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1 **[The court-martial was called to order at 1137, 1 August 2013.]**

2 MJ: Court is called to order. All parties present when the  
3 court last recessed are again present in court. The witness is on  
4 the witness stand. Major Fein?

5 TC[MAJ FEIN]: Yes, ma'am. Your Honor, this session is--will  
6 be--is a closed session, classified at the Secret level. The court  
7 security officer cleared the courtroom and completed his checklist  
8 and that will be filed with the post-trial documents.

9 And, also, ma'am, in the courtroom, other than the parties,  
10 is the bailiff, the Court's paralegal, members of the prosecution  
11 team, the security, members of the defense team, and U.S. government,  
12 properly cleared, officials.

13 MJ: Proceed.

14 **[Ms. Dibble was reminded of her previous oath and examination**  
15 **continued.]**

16 **Questions by the assistant trial counsel [CPT OVERGAARD]:**

17 Q. In the open session, you talked about your experience in  
18 preparing cables?

19 A. Uh-huh.

20 Q. Could you tell us, has that way--has the way of preparing  
21 cables changed at all in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs as a  
22 result of WikiLeaks?

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1           A.    I think it's fair to say that our officers are a little  
2 more cautious than they were before because, when the purported  
3 cables were released, a number of our sources were identified and, in  
4 some cases, compromised--some of our contacts--so--especially in the  
5 immediate aftermath, I think it led to a--us including less detail in  
6 cables, especially identifying details.

7           Q.    And what was the impact, in your opinion, of including less  
8 detail?

9           A.    Well, you don't get the full picture, the full context--as  
10 much of the back story as you would. I mean, as with anything, the  
11 more sharper [sic] you can paint a picture, the clearer the story is.  
12 So there was a bit of--I think a bit more fuzziness, if you will.  
13 And, maybe a word about why we included names in the first place,  
14 because, if I am a reporting officer and I am writing a cable on the  
15 democracy movement in Syria, I mean, just to give as an example, my  
16 conversations with certain people who are identified with that  
17 democracy movement or who are activists are much more meaningful than  
18 if I'm just talking to a taxi driver or a busboy at the hotel. So,  
19 you're--again, to help the readership back in the interagency policy  
20 community have a better understanding of the situation, we included  
21 identifying information, in some cases, with the parenthesis, "please  
22 protect," because we were concerned about disclosure of who our  
23 contacts were.

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1 Q. And you'd also mentioned comments were often in a lot of  
2 the cables that were written. Why are those comments important to  
3 include in cables?

4 A. The comment portion of a cable is often used for the  
5 drafting officer or the Embassy, the ambassador, the DCM--Deputy  
6 Chief of Mission is DCM--to add his or her opinion analysis of the  
7 facts being reported. You know, we can write a cable on Subject X,  
8 you know, the upcoming elections in--pick a country--and we can state  
9 the facts: "The elections are going to be held on this day. There  
10 are X number of candidates vying for X number of seats," but it's  
11 often in the comments section where the color, the background, and  
12 the opinions--the analysis of the drafting officer or of the Embassy  
13 get put in.

14 Q. And why is that analysis of the drafting officer so  
15 important at the Embassy?

16 A. It's important because it tells Washington in--for an  
17 example, that--"Okay, although these are the facts, we don't think  
18 this is actually--this is what we're being told by the government or  
19 these are the facts--this isn't how we actually think this is going  
20 to turn out," or, "These are the facts and these facts are important  
21 because of this. You know, "This is our interpretation," because  
22 that's really what we're there to do is not to just report what  
23 anyone could read in the media, but to add our analysis

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1 interpretation of what this means and why it's important for U.S.  
2 interests, for U.S. foreign policy, why it matters to us.

3 Q. And what is your analysis and interpretation based on?

4 A. It is based on analysis of the facts, but it's also based  
5 on the feel that we have because we're on the ground and we're the  
6 eyes and ears of the U.S. government on the ground. It is based on  
7 our views on the credibility of the person who is telling us  
8 something. It's--that's an area where the comment or analysis area--  
9 where, if we think someone is telling us something because they think  
10 we want to hear it, you know, we'd say it there. "Well, this is what  
11 the government is saying, but our other sources tell us--or indicate  
12 to us that this is really what's happening or this is what's behind  
13 that decision."

