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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

John Greenwald
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

FEB 08 2016

Reference: ODNI Case DF-2014-00064

Dear Mr. Greenwald:

This is an interim response to your request dated 4 December 2013 (Enclosure 1), received in the Information Management Division of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on 6 December 2013. Pursuant to the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, you requested a copy of *“all records of correspondence between members of Congress and the Director of national Intelligence, from the time period of 9/01/2012 – 12/31/2012.”*


Your request was processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and documents responsive to your request were located. At this time, 19 documents are being released to you in full. In addition, ODNI has determined that two documents can be released to you with information withheld pursuant to the following FOIA exemptions:

- (b)(3), which applies to information exempt from disclosure by statute, specifically the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(m)(1), which protects, among other things, the names and identifying information of ODNI personnel; and
- (b)(6), which applies to records which, if released, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of individuals.

Documents containing equities under the purview of other government agencies have been forwarded to the appropriate agencies for their review and response to us. Upon completion of those consultations we will provide our final response, along with appeal rights.

If you have any questions, email our Requester Service Center at DNI-FOIA@dni.gov or call us at (703) 874-8500.

Sincerely,


Jennifer Hudson
Director, Information Management Division

Enclosures

ENCLOSURE 1

DNI-FOIA

DF-2014-00064

From: John Greenewald, Jr. [john@greenewald.com]
Sent: Wednesday, December 04, 2013 6:44 PM
To: DNI-FOIA
Subject: FOIA REQUEST

To whom it may concern,

This is a non-commercial request made under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 5 U.S.C. S 552. My FOIA requester status as a "representative of the news media." I am a freelance television producer often working on documentaries related to my FOIA requests, my work is commonly featured throughout major news organizations, and I freelance writer for news sites as well. Examples can be given, if needed.

I prefer electronic delivery of the requested material either via email to john@greenewald.com or via CD-ROM or DVD via postal mail. Please contact me should this FOIA request should incur a charge.

I respectfully request a copy of all records of correspondence between members of Congress, and the Director of National Intelligence, from the time period of 9/01/2012-12/31/2012. This would include, but not be limited to, emails, letters, memos, etc.

Thank you so much for your time, and I am very much looking forward to your response.

Sincerely,

John Greenewald, Jr.
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

POD-ju

DEC 06 2013

Sincerely,

John Greenewald, Jr.
The Black Vault
<http://www.theblackvault.com>

Social Media:

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ENCLOSURE 2

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate

SEP 07 2012

The Honorable Richard M. Burr
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate

The Honorable Marco Rubio
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate

Dear Vice Chairman Chambliss, Senator Burr, and Senator Rubio:

(U) Thank you for your August 15th letter expressing concern about unauthorized disclosures of classified information. I too am outraged by the volume of media disclosures of classified information.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Your letter expresses concern that John Brennan's August 8, 2012 remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations may have revealed sensitive classified information. I want to assure you that is not the case. Mr. Brennan's remarks were drawn from the June 15, 2012 unclassified semiannual War Powers Report to Congress. The Congress received notification in advance of transmittal of the Report that the Report would acknowledge that the U.S. military engages in direct action against al-Qa'ida in Yemen and Somalia. The June 15 Report stated that in Somalia the U.S. military has worked to counter the terrorist threat posed by al-Qa'ida and al-Qa'ida-associated elements of al-Shabaab. The Report also noted that in a limited number of cases, the U.S. military has taken direct action in Somalia against members of al-Qa'ida, including those who are also members of al-Shabaab, who are engaged in efforts to carry out terrorist attacks against the United States and our interests. The Report went on to note that the U.S. military has also been working closely with the Yemeni government to operationally dismantle and ultimately eliminate the terrorist threat posed by al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). I have enclosed a copy of the Report that was transmitted to Congress on June 15 of this year, for your reference.

(U//~~FOUO~~) After a careful evaluation to ensure that disclosure of this information would not in any way harm U.S. national security or jeopardize the safety of the American people (including military and intelligence personnel), the Administration decided to publicly disclose the fact that the U.S. military has taken direct action in Yemen and Somalia against members of al-Qa'ida and its associated forces in the June Report to Congress. Mr. Brennan's speech repeated what had already been publicly disclosed. We try very hard to strike a careful balance

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between transparency and national security, and in the case of Yemen and Somalia, we agreed that the above information should be disclosed.

(U) Legislation that focuses on authorized disclosures of previously classified information – such as the case above – will not address the serious problem of unauthorized disclosures. I have taken steps to help prevent and detect leaks in the Intelligence Community, to include changes to polygraph questioning and to administrative practices to help ensure that all possible leads in unauthorized disclosure cases are exhausted before closing a case. However, any measures that address the problem of unauthorized disclosures of classified information should extend to the full set of individuals across the government entrusted with classified information. I appreciate you sharing your views with me and I look forward to working with you to strengthen our ability to deter and detect unauthorized disclosures.

Sincerely,


James R. Clapper

Enclosure

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available online
whitehouse.gov

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

June 15, 2012

TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE SENATE

June 15, 2012

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

I am providing this supplemental consolidated report, prepared by my Administration and consistent with the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148), as part of my efforts to keep the Congress informed about deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat.

MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST AL-QA'IDA, THE TALIBAN, AND
ASSOCIATED FORCES AND IN SUPPORT OF RELATED U.S.
COUNTERTERRORISM (CT) OBJECTIVES

Since October 7, 2001, the United States has conducted combat operations in Afghanistan against al-Qa'ida terrorists, their Taliban supporters, and associated forces. In support of these and other overseas operations, the United States has deployed combat equipped forces to a number of locations in the U.S. Central, Pacific, European, Southern, and Africa Command areas of operation. Previously such operations and deployments have been reported, consistent with Public Law 107-40 and the War Powers Resolution, and operations and deployments remain ongoing. These operations, which the United States has carried out with the assistance of numerous international partners, have degraded al-Qa'ida's capabilities and brought an end to the Taliban's leadership of Afghanistan.

United States Armed Forces are now actively pursuing and engaging remaining al-Qa'ida and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. The total number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan is approximately 90,000, of which more than 70,000 are assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. In accordance with June 2011 Presidential guidance, the Department of Defense remains on track to achieve a Force Management Level of 68,000 U.S. forces by the end of this summer. After that, reductions will continue at a steady pace.

The U.N. Security Council most recently reaffirmed its authorization of ISAF for a 12-month period until October 13, 2012, in U.N. Security Council Resolution 2011 (October 12, 2011). The mission of ISAF, under NATO command and in

partnership with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, is to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for international terrorists. Fifty nations, including the United States and all 28 NATO Allies, contribute forces to ISAF. These forces, including U.S. "surge" forces deployed in late 2009 and 2010, broke Taliban momentum and trained additional Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The ANSF are now increasingly assuming responsibility for security on the timeline committed to at the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon by the United States, our NATO allies, ISAF partners, and the Government of Afghanistan.

