

ARMY, MARINE CORPS, NAVY, AIR FORCE



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PEACE OPS

***Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and
Procedures for
Conducting Peace
Operations***

**FM 3-07.31
MCWP 3-33.8
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MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

FOREWORD


This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by respective commands and other commands as appropriate.



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PREFACE

1. Purpose

This publication provides a single-source tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) manual that focuses on conducting peace operations (PO) at the brigade level of warfighting. *Joint Warfighting Center's Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* and JP 3-07.3 *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, the current publications dedicated to PO, focus on the strategic and operational levels of war and do not provided the level of detail required for Army and Marine Corps TTP.

2. Scope

This publication is designed for use at the tactical level for planning and conducting joint or multi-Service PO. It will assist in training, planning, and conducting operations. This publication will serve as the focal point to guide the readers to existing TTP, and provide TTP where gaps exist. In general terms, the tactical level refers to those operations conducted by tactical units or task forces conducted at the O-6 level of command. This publication offers the reader a basic understanding of joint and multinational PO, an overview of the nature and fundamentals of PO, and detailed discussion of selected military tasks associated with PO. To a limited degree, this publication will also focus the commander and staff on training objectives for the proper execution of PO. This publication has worldwide application and is intended to supplement, at the tactical level, JP 3-07.3 *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations* and Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-3.4.1.1, *Peace Support Operations, Techniques and Procedures*.

3. Application

The TTP described in this publication apply to all elements of a joint force that may be executing PO missions under the command of a United States (US) only or multinational military organization. This publication uses approved joint, allied, and Service doctrine and terminology as a foundation. Guidance and TTPs established in this publication are not Service specific and apply to any tactical units within combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands that may be required to execute missions or tasks associated with PO. This publication applies to the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. It may also be used by multi-Service and service components of a joint force to conduct PO training and operations. Procedures herein may be modified to fit specific theater procedures, allied, and foreign national requirements.

4. Implementation Plan

Participating Service command offices of primary responsibility will review this publication, validate the information, and reference and incorporate it within service manuals, regulations, and curricula as follows:

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b. This publication reflects current joint and Service doctrine, command and control organizations, facilities, personnel, responsibilities, and procedures. Changes in service protocol that should be reflected in joint and Service publications will be incorporated in revisions to this document, as appropriate.

c. We encourage recommended changes for improving this publication. Key your comments to the specific page, paragraph, and provide a rationale for each recommendation. Send comments and recommendations directly to—

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PEACE OPERATIONS

MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING PEACE OPERATIONS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PEACE OPERATIONS

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations

Peace operations (PO) are not new to US Forces. Throughout history, the US government has called on its armed forces to implement US strategy. US armed forces have governed and guarded territories, built roads and canals, provided disaster relief, and quieted domestic disturbances—all actions that, today, are grouped under the term “peace operations.”

While many operations occur during peacetime, what we now call PO emerged during the 20th century as a major contributor to the overall success of combat operations. During World War II, for example, US forces assisted the local governments and populace in reconstituting the civil infrastructures of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. They fed starving civilians, rebuilt bridges and roads, and demined extensive tracts of farmland while full-scale combat operations continued against conventional enemies.

Many modern conflicts do not directly affect the national security of the US. They do, however, affect US humanitarian interests, access to markets and materials, the safety of our citizens abroad, and the stability of democratic governments. Such conflicts, which threaten US national interests, may require PO in response.

Analysis of historical trends and examination of the elements of instability can help us describe a current situation and prepare for PO. The strategic environment is complex, dynamic, and uncertain. The demands placed on US forces in the 21st century will be greater than ever. US forces will be called to respond to more foreign and domestic crises. Those commitments will often come in the form of PO.

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Chapter I INTRODUCTION TO PEACE OPERATIONS

1. Background

a. Changes in the political, military, and strategic environment of the post-Cold War era caused the United States (US) military to begin developing new doctrine. This doctrine addressed a broad range of missions to include those short of war, called military operations other than war (MOOTW). The US adopted the term peace operations (PO) for an element of MOOTW, while others, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), adopted the term peace-support operations (PSO).

b. PO are military operations that support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement and categorized as peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations (PEO). PO are conducted in conjunction with the various diplomatic activities necessary to secure a negotiated truce and resolve the conflict.

c. PKO are military operations, undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. The Stabilization Force operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina are an example of PKO.

d. PEO are the application or threat of military force, normally pursuant to international authorization, compelling compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Units from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable (MEU(SOC)) and units of the 82nd Airborne Division conducted PEO during the early stages of Kosovo ground operations in 1999. PEO also include air operations such as Operation DENY FLIGHT, NORTHERN WATCH, and SOUTHERN WATCH.

e. In addition to PKO and PEO, the military may conduct other operations in support of diplomatic efforts to establish peace and order before, during, and after conflict. These operations are described below:

(1) Preventive Diplomacy. Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. An example of military support to preventive diplomacy is Operation ABLE Sentry, where US forces deployed in 1993 in support of the United Nations (UN) effort to limit the spread of fighting in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

(2) Peacemaking. The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves the issues that led to conflict. Military support to the peacemaking process may include military-to-military relations, security assistance, or other activities to influence the disputing parties to seek a diplomatic settlement. An example of military support to peacemaking was the involvement of the Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) and the J-5, Joint Staff during the development of the Dayton Accord in 1995.

(3) Peace Building. Consisting of post-conflict actions, peace building is predominantly diplomatic and economic operations that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. It provides reconstruction and social rehabilitation, which offers hope to resolve the conflict and sustain the peace. Military forces have a limited, yet essential, role in

supporting peace building. Peace building usually begins while PKO or PEO are underway and continues after PKO or PEO have been concluded. The military support to the national elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996 by the Implementation Force (IFOR) is a recent example of operations in support of peace building. See JP 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, and JP 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Military Operations*.

2. Characteristics of Peace Operations

a. The PO operational area is characterized by complex, ambiguous, and, at times, uncertain situations that may have some or all of the following: asymmetrical threats, failed states, absence of rule of law, gross violations of human rights, collapse of civil infrastructure, or presence of displaced persons (DP) and refugees.

b. Political influence will extend down to tactical formations. In PO, actions at the tactical level can directly affect the strategic level. An incident may occur in PO where the actions of a unit, as small as a squad, may have strategic implications.

c. Risk management is a central theme. PO are dangerous. Leaders at every level must continuously assess the risk to their forces and take appropriate actions to mitigate that risk.

d. PO involve multiple agencies within the US government, for example, Departments of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and Department of Justice (DOJ). Additionally, most PO also involve international organizations, like the UN and NATO. Because of this, civil-military operations (CMO) are a central focus of PO with the military usually in a support role.

e. Most PO are multinational in character. This multinational aspect brings legitimacy to the operation. However, it also creates challenges as each nation brings with it individual perspectives and unique capabilities.

f. US participation in these operations is based on US national policy. The US may participate under the auspices of the UN, with regional organizations (e.g., NATO), in cooperation with other countries, or unilaterally. Refer to Appendix I, “Key Documents,” for additional information on PO mandates.

g. Commanders may impose a force cap that will reflect domestic and international political decisions. This is usually accomplished after a troop-to-task analysis has been conducted and it may require military units to conduct nontraditional military operations upon arrival.

h. There is no standard mission for PO. PO are unique, with their own political, diplomatic, geographic, economic, cultural, and military characteristics. These fundamentals guide actions and provide the basis for sound military decisions during PO.

3. Principles of MOOTW

a. PO are guided by the six principles of MOOTW—objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.

b. These principles are highlighted below, but are discussed fully in Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, and Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*.

(1) Objective

(a) Military personnel at all levels should understand the objectives of the operation and, more importantly, the potential impact of inappropriate military actions.

(b) Commanders should remain aware of changes and objectives in the situation or other events, which demand an adjustment of the military operation.

