secretary asked whether *Gromyko* was interested in discussing this or not. He would assume that he was. He suggested going through the text to determine what could be done to make it acceptable to the U.S.

Gromyko suggested that the two delegations part for a few minutes to review the text.

The Secretary agreed and the U.S. delegation left the room at 5:50 p.m.

At 6:25 p.m. the U.S. delegation returned.

The Secretary explained that the first and second paragraphs of the Soviet text are acceptable as they stand. In the third paragraph the U.S. wishes to drop the reference to strategic and medium-range arms. It proposes a paragraph reading as follows: "The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning nuclear and space arms, with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship."

Secretary Shultz proposed several additions to the fourth paragraph, which would read as follows: "The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements by a delegation divided into three negotiating groups, aimed at preventing an arms race on earth and in space, limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and strengthening strategic stability." He explained that here he had added a reference to the three groups, and clarified that the arms race meant on earth as well as in space.

Secretary Shultz said that the fifth paragraph of the Soviet draft would remain unchanged, although linguistically speaking, it did not read smoothly. He thought this was not worth arguing over. The final paragraph was acceptable as written. He thought if the sides could agree to fix the time and place of the negotiations, this would be desirable, but he would not insist on it.

Gromyko requested another break in order to examine the proposed U.S. changes.

The U.S. delegation left the room at 6:35 p.m.

At 7:00 p.m. the U.S. delegation returned.

Gromyko remarked that some of the suggested changes were acceptable and some were not. The first paragraph

was as solid as granite, and the second paragraph was also unchanged. He proposed that the third paragraph read as follows: “The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms—both strategic and medium-range—with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship.”

Gromyko also proposed an amended version of the fourth paragraph: “The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability. The negotiations will be conducted by a delegation from each side divided into three groups.”

By way of explanation, Gromyko said that we could not prevent an arms race on earth because there already is one, and therefore we must say that we will try to terminate it. Since there is as yet no arms race in space, we can say we will try to prevent one there. He said the Soviet side accepts the U.S. idea of referring to a delegation made up of three groups, but it prefers to say this in another sentence. The last two paragraphs of the statement stand unchanged.

The Secretary said this version of the text sounds reasonable, but he would like to caucus once again to look it over.

The U.S. delegation left the room at 7:10 p.m. On his way out, Mr. McFarlane had a brief exchange with Ambassador Karpov about the meaning of space arms (reported below).

The U.S. delegation returned at 7:22 p.m.

The Secretary asked Mr. McFarlane to repeat the exchange he had had with Karpov so that he could make sure it represented the Soviet view.

Mr. McFarlane quoted paragraph three of the proposed Soviet text, which states that “the sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms.” When referring to space arms, McFarlane inquired, does the Soviet side include land-based systems that attack targets in space, as well as space-based systems that attack targets on earth?

Gromyko said that he had stated this clearly yesterday. When referring to space strike arms, the Soviet side means space weapons of any mode of action or basing mode that are designed to attack space objects or attack from outer space objects in the air, land or sea. In the text at hand, this is what is meant, although it is expressed more economically. Gromyko added that this of course extends to ASAT systems and corresponding ABM systems.

McFarlane said that land-based systems that attack space objects include weapons which attack ballistic missile systems. Do the “corresponding ABM systems” to which Gromyko had referred include those ABM systems covered by the ABM Treaty?

Gromyko replied that this applies not only to the systems permitted by the ABM Treaty.

McFarlane asked whether Gromyko calls space arms those weapons which are within this meaning.

Gromyko answered: “It is exactly as I said—I cannot add or subtract anything else.”

McFarlane said in that case the ABM system around Moscow is a space weapon.

The Secretary thanked Gromyko for this clarification. He then made a suggestion for the third paragraph that would stress this concept. He proposed to add to the phrase “space arms” a clarifying phrase, “wherever based or targeted.” The rest of the paragraph would read as it stands.

Gromyko objected to this, saying that this would lead them into a jungle. Why mention targeting and why complicate the issue? What is unclear about this sentence? Why complicate an already clear sentence?

The Secretary wished to clarify another point. This paragraph also contains a reference to medium-range arms. As he understood it, the Soviet draft would say “medium-range arms” and the U.S. draft would say “intermediate-range arms.”

Gromyko confirmed this, saying it was fine with him. Both the U.S. and Soviet sides are accustomed to certain specific parameters agreed on long ago. These parameters define those arms that are considered strategic, as well as where tactical arms end and medium-range arms begin. Everything here is mathematically precise.

The Secretary repeated that the U.S. would say “intermediate-range” and the Soviet side would say “medium-range.” He had one more point to bring up. The U.S. side suggests that the fourth paragraph of the text be amended to read “agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth by limiting and reducing nuclear arms.” The word “by” is the change suggested here.

Gromyko objected that this would worsen the paragraph and change its meaning. Neither side needed this change.

The Secretary replied that it was not a big point, but it did explain how the sides would end the arms race—by limiting and reducing nuclear arms.

Gromyko again objected that this was a worse solution, and Secretary Shultz agreed to drop it. Although he believed his wording made the point more powerful, he would agree to leave the paragraph as it stands.

Gromyko wondered if the Secretary had found any other “heresy” in the Soviet draft.

The Secretary replied that he had found no heresy he was willing to disclose to *Gromyko*. He would now have a clean copy of the text typed up in English.

While the text was being typed, there was discussion of the time the joint statement would be released.

Gromyko asked that it be released at midnight Geneva time because of the time difference between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The announcement would not get into Soviet media until tomorrow, but it would make the news in the U.S. today. *Gromyko* said that Shultz would have something to announce even if he did not read the statement—he could announce that a statement had been agreed upon.

Secretary Shultz said that he would appear at a press conference this evening, and that he would be too sleepy to answer questions if he waited until midnight. He thought even 10:00 P.M. was late. It is possible to embargo the announcement, but on such a big story he doubted the embargo would be observed.

Gromyko pressed Shultz repeatedly not to make the announcement before midnight.

Secretary Shultz suggested a compromise of 11 p.m. *Gromyko* accepted, saying that the U.S. side wants the Soviet side to meet it more than half way. *Shultz* replied that *Gromyko* drives a very hard bargain.

When the clean copy of the joint statement arrived, the Secretary gave it to *Gromyko*.

Before departing, *Gromyko* expressed his satisfaction with the frank and business-like atmosphere that had prevailed at these discussions.

Secretary Shultz, in his turn, thanked *Gromyko* for his kind words and said he appreciated the cordial discussions that had taken place. *Gromyko* had used the word “useful” in earlier remarks, and *Shultz* thought this word could be applied here too.

The meeting ended at 7:55 p.m.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron March 1985 (2/4). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Matlock and Smith. This meeting took place in the U.S. Mission in Geneva. The memorandum of conversation mistakenly identified the end time of the meeting as 6:55 p.m. Brackets are in the original.

² See [Document 360](#).

363. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, January 8, 1985, 9 p.m.

The Secretary's Telephone Call to the President at 2100
January 8, 1985 from Geneva²

The Secretary: I am here in Geneva with Bud McFarlane. I can report to you that we have reached agreement with the Soviet Union to begin new negotiations on the questions we came here to discuss; nuclear and space arms. We will announce this at 11:00 pm here which is 5:00 pm your time. We agreed to a set of points that are consistent with and supportive of your instructions. I think this is an opportunity for a good beginning. There is a wide difference of opinion on important topics and the negotiations will be long and tumultuous. It will require patience but we have an agreement.

The President: When will the talks start?

The Secretary: We agreed that we would work through diplomatic channels to set a time and a site within one month. We will drive for Geneva and I doubt that that will be a problem. We will start probably in March or April.

The President: Congratulations. It sounds great.

The Secretary: Well, it's a relief to have it over with.

The President: Congratulations to everybody on the delegation. Well done. We have gone over a real hurdle.

The Secretary: A few hours ago, I was not sure we would make it. I want to tell you that this big delegation worked

very well. Everybody was included and everybody made comments on all of the drafts. This afternoon we had the whole delegation set up in the room next to where we were meeting and we went back and forth. They all signed off on this agreement. We have come out with a unified delegation that represents everyone's point of view. The JCS had Admiral Moreau here. Richard Perle told me tonight that he wanted to go out and tell the press that we are unified and that he fully supports the agreement. So the broad participation that you and Bud engineered paid off. I would like to read the statement to you.

I want to report to the press that I spoke to you and gave you the agreed statement.

(Note: Secretary reads text of statement)³

The Secretary: We tip our hat to you, Mr. President. It's your positions and your mandate that got us here. I want to put Bud on the phone now.

Bud McFarlane: Mr. President, you know what you can thank for this? You have got an iron-ass Secretary of State. He has done a marvelous job. This is as unified as this community of people has been in four years time. We appreciate your support. Your victory in the election has made an impression on Moscow, that's for sure.

The Secretary: I will be back tomorrow by about 1:00 pm. I hope to see you and give you a personal report.⁴ We will send a suggested statement for your press conference on Wednesday.⁵ You will also have the transcript of my press conference tonight and Q's and A's and briefing material.⁶

The President: This sounds great. You all have my congratulations.⁷

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 22A, 1985 Arms Control, Geneva. No classification marking.

² According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan spoke with Shultz from 3:04 to 3:20 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) In his January 8 diary entry, Reagan wrote: "I was in the family theatre briefing for tomorrow nites press conf. when I was called upstairs to take a call from George S. on the secure phone. The meetings in Geneva are over & the Soviets have agreed to enter negotiations on nuclear weapons etc. Within the month a time & place will be agreed upon." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 414)

³ The joint statement was released on January 8. It reads in part: "The sides agreed that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability." (Department of State *Bulletin*, March 1985, p. 30) The text was also printed widely in the press.

⁴ According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan met with Shultz on January 9 privately from 1:50 to 2:05 p.m. The two men then went into the White House library where they were joined by Bush and Poindexter. The meeting concluded at 2:38 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) Reagan wrote in his diary on January 9: "George S. is back & thing are better than I'd thought & I thought they were pretty good." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 414)

⁵ A draft statement was sent in telegram Secto 1038 from Shultz to the White House, January 9. (Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks Shultz-McFarlane Trip, Vol. III, 01/05/1985-01/08/1985) Reagan held a press conference on January 9. His statement and the transcript of his press conference are in *Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book I, pp. 23-30.

⁶ The transcript of Shultz's press conference is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, March 1985, pp. 30-32.

⁷ On January 16, Reagan met with Shultz, Weinberger, and members of the U.S. delegation. According to his statement released after the meeting: "I invited our team members to the White House so that I could personally express to them my recognition of their extremely hard work and my gratitude for the successful outcome." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book I, pp. 42-43)

January 1985-March 1985

“The principal menace to our security?”: Reagan and the Ambiguities of Soviet Leadership

[364. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs \(Armacost\) to Secretary of State Shultz](#)

Washington, January 10, 1985

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, January 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System.

[365. Editorial Note](#)

[366. Memorandum From William Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's](#)

Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, January 18, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, Geneva Meeting: Shultz/Gromyko 01/07/1985-01/08/1985 (2). Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Lehman, Matlock, Kraemer, Linhard, and Steiner.

367. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, January 22, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron January 1985 (3/4). Secret; Sensitive. The January 23 covering memorandum to McFarlane from Matlock is printed as Document 368.

368. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, January 23, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron January 1985 (3/4). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. McFarlane wrote in the margin: "Thanks Jack."

369. National Security Decision Directive 160

Washington, January 24, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chron, Preparation for New Negotiations I 01/15/1985:NSDD 160 01/25/1985. Secret. Reagan initialed his approval of the NSDD on an attached January 24 memorandum from McFarlane. A January 22 memorandum to McFarlane from Linhard, Kraemer, and Lehman, also attached but not printed, indicates they drafted the NSDD and McFarlane's memorandum to Reagan.

370. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, February 1, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 13, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (02/01/1985-02/03/1985); NLR-775-13-7-6-4. Secret; Noform; Nocontract; Orcon; Sensitive. Drafted by D. Graves on January 31. Abramowitz signed "Mort A" above his name in the "From" line. Abramowitz wrote Shultz a note on the last page: [text not declassified].

371. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, February 8, 1985

Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 02/85.

Drafted by Rodman. A notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. In a covering note to Murphy, Shultz wrote: “—this looks to me like a good basic paper and source of talking points for the meeting—share with the NSC as soon as you are satisfied with it.”

372. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, February 13, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, US-Soviet Diplomatic Contacts 8/8. Secret; Sensitive. According to a covering memorandum to Shultz on another copy, it was drafted by Pascoe and cleared by Simons and Palmer. (Ibid.)

373. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)

Washington, February 27, 1985

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1984–June 1985. No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on February 27.

374. Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, February 27, 1985

Source: Department of State, Paul Nitze Files, 1953, 1972-1989, Lot 90D397, January-February 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow, Pifer, S. Coffey (PM/TMP), D. Schwartz (PM/SNP), and Dunkerley; cleared by O. Grobel (PM/TMP), R. Davis (PM/SNP), J.H. Hawes/J. Gordon (PM), Dobbins/Palmer, Courtney, Timbie, and E.M. Ifft (PM/DEL). Vershbow initialed for all drafting and clearing officials. In a covering memorandum to Shultz on a February 1 draft of this paper, Burt, Chain, and Nitze explained: "Mr. Secretary: The attached paper outlines our views on the substance of our positions on strategic arms reductions, intermediate-range nuclear forces reductions, and defense and space arms. We would like to discuss these ideas with you at an early opportunity, in order that we might have your guidance on how we should proceed in the interagency process underway." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 3, 1985—Geneva)

375. Notes of a National Security Council Meeting

Washington, March 4, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSC Meeting, 03/04/1985. No classification marking. The editor transcribed Kraemer's handwritten notes of the NSC meeting specifically for this volume. An image of the notes is Appendix E. No formal notes of the meeting were found. In a February 28 memorandum to Kimmitt, Linhard and Kraemer forwarded papers on Defense and Space, INF, and START in preparation for the March 4 NSC meeting. (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, December Chron File: [No. 111-No. 112]) These three papers correlate closely with topics covered in Kraemer's notes of the meeting (see annotation below). In his diary on March 4,

Reagan wrote: “We had an N.S.C. meeting with our Arms Talk Leaders looking at various options for how we wanted to deal with the Soviets. It’s very complicated business. I urged one decision on them—that we open the talks with a concession—surprise! Since they have publicly stated they want to see nuclear weapons eliminated entirely, I told our people to open by saying we would accept their goal.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 431)

376. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, March 5, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, Reagan-Shcherbitsky Meeting 03/07/1985 (3). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Prepared by Matlock. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. A copy was sent to Bush.

377. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)

Washington, March 7, 1985

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1984–June 1985. No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on March 11. In his March 5 entry, Dam also noted: “In the evening I went to the Capital Centre for

a hockey game. The purpose of the hockey game was the invitation by Armand Hammer to the Soviet Congressional Delegation, which is here headed by Shcherbitskiy, a member of the Politburo. Not too much conversation was carried on, and on the whole, it didn't quite meet the objective of providing a quiet informal basis for conversation with the Soviets." (Ibid.)

378. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 7, 1985, 3-4 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron March 1985 (4/4). Secret; Sensitive. Prepared on March 8. A covering memorandum from Matlock to McFarlane suggests that the memorandum of conversation was drafted by Matlock. Brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Reagan wrote in his diary: "Big event was meeting with Polit bureau [Politburo] member (Soviet) Sheherbitsky [Shcherbitsky]. He had Amb. Dobrynin & a couple of others with him. I had George S., Bud, Don Regan & a couple of others with me. He & I went round & round. His was the usual diatribe that we are the destabilizing [destabilizing] force, threatening them. It was almost a repeat of the Gromyko debate except that we got right down to arguing. I think he'll go home knowing that we are ready for negotiations but we d—n well aren't going to let our guard down or hold still while they continue to build up their offensive forces." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 433; brackets are in the original)

379. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, March 8, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, March 1985 Chron File: [No.44-No.46]. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Kraemer and Linhard. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

380. National Security Decision Directive 165

Washington, March 8, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 3, 1985 Geneva. Secret. In a March 8 covering memorandum to multiple addressees, McFarlane noted: "The President has decided upon the following instructions for the first round of US/Soviet negotiations set to begin in Geneva on March 12, 1985."

381. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, March 8, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, Chernenko's Death—Miscellaneous 03/10/1985. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

382. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Kelly) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, March 10, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 13, Executive Secretariat Sensitive Chron (03/09/1985-03/13/1985). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons and Pascoe; cleared by Palmer. Pascoe initialed for Kelly. The memorandum is stamped "Treat As Original."

383. Editorial Note

364. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 10, 1985

SUBJECT

Gorbachev Visit to the U.S.

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] on Tuesday,² while you were in Geneva, Dwayne Andreas was informed that the Politburo was still considering whether a Gorbachev visit to the U.S. was desirable.³ The Politburo was leaning to May rather than March. (You'll recall that the Supreme Soviet delegation is coming here March 3-9 at Tip O'Neill's invitation, and that Tom Foley has made a pitch to Dobrynin for Gorbachev to head the Soviet delegation.) [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the Politburo preferred that Gorbachev come rather than Tikhonov, because Gorbachev had shown polish in the U.K.⁴

This indication that the Soviets have not decided yet on a Gorbachev trip is consistent with Gromyko's prickly reaction when you raised the matter.⁵ Chernenko may still be bristling about his rival's growing prominence, and Gromyko probably resists Gorbachev's increasingly active foreign role.

Jim Giffen confirmed to me that Andreas invited Gorbachev to the U.S. during the "planting or harvest" season, and indicated that the Soviets had been told that the planting season here is in April and May. Giffen promised to send me a copy of Andreas' letter of invitation to Gorbachev.⁶

Michael H. Armacost⁷

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, January 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System.

² January 8.

³ See [Document 350](#).

⁴ Regarding Gorbachev's visit to the U.K., see [Documents 337](#) and [341](#).

⁵ In his memoir, Shultz wrote that after the last session in Geneva on January 8: "I told Gromyko that we would welcome meeting Mr. Gorbachev when he came to the United States. The vice president would issue the invitation, and the president and I would be sure to meet with him. Gromyko replied, 'Nonsense! This is total invention, total invention!' I didn't know what Gromyko was driving at, but he clearly was not in favor of a Gorbachev visit to Washington. I dropped the subject." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 519) ⁶ Armacost forwarded a copy of Andreas's letter to Shultz on January 14. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, 1985) ⁷ Armacost initialed "MA" above his typed signature.

365. Editorial Note

On January 18, 1985, Secretary of State George Shultz held a press conference at 3 p.m. in the White House Briefing Room to announce the U.S. delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks with the Soviet Union, set to begin in Geneva on March 12. Shultz read the following Presidential statement: "Today I have asked three highly capable Americans to be the head negotiators of each of the three groups making up the U.S. delegation to the negotiations on nuclear and space arms. These negotiations will take place in accordance with the agreement reached at Geneva on January 8 between Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko of the Soviet Union. Senator John Tower of Texas will be nominated to serve as U.S. negotiator on strategic nuclear arms. Ambassador Maynard W. Glitman, a minister-counselor of the Foreign Service of the United States, will be nominated as the U.S. negotiator on intermediate-range nuclear arms. Ambassador Max M. Kampelman will be nominated as U.S. negotiator on space and defensive arms. Ambassador Kampelman will also serve as Head of the U.S. delegation. Ambassador Paul H. Nitze and Ambassador Edward L. Rowny will serve as special advisers to the President and to the Secretary of State on arms reduction negotiations. I am pleased that these distinguished Americans have agreed to serve in these positions of great importance to the United States." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book I, pages 51-52) Shultz later recalled the formation of the delegations in his memoir: "We now had to pick a negotiator who would head the entire unified delegation and the three subheads. Nitze's wife was ill, and he was not able to move once again to Geneva, and anyway, I wanted to keep him close to me in Washington as my principal idea man. I favored Max Kampelman and told Cap so. Cap said he would prefer

Edward Teller: no one else could be trusted to be totally committed to SDI. It was not a real struggle because Max Kampelman was so deeply respected. Within a few days, Bud, Cap, Casey, and even Richard Perle all accepted Max. We also decided that in addition to being overall head, Max would lead the space and defense talks.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 521) In a memorandum to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane on January 14, Jack Matlock, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs in the NSC Staff, wrote: “I don’t know whether, as rumored, Max Kampelman is the leading candidate, but I believe that he would be an excellent choice, despite his lack of extensive experience in the arms control area. He learns very quickly, is a superb and tough negotiator, has good political backing in and out of Congress and is solid on SDI.” (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, Geneva Meeting-Geneva Records 01/08/1985-01/09/1985 (2)) In his memorandum, Matlock also discussed the composition of the three negotiating groups. On the START delegation, he wrote: “I presume we will probably retain Rowny’s team for this one. If, however, a change is desired for any reason (or Ed prefers not to continue), I would recommend that thought be given to Jim Goodby. A strong case can also be made for a prominent specialist from outside the government, given the key importance of this forum politically, but I have no particular suggestions to make on that score—except that if Brent Scowcroft would take it, he would add a lot of clout to this negotiation.” However, Rowny was designated to serve, along with Paul Nitze, as special adviser to Reagan and Shultz on arms control negotiations. In his memoir, Shultz recalled: “Rowny, when I contacted him, could not bear the idea that the START talks, which he had headed for the United States and which had ended with a Soviet walkout in 1983, were now to be

reorganized in a new form under Tower. Rowny resented that I was the one to bring him this news: 'You are not high ranking enough to tell me this,' he said. 'I want to speak to the president alone.' He had the right, I felt, to make his case, so I took him over for his moment with the president." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 521) In his personal diary entry on January 18, Reagan wrote: "Met with George S.—we have a problem with General Ed Rowny (retired). We've named the 3 chief negotiators in the arms talks but we want Ed—who headed up the last negotiations to stay here as a special advisor to me & George. He sees this as a demotion. I met with him & did my best to convince it was nothing of the kind—that we need him & his expertise right here when these talks begin again. I'm not sure I convinced him." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 417)

366. Memorandum From William Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, January 18, 1985

SUBJECT

Soviet Positions Post Geneva

Gromyko's remarkable candid January 13 TV interview² and post Geneva Soviet commentaries provide us with a somewhat clearer, but not surprising, view of Soviet arms control and foreign policy positions:

Arms Control Negotiations

Space: Agreement (or even real progress) on START and INF will definitely be held hostage to reaching "an accord on preventing the militarization of outer space." Thwarting U.S. military space programs will continue to be the prime Soviet arms control objective, with START and INF remaining of second priority. As Gromyko stated: "If accords in this area (space) become clear, then it would be possible to move forward also on questions of strategic armaments." He also noted that the "single delegation" (with 3 "sub-groups") format should ensure that "a situation does not arise here in which an accord begins to take shape in one group independently of the second and of the third."

START/INF: Probably after considerable internal debate, the Soviets seemed to have finally opted for a merging of START and INF. As Gromyko put it: "These two problems of

strategic armaments and medium-range weapons can only be examined jointly.” As he previously noted: “for the Soviet Union, medium-range weapons are also strategic weapons.”

Not surprisingly, he insisted that British and French INF systems “must be taken into account,” but he also stated that in INF discussions the Soviets will raise all 15 U.S. carriers instead of just 6 as before. It looks as if the Soviets will push hard for a freeze in U.S. INF deployments and will try to convince the West Europeans (and us) that continued deployments will jeopardize the upcoming negotiations.

As to be expected, the Soviets will do little in START talks to alter their present strategic force structure—especially in regard to heavy missiles—because this would run counter to the principle of “equality and equal security.” Gromyko implied that we can keep our bombers and they will keep their heavy missiles.

Test Bans, Nuclear Freeze, No First Use: These, according to Gromyko, are all issues which could be negotiated and resolved independent of the three main fields of discussion. As the main talks stall, we could well see a Soviet push for talks on a comprehensive test ban and for putting into effect signed U.S.-Soviet agreements on threshold tests and peaceful use. “Freezing nuclear arsenals” will probably be a continuing proposal for propaganda purposes.

I suspect that, in reply to our continued insistence on adequate verification, we will hear more of Gromyko’s “universal and total monitoring.” The Soviets no doubt have in mind something akin to the 1973-1975 International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) for Vietnam or the old 1954-1973 International Control Commissions (ICC) for Indochina which were both hamstrung and

rendered totally ineffective by virtue of being “international” (i.e., having Communist members with a veto).

General Foreign Policy

U.S. Soviet Bilateral Negotiations: Gromyko made clear that the Soviets would like to resuscitate past (“more than ten”) agreements which have been cancelled by us or allowed to languish. We will certainly see increased Soviet efforts to promote bilateral agreements both for practical reasons (they have, says Gromyko, been of “benefit to both countries”) and to recreate a spirit of detente in promotion of larger objectives—especially in arms control.

Nicaragua and Cuba: In devoting some time to condemning U.S. policy towards these two countries, Gromyko sought to state that the USSR will continue to maintain a considerable interest in this region, whether we like it or not.

Current Situation: When asked if the world was moving towards peace or war, Gromyko replied: “The situation now is very complicated, and at times dangerous.” This statement is in stark contrast with the past Cassandra-like statements from Moscow which for nearly four years sought to conjure up an ever present danger of war.

“Public Diplomacy”: The Soviets have certainly not given up on the peace movement in Western Europe and here. Governments and legislative bodies will be prime targets of a growing propaganda campaign designed to freeze INF deployments, reduce defense expenditures and force levels and to pressure us into making concessions in the arms control negotiations. As the negotiations get underway, we will hear a great deal about how our resistance to an

accord on space is sabotaging the negotiations. Of course, as Gromyko indicated, the Soviets will also continue to fully exploit the UN General Assembly to promote their peaceable image and to attack our positions.

BMD Blackmail Potential: In a mirror image approach to ballistic missile defense, Gromyko stated: "If it (the U.S.) had a protective shield . . . would this really not be used for pressure, for blackmail? Of course it would." Since we have never used strategic systems to blackmail the Soviets (even during the Cuban missile crisis), while, on the other hand, the Soviets have done so several times, this statement gives us a good idea of how the Soviets intend to exploit their nationwide BMD when it is finally deployed.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, Geneva Meeting: Shultz/Gromyko 01/07/1985-01/08/1985 (2). Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Lehman, Matlock, Kraemer, Linhard, and Steiner.

² In telegram 567 from Moscow, January 14, the Embassy reported that on January 13 Gromyko appeared in a 2-hour long television interview, answering questions from four Soviet journalists: "in his January 13 interview Gromyko used a Soviet-style 'Meet the Press' format to respond forcefully to administration statements on the Geneva outcome and prospects for arms control." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850028-0149) For the transcript of the interview, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1985*, pp. 11-26.

367. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 22, 1985

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Dobrynin January 22

Dobrynin came in at his request for about 45 minutes this afternoon, mainly to present some Soviet proposals on joint commemorative events for V-E Day this spring.

The Soviets are suggesting several possibilities, he said:

—exchanging letters “at the highest level;”

—sending an official US delegation to the Soviet anniversary event in Moscow, and receiving a Soviet delegation here if we had a comparable event; and

—exchanging delegations of veterans’ groups.

He added that the Soviets are also thinking of honoring distinguished men, such as Averell Harriman, who played a crucial role in US-Soviet relations during World War II.

I said I would get back to him concerning these suggestions, but I also gave him the flavor of our thinking on what the approach to the anniversary should be. The themes should be peace, reconciliation and looking to the future rather than the past. I said we have been disturbed by the Soviet campaign against the FRG. As a friend and ally, we would stand with the West Germans, and V-E Day events should not be directed against them. For them V-E Day represented a new beginning. Dobrynin responded that

Soviet criticism of revanchism in the FRG has nothing to do with V-E Day. They see revanchist activities like meetings of ex-SS men and emigre groups that are tolerated by the government, watch them carefully and criticize them.

Dobrynin noted that they owed us an answer on the date and location of our arms control negotiations and the composition of their delegation.² The Politburo had not yet passed on these matters, but he expected to have a reply this week or next.

Dobrynin asked how our preparations for negotiation were shaping up. I said I thought we had had good, serious, substantive exchanges in Geneva; he said Gromyko and the Politburo felt the same way. I said I felt we have a good opportunity to move forward. The new US negotiating team is a strong one, you and I are fully engaged on the issues, and we have an improved internal structure for dealing with them. Dobrynin noted that both sides are using much the same language about engaging in a long and difficult process. I said we should not be afraid to make rapid progress, but history showed these things often take time. We will have to see if it is possible to reach mutually agreeable accords, but for our part we intend to give it a good try.