United States Armed Forces are detaining in Afghanistan approximately 2,748 individuals under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40) as informed by the laws of war. On March 9, 2012, the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Afghan government under which the United States is to transfer Afghan nationals detained by U.S. forces in Afghanistan to the custody and control of the Afghan government within 6 months. Efforts are underway to accomplish such transfers in a safe and humane manner.

The combat-equipped forces, deployed since January 2002 to Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, continue to conduct secure detention operations for the approximately 169 detainees at Guantanamo Bay under Public Law 107-40 and consistent with principles of the law of war.

In furtherance of U.S. efforts against members of al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, and associated forces, the United States continues to work with partners around the globe, with a particular focus on the U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility. In this context, the United States has deployed U.S. combat-equipped forces to assist in enhancing the CT capabilities of our friends and allies, including special operations and other forces for sensitive operations in various locations around the world.

In Somalia, the U.S. military has worked to counter the terrorist threat posed by al-Qa'ida and al-Qa'ida-associated elements of al-Shabaab. In a limited number of cases, the U.S. military has taken direct action in Somalia against members of al-Qa'ida, including those who are also members of al-Shabaab, who are engaged in efforts to carry out terrorist attacks against the United States and our interests.

The U.S. military has also been working closely with the Yemeni government to operationally dismantle and ultimately eliminate the terrorist threat posed by al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the most active and dangerous affiliate of al-Qa'ida today. Our joint efforts have resulted in direct action against a limited number of AQAP operatives and senior leaders in that country who posed a terrorist threat to the United States and our interests.

The United States is committed to thwarting the efforts of al-Qa'ida and its associated forces to carry out future acts of international terrorism, and we have continued to work with our CT partners to disrupt and degrade the capabilities of al-Qa'ida and its associated forces. As necessary, in response to the terrorist threat, I will direct additional measures against al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, and associated forces to protect

U.S. citizens and interests. It is not possible to know at this time the precise scope or the duration of the deployments of U.S. Armed Forces necessary to counter this terrorist threat to the United States. A classified annex to this report provides further information.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ

The United States completed its responsible withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq in December 2011, in accordance with the 2008 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN CENTRAL AFRICA

In October and November 2011, U.S. military personnel with appropriate combat equipment deployed to Uganda to serve as advisors to regional forces that are working to apprehend or remove Joseph Kony and other senior Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) leaders from the battlefield, and to protect local populations. The total number of U.S. military personnel deployed for this mission, including those providing logistical and support functions, is approximately 90. United States forces are working with select partner nation forces to enhance cooperation, information-sharing and synchronization, operational planning, and overall effectiveness. Elements of these U.S. forces have deployed to forward locations in the LRA-affected areas of the Republic of South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic to enhance regional efforts against the LRA. These forces, however, will not engage LRA forces except in self-defense. It is in the U.S. national security interest to help our regional partners in Africa to develop their capability to address threats to regional peace and security, including the threat posed by the LRA. The United States is pursuing a comprehensive strategy to help the governments and people of this region in their efforts to end the threat posed by the LRA and to address the impacts of the LRA's atrocities.

MARITIME INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS

As noted in previous reports, the United States remains prepared to conduct maritime interception operations on the high seas in the areas of responsibility of each of the geographic combatant commands. These maritime operations are aimed at stopping the movement, arming, and financing of certain international terrorist groups, and also include operations aimed at stopping proliferation by sea of weapons of mass destruction and related materials. Additional information is provided in the classified annex.

HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATIONS

As noted to you in my report of January 26, 2012, at my direction, on January 24, 2012, U.S. Special Operations Forces conducted a successful operation in Somalia to rescue Ms. Jessica Buchanan, a U.S. citizen who had been kidnapped by individuals linked to Somali pirate groups and financiers.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT

Approximately 693 military personnel are assigned to the U.S. contingent of the Multinational Force and Observers, which have been present in Egypt since 1981.

U.S.-NATO OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO

The U.N. Security Council authorized Member States to establish a NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Resolution 1244 on June 10, 1999. The original mission of KFOR was to monitor, verify, and, when necessary, enforce compliance with the Military Technical Agreement between NATO and the then-Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now Serbia), while maintaining a safe and secure environment. Today, KFOR deters renewed hostilities in cooperation with local authorities, bilateral partners, and international institutions. The principal military tasks of KFOR forces are to help maintain a safe and secure environment and to ensure freedom of movement throughout Kosovo.

Currently, 23 NATO Allies contribute to KFOR. Seven non-NATO countries also participate. The United States contribution to KFOR is approximately 817 U.S. military personnel out of the total strength of approximately 6,401 personnel, which includes a temporarily deployed Operational Reserve Force.

I have directed the participation of U.S. Armed Forces in all of these operations pursuant to my constitutional and statutory authority as Commander in Chief (including the authority to carry out Public Law 107-40 and other statutes) and as Chief Executive, as well as my constitutional and statutory authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States. Officials of my Administration and I communicate regularly with the leadership and other Members of Congress with regard to these deployments, and we will continue to do so.

BARACK OBAMA

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

DOC 3

OCT 05 2012

The Honorable Bob Corker
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Corker:

Thank you for your September 29th letter regarding the Intelligence Community's evolving assessment of the circumstances leading up to, during, and after the Benghazi terrorist attack. All of us in the Intelligence Community share your concern about having a full and accurate understanding of the attack and the identity of the attackers. Let me assure you that we are working relentlessly both in the United States and overseas to collect and analyze all of the disparate threads of information to provide policymakers in the Executive and Legislative Branches with that full understanding. We continue to receive new intelligence information as we review our assessments and judgments. In this attack, as in other terrorist attacks, Intelligence Community understanding of and ability to connect all of the dots takes time and evolves as we collect and analyze new intelligence. We are providing the congressional intelligence oversight committees with near-daily written intelligence updates and regular briefings. During the Congressional recess, these updates are being provided to congressional intelligence committee staff. We would be happy to brief you at your earliest convenience on our most up-to-date analysis.

You also asked about the FBI's investigation in Libya and the circumstances of its investigation in Benghazi itself. The FBI deployed agents to Europe and Libya, including Benghazi, and continues to interview witnesses and review evidence. It is important to note that the dynamics in parts of the Middle East/North Africa are such that the situation on the ground changes quickly and the threats to US persons and interests can rapidly cause security to deteriorate.

As an intelligence professional for over 40 years, I have been a witness to or active participant in the assessment of nearly every terrorist attack affecting our country and our interests. The initial intelligence reports we receive are almost always inaccurate or incomplete in some respects, and in every case a full understanding comes only after extensive review, investigation, and analysis. We look forward to providing you and other Members with an updated briefing.