(c) Mission Creep. PO are susceptible to mission creep, due to the uncertainty of the tactical environment and the dynamics associated with operations involving nongovernmental organizations (NGO), international organizations, and changing political objectives. Tactical commanders must remain focused on the mission, intent, and objectives stated in plans and orders.

(2) Unity of Effort

(a) PO require the combined efforts of military and civilian instruments of national power, NGO, international organizations, and, usually, efforts of foreign governments. These organizations must work together or, at least, coordinate with each other. This cooperation or coordination constitutes unity of effort.

(b) The US may participate in PO under various command and control (C2) arrangements. These arrangements might include unilateral US operation, multinational operation with the US as the lead nation or in the context of a standing alliance; parallel command arrangement; or operational command provided to another nation's commander.

(c) Force Tailoring. The unique nature of PO will result in the migration of some support below the doctrinally assigned echelon. For example, civil affairs (CA), public affairs (PA), military police (MP), and psychological operations (PSYOP) units normally assigned to higher echelons may find themselves operating in support of brigades, battalions, and even companies. When operating inside a multinational organization, commanders should expect to integrate units down to the company level for combat units, and to the individual military member for support units.

(d) Interagency Coordination. Commanders should integrate military activities with the activities of other US governmental agencies. This optimizes the effectiveness of the total effort and prevents military actions that may be counterproductive to the overall mission. Commanders should place emphasis on early establishment of liaison to the various agencies supporting PO. The establishment of interagency coordinating centers, such as civil-military operations centers (CMOC), is one means of fostering unity of effort in achieving objectives of the operation. For detailed information, refer to JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol II*.

(e) NGOs/International Organizations. Collaboration with NGO and international organizations is essential. The NGO and international organization community attempt to work together through consultation, coordination, consensus, and cooperation. For detailed information on specific NGOs and international organizations, refer to JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol II*, or Appendix G "NGO/International Organizations."

(f) Multinational Cooperation. Several factors are essential for success when operations are conducted in cooperation with other nations. For detailed information, refer to JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*.

- Mutual respect and professionalism.

- Mission assignments.
- Management of resources.
- Harmony.

(3) Security. Force protection considerations are central to all aspects of the planning and execution of PO, particularly when the mission involves interposition between former belligerent forces. Even in relatively benign environments, employ force protection measures commensurate with the security risks to the force. For more information on force protection, refer to Chapter V, “Force Protection.”

(4) Restraint. In PO, exercise restraint in the prudent and appropriate application of military capability. Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence characterize the environment of PO. While PKO are usually nonviolent, PEO may include violent offensive and defensive operations. The use of excessive force may adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short- and long-term goals. On the other hand, using force appropriately to prevent factional groups from destroying the peace process can strengthen consent. Clearly spell out these restraints in the rules of engagement (ROE) provided by higher authority. ROE are discussed in Appendix I, “Key Documents.”

(5) Perseverance. Forces conducting PO must be prepared for the measured, sustained application of military capability in support of strategic objectives. Most require long-term commitments that involve more than military efforts alone. This is particularly true as forces conducting the PO routinely rotate in and out of the mission area. Continually emphasize the long term nature of PO, without giving the impression of permanency.

(6) Legitimacy. Legitimacy is initially derived from the legal documents authorizing and proscribing the operation. Forces can only sustain the perception of legitimacy if operations are conducted with regard for international norms on the use of military forces and regard for the humanitarian principles. Remaining impartial is a key component of legitimacy.

4. Fundamentals of PO

a. Establishing a presence, which inhibits hostile actions by disputing parties and bolsters confidence in the peace process, is the peacekeeper’s main function.

b. There are certain fundamentals that apply specifically to PO. These fundamentals are--consent, impartiality, transparency, credibility, freedom of movement, and civil-military harmonization.

(1) Consent. Consent is a critical issue in PO. Actions by forces during PO can build or destroy consent. Consent may vary from genuine desire for peace by all parties to commitment of only the leaders signing the peace agreement to consent by only one party.

(a) If consent exists, then the UN may deploy a peace operation force under the UN Charter, Chapter VI, *Pacific Settlement of Disputes*. If consent is in doubt, then the UN may deploy a PO force under the UN Charter, Chapter VII, *Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression*.

(b) If consent is lost during PO, the assigned forces may no longer be capable of dealing with the situation. New political decisions, mandates, ROE, or force compositions will be necessary. The PKO’s force may have to be replaced with a PEO’s

force or total withdrawal from the mission. Many of these circumstances arose during the conduct of operations by the UN protection force in the Balkans in 1995.

(c) Commanders should always seek ways to promote consent through an active participation with PO forces, representatives from disputing parties, and NGO/international organization. The promotion of consent is fundamental to achieving the political end state in all PO. Closely linked to consent is the compliance with the agreement or mandate. The enforcement of compliance may be a necessary condition to maintain consent.

(2) Impartiality. Impartiality distinguishes PO from armed conflict. Impartiality requires the PO force to act on behalf of the peace process and mandate, and not show preference for any faction or group over another. Corrective actions are taken for noncompliance rather than a desire to support or oppose a particular party. The degree to which the PO force acts in an impartial manner and the degree to which the belligerent parties perceive the force to be impartial combine to influence the PO. Even-handed treatment of all sides in the conflict can improve the prospects for lasting peace and security; even when combat operations are underway. Compromised impartiality may trigger an uncontrollable escalation from PKO to PEO or from PEO to conflict situation and jeopardize the success of the ongoing PO.

(3) Transparency. The PO forces must make the parties and the populace aware of the operational mandate, mission, intentions, and techniques used to ensure compliance. Transparency serves to reinforce legitimacy and impartiality. It is more difficult to challenge the impartial status of an operation with informed parties. A failure to communicate will foster suspicion and may erode the development of the trust and confidence on which the long-term success of the operation depends. Integrated and synchronized information operations (IO) are necessary to facilitate transparency. Civil-military programs, joint commissions, and an effective liaison system reinforce transparency. Commanders must balance need for transparency against the need for operational security. See Appendix D for more information concerning IO.

(4) Credibility. Credibility is essential to ensure mission accomplishment. Credibility reflects the belligerents' assessment of the capability of the PO force to accomplish its mission. The force must have the proper structure and resources with appropriate ROE to accomplish the mandate. It must discharge its duties swiftly and firmly, leaving no doubt as to its capabilities and commitment. All personnel must consistently demonstrate the highest standards of discipline, control, and professional behavior on and off duty.

(5) Freedom of Movement. Freedom of movement equates to maintaining the initiative. As amplified in the mandate, no restrictions are allowed against the movement of the peace force or the civilian population. As restrictions increase, consent decreases. Freedom of movement is a necessary condition to maintain consent and allow the process toward peace to continue. If the parties persist in denying freedom of movement, the authorizing political organization must assess the situation to determine if the mandate must change or the force must withdraw.

(6) Civil-Military Harmonization. Harmonization is a central feature of PO that enhances the credibility of the PO force, promotes consent and legitimacy, and encourages the parties to the conflict to work toward a peaceful settlement, therefore facilitating the transition to civil control. See Chapter VI for detailed discussion of CMO.

5. Transition

a. The relationships established in the initial stages, coupled with accurate assessments of progress achieved in civil-military implementation, is crucial to affecting a smooth transition of responsibility and the ultimate extraction of the military force. The PO forces will eventually hand over responsibilities to other military forces, governmental agencies, NGOs, or host nation (HN) governments. Similar to a traditional “relief-in-place,” the PO forces will carefully plan, coordinate, and manage the transition to the relieving force, agency, or civilian police (CIVPOL).

b. Commanders should plan for transition and termination before deployment or as soon as possible during the initial phase. The units involved will present a seamless transfer of responsibility, both for efficiency and effectiveness, but also to prevent any divergence or discrepancy that a hostile party or adversary might exploit. Transitions between military forces may take the form of relief-in-place, or transition-by-function (such as medical and engineer services, communications, logistics, and security). Examples of types of transitions include the following:

(1) Transition from US unilateral to UN led coalition. In Haiti, the US led mission, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, transitioned from a US unilateral operation to an UN-led coalition with the US taking a leading role. A similar type of transition occurred in East Timor with Australian forces taking over the lead role from coalition forces.