We agreed that it would be useful to get together in a week or two to review the overall relationship area by area.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron January 1985 (3/4). Secret; Sensitive. The January 23 covering memorandum to McFarlane from Matlock is printed as [Document 368](#).

² In a January 17 memorandum to McFarlane, Matlock reported on Burt's January 16 meeting with Isakov: "Rick

proposed that arms control negotiations begin in Geneva in early March, reiterated our proposal for a joint space rescue mission, proposed consultations on the Middle East to be held in Washington February 19-20, protested the Soviet demarche to Mobutu, rejected Soviet preconditions for further discussions on southern Africa and expressed our opposition to Soviet efforts to arrange for an affiliation of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War with the World Health Organization." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron January 1985 (3/4))

368. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, January 23, 1985

SUBJECT

Shultz-Dobrynin Meeting, January 22, 1985

Secretary Shultz has submitted a Memorandum to the President reporting on his meeting with Dobrynin January 22.²

Dobrynin had asked for the meeting for the purpose of discussing Soviet proposals for observing V-E Day. Shultz took them under advisement and expressed concern about the Soviet policy of using the occasion to attack German "revanchism."

At the same meeting, Dobrynin acknowledged that the Soviets owe us a reply regarding the arms control negotiations, and said he expected one this week or next. He indicated that the delay is caused by the necessity of the Politburo passing on the arrangements.

Comment: I continue to be annoyed at the way State has failed to come up with a unified and detailed Allied position regarding observance of the V-E anniversary—but maybe these Soviet proposals will galvanize their activity. Off hand, I see no great problem with exchanging open letters—provided we can negotiate the content of both in advance. As for delegations, this will require more careful thought, consultation with the British and French—as well as the Germans, of course.

Dobrynin's excuse for the Soviet delay in setting the specifics for the negotiations rings true: these things doubtless require Politburo approval. In this regard, it is interesting to note that there seems to have been no Politburo meeting last week—at least none was announced, and announcements have been routine for the last couple of years. This adds to the circumstantial evidence that Chernenko's health has taken a nose-dive.³ If this is the case, the Soviet leadership will be utterly preoccupied with the question of succession. Even so, I would expect them to find a way to approve the arrangements fairly soon.

Recommendation:

That you send the attached memorandum to the President.⁴

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron January 1985 (3/4). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. McFarlane wrote in the margin: "Thanks Jack."

² See [Document 367](#).

³ Since mid-January, several cables and reports speculated on Chernenko's illness. Telegram 740 from Moscow, January 17, reported: "According to the French Embassy here, Central Committee International Department First Deputy Chief Zagladin acknowledged to a visiting French Minister of State on January 16 that Chernenko's poor state of health had been the reason for the postponement of the Warsaw Pact Summit." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850037-0738) Telegram 805 from Moscow, January 18, reported: "Two more senior Soviet officials have admitted privately that General Secretary Chernenko is ill." (Department of State,

Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams,
D850040-0519)

⁴ McFarlane did not mark the Approve or Disapprove option; however, a handwritten note dated January 28 in an unknown hand noted: “Per RCM—Shultz reported this to the President orally.” According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan met with Shultz in the Oval Office on January 23 from 1:41 to approximately 2:10 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) Tab I, an undated covering memorandum from McFarlane to the President, is attached but not printed. Tab A, Shultz’s memorandum, is attached and printed as [Document 367](#).

369. National Security Decision Directive 160¹

Washington, January 24, 1985

PREPARING FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION (S)

The success of the U.S. delegation at the recent Geneva meetings in gaining Soviet agreement to join us in renewed negotiations demonstrates the soundness of the basic U.S. approach to arms reductions.² The U.S. delegation, building upon the work of many over the last four years, has provided us an opportunity to pursue, once again, our national security objectives through direct, bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union. I want to ensure that the United States is in a position to capitalize fully on this opportunity. (C)

Organization of the U.S. Delegation. Senator John Tower will take charge of the negotiations on strategic nuclear arms. Ambassador Maynard Glitman will have responsibility for negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces. Ambassador Max Kampelman will lead the overall U.S. delegation and also the U.S. side in the negotiations on Defense and Space.³ (U)

Developing U.S. Positions. The Senior Arms Control Group (SACG) will coordinate the development of the general U.S. approach to the negotiations, the specific U.S. positions in each of the three substantive areas of negotiation, and the instructions to the U.S. delegation for the upcoming round of talks. The SACG will be supported by the existing Interagency Groups on START, INF and ASAT issues. The responsibilities of the ASAT IG will be expanded to address

the full extent of the Defense and Space issues associated with the upcoming negotiations. The SACG will provide draft instructions to the U.S. delegation for my review and approval no later than March 8, 1985. (S)

In the START and INF areas, the majority of the work needed to support the upcoming round of negotiations has already been accomplished. The SACG should draw upon that work in completing its preparations in these areas. In the area of Defense and Space issues, more preparation is necessary. Appropriate priority should be given to ensuring that the U.S. position in this substantive area is finalized and thoroughly vetted in a timely manner. (S)

Support for the Delegation. Once negotiations begin, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will chair an interagency backstopping group here in Washington to provide support for the U.S. delegation in implementing its instructions on a day-to-day basis. Should issues arise that cannot be resolved within the backstopping group or by the appropriate Interdepartmental Group, they will be referred to the Senior Arms Control Group and through the SACG to me as needed for resolution. (C)

Special Advisors. Ambassadors Ed Rowny and Paul Nitze have already made a major contribution to the U.S. effort to achieve equitable and verifiable agreements which would lead to equal and reduced levels of both U.S. and Soviet nuclear offensive forces.⁴ Their experience and judgment are a unique asset to me and to the nation. As we move into the next phase of negotiations, their advice and counsel on our broader range of issues under active negotiation will be greatly needed. Therefore, I have asked Ambassador Rowny and Ambassador Nitze to continue their long and distinguished records of service to this nation with the

titles of Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters. (U)

In their new capacities, Ambassadors Rowny and Nitze will provide advice and counsel on the arms control policy decision making process in general, on the development, formulation, and implementation of negotiations on the full range of nuclear, conventional, defense and space issues, as well as on the integration of arms control policy into U.S. national security strategy. To support their charter, Ambassadors Rowny and Nitze will be provided the information relevant to these subjects, attend NSC, NSPG and SACG meetings on these areas, and, have access to me, through the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor, to discuss these matters. (C)

Military Sufficiency. As we start this next phase of negotiations, I wish to reaffirm the guidance initially issued in NSSD 3-82 (March 3, 1982)⁵ to the effect that any approach or alternative approaches recommended for my approval should, as a minimum, permit the United States to develop and possess sufficient military capability relative to that allowed to the Soviet Union to execute U.S. national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to comply with this guidance and submit their timely assessments of approach(es) under consideration in terms of this criterion to the Senior Arms Control Group and Interdepartmental Groups as appropriate for use in developing and refining U.S. arms control positions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will certify to the military sufficiency of any approach submitted to me for my approval. (S)

Verification. The national security of the United States also requires the effective verification of arms control agreements. The Director of Central Intelligence, the

Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and other senior officials, have expressed concern about the process by which verification considerations are factored into the development of U.S. arms control policy and specific U.S. positions.⁶ In consideration of the above, it is directed that the following actions be taken:

—As the instructions for the upcoming negotiating round are developed, and subsequently as U.S. arms control positions are considered, the SACG will assure that comprehensive assessments are made of verification issues associated with U.S. negotiating proposals. The Arms Control Verification Committee and the appropriate Interdepartmental Groups will support the SACG in this effort. These assessments should address the overall effectiveness of verification, U.S. monitoring capability (to include Soviet cheating scenarios), and the possibility of safeguards. The Arms Control Verification Committee will work with the appropriate Interdepartmental Groups and advise the SACG on the verifiability of the general approaches and the specific positions recommended to me by the SACG for approval as part of the instructions to the U.S. delegation.

—Additionally, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, working with other Departments and Agencies as appropriate, are requested to forward to the National Security Advisor a report providing: (1) a more detailed assessment of the handling of verification issues in the policy development process; and, (2) specific recommendations as to how the process can be strengthened. This report should be available for my review by March 15. (S)


Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chron, Preparation for New Negotiations I 01/15/1985:NSDD 160 01/25/1985. Secret. Reagan initialed his approval of the NSDD on an attached January 24 memorandum from McFarlane. A January 22 memorandum to McFarlane from Linhard, Kraemer, and Lehman, also attached but not printed, indicates they drafted the NSDD and McFarlane's memorandum to Reagan.

² See [Documents 355](#), [357](#), [360](#), and [362](#).

³ See [Document 365](#).

⁴ See [Document 365](#).

⁵ NSSD 3-82, which "establishes the Terms of Reference for completing the review of U.S. policy and the development of a negotiating position for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)," is in [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. XI, START I, Document 6](#) .

⁶ See [Document 346](#).

370. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, February 1, 1985

SUBJECT

CIA Report of Chernenko's Retirement In Favor of Gorbachev

[less than 1 line not declassified] the Politburo has already selected Gorbachev to be the next party leader. Although plausible, the report cannot be confirmed.

This report and two others highlight Gorbachev's interest in meeting the President (or visiting the US). *[1½ lines not declassified]*

Parallel To London Sunday Times Story

The report (Tab A)² indirectly ascribes *[1½ lines not declassified]*—the statement that the Politburo has already decided that Gorbachev should succeed Chernenko even before he dies.³

—The report parallels the London press report of January 27 that Chernenko will soon retire in favor of Gorbachev because he could never recover from his present illness. It would have been weightier corroboration had the information in the CIA report been dated before rather than after the newspaper story.

—*[1 paragraph (3½ lines) not declassified]*

Gorbachev's Interest in a Summit

The report that Gorbachev will soon replace Chernenko is the latest in a series. It says that Gorbachev, once he has consolidated his new position, would like to meet the President, perhaps in Vienna. The President's May trip to Europe would be too early, however.⁴

Two other reports (Tab B)⁵ detail continuing efforts by US businessmen to invite Gorbachev to visit the US. The more recent information continues to assert Gorbachev's interest in a visit, but says that a May date is out because of Chernenko's poor health.

It appears from these reports that the businessmen are continuing to pursue the idea of inviting Gorbachev to visit the US. The Soviets seem to be putting them off, but not discouraging the idea in principle.

We are, however, leery of taking all of the rhetoric in these reports literally. [2½ lines not declassified]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 13, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (02/01/1985-02/03/1985); NLR-775-13-7-6-4. Secret; Noform; Nocontract; Orcon; Sensitive. Drafted by D. Graves on January 31. Abramowitz signed "Mort A" above his name in the "From" line. Abramowitz wrote Shultz a note on the last page: [*text not declassified*].

² Dated January 29; the report is attached but not printed.

³ See [footnote 3, Document 368](#).

⁴ On May 1, Reagan, accompanied by Shultz, arrived in Bonn for the G-7 Economic Summit and a State visit. He attended V-E Day ceremonies, including a visit to the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. The trip was most

notably remembered for the controversial visit to the Bitburg cemetery. Reagan then traveled to Madrid, Strasbourg, and Lisbon before returning to Washington on May 10.

⁵ Dated January 29; the report is attached but not printed. For an earlier report, see [Document 364](#).

371. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, February 8, 1985

SUBJECT

The Soviet Role in the Middle East

As we head into US-Soviet discussions on the Middle East, it would be useful to review what the Soviet role has been and what our objectives should be in these talks.²

Why the Soviets Have Been Excluded

There are many reasons why we have not wanted a major Soviet role in Arab-Israeli diplomacy, but the essence of it is that we doubt the Soviets have a real interest in a peaceful solution as we conceive it.

The Soviet Union has an interest in avoiding a war—since its clients usually lose, it has to replace vast losses of equipment, and it usually ends up in mutual recriminations with its clients over whose fault it was that the Soviet equipment didn't produce success. But the Soviet interest in avoiding war has never translated into a serious willingness to contribute to peace—even though the Soviets are committed to UNSC Resolution 242 and have no trouble endorsing Israel's right to exist.

Our strategic interest is in a settlement that strengthens moderates—that vindicates the policies of pro-Western Arabs like Mubarak, Hussein, and moderate Palestinians; that dampens the forces of radicalism and strengthens the

US position in the region. In conditions of successful peace diplomacy, our economic and political relations in the Arab world flourish and resentments over the Palestinian problem diminish. The Soviets can hardly be expected to exert themselves for such an outcome. By choice or otherwise, they have thrown in their lot with Syria. The military relationship cements this tie (though the Syrians basically despise the Soviets and certainly do not follow Soviet dictates). Whatever their differences with Syria on other issues, the Soviets have been comfortable with the Syrian policy of frustrating the Arab moderates and blocking US diplomacy.

Thus we have grounds for suspecting that bringing the Soviets into a major role in the diplomacy would do no more than put them in a better position to obstruct. They have never been willing to spend political capital to put pressure on their clients for moderation the way we are expected to squeeze Israel. In this sense, they have excluded *themselves* from a useful role in peace diplomacy. Their impotence in the face of the Syrian assault on the PLO suggests that they are unable or unwilling to exert real pressure on the Syrians. It also suggests that the Syrians, not the Soviets, are the decisive factor in the region that needs to be neutralized.

Proposals to bring the Soviets into the game are a recurring feature whenever our own diplomacy seems to be going nowhere. Precisely for this reason it is dangerous: It would symbolize US failure; it would further demoralize Arab states who have long sided with us *against* the Soviets and would legitimize the trend of growing ties between these Arabs and the Soviets; it could feed Arab illusions that some deus ex machina will relieve them of the need to make their own hard decisions; it would convey a signal of flagging US resolve to the Syrians, bolstering their

determination to wait us out. *Especially* when our diplomacy is not making progress, we have an incentive to keep demonstrating that end-runs around us won't work. The fact is, the Soviets cannot deliver Arab land and cannot even take the initiative away from us when we stumble. It has long been a cardinal principle of US policy to demonstrate to the Arabs that the Soviet connection gets them nowhere and that they have to come to us. This remains the best strategy for us.

Some Arabs may see value in a Soviet role, not for its own sake but as a means of putting additional pressure on *us*. The theory is that the United States will be spurred to greater effort (i.e., pressure on Israel) out of fear of the Soviets. This explains part of the Arab flirtation with an international conference. Clearly, we have a general strategic interest in showing that using this Soviet card against us doesn't work either. Otherwise we send a message around the world that the Soviets (not the Americans) are the pivotal factor.

Our Objectives in US-Soviet Talks

A number of conclusions follow from this.

1. The main value of bilateral US-Soviet talks is as a *substitute* for a greater Soviet role in Mideast diplomacy.³ The Soviets are sensitive to considerations of status, and such a dialogue will be somewhat of a political boost to them. This might be a useful card to play in US-Soviet relations. For the reasons stated above, however, it is in our interest to downplay its regional significance.
2. At the same time, it never hurts to have a chance to explain to the Soviets candidly *why* we have not welcomed

a greater role for them. These meetings are an opportunity to put the onus on them and to read the bill of particulars of what we want them to do: restore diplomatic relations with Israel; put pressure on the Syrians to permit a West Bank negotiation; stop siding with the rejectionists who are obstructing the chances for peace, etcetera.

The only risk of making these points to them is the risk that they may do something along these lines (e.g., diplomatic relations with Israel) and then claim their right to a greater role—a claim that it would be harder for us to block. We might conceivably be better off the way things are. On the other hand, while restoring relations with Israel would strengthen their claim to a greater role, it would also complicate their relations with all the Arabs: It would protect Egypt's flank as Israel's peace partner; it would infuriate the Syrians; it would provide an excuse for a number of African states to restore their relations with Israel. It would even vindicate Israel's decision to take the risks of accepting VOA/RL facilities.

But for precisely these reasons, the Soviets are unlikely to do it. (The KGB may also have an internal-security concern about an Israeli Embassy in Moscow stirring up Soviet Jewry—not to mention a Mossad station.) If they continue to be too paralyzed by their own immobilism to make these positive moves, then the onus is clearly on them for their continuing exclusion.

3. Perhaps the most useful message to convey is to warn the Soviets of the risks of war. This, as noted at the beginning, is their point of weakness and their main incentive to behave constructively. Our theme should be that Lebanon is still a powder keg, that Syria is acting irresponsibly, and that Israel's military prowess and strength of will should not be underestimated. The Israelis

are confident they can handle Syria; the question is whether Syria, with all its new Soviet equipment, will be tempted into some reckless move. Soviet nervousness on this score would be healthy, and it could, on the margin, turn the Soviet-Syrian connection into a factor for restraint on the Syrians.

4. The Iran-Iraq war, of course, is another useful topic to discuss. Had the crisis last year necessitated US intervention, we probably would have wanted to talk to the Soviets to make clear we were not threatening Soviet interests. In the present context, discussions on this subject could be a way of deflecting their approaches to us for a role in Arab-Israeli diplomacy, and also a way of testing their bona fides: A serious Soviet effort to restrict East-bloc arms sales to Iran would be in the general interest; if they fail to make such an effort, we need not be shy about playing this back to Iraq and the other Arabs.

5. As a general matter, on either the peace process or the Gulf war, it is *not* our objective to reassure the Soviets too much. Certainly we can tell them that our policies are not hostile to Soviet interests. At the same time, their incentives for restraint come from their fear that the United States (and Israel) would be dealing from strength in any crisis; assuring them of our goodwill and self-restraint would only confirm that their nonconstructive behavior runs no risks. Our talking points should be fashioned with this in mind—emphasizing risks, not reassurances.

6. As noted, it is in our interest to downplay the importance of these talks. We should slow them down, in the sense of not scheduling another discussion of the Middle East for a long while. At the same time, we might make the Middle East talks seem more routine by scheduling other talks at

some point on other regional subjects (e.g., Southern Africa). We want no communiqué from these talks, no joint action, and no joint follow-up. Indeed it is not clear we want any outcome, except to be able to reassure all our friends that nothing harmful resulted.

7. The Soviets, too, will have nervous clients to reassure. We should be alert for opportunities to sow discord between the Soviets and the Arabs. Any signs of Soviet willingness to improve relations with Israel, to move toward more even-handed positions, to restrain the Arabs, etc., should be played back to the Arabs—just as any Soviet waffling on the Iran-Iraq war could be used to complicate Soviet relations with Iraq or Iran as the case may be. The Soviets are likely to do the same to us if they get the chance.

Just think what we might be doing to each other if this constructive dialogue on regional issues were not taking place!

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 02/85. Drafted by Rodman. A notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. In a covering note to Murphy, Shultz wrote: “—this looks to me like a good basic paper and source of talking points for the meeting—share with the NSC as soon as you are satisfied with it.”

² In telegram 44264 to all Near Eastern and South Asian posts and copied to Moscow, February 13, the Department informed the posts: “We have reached agreement with the Soviets to hold experts’ talks on the Middle East in Vienna on February 19-20. Assistant Secretary Richard Murphy

will lead the U.S. delegation. We have been informed that the Soviet interlocutor will be Vladimir Polyakov, Head of the Near East Division of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. In view of considerable speculation that these talks would represent a process of negotiation with the Soviets, we believe it important that our friends in the region and allies be assured that the talks will be held within the context of our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and will consist of an exchange of views on regional issues, rather than negotiations. We would like to allay both fears and expectations that we intend to enter into a joint effort with the Soviets to seek a solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute. We also want to make clear that our focus is bilateral, and that significant results are not to be expected from this dialogue.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850101-0073)

[3](#) Background and information on these talks are in the following telegrams to Near Eastern and South Asian posts: telegram 48445, February 15, and telegram 49273, February 16. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850109-0850 and D850111-0487) Analysis after the conclusion of the talks is in telegram 52867, February 22, and telegram 55542, February 23. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850120-0886 and D850124-0488)

372. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, February 13, 1985

SUBJECT

My Meeting Today with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin

I called in Dobrynin today for an extended session to take stock of the overall US-Soviet agenda. My purpose was to emphasize to the Soviets that we expect progress on all aspects of the relationship in the months ahead and to warn them of some possible stumbling blocks.

Arms Control: To lead off the discussion, I stressed that you are pleased talks are to begin in Geneva and have been saying so publicly, and that our approach is serious.² I noted that we have a strong new delegation and are taking a fresh look at the issues.³ I chided Dobrynin on Soviet reports that question US seriousness in the negotiations.⁴ Dobrynin replied that the Soviets also want the negotiations to be successful, but insist on strict adherence to the terms of the January communique, a line approved by the Politburo at a meeting he said he had attended.⁵ He complained about US statements that some things are not negotiable. I also told Dobrynin I hoped we would see some serious movement in the on-going arms control talks in Stockholm and Vienna.

Regional Issues: Referring to the February 19-20 talks in Vienna between Dick Murphy and his Soviet counterpart, I said we would want to talk about Iran-Iraq, Lebanon, Arab-Israeli issues, and Afghanistan.⁶ I expressed concern that the Afghanistan war might be broadened by actions against

Pakistan, and reaffirmed our support for the UN peace efforts. Dobrynin said they were prepared to discuss all Mideast issues in Vienna, but that they “did not intend” to talk about Afghanistan since it did not fall under their man Polyakov’s area of responsibility. I am sure he understands we will make our Afghanistan points in the meeting regardless of whether they choose to respond. He had nothing new on Iran-Iraq or the Mideast other than to say that they believe the Vienna talks can be useful.

I reviewed with Dobrynin our concerns over their support for Vietnamese actions in Cambodia. He excused the Vietnamese, as usual, by referring to the past abuses by the Khmer Rouge. I responded that I did not believe the people of Cambodia wanted either the Khmer Rouge or the Vietnamese, that a way needs to be found for them to make their own choice, and that the ASEAN proposals have merit. Turning to Ethiopia, I sketched out the tragedy of three million starving people in contested areas and urged the Soviets to persuade the Ethiopians to allow food into these areas. Dobrynin agreed that the humanitarian issues were beset with political complications, but he said that the distribution was a purely Ethiopian issue and we should discuss the problems directly with the Ethiopian government.

Bilateral Issues: I told Dobrynin that we were pleased with the Shcherbitskiy visit to the United States and would work to make the trip a success.⁷ The visit offered an excellent opportunity to move on new consulates in Shcherbitskiy’s Kiev base and in New York. Dobrynin agreed that we should discuss the Kiev Consulate with Shcherbitskiy, but then reiterated the Soviet line that the Soviets had no interest in a New York consulate unless Aeroflot was giving it some visitors to deal with.⁸ I responded that we needed to resolve the issues that had led to Aeroflot suspension.

Indicating he understood the linkage, Dobrynin noted that we have proposed that talks on Northern Pacific safety measures begin February 26,⁹ and hoped this would help clear the way. We both agreed that the exchanges negotiations should move ahead rapidly, and I gave him our views on several economic issues including fishing and the unacceptability of Soviet whaling practices.

I reiterated US interest in your space rescue proposal¹⁰ and the possibility of joint commemoration this July of the Tenth Anniversary of the linkup of Apollo and Soyuz spacecraft. Dobrynin was interested if we had anything on their proposals for the V-E Day anniversary, but I put him off for the present.¹¹ I also used the session to get Dobrynin's attention on our strong opposition to a new payroll scheme they are attempting to institute for Soviet employees of foreign embassies in Moscow.

Human Rights: I took the time to once again underline our deep concern over the human rights situation in the Soviet Union. I encouraged movement on Shcharanskiy and Sakharov, deplored the recent wave of arrests of Hebrew teachers and the increase in anti-Semitism in the USSR, and told him we expected some progress on the emigration of people with a claim to American citizenship and the Soviet spouses of Americans.

In closing, we both agreed that the US-Soviet relationship was better than a year or two ago, but that it still has a long way to go.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, US-Soviet Diplomatic Contacts 8/8. Secret; Sensitive. According to a covering memorandum to

Shultz on another copy, it was drafted by Pascoe and cleared by Simons and Palmer. (Ibid.)

² On January 26, the White House formally announced “The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to begin negotiations on nuclear and space arms on March 12, 1985, in Geneva, Switzerland.” (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book I, p. 74)

³ See [Document 365](#).

⁴ In telegram 688 from Moscow, January 16, the Embassy reported: “Following up Gromyko’s TV interview on the Geneva arms control agreement,” (see [Document 366](#)) “*Pravda* carries a front page editorial on the subject January 16. The editorial reiterates many of Gromyko’s points, and directly questions US seriousness in the upcoming talks.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850034-0792)

⁵ The communiqué concluded the January 7-8 Geneva meetings between Shultz and Gromyko. See [footnote 3](#), [Document 363](#).

⁶ See [Document 371](#).

⁷ A Soviet delegation, headed by Politburo member Vladimir Shcherbitsky, was scheduled to visit Washington and met with President Reagan on March 7. This was a reciprocal invitation issued by Congressmen Tom Foley and Dick Cheney who were in Moscow in the summer of 1983. For the meeting between Reagan and Shcherbitsky, see [Document 378](#).

⁸ Since April 1983, talks regarding consulates in Kiev and New York were ongoing (see [Document 36](#)). After the KAL shutdown and suspension of Aeroflot flights, the consulate talks became linked to ICAO discussion on air safety and resumption of Aeroflot flights. In telegram 493 from Moscow, January 11, the Embassy reported on a January 7 meeting on civilian air issues: “The Soviet official broached the issue of Aeroflot service to the U.S., and was reminded

of U.S. requirements on North Pacific safety measures, and of the need for equitable treatment of any U.S. carrier operating in the U.S.-USSR market. The Soviets continue to be interested in contacts with Pan Am on commercial questions related to U.S.-USSR air service.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850024-0434)

⁹ In telegram 63798/Tosec 40089 to Moscow, March 2, the Department reported: “Following the tragedy of the Korean Air Lines Flight 007 the United States and Japan jointly proposed to the Soviet Union that technical measures be instituted to improve air safety in the Northern Pacific. These proposals provide for, among other things, the designation of a single point of contact between U.S., Soviet and Japanese air traffic control services, a direct communications link between Japanese and Soviet air control centers and the publication by the U.S.S.R. of non-directional radio beacons to provide for a cross check for aircraft flying international routes over the Northern Pacific. The proposals were given to the Soviet ICAO representative in Montreal in February 1984. US, Soviet, and Japanese negotiators began meeting in Washington on February 26.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850144-0003)

¹⁰ See [footnote 5, Document 352](#). During a January 16 meeting, Burt informed Isakov that the President wanted to renew “the US offer to undertake joint space rescue mission with the Soviet Union. Burt made the following points:

“—The US does not view or seek to make space an arena of competition between our two countries.

“—There have been notable cooperative efforts between us, for example, the instrumentation developed by US scientists now carried aboard your Vega space probe.

“—The President has asked us to reiterate the offer we made to you last January for a joint US-Soviet manned mission to develop space rescue techniques.

“—Such a mission would be relatively easy to set up from a technical view, and would benefit both our manned space programs.

“—In your response last March to our offer, you said that we needed first to address the problems of the ‘militarization of space.’

“—Now that we have agreed to begin negotiations on space as a part of our new arms control dialogue, we urge you to reconsider our suggestion on space rescue.” (Telegram 17209 to Moscow, January 18; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850001-0484) On February 19, during a meeting with Burt, Sokolov reaffirmed “the essentially negative Soviet response last year (March 13, 1984), tying agreement in this instance to progress in Geneva and on not turning space ‘into an arena for military competition.’” (Telegram 50737 to Moscow, February 20; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850002-0585)

¹¹ The approaching 40th anniversary of V-E Day posed some diplomatic problems for the United States. In his memoir, Shultz wrote: “By the end of 1984, anxiety was growing about the upcoming fortieth anniversary of the Allied victory in Europe and about how V-E Day would be commemorated. The German government was particularly concerned that Allied, or even U.S.-Soviet, ceremonies would project the image of wartime victors in sharp relief against the vanquished Germans. These fears made the Germans seem uncharacteristically wary of U.S.-Soviet commemorative steps, even though they might contribute

to positive movement in East-West relations, a goal they otherwise strongly supported. Any step, I could see, that would be interpreted as once again consigning West Germany to outcast status was undesirable." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 540)

373. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, February 27, 1985

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

I attended the Secretary's meeting with the arms control negotiators this afternoon. The discussions were basically procedural up to the end when we got into a very interesting discussion of what will be the central problem, not only in negotiations with the Soviets but also in explaining our position here at home: How do we square the emphasis on SDI in our programs with the argument that we are trying for deep reductions? There are various fancy theories as to how that is so, but this is obviously a difficult point in our own thinking. The fact of the matter is that SDI and deep reductions are both articles of faith with the President, and the question of how they are presented in a consistent way is being left to an interagency process which is simply unable to confront basic questions of this nature. Fortunately Paul Nitze is with us, and he has been doing some rather interesting thinking about how the future might evolve such that we could move on both fronts simultaneously. The Soviets are doing everything they can to argue that the two goals are inconsistent and that, if SDI goes forward, they will have to build up, rather than reduce, their intercontinental ballistic missile force.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot

85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1984-June 1985. No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on February 27.

374. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, February 27, 1985

THE GENEVA TALKS: STATE DEPARTMENT POSITIONS

Introduction

Our priority goal in the upcoming Geneva talks is to move toward radical reductions in the numbers and destructive power of nuclear arms and the establishment of a more stable balance in which the incentives for either side to strike first are substantially diminished. These objectives are integral to the long-range goal of the Strategic Defense Initiative—to shift away from “mutual assured destruction” to a transition phase in which both we and the Soviets rely more on defense as the basis for deterrence, and to lay the groundwork for an ultimate phase in which we might accomplish our objective of eliminating all nuclear weapons.

In the near term, however, the Soviets will attempt to exploit the tension between our objectives in offensive arms reductions and strategic defense. They have linked progress on nuclear arms reductions to progress on “demilitarizing” space, and can be expected to resist substantial reductions—both to hedge their bets against future US defenses, and to put pressure on us to be more forthcoming on space arms limits. For our part, we are not now prepared to negotiate restrictions beyond those contained in the ABM and Outer Space treaties that would significantly impede SDI research or foreclose future

defensive deployment options. (We are, however, prepared now to discuss the implications of possible new defensive technologies, and ways in which defenses might be cooperatively introduced into force structures.)

Our objective at Geneva will be to defeat the Soviet attempt to assert a rigid linkage between offensive reductions and SDI, and to insist on the necessity and possibility of agreements providing for significant offensive force reductions in the near term, even while the future of SDI remains uncertain. We will need to counter Soviet attempts to achieve leverage through their massive propaganda campaign against SDI. Further, we will have to demonstrate that Soviet arguments against offensive arms reductions are unfounded and damaging to mutual security.

A strong and credible US negotiating position on offensive nuclear arms, one that demonstrates convincingly that militarily meaningful and mutually beneficial agreements are achievable, would put the onus on the Soviets to weaken the link they have established between space and nuclear arms. It would also help fend off near-term public, Allied and Congressional pressures to accept broad-gauged restrictions on space weapons that would impede the SDI research program. Thus, in the first round of negotiations, we should:

- lay out basic concerns and objectives, and present our long-term strategic concept, elaborating on the Secretary's presentation to Gromyko in Geneva;

- introduce concrete proposals for reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms, while seeking to gain a sense of the Soviet position in both areas; and

—begin a more detailed discussion of the offense-defense relationship in the defensive and space forum.

Interrelationships at Geneva

In conceptual terms, the US has taken the view that the three negotiating areas at Geneva are inherently interrelated. Indeed, from the beginning of the US-Soviet strategic arms dialogue in the late 1960s, we have maintained that the nature of the relationship between offensive nuclear and defensive systems has a direct bearing on the stability of the strategic balance. Our goal in the near term—to reverse the erosion that has occurred since 1972 in the existing offense-dominant regime—does not require any direct linkage between our negotiating approaches in the offensive and defense/space areas. If new defensive technologies should prove feasible and we decide to move toward a more defense-reliant posture, however, careful management of offensive arms reductions and concurrent deployment of non-nuclear defensive systems would be necessary to ensure that deterrence were not undermined at any point during the transition phase.

In addition to the offense-defense relationship, the US has maintained that there is a relationship between strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces. Soviet intermediate-range systems constitute a strategic threat to our European and East Asian allies; US LRINF deployments are intended as a mechanism for “coupling” the US strategic deterrent to the defense of NATO. The 1979 NATO decision stated, moreover, that arms control talks on INF would take place within the strategic arms control framework. In this case as well, however, we and our allies have agreed that we should avoid formally linking these

issues in the negotiations, and that it is more practical to pursue reductions in strategic forces and INF in separate fora.

While the US has emphasized the conceptual rather than negotiating relationship among all these issues, it is the Soviets who have made clear their intention firmly to link the three areas in negotiating terms. However, Gromyko's proposal for three separate groups within a single "complex" suggests that the Soviets have a circumscribed notion of the interrelationships in negotiating terms as well: although they reserve the right to hold potential agreements in individual areas hostage to agreement in all three (in particular, to link offensive arms reductions to US concessions on space, as well as their long-standing linkage of strategic forces to INF), there is no evidence that they are planning to propose explicit trade-offs among systems that cut across the three groups.

Interrelationships at Geneva, therefore, will most likely be a factor underlying the sides' efforts in the three areas rather than an issue central to the give-and-take of the negotiating process. In procedural terms, we expect the Delegations will meet periodically in joint session; these joint meetings will provide an opportunity for US negotiators to set forth our overall conceptual approach to the strategic relationship and to explain how our proposals in the individual areas reinforce one another in moving toward radical reductions in, and ultimately total elimination of, nuclear arms. In the meetings of the three separate groups, we would also tie our specific proposals to our long-term strategic concept, but make clear that we oppose artificial linkages among the groups that would deny us the possibility of moving toward agreements in individual areas where possible, and that we do not (at

least in the initial stages of the talks) envisage any cross-cutting trade-offs.

As the negotiations evolve, of course, we will want to consider whether there may be linkages or trade-offs which would be consistent with our fundamental objectives, and which might help to break logjams in the talks. For example:

—In the offensive arms area, we may want to consider shifting Backfire from the strategic to the INF agenda in exchange for Soviet flexibility on an issue of importance to us (such as exclusion of B-52s that have been retired from their nuclear role). Some believe that we could conceivably consider a similar shift of nuclear-armed SLCMs from the strategic to the INF category, in view of the multiple roles they perform on both sides—although this would run counter to US statements to our Allies emphasizing SLCM's primarily non-theater role, and risk suggesting that SLCMs are an acceptable substitute for land-based INF. In the longer term, we may want to consider more closely relating limits on intercontinental- and intermediate-range systems.

—With regard to possible offense-defense or offense-space linkages, the Soviets may well hold firm in resisting a long-term commitment to substantial reductions in offensive arms absent a similarly long-term US commitment to eschew testing and deployment of new strategic defensive systems. The positions below take this eventuality into account.

Although Soviet rhetoric would suggest that their offense-defense linkage will be the most troublesome, in the longer term the strategic-INF linkage may prove to be equally

difficult for us to manage. As noted, strong and credible US positions on strategic and INF systems could lead the Soviets to conclude that self-denying linkages run counter to their interest in constraining US offensive forces, and induce them either to drop the space linkage or settle for more modest measures in the defense/space area. In the case of the strategic-INF linkage, the Soviets have for more than a decade harped on the "strategic" threat posed by US "forward-based systems." While Moscow eventually backed down in SALT (claiming that their unilateral right to heavy ICBMs represented compensation for FBS), US LRINF do, in fact, represent an increased US forward-based capability; in addition, the number of UK and French warheads will increase fourfold by the late 1990s. Thus, progress toward strategic arms reductions may depend on movement toward some satisfactory solution of the INF problem.

Substance of the US Approach in the Three Areas

The remainder of this paper sets forth the Department's views on the approach the US should take in each of the three negotiating groups during the first round of talks beginning March 12, followed by a discussion of the relationship of these approaches to our long-term strategic concept.

Strategic Arms Reductions

Although the formal US and Soviet positions at the end of the START negotiations remained far apart, the concept of trade-offs provided a promising basis for a solution that would reconcile the US objective of substantial reductions in the most destabilizing categories of ballistic missile warheads with Soviet concerns about avoiding a

fundamental restructuring of their strategic forces. NSDD-153 stated that we will be prepared to explore a variety of potential trade-offs, including “different aggregation of the elements” of an agreement and “asymmetrical limits.”² The Secretary told Gromyko that we will be prepared to go beyond where we left off in the final round of START.

The common framework represents the most promising means of implementing the concept of trade-offs. It would be politically advantageous in that it incorporates elements of both sides’ previous positions in START. In substantive terms, it provides a mechanism for achieving real reductions in overall strategic warheads and in the categories we consider most destabilizing (warheads on MIRVed ballistic missiles, heavy ICBMs), while allowing some asymmetry in the structure of the two sides’ forces.

The framework allows for a wide range of opening positions in terms of the scope and pace of reductions in warheads and throw-weight. Under the approach we recommend, the US would propose an agreement of long or even unlimited duration, providing for early reductions to equal levels in warheads and SNDVs, after which the sides would be obliged to carry out annual reductions in warheads to progressively lower levels. Initial reductions to equal levels would be implemented over the first 2-4 years. Illustrative levels would be:

8000 warheads on ballistic missiles and ALCMs ³	1800 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers)
6000 warheads on MIRVed ballistic missiles	200 heavy ICBMs.

After the initial equal levels were established, the ceiling on ballistic missile warheads plus ALCMs and the subceiling on MIRVed missile warheads would be reduced annually by an agreed percentage (e.g. 4-5% per year) or an absolute amount (e.g. 300-400 total warheads per year, and 250-350 MIRVed missile warheads per year); we would also seek a further reduction in the permitted level of heavy ICBMs (e.g. 25 per year). The overall ceiling on SNDVs, however, would be held constant, to encourage a shift away from highly-MIRVed systems and to permit deployment of sizeable numbers of single-RV ICBMs. In the longer term, as warhead levels reached substantially lower levels, we would propose some reduction in SNDVs as well, albeit at a slower rate than warheads.

We would propose that the annual reductions scheme be open-ended in terms of duration, consistent with our goal of eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons. We would, however, propose that there be a mechanism for periodic review at agreed intervals (e.g. every 5 years), to provide the sides a means of amending or halting the reductions schedule. The review mechanism would be an effort to deal with the Soviets' certain reluctance to commit themselves to a long-term schedule for deep reductions without restrictions on SDI. For our part, the review mechanism would ensure that we had the opportunity ten years hence—when we might be ready to begin the transition period toward a more defense-reliant balance—to reassess the offensive nuclear arms regime in light of the decisions we have taken flowing out of SDI.

Tactically, we could either table specific levels for the ceilings and subceilings, or propose the framework concept with many or all levels left blank (thereby deferring negotiation on numbers until the Soviets evidenced interest in the structure). Either way, the framework has the

advantage of permitting genuine bargaining on levels within the terms of its basic structure.

In order to minimize Soviet breakout potential, ensure greater reductions in throw-weight, and increase ICBM survivability over the long term, we would propose constraints on the weight of RVs on future types of ballistic missiles and a minimum ratio of RV weight to throw-weight (this would prevent deployment of new types of heavy missiles with artificially low numbers of RVs). We would also seek to limit the number of warheads that can be tested or deployed on each type of ballistic missile. Finally, we would express a willingness in principle to place limits on nuclear-armed SLCMs if it proves possible to resolve the enormous verification problems.

Apart from the foregoing, modernization of strategic forces would be permitted without constraint within the quantitative ceilings. We would seek to ensure that the agreement did not impede new ICBM deployment concepts that enhance survivability, including superhardening, closely-spaced basing, multiple protective shelters, or the introduction of fixed or mobile single-RV ICBMs. We would avoid constraints on missile characteristics that cannot be monitored effectively when the Soviets encrypt most of their telemetry, as they are doing now.

At a later stage in the negotiations, we will need to come up with concrete proposals on SLCMs and other difficult issues such as verification of mobile ICBM deployments. We will also have to revisit problematic elements of our previous START position, such as the limits on non-deployed missiles (which may no longer be in our net interest) and treatment of Backfire. We should avoid discussion of these issues in the first round, however, and focus on the basic question of a framework for reductions.

Likely Soviet Reaction: This approach provides a basis for strategic arms reductions that the Soviets could live with, while meeting basic US criteria: it recognizes asymmetries in force structures and offers the prospect of real reductions in US systems in exchange for commensurate reductions in Soviet systems of principal concern to us. The Soviets have, however, resisted deep reductions in the past, and this position is likely to be reinforced by the prospect of future US strategic defenses. Even with a periodic review mechanism, they may well refuse to commit themselves to reductions in strategic forces for a longer period than we are prepared to commit ourselves to adhere to the ABM Treaty unamended. Moreover, as noted above, they are likely to continue to link reductions in strategic forces to a solution in INF.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

Of the three general areas, INF is the one in which an early US move might be the easiest to accomplish:

- we can move in INF without prejudging how we will want larger offense/defense issues to come out;
- there are steps available which should not require debilitating interagency battles, but which would be a tangible demonstration of flexibility;
- it would do much to reassure the Allies that their interests will not be neglected in any new US-Soviet negotiations (while at the same time, it could put pressure on Moscow vis-à-vis its own East European allies eager for agreement in this area); and finally,
- the Soviets are unlikely to make any serious moves on strategic forces in the absence of some sense of

how the LRINF missile issue might be resolved.

By the same token, it is possible that the Soviets will indicate a readiness to accept an INF deal on terms favorable to the West, and then seek to hold the accord hostage to US concessions on SDI.

In crafting a 50-percent reduction offer, we could use either warheads or launchers as the basis for reductions—with end results that would likely have much in common. Based on the Secretary's guidance, we have adopted the latter.

The US would propose that the Soviets halve the existing global total of operationally deployed SS-20 launchers as of a certain date—for example, some 400 launchers with 1200 warheads). They would also halve their European and Asian levels as well (to about 120 and 80 launchers respectively).

The Soviets would not be allowed to change the relative allocation of SS-20s between Europe and Asia, i.e., they would be permitted no more than 120 launchers (with 360 warheads) in Europe and no more than 80 launchers (with 240 warheads) in Asia. For purposes of delineating Europe from Asia, we would accept the Soviets' 80 degrees east longitude line, as modified during the course of the INF talks (SS-20s based in the area around Novosibirsk would thus count under the Asian subceiling).

For its part, the US would be prepared to halve its planned total of 224 operational LRINF launchers (with 572 warheads) to 112. The US LRINF warhead level in Europe would depend on the mix between P-II (one warhead per launcher) and GLCM (four warheads per launcher) that we chose to deploy. Were only GLCM deployed, the US warhead level in Europe would be 448; were only P-II deployed, the US warhead level would be 112; were a mix

of P-II and GLCM deployed in the proportion now planned for the entire force, the US warhead level would be 286; and were a mix of 36 P-IIIs (one battalion) and 76 GLCM launchers (19 flights) deployed, the US warhead level would be 340, roughly equal to the Soviet level after they halved their force in Europe.

In any event, the US would retain the right to make LRINF deployments outside of Europe so as to match the global total of Soviet SS-20 warheads. We have no current plans to deploy outside of Europe or the continental US, and could so indicate to the Soviets (as was done informally in the fall 1983 INF round). The primary limitation of this proposal would be the global ceiling of 600 warheads for each side.

Since an INF move will require thorough and visible Alliance consultations, we may need to decide upon such a move in advance of determining our opening position in the other two areas and begin the process of alerting key Allies to the direction of our thinking early on.

The possibility has been raised of having a draft treaty ready to table during the first round. This would demonstrate our readiness to press ahead quickly on INF and could be a vehicle to force resolution within the USG of a number of outstanding secondary substantive issues. However, some of these issues—such as treatment of aircraft—are likely to be very contentious within the USG, and focusing on them during the first round could hamper our efforts to move toward agreement on the central issue of equal percentage reductions.

Likely Soviet Reaction: Judging from Gromyko's remarks in Geneva and his January "interview" on Soviet television,⁴ we do not expect the Soviets to come to the talks with a

new INF proposal acceptable to the US. At the same time, Gromyko's formulation at Geneva was ambiguous on whether the Soviets could eventually accept some level of US deployments in exchange for reductions from our planned total.

The proposal outlined above would be designed to display flexibility within established INF criteria and to test Soviet willingness to accept some US deployments. A 50 percent equal reductions proposal could serve as the basis for negotiating a final agreement that would grant the Soviets a *de facto* global warhead advantage, while preserving a US *de jure* right to match the Soviet global total. At the same time, the Soviets are likely to resist accepting an offer that makes substantial reductions in *existing* Soviet systems with no commensurate reduction in *existing* (versus planned) US systems. Moreover, it does not directly address Soviet demands for compensation for UK/French systems.

Defense and Space Arms

The defense and space arms forum may be the most difficult and contentious of the three. We will want to address the more general issue of the overall offense-defense relationship; the Soviets, by contrast, will likely come in with specific but sweeping proposals to ban "space-attack" weapons.

We should elaborate on our views of the offense-defense relationship, in terms of both current problems and how—should new defensive technologies prove feasible and cost-effective—we would like to see it evolve in the future, i.e., toward a more defense-reliant balance and, ultimately, the elimination of nuclear weapons. This would be an expanded

version of the Secretary's presentation to Gromyko in Geneva.

With regard to the near term, we would raise our concern about the erosion of the ABM Treaty regime, citing issues such as the Krasnoyarsk radar.⁵ We would raise these more as political concerns than as issues for negotiation in this forum. Technical compliance issues would be left to the SCC, and we would indicate that we look to the Soviets to come forward with solutions. We would not in the near term suggest amending the ABM Treaty; doing so could prompt charges that we were trying to dismantle it or, conversely, Soviet proposals designed to inhibit SDI. (This would not, however, preclude the SCC from working out additional understandings to alleviate ambiguities in the Treaty.)

Given the need to protect SDI until we know what is and is not feasible with new defensive technologies, there is little of significance that we can offer or accept in the way of new limits on defense and space arms. It may be somewhat awkward in a tactical sense to have no concrete proposals, but we are not the demandeurs on space; it is logical for us to be in a listening mode, prepared to hear out and discuss Soviet proposals. Combined with credible proposals on offensive nuclear arms reductions, this approach should suffice to keep us off the defensive—at least for the first round.

While offering no proposals initially, we should be prepared to state, if pressed by the Soviets on the meaning of previous US statements regarding “mutual restraints” on ASATs, that we might consider areas of mutual restraint in the context of a broader range of agreements providing for stabilizing offensive arms reductions (per NSDD-153). We should not wholly preclude the possibility of negotiating

some limits in this area in future rounds. Whether or not we do so should depend in part on the price the Soviets offer in terms of offensive arms cuts, and on the public, Allied and Congressional pressures we may come under to show forthcomingness. (We do not expect that Soviet offers or public, Allied and Congressional pressures will be such that we need consider concrete space arms proposals for round one.)

In later rounds, we might propose a reaffirmation of our adherence to the basic provisions of the ABM Treaty and/or a statement that we would not seek to amend the ABM Treaty for SDI purposes for X years. We may also want to consider other measures as the negotiations develop.

Likely Soviet Reaction: The Soviets will not be prepared for a serious discussion of the offense-defense relationship and its possible evolution. Consistent with their propaganda campaign to force us to abort our SDI and ASAT programs, we anticipate they will instead introduce sweeping proposals to ban “space-attack” weapons and for the “non-militarization” of space; they may also press for a termination of SDI research.

After we have completed our own presentations in the defense and space forum, we could react to and point out the problems in their position. In response to the likely attack on SDI, we will want to emphasize its research nature, and our belief that any transition—which could not begin for some years—should be a cooperative effort, e.g., we would consult with the Soviets before taking steps not permitted by existing limitations.

Long-term Considerations

Each of these positions must be seen in a broader context, namely, the strategic concept outlined in NSDD-153 which guides our long-term planning in these negotiations. We must have a way of relating the immediate positions we take into the talks to our mid-term goal—should defensive technologies prove feasible—of a transition to a more defense-reliant strategic relationship, as well as to our long-term objective of eliminating nuclear weapons. The attached chart outlines an illustrative scheme for relating the three fora over the longer term, based on our central objectives.⁶

In the near term, if the Soviets were to accept our concept and proposals, we would envisage reductions in offensive strategic forces down to a level of, say, 8000 RVs and ALCMs over a period of 2-4 years, and to about 5000 by the middle of the next decade. In INF, 50 percent launcher/warhead reductions would also occur during this timeframe. Finally, we would use this period to explore with the Soviets possible mechanisms by which we can make a stable transition to a defense-dominant strategic relationship.

As SDI proceeds, we will face decisions on whether to amend the ABM Treaty to permit, first, testing of new defensive technologies and, ultimately, deployment of defensive systems. If defensive technologies prove feasible and we move into the transitional period, we would continue to seek to reduce strategic offensive forces within the established framework. At the same time, we would have to recognize that reductions to very low levels could not be undertaken without the involvement in some manner of other nuclear powers. We would also want to begin consideration of limits on other nuclear weapons not dealt with in our initial proposals, including in particular shorter-range systems in Europe of special interest to NATO.

In the final, long-term, stage, we envisage bringing nuclear forces of all types—offensive and defensive—down to zero, under a regime in which effective, stable non-nuclear defenses serve as the ultimate guarantor of deterrence.

It should be clear, however, that such a plan can only be illustrative. Indeed, many questions cannot be answered for many years. For example, we do not know how our research program in SDI will affect our near-term ability to reach agreements on offensive nuclear force reductions. Nor do we know how we will deal with the many verification problems which will become increasingly important as we move to reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons. However, keeping this general scheme in mind as we move through these negotiations will be essential for maintaining an overall rationale for our efforts.

¹ Source: Department of State, Paul Nitze Files, 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, January–February 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow, Pifer, S. Coffey (PM/TMP), D. Schwartz (PM/SNP), and Dunkerley; cleared by O. Grobel (PM/TMP), R. Davis (PM/SNP), J.H. Hawes/J. Gordon (PM), Dobbins/Palmer, Courtney, Timbie, and E.M. Ifft (PM/DEL). Vershbow initialed for all drafting and clearing officials. In a covering memorandum to Shultz on a February 1 draft of this paper, Burt, Chain, and Nitze explained: “Mr. Secretary: The attached paper outlines our views on the substance of our positions on strategic arms reductions, intermediate-range nuclear forces reductions, and defense and space arms. We would like to discuss these ideas with you at an early opportunity, in order that we might have your guidance on how we should proceed in the interagency process underway.” (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 3, 1985—Geneva)

² See [Document 348](#).

³ We would condition this framework on Soviet agreement to ALCM counting rules that preserved sufficient flexibility for structuring our heavy bomber/ALCM force. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁴ See [Document 366](#).

⁵ See [footnote 3, Document 355](#).

⁶ The chart, attached but not printed, describes reductions in the “Near-Term,” “Transitional Period,” and “Long-Term” in each of the three negotiating fora.

375. Notes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, March 4, 1985

NSC MTG Mar 4 85

Bud

A lot to cover, result of a year of analysis today put it all in one presentation, so you can ponder in next few days instructions to delegation which leaves on Friday 3 areas

Space & Defense—advisors consensus re relationship, not to propose limitation at this point Face a military problem represented in Sov [Soviet] adv [advantage] in most every measure of mil [military] power AC [arms control] may be one means of infl [influence], or may not be e.g. ICBM warheads—have 3:1 adv & disadv [disadvantage] in crisis situations may be worse as intel [intelligence] exercises have effect —try arms control to get them to reduce

—US increases—MX, Midg [Midget] M [Man], D-5, B-1

may be more diff[icult] to increase our ICM

—look at US compensate imbalance via SDI

Today see after 5 rounds START & INF see whether can get closer I. Space & Def [Defense]

No one proposes tabling new line now bec [because]: — need look at 10 yr period to reduce

—transition period to inten [intensify] def & further red [reduce] in off [offense]

Devote session to explain

—11 generic areas²

—Strat [strategic] Sit [situation]³

—Strat concept⁴

—Sov actions

—undermine AB[M] Treaty

—appearance of [unclear]

—go over each area in which undermining ABM

—Kras [Krasnoyarsk] radar

—transportability

upgrade

concurrent ops [operations]

A very solid record that they have undermined existing doctr [doctrine] of deter [deterrence]

—compl [compliance] problem undermines in each of AC

[compliance] at heart of any prospect or if no change in Sov record can't expect AC to/will remain viable instrument of diplom [diplomacy]

—Emerging Technologies

In coming months [unclear—owe?] further

—what initiatives/restriction might be [unclear—fair?]

haven't found any yet

—what CBMs might take for better [unclear]

—[what] US [unclear—mil?] in [unclear—Am?] Def

—3 or 4 others

Comment? Max?

Kampelman—

—yes ok

—agreement throughout gvt [government]

we're not demandeur

—Our plan to suggest a less long session about a month—
look over & come back to recommend —exchange, inform,
explain concerns, hear Nitze— —SDI=research program
not to be limited

—Begin discuss transition phase

INF

Current balance

Sov have 10:1 warhead adv

2 options

1. Current⁵

Zero Zero, INF agreem [agreement]

Sept 83—aircraft, global geog [geographic] scope, P
[Pershing] II, 420 global is really an infinite number of
[unclear—positions?]

eg 0-572 eg 420

is not a take it or leave it posit[ion]—

meet criteria

—eg verify, not export to Asia

excl Fr Brit

Comments

Weinb—footnote re 27 systems in transit

—probl [problem] re Dutch

Adelman—shows probl of any non zero-zero

1) very diff to verify—low degree

2) repres coming prob re mobile land based eg Sov [SS-]24
& [SS-]25 rail/road mobile 2. Equal % Red⁶

Works only under very narrowly defined point in time &
even then conceding Sov INF [unclear] in Asia from 400
(Sov) launchers to about 200 (50% red) 120 in Eur, 80 in
East From US [launchers] to 112 launchers in Eur
(warhead [unclear—range?] of 112-448) Comments Weinb
—strongly opposed

— = % red not = equals

—Mobility means can rapidly move from East—easily
[unclear] therefore not useful or safe distinct [distinction]

—get away from simple easy expl

Shultz—Cap's mobility concern applies to all —% red not
principle we want to endorse but might make it negotiable
Weinb—but 200: 112 launchers = Sov adv & West/East
distinction meaningless Sh—merely = variant of Option 1

Nitze—change chart to show US global r[ight] to 200

Pres—Verific? [verification?]

Pick spot in world to which deliver missiles for dismantling
by intern[ational] team Adel—not know if all exist [existing]
missiles delivered there Pres—at least this way we'd know

Casey—can now observe dest [?] [destruction?]

Weinb—all non zero=hard find

all have [unclear] problem

Glitman

—either option can be worked with

—could be used in sequence

—should have treaty with = warheads (?)⁷

Weinb—is launchers, not warheads

[unclear—so?] dangerous move away from one warhead
[unclear—focus?]

Sh—if Opt 1 again, Sovs accept, but seek make more specific & propose Opt 2 within framework of Opt 1

Opt 2 is an illustration of 1 which may not work as balance changes W—can't say Opt 2 = illust of Opt 1 when 1 = global equal Sh—need add sec[ti]on re US right to 200 globally Bud—all agree & to same warhead Weinb—moves us away from = launchers therefore [unclear]

—Opt 2 = increase, not reductions therefore back to SALT II [unclear—treaty?]

Bud—Gen Vessey

Vessey—must limit all so Sovs can't move to Eur.

START

Balance Current U.S. 1250, 5000, 400, 2.5 mil KG

Trade offs

Alt 1⁸

1250, 5000, 350

Alt 2⁹ (ALMs lim to 4,000)

1800 launchers—Sov category & [unclear—desire?]
—we'd meet ½ way but we'd still try reduce heavy ICBMs from 308 to 200 and if want add ALCMs would need reduce 200 further RVs—6,500 in 95 [25% below current 8,300]¹⁰
instead of 5,000 proposal today Rowny—this is end game after Sovs have reduced heavies Alt 3¹¹ —Adds ALM (1500-2000) —1800 SNDVs, Aggregate 4500 MIRVd missiles & 1500 ALCM

[[12](#) 35% reduct [reduction] in Sov MIRVd miss [missile] [unclear—warheads?]] & 25% cut in Sov Shultz—most rad [radical] reduct in most threat system Alt 4[13](#)

Bud—premised on what is militarily essential to target (that's my pers [personal] opinion re its advantage) — aggregates to 1800 launchers add sublimits to restrain Sovs —permits US 700 Midgetman

—price = 9700 warheads = very high of which 7,000 ballistic in '95

—20% fewer SNDVs than S[ALT] II & roughly double SII reds 33% MIRVd ball miss warhead cut

Vessey—right, permits US to modernize

—also needs look at SDI & Def/Sp

—prob [probably] closer to what Sovs want therefore risk them OKing, then press on SDI Pres—relatively cut? how perceived

Ves—big cut in destabilizing [things ?]

Alt 5[14](#)

Goes to heart of reducing—most impt [important] reasons —warheads & TW [Throw Weight]—by 50% in power & not dictate Sov force restructuring eg 5,300 MIRV RVs, TW & heavy bombers trade-offs specific re bombers Weinb— bomber diff [differential] recogn we need more bomber bec of Sov air defenses —also recogn [unclear—great?] diff in TW/much narrower US/Sov imbal than other [unclear—of?]