14 So it goes--it delves a layer or two deeper into the  
15 situation to put it in context for our readership back in the U.S.

16 Q. Now, we talked a little bit in the open session about when  
17 the cables were first released. What position were you in when the  
18 actual leaks--or the unauthorized disclosures first began?

19 A. I was a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of  
20 European Affairs at the time.

21 Q. What does it mean to be the Deputy Assistant Secretary?

22 A. I worked for the Assistant Secretary. I was one of--I  
23 believe there were seven of us working on European Affairs. My

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1 specific portfolio included Western Europe--so the 11 countries of  
2 Western Europe as defined by the State Department--and I also covered  
3 the European Union. I had just come from being Deputy Chief of  
4 Mission in Rome. Italy was one of the countries that I covered.

5 Q. Did you, personally, experience any impact from the  
6 unauthorized disclosures?

7 A. Yes, unfortunately.

8 Q. What was it?

9 A. I had been, as I said, Deputy Chief of Mission, and for a  
10 period of 7 months, I was chargé d'affaires in Rome when we were  
11 between ambassadors.

12 Q. Can you tell us what that means?

13 A. Chargé d'affaires is when there is no ambassador in a  
14 country, the senior--the next most-senior official is in charge of  
15 the Embassy; it's the acting-ambassador, if you will. And I was  
16 acting-ambassador in Italy from February to August of 2009. Included  
17 in that period was a visit to Italy by President Obama; his first  
18 visit to Italy.

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1 Q.

2 A.

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Q. And just go--you said you were the reviewer. So what does

9 that mean as far as how the cable appears?

10 A.

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17 Q.

18 A.

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22 Q.

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1           A.    I had just left Rome when the first wave of cables came  
2 out--or purported cables came out and the--I was in my new job as  
3 Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Europe. I was vilified in the  
4 Italian press for insulting the honor of the Prime Minister. It  
5 hampered my--because my Italian contacts were, I think, embarrassed  
6 by this, it hampered my ability, to a certain extent, to deal with  
7 the Italians. I got comments like, "Well, we thought you were our  
8 friend. We thought you could--we could trust you." Right after the  
9 release occurred, the, then Secretary of State, Secretary Clinton met  
10 with Prime Minister Berlusconi at an OSCE, Organization for Security  
11 and Cooperation in Europe, Summit in Kazakhstan and he raised--I was  
12 not in this meeting, but my boss, the Assistant Secretary for  
13 European Affairs was and----

14           ADC[MAJ HURLEY]: Pardon me, Ms. Dibble. Ma'am, we'd object as  
15 to hearsay.

16           MJ: Yes?

17           [Examination of the witness continued.]

18           Q.    And, actually, we would just ask that you focus on your  
19 personal impact, versus what you heard.

20           WIT: Well, I got told by my boss, when he got back from this  
21 meeting----

22           ADC[MAJ HURLEY]: Again, I'm sorry to interrupt Ms. Dibble.  
23 Objection, hearsay.

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1 Q. Without going into what your boss said, what impact did you  
2 experience?

3 A.

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5 Q. And when did you move back over to the Near Eastern Affairs  
6 Bureau?

7 A. In the summer of 2011, right around Labor Day.

8 Q. And were there still cables being posted on WikiLeaks at  
9 that time?

10 A. Yes, I think there was a tranche--I believe there was a  
11 tranche--or the full tranche was posted in that summer in August, as  
12 I recall. I don't recall the exact date, but----

13 Q. Did you review any of those cables at the--in the Near East  
14 Affairs Bureau?

15 A. Yes, I did. And we're going to start--and we're just going  
16 to talk about what's been the overall impact and then break down into  
17 the specific countries. So, can you tell us about, just what overall  
18 impact of the release of these cables was on the Near East?

19 A. Again, I think----

20 Q. On the U.S. operation----

21 A. Sure.

22 Q. ----in the Near East.

23 A. On U.S. operations?

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1 Q. Yes.