(2) From PEO to PKO. If PO are successful, the mission can transition from PEO to PKO. When IFOR initially entered Bosnia in 1995, it was a peace enforcement operation. By 2000, the mission transitioned to a peacekeeping operation with vastly reduced force structure.

(3) From military to civilian control. Transitions may involve the transfer of certain responsibilities to civilian control. Examples include passing refugee assistance missions to international organizations such as the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or NGO, or law enforcement missions to CIVPOL.

c. The ultimate goal is to transition all the functions performed by the PO force in a smooth and orderly fashion. Whether functions are transitioned to international organizations or local organizations, they require detailed military planning. Once all transitions are complete, the PO force can depart.

Chapter II PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

1. Background

a. The environment in which a military unit operates in PO is complex and distinct from other operations. The commander and staff must work with other countries' militaries as well as agencies and organizations of the international community that represent an integral part of most PO. This chapter attempts to broadly outline the many considerations the PO planning staff has to face during each phase of the PO.

b. The PO staff should develop a firm grasp on the military, political, economic, social, informational, and historical aspects of the region as they affect execution of the mission at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Working on political issues associated with the local communities in the area of operations (AO) will likely become a major focus of attention for the staff.

c. The PO staff should understand the interests of the diverse elements of the international community in country. The many agencies and organizations of the international community represent an integral part of most PO, often present in country throughout a conflict and staying after withdrawal of the last of the PO forces. Their agendas range widely across human rights, refugee resettlement, disaster relief, economic development, election support, education, child welfare, and other areas. Communication with them is essential, but the command must appreciate that the agencies usually want distinct and independent consideration from one another as well as from the PO forces. Be sensitive to the activity of these agencies; most do not want control or interference by the military. Whenever the command can leverage the international community agencies to support common civilian-military goals, those organizations should receive credit for the successes.

Note: The relationship with the UN mission, if present, will likely be a much closer working relationship.

d. The staff should gain a greater appreciation for the capabilities and limitations of all nonorganic organizations that will augment the unit's capabilities by receiving briefings, talking with their leaders, and training with them (or skilled role players) prior to deployment. As a result, the staff may benefit from the assets not normally a part of the unit.

e. The PO staff should develop, as early as possible, the concept of how they will operate. The staff may use military police and interpreters as new elements in the existing staff for the PO. In many cases the following are new components of higher headquarters' staffs: political advisor (POLAD), Joint Military Commission structure, Combined Press Information Center, Information Operations Cell, Force Protection Working Group, and other working groups.

f. Early on, the staff should establish mechanisms such as weekly meetings, coordination committees, or joint commissions to facilitate support with UN agencies, NGOs, and other international organizations. The staff might need similar mechanisms to work with the local population leaders and government.

2. Staff Considerations for Personnel

a. The personnel staff officer may face multinational issues for units attached. The personnel officer should understand and anticipate those requirements, be they emergency leaves or unit rotations.

b. PO may involve a myriad of statutory, regulatory, and policy considerations, both foreign and domestic. Some instances may involve conflicting bodies of law. Operations may require that commanders at all levels become involved with local governments and/or conduct and participate in negotiations among competing factions.

c. Determine the legal and fiscal restraints involved in logistics and material assistance to nonmilitary organizations and other nations' forces. Be proactive in seeking all necessary assistance to gain the authority needed to execute the mission in a multinational and interagency context.

3. Staff Considerations for Intelligence

a. During PO, the commander and staff will develop intelligence much in the same process used in war. The principal difference between intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) for conventional war and PO is the focus. Political, economic, linguistic, ethnic, and other factors influence populations and determine the "people" relevance to the mission. The analysts must determine what factors make a given population segment important to the commander and communicate this to the command.

b. Consider the following as possible intelligence sources during PO planning:

(1) The UN, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNHCR, special forces, CA, and PSYOP units, as well as other organizations, which may have been in the area for many years, may have useful studies and valuable resources for the intelligence planner.

(2) The leaders of the disputing parties.

(3) Military and political leadership from the regions bordering the AO.

(4) Civilian populations (including their expected level of support, indifference, or hostility to the force, as well as the potential for violence between different segments).

(5) Insurgent elements.

(6) Police and paramilitary forces.

(7) Patterns of criminal activity.

(8) Historical context (including cultural, ethnic, and religious factors and relationships).

(9) Economic conditions.

(10) Unique environmental threats.

(11) Internal and external political factors.

(12) The mandate will normally require tracking and recording the activities of the disputing parties.

(13) Personnel from NGO, international organizations, and the UN may provide general information to corroborate other sources. However, an active collection against such organizations is strongly discouraged.

c. Only release classified US information in accordance with the multinational sharing agreements. All commanders must understand these agreements.

d. A successful information collection plan must leverage the unique capabilities of CA, combat camera, MP, criminal investigation division (CID), Air Force Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI), Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), PSYOP, and multinational partners. Consider the availability of intelligence information from aerial reconnaissance vehicles.

e. Battle damage assessment (BDA) guidance focuses on assessing the results of the operations as well as compliance to the accords. It is a tool for determining the measure of effectiveness for an operation. Assessment of information operations may take long periods of time.

f. Synchronization.

(1) Understand information management and intelligence sharing issues.

(2) Give special consideration to multinational participants, many of whom will not have intelligence sharing agreements with the US.

(3) Direct special attention toward integrating the NGOs, international organizations, HN/police, CIVPOL, and others into the process.

(4) Pay special attention to human intelligence (HUMINT) organization. For example PO forces may develop an allied military intelligence.

g. The staff should anticipate integrating intelligence assets from higher levels.

h. Situational development relies on situational awareness. Situational awareness is the process of continually collecting and integrating intelligence and information. Units maintain situational awareness by producing and updating the intelligence estimate.

4. Staff Considerations for Operations

a. Pre-deployment Site Survey. Members of the staff should make at least two reconnaissance visits throughout mission preparation, since the nature of the operation and available assets will change over time.

b. This survey must include NGO and international organizations, as well as the HN and neighboring national inputs. Planners must coordinate with other nations' forces that are contributing to the PO effort to eliminate redundancy. Accomplish the survey as soon as feasible and consider the surveys and studies done by the UN, ICRC, UNHCR, and other organizations who may have been engaged in this area for many years. It should identify all potential tasks required to support the civil missions such as infrastructure and refugee support. A good survey will help mitigate "mission creep." The CMO staff officer leads this process with intelligence contributions. See Appendix E, "Civil IPB and Templating," for more detail.

c. Both the design of the command structure and the physical location of the various parts of the command carry significant meaning in PO. Bosnia and Kosovo are examples of national sectors being based on the local political reality and the desires of each contributing nation. The selection of certain nations to participate and location of those contingents on the ground can either enhance or retard the peace process.

d. HN political realities.