—“Radical red” per Sov vocab

—Simple, 50%

—Per Vessey, may not give us all weaps for all [unclear] but reduct in #s, TW & compensat [compensation] for air def = impt Alt 6¹⁵

Inspired by your Sept speech on Roadmap in 20 yrs horizon¹⁶

Therefore, 20 yrs instead of just 10 yr horizon Proposes we discuss outcomes at end of day but not as demanding re dictating how get there, replace etc '95 benchmarks — 5,000 warheads

—3½ MKG Sov (25% red)

—400 US 320 Sov

Adelman—give negot view of 1st Round set of [unclear—outcomes?]

—RV ball, TW & bombers

all consid most impt factors

—lays out factors without partic adornment —not include SNDV limit that not a service to US, if Scowcroft can —not include ALCM limit Sov are demandeur Bud

You asked JCS address mil sufficiency

Chiefs have addressed alter [alternatives]

Vessey—most impt = assumptions 1. one assumption = we'll be able to complete own mod progr some of these damage but you must assess our mod vs. pol [policy] re [recommendations]

none of these proposals OK, unless we mod 2. you must pick a point in time when we can check US & Sov force structure We've picked 1995.

—All of these [unclear] OK at '95

some far better re US mod

[ditto] re Sov

MIRVd mobile land based missiles extremely threatening [therefore] should add provis [provisions] to all opts for ban
3. how affects other negotiations

Rowny —all proposals should be kept simple

—we ought to talk trade offs home in on Sov ICBMs vs US bombers —need offensive vs offensive deal otherwise Sovs will accept [unclear] deal & zero in on SDI —[therefore] go back to off vs off capab

Tower —not known whether Sovs are serious

—I'm reluctant reward their walk out

—I'd prefer build on current position

they've not even discussed it & it was new —We need discuss trade-offs, can [unclear—codify?]

—Prefer to probe, report back on our findings seek flexibility to probe

keep our moral posture on 5,000 warhead line & maybe pkg with sublimits

Pres—Sovs have talked re goal of total elim —Shouldn't we pick that up

Nitze—agree

repeat goal & set path toward it

Shultz—Gromyko not answer in Geneva

Pres—but since Geneva

Bud—

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSC Meeting, 03/04/1985. No classification marking. The editor transcribed Kraemer’s handwritten notes of the NSC meeting specifically for this volume. An image of the notes is Appendix E. No formal notes of the meeting were found. In a February 28 memorandum to Kimmitt, Linhard and Kraemer forwarded papers on Defense and Space, INF, and START in preparation for the March 4 NSC meeting. (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, December Chron File: [No. 111–No. 112]) These three papers correlate closely with topics covered in Kraemer’s notes of the meeting (see annotation below). In his diary on March 4, Reagan wrote: “We had an N.S.C. meeting with our Arms Talk Leaders looking at various options for how we wanted to deal with the Soviets. It’s very complicated business. I urged one decision on them—that we open the talks with a *concession*—surprise! Since they have publicly stated they want to see nuclear weapons eliminated entirely, I told our people to open by saying we would accept their goal.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 431) ² Although this phrase is unclear, it seemingly correlates to the “Areas of Agreement” section of the briefing paper on Defense and Space. This section lists 12 “approaches” for the first round of talks.

³ In the briefing paper on Defense and Space, Section II. “Areas of Agreement,” subsection A. “Current Strategic Situation,” stated that “both sides have certain incentives to act quickly and decisively with their military power, both nuclear and conventional. This creates an unstable situation that could make crises more difficult to manage and, if conflict breaks out, makes rapid, perhaps immediate, escalation to high levels of destruction more likely. This is a dangerous situation. It is one the US and the Soviet Union must address both together and unilaterally. The political and military measures necessary to do so will be difficult for both sides. But we must tackle this problem; the danger must be diffused.”

⁴ In the briefing paper on Defense and Space, Section II. “Areas of Agreement,” subsection B. “Strategic Concept,” stated: “We should present our views on correcting these dangers and moving toward a more stable strategic relationship, highlighting the benefits that effective limitations on nuclear arms and moving toward a posture more reliant on defense would have on enhancing the stability of our strategic relationship.”

⁵ In the INF briefing paper under “INF Policy Options,” Option 1 to “Resubmit Previous US Proposals” stated: “The US would resubmit the position on LRINF missile limitations embodied in its two draft treaties, recalling NSDD 153’s statement that ‘an agreement is possible on the basis of the September 1983 US proposals.’ In doing so, we could emphasize that we are willing to consider any other alternatives which could lead to an INF agreement meeting our basic standards.”

⁶ In the INF briefing paper under “INF Policy Options,” Option 2, “Equal Warhead Levels in Europe,” stated that the “US could add specificity to previous proposals such as “—a commitment not to deploy in Europe more than 210 to

280 warheads (one-half to two-thirds of 420) if the Soviets deployed the same number within range of Europe. The US would retain the right to deploy additional warheads, up to the global ceiling of 420 outside of Europe; and “—a commitment to deploy no more than 42 to 56 P-IIs in Europe (one-fifth of 210 to 280, roughly the existing ratio).

“The USG could also consider proposing a separate Asian subceiling to limit the SS-20 deployments in the eastern USSR.” (Ibid.)

⁷ The parenthetical question mark is in the handwritten text. It is unclear if Kraemer was questioning Glitman’s statement or if the statement was unclear.

⁸ In the START briefing paper, six alternatives were presented, and all were discussed during this NSC meeting. “Alternative 1: 1983 US START Proposal with Trade-Offs” proposed a reduction to 5,000 deployed ballistic missile warheads for each side, “equal ceilings of 400 heavy bombers,” and “deep reductions in Soviet throw-weight” to the “internal US goal of 2.5 Mkg.” (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, December Chron File: [No. 111-No. 112]) ⁹ The START paper continued with “Alternative 2: SNDV Aggregate; Heavy Missiles/AHB Sublimit; No Weapons Aggregation.” This alternative “accepts some elements of the Soviet proposal, e.g. an aggregate of 1800 SNDVs,” and would “establish a ceiling of 6000-7000 ballistic missile warheads; that is, 1000-2000 more than our current position but still as much as a 25 percent reduction from current US and Soviet levels.” Alternative 2, “a combined subceiling, limiting each side to 200-250 ALCM-carrying heavy bombers (AHBs) and heavy ballistic missiles, would establish a *de facto* trade-off between the sides’ areas of relative advantage while permitting *de jure* equality.” (Ibid.) ¹⁰ These brackets are in the original.

¹¹ “Alternative 3: SNDV Aggregate; Heavy ICBM Sublimit; RV/ALCM Aggregate; MIRV RV Sublimit” proposed “progressively stringent constraints on US and Soviet strategic forces” that would “put into place a framework for achieving our ultimate objective of eliminating nuclear weapons.” This alternative “would adopt a single combined limit on missiles and bombers, with a sublimit on heavy ICBMs; and a parallel combined limit on missile warheads and ALCMs, with a sublimit on MIRV RVs.” (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, December Chron File: [No. 111-No. 112]) ¹² Left bracket is in the original text.

¹³ Alternative 4 in the START paper, “SNDV Aggregate: RV/ALCM Aggregate: Nested SNDV and Weapon Sublimits,” proposed the adoption of “an aggregate limit on ballistic missiles and heavy bombers and a parallel limit that aggregates ballistic missile RVs and ALCMs. The SNDV aggregate contains nested sublimits on heavy ICBMs (150), MIRVed ICBMs (550), total MIRVed ballistic missiles (960), and ALCM heavy bombers (1080). The RV/ALCM aggregate places similar sublimits on MIRVed ICBM RVs (4500), MIRVed ballistic missile RVs (7000), and total RVs and ALCMs (9000).” (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, December Chron File: [No. 111-No. 112]) ¹⁴ “Alternative 5: Direct Throw-Weight and Warhead Limits” went beyond the current U.S. “START position in terms of requiring deep reductions from existing levels in the most destabilizing systems, namely ballistic missile warheads and throw-weight. It would also compensate for the existence of massive, unconstrained Soviet air defenses.” It proposed a reduction in ballistic missiles to 4,000 with “throw-weight to 2.0 million kilograms. There would be no direct limits on the number of deployed missiles, since we wish to encourage movement toward single-warhead missiles.” It would reduce heavy bombers to a “separate limit of 400 for the US and 200 for the USSR, with Backfire included in this

total. This asymmetry would compensate for the massive Soviet air defense system.” (Ibid.) ¹⁵ “Alternative 6: Bomber and Missile Destructive Capability Limits” proposed to distinguish “between the destructive potential of missiles and bombers in relation to the size and numbers of weapons they can carry to intercontinental range—and permits an explicit trade-off by negotiation of missiles and bomber destructive capacity. (RVs and possibly ALCMs would also be limited directly.)” (Ibid.) ¹⁶ A reference to Reagan’s September 1984 UNGA speech. See [footnote 7, Document 267](#).

**376. Memorandum From the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane) to President Reagan¹**

Washington, March 5, 1985

SUBJECT

Politburo Member Shcherbitsky's Visit to the U.S.

You will be meeting Thursday with Soviet Politburo Member Vladimir Shcherbitsky, who is in the U.S. this week as head of a Soviet "parliamentary" delegation.² I will be forwarding suggested talking points shortly,³ but thought that you might want to have some information in advance regarding how this visit fits into the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Background

The Soviets responded a few weeks ago to an invitation issued in Tip O'Neill's name by Tom Foley and Dick Cheney when they visited Moscow the summer of 1983. (You will recall that they briefed you on their trip following their return to Washington.)⁴ Therefore, the Soviets picked the time for the visit, and also decided that it would be, in Soviet terms, a high-level one by selecting a full Politburo member to head it.

The Soviet decision to send the delegation to the U.S. at this time was an important one. Several factors probably entered into this decision:

- (1) A desire to symbolize the intensification of contacts with the U.S., following the "freeze" of much

of last year;

(2) A desire to influence American public opinion, and especially Congress, as negotiations at Geneva are about to begin and as Congress debates our defense modernization program;

(3) The felt need for a political “reconnaissance mission” at a high level and outside formal Foreign Ministry channels; and

(4) Perhaps—on the part of some Soviet officials—a desire to expose one of their more provincial and reputedly hard-line Politburo members to realities in the United States.

The fact that this decision was made despite ongoing leadership uncertainty in Moscow is interesting in itself. Given Chernenko’s parlous health, full Politburo members, aside from Gromyko who must continue to function as Foreign Minister, might be expected to limit their foreign travel unless the question of succession has been decided in principle. I would consider the decision to send Shcherbitsky here for ten days as tending to corroborate reports that a decision has been made on the succession—or that medical advice is that Chernenko is likely to hang on for at least a month or so.

Discussion

Although one of the Soviet objectives is doubtless to influence Congress and our public opinion, I do not believe that this group will be notably effective on that score. Shcherbitsky has none of the charm and PR skill that Gorbachev used to such good advantage in the UK last December.⁵

I believe that we can make best use of this visit by seeing to it that Shcherbitsky receives an accurate impression of our strength and resolve, and at the same time, of our desire to move decisively to reduce offensive nuclear weapons and to forge a better working relationship with the Soviets. The visits the Congressional hosts have planned for the delegation to California and Texas should do a lot to impress the provincial Shcherbitsky with our basic economic, social and political health. No Soviet official comes back from such exposure to the U.S. without being shaken by the palpable evidence of U.S. strength and well being.

This being the case, I believe that you should devote the thirty minutes you have available for your meeting with Shcherbitsky to driving home some of the points you made to Gromyko last September.⁶ Specifically, I believe you should concentrate on the following themes:

- Your desire to move toward a radical reduction in offensive nuclear weapons;
- Your determination to keep U.S. defenses adequate and specifically to continue present programs until there is a fair agreement to limit them;
- The fallacy of the Soviet attack on SDI research, making plain that the current Soviet ploy will fail;
- The reasons we are concerned with the Soviet military build-up and in particular with the problem posed by their prompt hard-target kill capability, which suggests a first-strike strategy; and
- The necessity for improvements in the human rights situation if relations in general are to improve.

I will soon be sending you suggested talking points along these lines, but in the meantime you may wish to scan the CIA study “What to Expect from Shcherbitsky” at Tab A,⁷ and the biography of Shcherbitsky at Tab B.⁸

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, Reagan-Shcherbitsky Meeting 03/07/1985 (3). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Prepared by Matlock. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. A copy was sent to Bush.

² March 7. See [Document 378](#).

³ The talking points were not found.

⁴ On July 25 1983, Reagan met with Foley, Cheney, Bush, Shultz, Baker, Clark, Duberstein, and Matlock to discuss Foley and Cheney’s trip to the Soviet Union. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) In a July 23 memorandum to Clark, Hill noted that the delegation was in the Soviet Union from July 4 to 9, traveling to Moscow, Leningrad, and Yerevan. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (7/23/83–7/29/83))

⁵ See [Documents 337](#) and [341](#).

⁶ See [Documents 284](#) and [288](#).

⁷ Not attached. A copy is attached to an unsigned draft of this memorandum. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, Reagan-Shcherbitsky Meeting 03/07/1985 (2))

⁸ Not found.

377. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)1

Washington, March 7, 1985

I ate three meals for my country today. In the morning I attended a breakfast for Congressmen on MX in the Old Family Dining Room in the White House. I never got to give my pitch, because the President, who did not actually eat with us, came in before I had a chance to rise to speak, in order to give his own pitch. At lunch I joined the Secretary's luncheon in honor of Politburo Member Shcherbitskiy. I sat at a separate table next to Mr. Alkhimov, Chairman of the Soviet State Bank, and at the same table with Mr. Chervov, who is the Soviets' leading internal figure on arms control. He sits on the general staff and plays a coordinating role similar to Bud McFarlane's role in arms control. I got into quite an argument with Chervov over the Strategic Defense Initiative. I provoked him somewhat by asking whether the Soviets were going to propose prohibiting all anti-ballistic missile research in the Geneva talks. At first he didn't seem to want to talk about it, but then he came back very strongly explaining the Soviet position. I found him an extremely articulate and strong personality.

In the evening I attended a dinner given by Congressman Foley for Shcherbitskiy and sat next to him. It was a very interesting occasion in view of the fact that Shcherbitskiy is a Politburo member. We had a free-flowing discussion, but at only one point in the evening did we actually discuss foreign policy substance. Earlier I had gone to a reception given at the Soviet Embassy to pull Shcherbitskiy aside to protest an attack on one of our Marine Guards in the

Intourist hotel in Moscow.² I pointed out to Shcherbitskiy that it had all the appearances of an official act by security guards, and that we knew from the presence of a Canadian witness that there was no provocation. I pointed out that if he (unlike the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) were to investigate, he would find out the truth. Shcherbitskiy had little to say in reply other than to point out that people got into fights through drinking or over women.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1984–June 1985. No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on March 11. In his March 5 entry, Dam also noted: "In the evening I went to the Capital Centre for a hockey game. The purpose of the hockey game was the invitation by Armand Hammer to the Soviet Congressional Delegation, which is here headed by Shcherbitskiy, a member of the Politburo. Not too much conversation was carried on, and on the whole, it didn't quite meet the objective of providing a quiet informal basis for conversation with the Soviets." (Ibid.)

² In telegram 2899 from Moscow, March 7, the Embassy reported: "At approximately 0230 hours on March 6, 1985, Marine Corporal Jon Hildreth was brutally assaulted by two unidentified Soviets inside the Intourist Hotel in Moscow. Only after suffering a series of blows which resulted in abrasions to his head, neck, left arm, and chest, did Hildreth manage to break free of his attackers, escape the hotel, and return to the Embassy. A subsequent Embassy investigation of this incident could determine no plausible

reason for the assault.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850155-0371)

378. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 7, 1985, 3-4 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Vladimir Shcherbitsky of the Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS

UNITED STATES

The President
Secretary of State George Shultz
Mr. Donald Regan, Chief of Staff
Mr. Michael K. Deaver, Deputy Chief of Staff
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, Chief of Staff to the Vice President
Mr. Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State
Mr. Jack F. Matlock, NSC
Mr. Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

USSR

Vladimir Shcherbitsky, Member of Soviet Politburo
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
Boris I. Stukalin, Department Head, Central Committee
Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Oleg A. Krokhalev, Interpreter

The President opened the meeting by saying that he supposed the question uppermost on both their minds was the negotiations to open next week in Geneva.² He said he had read the words by Chernenko and Gromyko recently expressing a hope to eliminate nuclear weapons, and he agreed with these words completely. (C)

Shcherbitsky confirmed that this is Soviet policy. (C)

The President added that he knew it is a complicated question, but if both countries feel that way, we should move ahead toward accomplishing the goal. It, of course,

cannot be done all at once, but we can establish phases of reductions to move in that direction. (C)

Shcherbitsky said he had the impression that our goals coincide. But to bring them into effect we need patience, and also need to exhibit less emotion in the dialogue. He pointed out that we have so far been able to accomplish some small-scale things, such as increased exchanges in the cultural and environmental protection areas, but we must be more ambitious. (C)

He continued by saying that you say you have no aggressive intent toward us and we say the same, that we have no aggressive intent toward you. You are determined to defend your allies and we are committed to defend ours. So in this respect our policies are the same. But there is an excess of arms. We have enough to destroy the world many times over, and to what point? People are surprised by this situation and think their governments are not acting in a sensible fashion. (C)

He then recalled that he had been in public service for many years and had worked under various Soviet leaders who differed in many ways. He was a student in Stalin's time, then was in the Army during the war, and after that in various party and government positions. The Soviet leaders differed in their approaches on many things: Stalin took decisions alone; Khrushchev, who had both positive and negative qualities, did as well. The others consulted their colleagues. He worked for Brezhnev for many years, with Andropov for a period which proved unfortunately short, and now with Chernenko. But through all this period there was not a single meeting of the Politburo where any plans were developed to attack the U.S. or impose on the U.S. (S)

We think of our countries as far apart, he continued parenthetically, but in fact our borders are very close in the Bering Sea. The Diomedede Islands, one of which is Soviet and one American, lie only a few miles apart. But the fact is, whether we are distant or close, such questions as aggressive acts against the U.S. are simply not discussed by the Soviet leadership. (S)

The Soviet people had learned a bitter lesson in World War II and are determined not to repeat the experience. They saw U.S. bases all around the Soviet Union created by the U.S. after the war, so the question was not that of threatening the U.S. but of not lagging behind the U.S. And what he had said of discussions among the Soviet leadership was equally true of discussions and plans made by their military people and scientists. (S)

So the picture is different in our two countries, he continued; you kept up an arms race while we kept up with you. (C)

As for the Geneva negotiations, he referred to Chernenko's recent letters to the President and stated that the principled positions set forth in them had not changed. He could reaffirm the policy Chernenko had described. His government has been working hard on the instructions for their delegation to Geneva. He believes we can reach a mutual understanding there if we approach the negotiations in the spirit of mutual concessions. Referring to the treaties and agreements signed between 1972 and 1974, and to the Declaration of Principles of 1972, he said that this experience demonstrated that we can reach agreement by a series of compromises. (S)

However, Shcherbitsky continued, if you continue your plans for an ABM system with elements based in space,

then this will be contrary to the ABM Treaty. That treaty bans development, testing and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based ABM's. He recognized that the President had said the U.S. program is limited to research, but wondered what the point of the research could be if the results are not tested. (S)

The President said he would like to speak to that. Research is not banned by the ABM Treaty and all we propose is research. He had stated publicly that if this research proves that defensive weapons are possible, we will sit down and talk about how they can be integrated into a more stable deterrent system. We must try to move toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, and defensive systems could help. The Soviet Union has defensive systems today, including ABM's which the U.S. does not have. (S)

Regarding suspicion of each other, the President pointed out that there was no ground for Soviet fear of the U.S. At the end of World War II, the U.S. was the only one of the wartime allies which emerged with its industry intact, and the only one with nuclear weapons. If our intentions had been aggressive, we could not have been stopped. But instead of threatening others with our nuclear weapons, we proposed that atomic energy be placed under international control and that the military devices be dismantled. The Soviet Union rejected this and proceeded to undertake what was probably the greatest military buildup in the history of the world. Soviet leaders also made statements declaring their intent to expand their control in the world. So the U.S. had no choice. (S)

The U.S. has tried unilateral disarmament, the President continued, but the Soviet buildup continued. Our intentions are peaceful, but we cannot sit still when there is an

imbalance of forces. The U.S. must act to make sure the balance is not upset. (S)

As for the Geneva negotiations, the President stated, we must either achieve reductions of nuclear weapons—and we want their total elimination—or else, until we have agreements and these are honored, the U.S. must build sufficient force to match the Soviet force. He pointed out that Gromyko had spoken of the mountains of weapons we are sitting on. We want to reduce them, just as Gromyko said he did, but we will not stand by and see ourselves inferior. (S)

The President then pointed out that we have some important things in common. We have the power to start a war, but we also have the power to bring peace to the world. That is where our efforts must be directed. (C)

Shcherbitsky said he agreed that it would be good to pursue joint efforts in this direction. He also had some comments on some of the President's earlier remarks. (C)

As for the President's mention of U.S. restraint after World War II when it had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, *Shcherbitsky* said that the Soviet Union had ten million men under arms and could have swept across Europe if it had so chosen. Nevertheless, they observed the wartime agreements, which illustrated their restraint and lack of aggressive intent. (S)

Regarding strategic defense, he would not agree that the U.S. program is purely research. Assistant Secretary Perle had stated that there could be testing within four years, and General Abrahamson had spoken of tests within two years. (S)

Regarding compliance, Shcherbitsky said that he had read the U.S. memorandum and had consulted with Soviet military experts in regard to the 19 allegations.³ He believes the Soviet Union has not violated any treaties, but that there have been violations by the U.S. It is true that they have ABM's around Moscow, but this is permitted by the treaty. As for the radar near Krasnoyarsk, it is a system to be used for tracking civilian satellites, communication satellites. He suggested that we have our specialists discuss these matters. If we do so, many doubts might be dispelled. (S)

Shcherbitsky then asked why the U.S. refuses to commit itself not to use nuclear weapons first. He understands the U.S. position that it is because the Warsaw Pact has more conventional weapons than NATO. But we have been holding negotiations in Vienna for 12 years on this question and the Soviet Union has agreed to equal levels. They are willing to withdraw troops and their equipment in accord with an agreement, and are willing to have verification. And the Soviets are willing to ban the first use of any type of force. He wondered whether an agreement in the MBFR forum would not make it possible to proceed to a no-first-use of nuclear weapons commitment. (S)

He then turned to the question of chemical weapons, alleging that the U.S. has a campaign to stockpile chemical weapons. This gives the Soviets great concern. He has talked to many Soviet citizens, and many have the impression that the U.S. is preparing for war against the Soviet Union. When they hear threatening statements by U.S. political figures they feel that war is close. (C)

Nevertheless, Shcherbitsky asserted, Soviet citizens have maintained a warm attitude toward Americans since World War II. They know of American achievements and the high

standard of living here. Soviet media do, Shcherbitsky added, show examples of poverty and the “barbaric treatment of Negroes,” but they know that this is not the whole story. In short, the U.S. is respected in the Soviet Union and the Soviet people want only peace. (S)

The President agreed that the Soviet people, like the American people, want peace. Americans feel great friendship for Russians also. As he had said many times, people don’t start wars, governments do. And the problem is that the Soviet people do not have much to say about what their government does. [*Shcherbitsky* interjected, “Why do you say this?”] We want the people in both countries to live in peace, *the President* continued. (S)

The President then explained why we are concerned about Soviet intentions, recalling statements by Lenin and other leaders to the effect that they would take Asia, then Europe and eventually the U.S. would fall into their hands like ripe fruit. He also recalled, as an example of Soviet official hostility, the Soviet refusal for a long time during World War II to allow U.S. bombers on missions over Germany to land on Soviet territory. The Cuban missile crisis was another example; the Soviets removed their missiles, but we had superiority at the time. Many Soviet activities today give us concern, such as their preponderance of heavy missiles and their continually expanding blue water navy. (S)

The President then observed that deterrence based entirely on offensive weapons is undesirable. All we have now to deter war is a system of mutual threats against innocent civilians. History records a whole series of international agreements designed to protect civilians in wartime, and we must not ignore that experience or that moral principle. We need to see if defensive weapons can be developed so

that we can return to a more acceptable means of avoiding war than threatening civilian populations. (C)

Shcherbitsky asked which country had encircled the other with bases. (S)

The President replied that we had dismantled some of these bases, and we began to deploy missiles in Allied countries which could strike the Soviet Union only when our Allies asked for protection from the threat of Soviet SS-20's. Even then, we offered the zero option, but the Soviet answer was that they would reduce by half but NATO could have nothing. So it was a half zero option—half for them and nothing for us. (S)

Shcherbitsky remarked that they could argue endlessly on these points, but would point out that when the U.S. refused to count British and French missiles, there was no way the Soviet Union could agree. Now U.S. missiles are in Europe, and the President should try to understand how the Soviets feel. (S)

The President pointed out that Soviet SS-20's are there too. (S)

Shcherbitsky said that they cannot strike the U.S., and that the Soviets must take measures to counter them. And if the U.S. is to pursue SDI, why does it need the MX and a new bomber? (S)

The President said that the MX is in response to four new Soviet systems. It has the same capability of the SS-18, but the Soviets have many more of these than the hundred MX's which the U.S. intends to deploy. (S)

Shcherbitsky alluded to the research done on the possibility of a nuclear winter if a nuclear war should be

fought. In light of this possibility, he wondered why we keep creating more weapons. We can destroy mankind only once, and we already have the means to do so many times over. (C)

The President said that if Shcherbitsky wished to negotiate, he would have a deal. We can start eliminating nuclear weapons right now. If our two countries could cooperate in this, we could make sure that no one else uses these weapons. We must do this to preserve peace for our children and grandchildren. (S)

Shcherbitsky said that the prospect of space weapons is particularly frightening. People would feel that destruction is poised above their heads. To have weapons on earth and on and under the water is one thing, but something which is poised in space above your head all the time is enough to drive people crazy. (S)

The President pointed out the desirability of having a non-nuclear weapon which could be used against nuclear ones. This would be particularly important if nuclear weapons ever came into the hands of a madman. Madmen exist, but if the nuclear weapons could be destroyed, then we could deal with that problem. (S)

The President then reiterated that if we ever find a way to build such a weapon, we would internationalize the question and work for agreement on how to use it as a means for eliminating nuclear weapons. (S)

Shcherbitsky replied that, in that case, the U.S. would begin dealing with the Soviets as if they were children. And what is the Soviet Union to do until it has such a weapon? Their only choice would be to increase their offensive weapons. (S)

The President asked why they would not be willing to reduce their nuclear weaponry. (S)

Shcherbitsky claimed that we have parity, an approximate parity, of nuclear weapons now. U.S. claims that the Soviets have superiority are without foundation. This parity must not be disturbed. But the main problem is distrust. (S)

The President agreed that distrust is a problem. (C)

Shcherbitsky then said that if the U.S. proceeds with SDI, the Soviets will have to spend much more on new weapons. This will be painful. The U.S. is richer. But although the Soviet people have on average 3% fewer calories to consume each day and do not live as well as Americans in general, no army in the world defends its country better than theirs. If necessary, they will tighten their belts, but this will mean another spiral in the arms race. (S)

As for the Geneva negotiations, the Soviets are ready for a sensible compromise, he said, and noted that he understood that some members of Congress intended to go to Geneva for the opening of the talks. He said that this is up to the U.S., but if Soviet legislators wished to attend the talks, he would not think that this is a good idea. (S)

The President returned to some of *Shcherbitsky's* earlier comments and pointed out that there is no evidence that the U.S. has embarked on expansionism. The U.S. is not in Africa and is not injecting its forces into local disputes. He added, however, that it seems to us that the Soviets have an expansionist program, and this gives us concern. (S)

Shcherbitsky inquired, "What do you mean by an expansionist program?" (S)

The President answered citing Afghanistan and proxy forces in Angola and Kampuchea, for a start. (S)

Shcherbitsky inquired about Kampuchea, and *the President* said he was referring to the North Vietnamese, who are backed by the Soviets. (S)

Shcherbitsky protested that Soviet troops were not involved here. As for Afghanistan, Soviet troops were there at the request of the government. The request had been made several times and the Politburo had considered the request several times before finally granting it. He then asked about the American action in Grenada. (S)

The President explained that we have no troops in Grenada, and the island has been returned to the control of its people. He pointed out that we had found documents and weapons there which had made the earlier Soviet involvement and intentions quite clear. (S)


Shcherbitsky observed that Afghanistan is a much larger country and therefore presents a much more formidable military problem. Noting that they were already over the scheduled time, he expressed the hope that the negotiations in Geneva would be fruitful. (S)

The President said that he also hoped for good results and wished *Shcherbitsky* and his delegation a pleasant trip to Texas and California. (U)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron March 1985 (4/4). Secret; Sensitive. Prepared on March 8. A covering memorandum from Matlock to McFarlane suggests that the memorandum of conversation was drafted by Matlock. Brackets are in the

original. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Reagan wrote in his diary: “Big event was meeting with Polit bureau [Politburo] member (Soviet) Sheherbitsky [Shcherbitsky]. He had Amb. Dobrynin & a couple of others with him. I had George S., Bud, Don Regan & a couple of others with me. He & I went round & round. His was the usual diatribe that we are the destabilizing [destabilizing] force, threatening them. It was almost a repeat of the Gromyko debate except that we got right down to arguing. I think he’ll go home knowing that we are ready for negotiations but we d—n well aren’t going to let our guard down or hold still while they continue to build up their offensive forces.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 433; brackets are in the original)

² The Nuclear and Space Talks between the United States and USSR were set to open in Geneva on March 12.