2 A.

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7 MJ: Yes?

8 ADC[MAJ HURLEY]: Pardon me, Ms. Dibble. Ma'am, we'd object to  
9 that as to her understanding of that information is based on hearsay.

10 MJ: She's testifying in her expert capacity. That's fine.

11 ADC[MAJ HURLEY]: All right, ma'am.

12 [Examination of the witness continued.]

13 Q. And we'll get to--we'll go into Libya in more detail in a  
14 few moments,

15 A.

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20 Q.

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22 A.

23 , just to put it in context, this is the spring of

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1 and not just in--do I need to  
2 go into detail about what the is or is that----

3 MJ: I got that.

4 A.

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9 Q.

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11 A.

12 Q. And can you explain the importance of our relationship with  
13 Libya at that time?

14 A. Libya had been a pariah state for several decades,  
15 basically, under Omar Ghaddafi's reign from the--he took power in  
16 1969. Libya was a state-sponsor of terrorism. Libya was pursuing a  
17 program of weapons of mass destruction. Libya was responsible for  
18 the Pan-Am 103 bombing in 1988 that killed a number of U.S. citizens.  
19 There were a couple of other terrorist interests that were pinned--  
20 attributed to--credited by Libya.

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Q. Did we have an Embassy in Libya at the time?

A. We had an Embassy, but, before that, it was headed by a Deputy Chief of Mission/Chargé d'Affaires. It took a long time to get an ambassador back,

and also to get an ambassador through the Congress because there was great skepticism. So, Gene Cretz was our first ambassador in Libya in several decades.

Q. And was he the ambassador in late 2010 when the cables were initially released?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. And how long had he been in Libya at the time?

A. I'm trying to remember--2008--I guess it was the summer of 2008 he went back there. He had been there for a couple of years--I think it was 2 1/2 years at that point.

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1 Q. And what happened to the ambassador--to Ambassador Cretz in  
2 late 2010 as a result of WikiLeaks?

3 MJ: Yes?

4 ADC[MAJ HURLEY]: Ma'am, this is just where we would object;  
5 1001(b)(4).

6 MJ: Got it. Go ahead.

7 [Examination of the witness continued.]

8 A.

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12 Q.

13 A.

14 Q. Like you were explaining before?

15 A. Yes. I should say, at the bottom of all of our cables,  
16 there's a signature block and, you know, if I'm signing out--if I'm  
17 the chargé d'affaires, the cable would say, "Dibble" at the bottom.

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ADC[MAJ HURLEY]: Pardon me, Ms. Dibble. Ma'am, objection, hearsay.

MJ: All right. On this one, the Court believes that under M.R.E. 703, that this would be more probative in value in helping the fact-finder evaluate the opinion and that it substantially outweighs the prejudicial effect. I'm going to overrule the objection.

Go ahead.

[Examination of the witness continued.]

Q. You can continue.

A.

Q.

A. In February of 2011, the Libyan Revolution erupted.

ADC[MAJ HURLEY]: Ma'am--I'm sorry, Ms. Dibble--again, this 1001(b)(4) objection; relevance, generally.

MJ: Okay. Got it.

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1 [Examination of the witness continued.]

2 A. The Libyan Revolution erupted and it became clear as the  
3 fighting intensified in and around Tripoli that we would have to  
4 evacuate not only U.S. government personnel, but any American  
5 citizens who wanted to be evacuated which is--evacuating private  
6 Americans is standard practice under the No Double Standard Rule.  
7 So, if we're pulling all of our folks out, we have to offer  
8 assistance to pull out American--private Americans as well.

9 Q. And who was--after Ambassador Cretz left, who was in charge  
10 of the Embassy?

11 A. The Embassy was run by the Deputy Chief of Mission who,  
12 after Ambassador Cretz's departure, became the Chargé d'Affaires, who  
13 was a very a capable, but more junior officer. She was, in our  
14 parlance, an O1 officer which is the equivalent of an O6 in the  
15 military system. Ambassador Cretz is Senior Foreign Service,  
16 equivalent of a two-star. So, we were without our senior leadership  
17 at the Embassy.