- (1) Are US forces tolerated in this area or would forces of another nation be able to gain rapport easier?
- (2) What are the local political, social, and economic boundaries?
- (3) Design the PO force boundaries to capitalize on the administrative political boundaries of the HN. The operations officer must continuously assess:
 - (a) The threat to US forces.
 - (b) How to accommodate the agendas of the contributing nations.
 - (c) The compatibility of other national military structures with the US systems.
 - (d) Bilateral or multilateral agreements with the US for support and funding.
 - (e) The historic connections of other nations' involvement in the life of the HN.
 - (f) ROE. The ROE may vary between national forces in the mission.
 - (g) Rules of Interaction (ROI). ROI embody those human dimension skills needed to successfully interface with various categories of people. They delineate with whom, under what circumstances, and to what extent military personnel may interact with other forces and the civilian populace. ROI, when applied with good interpersonal communication skills, improve the military personnel's ability to accomplish the mission while reducing possible hostile confrontations.
 - e. Since tours of duties for units normally are shorter than the peace operation, the staff must prepare transitional records. These records need to capture the civilian-military work that the unit has conducted to provide context for the new leaders as they meet with officials who are now dealing with a new chain of command.
 - f. Because individuals or organizations better qualified to perform these tasks are not in the area in the early stages of a peace operation, the military unit may have to perform certain tasks. Commanders and staff should conduct these tasks in a way that provides for a smooth handover of functions to the appropriate civilian organizations to sustain the new tasks.
 - g. Negotiations. The commander and his subordinates need to understand how to negotiate. See Chapter VII "Conflict Resolution."
 - h. Media. Prepare the staff to deal with US, international, and HN radio, television, and press media.
 - i. To ensure missions selected for special operations forces (SOF) are compatible with their capabilities, familiarize commanders the following special operations characteristics:
 - (1) Mature, experienced personnel compose SOF. Many maintain a high level of competency in more than one military specialty. Most special operations personnel are regionally oriented for employment. Cross-cultural communication skills are a routine part of their training. They require a detailed knowledge of the cultural nuances and languages of a country or region where employed. Selected special operations personnel can survey and assess local situations and report these assessments rapidly. SOF work closely with regional military and civilian authorities and populations.
 - (2) SOF are not a substitute for conventional forces, but a necessary adjunct to existing conventional forces' capabilities. Depending on requirements, SOF can operate independently or with conventional forces. SOF can assist and complement

conventional forces so that they can achieve their objectives. The special skills and low-visibility capabilities inherent in SOF also provide an adaptable military response in situations or crises requiring tailored, precise, focused use of force. For additional information on SOF see JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*.

j. PSYOP units support US forces during PKO by inducing or reinforcing attitudes and behavior. PSYOP forces can provide key support and information for the civil military aspects of the mission. Integrate PSYOP capabilities into the unit's operations. Examples of the tasks PSYOP forces can accomplish in support of the peace operation mission are:

(1) Disseminating information concerning the safety and welfare of the indigenous civilian population.

(2) Influencing a civilian population's attitude toward US policy and exploiting the goodwill created by US humanitarian efforts in the area of medical and veterinary aid, construction, and public facilities activities.

(3) Conducting assessments before and after an operation to determine the most effective application of effort and document the results.

(4) Amplifying the effects of PO.

(5) Overcoming propaganda broadcast by spoilers against the peace process.

(6) Increasing consent by interacting with various audiences.

k. Hazardous Material(s) (HAZMAT): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological

(1) Chemical staff officers may advise on commercial chemical threats as well as on the collection, packaging, storage, disposal, and cleanup of hazardous materials and/or wastes. This latter capability became important in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, where environmental assessment and reconnaissance teams encountered hazards associated with the misuse and improper disposal of industrial hazards and their by-products.

(2) Staffs need to consider the requirement for specialized teams (HAZMAT/environmental/technical escort) for the recovery and reclamation of toxic industrial materials, toxic industrial chemicals, toxic industrial biological materials, or industrial radiological materials that could pose a hazard to US forces. Damaged or abandoned medical facilities, universities, and industrial facilities may contain material that could pose a significant hazard to individuals performing PO and to the local populace. Additional guidance and response procedures are available in JP 3-11, *Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments*, and FM 3-11.21/MCRP 3-37.2C/NTTP 3-11.24/AFTTP (I) 3-2.37, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Consequence Management*.

l. Engineer

(1) Military engineer effort may form the bulk of the initial surge, but over time this will probably transition to civilian contractor effort (logistics civilian augmentation program or other sustainment contractors) as contractors have time to mobilize, hire, and train a local workforce. Take care to avoid "overbuilding" and ensure good stewardship of resources. As peace building succeeds, transition activities to local control. As some activities are closed down due to changes in the peace process, modify force structures and concepts around the availability of materials and equipment.

(2) Consider engineer organizations as one of the sources for intelligence information to satisfy the priority intelligence requirements (PIR). By conducting on-site reconnaissance and discussions with local officials, civil engineers can determine the viability of local infrastructure to support military operations and enhance engineer planning in support of operations.

m. Medical

(1) Determine if there are any requirements for forensic support to war crimes investigation.

(2) Be aware of special technical agreements with other Services on casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) and emergency care and health care logistics.

(3) The health support estimate should include:

(a) Number of troops to support.

(b) Population at risk.

(c) Expected casualty or combat intensity rates.

(d) Expected disease and non-battle injury casualty rates.

(e) Bed availability.

(f) Expected admission rates.

(4) Determine the medical concept for support of Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA).

(5) Theater evacuation policy. The theater evacuation policy will state the maximum period that injured military members or patients, not expected to return to duty, are held within the theater for treatment before evacuation. The Secretary of Defense established this policy upon advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and recommendations of the designated unified combatant commander.

(6) Determine the medical concept for support of FHA. (FM 8-42, *Combat Health Support in Stability Operations and Support Operations*).

(7) Medical programs such as medical civic action programs, dental civic action programs, and veterinary civic action programs may be operating in rural areas of a country. Make the unit aware of these programs and so it can benefit from their presence.

n. Combat Camera is an effective tool for documenting search operations, patrols use of nonlethal weapons (NLW), and is a combat multiplier for IO and supports both internal and external public affairs plans.

o. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO). Prepare staff to provide the following information to support UXO/explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams:

(1) Priorities. Staffs must prioritize tasks when dealing with UXO. For example, remove the wounded and fatalities, act to prevent loss of life and property damage, or remove hazardous munitions or explosives.

(2) Area security.

(3) Medical support.

(4) Fire fighting support.

(5) Finally, see FM 9-15, *Explosive Ordnance Disposal Service and Unit Operations*; AFI 32-3001, *Explosive Ordnance Disposal Program*; and AFJI 32-3002,

Interservice Responsibilities For Explosive Ordnance Disposal; for more information regarding UXO.

p. Nonlethal. Tactical employment of NLW are detailed in the multi-Service publication, FM 3-22.40, MCWP 3-15.8, NTTP 3-07.3.2, AFTTP(I) 3-2.45, USCG Pub 3-07.31 *Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons*, or online at <https://lad.dtic.mil/alsa/nlw.htm>.

5. Staff Considerations for Logistics

a. Logistic planning and support in PO are the same as in war; however, the demand for food, water, billeting, waste disposal, movement control, environmental and safety concerns, and HN supplies and services may increase substantially above the force's own requirements depending on the magnitude of the DPs situation, the status of the nation's infrastructure, and the requirements of the peace implementation agreement.

b. Contractors. Contractors provide a range of support, expertise, and assistance to the military and the civil dimensions of the operation. The staff needs to understand its responsibilities for oversight and discipline of contractor personnel.

c. Fiscal.

(1) Determine the authority to provide or receive coalition support to the local procurement process. Determine the additional financial support needed for peace related programs like weapons bounties.

(2) Recommend proactive measures to determine the amount of UN or alliance fiscal shortfall.