³ On February 1, Reagan submitted to Congress a report on “Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements.” For the text of Reagan’s message to Congress and this report, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, April 1985, pp. 29–34. Soviet non-compliance was also addressed by the administration in NSDD 161, February 6, which is planned for publication in [Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981–1984](#) .

**379. Memorandum From the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane) to President Reagan¹**

Washington, March 8, 1985

SUBJECT

Principals' Views on Geneva Options

Secretaries George Shultz and Cap Weinberger and ACDA Director Kenneth Adelman have sent separate memoranda to you forwarding their views on preferred options for the Geneva negotiators.

Secretary Shultz's memorandum (Tab A)² endorses START Option 3, arguing that while this option permits more ballistic missile warheads than our current START proposal (i.e., far more than 5,000), it seeks to cut the most destabilizing categories (i.e., warheads on MIRVed missiles and heavy ICBMs) and would set important numericals limit on air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) by aggregating these with ballistic missile warheads. For INF, Shultz argues in favor of a new initiative incorporated in Option 2 that, in his view, properly amplifies previous positions while sustaining US and Allied public opinion. On Defense and Space, he states that to avoid focus on SDI as an obstacle, the US must avoid being perceived as standing pat on START and INF.

Secretary Weinberger's memorandum (Tab B)³ cautions against moving too rapidly on START and INF as time is needed to build support for SDI and as rapid progress in START and INF would build pressure for US concessions on SDI. Concerning START, Weinberger endorses Option 5 as

simplifying constraints to two measures (warheads and throwweight) as opening with a proposal for truly deep reductions to 4,000 warheads after 12 years, and as thus taking the Soviets at their word on favoring “radical reductions,” while offering substantial flexibility on various tradeoffs during the course of the negotiations. For INF, Weinberger endorses Option 1, and strongly criticizes Option 2’s “equal percentage reduction” concept as moving us far from our current concept of zero-zero and of global equality and as leaving more Soviet than US missiles in place.

ACDA Director Adelman’s memorandum (Tab C)⁴ is silent on INF and Defense/Space issues, but endorses START Option 6 as an elaboration of our current position (Option 1) and as providing a long-term “road map” outlining a path to our long-term goal, without tying our negotiators to a specific tactic.

In addition, Senator Tower has sent a memorandum (Tab D)⁵ to NSC Staff outlining his views as to how Option 1 (our current position), which he favors, can be enhanced to make it more dynamic. We are drawing on several of his suggestions.

Recommendation

That you review the attachments together with the proposed National Security Decision Memorandum draft which is being provided in a separate package.⁶

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, March 1985 Chron File: [No.44–No.46]. Secret. Sent for

action. Prepared by Kraemer and Linhard. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² Shultz's memorandum is not attached, but an unsigned copy, dated March 6, is in the Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, March 1985 Chron File: [No.21-No.25].

³ Weinberger's memorandum is not attached, but an undated, unsigned copy is in the Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, March 1985 Chron File: [No.21-No.25].

⁴ Adelman's memorandum is not attached, but a copy, dated March 6, is *ibid*.

⁵ Tower's memorandum is not attached, but a copy, dated March 6, is *ibid*.

⁶ Reagan did not indicate his approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

380. National Security Decision Directive 165¹

Washington, March 8, 1985

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE FIRST ROUND OF US/SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA (U)

Our nation faces a number of challenges to its national security. Each of these imposes demands and presents opportunities. To achieve our national goals, we will have to apply all the instruments at our disposal in a coherent and complementary way. (U)

The Soviet Union remains the principal menace to our security and that of our allies. As a part of a larger effort to improve its overall military capability, the Soviet Union's improvement of its ballistic missile force, providing increased prompt, hard target kill capability, has increasingly threatened the fundamental survivability of our land-based retaliatory forces and the leadership structure that commands them. At the same time, the Soviet Union has continued to pursue strategic advantage through the development of active defenses with increased capability to counter surviving U.S. retaliatory forces. It is spending significant resources on passive defensive measures aimed at improving the survivability of its own forces, military command structure, and national leadership—ranging from providing mobility for its latest generation of ICBMs, to constructing a network of super-hard bunkers to protect its leadership—thus further eroding the effectiveness of our existing offensive deterrent. Finally, the problem of Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements, including the ABM Treaty, is a cause of increasing concern.² (S)

In response to this long-term pattern of Soviet activity, the United States is compelled to take certain immediate actions designed both to maintain security and stability in the near-term and to ensure security and stability in the future. We must act in three areas. (C)

First, we must modernize our offensive nuclear retaliatory forces. This is necessary to reestablish and maintain the balance in the near-term, and to create the strategic conditions that will permit us to pursue effectively the other options I will mention. The Administration's comprehensive strategic modernization program permits us to implement this option. (C)

However, over the long run, this path alone cannot fully assure U.S. national security interests. As noted in NSDD 153,³ the trends set in motion by the pattern of Soviet activity, and the Soviets' persistence in that pattern of activity, indicate that continued long-term U.S. dependence on offensive forces alone for deterrence is likely to lead to a steady erosion of stability to the strategic disadvantage of the United States and its allies. In fact, should these trends be permitted to continue and the Soviet investment in both offensive and defensive capability proceed unrestrained and unanswered, the resultant condition will destroy the foundation on which deterrence has rested for a generation. (C)

Secondly, we must take those steps necessary to provide a future option for changing the basis upon which deterrence and stability rest and to do so in a way that allows us both to negate the destabilizing growth of Soviet offensive forces and to channel Soviet defensive activity toward mutually beneficial ends. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is specifically aimed towards this goal. (U)

In the near term, the SDI program directly responds to the ongoing and extensive Soviet anti-ballistic missile effort, including the existing deployments permitted under the ABM Treaty. The SDI research program provides a necessary and powerful deterrent to any Soviet near-term decision to expand rapidly its anti-ballistic missile capability beyond that contemplated by the ABM Treaty. This, in itself, is a critical task. However, the overriding, long-term importance of SDI to the United States is that it offers the possibility of radically altering the dangerous military trends cited above by moving to a better, more stable basis for deterrence, and by providing new and compelling incentives to the Soviet Union for seriously negotiating reductions in existing nuclear arsenals. (U)

The Soviet Union is correct in recognizing the potential of advanced defense concepts—especially those involving boost, post-boost, and mid-course defenses—to change existing, and increasingly destabilizing, aspects of the strategic situation. In investigating the potential of these systems, we do not seek to establish a unilateral advantage. However, if the promise of SDI is fulfilled, the destabilizing Soviet advantage accumulated over the past ten years at great cost can be redressed. And, in the process, we will have enhanced deterrence significantly by turning to a greater reliance upon defensive systems—systems which threaten no one. (C)

Third, we have to use negotiation and diplomacy to complement our force modernization and SDI programs and help us address the challenge we face both in the near term and as we seek to transition into a more stable and secure future. In this effort, we will continue our pursuit of equitable and verifiable agreements that lead to significant reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals and will also seek resolution of our serious compliance concerns. At

the same time, the specific details of the agreements we seek must provide for our security and that of our allies and must enhance stability. (C)

The U.S. Approach to Negotiations. As previously indicated in NSDD 153, the thrust of the U.S. effort for the foreseeable future will be as follows. (U)

1. We will continue to pursue vigorously the negotiation of equitable and verifiable agreements leading to significant reductions of existing nuclear arsenals. As we do, we will continue to exercise flexibility concerning the mechanisms used to achieve these reductions, but judging these mechanisms on their ability to maintain the security of the United States and our allies, to enhance stability, and to reduce the risk of war. (S)

2. As we do so, we will protect the promise offered by the US ASAT and SDI research program to alter the adverse, long-term prospects we now face and to provide a basis for a more stable deterrent at some future time. This specifically involves protecting those SDI technologies that may permit a layered defense, including boost, post-boost, and mid-course elements. (S)

3. To prepare for the day that promise may be realized, we will immediately begin the process of bilateral discussion needed to lay the foundation for the cooperative integration of advanced defenses into the forces of both sides at such time as the state of the art and other considerations make it sensible to do so. (S)

4. Complementing this, we will also protect the U.S. strategic modernization program which is needed to maintain existing deterrence, to restore the balance of offensive forces, and to provide incentives for negotiating real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals. (S)

In addition, as noted above, we will continue to raise our compliance concerns with the Soviet Union, seeking their resolution as fundamental to the prospect of genuine arms control. (U)

Characterizing the U.S. Approach. The guidance provided in NSDD 153 with respect to characterizing the US approach to the Soviet Union, the Congress, our Allies, and Western publics is reaffirmed. The basic, central concept that the U.S. is pursuing should be characterized as follows. (C)

“During the next ten years, the U.S. objective is a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between offensive and defense nuclear arms, whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon the increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This period of transition could lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.” (U)

General Guidance to the U.S. Delegation. In implementing the above, the additional general guidance provided in the draft instructions cable developed by the Senior Arms Control Group (SACG) and the U.S. Delegation is approved. This cable should be redrafted to reference this directive as appropriate and be promptly resubmitted in final form for clearance prior to release.⁴ (U)

Instructions for the Defense and Space Negotiating Group. The additional guidance provided in the draft instructions cable for the INF Defense and Space Negotiating Group developed by the Senior Arms Control Group and the U.S. Delegation is also approved. This cable should also be redrafted to reference this directive as appropriate and be promptly resubmitted in final form for clearance prior to its release.⁵ (U)

Instructions for the INF Negotiating Group. The primary U.S. objective in this area is to press for early progress on INF consistent with the criteria for agreement previously enunciated. The U.S. INF negotiating group should make clear that the U.S. believes that an agreement is possible on the basis of the September 1983 U.S. proposals which signalled flexibility and a willingness to consider a variety of ways to reach the goal of equal global limits on LRINF. The negotiating group should point out that the U.S. proposals provide for an equal global limit under which the United States would consider not deploying its full global allotment in Europe. They also indicate that the United States also is willing to consider reductions in Pershing II missile deployments and limitations on aircraft, two major concerns of the Soviet Union. The negotiating group should stress that within our basic principles, the U.S. remains prepared and ready to show considerable flexibility. (C)

The U.S. INF negotiating group should probe the Soviets for any signs of corresponding flexibility on their part. While doing so, the INF negotiating group is authorized to explore Soviet interest in equal global entitlements at levels other than those previously proposed. Findings as a result of the above actions should be reported back to Washington, including recommendations for future U.S. actions. (C)

The U.S. INF negotiating group will not introduce the concept of equal percentage reductions. Should the Soviets raise this approach, the U.S. side will reject it. In doing so, the U.S. side should point out that we could envision how such an approach, if applied under appropriate conditions, could yield a very limited set of outcomes that could be of interest to both sides. For example, the U.S. can imagine an approach through which equal warhead levels could be reached through a specific equal percentage reduction of launchers on both sides (i.e., the U.S. reducing from its planned levels of deployment—224 GLCM and Pershing II launchers carrying 572 missiles/warheads). An approach leading to such an outcome, under the proper conditions, could perhaps be crafted in such a way to be of mutual interest. However, this is the exception rather than the general rule. Therefore, the U.S. feels that the range of acceptable outcomes likely to result by the application of this concept is so narrow, compared to the range of unacceptable outcomes, that it invalidates the equal percentage reductions concept as an acceptable operative principle to serve as the basis for a mutually acceptable agreement. (S)

In addition to the above, the additional guidance provided in the draft instructions cable for the INF Negotiating Group developed by the Senior Arms Control Group and the U.S. Delegation is approved. This cable should also be

redrafted to incorporate the guidance provided by this directive and reference it as appropriate. The redrafted cable should be promptly resubmitted in final form for clearance prior to its release.⁶ (U)

Instructions for the START Negotiating Group. In the area of strategic forces, the primary focus must remain on achieving significant reductions in the most destabilizing forces, ballistic missiles, and especially MIRVed, land-based ICBMs. In doing so, the U.S. will continue to place its emphasis on reducing the numbers of warheads and the level of destructive capacity and potential associated with these systems. (C)

The U.S. certainly recognizes the Soviet interest in dealing with Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs). The U.S. is prepared to entertain Soviet alternatives to our own position in this area. However, we remain convinced that appropriate reductions in the number of ballistic missile warheads and destructive capacity and potential are the central issues that we must mutually address. (C)

The outcome that the U.S. continues to seek remains a reduction for the period of this agreement to an equal limit of 5,000 ballistic missile warheads which applies to the forces of both sides. During the past year, we have studied a number of ways to reach this point. Some involve relatively fast reductions. Others would move more slowly to accommodate normal force planning and an improved confidence in the reduction activity over time. The mechanism finally chosen to accomplish the reduction must provide for the national security of the U.S. and its allies. It must also enhance stability. But, given these conditions, it is the outcome that is of primary importance. (S)

With respect to ballistic missile destructive capability, the U.S. remains flexible on how reductions in ballistic missile destructive capability are achieved (i.e., through direct or indirect limitations) as long as an appropriate outcome results. However, of equal importance to reductions in the number of ballistic missile warheads and ballistic missile destructive capability, is the quality of stability that results from the specific reductions. In that context, the U.S. continues to believe that moving away from high concentrations of land-based MIRVed ballistic missiles is in everyone's interest. (C)

The U.S. is prepared to explore trade-offs between areas of relative U.S. advantage and areas of relative Soviet advantage. The U.S. feels that the relative U.S. advantage in bomber forces and the relative Soviet advantage in land-based ballistic missile forces offers the grounds for such a potential trade-off. (C)

The above builds upon U.S. proposals previously made and constitutes the foundation of the U.S. position. The START negotiating group should draw upon the above as appropriate in presenting the U.S. position to the Soviet side. (C)

The START negotiating group should probe in the areas of potential trade-offs, the pace of reductions, and methods of addressing ballistic missile destructive potential. It should listen to Soviet views on alternative SNDV limits. Findings should be reported to Washington, including recommendations for future U.S. actions. (C)

The START negotiator is also authorized the following contingent authority. As a function of the degree of Soviet interest in making early progress as reflected by specific

Soviet proposals, or as a result of significant exploratory conversation, you are authorized to state that: (U)

—The U.S. is willing to consider Soviet proposals which involve associated limitations on ballistic missile warheads and Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs), so long as the resulting outcome would result in significant reductions in ballistic missile warheads, improved overall stability, and equality in the aggregate. Any specific aggregate numbers proposed by the Soviet Union should be referred to Washington. However, in accordance with the criteria stated, any levels proposed that would not result in a reduction in the number of Soviet ballistic missile warheads should be rejected at the time proposed. (S)

—In the context of an agreement in which U.S. concerns about the destructive capacity and potential of ballistic missiles were met, the U.S. is willing to consider Soviet proposals which could involve associated limits on ballistic missiles and bombers with the total of both in the range previously proposed by the Soviet Union (i.e., around 1800). (S)

The previously submitted draft cable of instructions submitted in this area should be promptly redrafted to reflect the guidance provided above. This revised cable should be submitted as a draft in final message form for final clearance prior to its release.⁷ (C)

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 3, 1985 Geneva. Secret. In a March 8 covering memorandum

to multiple addressees, McFarlane noted: “The President has decided upon the following instructions for the first round of US/Soviet negotiations set to begin in Geneva on March 12, 1985.”

² See [footnote 3, Document 378](#).

³ See [Document 348](#).

⁴ In telegram 72682 to USDel NST Geneva, March 10, the Department provided general guidance for the first round of talks. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number])

⁵ In telegram 72686 to USDel NST Geneva, March 10, the Department sent instructions for the Defense and Space group. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850003-0458)

⁶ In telegram 72685 to USDel NST Geneva, March 10, the Department sent instructions for the INF group. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850194-0128)

⁷ In telegram 72684 to USDel NST Geneva, March 10, the Department provided instructions for the START group. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850194-0129)

381. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, March 8, 1985

SUBJECT

Report of Chernenko Death

You will have seen the report² [*less than 1 line not declassified*] indicating that, [*1 ½ lines not declassified*] Chernenko had died but the news was being withheld until after the holiday (International Women's Day). (The motivation cited is plausible, since this is a big holiday in the Soviet Union and is considered a joyful one.)

There is, however, no other indication that Chernenko has died, except for an alert originating with BBC, which could have been asked to monitor broadcasts by the UK government on the basis of the same report that we have. If the Soviets have decided to withhold the information for a day, however, one would not expect to see indications in the media, and as of noon today there have been no signs of unusual programming. More significant perhaps is the report that the Shcherbitsky delegation here has done nothing to alter their travel plans.³ (It is virtually inconceivable that Shcherbitsky would not be notified if Chernenko had in fact died.)

Fritz Ermarth, the Agency's NIO for the Soviet Union, believes that there is no more than a 50/50 chance that the report of Chernenko's death is correct, and I concur.

However that may be, this report serves as a reminder that we may very well be faced with Chernenko's death without advance notice. Therefore, the question of whether or not the President attends the funeral will arise once again. While we cannot anticipate all the particulars which may be relevant at the time the event occurs, it would probably be prudent to discuss the matter with the President.

It seems to me that arguments for and against the President's attendance are fairly evenly balanced, and I would not be inclined to come down hard on either side. On the positive side one can say that our relations started to be more civil under Chernenko than under his predecessors, and also that without a KGB background Chernenko is marginally more savory than Andropov was. This makes it somewhat easier for the President to be seen honoring him. The President's attendance at the funeral would also disarm those critics who accuse him of not doing enough to communicate with the Soviet leaders.

On the other hand, there are no strong substantive reasons for him to go. The precedent has already been established for the Vice President to do this duty, and there will certainly be no offense if he goes once again. Any conversation the President would have with a successor would necessarily be short, and there are arguments for waiting until a more substantive summit can be arranged.

If the President is interested in considering attendance at the funeral, we should give some thought to how the trip and announcement should be handled in order to maximize the advantages. Obviously, we should do so in the most discreet fashion.

Recommendation:

That you encourage the President to consider what his position should be in regard to attending Chernenko's funeral, and if he is inclined to go this time to let you know so some very discreet contingency planning can be done.⁴

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, Chernenko's Death—Miscellaneous 03/10/1985. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

² Attached but not printed.

³ After meeting with Reagan on March 7 (see [Document 378](#)), Shcherbitsky traveled to Texas and then California.

⁴ McFarlane initialed his approval of the recommendation.

382. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Kelly) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, March 10, 1985

SUBJECT

Shcherbitskiy's Hurry-Up Departure and the Chernenko Succession

Dobrynin's No. 2 Oleg Sokolov called Mark Palmer in mid-afternoon to request that we arrange an early departure from San Francisco to Moscow for Shcherbitskiy and his party, two days ahead of schedule. He said he was unable to tell us the reason for this request. However, the party cancelled out San Francisco events they would still have been able to attend, and a Central Committee staffer with the party told an accompanying State Department official that "we have a custom that for 24 hours after a death there is no public announcement." Other officials in the party including Arbatov are disclaiming any knowledge of the reason for the departure but say they "assume" it means Chernenko is dead. By 7:30 pm our time, FBIS was reporting somber music on Soviet radio.

In the course of the afternoon plans shifted from a night departure from Andrews to New York's Kennedy Airport and then to a Kennedy departure at 3:00 p.m. tomorrow, all with no reasons given. Mark worked through the afternoon and EUR/SOV until late in the evening arranging the flight clearances and other logistics needed to marry up the Shcherbitskiy party coming by US military aircraft from San Francisco with his Aeroflot special plane coming up from Havana. The Soviet confusion was clearly shown when

the Soviet aircraft departed Havana early without clearances and with a flight plan to Washington. With good cooperation from the Air Force at Andrews and the Port Authority people in New York, we made and broke arrangements at Andrews and finally arranged for the plane to land at JFK at 11:15 pm.

Concurrently, we alerted all interested Department officials, Embassy Moscow, the White House, and CIA. We have kept in close touch with Jack Matlock, and also touched base with Don Gregg in the Vice President's party in Geneva.² Embassy Moscow kept in touch several times through the night as they watched for any telltale signs. Matlock was in touch with Bud McFarlane, and had the impression that he would be briefing the President when he returned to the White House late Sunday.³

During the evening we also updated the contingency briefing book we have had on hand for the last month or so. It includes suggested drafts of the appropriate condolence and congratulation messages for the outgoing and incoming General Secretaries and Gromyko, very much along the lines we used for the Brezhnev and Andropov cases. The US media already have the story that Shcherbitskiy will be departing ahead of schedule, and Department spokesmen have confirmed that he is returning tomorrow but offering no further comment. Press stories will most likely state that Chernenko has died but there will, of course, be no way to verify this until it is announced by Moscow.

Jack Matlock tells us that late last week he raised with Bud the issue of whether or not the President should go to Moscow for a Chernenko funeral instead of the Vice President, in addition to you if you decide to go this time. He did so because a number of the inhibitions to

Presidential participation that were in play last time have been removed.

In Jack's view, Chernenko is not the policeman Andropov was, and we are back in arms control negotiations at Geneva, so there is no question of rewarding them for their 1983 walkout. Moreover, even though we might not know who Chernenko's successor will be before we must decide on our delegation, this succession is more critical than its two predecessors whether or not a younger man representing the new generation is chosen. The 27th CPSU Congress, which will choose a new Central Committee and pass on the 1986-1990 Five-Year Plan, is to take place late this year, and the infighting over directions and priorities which is already underway will take a quantum jump in intensity whether the third oldster in a row is chosen or Gorbachev succeeds. To the extent that the outside world figures in debate over Soviet futures, the US is the key variable.

It is conceivable that Shcherbitskiy is leaving because of some development other than the Chernenko succession, but the Soviets in the delegation have been giving the clear impression without being categorical that the reason is Chernenko's death. Assuming this is the case, we should have an announcement tomorrow. Following the Brezhnev and Andropov precedents, the announcement of a funeral committee should follow some hours later—both Andropov and Chernenko headed their predecessors' funeral committees—with the funeral itself possibly five days after the death, i.e. on Friday.¹

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 13, Executive Secretariat Sensitive Chron (03/09/1985-03/13/1985). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons and

Pascoe; cleared by Palmer. Pascoe initialed for Kelly. The memorandum is stamped "Treat As Original."

² Bush was in Geneva for the opening of the Nuclear and Space Talks on March 12.

³ According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan was at Camp David from late afternoon on Friday, March 8, until he returned to Washington on Sunday, March 10 around 2:30 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)


⁴ March 15.

383. Editorial Note

On March 11, 1985, the Embassy in Moscow reported the death of Soviet General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko: "Chernenko's death 'after a serious illness' was announced at 1400 Moscow time on Moscow radio and television. Time of death was given as 1920 on March 10." (Telegram 2946 from Moscow, March 11; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850163-0464) In his diary entry for March 11, President Ronald Reagan wrote: "Awakened at 4 A.M. to be told Chernenko is dead. My mind turned to whether I should attend the funeral. My gut instinct said no. Got to the office at 9. George S. had some arguments that I should—he lost. I don't think his heart was really in it. George B. is in Geneva—he'll go & George S. will join him leaving tonight." He continued: "Word has been received that Gorbachev has been named head man in the Soviet." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981-October 1985, page 434) According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan met with Shultz in the Oval Office around 2 p.m. on March 11. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "A few weeks earlier, aware of Chernenko's poor health, the president had decided that the funeral delegation should be George Bush, myself, and Art Hartman." Shultz wrote that he "went to the White House to see President Reagan to go over ideas for the meeting our delegation would have with Gorbachev. There wasn't a thought in his [Reagan's] mind about going to Moscow." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 527)

In his diary entry for March 11, Reagan also wrote: "A Haircut & then over to the Soviet embassy to sign the grief book—this is my 3rd such trip." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981-October 1985, page 434)

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin recalled Reagan and Shultz's visits to the Embassy that evening in his memoir: "On the very day Gorbachev was elected general secretary, we received our first hint of changes that he might expect from the Reagan administration. Shultz visited the embassy on March 11 to sign the condolence book for Chernenko, arriving twenty minutes before president Reagan to talk with me in private. Shultz told me he and the president had met in the White House earlier that day with McFarlane and Donald Regan, the new White House Chief of Staff. The president summed up by saying that a new situation with new opportunities was emerging in Soviet-American relations and it would be unforgivable not to take advantage of it, although the outcome was hardly predictable. Just as he was starting his second term as president, a new Soviet leader had taken the helm who by all appearances would manage foreign and domestic affairs energetically. Relations with Moscow would therefore be high on the president's list of priorities. With the Geneva arms control negotiations starting, Reagan added, results were crucial." "When the president arrived," Dobrynin continued, "he did not raise these questions with me, but I took note of his remark that it was his third visit to the embassy in the course of three years on the occasions of grief. 'But,' he added, 'I hope to come to the embassy next time on a happier occasion.' He also asked me to convey his personal regards to Gorbachev." (Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, pages 566-567)

Mikhail S. Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on March 11. Vice President Bush and Secretary Shultz attended Chernenko's funeral and met with Gorbachev in Moscow on March 13. For the memorandum of conversation, see [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985-October 1986, Document 5](#) .

Appendix

[Document 384]

A. Editorial Note

Stark deviations in assessments by the U.S. Intelligence Community of the November 1983 NATO exercise Able Archer and the Soviet “war scare” led to a much later 1990 investigation by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board during the George H.W. Bush administration, resulting in the report, “The Soviet ‘War Scare.’” (George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Subject Files; Reports to the President-War Scare Report 1990 [OA/IDCF01830-020]) The February 15, 1990, PFIAB report analyzed intelligence and reporting on the Soviet war scare, Able Archer, and other related activities. The PFIAB report stated: “During the past year, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has carefully reviewed the events of that period to learn what we (the U.S. intelligence community) knew, when we knew it, and how we interpreted it. The Board has read hundreds of documents, conducted more than 75 interviews with American and British officials, and studied the series of National Intelligence Estimates (NIE’s) and other intelligence assessments that have attempted over the last six years to interpret the war scare data. Additionally, we have offered our own interpretation of the war scare events.” (PFIAB, pages vi-vii) Although outside the normal scope of this volume, the 1990 PFIAB report and other memoranda from 1988 and 1989 are addressed in this editorial note because the documents focus upon crucial events from 1983 to 1984.

Reactions from the Intelligence Community (IC) and policymakers to the events surrounding Able Archer and the Soviet “war scare” differed significantly and evolved over time. The contemporaneous reporting in 1983–1984 from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Intelligence Council (NIC), [*text not declassified*] drew varied conclusions about Soviet anxieties. While some reporting assessed that “Contrary to the impression conveyed by Soviet propaganda, Moscow does not appear to anticipate a near-term military confrontation with the United States” (see [Document 157](#)), another analysis presented evidence that [*text not declassified*].

Retrospective assessments of these events seem to conflate the NATO Able Archer exercise with the broader “war scare” talk emanating from Moscow related to INF deployments. The Soviet military unquestionably reacted to Able Archer differently than to previous NATO exercises. (See [Document 134](#).) Whether the Soviet response was attributable to the circumstances of the time, to the “war scare” (whether real or Soviet propaganda), or to a credible belief within the Soviet military leadership or the Politburo that the United States was planning to launch a nuclear first strike against the USSR, under the guise of a NATO exercise or otherwise, remains unclear on the basis of the available evidence.