18 Q. And what role does an ambassador play when a country goes  
19 through turmoil like Libya was going through at the time?

20 A.

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MJ: Captain Overgaard, I am going to stop you, here, for a moment.

ATC[CPT OVERGAARD]: Yes, ma'am.

MJ: Where are you going with this? Is the----

ATC[CPT OVERGAARD]: Well, my next question is: "Would there have been a benefit to having Ambassador Cretz there and, in your opinion, what would that benefit have been?"

MJ: Ms. Dibble, could the Department of State have put another person of ambassador level in Libya at the time?

WIT: No, we couldn't have gotten approval from the Libyans to send someone in on short notice because of--you can't just re-appoint--you can't appoint an ambassador without Senate confirmation process and, even getting a temporary ambassador requires visas and things like that and, as things were happening so quickly, we didn't have an option. That was our judgment at the time.

MJ: All right. Develop your foundation if you're going to go down there.

ATC[CPT OVERGAARD]: Yes, ma'am.

MJ: Go ahead.

[Examination of the witness continued.]

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1 Q. And you said the replacement was an O6 level and Ambassador  
2 Cretz was, basically, our equivalent of a two-star. What weight does  
3 the title of ambassador carry in a country such as Libya?

4 A. It carries a great deal of weight in any country because  
5 ambassadors are recognized as sort of the top dog and are--especially  
6 in the U.S. system because they require Senate confirmation; they're  
7 presidential appointees. So, in terms of protocol and access, it is  
8 much easier for an ambassador to get in to see senior government  
9 officials and press a case, as opposed to having to go in at the  
10 working level, say, of the foreign ministry and try and work an issue  
11 from there.

12 Q. So, does it help with negotiations?

13 A. Yes, it does.

14 Q. Does it help with getting things done in a country?

15 A.

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19 Q.

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22 A.

23 Q.

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7 Q.

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12 Q.

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21 Q.

22 A.

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19 Q.

20 A.

21 Q.

22 ADC [MAJ HURLEY] :

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1 MJ:

2 [Examination of the witness continued.]

3 Q.

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15 Q.

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17 A.

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13 ADC [MAJ HURLEY] :

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15 ATC [CPT OVERGAARD] :

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18 MJ:

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20 [Examination of the witness continued.]

21 Q.

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23 A.

1 Q.

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14 ADC [MAJ HURLEY] :

15 WIT :

16 MJ :

17 ADC [MAJ HURLEY] :

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19 MJ :

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21 WIT :

22 MJ :

1 WIT

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4 MJ:

5 [Examination of the witness continued.]

6 Q.

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13 Q.

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1 Q.

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3 A.

4 Q.

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10 A.

11 ATC[CPT OVERGAARD]: One moment, please. No further questions.

12 Thank you.

13 MJ: All right. Defense?

14 ADC[MAJ HURLEY]: Yes, ma'am. Thank you.

15 **CROSS-EXAMINATION**

16 **Questions by the assistant defense counsel [MAJ HURLEY]:**

17 Q. Good morning, again, Ms. Dibble.

18 A. Good morning again.

19 Q. Ma'am, I'm going to start off by reading the full quote  
20 from Secretary Gates; I was concerned about spillage.

21 A. Uh-huh.

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1 Q. And, as we talked about it, you said that more context  
2 would have helped you understand and comment on the quote and I'll  
3 just start there. Okay?

4 A. Okay.

5 Q. And the--here's the full quote from the secretary: "The  
6 fact is governments deal with the United States because it's in their  
7 interest, not because they like us, not because they trust us, not  
8 because they believe we can keep secrets. Many governments--some  
9 governments deal with us because they fear us, some because they  
10 respect us, most because they need us. We are, essentially, as has  
11 been said before, the indispensable nation."

12 Does that context help you process that a little better?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Do you agree with that statement?

15 MJ: Let the record reflect Chief Parra has entered the  
16 courtroom. Go ahead.

17 A. I don't agree with that 100 percent. I don't know--maybe  
18 you can tell me when the quote was released and the context--was that  
19 a public quote?