(3) Understand the common funding arrangements.

d. The logistic support concept should include the concept for multinational force support as well as anticipated NGO/international organization requirements. Also, it should identify what areas will come under multination control, US unilateral control, and what areas will remain under HN control. This should also identify who is the lead nation for the operation and who has specific responsibility for providing each class of supply.

e. The organization and structure required for logistical support. Understanding the unique logistics capabilities of each member of the multinational force will assist in organizing and structuring for logistical support.

f. The requirements, shortfalls, and necessary arrangements; to include support for multinational elements as well as support for civil military operations.

g. The availability of HN support and contracting.

h. Redeployment and recovery plans for transition should include plans for transition to a UN force, if appropriate.

i. Specific technical agreements. Understand special agreements, such as environmental clean-up, exemption from customs duties, HAZMAT storage, and transit restrictions. The status of forces agreement (SOFA) is a key document described further in Appendix I, "Key Documents."

j. Special Equipment Requirements. Technologically advanced equipment can improve the ability of the force to perform its mission. This equipment can improve the probability of detecting violations of agreements, enhancing weapons verification,

supporting weapons destruction, and enhancing force protection. Support of the zones of separation, checkpoints (CP), and observation posts (OP) may require special equipment.

k. Dislocated civilians (DC) can pose a significant logistical challenge. See Chapter III “Operational Design.”

l. Inform staff logistic officers of the impact of the PO force on the local economy. Although the presence of the force may stimulate growth in the local economy, there are potential negative impacts on the economy, which commanders must understand. Develop policies to reduce these impacts, such as regulating the amount of US dollars US personnel are allowed to convert to local currency and paying local civilians hired to support the PK force the prevailing wages for the area. Also consider the economic impacts of leave, pass, liberty, and rest and relaxation.

m. Movement Planning.

(1) Limited availability of movement and transport resources require planning, coordination, and cooperation among all participants. Multinational deployments are inherently difficult to coordinate because each nation is responsible for obtaining movement resources and planning and controlling the movement of their forces, their components of multinational forces, and when acting as a lead nation, the multinational headquarters group. This also requires coordination with the HN so that nations do not deploy redundant capabilities already available, such as port operations forces.

(2) In NATO context, see Allied Joint Publication 4-0, *Multinational Joint Logistics*. If it is a NATO operation, there are normally both a US and a NATO joint movement center (JMC). In such a case, the NATO JMC, sometimes called the multinational deployment agency, is the lead movement agency.

n. In other multinational operation, the US may have the JMC and liaison officer (LNO) from national contingents coordinating directly with the US JMC.

6. Staff Considerations for Communications

a. Communications connectivity in PO include the standard communication architecture and extension to support civil military operations. These operations require multiple liaison teams with a significant communications requirement. The unit may need to utilize nonmilitary communication systems.

b. Interoperability is often constrained by the least technologically advanced nation. In addition to problems of compatibility and security, many multinational units do not have enough communications equipment to meet mission requirements. This will be an issue if such a unit is assigned to operate under US control.

7. Other Staff Considerations

a. POLAD. Of all the new staff members, the POLAD stands out as probably the most important for the PO staff, since the political aspects of PO will often carry greater significance than the military aspects.

(1) It should be clear that the POLAD is a key member of the staff, as such, includes it in all relevant decision-making.

(2) Expect that the POLAD would probably be sent from another organization, preferably an experienced senior Foreign Service Officer from the State Department.

(3) Use the POLAD as a sounding board, advisor, salesman, and marketer. If the job is done correctly, the POLAD is a key player in the decision support group and a source of advice for the commander.

(4) The POLAD will expect the military to be good professionals first, rather than politicians. Even if the military leaders are not politically astute, they should develop an approach that demonstrates political sensitivity and an understanding of how the system works.

b. Chaplains. In addition to their traditional missions, chaplains have a key and unique role in PO. Most of these complex contingencies have significant religious issues. The chaplain can assist the commander by serving as a liaison, with CA and intelligence representatives, to local religious leaders, NGOs, and international organizations.

c. Provost Marshal (PM).

Note: For the purposes of this multi-Service TTP (MTTP), MP will encompass the terms “military police,” as used by the Army, and “security force,” as used by the Air Force.

(1) The PM for each level of command advises the commander on how MP support PO across the spectrum of the core MP functionalities: maneuver and mobility support operations, area security, police intelligence operations, law and order, and internment and resettlement operations.

(2) Maneuver and Mobility Support Operations. MP support the commander through maneuver and mobility support operations in a variety of measures to include:

- (a) Supporting straggler and DP operations.
- (b) Conducting route reconnaissance and surveillance.
- (c) Enforcing regulations along any main supply routes (MSR) within the

AO.

- (d) Performing presence patrols throughout an AO.
- (e) Assisting in the collection of information for analysis by military

intelligence.

(3) MP operations within the mission of area security include:

- (a) Reconnaissance operations.
- (b) Area damage control.
- (c) Can perform as a reactionary force to the command.
- (d) Conduct critical site, asset, high-risk personnel security to include

security of convoys and very important persons (VIP).

(e) The MP deploying during PO can provide early force protection to an initial aerial port/seaport of debarkation security.

(f) The MP’s mobility, firepower, and communications provide critical reconnaissance, information-collection, and response-force capabilities to the command.

(4) Police intelligence operations.

- (a) A police intelligence operation is a network of law enforcement.
- (b) Security and intelligence organizations collect, analyze, fuse, and report.

(c) Information/intelligence regarding threat/criminal groups for evaluation, assessment, targeting, and interdiction. MP conduct police intelligence operations through integrated patrols, mounted/dismounted, and coordination with joint, interagency, and multinational assets. MP patrols greatly assist in confirming or denying the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR).

(5) Law and order operations in PO ensure stability and security is maintained throughout the AO. MP perform various tasks under this function, such as the following:

(a) Conducting law enforcement missions throughout the AO; to include coordination of joint security patrols with host-nation assets.

(b) The conduct of criminal investigations through coordination and synchronization with CID assets.

(c) MP are also the ideal force for conducting crowd and riot control operations, including the extraction of mob leaders. MP also control antagonistic masses engaged in rioting, looting, and demonstrating.

(6) Internment and resettlement operations in PO maintain stability within a given AO. Tasks performed under this function in a peace operation are as follows:

(a) Dislocated Civilian (DC). DCs are civilians who left their home for various reasons. Their movement and physical presence can hinder military operations. DC is a generic term that is further subdivided into the following categories:

(b) Displaced Person: A person who has been dislocated because of war, natural disaster, or political/economic turmoil.

(c) Refugees: People who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, are outside the country of their nationality, and are unable to or, owing to such fear, are unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country.

(d) Evacuees: Civilians who are removed from their place of residence by military direction because of personal security or other requirements of the military situation.

(e) Stateless Person: A civilian who has been denationalized, whose country of origin cannot be determined, or who cannot establish a right to be nationality claimed.

(f) War victim: Civilians who have suffered injury, loss of a family member, or damage or destruction of their homes because of war.

(g) Migrant: A worker who moves from one region to another by chance, instinct, or plan.

(7) Internal displaced persons (IDP): A person forced to flee from home for the same reason as a refugee, but has not crossed an internationally recognized border.

(a) Expellees: Civilians who are outside the boundaries of their country of nationality or ethnic origin and are being forcibly repatriated to that country or a third country for political or other purposes.

(8) Finally, for a further discussion of the role of the Military Police in PO see FM 3-19.1, *Military Police Operations*, and FM 3-19.40, *Internment/Resettlement Operations*.

d. Public Affairs (PA).

(1) The relationship the commander and his PA staff develop with the media will be critical.

(2) Other nations' forces are familiar with their national media organizations and their methods, but other nation's media elements may operate under different rules. The Public affairs officer (PAO) and PA staffs must realize these differences and work closely with the media to develop an open environment with a minimum of ground rules to maintain operational security.

(3) Develop media policy before deployment and update periodically.

(4) To help in handling the media and providing maximum coverage of important events, the command should deploy with PA assets as part of the command Task Force headquarters. Initially, public interest in military operations is high. A robust PA element is necessary to handle high volumes of media calls. It is better to deploy more PA assets than needed and scale back, rather than lose initial control of the media impact on operations.