Sincerely,



James R. Clapper

cc: The Honorable Hillary R. Clinton
The Honorable Leon E. Panetta
The Honorable Robert S. Mueller

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

Doc 4

OCT 26 2012

The Honorable Jon Tester
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-0001

Dear Senator Tester:

Thank you for your letter of August 29, 2012, regarding your concerns about responses to Question 21 (Q21) of the Standard Form (SF) 86 by military victims of sexual assault who have received mental health counseling.

Following your letter of February 23, 2012, I convened an interagency working group of senior security and mental health professionals from the Intelligence Community, Department of Defense (DoD), Health and Human Services, and Veterans Affairs, as well as DoD's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office. Their purpose was to conduct a comprehensive review of Q21 and propose revisions to tailor the question in such a manner that it would provide the government with the information it needs, while taking into account an individual's privacy interests and desire to seek mental health services.

The working group recommended, and I approved, a complete revision of the current Q21, with the intent to change the focus from whether or not the individual has received mental health counseling, to instead asking about the individual's behavior and ability to function appropriately. While the precise wording of the new question is still to be determined, we anticipate that no exemptions will be necessary in the revised question.

Once the working group finalizes the new language, it will be necessary to initiate the process to amend the SF 86 with the revised Q21 language, which includes the Office of Management and Budget regulatory review process and publication in the Federal Register. Since the formal process for finalizing revisions of the SF 86 may be lengthy, I am researching the feasibility of issuing interim national guidance for the Executive Branch. I am also focused on outreach and accountability initiatives with partner organizations throughout government.

In addition, Secretary of Defense Panetta signed a memorandum on September 4, 2012, providing DoD guidance for Q21, which reaffirms that an individual's decision to seek mental health care should not, in and of itself, adversely impact the person's ability to obtain or maintain a national security position. The DoD guidance also discusses the critical importance of proactive management of mental health conditions, wellness, and recovery.

I assure you that I share your sense of urgency and commitment. However, existing statutory and regulatory processes must be observed.

The Honorable Jon Tester

This matter has my full attention and I am very sensitive to the concerns expressed on this matter by members of Congress, DoD, and victims of sexual assault, and will continue to work diligently to eliminate the stigma from service members and all others who seek mental health counseling.

Sincerely,


James R. Clapper

Doc 5

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman
Chairman
Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
Washington, DC 20510

NOV 03 2012

The Honorable Susan M. Collins
Ranking Member
Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Collins:

Thank you for your letter of October 18, 2012, notifying my office of your investigation into the circumstances surrounding the attack on the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya. As we have in the past, we intend to cooperate with you and your staff in your investigation into the tragic deaths of Ambassador Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Glen Doherty, and Tyrone Woods, as well as provide certain documents and intelligence assessments requested by your committee.

As my staff discussed with your staff director, [REDACTED], in the coming weeks we intend to provide your committee members with a classified briefing detailing the evolution of the Intelligence Community's (IC's) assessments. This briefing will include what the IC knew of the threat environment prior to September 11, 2012 and how it disseminated that information; how it came to its original assessments after the attack; and how those assessments evolved as new intelligence was acquired. We are committed to providing as complete a picture as possible, including a timeline of the attack itself. (b)(6)

We anticipate being able to answer most of your questions by November 9, 2012, as you requested. However, for those questions that require a new assessment or extensive coordination across the interagency, we may require additional time. Our response will include an estimate of how much additional time would be necessary to answer any remaining questions.

I look forward to working with you and your staff as this investigation moves forward. If your staff has any questions, please contact [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] in my Office of Legislative Affairs at [REDACTED]. (b)(3)

Sincerely,


James R. Clapper

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

DOC 6

NOV 05 2012

The Honorable Peter T. King
Chairman
Committee on Homeland Security
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairman King:

Thank you for your letter of October 8, 2012, regarding the possible disclosure to members of the media of sensitive intelligence pertaining to the terrorist attacks on the U.S. Consulate and Annex in Benghazi, Libya. I am responding for myself and on behalf of Director Petraeus.

Neither the Office of the Director of National Intelligence nor the Central Intelligence Agency Public Affairs Offices provided Dr. Leslie Gelb with an intelligence briefing pertaining to these attacks.

We agree that this is a very serious matter and it has been referred to the appropriate staff for follow-up action. Our normal process for investigating such incidents begins with a preliminary inquiry to determine: (1) if the article in question contained classified information, (2) if the classified information has been publicly disclosed before, (3) the source material from which the classified information was derived, and (4) the agency that produced the source material. The results of the preliminary inquiry will inform the decision process as to whether the matter warrants referral to the Department of Justice for criminal investigation.

Once the preliminary inquiry has been completed and reviewed, we will be in a better position to respond to the questions in your letter. This will allow us to provide you with answers that are as complete and accurate as possible without awaiting the results of a full security or criminal investigation. As you will appreciate, full investigations occasionally identify facts that differ from those resulting from preliminary inquiries. We share and appreciate your concern over the damage caused by leaks to the media and will notify your office regarding the final disposition of this matter.

Sincerely,


James R. Clapper

cc: David H. Petraeus
Director, CIA

DOC 8

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

NOV 15 2012

The Honorable Ron Wyden
United States Senate

The Honorable Mark Udall
United States Senate

The Honorable Jeff Merkley
United States Senate

The Honorable Tom Udall
United States Senate

Dear Senators:

Thank you for your November 5, 2012 letter concerning the FISA Amendments Act (FAA). We share the view that Congress must understand how the FAA has been implemented, particularly as it debates the reauthorization of these critical intelligence tools. As discussed in our earlier letters, the Executive Branch has engaged in substantial efforts to fully inform Congress about the use of these authorities, including formal classified briefings and hearings, classified written notifications and reports, discussions, briefings, and demonstrations with committee staff, and responses to inquiries from you and other Members.

I also share your interest in an informed public debate on the government's use of its intelligence collection authorities. As you know, it is my responsibility under the law to protect critical intelligence activities from public disclosure in order to safeguard sensitive sources and methods, including the government's acquisition of vital foreign intelligence information through FAA authorities. Our earlier publicly available letters, including my August 24, 2012 unclassified letter (with classified annex) responding to your July 26, 2012 inquiry, and General Alexander's November 13, 2012 letter, properly balance protecting classified information and informing the public of the manner in which FAA is implemented.

We cannot provide additional answers to your questions in an unclassified format. Rather than provide you with imprecise, unclassified information, I reiterate our offer to meet with you — and any other Members of Congress — in a classified setting to discuss these authorities and answer any questions you might have.