20 Q. Yes, ma'am, it was.

21 A. In press guidance--or what was it?

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1 Q. It was a public quote in a--this was in the--in his  
2 interaction with reporters--the quote that I have is dated November  
3 30th, 2010.

4 A. Well, with all respect to the former Secretary of Defense,  
5 I don't agree, entirely, with everything that is included in that  
6 statement, no.

7 Q. And there are sometimes disagreements between  
8 representatives of the United States--or individuals in the United  
9 States government?

10 A. Yes, frequently.

11 Q. And this would just be one of those instances?

12 A. [No response.]

13 Q.

14 Thanks--and ma'am, again, when I ask you  
15 questions--when I stop talking, if you would respond to the statement  
16 or question----

17 A. Okay.

18 Q. ---verbally, that would be great.

19 A. Okay.

20 Q. Thank you.

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22 A. Yes.

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1 Q.

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3 A.

4 Q.

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6 A.

7 Q.

8 A.

9 Q.

10 A.

11 Q. And you'd left to be the PDAS for the--Western Europe?

12 A. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Europe and  
13 European Union, yeah.

14 Q. Thanks, ma'am. And then, subsequent to--and that was  
15 unrelated to this matter with Prime Minister Berlusconi--that  
16 personnel move?

17 A.

18 Q. And then you are--you transitioned from there to the Bureau  
19 of Near Eastern Affairs?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. That personnel move was unrelated to these disclosures?

22 A. Correct.

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1 Q. Now you're going to be the Deputy Chief of Mission of  
2 London?

3 A. Correct.

4 Q. And that personnel move was unrelated to these disclosures?

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. Your career inside the United States government has not  
7 been harmed as a result of this public disclosure?

8 A. No.

9 Q.

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11 A.

12 Q.

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14 A.

15 Q.

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18 A.

19 Q.

20 A.

21 Q.

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1 A.

2 Q. They were fairly harsh with him?

3 A. The Italian press?

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. Parts of it, yes.

6 Q.

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9 A.

10 Q.

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12 A.

13 Q.

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1 A.

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3 Q.

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6 A. Yes, and then, like any cable--I mean, as a drafting  
7 officer, you know, if I'm a mid-level officer in an Embassy, I draft  
8 a cable, I don't just send it out.

9 Q. Right.

10 A. It goes up through the chain through the clearance process.

11 Q. And you've been part of that clearance process, right?

12 A. Yes, I have.

13 Q. And sometimes you tell the drafting officer to take out  
14 information?

15 A. Yes, or to add--to expand to this session, yeah.

16 Q. Because the concept, generally stated, with cables is to  
17 inform someone about an event of importance to the Embassy?

18 A. Correct.

19 Q. And, therefore, an event of importance----

20 A. An event of importance to the United States government.

21 Q. Right.

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. That's what I was driving at.

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1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. Thank you, ma'am. Now, you talked about the Arab Spring  
3 and here's the way I would described the Arab Spring in succession:  
4 there was a revolution in Tunisia--or the government fell in Tunisia--  
5 ---

6 A.

7

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9 Q. And that--the president of Tunisia, his name was?

10 A. Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.

11 Q. And he'd been the long-time president of Tunisia?

12 A. Yes, since 1987.

13 Q. And then after Tunisia, the Arab Spring shifted to Egypt?

14 A. Egypt.

15 Q. And the government of President Mubarak fell, correct?

16 A. Yes, President Mubarak did not take the Ben Ali option of  
17 hopping on a plane and stayed and ended up--basically, there was a--  
18 the popular uprising resulted in Mubarak being placed under arrest.

19 Q. And, I guess, before we go any further, sometimes there are  
20 different euphemisms for governments falling. One way to describe a  
21 government falling would be the coalition running the government  
22 stopped working and the--but, otherwise, the institutions of the  
23 government remained in place.

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1           A.    Yes, and that's what happens in a parliamentary democracy,  
2 for example. You know, the government falls and they call for new  
3 elections, but the army still functions, the civil service still  
4 functions; you know, that's what happens in a place like Italy, for  
5 example, when the government falls.