(5) Ensure that the PAO is part of the planning process and advise the commander on all PA implications of the operation. Ensure that the PAO or representative is part of the information coordination group, joint targeting process, and coordinate PA operations within the operations coordination group.

e. Space Support.

(1) Space operations provide space-related tactical planning and support, expertise, advice, and liaison regarding available space capabilities.

(2) Space operations personnel should:

(a) Determine space support requirements and request, plan, and integrate space capabilities into operations (See JP 3-14 *Joint Doctrine for Space Operations*, chapter II, paragraph 9 for possible space support resource).

(b) Coordinate space support with national, service, joint, and theater resources.

(c) Prepare the space support plan.

(d) Provide space products to support planning.

(e) Provide estimates on the status, capabilities, and limitations of space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), weather, navigation and timing, and communication satellites for friendly, threat, and commercial systems.

Chapter III OPERATIONAL DESIGN

1. Creating a Secure Environment

a. The goal of the peace force is to create the conditions for other political, economic, and humanitarian peace building activities to achieve the political objective stated in the mandate and to transition from military to civil control. The peace force must separate and neutralize belligerent forces to ensure public security, establish/maintain freedom of movement, and protect FHA.

b. Principles.

- (1) Focus the operation at the tactical level.
- (2) Sustain consent for the operation.
- (3) Keep the entire operation transparent.
- (4) Act as liaison to all key parties and local authorities.
- (5) Belligerents must fully participate for success.
- (6) The PO force must have full freedom of movement.
- (7) Observing, reporting, and monitoring are the essential tools.
- (8) IO are key.
- (9) Maintain law and order.

c. Military Tasks.

(1) The peace force must physically occupy key terrain to establish control over urban and rural areas. (Chapter III, Sec 4).

(2) Separate belligerent forces. (Chapter III, Sec 5).

(3) Disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate.

(4) Control weapons.

(5) Control borders. Commanders must regulate the movement of persons or goods across borders. They may task units to guard ground, maritime, or air (or a combination of all) borders. They must clearly state all instructions regarding permitted or prohibited movements of peoples, units, or goods.

(6) Secure key sites. (Chapter III, Section 3)

(7) Establish control measures that are visible and known to the local population. See OPs, CPs/roadblocks, and curfews.

(8) Ensure freedom of movement.

(9) Establish secure base(s).

(10) Establish and maintain presence in the AO.

(11) Establish protected areas.

(12) Ensure public security. (See Chapter III, Section 6, “Nonlethal Weapons”; Chapter III, Section 7, “Search Operations”; Chapter IV, Section 7, “Civil Disturbances”; Chapter IV, Section 8, “Curfews”; and Chapter VI, Section 6, “Rule of Law”)

d. Planning Considerations

(1) Commanders and staffs must conduct a thorough analysis of the peace agreement.

(2) Commanders should have and use legal advisers during all planning and operations to establish a secure environment.

(3) Urban environments require special considerations.

(4) Joint military commissions provide the cornerstones for settling problems associated with establishing a secure environment.

2. Protected Areas

a. Commanders may elect to require the PO force to establish and maintain a protected area. A protected area is a geographic area, inside of which the military force provides security and facilitates humanitarian aid for people at risk. This area has had several names in the past: security zone, safe area, humanitarian zone, and safe haven.

b. Principles

(1) The commander may use force to compel compliance. The PO force should have the appropriate ROE and capability.

(2) The local population must perceive the PO force as impartial. This will require a significant IO plan and constant command attention.

(3) Demilitarized and demobilized the area. Do not let it become a protected area for one of the belligerents.

(4) PO forces must enforce freedom of movement to and from the area.

(5) The commander must build consent through all means to eliminate the need for a protected area.

c. Military Tasks

(1) Establish the protected area.

(2) Establish and enforce weapons exclusion zone.

(3) Establish and maintain cantonment areas and weapons holding areas.

(4) Dominate avenues of approach.

(5) Establish CPs, OPs, and other control access measures.

(6) Establish curfew.

(7) Conduct presence patrols.

(8) Develop and rehearse reinforcement contingency plans.

d. Planning Considerations for Protected Areas.

(1) The commander must insist on clear and unambiguous guidance. The commander must make clear the objectives of the mission and the criteria for success.

(2) The selected area must afford at least the minimal military requirements to ensure protection. The selected area will have significant political dimensions driven by a humanitarian crisis. The military commander must provide input as to the military feasibility behind the political decision.

(3) Commanders should establish quick reaction forces (QRF) and decide the ROE for their employment. The commander must understand and rehearse the use of the QRF.

(4) Coordinate the extent of humanitarian support with NGOs, international governmental organizations, and HN. If the military must assist, this will influence the force size and force mix.

- (5) Coordinate and understand the extent of the PO effort and responsibilities for villages and towns in the area.
- (6) Understand the plan for dealing with the media.
- (7) Understand and rehearse ROE.
- (8) Establish an LNO with local law enforcement officials. Establishing a liaison is a key ingredient to PO, as it produces trust from all sides involved.

3. Site Security

a. PO forces may provide site security at various locations within their AO. These sites include, but are not limited to:

- (1) Religious sites, such as mosques, temples, churches, or shrines.
- (2) War crimes sites.
- (3) Governmental buildings.
- (4) Election sites.
- (5) Schools.
- (6) Culturally or historically significant sites.

b. Commanders may deem these requirements temporary or permanent in nature. Commanders should make a thorough IPB of the AO to determine those sites that may require security. Based on threat conditions and forces available, the commander must then conduct a risk assessment to determine if and how to provide the security.

c. Fixed Site Security techniques. Commanders may combine and vary these techniques according to the local situation.

- (1) Periodic observation by patrols, to include over flights.
- (2) Obstacles.
- (3) Electronic monitoring.
- (4) Guards – periodic or permanent.

(5) Patrols should make periodic, random checks of guard posts; however, make these checks part of the unit's patrol plan and involve coordination with the elements conducting the guard. Commanders may use QRFs as part of this type check during rehearsals and route recons. Depending on the size and location of the guard force required, security of fixed sites may require area reconnaissance patrols on a periodic basis.

(6) The type of site requiring security will determine the amount of coordination required with local authorities, owners, and NGO/international organization. The situation may require entrance rosters for those sites with limited access, such as war crimes sites. School and church officials should assist guards at entrances during periods of high volume; i.e., start and end of the school day and scheduled services.

(7) If not already instituted by local authorities, commanders should encourage and formalize relations with neighborhood watch programs. Normally, create this relationship through the local police or international police monitors.

4. Separation of Forces (Interpositioning)

a. Means of separation. One, or a combination, of the following, may delineate the geographical separation in any environment (figure III-1):

(1) Cease-Hostilities Line. This is the place where the fighting stopped. This line marks the forward limit of the positions occupied by the troops of the opposing sides at the suspension of hostilities. The exact location of this line is often contentious and a topic of discussion in the peacemaking process. This is just a reference point and not a control measure, unless so negotiated by the settlement.

(2) Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL). A geographically defined line from which disputing or belligerent forces disengage and withdraw to their respective sides following a truce or cease fire agreement. The agreement of cease fire lines may pave the way for the establishment of buffer zones (BZ), zones of separation (ZOS), or demilitarized zones (DMZ), as well as the withdrawal of forces.

(3) ZOS and Separation Lines: A neutral space on either side of an ADL. Separation lines are the borders of the ZOS. ZOS refer to intrastate conflict, while BZ refers to interstate conflict. Base the width of the ZOS on visual distances or weapon ranges. Out of visual sight is preferable, as it reduces the temptation of casual sniping. A ZOS may contain residences, farmland, or other assets that the force may need to patrol or monitor to ensure that FHA is delivered, and protected. If it is the sovereign territory of one of the belligerents, coordinate the administration and policing of the inhabitants. The supervising authority will usually control and limit access to a ZOS, and generally the air space above it. Any maritime zones should specify infringements to international shipping rights.