After a year of research and a reassessment of the relevant intelligence and documentation, the PFIAB report stated: “We believe that the Soviets perceived that the correlation of forces had turned against the USSR, that the US was seeking military superiority, and that the chances of the US launching a nuclear first strike—perhaps under cover of a routine training exercise—were growing. We also believe that the US intelligence community did not at the time, and for several years afterwards, attach sufficient weight to the

possibility that the war scare was real. As a result, the President was given assessments of Soviet attitudes and actions that understated the risks to the United States. Moreover, these assessments did not lead us to reevaluate our own military and intelligence actions that might be perceived by the Soviets as signaling war preparations.

“In two separate Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs) in May and August 1984, the intelligence community said: ‘We believe strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States.’ Soviet statements to the contrary were judged to be ‘propaganda.’ [See [Documents 221](#) and [264](#).]

“The Board believes that the evidence then did not, and certainly does not now, support such categoric conclusions. Even without the benefit of subsequent reporting and looking at the 1984 analysis of then available information, the tone of the intelligence judgments was not adequate to the needs of the President.” (PFIAB, pages vi-vii)

During November 1983, Able Archer and the Soviet responses to this exercise received little immediate attention in the U.S. Intelligence Community. (See [Document 135](#).) However, by spring 1984, some in the intelligence communities in the United States [*text not declassified*] believed the Reagan administration should have recognized Soviet sensitivities and anxieties about a potential U.S. first strike. [*text not declassified*].

According to the PFIAB report, [*text not declassified*] “KGB Deputy Resident Colonel Oleg Gordiyevskiy, [*text not declassified*] had witnessed what he saw as Soviet paranoia over a US nuclear first strike; [*text not declassified*] As one

of the most senior KGB officers in London, [*text not declassified*].” (PFIAB, page 10)

In a covering memorandum [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to Director of Central Intelligence William Casey and others, Herbert Meyer, Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, wrote: [*text not declassified*]. The PFIAB report commented that the [*text not declassified*] report was “not well received in the US intelligence community.” (PFIAB, pages 10-11)

Another contemporaneous analysis from the CIA, the May 1984 SNIE 11-10-84/JX concluded: “We believe strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States.” (See [Document 221](#).) The PFIAB report commented on this SNIE: “The estimate boldly declared that ‘Recent Soviet war scare propaganda . . . is aimed primarily at discrediting US policies and mobilizing ‘peace’ pressures among various audiences abroad.’ In a more piecemeal fashion, it was judged that ‘Each Soviet action has its own military or political purpose sufficient to explain it.’ The accelerated tempo of Soviet live exercise activity was explained simply as a reflection of ‘long-term Soviet military objectives.’

“The Soviet reaction to Able Archer 83 was dismissed as a ‘counterexercise,’ but analysts acknowledged that the ‘elaborate Soviet reaction’ was ‘somewhat greater than usual.’ [*less than 1 line not declassified*] prior to and during the exercise indicated that the Warsaw Pact Intelligence services, especially the KGB, were admonished ‘to look for any indication that the United States was about to launch a first nuclear strike,’ analysts concluded that ‘by confining heightened readiness to selected air units, Moscow clearly revealed that it did not, in fact, think there was a possibility

at this time of a NATO attack.’ The assessment, however, was not specific about what type of defensive or precautionary Soviet activity might be expected—and detected—were they preparing for an offensive NATO move.” (PFIAB, page 13)

The PFIAB report continued its critique of SNIE 11-10-84/JX: IC “analysts dismissed [*less than 1 line not declassified*] on the war scare, including the KGB’s formal tasking to its Residencies. ‘This war scare propaganda has reverberated in Soviet security bureaucracies and emanated through other channels such as human sources. [See for example, [Document 144](#).] We do not believe it reflects authentic leadership fears of imminent conflict.’” The report contended: “Such judgments were made even though the analysis was tempered ‘by some uncertainty as to current Soviet leadership perceptions of the United States, by continued uncertainty about the Politburo decisionmaking processes, and by our inability at this point to conduct a detailed examination of how the Soviets might have assessed recent US/NATO military exercises and reconnaissance operations’—which, of course, included the previous Able Archer exercise. In other words, US analysts were unsure of what the Kremlin leadership thought or how it made decisions, nor had they adequately assessed the Soviet reaction to Able Archer 83. This notwithstanding, the estimate concluded: ‘We are confident that, as of now, the Soviets see not an imminent military clash but a costly and—to some extent—more perilous strategic and political struggle over the rest of the decade.’” (PFIAB, page 14)

The Board had similar criticisms of the August 1984 SNIE 11-9-84, “Soviet Policy Toward the United States in 1984” (see [Document 264](#)), for its “categorical and unqualified” judgments “about the likelihood of the war scare,” and the

analysts' conclusions: "We strongly believe that the Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States. Also, we do not believe that the Soviet war talk and other actions 'mask' Soviet preparations for an imminent move toward confrontation on the part of the USSR." (PFIAB, page 19-20) The PFIAB report continued: "Analysts readily acknowledged that the previous six months had seen extraordinary, unprecedented Soviet activities. Large scale military exercise, 'anomalous behavior' during the troop rotation, withdrawn military support for the harvest (last seen prior to the 1968 Czech invasion), new, deployed weapons systems (termed 'in response to INF deployments'), and heightened internal vigilance and security activities were noted. These events, however, were judged to be 'in line with long-evolving plans and patterns, rather than with sharp acceleration of preparations for major war.'" (PFIAB, page 19)

The PFIAB report acknowledged that its assessment and criticism of the May and August 1984 SNIEs "derives from information not known at the time. Our purpose in presenting this report is not so much to criticize the conclusions of the 1984 SNIE's as to raise questions about the ways these estimates were made and subsequently reassessed." (PFIAB, page ix) The PFIAB report concluded: "Reasonable people can disagree about the conclusions of the 1984 SNIE's. The PFIAB does disagree with many of them. More worrisome to us, however, is the process by which the estimates were made and subsequently reassessed. Although both estimates were reportedly reviewed by outside readers—and both, but particularly the first, contained alternative scenarios—strongly worded interpretations were defended by explaining away facts inconsistent with them. Consequently, both estimates

contained, in essence, single outcome forecasting based in large part on near-term anomalous behavior. Moreover, neither alerted the reader to the risks erroneously rejecting the correct scenario.” (PFIAB, page 30) The PFIAB report criticized the performance of the IC in 1983–1984, showing that contemporary assessments of Soviet intentions after Able Archer did not go far enough in providing President Reagan with alternative scenarios, explaining that the anxiety from the Soviet leadership could have been real.

In criticizing contemporary estimates, the PFIAB report emphasized intelligence that had not been available to the IC during these years, principally information provided by Gordiyevskiy after he defected in 1985. Robert McFarlane’s thoughts on the influence of Gordiyevskiy’s information on the President are recorded in a December 16, 1988, memorandum for the record:

Memorandum for the Record

16 December 1988

SUBJECT

[less than 1 line not declassified] Robert F. McFarlane Regarding the Influence of Oleg Gordiyevskiy’s Reporting on President Reagan

On 15 December *[less than 1 line not declassified]* Robert F. (“Bud”) McFarlane, formerly National Security Advisor to the President, as to the veracity of claims *[less than 1 line not declassified]* that the reporting of KGB officer *[less than 1 line not declassified]* Oleg Gordiyevskiy about the Kremlin’s fear of war greatly influenced President Reagan in the mid-1980s to seek better relations with the USSR. In response, Bud made several points:

He definitely remembered the reporting associated (later) with Gordiyevskiy that conveyed the Kremlin’s fear of war.

He also specifically recalled [*less than 1 line not declassified*] on Gordiyevskiy's assessments given to the President [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

He noted that he discussed this reporting with the President on several occasions. This was in the course of numerous discussions extending throughout 1983 and part of 1984 about the apparent anxieties being transmitted by Moscow through many channels, [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

The President, according to Bud, saw this reporting attributed to Gordiyevskiy in the larger context of a Soviet "war-scare" campaign arising from the NATO decision to deploy INF and from Reagan's hard line on defense, SDI, etc. In the President's view, either the Soviets were paranoid in strange ways we could not let bother us, or they were fabricating the appearance of fear to intimidate and sway us, which we should even more be prepared to ignore.

Often in these conversations, according to Bud, the President outlined his sustained intention to concentrate on building US strength and credibility in the first term and to move toward diplomatic reengagement in the second. The President's key speech of January 1984 [see [Document 158](#)] was a natural step in a long-planned shift of policy. Neither Gordiyevskiy's reporting nor the Soviet "war-scare" campaign in general were responsible for the evolution of the President's policy.

Bud said he'd been queried before on this matter by [*name not declassified*], a journalist, who might be (or have been) writing an article on it. Against the background of the above, Bud said he discounted Gordiyevskiy's impact on the President [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

[1 paragraph (8½ lines) not declassified]

[name not declassified]

(Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 90T00435R: Chronological Files (1988), Box 1, Folder 12: C/NIC Chrono for December 1988)

McFarlane's recollections in this memorandum for the record correlate with a January 1984 memorandum by Jack Matlock, Soviet specialist on the NSC Staff, which demonstrated an awareness of potential Soviet concerns, but concluded:

“—The Soviet leadership is not overly nervous about the immediate prospect of armed confrontation with the U.S.;

“—They are however very nervous about the prospects five to ten years down the road—not so much of a confrontation as such, as of a decisive shift in the balance of military power.” (See [Document 157](#).)

As mentioned in the 1988 memorandum for the record, McFarlane did recall “later” reporting to Reagan about Gordiyevskiy. The PFIAB report addressed Gordiyevskiy's situation in relation to the war scare and the 1984 SNIE assessments: “The Board found that after the 1984 assessments were issued, the intelligence community did not again address the war scare until after the defection to Great Britain of KGB Colonel Oleg Gordiyevskiy in July, 1985. Gordiyevskiy had achieved the rank of Acting Resident in the United Kingdom, but he fell under suspicion as a Western agent. Recalled to the Soviet Union, he was placed under house arrest and intensely interrogated. Able to flee his watchers, Gordiyevskiy was exfiltrated from Moscow by the British Secret Intelligence Service.”

The report continued: “During lengthy debriefing sessions that followed, Gordiyevskiy supplied a fuller report on the Soviet war hysteria. This report, complete with documentation from KGB Headquarters and entitled ‘KGB Response to Soviet Leadership Concern over US Nuclear Attack,’ was first disseminated in a restricted manner within the US intelligence community in October 1985. Gordiyevskiy described the extraordinary KGB collection plan, initiated in 1981, to look for signs that the US would conduct a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. He identified and reviewed factors driving leadership fears. Based on the perception the US was achieving a strategic advantage, those in the Kremlin were said to believe that the US was likely to resort to nuclear weapons much earlier in a crisis than previously expected. They also were concerned the US might seek to exploit its first-strike capability outside the context of a crisis, probably during a military exercise. He described the leadership’s worries of a ‘decapitating’ strike from the Pershing II’s, and its belief that the US could mobilize for a surprise attack in a mere seven to ten days. He explained how the London Residency responded to the requirements, and the effects that reporting had back at Moscow Center in reinforcing Soviet fears. He described conversations he had held with colleagues from Center and from the GRU. The next month, President Reagan held his first summit with Mikhail Gorbachev and relations began to thaw.” (PFIAB, pages 22-23)

The PFIAB report also cited a January 1989 “End of Tour Report Addendum” by Lieutenant General Leonard H. Perroots, who had served as Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Air Forces Europe, during the 1983 Able Archer exercise, to emphasize the potential consequences of the intelligence gap during the Able Archer exercise.

Perroots addressed Able Archer as well as Gordiyevskiy's reporting in that memorandum:

1. (U) In 1983, I was assigned as the DCS for Intelligence, US Air Forces, Europe, Ramstein AB, Germany. The annual NATO Command and Control exercise ABLE ARCHER was scheduled to begin during the first week of November. The context of this nuclear command and control exercise was relatively benign; the scenario had been purposely chosen to be non-controversial, and the exercise itself was a routine annual event. This exercise closely followed the bombing of air defense sites in Lebanon and directly followed the invasion of Grenada. As I recall, however, there was no particular feeling of tension in the European Theater beyond that which is normal.

2. [*portion marking not declassified*] Only the fact that Soviet Intelligence collection assets (primarily low level signals intercept units) had failed to return to garrison after their normal concentrated coverage of NATO's AUTUMN FORGE exercise series could be reckoned strange at all. As the kickoff date of ABLE ARCHER neared it was clear that there was a great deal of Soviet interest in the forthcoming events. Again, this seemed nothing out of the ordinary. We knew that there was a history of intensive Soviet collection against practice Emergency Action Messages (EAM's) related to nuclear release.

3. [*portion marking not declassified*] ABLE ARCHER started in the morning of 3 November, and progressed immediately in the scenario to NATO STATE ORANGE. At 2100Z on 04 November NSA issued an electrical product report G/00/3083-83, entitled "SOVIET AIR FORCES, GSFG, PLACED ON HEIGHTENED READINESS, 2 NOVEMBER 1983." I saw this message on the morning of 5 November and discussed it with my air analysts. It stated

that as of 1900Z on 02 November the fighter-bomber divisions of the air force of Group Soviet Forces, Germany had been placed in a status of heightened alert. All divisional and regimental command posts and supporting command and control elements were to be manned around-the-clock by augmented teams.

4. [*portion marking not declassified*] In addition to the directed command and control changes the fighter-bomber divisions were also ordered to load out one squadron of aircraft in each regiment (if this order applied equally across GSFG the result would have been at least 108 fighter-bombers on alert). These aircraft were to be armed and placed at readiness 3 (30 minute alert) to “destroy first-line enemy targets.” The alert aircraft were to be equipped with a self-protection jamming pod. We knew from subsequent NSA reporting that a squadron at Neuruppin, East Germany sought and was apparently granted permission to configure its aircraft without the ECM pod because of an unexpected weight and balance problem. My air analysts opined that this message meant that at least this particular squadron was loading a munitions configuration that they had never actually loaded before, i.e., a warload.

5. [*portion marking not declassified*] At this point, I spoke to CinCUSAFE, General Billy Minter. I told him we had some unusual activity in East Germany that was probably a reaction to the ongoing ABLE ARCHER. He asked if I thought we should increase the real force generation. I said that we would carefully watch the situation, but there was insufficient evidence to justify increasing our real alert posture. At this point in the exercise our forces were in a simulated posture of NATO State ORANGE and local SALTY NATION tests involving simulated generation of combat aircraft were underway at various locations including

Ramstein AB. If I had known then what I later found out I am uncertain what advice I would have given.

6. [*portion marking not declassified*] An NSA message dated 022229Z DEC 83 provided the rest of the picture as far as we knew it—at least until the reports began to surface from the British penetration of the KGB, Oleg Gordievskiy. This GAMMA message was entitled “SOVIET 4th AIR ARMY AT HEIGHTENED READINESS IN REACTION TO NATO EXERCISE ABLE ARCHER, 2-11 NOVEMBER 1983.” This report stated that the alert had been ordered by the Chief of the Soviet Air Forces, Marshal Kutakhov, and that all units of the Soviet 4th Air Army were involved in the alert “which included preparations for immediate use of nuclear weapons.” This report described activity that was contemporaneous with that reflected in East Germany, but because of the specific source of this material it was not available in near realtime. The two pieces taken together present a much more ominous picture.

7. [*portion marking not declassified*] Equally ominous in its own way was the fact that this alert was never reflected at all by the I&W system. At the time of this occurrence there was no distribution of electrically reported GAMMA material to the Tactical Fusion Center at Boerfink. I remedied that shortfall in the aftermath of this activity. Secondly, a real standdown of aircraft was secretly ordered in at least the Soviet Air Forces units facing the Central Region, and that standdown was not detected. The Soviet alert in response to ABLE ARCHER began after nightfall on Wednesday evening, there was no flying on the following two days which led to the weekend, and then the following Monday was 7 November, the revolution holiday. The absence of flying could always be explained, although a warning condition was raised finally on about the ninth of

November when overhead photography showed fully armed FLOGGER aircraft on air defense alert at a base in East Germany. When this single indicator was raised, the standdown had been underway for a week.

8. [*portion marking not declassified*] For the next six months I was on a soapbox about ABLE ARCHER whenever I could discuss it at the appropriate classification level. I spoke to the Senior Military Intelligence Officers' Conference (SMIOC), and I buttonholed a lot of people. I suggested that perhaps we should move our annual exercise away from the November 7 holiday, because it is clear to me that the conjunction of the two events causes a warning problem that can never be solved. Our problem here was that we had a couple of very highly classified bits of intelligence evidence about a potentially disastrous situation that never actually came to fruition. For decision-makers it was always difficult to believe that there could have been any serious reaction by the Soviets to such a "benign" exercise as ABLE ARCHER. From the Soviet perspective, however, it might have appeared very different. It was difficult for all of us to grasp that, but Oleg Gordievskiy's reporting began to provide a somewhat more frightening perspective when it became available in the Fall of 1985.

9. (S) By the time Gordievskiy's reporting began to surface for analytical review I was the Director of DIA. Gordievskiy's initial reporting about a "war scare" in 1983 immediately caught my attention. It should be pointed out at the outset that Gordievskiy knew nothing of a military alert during ABLE ARCHER. He did, however, tell us something of a chilling story about Moscow Center's Intelligence tasking during 1983. He related that there was a project called either "RYaN" or "VRYaN," the latter probably being the full form of a Russian acronym meaning

“sudden rocket nuclear attack.” There was a cadre of specialists in Moscow Center charged with, among other things, finding the evidence of planning for a western attack on the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1982 and continuing into 1983 Gordievskiy says that this group became ever more insistent that an attack was being planned by the West. By March 1983 the KGB officers in Moscow had decided that ABLE ARCHER 83 would provide an excellent cover for the planned attack, and KGB and GRU residencies around the world were being directed to find the evidence. Gordievskiy, living in London at the time, states that he never believed there was really a threat, and that the London residency of the KGB simply ignored the collection requirements until it began to become clear that Moscow was serious. During the summer of 1983 the London residency sent some reports that, in retrospect, Gordievskiy believed might have hyped the war hysteria. He never really believed in the threat, however, and reported during his debriefing in 1985 that he thought the VRYaN hysteria might have been some kind of internal political ploy. I must reiterate again that Gordievskiy did not know about the secret military alert of November 1983.

10. [*portion marking not declassified*] The US intelligence community has never really closed with this analytical problem. A SNIE addressed this subject, [*1½ lines not declassified*]. The position has been taken again and again that had there been a real alert we would have detected more of it, but this may be whistling through the graveyard. It is not certain that we looked hard enough or broadly enough for information. For Western collectors the context was peacetime without even the most basic ripples of crisis. For the Soviets, however, the view may have looked quite different. It is uncertain how close to war we came or even if that was a possibility at all, but we know from Gordievskiy that the analysts in Moscow had predicted that

the West would launch the attack from a posture of NATO State ORANGE. What might have happened that day in November 1983 if we had begun a precautionary generation of forces rather than waiting for further information?

(Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 91B00551: Speeches, Lectures, Briefing Files (1988-1989), Box 1, Folder 2: C/NIC (Ermarth) Chrons March 1989)

The PFIAB report commented that “as his parting shot before retirement,” Perroots, who served as DIA Director from 1985 to 1989, sent a January 1989 “letter outlining his disquiet over the inadequate treatment of the Soviet war scare to, among others, the DCI and this Board.” The report continued: “Following the detection of the Soviet Air Forces’ increased alert status, it was his [Perroots’s] recommendation, made in ignorance, not to raise US readiness in response—a fortuitous, if ill-informed, decision given the changed political environment at the time.” (PFIAB, pages 27-28) In further accord with Perroots’s report, the PFIAB report concluded: “As it happened, the military officers in charge of the Able Archer exercise minimized the risk by doing nothing in the face of evidence that parts of the Soviet armed forces were moving to an unusual alert level. But these officials acted correctly out of instinct, not informed guidance, for in the years leading up to Able Archer they had received no guidance as to the possible significance of apparent changes in Soviet military and political thinking.” (PFIAB, page x)

[*name not declassified*] the National Warning Staff and [*name not declassified*] of the Office of Soviet Analysis prepared an undated memorandum reacting to Perroots’s

comments, which was distributed by Ermarth to the DCI and DDCI for consideration:

SUBJECT

Comments on Memorandum of Lieutenant General Perroots

Summary

1. General Perroots's memorandum describes in detail a worrisome episode in which Soviet Air Forces in Central Europe assumed an abnormally high alert posture in early November 1983 in response to a routine NATO command post and communications exercise. Two Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs)—written in May and August 1984 respectively—treated the events described in the General's memorandum in the larger context of US-Soviet relations. Those Estimates judged that the Soviets displayed a heightened sense of concern in many areas of national life primarily because of the more aggressive policies of the US Administration in the early 1980s, the US strategic modernization program that included the peacekeeper ICBM and the D-5 SLBM, the actual implementation of NATO's 1979 decision for Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) modernization by deployment of the first Pershing-II missile systems to Europe, and because of the leadership instability in the USSR from the successive deaths of three general secretaries between 1981 and 1985. A National Intelligence Estimate in 1988 assessed the significance of the events in 1983 with the benefit of a longer time perspective and reached the same broad conclusions. General Perroots's memorandum and its enclosure neither raises no new issues nor contains new data that change the strategic judgements already written. *[portion marking not declassified]*

2. At the tactical and theater level, however, General Perroots's memorandum surfaces a long-standing warning problem, i.e., the need for the Intelligence Community in Washington to provide more timely, discriminating, and accurate warning in support of the theater commander. Perroots, who at the time was Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Air Forces Europe (USAFE), describes three serious problems for which there are only partial answers. First, he believes that, despite the enormous amount of resources and energy spent in guarding against a strategic surprise attack, USAFE was not well informed in that the US warning systems did not detect in a timely fashion the extent of Soviet precautionary readiness measures undertaken in November 1983 in response to NATO exercise Able Archer. Secondly, he believes that Washington-based agencies had relevant information which was not available to the European Command when he recommended against a precautionary US alert by US Air Forces Europe in response to the detection of the increased alert status of the Soviet Air Forces. Finally, [1½ lines not declassified], General Perroots is concerned that in similar circumstances—even if there is better intelligence—another officer in his position might recommend a precautionary US Air Force alert in Europe that could have serious escalatory consequences, unless there are timely, national level assessments available. [portion marking not declassified]

3. The dilemma that General Perroots has described is characteristic of the warning problems faced by senior US military intelligence chiefs in many past crises, in which decisions about US force posture were dependent upon threat assessments prepared rapidly and based on fragmentary and incomplete intelligence. General Perroots's memorandum reinforces two long-standing lessons of warning: warning systems are no substitute for

seasoned, professional judgment and assessments; and they require constant attention and improvement. In terms of process, however, his memorandum reinforces the requests of successive SACEURs and other US theater commanders for better ways to provide more timely national-level warning assessments to the theater intelligence staffs.

The Setting of Exercise Able Archer, 1983

4. The larger context of the period, often referred to as the “war scare,” reflected increasing Soviet concern over the drift in superpower relations, which some in the Soviet leadership felt indicated an increased threat of war and increased likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons. These concerns were shaped in part by a Soviet perception that the correlation of forces was shifting against the Soviet Union and that the United States was taking steps to achieve military superiority. These fears were exacerbated by planned improvements in US strategic forces, as well as by progress made by NATO to implement its 1979 decision began with NATO’s deliberations in the late 1970s to modernize its theater nuclear forces by deploying Pershing-II missiles and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) to Europe. By 1981, after the new US Administration was inaugurated, the Soviet concern intensified almost concurrently with General Secretary Brezhnev’s decline in health [*portion marking not declassified*]

5. [*1½ lines not declassified*] the increased Soviet concern stemmed from a fear by some Soviet leaders that the West might seek to exploit its new capability in Europe for a preemptive nuclear surprise attack against the USSR, for which the Soviets had no defense. From a national security

standpoint, this Western capability led to questions about the long-standing Soviet view that crises and other adverse developments in international affairs would precede the outbreak of war and be the basis for long-term early warning. The Soviets had concern that the West might decide to attack the USSR without warning during a time of vulnerability—such as when military transport was used to support the harvest—thus compelling the Soviets to consider a preemptive strike at the first sign of US preparations for a nuclear strike. [*portion marking not declassified*]

6. From Brezhnev's death in 1982 through late 1984, the Soviets ordered a number of unusual measures not previously detected except during periods of crisis with the West. These included: disruption of the normal troop rotation cycle for Soviet forces in central Europe in 1984; updating civil defense procedures in the USSR from 1982 through 1984; in the spring of 1984 the first, and apparently only, time that Soviet military trucks were not sent to support the harvest since the end of World War II; and increased alert reactions even to routine NATO training from 1982 to 1984. The cumulative effect of these and other measures was to reduce the Soviet and Warsaw Pact vulnerability to a surprise attack. The abnormal Soviet reaction to NATO Exercise Able Archer in November 1983 occurred within this setting. [*portion marking not declassified*]

7. Concurrent with the military dimension, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] other precautionary measures taken by the Soviets probably were a reflection of the political maneuvering in the Kremlin in 1982 and 1983 associated with Andropov's rise to power. In exchange for military support for his bid to become General Secretary, Andropov, then KGB Chairman, may have promised greater

allocations of resources for military industrial expansion, improved civil defense readiness, and military modernization. All of these were espoused by the Chief of the General Staff at the time, Marshal Ogarkov. Successful manipulation of threat perceptions by the KGB at Andropov's direction would have helped cultivate the strong military backing Andropov enjoyed when he came to power. In this environment, the heightened Soviet military reactions to NATO exercises would have been expected. *[portion marking not declassified]*

8. Finally, *[less than 1 line not declassified]* the Soviets wanted the new US Administration to tone down its anti-Soviet rhetoric, moderate its hostile attitudes, and begin serious business on trade and arms control. Some analysts believe that the Soviet activities, *[1 line not declassified]*, were intended to be detected and were contrived to nudge Washington toward a more conciliatory and cooperative attitude in dealings with Moscow. *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Intelligence Community Performance

9. Since 1983, the Intelligence Community, CIA's Office of Soviet Analysis, and the Defense Intelligence Agency have treated the events surrounding the Able Archer episode in a number of in-house publications and national estimates. When General Perroots was Director, DIA, analysts concurred in the Community assessments in 1988 that the "war scare" period of heightened Soviet concern was triggered by the change of the US Administration and its policy decisions toward the Soviet threat; that at least some Soviet leaders concluded that a surprise nuclear attack by NATO was possible outside the context of a crisis; and that this led to a number of Soviet responses consistent with

such a conclusion, including high priority intelligence collection taskings. DIA believes, however, that the Soviet measures were primarily a function of the internal leadership instability from which Andropov emerged as General Secretary. [*portion marking not declassified*]

General Perroots's Problem

10. The events surrounding NATO Exercise Able Archer, however, all occurred some months before the first national-level assessments were written, and General Perroots was confronted with a serious choice of what recommendation to make to the Commander, US Air Forces Europe. The Department of Defense warning indicators system reflected that, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Soviet air units in Poland and East Germany were observed at a high state of alert, although no other Soviet strategic forces adopted such a posture. [*2½ lines not declassified*] Consequently, the Commander, US Air Forces Europe, was concerned whether he should exercise his discretionary authority to increase the alert posture of his force. General Perroots recommended that no precautionary US alert be instituted, despite the evidence of his own warning system. Several days later, the Soviet air forces returned to normal alert status. [*portion marking not declassified*]

11. [*1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified*]

12. General Perroots's concerns about this episode are legitimate to the extent that they deal with Washington's support to the US military commands. [*4½ lines not declassified*] Third, national-level assessments of Soviet intentions were not available when most needed. The General's memorandum indicates the Defense Department has taken steps to correct the problems in the processing

and dissemination of intelligence. The third problem, of timely national-level support, is continuous. As Director of DIA, General Perroots himself initiated organizational and procedural changes to improve DIA's support to the commands. [*portion marking not declassified*]

13. Underlying all of the above, however, is the paradox that General Perroots believes he made a correct judgment, but for the wrong reasons. This is not a new problem nor is there a solution to it. General Perroots has accurately identified inherent limits of the warning systems as they now exist. His candor is a safeguard against complacency and denial that problems exist. Additionally, he raises again the need for better understanding in Washington of the problems facing intelligence in the field. [*portion marking not declassified*]

[*name not declassified*] [*name not declassified*]

Chief, TFD/RIG/SOVA Director, National Warning Staff

(Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 91B00551: Speeches, Lectures, Briefing Files (1988-1989), Box 1, Folder 2: C/NIC (Ermarth) Chrons March 1989)

The 1990 PFIAB report repeatedly stressed: "During the November 1983 NATO 'Able Archer' nuclear release exercise, the Soviets implemented military and intelligence activities that previously were seen only during actual crises. These included: placing Soviet air forces in Germany and Poland on heightened alert, [*4 lines not declassified*]."