6           Q.    Right. But, we're talking about these governments falling,  
7 they washed away?

8           A.

9

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14          Q.    Right.

15          A.

16          Q.    And then the work in progress in the spring of 2011  
17 continued after the event in Egypt to the events in Libya?

18          A.    Now,

19          Q.                Thank you, ma'am. And we talked--we had two  
20 interviews, is that right, Ms. Dibble?

21          A.    Yes.

22          Q.    You and I have met twice?

23          A.    Yes.

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1 Q. In fact, you met with me and Captain Tooman and Mr. Coombs  
2 joined us today and our defense security experts?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. In the first one, we talked about the cause of the Arab  
5 Spring, and I don't know if you remember that; it's been a while.

6 A. I don't remember the specific conversation.

7 Q. It has been a while, but I asked you in that conversation,  
8 "Did the WikiLeaks disclosures cause the Arab Spring?"

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10 A.

11 Q.

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15 A.

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21 Q. Right. And you would use that

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23 A.

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1 Q. But the WikiLeaks--but these disclosures, they did publicly  
2 revealed certain information about Tunisia to Tunisians--that they  
3 didn't have those--that information before? Do you see what I mean?

4 A.

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21 Q. Certainly, ma'am. And we were just talking about Tunisia,  
22 but the arc that you were talking about where people that--and I'm--  
23 I'll just restate the arc as I understood it--the individuals in

~~SECRET~~

1 these countries, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Tunisia, they knew--they  
2 intuitively knew things were true about their own country, but now,  
3 with these disclosures, they had other information to inform their  
4 opinions?

5 A.

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13 Q.

14 A.

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16 Q. It wasn't a surprise, but it was information they didn't  
17 have before?

18 A.

19

20

21

22 Q.

23

~~SECRET~~

- 1 A.
- 2 Q.
- 3 A.
- 4 Q.
- 5 A.
- 6 Q.
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10 A.
- 11 Q.
- 12 A.
- 13 Q.
- 14
- 15 A.
- 16 Q.
- 17 A.
- 18 Q.
- 19 A.
- 20 Q.
- 21
- 22 A.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1 Q. Now, was Cretz leaving--he wasn't the cause of the Libyan  
2 revolution, was he?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Let's talk about the evacuation. You indicated that there  
5 was an evacuation had to be done for the Embassy and the personnel in  
6 the Embassy?

7 A. Yes, and also for private American citizens.

8 Q. In that evacuation would've had to occur no matter who was  
9 the ambassador or the chargé or whatever? The nature of the  
10 revolution caused the evacuation?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And the evacuation required a good bit of resources to pull  
13 off?

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. Any required a good bit of coordination with the Libyan  
16 government, as it existed then?

17 A.

18 Q. Ambassador Cretz's absence made the evacuation more  
19 difficult?

20 A.

21 Q. The evacuation still occurred?

22 A. Yes.

~~SECRET~~

1 Q. And the mission, in its entirety, to pull out that American  
2 Embassy was accomplished?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q.

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8 A.

9 Q.

10 A.

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14 Q.

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16 A.

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18 Q.

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22 A.

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Q. Now, you indicated once, before--in fact, I guess it came up in your role when you had to be the chargé in the Italian Embassy--that the Italian Embassy was between ambassadors for a while, right?

A. Correct.

Q. And it's a fairly routine occurrence to have an ambassador leave an Embassy?

A. Yes, we rotate our ambassadors, more or less, on 3-year cycles.

Q. And--all right, ma'am. Thank you. Those are all the questions I have about Libya. I reconsidered asking the question I was going to ask.

A. Okay.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.



1 A.

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5 Q.

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8 A.

9 Q.

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11 A.

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13 Q.

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17 A.

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20 Q.

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3 A.

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6 Q.

7 A.

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13 Q.

14 A.

15 Q.

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17 A.

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19 Q.

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21 A.

22 Q.

23 A.

1 Q.

2 A.

3 Q.

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5 A.

6 Q.

7 A.

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10 Q.

11

12 A.

13 Q.

14 A.

15 Q.

16 MJ:

17 WIT:

18 ADC[MAJ HURLEY]:

19

20 [Examination of the witness continued.]