Sincerely,


James R. Clapper

DOC 10



16 NOV 2012

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Congressman Smith-

Sir- I had to drop you a quick note to thank you for your astute commentary today during the House leadership meeting on Benghazi.

You EXACTLY got the point, and I (all of us we) most grateful for your understanding and support.

I regret we weren't permitted to present our visual briefing

on what happened. I am very determined to have it given on an all - House, all Senate basis, and then to the public directly in unclassified form.

Again, my thanks, and let me know directly if I can be of service to you.

With Respect -

Jim Clapper

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

September 10, 2012

The Honorable Leon E. Panetta
Secretary of Defense
1400 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

James R. Clapper
Director of National Intelligence
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Washington, DC 20511-0001

Jeffery D. Zients
OMB Acting Director
The Office of Management and Budget
725 17th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20503-0009

Dear Secretary Panetta, Director Clapper and Acting Director Zients:

We write to you regarding the potential costs of going to war in an attempt to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. We share President Barack Obama's belief that a nuclear-armed Iran would seriously undermine the security of the United States and our allies in the Middle East. We also support his administration's firm commitment to preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons through targeted sanctions and diplomacy.

It is in large part because we endeavor to keep nuclear weapons from proliferating to Iran that we are very concerned about the growing prospect of launching a new war against it. The current discourse over how to deal with Iran's nuclear program is disconcerting for several reasons. Numerous American and Israeli security experts have warned that a military strike against Iran would likely fail to stop its nuclear program, and could even trigger its acceleration. Moreover, these experts have cautioned that Iran could counter the use of force against it by igniting a regional war through its terrorist proxies that would gravely imperil the populations of our allies and U.S. troops stationed throughout the Middle East and Afghanistan. A strike on Iran would also undermine Iran's domestic opposition movement, by allowing the Iranian regime to rally the Iranian people around their national leaders in response to foreign attack.

After the past decade of wars in the Middle East paid on the nation's credit card, our troops have been stretched to their limits and our fiscal situation remains precarious. Military hostilities could

easily escalate into a conventional war with Iran which could place an untenable burden on our troops as well as threaten our economic recovery by incurring tremendous new debt and destabilizing oil prices. Further, with Congress now considering appropriations for Fiscal Year 2013 including the prospect of a sequester—the time is more than ripe for considering the practical and fiscal costs of the use of force against Iran.

We request a report assessing the projected costs of a potential war with Iran. The report would address the following (with appropriate classified appendixes):

- The scope, duration, potential number of combat troops (including National Guard and Reserve Forces) and costs of military action by the United States Armed Forces that would be required to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons or the capability to produce such weapons.
- Additional measures that would be necessary to protect members of the United States Armed Forces and the United States Armed Forces' facilities in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and elsewhere from the Iranian forces and their proxies following a military attack by the United States or any of its allies against Iran.
- Any other factors relating to the efficacy, risks, and costs of the use of military force by the United States against Iran as a means of deterring or neutralizing Iran's nuclear program.

The United States is only now transitioning out of a period of nearly a decade of war. It is essential that we understand clearly what another war would do to our economic and national security, and the safety of our troops. Having your full assessment of the costs of war with Iran will allow Congress to have an informed discussion on this pressing issue.


Please contact Teddy Miller in Rep. Lee's office at (202) 225-2661 or teddy.miller@mail.house.gov if you have any questions.

Sincerely,


Barbara Lee
Member of Congress



Earl Blumenauer
Member of Congress


John Conyers
Member of Congress



Yvette D. Clarke
Member of Congress



Keith Ellison
Member of Congress




Bob Filner
Member of Congress



Raul M. Grijalva
Member of Congress



Timothy Johnson
Member of Congress



James P. McGovern
Member of Congress




Gwen Moore
Member of Congress




John W. Olver
Member of Congress




Nick J. Rahall
Member of Congress




Charles B. Rangel
Member of Congress




Bobby L. Rush
Member of Congress



Loretta Sanchez
Member of Congress




Fortney Pete Stark
Member of Congress



Lynn C. Woolsey
Member of Congress



Michael M. Honda
Member of Congress



Peter Welch
Member of Congress

United States Senate

September 29, 2012

COMMITTEES:
BANKING, HOUSING
AND URBAN AFFAIRS
FOREIGN RELATIONS
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING

The Honorable James R. Clapper, Jr.
Director of National Intelligence
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20511


Dear Director Clapper:

It seems that with each passing day, the situation surrounding the administration's response to the terrorist attack on the U. S. Consulate in Libya becomes more bizarre. The United States Congress and the American people are still waiting to get straight answers from the administration on what actually happened that led to the deaths of four Americans, including one of our ambassadors, in Benghazi on September 11, 2012.

As of this morning, reports indicate that our well-trained FBI agents still have not been able to get into Benghazi to investigate. Yet just 18 days ago the administration apparently judged that it was appropriate for our consulate to be lightly guarded and it was safe for our ambassador to come through the city with a small security detail. What has changed in Libya in such a short time that even FBI agents, our most elite investigative personnel, cannot safely enter the city? What has led to such a precipitous decline?

An unwillingness to provide answers and the inaccuracy of the limited information we have received to date has undermined the credibility of the administration. To avoid further damage, I ask that you please personally respond with substantive answers very quickly.

Sincerely,



BOB CORKER
United States Senator

CC: The Honorable Hillary R. Clinton, Secretary of State
The Honorable Leon E. Panetta, Secretary of Defense
The Honorable Robert S. Mueller, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

JOHN A. BOGERT (ALABAMA)	JOHN CORNYN (TEXAS)
JOHN C. BOGERT (ALABAMA)	JOHN CORNYN (TEXAS)
JOHN C. BOGERT (ALABAMA)	JOHN CORNYN (TEXAS)
JOHN C. BOGERT (ALABAMA)	JOHN CORNYN (TEXAS)
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JOHN C. BOGERT (ALABAMA)	JOHN CORNYN (TEXAS)
JOHN C. BOGERT (ALABAMA)	JOHN CORNYN (TEXAS)

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-4476

BARBARA MITCHELL (SOUTH CAROLINA)
MICHAEL LEE (KENTUCKY)
LINDSEY O'HANRAHAN (MISSISSIPPI)
JOSHUA HART (ARIZONA)

DAVID GARDNER, STAFF DIRECTOR
MARTIN MALCOLM, POLICY AND ANALYSIS STAFF DIRECTOR
KATHLEEN P. SALVAGE, CHIEF OF STAFF

October 3, 2012

The Honorable James R. Clapper
Director of National Intelligence
Washington, DC 20511


Dear Director Clapper,

It has become increasingly clear from a review of intelligence that the information provided to the public and to Congress in the days following the attack on our diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, was not comprehensive and, in some cases, was inaccurate. The statement released last Friday by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence stated, "we revised our initial assessment to reflect new information indicating that [the attack] was a deliberate and organized terrorist attack carried out by extremists." We question, however, why this information was not conveyed during the briefing to Congress over a week after the attack when it was available in intelligence assessments within 24-hours.