The PFIAB report argued: "The meaning of these events obviously was of crucial importance to American and NATO policymakers. If they were simply part of a Soviet propaganda campaign designed to intimidate the US, deter

it from deploying improved weapons, and arouse US domestic opposition to foreign policy initiatives, then they would not be of crucial significance. If they reflected an internal power struggle—for example, a contest between conservatives and pragmatists, or an effort to avoid blame for Soviet economic failures by pointing to (exaggerated) military threats—then they could not be ignored, but they would not imply a fundamental change in Soviet strategy. But if these events were expressions of a genuine belief on the part of Soviet leaders that the US was planning a nuclear first strike, causing the Soviet military to prepare for such an eventuality—by, for example, readying itself for a preemptive strike of its own—then the ‘war scare’ was a cause for real concern.” (PFIAB, page vi)

The PFIAB report concluded that the IC’s failure to adequately report on Able Archer and the 1983–1984 Soviet war scare had important implications for the future: “In cases of great importance to the survival of our nation, and especially where there is important contradictory evidence, the Board believes that intelligence estimates must be cast in terms of alternative scenarios that are subjected to comparative risk assessments. This is the critical defect in the war scare episode.” (PFIAB, page ix)

[Document 385]

B. Note of a Meeting Between President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Hill)¹

Washington, March 25, 1983

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

**C. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet
General Secretary Andropov¹**

Washington, July 11, 1983

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 11, 1983

Dear Gen. Secretary Andropov

I appreciate very much your letter pledging an "unending commitment of the Soviet leadership and the people of the Soviet Union to the course of peace, the elimination of the nuclear threat and the development of relations based on mutual benefit and equality with all nations."

Let me assure you the government & the people of the United States are dedicated to "the course of peace" and "the elimination of the nuclear threat". It goes without saying that we also seek relations with all nations based on "mutual benefit and equality." Our record since we were allied in W.W.II confirms that.

Mr. General Secretary could we not begin to approach these goals in the meetings now going on in Geneva? You and I share an enormous responsibility for the preservation of stability in the world. I believe we can fulfill that mandate but to do so will require a more active level of exchange than we have heretofore been able to establish. We have much to talk about with regard to the situation in Eastern Europe, South Asia, and particularly this hemisphere as well as in such areas as arms control, trade between our two countries and other ways in which we can expand east-west contacts.

Historically our predecessors have made better progress when communicating has been private and candid. If you wish to engage in such communication you will find me ready. I await your reply.

Sincerely
Ronald Reagan

Declassified
AHS/IPS
Department of State
E.O. 13526

**D. Notes by Secretary of Defense Weinberger of
a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹**

Washington, September 2, 1983

9/2/83

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NSC - Sirhan
President
V.P.

G.P.S. Even ^{if} USSR thought it was a US B-52
Plane - they shot it down w/
any inquiry - was a hot line, etc -
Sharon they'd check for strike -

We should use this to help us
get Big Reform Budget -
& get rid of Bob and Gorbachev
and.

Agony [unclear] & maybe in Lebanon.

Sanctions - They don't hurt us.

USSR - Says they respect loss of lives by
them but not us

2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

options

State

Civil aviation options -

RR - Buy something to get preparation

CU - Ct. of Intl Justice - x
desert demand of USSR for
Expansion

RR - They shut down our planes
in 50's & 60's

RR - what if we just turn around
a USSR ship going into
Cointo.

CU - ^{such meetings} NATO & ASEAN -

RR - Get other countries to join
with us for expansion - & in
action to block USSR Aircraft

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

RIS

Make public: being vs. Polansky
claim of USSR in SD, so bus

CH

Do Regan -

~~Attest~~

Economic Sanctions

Probably ~~Wants~~ agreement

or other countries

from Soviet

Stop Tourism & ask other nations to do same

Until we could get assurances

for USSR

Stop ~~imports~~ imports from USSR - all is ~~needed~~
help.

Titanium & chlorine

no - on blocking USSR assets deposits -

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CW - Rescue task force

INF

GP's Army Co. meeting

Donald, Overay - Search been
unsuccessful.

PR - need Army Reductiois. I

102 Hours proceed & meet
with Ron.

Rescue mission -
Reportings. -

Stop ends' stops to measure or call
Stop for you

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

GA
Mistake had to go to media
n To open to talk to people

Shorter meeting

agenda

Short don

human rights - Schanley

Complex with Treede

Ed Meece, need to do our
Thurs Day talk
to a safety.

Memorial Service at Natl. Cathedral
at 11:00

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CR - Attitude

INF - great opportunity
to go after USSR - The best
way to stop deployment -
If you eliminate we can't deploy
But we can't leave unless if you
leave even 1

You have morally what

Statement by Confrontation

Planning - what can be done a looking
or wishes

Page

Ex - Range of activities

ps

Comments

ask for Repl. of Cond. matter

+ General Support

Let's see -
the future

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Date:

**E. Notes of a National Security Council
Meeting¹**

Washington, March 4, 1985

3-1

NSC MTG + Mar 4 65

(1)

a lot to cover result of a year of analysis today put it all in one presentation, so, a low powder in next few days instructions to delegation which leaves on Friday

3 areas

Space & Defense - admin consensus re relationship, not to propose limitation at this point

Face a military problem represented in Sov also in most any measure of real power a/c may be one view of world, or may not be e.g. ICBM warheads - have 3:1 adv & decide in crisis situation may be worse

- intel exercise how affect
- try arm control to get fewer d. rods
- US incision - HE, Major, D-5, B-1 may be more diff to increase on ICBM
- look at P's components imbalance via SDI

Today see after T Rumb's START + - IRIT see whether can get down

I Space + Def

No one proposes fastly new but now see:
- need look at 10 yr period to reduce
- transition period to enter def

& further red in of roots session to explain

- 11 years in
- Strat S. &
- Strat Concept
-

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- go over each area in which including ASN (2)
 - Krom radar
 - Transportability
 - suggest
 - concerns for a very solid record that they have nuclear activity data of detection
- could prob. undermine in each of a c " at heart of any project or if no chop in SW viewed, can't expect AC to remain viable instrument of diplomacy
- Emerging Technology

- In coming months, we further
- what limitations/restrictions might be seen haven't found any yet
 - what CBRES might take for better or
 - " us need it Ar Day
 - for 4 other

Comment? Mox?

Kampelman -

- yes OK
- agreement throughout just
- we're not demanding
- our plan to suggest a less long session about a month - look over & come back to recommence
- exchange, inform, express concerns, hear

Nitze -

- SDI = research progr not to be limited
- Begin discuss Transition phase

INF

Current Balance
Gov have 10:1 market adv

2 options

1. Current

zero zero, Int + prem,
Sept 83 - aircraft, global, PII, 420 glosa
gov 50%

is really an infinite number of points
eg 0-572 eg 420
is not a take it or leave it position -
meet criteria
- eg, verify, not export to Africa
excl Fr Brit

Comments

Weins - potential re 2) system in transit
- prob re Dutch

Adeln - show prob of any non zero - 2000
1) very diff to verify - low degree
2) repres coming prob re mobile land based
eg Sov 24 & 25 railroad mobile

2. Equal to Red

works only under very narrowly defined point in time
even then conceding Sov INF money in Asia
from 400 (Sov) launched to 200 (50% cut)
to 120 in East, 80 in East
to 45 " to 112 launched in Eur
(market cap of 112-448)

Comments

Weins - strongly opposed
- = 90 red not = equals
- molecular mean can rapidly move
from East - easy to copy
∴ not useful & safe distinct
- get us from market, easy expl

Shultz - says mobility concern applies to all
 - go and not presume we want to endorse
 but might make it negotiable

Weinb - Sat 200:112 launcher = Six ads
 & West/East distance means less

Sh - merely = variant of option 1

Nice - Chap chud to show us global rt to 200

Pres - Verific?

Best spot in world to which deliver
 missile for demands by nations. For

Adel - not know if all exist missile delivered here

Pres - at least this way we'd know

ling - can now observe best

Weinb - all non zero = hard first
 " have diffie problem

Coltman

- either option can be worked with
 - could be used in sequence
 - should have treaty with = workheads (?)

Weinb - is 10-nukes, not workheads
 or dangerous move away from one workhead from.

Sh - if Opt 1 again,

Sovs accept, but seek make more specific
 + propose Opt 2 within framework
 of Opt 1

Opt 2 is an illustration of 1

which may not work as balance changes

W - can't say Opt 2 = illustr of Opt 1

when 1 = global equal

Sh - need add sec re US right to 200 globally
 2 1 - 11 + to some workhead

Wims - movement away from = burden
∴ need relief
- opt 2 = increase, not reductions
∴ back to SALT theory

B. d - Gen Vissey
Vissey - Must limit all so Sovs can't move to Eur.

START

Balance

Current 1250, 5000, 400, 2.5 mil KG
Trade off

Alt 1
1250, 5000, 350

Alt 2 (ALMs lim to 4,000)
1500 launchers

Sov category & denials - would meet 1/2 way
but we'd still try reduce heavy ICBMs
from 308 to 200
and if want add ALMs would need reduce 200 further

RVS - 6,500 in 95 [25% below current
instead of 5,000 proposal today 8,300]

Rowing -
this is end game
after Sovs have reduced launchers

Alt 3 - adds ALM (1500-2000) 4500 [35% reduction in
Sov MIRVed missile and
35% cut in
Sov
- 1800 SANDVs, Aggregate MIRVed Missiles + 1500 ACSM
- Shultz - most rad. red. in most threat system

USC - Mar 4

6

ALT 4

Bud - premised in what is militarily essential to target
(that's my pers opin re its advantage)

- approx 1000 launchers
adds systems to retrain Sov
- permits us 700 midjetman
- price = 7700 warheads = very high
of which 7,000 in '85
~~ballistics~~

- 2070 fewer SNDVs than SII
& roughly double SII costs
33% MIRV ball M15 warhead cost

- Vissey - right, promote us to moderate
- also needs look at SDI & D/S/P
 - pride close to what Sovs want
risk term ok, then price in SDI

Pres - relatively cut? how proceed

Vis - big cut in destabilizing

ALT 5

Goes to heart of reducing most important resources
warheads & TW - by 50% in TW force
& not deplete Sov force restructuring

Eg 5,300 MIRV RVs, TW & heavy Sov Sovs
Trade-offs specific re bomber ~~restructure~~

- Wrens - bomber diff recogn we need more bomber
force of Sov air defenses
- also recogn jet diff in TW
much narrower us/Sov imbal than other of
 - "Radical rid" per Sov vocal
 - Similar. 50%

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Department of State
C 13526
ate:

see Vissey, may not give in all ways for all topics
but reduce in $\$15$, TV & computers per day = 10%
horizon

Alt 6

Inspired by your Sept speech on Road map re 20 yrs
instead of just 10 year horizon

Propose we discuss outcomes at end of day
but not as demanding re details by how
get there, replace etc

95 benchmarks

- 5,000 workdays
- $3\frac{1}{2}$ MKG Sov (25% red)
- 400 US 320 Sov

Adelm - give next view of 1st Round
set of outcomes

- RU fuel, TV & Sambers
all could most input factors
- lays out factors without parties agreement
not include SMDV limit
that's not a source to us, of Scowcroft
can
- not include ALLM limit
Sovs are demanders

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Back

you asked JCS address rail sufficiency
chiefs have addressed other

Vissey - most input = assumptions

- ① one assumption = will be able to complete our mod prop
Some of these damage
but you must assess our mod $\$15$ pol re
none of these proposals OK, unless we miss

8
② you must pick a point in time when we
can check US & Sov force structures.
we've picked 1995

- all of these prop OK at '85
same for better re US moral

MIRVed mobile land based missile
extremely threatening re Sov

∴ should add prov to all opt for Sov

③ how affects other negotiations

Rowley

- all proposals should be kept simple

- we ought to talk Trade offs
how in m ^{Sov} ICBM vs ^{US} BOM

- need offensive vs offensive deal
other-wise Sov will accept off deal
+ zero in on SDI

- ∴ go back to off vs off capab

Town

- not know whether Sov are serious

- I'm reluctant seek renewal their word as

- I'd prefer build on current position
Hejira not even discussed it
& it was new

- We need discuss trade-offs, in code

- Prefer to probe, report back on our findings
such flexibility to probe

keep our moral posture on S,000 warhead in
maybe play with subliminals

Pres - Sovs has talked re goal of total elim
- Shouldn't we pick heat up

Nike - agree
repeat goal & set path toward it

St-Ltz - Brangho not answer in Geneva

Pres - but since Geneva

Bud -

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, Entry for March 25, 1983. No classification marking. For the transcribed text of the note, see [Document 27](#).

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Andropov (8290913, 8391028, 8391032). No classification marking. For the transcribed text of the note, see [Document 70](#).

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Appointment and Diary File, Box 9, Notes Set B, 1983 #25-41. No classification marking. For the transcribed text of the note, see [Document 91](#).

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSC Meeting, 03/04/1985. No classification marking. For the transcribed text of the note, see [Document 375](#). No formal notes of the meeting were found.

A. Editorial Note

Stark deviations in assessments by the U.S. Intelligence Community of the November 1983 NATO exercise Able Archer and the Soviet “war scare” led to a much later 1990 investigation by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board during the George H.W. Bush administration, resulting in the report, “The Soviet ‘War Scare.’” (George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Subject Files; Reports to the President-War Scare Report 1990 [OA/IDCF01830-020]) The February 15, 1990, PFIAB report analyzed intelligence and reporting on the Soviet war scare, Able Archer, and other related activities. The PFIAB report stated: “During the past year, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has carefully reviewed the events of that period to learn what we (the U.S. intelligence community) knew, when we knew it, and how we interpreted it. The Board has read hundreds of documents, conducted more than 75 interviews with American and British officials, and studied the series of National Intelligence Estimates (NIE’s) and other intelligence assessments that have attempted over the last six years to interpret the war scare data. Additionally, we have offered our own interpretation of the war scare events.” (PFIAB, pages vi-vii) Although outside the normal scope of this volume, the 1990 PFIAB report and other memoranda from 1988 and 1989 are addressed in this editorial note because the documents focus upon crucial events from 1983 to 1984.

Reactions from the Intelligence Community (IC) and policymakers to the events surrounding Able Archer and

the Soviet “war scare” differed significantly and evolved over time. The contemporaneous reporting in 1983–1984 from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Intelligence Council (NIC), [*text not declassified*] drew varied conclusions about Soviet anxieties. While some reporting assessed that “Contrary to the impression conveyed by Soviet propaganda, Moscow does not appear to anticipate a near-term military confrontation with the United States” (see [Document 157](#)), another analysis presented evidence that [*text not declassified*].

Retrospective assessments of these events seem to conflate the NATO Able Archer exercise with the broader “war scare” talk emanating from Moscow related to INF deployments. The Soviet military unquestionably reacted to Able Archer differently than to previous NATO exercises. (See [Document 134](#).) Whether the Soviet response was attributable to the circumstances of the time, to the “war scare” (whether real or Soviet propaganda), or to a credible belief within the Soviet military leadership or the Politburo that the United States was planning to launch a nuclear first strike against the USSR, under the guise of a NATO exercise or otherwise, remains unclear on the basis of the available evidence.

After a year of research and a reassessment of the relevant intelligence and documentation, the PFIAB report stated: “We believe that the Soviets perceived that the correlation of forces had turned against the USSR, that the US was seeking military superiority, and that the chances of the US launching a nuclear first strike—perhaps under cover of a routine training exercise—were growing. We also believe that the US intelligence community did not at the time, and for several years afterwards, attach sufficient weight to the possibility that the war scare was real. As a result, the President was given assessments of Soviet attitudes and

actions that understated the risks to the United States. Moreover, these assessments did not lead us to reevaluate our own military and intelligence actions that might be perceived by the Soviets as signaling war preparations.

“In two separate Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs) in May and August 1984, the intelligence community said: ‘We believe strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States.’ Soviet statements to the contrary were judged to be ‘propaganda.’ [See [Documents 221](#) and [264](#).]

“The Board believes that the evidence then did not, and certainly does not now, support such categoric conclusions. Even without the benefit of subsequent reporting and looking at the 1984 analysis of then available information, the tone of the intelligence judgments was not adequate to the needs of the President.” (PFIAB, pages vi-vii)

During November 1983, Able Archer and the Soviet responses to this exercise received little immediate attention in the U.S. Intelligence Community. (See [Document 135](#).) However, by spring 1984, some in the intelligence communities in the United States [*text not declassified*] believed the Reagan administration should have recognized Soviet sensitivities and anxieties about a potential U.S. first strike. [*text not declassified*].

According to the PFIAB report, [*text not declassified*] “KGB Deputy Resident Colonel Oleg Gordiyevskiy, [*text not declassified*] had witnessed what he saw as Soviet paranoia over a US nuclear first strike; [*text not declassified*] As one of the most senior KGB officers in London, [*text not declassified*].” (PFIAB, page 10)

In a covering memorandum [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to Director of Central Intelligence William Casey and others, Herbert Meyer, Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, wrote: [*text not declassified*]. The PFIAB report commented that the [*text not declassified*] report was “not well received in the US intelligence community.” (PFIAB, pages 10-11)

Another contemporaneous analysis from the CIA, the May 1984 SNIE 11-10-84/JX concluded: “We believe strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States.” (See [Document 221](#).) The PFIAB report commented on this SNIE: “The estimate boldly declared that ‘Recent Soviet war scare propaganda . . . is aimed primarily at discrediting US policies and mobilizing ‘peace’ pressures among various audiences abroad.’ In a more piecemeal fashion, it was judged that ‘Each Soviet action has its own military or political purpose sufficient to explain it.’ The accelerated tempo of Soviet live exercise activity was explained simply as a reflection of ‘long-term Soviet military objectives.’

“The Soviet reaction to Able Archer 83 was dismissed as a ‘counterexercise,’ but analysts acknowledged that the ‘elaborate Soviet reaction’ was ‘somewhat greater than usual.’ [*less than 1 line not declassified*] prior to and during the exercise indicated that the Warsaw Pact Intelligence services, especially the KGB, were admonished ‘to look for any indication that the United States was about to launch a first nuclear strike,’ analysts concluded that ‘by confining heightened readiness to selected air units, Moscow clearly revealed that it did not, in fact, think there was a possibility at this time of a NATO attack.’ The assessment, however, was not specific about what type of defensive or precautionary Soviet activity might be expected—and

detected—were they preparing for an offensive NATO move.” (PFIAB, page 13)

The PFIAB report continued its critique of SNIE 11-10-84/JX: IC “analysts dismissed [*less than 1 line not declassified*] on the war scare, including the KGB’s formal tasking to its Residencies. “This war scare propaganda has reverberated in Soviet security bureaucracies and emanated through other channels such as human sources. [See for example, [Document 144](#).] We do not believe it reflects authentic leadership fears of imminent conflict.” The report contended: “Such judgments were made even though the analysis was tempered ‘by some uncertainty as to current Soviet leadership perceptions of the United States, by continued uncertainty about the Politburo decisionmaking processes, and by our inability at this point to conduct a detailed examination of how the Soviets might have assessed recent US/NATO military exercises and reconnaissance operations’—which, of course, included the previous Able Archer exercise. In other words, US analysts were unsure of what the Kremlin leadership thought or how it made decisions, nor had they adequately assessed the Soviet reaction to Able Archer 83. This notwithstanding, the estimate concluded: ‘We are confident that, as of now, the Soviets see not an imminent military clash but a costly and—to some extent—more perilous strategic and political struggle over the rest of the decade.’” (PFIAB, page 14)

The Board had similar criticisms of the August 1984 SNIE 11-9-84, “Soviet Policy Toward the United States in 1984” (see [Document 264](#)), for its “categorical and unqualified” judgments “about the likelihood of the war scare,” and the analysts’ conclusions: “We strongly believe that the Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or

confrontation with the United States. Also, we do not believe that the Soviet war talk and other actions ‘mask’ Soviet preparations for an imminent move toward confrontation on the part of the USSR.” (PFIAB, page 19-20) The PFIAB report continued: “Analysts readily acknowledged that the previous six months had seen extraordinary, unprecedented Soviet activities. Large scale military exercise, ‘anomalous behavior’ during the troop rotation, withdrawn military support for the harvest (last seen prior to the 1968 Czech invasion), new, deployed weapons systems (termed ‘in response to INF deployments’), and heightened internal vigilance and security activities were noted. These events, however, were judged to be ‘in line with long-evolving plans and patterns, rather than with sharp acceleration of preparations for major war.’” (PFIAB, page 19)

The PFIAB report acknowledged that its assessment and criticism of the May and August 1984 SNIEs “derives from information not known at the time. Our purpose in presenting this report is not so much to criticize the conclusions of the 1984 SNIE’s as to raise questions about the ways these estimates were made and subsequently reassessed.” (PFIAB, page ix) The PFIAB report concluded: “Reasonable people can disagree about the conclusions of the 1984 SNIE’s. The PFIAB does disagree with many of them. More worrisome to us, however, is the process by which the estimates were made and subsequently reassessed. Although both estimates were reportedly reviewed by outside readers—and both, but particularly the first, contained alternative scenarios—strongly worded interpretations were defended by explaining away facts inconsistent with them. Consequently, both estimates contained, in essence, single outcome forecasting based in large part on near-term anomalous behavior. Moreover, neither alerted the reader to the risks erroneously rejecting

the correct scenario.” (PFIAB, page 30) The PFIAB report criticized the performance of the IC in 1983–1984, showing that contemporary assessments of Soviet intentions after Able Archer did not go far enough in providing President Reagan with alternative scenarios, explaining that the anxiety from the Soviet leadership could have been real.

In criticizing contemporary estimates, the PFIAB report emphasized intelligence that had not been available to the IC during these years, principally information provided by Gordiyevskiy after he defected in 1985. Robert McFarlane’s thoughts on the influence of Gordiyevskiy’s information on the President are recorded in a December 16, 1988, memorandum for the record:

Memorandum for the Record

16 December 1988

SUBJECT

[less than 1 line not declassified] Robert F. McFarlane Regarding the Influence of Oleg Gordiyevskiy’s Reporting on President Reagan

On 15 December *[less than 1 line not declassified]* Robert F. (“Bud”) McFarlane, formerly National Security Advisor to the President, as to the veracity of claims *[less than 1 line not declassified]* that the reporting of KGB officer *[less than 1 line not declassified]* Oleg Gordiyevskiy about the Kremlin’s fear of war greatly influenced President Reagan in the mid-1980s to seek better relations with the USSR. In response, Bud made several points:

He definitely remembered the reporting associated (later) with Gordiyevskiy that conveyed the Kremlin’s fear of war. He also specifically recalled *[less than 1 line not declassified]* on Gordiyevskiy’s assessments given to the President *[less than 1 line not declassified]*.

He noted that he discussed this reporting with the President on several occasions. This was in the course of numerous discussions extending throughout 1983 and part of 1984 about the apparent anxieties being transmitted by Moscow through many channels, [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

The President, according to Bud, saw this reporting attributed to Gordiyevskiy in the larger context of a Soviet “war-scare” campaign arising from the NATO decision to deploy INF and from Reagan’s hard line on defense, SDI, etc. In the President’s view, either the Soviets were paranoid in strange ways we could not let bother us, or they were fabricating the appearance of fear to intimidate and sway us, which we should even more be prepared to ignore.

Often in these conversations, according to Bud, the President outlined his sustained intention to concentrate on building US strength and credibility in the first term and to move toward diplomatic reengagement in the second. The President’s key speech of January 1984 [see [Document 158](#)] was a natural step in a long-planned shift of policy. Neither Gordiyevskiy’s reporting nor the Soviet “war-scare” campaign in general were responsible for the evolution of the President’s policy.

Bud said he’d been queried before on this matter by [*name not declassified*], a journalist, who might be (or have been) writing an article on it. Against the background of the above, Bud said he discounted Gordiyevskiy’s impact on the President [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

[*1 paragraph (8½ lines) not declassified*]

[*name not declassified*]

(Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 90T00435R: Chronological Files (1988), Box 1, Folder 12: C/NIC Chrono for December 1988)

McFarlane's recollections in this memorandum for the record correlate with a January 1984 memorandum by Jack Matlock, Soviet specialist on the NSC Staff, which demonstrated an awareness of potential Soviet concerns, but concluded:

“—The Soviet leadership is not overly nervous about the immediate prospect of armed confrontation with the U.S.;

“—They are however very nervous about the prospects five to ten years down the road—not so much of a confrontation as such, as of a decisive shift in the balance of military power.” (See [Document 157](#).)

As mentioned in the 1988 memorandum for the record, McFarlane did recall “later” reporting to Reagan about Gordiyevskiy. The PFIAB report addressed Gordiyevskiy's situation in relation to the war scare and the 1984 SNIE assessments: “The Board found that after the 1984 assessments were issued, the intelligence community did not again address the war scare until after the defection to Great Britain of KGB Colonel Oleg Gordiyevskiy in July, 1985. Gordiyevskiy had achieved the rank of Acting Resident in the United Kingdom, but he fell under suspicion as a Western agent. Recalled to the Soviet Union, he was placed under house arrest and intensely interrogated. Able to flee his watchers, Gordiyevskiy was exfiltrated from Moscow by the British Secret Intelligence Service.”

The report continued: “During lengthy debriefing sessions that followed, Gordiyevskiy supplied a fuller report on the Soviet war hysteria. This report, complete with

documentation from KGB Headquarters and entitled 'KGB Response to Soviet Leadership Concern over US Nuclear Attack,' was first disseminated in a restricted manner within the US intelligence community in October 1985. Gordiyevskiy described the extraordinary KGB collection plan, initiated in 1981, to look for signs that the US would conduct a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. He identified and reviewed factors driving leadership fears. Based on the perception the US was achieving a strategic advantage, those in the Kremlin were said to believe that the US was likely to resort to nuclear weapons much earlier in a crisis than previously expected. They also were concerned the US might seek to exploit its first-strike capability outside the context of a crisis, probably during a military exercise. He described the leadership's worries of a 'decapitating' strike from the Pershing II's, and its belief that the US could mobilize for a surprise attack in a mere seven to ten days. He explained how the London Residency responded to the requirements, and the effects that reporting had back at Moscow Center in reinforcing Soviet fears. He described conversations he had held with colleagues from Center and from the GRU. The next month, President Reagan held his first summit with Mikhail Gorbachev and relations began to thaw." (PFIAB, pages 22-23)

The PFIAB report also cited a January 1989 "End of Tour Report Addendum" by Lieutenant General Leonard H. Perroots, who had served as Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Air Forces Europe, during the 1983 Able Archer exercise, to emphasize the potential consequences of the intelligence gap during the Able Archer exercise. Perroots addressed Able Archer as well as Gordiyevskiy's reporting in that memorandum:

1. (U) In 1983, I was assigned as the DCS for Intelligence, US Air Forces, Europe, Ramstein AB, Germany. The annual NATO Command and Control exercise ABLE ARCHER was scheduled to begin during the first week of November. The context of this nuclear command and control exercise was relatively benign; the scenario had been purposely chosen to be non-controversial, and the exercise itself was a routine annual event. This exercise closely followed the bombing of air defense sites in Lebanon and directly followed the invasion of Grenada. As I recall, however, there was no particular feeling of tension in the European Theater beyond that which is normal.

2. [*portion marking not declassified*] Only the fact that Soviet Intelligence collection assets (primarily low level signals intercept units) had failed to return to garrison after their normal concentrated coverage of NATO's AUTUMN FORGE exercise series could be reckoned strange at all. As the kickoff date of ABLE ARCHER neared it was clear that there was a great deal of Soviet interest in the forthcoming events. Again, this seemed nothing out of the ordinary. We knew that there was a history of intensive Soviet collection against practice Emergency Action Messages (EAM's) related to nuclear release.

3. [*portion marking not declassified*] ABLE ARCHER started in the morning of 3 November, and progressed immediately in the scenario to NATO STATE ORANGE. At 2100Z on 04 November NSA issued an electrical product report G/00/3083-83, entitled "SOVIET AIR FORCES, GSFG, PLACED ON HEIGHTENED READINESS, 2 NOVEMBER 1983." I saw this message on the morning of 5 November and discussed it with my air analysts. It stated that as of 1900Z on 02 November the fighter-bomber divisions of the air force of Group Soviet Forces, Germany had been placed in a status of heightened alert. All

divisional and regimental command posts and supporting command and control elements were to be manned around-the-clock by augmented teams.