Figure III-1 Control Zones

(4) BZ or DMZ. These terms are usually applied to interstate conflict. It is a zone from which the armed forces of both sides are excluded. Buffer lines are the borders of the BZ. BZ/DMZ are the sovereign territory of at least one of the parties, which the PO forces must recognize the rights of administration.

(5) Control Zones. The Control Zones are areas on either side of a ZOS, the forward limits of which will be the cease fire line. In some areas, limits are set for numbers of personnel, tanks, artillery (by caliber), mortars, and missiles (rockets) permitted in the control zone at any one time, or during any particular period.

(6) Lines Demarcating a BZ. There is not always agreement on the location of the lines on either side of a BZ. This may be because the parties to the dispute do not use the same map grid or because one side refuses to give up a position near the line, which it considers essential to its security. A BZ is normally only a DMZ to exclude the armed forces of both sides. Both sides may still police the area. Mark these lines by wire fences and signs wherever possible. Beware of political implications in doing this form of marking; clear instructions are necessary to avoid disputes on the ground and disputes in the diplomatic and political arena.

(7) Areas of Transfer: Turn over these areas to one party or another and do not relate to the ADL.

b. Means of separation. The following principles apply:

- (1) Focus the operation at the tactical level.
- (2) Sustain consent to the separation.
- (3) Keep the entire operation transparent.
- (4) Liaison to all key parties and the local authorities is essential.
- (5) Full participation of the belligerents is the only hope of success.
- (6) The peace force must have full freedom of movement.
- (7) Observing, reporting, and monitoring will be the essential tools.

c. Military Tasks.

(1) Occupying key terrain. The PO force normally separates belligerents by physically occupying a corridor between the two parties.

(2) Establishing and marking the ADL, ZOS, and BZ. The initial and most important task is to determine accurately the location of the agreed geographic locations and mark them. The unit commander must negotiate the details with the belligerent forces.

(a) Where possible, the trace should follow identifiable natural or manmade terrain features.

(b) Promptly survey and physically mark the ground by an acceptable means, such as the placement of painted barrels, oil drums, stakes, single strand wire, or coiled wire is important. A global positioning system (GPS) may assist most units to conduct marking accurately.

(c) Clearly identify markers so all parties can see them from 100m in daylight and from both directions in travel. Locate permanent in the most heavily trafficked areas.

(d) If possible, use belligerent forces to do the marking. This gives them more ownership of the peace process and provides needed labor to mark the area quickly.

(e) Determining the location of all forces. The belligerent forces must provide maps and overlays of the disposition of their forces and equipment.

(f) Establish communication with all belligerent forces. Ensure that all elements have communication with the belligerent forces and that liaisons from those forces are located in the tactical operation centers of the peace operation.

(g) Establish control measures.

- Make all control measures visible and known to the local population.
- These control measures will enable the PO force to supervise the withdrawal of the belligerent forces via designated routes to assembly areas where initial disarmament of key weapons systems will take place.
- Move belligerents to barracks. Take confiscated weapons to cantonment or weapons storage sites or destroy them.
- Examples of control measures are CPs, OPs, access routes, belligerent assembly areas, and weapons cantonment sites.

(h) Clear key areas of mines, obstacles, and fortifications. Minefields, craters, tank ditches, berms, bunkers, and fortifications will block roads and access into and out of the zone. The PO force cannot separate belligerent forces or establish freedom of movement until cleared areas are established. The belligerents who must clear the minefields and remove obstacles, bunkers, and fortifications fall under the supervision and assistance of the PO force. PO forces may have to provide material to the belligerent forces to accomplish this task.

- Establish surveillance, verification, and collection systems to monitor and demonstrate progress. One technique is to establish a reconnaissance board modeled after a targeting board whose function is to synchronize intelligence information, reconnaissance, assets, and verification requirements into a workable, comprehensive plan. Make this a coordinated effort among all ground, air, maritime, and technical assets of all of the nations participating. The collection plan can then focus on named areas of interest to monitor key belligerent force locations.

(i) Controlling ZOS. The series of observation and control measures supported by active ground, air, and maritime patrolling is essential for controlling the zone. Set clear guidelines on whom and what is allowed inside or to transit the zone. Clearly state the authority and role of CIVPOL. Regulate agricultural activities inside the zone. Clearly state, so that all members of the PO force can understand, all procedures for handling violators and confiscated weapons and ammunition. Establish clear communication among all players. Use joint military commissions or other such consultative body to settle disputes arising from control of the zone.

5. PO Interposition Tactics

a. As in a preventive deployment, give an interposition force sufficient combat power available to match whatever threat could develop. PO will require the interpositioning of the PO force to supervise the orderly disengagement and withdrawal of the parties to the dispute.

b. Defusing sensitive or potentially explosive situations may require commanders to interposition the PO force. This gives the disputing parties confidence that their withdrawal will not give an advantage to another disputing party or parties.

c. Interpositioning places PO forces between the disputing parties in an effort to supervise the withdrawal of the disputing parties' forces and establish a BZ. This operation requires careful and accurate timing to reduce the inherent risks to the PO

force. Maintain the PO force credible and impartial in order to interpose successfully. If possible, the PO force should take advantage of the lull in hostilities to interpose as the parties in the conflict disengage.

d. If interpositioning occurs after disengagement or withdrawal has begun, accomplish it quickly to prevent clashes that could lead to renewal of the conflict or a general breakdown in the cease fire. The possible sequence of separation may be as follows:

(1) After a truce or cease fire is in effect and the disputing parties reach agreement on the trace of an ADL as shown in Figure III-2, PO can begin. Some operations call this line a cease fire line.




Figure III-2 Armistice Demarcation Line Trace

(2) The JTF commander coordinates the deployment of PO forces with the disputing parties and their forces.

(3) PO forces deploy along the ADL between the disputing forces as shown in Figure III-3 and supervise the disengagement and withdrawal of the disputing forces behind their respective sides of the ADL. The ADL becomes the forward limit for the disputing forces. The purpose of the interpositioning is to establish a presence and

place a buffer force between disputing forces. Carefully planned interpositioning considers the following implied tasks:

(a) Where possible, the trace of the ADL should follow identifiable natural or manmade terrain features. Make artillery or engineer survey qualified PO force personnel responsible for carrying out demarcation duties. Monitoring of the line is required to ensure that the markings are not moved. PO forces may use ADL markers, which are difficult to remove and have a GPS signature.

(b) Make the size of the interpositioning force sufficiently credible to provide the disputing parties with the confidence needed to disengage and withdraw safely from their positions.

(c) The utmost care is needed during initial interpositioning because of the likelihood of disagreements and misunderstandings. Commanders may employ mine clearance operations to deploy safely the PO force along the line.

(d) Commanders must promptly mediate localized disagreements or potential clashes at the lowest practical level to prevent a recurrence of conflict.




Figure III-3 Deployment of PO forces Along an ADL

(4) Once there is agreement on the formation of a BZ, PO forces can establish lines of demarcation on each side of the ADL. The PO force then supervises the

withdrawal of the disputing forces to positions behind their respective lines of demarcation, as shown in Figure III-4, to prepare for the establishment of the BZ. The lines of demarcation are now the forward limits for the respective disputing forces.




Figure III-4 Withdrawal of Disputing Forces Behind Lines of Demarcation

(5) PO forces establish the BZ, begin observation, and patrol activities as shown in Figure III-5. Some UN PO refer to the BZ as the area of separation. A BZ is normally only a zone or area from which the disputing forces are excluded. Observation posts (OP) provide visual coverage within the BZ. Patrols supplement the OP by patrolling areas out of effective visual coverage. Access to the BZ is normally restricted to the PO force or observer group. Commanders may negotiate special arrangements between the disputing parties and the PO force to allow restricted access to local civilians, such as farmers or fishermen. At any point where commanders may permit, by the agreement, people or vehicle traffic to pass into or through a BZ, peacekeepers may control access at CPs and can restrict hours to daylight. Commanders will determine staffing of such CPs based on their analysis of the mission and other factors.