Efforts by the Senate Intelligence Committee to review relevant intelligence and question the Intelligence Community about the reasons for the shifting assessments, lack of security, and warnings of the attack have been impeded or met with incomplete responses. This has hampered the Committee's ability to provide effective oversight of a dynamic and evolving situation.

The Intelligence Community is scheduled to participate in a briefing for Committee staff on October 4, 2012. We ask that Intelligence Community representatives be prepared to address all aspects of the attack including, but not limited to, the security situation in Benghazi, warnings of impending attack, warnings of poor security, the involvement of terrorist groups including al-Qa'ida, and the shifting Intelligence Community assessments following the attack. Furthermore, we expect that all requested documents will be provided expeditiously to facilitate the Committee's oversight of the circumstances surrounding the attack. Thank you.

Sincerely,



Ray Bent

Olympia J. Jones

Don Coats

Joe E. Keefe

Mark

PETER T. KING, NEW YORK
CHAIRMAN

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, MISSISSIPPI
RANKING MEMBER



One Hundred Twelfth Congress
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20515

October 8, 2012

The Honorable James R. Clapper
Director
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20511

The Honorable David H. Petraeus
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Generals Clapper and Petraeus:

I write regarding the possible disclosure of sensitive intelligence, and request you initiate an investigation into whether any intelligence was inappropriately provided to members of the media pertaining to the terrorist attacks on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya.

On October 18, 2012, Dr. Leslie Gelb wrote on *The Daily Beast* website that United States Ambassador to the United Nations Susan E. Rice based her September 16, 2012 public remarks about the terrorist attacks on the U.S. Consulate and Annex in Benghazi on the intelligence given to the President and to her. In his defense of possible inaccuracies in Ambassador Rice's statements about the Benghazi attack, Dr. Gelb not only blames the U.S. Intelligence Community, he writes that he, too, received an intelligence briefing and even infers that he received the same briefing as President Obama and Ambassador Rice: "Her mistake was taking the initial intelligence at face value. The White House briefers made the same error, and so did I. I too repeated in an op-ed on *The Daily Beast* what the intelligence briefers told me."¹

¹ See Leslie H. Gelb, "Person of Interest: United States U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice," *The Daily Beast*, October 8, 2012, accessed at <http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/10/07/person-of-interest-united-states-un-ambassador-susan-rice.html>.

While I recognize that members of the Executive Branch provide background briefings to members of the media, I do not recall any occasion where a journalist received an intelligence briefing equivalent to that received by the President or the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., especially in the aftermath of a terrorist attack against U.S. personnel.

Therefore, to ensure the protection of classified information against unlawful disclosure, I request answers to the following questions no later than October 19, 2012:

1. Does Dr. Gelb maintain a security clearance? If so, what classification level?
2. Did any employee or contracted employee of the Obama Administration and/or the U.S. Intelligence Community provide Dr. Gelb an intelligence briefing? If so, please provide the names of the individuals who provided the briefing, the date and times of the briefing, and copies of any information provided in the briefing.
3. Did Dr. Gelb receive access to intelligence also contained in the Presidential Daily Brief?
4. Did Dr. Gelb receive finished intelligence products, or signals, imagery or human intelligence reports, of equal or lesser classification level than those provided to Ambassador Rice?
5. If disclosures of classified information to Dr. Gelb were authorized, was his publication of such intelligence also authorized? If the disclosures were unauthorized, what penalties are in place to protect against such disclosures in the future?
6. In the event Dr. Gelb did not receive any such intelligence briefing, do any penalties or administrative actions exist for falsely claiming to have received an intelligence briefing?
7. Do other members of the media receive the intelligence briefings Dr. Gelb claims to have received? If so, who are they, do they hold security clearances, and at what level?

As you know, for nearly four years, I have written to President Obama, yourselves, and other Intelligence Community leaders to express my deep concern about the numerous leaks coming from the Obama Administration. Illegal disclosures of classified information have repeatedly jeopardized our clandestine and law enforcement officials, special operators, and intelligence sources and methods.


These leaks include the whereabouts of Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad, details of the intelligence and raid that found and killed Osama bin Laden, the existence of a human source penetration of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, possible U.S. involvement in cyber attacks against Iran's nuclear arms program, specifics regarding drone campaigns, and (most recently) reported ongoing counterterrorism efforts and even future possible operations in North Africa.

If the Obama Administration and/or the Intelligence Community now provide intelligence briefings (as opposed to background briefings) to journalists—as claimed by Dr.

Gelb—I urge you to take immediate corrective action to protect the public trust in your agencies, vital intelligence, and lives.

If you have any questions regarding this issue, please contact me. Thank you for your time and personal attention to this important matter of national security.

Sincerely,



PETER T. KING
Chairman

CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN, CHAIRMAN

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RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, CONNECTICUT	

United States Senate
 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

October 9, 2012

RICHARD D. DRIBBLE, STAFF DIRECTOR
 AYNA K. SAUER, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

The Honorable James R. Clapper, Jr.
 Director of National Intelligence
 Office of the Director of National Intelligence
 Washington, DC 20511

The Honorable David H. Petraeus
 Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
 Central Intelligence Agency
 Washington, DC 20511

The Honorable John Brennan
 Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
 Counterterrorism and Deputy National Security Advisor
 The White House
 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
 Washington, DC 20500

Dear Director Clapper, Director Petraeus and Mr. Brennan:

Amid the public confusion and shifting official explanations surrounding the tragic murder of Ambassador Chris Stevens and three of our fellow Americans in Benghazi, Libya on September 11, 2012, we write to ask you to provide your best professional judgment in response to a few questions regarding the circumstances of this attack. Clarifying the record about what information our intelligence community possessed in the aftermath of the attack in Benghazi, what judgments it reached at what time as a result of this information, and what recommendations it provided to senior policymakers as they spoke publicly about these events is a matter of utmost important for the Congress and our constituents. The American people deserve answers.

We therefore ask for your prompt and thorough reply to the following questions:


- First, within 48 hours of the attack, was there credible information and reporting to suggest that the assault on our Consulate and other U.S. facilities in Benghazi should be characterized as a terrorist attack? This is certainly how it appeared to many Americans, allegedly including some members of the Administration. It has been reported that Under Secretary of State for Management Patrick Kennedy – a Foreign Service Officer with decades of experience, and the senior official responsible for the security of State Department operations – offered his personal judgment during a briefing to Congressional staff on the day after the attack in Benghazi that it had the hallmarks of a sophisticated, well-coordinated terrorist act. We are eager to know what the intelligence community knew, and what initial judgments it reached, at that time.
- Second, at what time did intelligence community agencies or elements first assess that the events in Benghazi were a terrorist attack? This is important because, as late as five days

after the attack in Benghazi, senior policymakers were still characterizing it as the result of a spontaneous demonstration in response to a disgusting video insulting Islam. Furthermore, in a letter last week, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice maintained that she was relying on the best assessments of the intelligence community when she characterized the cause of the attack in Benghazi as a spontaneous protest, not an act of terrorism, during a television interview five days after the fact.