21 Q.

22

1 A.

2

3

4

5 Q.

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7 A.

8 Q.

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11 A.

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16 Q.

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21 A.

1 Q.

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4 A.

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6 Q.

7 A.

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11 Q.

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15 A.

16 Q.

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19 A.

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22 Q.

23 A.

1 Q.

2 expression?

3 A.

4 Q.

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8 A.

9 Q.

10

11 A.

12 Q.

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15 A.

16 Q.

17 A.

18 Q.

19

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21 A.

22 Q.

1 A.

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7 Q.

8 A.

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10 Q.

11 A.

12 Q.

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15 A.

16 Q.

17 A.

18 Q.

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20 A.

21 Q.

22

23 A.

- 1 Q.
- 2
- 3 A.
- 4 Q.
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- 6 A.
- 7 Q.
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- 9 A.
- 10 Q.
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- 12 A.
- 13 Q.
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- 17 A.
- 18 Q.
- 19 A.
- 20 Q.
- 21 A.
- 22 Q.
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- 1 A.
- 2 Q.
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- 7 A.
- 8 Q.
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- 10 A.
- 11 Q.
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- 13 A.
- 14 Q.
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- 16 A.
- 17 Q.
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- 20 A.
- 21 Q.
- 22
- 23 A.

- 1 Q.
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- 6 A.
- 7 Q.
- 8 A.
- 9 Q.
- 10
- 11 A.
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- 13 Q.
- 14 A.
- 15 Q.
- 16 A.
- 17 Q.
- 18 A.
- 19 Q.
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- 21 A.
- 22 Q.
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- 19 Q.
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- 22 A.

1 Q.

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15 Q.

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18 Q.

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21 Q.

22 A.

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6 Q.

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8 A.

9 Q.

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19 Q.

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21 A.

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11 Q.

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13 A.

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17 Q.

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9 Q.

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11 A.

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17 Q.

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19 A.

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21 ADC[MAJ HURLEY]: Thank you, ma'am.

22 MJ: Redirect?

23 ATC[CPT OVERGAARD]: Yes, ma'am.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

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Questions by the assistant trial counsel [CPT OVERGAARD]:

Q.

MJ:

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.



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17 Q.

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19 A.

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21 Q.

22 A.

~~SECRET~~

1 Q.

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4 A.

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7 Q.

8 A.

9 Q.

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14 A.

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20 ATC[CPT OVERGAARD]: Thank you.

21 ADC[MAJ HURLEY]: Yes, ma'am.

22 MJ: Briefly.

23 ADC[MAJ HURLEY]: Yes, ma'am.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1 MJ: And the government gets the last word; it's their witness.  
2 So, go ahead.

3 ADC[MAJ HURLEY]: Yes, ma'am.

4 **RE-CROSS-EXAMINATION**

5 **Questions by the assistant defense counsel [MAJ HURLEY]:**

6 Q. Ms. Dibble, there are reporting channels to the 65 other  
7 U.S. government agencies that are not SIPDIS, right?

8 A. Yes, there are.

9 Q. And are you aware that Undersecretary Kennedy testified  
10 that, during the same time you distributed 250,000 cables on SIPDIS,  
11 you distributed 10 times that amount, or 2.5 million cables, through  
12 these other channels.

13 A.

14  
15 Q. So, it was truly sensitive, a more restricted channel or  
16 one of these other methods could have been used and you would not  
17 have to worry about not getting the information to those who need it?

18 A.

19

20 ADC[MAJ HURLEY]: Thank you, ma'am.

21 MJ: Go ahead.

22 ATC[CPT OVERGAARD]: No more questions, ma'am.

23 MJ: I just have one.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

1 MJ: Okay. That sounds good.

2 ADC[MAJ HURLEY]: We will leave for you, I guess.

3 MJ: Anything else we need to address?

4 TC[MAJ FEIN]: No, ma'am. This session was at the Secret level,  
5 for the record.

6 MJ: Okay. So, court is in recess, now until 1430.

7 **[The court-martial recessed at 1309, 1 August 2013.]**

~~SECRET~~