4. [*portion marking not declassified*] In addition to the directed command and control changes the fighter-bomber divisions were also ordered to load out one squadron of aircraft in each regiment (if this order applied equally across GSFG the result would have been at least 108 fighter-bombers on alert). These aircraft were to be armed and placed at readiness 3 (30 minute alert) to “destroy first-line enemy targets.” The alert aircraft were to be equipped with a self-protection jamming pod. We knew from subsequent NSA reporting that a squadron at Neuruppin, East Germany sought and was apparently granted permission to configure its aircraft without the ECM pod because of an unexpected weight and balance problem. My air analysts opined that this message meant that at least this particular squadron was loading a munitions configuration that they had never actually loaded before, i.e., a warload.

5. [*portion marking not declassified*] At this point, I spoke to CinCUSAFE, General Billy Minter. I told him we had some unusual activity in East Germany that was probably a reaction to the ongoing ABLE ARCHER. He asked if I thought we should increase the real force generation. I said that we would carefully watch the situation, but there was insufficient evidence to justify increasing our real alert posture. At this point in the exercise our forces were in a simulated posture of NATO State ORANGE and local SALTY NATION tests involving simulated generation of combat aircraft were underway at various locations including Ramstein AB. If I had known then what I later found out I am uncertain what advice I would have given.

6. [*portion marking not declassified*] An NSA message dated 022229Z DEC 83 provided the rest of the picture as far as we knew it—at least until the reports began to surface from the British penetration of the KGB, Oleg Gordievskiy. This GAMMA message was entitled “SOVIET 4th AIR ARMY AT HEIGHTENED READINESS IN REACTION TO NATO EXERCISE ABLE ARCHER, 2-11 NOVEMBER 1983.” This report stated that the alert had been ordered by the Chief of the Soviet Air Forces, Marshal Kutakhov, and that all units of the Soviet 4th Air Army were involved in the alert “which included preparations for immediate use of nuclear weapons.” This report described activity that was contemporaneous with that reflected in East Germany, but because of the specific source of this material it was not available in near realtime. The two pieces taken together present a much more ominous picture.

7. [*portion marking not declassified*] Equally ominous in its own way was the fact that this alert was never reflected at all by the I&W system. At the time of this occurrence there was no distribution of electrically reported GAMMA material to the Tactical Fusion Center at Boerfink. I remedied that shortfall in the aftermath of this activity. Secondly, a real standdown of aircraft was secretly ordered in at least the Soviet Air Forces units facing the Central Region, and that standdown was not detected. The Soviet alert in response to ABLE ARCHER began after nightfall on Wednesday evening, there was no flying on the following two days which led to the weekend, and then the following Monday was 7 November, the revolution holiday. The absence of flying could always be explained, although a warning condition was raised finally on about the ninth of November when overhead photography showed fully armed FLOGGER aircraft on air defense alert at a base in East

Germany. When this single indicator was raised, the standdown had been underway for a week.

8. [*portion marking not declassified*] For the next six months I was on a soapbox about ABLE ARCHER whenever I could discuss it at the appropriate classification level. I spoke to the Senior Military Intelligence Officers' Conference (SMIOC), and I buttonholed a lot of people. I suggested that perhaps we should move our annual exercise away from the November 7 holiday, because it is clear to me that the conjunction of the two events causes a warning problem that can never be solved. Our problem here was that we had a couple of very highly classified bits of intelligence evidence about a potentially disastrous situation that never actually came to fruition. For decision-makers it was always difficult to believe that there could have been any serious reaction by the Soviets to such a "benign" exercise as ABLE ARCHER. From the Soviet perspective, however, it might have appeared very different. It was difficult for all of us to grasp that, but Oleg Gordievskiy's reporting began to provide a somewhat more frightening perspective when it became available in the Fall of 1985.

9. (S) By the time Gordievskiy's reporting began to surface for analytical review I was the Director of DIA. Gordievskiy's initial reporting about a "war scare" in 1983 immediately caught my attention. It should be pointed out at the outset that Gordievskiy knew nothing of a military alert during ABLE ARCHER. He did, however, tell us something of a chilling story about Moscow Center's Intelligence tasking during 1983. He related that there was a project called either "RYaN" or "VRYaN," the latter probably being the full form of a Russian acronym meaning "sudden rocket nuclear attack." There was a cadre of specialists in Moscow Center charged with, among other

things, finding the evidence of planning for a western attack on the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1982 and continuing into 1983 Gordievskiy says that this group became ever more insistent that an attack was being planned by the West. By March 1983 the KGB officers in Moscow had decided that ABLE ARCHER 83 would provide an excellent cover for the planned attack, and KGB and GRU residencies around the world were being directed to find the evidence. Gordievskiy, living in London at the time, states that he never believed there was really a threat, and that the London residency of the KGB simply ignored the collection requirements until it began to become clear that Moscow was serious. During the summer of 1983 the London residency sent some reports that, in retrospect, Gordievskiy believed might have hyped the war hysteria. He never really believed in the threat, however, and reported during his debriefing in 1985 that he thought the VRYaN hysteria might have been some kind of internal political ploy. I must reiterate again that Gordievskiy did not know about the secret military alert of November 1983.

10. [*portion marking not declassified*] The US intelligence community has never really closed with this analytical problem. A SNIE addressed this subject, [*1½ lines not declassified*]. The position has been taken again and again that had there been a real alert we would have detected more of it, but this may be whistling through the graveyard. It is not certain that we looked hard enough or broadly enough for information. For Western collectors the context was peacetime without even the most basic ripples of crisis. For the Soviets, however, the view may have looked quite different. It is uncertain how close to war we came or even if that was a possibility at all, but we know from Gordievskiy that the analysts in Moscow had predicted that the West would launch the attack from a posture of NATO State ORANGE. What might have happened that day in

November 1983 if we had begun a precautionary generation of forces rather than waiting for further information?

(Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 91B00551: Speeches, Lectures, Briefing Files (1988–1989), Box 1, Folder 2: C/NIC (Ermarth) Chrons March 1989)

The PFIAB report commented that “as his parting shot before retirement,” Perroots, who served as DIA Director from 1985 to 1989, sent a January 1989 “letter outlining his disquiet over the inadequate treatment of the Soviet war scare to, among others, the DCI and this Board.” The report continued: “Following the detection of the Soviet Air Forces’ increased alert status, it was his [Perroots’s] recommendation, made in ignorance, not to raise US readiness in response—a fortuitous, if ill-informed, decision given the changed political environment at the time.” (PFIAB, pages 27–28) In further accord with Perroots’s report, the PFIAB report concluded: “As it happened, the military officers in charge of the Able Archer exercise minimized the risk by doing nothing in the face of evidence that parts of the Soviet armed forces were moving to an unusual alert level. But these officials acted correctly out of instinct, not informed guidance, for in the years leading up to Able Archer they had received no guidance as to the possible significance of apparent changes in Soviet military and political thinking.” (PFIAB, page x)

[*name not declassified*] the National Warning Staff and [*name not declassified*] of the Office of Soviet Analysis prepared an undated memorandum reacting to Perroots’s comments, which was distributed by Ermarth to the DCI and DDCI for consideration:

SUBJECT

Comments on Memorandum of Lieutenant General Perroots

Summary

1. General Perroots's memorandum describes in detail a worrisome episode in which Soviet Air Forces in Central Europe assumed an abnormally high alert posture in early November 1983 in response to a routine NATO command post and communications exercise. Two Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs)—written in May and August 1984 respectively—treated the events described in the General's memorandum in the larger context of US-Soviet relations. Those Estimates judged that the Soviets displayed a heightened sense of concern in many areas of national life primarily because of the more aggressive policies of the US Administration in the early 1980s, the US strategic modernization program that included the peacekeeper ICBM and the D-5 SLBM, the actual implementation of NATO's 1979 decision for Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) modernization by deployment of the first Pershing-II missile systems to Europe, and because of the leadership instability in the USSR from the successive deaths of three general secretaries between 1981 and 1985. A National Intelligence Estimate in 1988 assessed the significance of the events in 1983 with the benefit of a longer time perspective and reached the same broad conclusions. General Perroots's memorandum and its enclosure neither raises no new issues nor contains new data that change the strategic judgements already written. [*portion marking not declassified*]

2. At the tactical and theater level, however, General Perroots's memorandum surfaces a long-standing warning problem, i.e., the need for the Intelligence Community in Washington to provide more timely, discriminating, and

accurate warning in support of the theater commander. Perroots, who at the time was Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Air Forces Europe (USAFE), describes three serious problems for which there are only partial answers. First, he believes that, despite the enormous amount of resources and energy spent in guarding against a strategic surprise attack, USAFE was not well informed in that the US warning systems did not detect in a timely fashion the extent of Soviet precautionary readiness measures undertaken in November 1983 in response to NATO exercise Able Archer. Secondly, he believes that Washington-based agencies had relevant information which was not available to the European Command when he recommended against a precautionary US alert by US Air Forces Europe in response to the detection of the increased alert status of the Soviet Air Forces. Finally, [1½ lines not declassified], General Perroots is concerned that in similar circumstances—even if there is better intelligence—another officer in his position might recommend a precautionary US Air Force alert in Europe that could have serious escalatory consequences, unless there are timely, national level assessments available. [portion marking not declassified]

3. The dilemma that General Perroots has described is characteristic of the warning problems faced by senior US military intelligence chiefs in many past crises, in which decisions about US force posture were dependent upon threat assessments prepared rapidly and based on fragmentary and incomplete intelligence. General Perroots's memorandum reinforces two long-standing lessons of warning: warning systems are no substitute for seasoned, professional judgment and assessments; and they require constant attention and improvement. In terms of process, however, his memorandum reinforces the requests of successive SACEURs and other US theater

commanders for better ways to provide more timely national-level warning assessments to the theater intelligence staffs.

The Setting of Exercise Able Archer, 1983

4. The larger context of the period, often referred to as the “war scare,” reflected increasing Soviet concern over the drift in superpower relations, which some in the Soviet leadership felt indicated an increased threat of war and increased likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons. These concerns were shaped in part by a Soviet perception that the correlation of forces was shifting against the Soviet Union and that the United States was taking steps to achieve military superiority. These fears were exacerbated by planned improvements in US strategic forces, as well as by progress made by NATO to implement its 1979 decision began with NATO’s deliberations in the late 1970s to modernize its theater nuclear forces by deploying Pershing-II missiles and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) to Europe. By 1981, after the new US Administration was inaugurated, the Soviet concern intensified almost concurrently with General Secretary Brezhnev’s decline in health [*portion marking not declassified*]

5. [*1½ lines not declassified*] the increased Soviet concern stemmed from a fear by some Soviet leaders that the West might seek to exploit its new capability in Europe for a preemptive nuclear surprise attack against the USSR, for which the Soviets had no defense. From a national security standpoint, this Western capability led to questions about the long-standing Soviet view that crises and other adverse developments in international affairs would precede the outbreak of war and be the basis for long-term early

warning. The Soviets had concern that the West might decide to attack the USSR without warning during a time of vulnerability—such as when military transport was used to support the harvest—thus compelling the Soviets to consider a preemptive strike at the first sign of US preparations for a nuclear strike. [*portion marking not declassified*]

6. From Brezhnev's death in 1982 through late 1984, the Soviets ordered a number of unusual measures not previously detected except during periods of crisis with the West. These included: disruption of the normal troop rotation cycle for Soviet forces in central Europe in 1984; updating civil defense procedures in the USSR from 1982 through 1984; in the spring of 1984 the first, and apparently only, time that Soviet military trucks were not sent to support the harvest since the end of World War II; and increased alert reactions even to routine NATO training from 1982 to 1984. The cumulative effect of these and other measures was to reduce the Soviet and Warsaw Pact vulnerability to a surprise attack. The abnormal Soviet reaction to NATO Exercise Able Archer in November 1983 occurred within this setting. [*portion marking not declassified*]

7. Concurrent with the military dimension, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] other precautionary measures taken by the Soviets probably were a reflection of the political maneuvering in the Kremlin in 1982 and 1983 associated with Andropov's rise to power. In exchange for military support for his bid to become General Secretary, Andropov, then KGB Chairman, may have promised greater allocations of resources for military industrial expansion, improved civil defense readiness, and military modernization. All of these were espoused by the Chief of the General Staff at the time, Marshal Ogarkov. Successful

manipulation of threat perceptions by the KGB at Andropov's direction would have helped cultivate the strong military backing Andropov enjoyed when he came to power. In this environment, the heightened Soviet military reactions to NATO exercises would have been expected. *[portion marking not declassified]*

8. Finally, *[less than 1 line not declassified]* the Soviets wanted the new US Administration to tone down its anti-Soviet rhetoric, moderate its hostile attitudes, and begin serious business on trade and arms control. Some analysts believe that the Soviet activities, *[1 line not declassified]*, were intended to be detected and were contrived to nudge Washington toward a more conciliatory and cooperative attitude in dealings with Moscow. *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Intelligence Community Performance

9. Since 1983, the Intelligence Community, CIA's Office of Soviet Analysis, and the Defense Intelligence Agency have treated the events surrounding the Able Archer episode in a number of in-house publications and national estimates. When General Perroots was Director, DIA, analysts concurred in the Community assessments in 1988 that the "war scare" period of heightened Soviet concern was triggered by the change of the US Administration and its policy decisions toward the Soviet threat; that at least some Soviet leaders concluded that a surprise nuclear attack by NATO was possible outside the context of a crisis; and that this led to a number of Soviet responses consistent with such a conclusion, including high priority intelligence collection taskings. DIA believes, however, that the Soviet measures were primarily a function of the internal

leadership instability from which Andropov emerged as General Secretary. [*portion marking not declassified*]

General Perroots's Problem

10. The events surrounding NATO Exercise Able Archer, however, all occurred some months before the first national-level assessments were written, and General Perroots was confronted with a serious choice of what recommendation to make to the Commander, US Air Forces Europe. The Department of Defense warning indicators system reflected that, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Soviet air units in Poland and East Germany were observed at a high state of alert, although no other Soviet strategic forces adopted such a posture. [*2½ lines not declassified*] Consequently, the Commander, US Air Forces Europe, was concerned whether he should exercise his discretionary authority to increase the alert posture of his force. General Perroots recommended that no precautionary US alert be instituted, despite the evidence of his own warning system. Several days later, the Soviet air forces returned to normal alert status. [*portion marking not declassified*]

11. [*1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified*]

12. General Perroots's concerns about this episode are legitimate to the extent that they deal with Washington's support to the US military commands. [*4½ lines not declassified*] Third, national-level assessments of Soviet intentions were not available when most needed. The General's memorandum indicates the Defense Department has taken steps to correct the problems in the processing and dissemination of intelligence. The third problem, of timely national-level support, is continuous. As Director of DIA, General Perroots himself initiated organizational and

procedural changes to improve DIA's support to the commands. [*portion marking not declassified*]

13. Underlying all of the above, however, is the paradox that General Perroots believes he made a correct judgment, but for the wrong reasons. This is not a new problem nor is there a solution to it. General Perroots has accurately identified inherent limits of the warning systems as they now exist. His candor is a safeguard against complacency and denial that problems exist. Additionally, he raises again the need for better understanding in Washington of the problems facing intelligence in the field. [*portion marking not declassified*]

[*name not declassified*] [*name not declassified*]

Chief, TFD/RIG/SOVA Director, National Warning Staff

(Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 91B00551: Speeches, Lectures, Briefing Files (1988-1989), Box 1, Folder 2: C/NIC (Ermarth) Chrons March 1989)

The 1990 PFIAB report repeatedly stressed: "During the November 1983 NATO 'Able Archer' nuclear release exercise, the Soviets implemented military and intelligence activities that previously were seen only during actual crises. These included: placing Soviet air forces in Germany and Poland on heightened alert, [*4 lines not declassified*]."

The PFIAB report argued: "The meaning of these events obviously was of crucial importance to American and NATO policymakers. If they were simply part of a Soviet propaganda campaign designed to intimidate the US, deter it from deploying improved weapons, and arouse US domestic opposition to foreign policy initiatives, then they would not be of crucial significance. If they reflected an

internal power struggle—for example, a contest between conservatives and pragmatists, or an effort to avoid blame for Soviet economic failures by pointing to (exaggerated) military threats—then they could not be ignored, but they would not imply a fundamental change in Soviet strategy. But if these events were expressions of a genuine belief on the part of Soviet leaders that the US was planning a nuclear first strike, causing the Soviet military to prepare for such an eventuality—by, for example, readying itself for a preemptive strike of its own—then the ‘war scare’ was a cause for real concern.” (PFIAB, page vi)

The PFIAB report concluded that the IC’s failure to adequately report on Able Archer and the 1983–1984 Soviet war scare had important implications for the future: “In cases of great importance to the survival of our nation, and especially where there is important contradictory evidence, the Board believes that intelligence estimates must be cast in terms of alternative scenarios that are subjected to comparative risk assessments. This is the critical defect in the war scare episode.” (PFIAB, page ix)

[Document 385]

**B. Note of a Meeting Between President Reagan
and Secretary of State Shultz by the Executive
Secretary of the Department of State (Hill)[1](#)**

Washington, March 25, 1983

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, Entry for March 25, 1983. No classification marking. For the transcribed text of the note, see [Document 27](#).

[Document 386]

**C. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet
General Secretary Andropov^{[1](#)}**

Washington, July 11, 1983

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 11, 1983

Dear Gen. Secretary Andropov

I appreciate very much your letter pledging an "unending commitment of the Soviet leadership and the people of the Soviet Union to the course of peace, the elimination of the nuclear threat and the development of relations based on mutual benefit and equality with all nations."

Let me assure you the government & the people of the United States are dedicated to "the course of peace" and "the elimination of the nuclear threat". It goes without saying that we also seek relations with all nations based on "mutual benefit and equality." Our record since we were allied in W.W.II confirms that.

Mr. General Secretary could we not begin to approach these goals in the meetings now going on in Geneva? You and I share an enormous responsibility for the preservation of stability in the world. I believe we can fulfill that mandate but to do so will require a more active level of exchange than we have heretofore been able to establish. We have much to talk about with regard to the situation in Eastern Europe, South Asia, and particularly this hemisphere as well as in such areas as arms control, trade between our two countries and other ways in which we can expand east-west contacts.

Historically our predecessors have made better progress when communicating has been private and candid. If you wish to engage in such communication you will find me ready. I await your reply.

Sincerely
Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Andropov (8290913, 8391028, 8391032). No classification marking. For the transcribed text of the note, see [Document 70](#).

[Document 387]

**D. Notes by Secretary of Defense Weinberger of
a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹**

Washington, September 2, 1983

9/2/83

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NSC - Sir [unclear]
President
V.P.

G.P.S. Even ^{if} USSR thought it was a US B-52
Plane - they shot it down w/
any inquiry - was a hot line, etc -
Sharon they'd check for strike -
We should use this to help us
get Big Reform Budget -
& get rid of Bobal of Goblecki
and.

Agreement

+ maybe in Lebanon.

Sanctions - They don't hurt us.

USSR - Says they respect loss of lives by
them but not us

2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

options

State

Civil aviation options -

RR - Buy something to get preparation
Civ - Ct. of Intl Justice - x
desert demand of USSR for
Expansion

RR - They shut down our planes
in 50's & 60's

RR - what if we just turn around
a USSR ship going into
Cointo.

such meetings
Civ - NATO & ASEAN -

RR - Get other countries to join
with us for expansion - & in
action to block USSR Aircraft

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

RIS

Make public: being vs. Polansky
claim of USSR in SD, so bus

CAD

De Regan -

~~Attest~~

Economic Sanctions

Probably ~~Wants~~ agreement

or other countries
Econ. Sanctions

Stop Tourism & ask other nations to do same
Until we could get assurances
for USSR

Stop ~~imports~~ imports from USSR - All is ~~unacceptable~~
help.

Titanium & aluminum

My - on blocking USSR assets deposits -

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CW - Rescue task force

INF

GP's Army Co. meeting

Donald, Overay - Search been
unsuccessful.

PR - need Army Reductiois. I

102 Hours proceed & meet
with Ron.

Rescue mission →
Reportings. -

Stop ends' stops to measure or call
Stop for you

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

GA
Mistake had to go to media
n To open to talk to people

Shorter meeting

agenda

Shoot down

human rights - Schenck

Complain with freedom

Ed Meese, need to do our
Muj's Don't relate
to a safety.

Memorial Service at Natl. Cathedral
at 11:00

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CR - Attitude

INF - great opportunity
to go after USSR - The best
way to stop deployment -
If you eliminate we can't deploy
But we can't leave unless if you
leave even 1

You have morally what

Statement by Assistant

Planning - what can be done a better
direction

Page

Ex - Range of activities

ps

Comments

ask for Repl. of Cond. mtg

+ General Support

Let's see -
the future

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Appointment and Diary File, Box 9, Notes Set B, 1983 #25-41. No classification marking. For the transcribed text of the note, see [Document 91](#).

[Document 388]

E. Notes of a National Security Council Meeting^{[1](#)}

Washington, March 4, 1985

3-1

NSC MTG + Mar 4 65

(1)

a lot to cover result of a year of analysis today put it all in one presentation, so, a low powder in next few days instructions to delegation which leaves on Friday

3 areas

Space & Defense - admin consensus re relationship, not to propose limitation at this point

Face a military problem represented in Sov also in most any measure of real power a C may be an area of conflict, or may not be e.g. ICBM warheads - have 3:1 adv & decide in crisis situation may be worse

- intel exercise how affect
- try arm control to get fewer d. rods
- US incisors - HE, Major, D-5, B-1 may be more diff to increase on ICBM
- look at P's components imbalance via SDI

Today see after T Rumb's START + - INF see whether can get down

I Space + Def

No one proposes fastly new but now see:

- need look at 10 yr period to reduce
- transition period to enter def & further red in P

write session to explain

- 11 years in arms
- Strat S. &
- Strat Concept
-

Declassified
A/GIS/IPS
Department of State
EO 13526
Date:

- go over each area in which including ASN (2)
 - Krom radar
 - Transportability
 - suggest
 - concerns for a very solid record that they have nuclear activity data of detection
- could prob. undermine in each of a c " at heart of any project or if no chop in SW viewed, can't expect AC ~~to~~ remain viable instrument of diplomacy
- Emerging Technology

- In coming months, we further
- what limitations/restrictions might be seen haven't found any yet
 - what CBRES might take for better or
 - " us need it or not
 - for 4 other

Comment? Max?

Kampelman -

- yes OK
- agreement throughout just
- we're not demanding
- our plan to suggest a less long session about a month - look over & come back to recommence
- exchange, inform, express concerns, hear

Nitze -

- SDI = research progr not to be limited
- Begin discuss Transition phase

INF

Current Balance
Gov have 10:1 market adv

2 options

1. Current

zero zero, Int + prem,
Sept 83 - aircraft, global, PII, 420 glosa
gov sign

is really an infinite number of points

(1 0-572 (1 420

is not a take it or leave it position -
meet criteria

- eg, verify, not export to Africa
excl Fr Brit

Comments

Weins - potential re 2) system in transit
- probl re Dutch

Adeln - show probl of any non zero - 2000
1) very diff to verify - low degree
2) repres coming probl re mobile land based
1) Gov 24 + 25 railroad mobile

2. Equal to Red

works only under very narrowly defined point in time
or even then conceding Gov INF money in Asia

from 400 (Gov) number to 200 (50% cut)

to 45 " to 112 number in Eur
(market cap of 112-448)

Comments

Weins - strongly opposed

= go red not = equals

- molecular near can rapidly move
from East - easy to copy

∴ not useful re safe distinct

- get us gov money, easy expl

Shultz - says mobility concern applies to all
- go and not presume we want to endorse
but might make it negotiable

Weinb - Sat 200:112 launcher = Six ads
& West/East distance means less

Sh - merely = variant of option 1

Nice - Chap chud to show us global rt to 200

Pres - Verific?

Best spot in world to which deliver
missiles for demands by nations. For

Adel - not know if all exist missiles delivered here

Pres - at least this way we'd know

ing - can now observe best

Weinb - all non zero = hard find
" have diffie problem

Coltman

- either option can be worked with

- could be used in sequence

- should have treaty with = workheads (?)

Weinb - is 10-nukes, not workheads
or dangerous move away from one workhead from.

Sh - if Opt 1 again,

Sovs accept, but seek make more specific
& propose Opt 2 within framework
of Opt 1

Opt 2 is an illustration of 1

which may not deal as balance changes

W - can't say Opt 2 = illustr of Opt 1

when 1 = global equal

Sh - need add sec re US right to 200 globally
2 - ... to some workhead

Wims - movement away from = burden
∴ need relief
- opt 2 = increase, not reduction
∴ back to SALT theory

B. d - Gen Vissey
Vissey - Must limit all so Sovs can't move to Eur.

START

Balance

Current 1250, 5000, 400, 2.5 mil KG
Trade off

Alt 1
1250, 5000, 350

Alt 2 (ALMs lim to 4,000)
1500 launchers

Sov category & denials - would meet 1/2 way
but we'd still try reduce heavy ICBMs
from 308 to 200
and if want add ALMs would need reduce 200 further

RVS - 6,500 in 95 [25% below current
instead of 5,000 proposal today 8,300]

Rowing -
this is end game
after Sovs have reduced launchers

Alt 3 - adds ALM (1500-2000) 4500 [35% reduction in
Sov MIRVed missile work
& 35% cut in
Sov
- 1800 SMDVs, Aggregate MIRVed Missiles + 1500 ACSM
- Shift - most rad. red. in most threat system

USC - Mar 4

6

ALT 4

Bud - premised in what is militarily essential to target
(that's my pers opin re its advantage)

- approx 1000 launchers
adds systems to retrain Sov
- permits us 700 midjetman
- price = 7700 warheads = very high
of which 7,000 in '85

- 2070 fewer SNDVs than SII
& roughly double SII costs
33% MIRV ballistics

- Vissey - right, promote us to moderate
- also needs look at SDI & D/S/P
 - pride close to what Sovs want
risk term ok, then price in SDI

Pres - relatively cut? how proceed

Vis - big cut in destabilizing

ALT 5

Goes to heart of reducing most important resources
warheads & TW - by 50% in TW force
& not deplete Sov force restructuring

Eg 5,300 MIRV RVs, TW & heavy Sov Sovs
Trade-offs specific re bomber ~~restructure~~

- Wrens - bomber diff recogn we need more bomber
force of Sov air defenses
- also recogn jet diff in TW
much narrower us/Sov imbal than other of
 - "Radical rid" per Sov vocal
 - Similar. 50%

declassified
FIS/IPS
Department of State
D 13526
ate:

see Vissey, may not give in all ways for all topics
but reduce in $\$15$, TV & computers per day = 10%
horizon

Alt 6

Inspired by your Sept speech on Road map re 20 yrs
instead of just 10 year horizon

Propose we discuss outcomes at end of day
but not as demanding re details how
get there, replace etc

95 benchmarks

- 5,000 workdays
- 3 1/2 MKG Sov (25% red)
- 400 US 320 Sov

Adelm - give next view of 1st Round
set of outcomes

- RU fuel, TV & Sambers
all commit most input factors
- lays out factors without parties agreement
not include SNV limit
that's not a source to us, of Scowcroft
can
- not include ALLM limit
Sovs are demanders

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EO 13526
Date:

Back

you asked JCS address rail sufficiency
chiefs have addressed other

Vissey - most input = assumptions

- ① one assumption = will be able to complete our mod prop
Some of these damage
but you must assess our mod $\$15$ pol vs
none of these proposals OK, unless we miss

8
② you must pick a point in time when we
can check US & Sov force structures.
we've picked 1995

- all of these prop OK at '85
same for better re US moral

MIRVed mobile land based missile
extremely heterogeneous

∴ should add prov to all opt for Sov

③ how affects other negotiations

Rowley

- all proposals should be kept simple

- we ought to talk Trade offs
how in m ^{Sov} ICBM vs ^{US} BOM

- need offensive vs offensive deal
other-wise Sovs will accept off deal
& zero in on SDI

- ∴ go back to off vs off capab

Tower

- not know whether Sovs are secure

- I'm reluctant seek renewal their vult ad

- I'd prefer build on current possib
Hejira not even discussed it
& it was new

- We need discuss trade-offs, in code

- Prefer to probe, report back on our findings
such flexibility to probe

keep our moral posture on 5,000 warheads
& maybe ply with 5-5 limit

Pres - Sovs has talked re goal of total elim
- Shouldn't we pick heat up

Nike - agree
repeat goal & set path toward it

St-Ltz - Brangho not answer in Geneva

Pres - but since Geneva

Br-d -

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSC Meeting, 03/04/1985. No classification marking. For the transcribed text of the note, see [Document 375](#). No formal notes of the meeting were found.