- Finally, what information did you and the intelligence community provide to senior policymakers that led some of them to draw the conclusion as late as five days after the attack in Benghazi that it was the result of a spontaneous demonstration, not a terrorist act? Was there no credible evidence at that late date that was compelling enough for the intelligence community and the senior policymakers to draw a conclusion with at least moderate confidence that the attack in Benghazi was a terrorist act?

We look forward to your prompt reply to our questions and ask that they submitted in unclassified form. It is important for the intelligence community to clarify the confusion that still surrounds the Administration's initial explanation of the attack in Benghazi. This matter raises many critical questions for Congress to consider further, and we appreciate your cooperation and assistance in this effort.

Sincerely,




John McCain
United States Senator



Saxby Chambliss
United States Senator



Kelly Ayotte
United States Senator



Lindsey Graham
United States Senator

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN
 SAXBY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA, VICE CHAIRMAN

~~TOP SECRET//SI//NF//ANT//CRD//PT//SN//SR//SI//SI//GAMMA//GTRD//ISCP//QZFL~~
~~REF//OC//NOFORN~~

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, WEST VIRGINIA
 RON WYDEN, OREGON
 BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, MARYLAND
 DEL WELDON, FLORIDA
 KEVIN CONRAD, NORTH DAKOTA
 MARK UDALL, COLORADO
 MARK WARNER, VIRGINIA

CENFLET, MAINE
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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

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SSCI# 2012-3890

October 12, 2012

The Honorable James R. Clapper, Jr.
Director of National Intelligence
Washington, DC 20511

Dear Director Clapper:

(b)(3)

~~(S)~~ We appreciate the participation of [REDACTED], in the hearing held by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on September 20, 2012, regarding Iran.

(U) We are submitting the attached questions for the record. We would appreciate written responses no later than October 29, 2012.

(U) If your staff has any questions, please have them contact Mr. Brian Miller, of the Committee staff, at (202) 224-1700.

Sincerely,

Dianne Feinstein
Chairman

Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman

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~~REF//OC//NOFORN~~

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM
SOUTH CAROLINA



280 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
(202) 224-6972

UNITED STATES SENATE

October 15, 2012

The Honorable James R. Clapper, Jr.
Director of National Intelligence
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Washington, DC 20511

Dear Director Clapper,

On June 6, 2012, assailants placed an IED on the northern gate of the United States Consulate in Benghazi. The IED detonated and ripped a hole in the security perimeter that was described by one individual as, "big enough for forty men to go through." This attack was preceded by an earlier IED attack against the Consulate in April 2012.

Director Clapper, were you aware of these attacks? Did you inform the President of these attacks? If so, what action was taken to protect our Consulate?

If you did not inform the President, why not?

Thank you again for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Lindsey Graham".

Lindsey Graham
United States Senator

Doc 18

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN
SALLY CHAMBERLAIN, GEORGIA, VICE CHAIRMAN

SSCI# 2012-3985

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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BILL NELSON, FLORIDA
KENT CONRAD, NORTH CAROLINA
MARK UDALL, COLORADO
MARK WARNER, VIRGINIA

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, MAINE
RICHARD BURR, NORTH CAROLINA
JAMES E. RISH, INDIANA
DANIEL COATS, INDIANA
ROY BLUNT, MISSOURI
MARCO RUBIO, FLORIDA

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

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MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY, EX OFFICIO
CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN, EX OFFICIO
JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA, EX OFFICIO

DAVID CRANNS, STAFF DIRECTOR
MARTHA SCOTT FONDULAKIS, MEMORIAL STAFF DIRECTOR
KATHLEEN P. McGRHEE, CHIEF CLERK

October 19, 2012

The Honorable James R. Clapper
Director of National Intelligence
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20511

Dear Director Clapper:

(U) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will conduct a closed hearing on Thursday, November 15, 2012, at 2:30 p.m. in Senate Hart Building Room 219 on issues involving the September 11, 2012, attack against two U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya, that killed U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans. We request that you attend as a witness, along with any staff you deem necessary. We are also inviting Deputy Secretary of State William Burns, Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Michael Morell, and Deputy Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Sean Joyce to attend as witnesses at this hearing.

~~(S//NF)~~ We request that you provide a written statement for the record, in both hardcopy and softcopy form, no later than November 9, 2012, that addresses the following issues:

- Intelligence Community (IC) assessments about terrorist involvement in the Benghazi attack, including groups or individuals involved or likely to have been involved in the attack, key relationships between those groups and individuals, and the current posture of these groups within Libya and the region;
- Any relevant information from the IC with respect to the ongoing U.S. Government investigations into the Benghazi attacks;
- Intelligence Community assessments on key counterterrorism challenges involving Libya, including current terrorist activities in Libya and surrounding countries; and
- An outline of relevant counterterrorism cooperation ongoing with the Government of Libya.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~(S//NF)~~ We request that all witnesses and supporting staff have the appropriate clearances, including necessary special accesses, to discuss these matters, or that other arrangements be made in advance to ensure compliance with security procedures and the protection of classified information.


(U) If you or your staff have any questions or would like to discuss the hearing further, please contact Tressa Guenov or Tyler Stephens of the Committee staff at 202-224-1700.

Sincerely,


Dianne Feinstein
Chairman


Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510
November 5, 2012



The Honorable James R. Clapper, Jr.
Director of National Intelligence
Washington, DC 20511

Dear Director Clapper:

As Congress prepares to vote on a long-term extension of the surveillance law known as the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, we believe that it is important for both Congress and the public to have as much information as possible about this law's impact on the privacy of American citizens, so that members of Congress can consider whether the law should be reformed, or renewed without changes. We recently sent you a letter, along with nine other senators, asking questions about the privacy impact of the FISA Amendments Act, and we have received your response. We appreciate that you have generally been responsive to previous questions from us on this topic, but we were disappointed by your reply to our most recent set of questions.

Our letter asked four questions about the impact of the FISA Amendments Act on the privacy of American citizens, and asked you to provide an unclassified response. Your reply stated that you could not provide a "meaningful and accurate" response to our questions in an unclassified format, but that you would answer the questions in the classified attachment that accompanied your reply. However, the classified attachment only answered two of our four questions, and it is not clear to us why you chose to classify these answers.¹ We repeat these questions here, and ask that you please respond to all of them with unclassified answers as soon as possible.

