



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2ND BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM
10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION (LIGHT INFANTRY)
FORT DRUM, NY 13602

AFZS-BBA-IN

29 April 2011

MEMORANDUM THRU Commander, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division
(Light Infantry), Fort Drum, NY 13602-5000

Commander, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Fort Drum, NY 13602-500

FOR Commander, Headquarters, United States Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson,
Georgia 30330-1062

SUBJECT: Rebuttal of General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand of Master Sergeant Paul D.
Adkins, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d BCT, 10th MTN DIV, Fort Drum, NY
13602-5000

1. I respectfully request that this statement be reviewed and considered before a final determination is made regarding filing of this Administrative Reprimand in accordance with Army Regulation (AR) 600-37, paragraph 3-4(b)(1)(b).
2. I acknowledge receiving this Administrative Reprimand.
3. I have read and understand the unfavorable information presented against me and submit the following on my behalf.
 - a. Understanding of time line of events while in garrison.

(1) I have read the AR 15-6 Report, and it fails to provide and establish a timeline of events that would give the reader a better perspective of why certain courses of actions were taken.

(2) As a leader, one learns to employ a variety of tactics to train, mentor and address deficiencies. Therefore, to my recollection, the first outburst (he did not harm himself or others) that PFC Manning had occurred around August of 2009. We were set to deploy in September of 2009. I determined as a leader it was urgent to address whatever issues PFC Manning was having, to ensure our section's ability to support the needs of the Command. I had to take control because the S-2 section was not fully functional. The S-2 was below staffing requirements in accordance with the UMR. Additionally, five key leaders within the section (one CPT, one 1LT, one CW2, one SSG and one SGT) deployed at least one month later than the main body due to medical, familial or administrative requirements. Contrary to the misleading statements in paragraph (5) of the AR 15-6 Report, I expressed my concerns about PFC Manning at the time with MAJ Clausen, the brigade S-2. We discussed leaving PFC Manning with the rear detachment, but we were faced with another soldier who had recently had a heart attack and was pending medical retirement in the near future. One incident in August of 2009 by PFC Manning was of him yelling and would not justify leaving him with rear detachment.

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Additionally, I informed MAJ Clausen that I was referring PFC Manning to Behavioral Health.

(3) The Army has been placing an enormous emphasis on its leaders to not stigmatize and instead assist their Soldiers in receiving mental health treatment, avoiding situations that may lead to suicide or other behaviors harmful to Soldiers. Therefore, after his outburst, I not only addressed concerns with leadership in the S-2 section, but guided PFC Manning to seek the services of a behavioral health specialist. PFC Manning went through a pre-screening exam. However, there was not enough time to initiate therapy because of the impending deployment in only about a month.

(4) I was able to conclude from the lack of concern from the pre-screening, that PFC Manning's issues were not grave enough to concern a behavioral health expert, or disqualify him from deploying on time with the unit. It was my understanding at the time that there simply was not enough time to initiate long term therapy. The recommendation from Behavioral Health was to initiate therapy in theater.

(5) Essentially, what the AR 15-6 Report characterizes as leadership that appeared to be hands on, personal and close allowed me to lose objectivity is erroneous. PFC Manning's immediate supervisors during a month prior to deployment had enough to deal with, and I took control of the situation. I ensured they supported the needs of the command while I ensured PFC Manning received attention through the appropriate services the Army has available, allowing the section to support the Command's intelligence requirements.

b. Events while deployed.

(1) While deployed, I ensured PFC Manning initiated therapy, as was recommended in garrison. He attended therapy sessions at the combat stress center shortly after arriving in theater, approximately November of 2009. MAJ Clausen and myself wanted to reduce the risk of problems with PFC Manning; thereby, he was placed on the night shift to mitigate his stress level. During the course of the deployment, I also suggested to the company commander MAJ Potter that a Command referral be made for a mental health evaluation. The commander concurred. The evaluation, however, determined the Soldier was fit to return to duty. However, he continued therapy until he was arrested around May of 2010.

(2) I wrote three memorandums for record, December of 2009, March of 2010 and April of 2010. The three memorandums were addressed to PFC Manning's therapist, which described his behaviors and outburst. My intention of writing those memorandums was to ensure the therapist had a clear understanding of PFC Manning's behavior since I was not privy to their discussion and did not want PFC Manning to sugarcoat or fail to mention the incidents. Additionally, I met face-to face at least twice with his therapist to discuss PFC Manning's conditions.

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(3) The AR 15-6 Report states I failed to take appropriate actions after PFC Manning assaulted SPC Showman and allowed him to retain his weapon. This statement is misleading. PFC Manning kept his weapon, but I secured PFC Manning's bolt from his weapon the evening of the incident. I placed the bolt in a locked ammo can which was chained to the floor, thus rendering his weapon unusable.


(4) Paragraph (4) of the AR 15-6 Report is again misleading in that it states that I failed to notify the chain of command of the incident concerning SPC Showman, when in fact CPT Fulton, the S-2 Planning Officer, was present during the incident. PFC Manning was removed immediately from the T-SCIF and later charged with assault. I notified the S2, CPT Lim, as well as the company 1SG, immediately after the situation stabilized. Due to this incident, he was reduced from SPC to PFC. Additionally, he lost access to the T-SCIF and no longer had access to his MI computer.

(5) Lastly, I do not recall PFC Manning making any statements to me that indicated a lack of loyalty to the United States or that the United States flag meant nothing to him.

4. In conclusion, I should not be reprimanded for the actions of PFC Manning. I made leadership decisions based on limited information. I deemed these decisions at the time to be in the best interests of the Soldier and our unit. I attempted to mitigate risk by affording PFC Manning proper medical attention while continuing to employ him effectively in a combat situation. Within my service time I have deployed four times for a total of 42 months, to both Iraq and Afghanistan. I consider myself a patriot of a country I love, and have always been willing to die for. I always had the best interests of my unit, Army and our nation in mind. I am just as appalled and disgusted by the actions of PFC Manning as all are in our nation.

5. For the forgoing reasons, I respectfully request that you withdraw the Administrative Reprimand and not place it in my OMPF.

6. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at DSN (b) (6) r DSN (b) (6)


PAUL D. ADKINS
MASTER SERGEANT