First, we asked if any entities have made any estimates – even imprecise estimates – about how many US communications have been collected under section 702 of the FISA statute (which is the central provision of the FISA Amendments Act). You did not answer this question. Please provide an answer. We would expect this answer to be unclassified, but if you disagree please provide your reasons for keeping this answer secret.

Second, we asked if it was possible to estimate the order of magnitude of this number. (For example, is the number of US communications collected under section 702 closer to 100, or 100,000, or 100 million?) You did not answer this question directly, however the Director of the NSA has made public statements that appear to estimate this order of magnitude. Specifically, the NSA Director has said that "the story that [the NSA] has millions or hundreds of millions of dossiers on people is absolutely false." Please explain whether this statement should be understood to mean that the number of US communications collected under section 702 is less than "millions or hundreds of millions." Since the NSA Director made this statement publicly, we would expect this answer to be unclassified as well.

Third, we asked if any wholly domestic American communications had been collected under section 702 authorities. Your response was classified. We do not understand how simply stating

¹ We note that classifying these answers does not just keep them secret from the public. Most members of Congress – including eleven of the thirteen senators that signed our letter – do not have any staff who are cleared to read your attachment, which will make it extremely difficult for most members to review and understand these answers.

whether any wholly domestic communications have been collected under section 702 authorities would have any impact at all on US national security interests. If you believe that it would, please explain why. And if you agree that it would not, please provide an unclassified answer to this question.


Fourth, we noted that the FISA Amendments Act does not prohibit searching through communications collected under section 702 to find the communications of particular Americans, and asked if the US government has ever attempted to search for the communications of a specific American in this way without a warrant or emergency authorization. Your response was classified. We do not understand how providing a 'yes' or 'no' answer to this question would impact US national security interests in any way, and we ask that you provide an unclassified response.

We recognize that you are not comfortable with our description of such queries as "back-door searches" or with our statement that these queries are permitted because of a loophole in section 702, but in our judgment these terms are entirely appropriate. We are confident that most members of Congress did not believe that they were authorizing these searches when they voted for the FISA Amendments Act in 2008, but you have not denied that section 702 gives the NSA the authority to conduct these searches, and it is a matter of public record that the intelligence community has sought to preserve this authority. If it is not classified that you have this authority, and it is not classified that you would like to keep it, we do not understand why you cannot simply say whether it has ever been used.

In our judgment, this lack of transparency limits the ability of Congress and the public to have an informed debate about the impact of this law on Americans' privacy. To be clear, we do not believe that the government should be able to deliberately search for and read an American's emails without getting a warrant or emergency authorization on that American. We respect that you may have a different view, but we do not believe that it is appropriate for intelligence community officials to withhold information from the public unless they can articulate why doing so is necessary to protect the national security of the United States, which you have not done in this case.

Thank you for your attention to this matter. Since the Senate will debate this issue during the November/December 2012 session, please provide your response by November 16. If you have any questions concerning this request, please have your staff contact John Dickas of Senator Wyden's staff or Jennifer Barrett of Senator Udall's staff at (202) 224-1700. We look forward to your prompt reply.

Sincerely,



Tom Udare

Jeffrey A. Markley

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SAXBY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA, VICE CHAIRMAN

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DANIEL COATS, INDIANA
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MARCO RUBIO, FLORIDA

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

SSCI# 2012-3796

HARRY REID, NEVADA, EX OFFICIO
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KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, CHIEF CLERK

November 19, 2012

The Honorable James R. Clapper
Director of National Intelligence
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20511

Dear Director Clapper:

(U) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will conduct a closed hearing on Tuesday, November 27, 2012, at 2:30 p.m. in Senate Hart Building Room 219 on threats to, and security of, U.S. facilities. This hearing is a follow up to our November 15, 2012, hearing, at which you testified on the September 11, 2012, attack against two U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya, that killed U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans. We request that Mr. Matthew Olsen, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, testify at the November 27 hearing.

~~(S//NF)~~ We request that Mr. Olsen be prepared to discuss the following topics:

1. The terrorist threat to U.S. diplomatic, military, and intelligence facilities in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as other regions of the world;
2. Recent threats or disrupted plots against U.S. embassies and diplomatic facilities following the September 11, 2012, attacks, including thwarted plots in Jordan, Yemen, and Indonesia; and
3. An assessment of the likelihood that al-Qa'ida or other terrorist groups will attempt assaults similar to the Benghazi attack against U.S. or allied facilities.

(U) We request that Mr. Olsen provide the Committee with a statement for the record, in both hardcopy and softcopy form, by November 26, 2012. We also request that he provide five minutes of oral testimony summarizing this statement at the hearing.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) We request that all witnesses and supporting staff have the appropriate clearances, or that other arrangements are made in advance to ensure compliance with security procedures and the protection of classified information.

(U) Please have your staff contact Tressa Guenov or Tyler Stephens, of the Committee staff, with any questions at 202-224-1700.

Sincerely,



Dianne Feinstein
Chairman



Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Doc 21

MIKE THOMPSON

1ST DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SELECT
REVENUE MEASURES

PERMANENT SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE, ANALYSIS AND
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT



CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515

Tuesday, November 20, 2012

DISTRICT OFFICES:
1040 MAIN STREET, SUITE 101
NAPA, CA 94559
(707) 226-9898
317 THIRD STREET, SUITE 1
EUREKA, CA 95501
(707) 269-9595
POST OFFICE BOX 2208
FORT BRAGG, CA 95437
(707) 962-0933
712 MAIN STREET, SUITE 101
WOODLAND, CA 95695
(530) 662-5272
CAPITOL OFFICE:
231 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-3311
WEB: <http://mikethompson.house.gov>

The Honorable James R. Clapper, Jr.
Director of National Intelligence
Washington, DC 20511

The Honorable Michele Leonhart
Administrator
Drug Enforcement Administration
8701 Morrissette Drive
Springfield, VA 22152

Dear Director Clapper and Administrator Leonhart:

We continue to see that our nation's public lands are under attack by sophisticated foreign Drug Trafficking Organizations that are using public resources to produce large quantities of marijuana and other illegal narcotics. Specifically, marijuana growers have increasingly shown no regard for our public lands and are degrading our environment, by illegally diverting and damming streams, eliminating native vegetation, and polluting land and water with potent pesticides and fertilizers. As you know, these organizations are typically well armed, threatening land owners and users of public lands like hikers, hunters and fishermen.

Our law enforcement and intelligence community's response to this threat must be coordinated and unified in order to take our forests back from these illegal activities. Following up concerns that I had heard from law enforcement involved in this effort, in 2011, I included a provision in Public Law 112-87 requiring the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to submit a detailed assessment of what was being done to protect our public lands from marijuana grow operations. I had hoped that this threat assessment would have examined in detail the ability of law enforcement, task forces, and the intelligence community to gather, process, and share critical intelligence information regarding the possible presence of foreign drug trafficking organizations on our public lands to allow for more international investigations and prosecutions.

Earlier this year, I was briefed by the office of the Assistant Director of National Intelligence for Partner Engagement (ADNI/PE) on the threat assessment assembled pursuant to PL 112-87. During that and subsequent discussions with the ADNI/PE, I identified and raised significant issues with the process used to develop this threat assessment, how substantive the threat assessment was, and how the information assembled would be used to address the underlying issues I raised.

Instead of including an additional threat assessment requirement in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, I ask for the ODNI's commitment to facilitate additional

contact between elements of the intelligence community and Federal Land Management Agencies (FLMAs). This commitment must ensure that FLMAs have the strategic intelligence, operational assessments and any other necessary information they need to disrupt and dismantle foreign DTOs, establish target priorities and disrupt the market.

In addition, I request that the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), in coordination with the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Intelligence Support Centers, provide an assessment to FLMAs and the relevant Congressional committees that: (a) explores whether Mexican trafficking organizations are supplying illegal aliens to support grow sites located on public land or are facilitating illicit cross-border money transfers; (b) determines whether market disruption tactics are working; and (c) establishes, if possible, and in consultation with the law enforcement directors of the FLMA's, any target priorities for later strategic assessments. In assembling this assessment, I request that DEA coordinate with the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and the National Marijuana Initiative (NMI) who together will be working on a National Marijuana Threat Assessment with an emphasis on public lands, later this year.

I strongly urge your careful consideration of this request before Congress completes its work on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, so that we may update the text of that bill accordingly.

I thank you both for your continued work on this issue. Please contact me if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Mike Thompson". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

MIKE THOMPSON
Member of Congress

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN
 ANNY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA, VICE CHAIRMAN

JOHN CORNYN, TEXAS
 RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, CONNECTICUT
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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6476

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 NATHANIEL WOODS, CHIEF CLERK

December 4, 2012

SSCI# 2012-4387

The Honorable James R. Clapper
Director of National Intelligence
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20511

Dear Director Clapper:

We have requested repeatedly over the past month in Committee hearings, staff briefings, and requests for documents that the Intelligence Community (IC) provide the Committee with the documents and communications related to the drafting and editing of the unclassified talking points on the September 11, 2012 attack in Benghazi, Libya that were provided to Congress on September 15, 2012. We ask that you personally intervene in this matter and provide us with these materials as soon as possible.

After a considerable delay on acting on the Committees' requests, we understand that the responsive documents have now been compiled and are in the possession of your office.

These materials are essential to our Committee's oversight of how the Intelligence Community responded to the attack on the Temporary Mission Facility (TMF) in Benghazi. Frankly, we are astounded by the unnecessary delay in providing these and other materials regarding the attack previously requested by the Committee. Below is a timeline of the requests for this material:

- November 1, 2012 – At an on-the-record briefing by IC officials to staff, SSCI Staff Director Grannis requested a written response explaining how the talking points were drafted and edited.
- November 15, 2012 – At a hearing on the attacks on the TMF in which you, Acting CIA Director Michael Morell, Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Sean Joyce, Under Secretary of State for Management Patrick Kennedy, and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Director

Matthew Olsen were witnesses, Chairman Feinstein, Vice Chairman Chambliss and other Committee Members stressed the importance of reviewing the material related to these talking points. The Committee again requested these documents.

- November 16, 2012 – During a meeting with former CIA Director David Petraeus at which other IC officials were present, the Committee again asked for documents and communications related to the drafting of the talking points.
- November 29, 2012 – At a hearing with IC witnesses on intelligence collection and operations in the aftermath of the Benghazi attack, Committee Members again stressed the need to review the process that led to the unclassified talking points and discussed whether it would be necessary to subpoena these materials due to the slow response.

In addition, SSCI staff have called your Office of Legislative Affairs on an almost daily basis regarding these materials and the needless bureaucratic process involved in providing them to us.

Today, we held another hearing on the Benghazi attack and discussed with your General Counsel Robert Litt the status of our request. Unfortunately, Mr. Litt informed us that a letter memorializing this oft-repeated request is now needed to help the Administration resolve its difficulties in order to provide these materials to the Committee.

We expect that you will take the steps necessary to provide these materials to the Committee by no later than the end of this week. The longer this request remains open, the more questions arise regarding the integrity of the IC analytic process and credibility of the Intelligence Community. That is not in anyone's best interests.

Sincerely,



Dianne Feinstein
Chairman



Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman



UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20510

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE
MAINE

December 12, 2012

Dear Director Clapper,

Once again, I want to convey my deepest appreciation for the National Intelligence Distinguished Public Service Medal.

I am truly humbled by this recognition and eternally grateful to the extraordinary men and women of the intelligence community whose invaluable work keeps our nation safe and secure. As Director, you are emblematic of that excellence, and I commend you for your superlative and stalwart leadership.

Again, thank you so very much
for the honor, and please know I will
prize treasure the award and all that
it represents - It has been a privilege
to work with you -! Wishing you the
very best in the future -!

Sincerely,
Olympia

DOC 24

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CONNECTICUT, CHAIRMAN

Approved for release by ODNI on 2-8-2016, FOIA Case DF-2014-00064

CARL LEVY, MICHIGAN
DANIEL K. AKANA, HAWAII
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RAND PAUL, KENTUCKY
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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6250

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, STAFF DIRECTOR
NICHOLAS A. ROSSI, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

December 19, 2012


The Honorable James R. Clapper
Director of National Intelligence
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Washington, DC 20511

Dear Director Clapper:

In furtherance of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee's investigation of the September 11, 2012 terrorist attacks in Benghazi Libya, we are writing to request the timeline of the changes made to the talking points provided to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence regarding the Intelligence Community's assessment of the attacks.

During our previous meeting on November 19, 2012, we appreciated your agreement to provide this timeline and it seemed as if such a timeline was already nearing completion. We appreciate your providing this information to our Committee without delay as we continue our investigation into the attacks in Benghazi on September 11, 2012.

Sincerely,



Joseph I. Lieberman
Chairman



Susan M. Collins
Ranking Member

SUE MYRICK
NINTH DISTRICT-NORTH CAROLINA



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

December 19, 2012

Dear Director Clapper,

Thank you for honoring me with
the National Intelligence Distinguished
Public Service Medal. I was
totally surprised and appreciate
it very much.

Thank you also for your
leadership during these challenging
times.

If I can ever be of service,
let me know. My new phone
is [REDACTED]

b6

Best wishes,
Sue