Figure III-5 Establishment of BZ

(6) Subject to negotiated diplomatic agreements, the disputing parties may agree to extended areas of supervision called areas of limitation (AOL), as shown in Figure III-6, where peacekeepers may inspect the strength and fortifications of the disputing parties. The usual arrangement is for the disputing parties to agree to maintain equal numbers of small, lightly armed forces in the area immediately adjacent to the BZ. Agreements between disputing parties may allow larger forces in other areas of the AOL, but the agreement will specify an upper limit for the number and type of formations, tanks, and anti-aircraft weapons and artillery (by caliber) permitted. The PO force or observer group will monitor each side's compliance with the personnel and armaments limitations. Lines of demarcation define outer boundaries of the AOLs. AOLs constitute an additional measure for improving the security of the BZ and increasing the confidence of the disputing parties.




Figure III-6 Establishment of AOL

(7) The BZ may eventually become a DMZ, following further diplomatic activity. In contrast to BZs, PO forces do not occupy DMZs, but observe and patrol with observer groups. A DMZ is created to neutralize certain areas from military occupation and activity. Generally, a DMZ is in an area claimed by two or more of the disputing sides and where control by one party could constitute a direct threat to the others. Lines of demarcation define DMZ boundaries. Make these boundaries easily recognizable and, ideally, do not run them counter to locally accepted political and cultural divisions. The airspace over a DMZ is also denied to aircraft of the disputing parties.

6. Nonlethal Weapons

a. NLW are weapons explicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate personnel or material, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property, and the environment. Make all parties understand that the term "nonlethal" is a function of intent and goal, not a guarantee that these weapons will not produce serious bodily injury, death, or other severe adverse effects. NLW add flexibility to all types of operations, but are especially useful in civil disturbances and PO by limiting the risk of unnecessary casualties and collateral damage.

b. NLW should enhance the abilities of military commanders to conduct missions across the range of military operations. NLW provide tools that enable the individual, team, or unit to anticipate and/or respond to provocation when the use of deadly force is

not appropriate. Essentially, NLW provide US forces with a capability for effectively controlling the nontraditional battlefield of PO, within the constraints levied by ROE, by mitigating casualties and minimizing collateral damage.

c. Planning Considerations:

(1) Consider the use of NLW as an integral part of PO. Due to the increasing US armed forces involvement in PO and the advances in communication technology, the public is able to see operations unfold in real time. Such public scrutiny has highlighted the difficulties of military forces responding to a situation because they often have no weapons capable of generating anything less than lethal force.

NOTE: Per CJCSI 3121.021A, *Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces (SROC)*, 15 January 2000, all US forces specifically retain the inherent right of individual and unit self defense.

(2) As with any other capability, NLW have limitations on their usage. Political leadership and media personnel may misunderstand the appropriate applications of NLW across the full range of military operations. NLW allowing the completion of PO without casualties is incorrect and may lead to conflicting expectations between political and military leaders. Leaders are encouraged to again refer to multi-Service procedures for the *Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons*, for more in-depth information on the use of NLW.

(3) Operations may involve nonlethal or lethal weapons, or both, and force cannot limit any one situation to a specific level of damage. NLW could contribute to the application of military force in pursuit of military/political aims and objectives. Employing Combat Camera to document NLW use, provides support for positive media coverage and assurance against hostile misinformation and propaganda

d. The services are procuring nonlethal capability sets (NLCS) that are versatile packages of NLW comprised of commercial off-the-shelf and government off-the-shelf equipment and munitions. Advanced developmental technologies are also being explored for future procurements. In addition to addressing contingency requirements, the Services' NLCS address training requirements by providing limited sustainment training ammunition and appropriate sustainment training equipment. Services can divide NLCS components into four distinct categories: personnel protectors, personnel effectors, mission enhancers, and training devices. The following examples of NLCS are not all-inclusive:

(1) Personnel protectors include items such as ballistic face shields and riot shields that protect the individual from blunt trauma injuries inflicted by thrown objects, clubs, etc.

(2) Personnel effectors include items such as riot batons, malodorants, stingball grenades, pepper sprays, and other kinetic rounds (e.g., sponge grenades) designed to discourage, disorient, or incapacitate individuals or groups.

(3) Mission enhancers include items such as bullhorns, spotlights, and caltrops. These items are designed to facilitate target identification and crowd control, and to limit personnel and vehicular movement.

(4) Training devices include items such as training suits, training rounds, training batons, and inert pepper sprays. They are designed to facilitate realistic hands-on scenario training in preparation for operations.

e. The generic NLCS is designed to provide a battalion-sized infantry element with limited, tactically deployable NLW. Fielding of this capability set enhances the operation of systems and equipment already fielded and planned within the joint community. The generic NLCS components are compatible with military equipment that is already fielded or planned for future use. Capability set munitions are either hand thrown or fired from 12-gauge shotguns or 40 millimeter grenade launchers.

f. The core capabilities associated with nonlethal effects fall into two major categories: counterpersonnel and countermateriel.

(1) Counterpersonnel capabilities include:

(a) Non-lethal counterpersonnel capabilities enable the application of military force with reduced risk of fatalities or serious casualties among noncombatants or even, in some instances, among enemy forces.

(b) US forces require the capability to incapacitate personnel and stop the disturbance behaviors. For the purposes of this document, “incapacitation” is achieved when weapons effects result in physical inability (real or perceived) or mental disinclination to act in a hostile or threatening manner. While the focus, at least initially, is on capabilities that affect groups of people, NLW also provide capabilities to incapacitate individuals without affecting those nearby.

(c) US forces require a nonlethal capability to deny personnel access to an area. This capability can include the use of physical barriers or systems that produce physical or mental discomfort to those who enter the denied area. Non-explosive nonlethal area denial technologies would likely have none of the restrictions applied to conventional land mines. Thus, they can provide new possibilities for barrier planning in any type of military operation.

(d) US forces require a nonlethal capability to seize personnel. This may include some combination of technologies inherent in other core capabilities. Incapacitation methods or the use of entangling devices, such as those designed for area denial, may aid in seizing personnel. This capability is intended to augment lethal means used to capture specified individuals, such as enemy combatants or persons who are inciting a mob or crowd to violence.

(2) Countermateriel capabilities refer to:

(a) The joint NLW approach focuses on three specific countermateriel capabilities. US forces require a nonlethal capability to deny vehicles to air, land, and sea areas. This requirement applies to wheeled, tracked, and surface effects vehicles, as well as aircraft on the ground. US forces may include physical barriers or systems that artificially reduce the trafficability of terrain in this requirement.

(b) US forces require the ability to disable ships and other maritime vessels or deny their entry into targeted areas. US forces also require an enhanced ability to disarm personnel or disable maritime vessels to facilitate boarding.

g. Tasks associated with NLW are derived from the commander’s and service’s mission needs statements. These tasks are grouped under three core capabilities: counterpersonnel, countermateriel, and countercapability.

(1) Counterpersonnel

(a) Control crowds.

(b) Incapacitate personnel.

- (c) Deny an area to personnel.
- (d) Clear facility/structure of personnel.
- (2) Countermaterial
 - (a) Deny an area to vehicle, vessel and aircraft
 - (b) Disable/neutralize vehicles aircraft, vessels, and equipment.
- (3) Countercapability.
 - (a) Disable or neutralize facilities or systems
 - (b) Deny use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

7. Search Operations

a. General. Searches are one of the opportunities when the security forces have the initiative and can decide when, where and how to act. Search operations pressure belligerent parties to move illegal items, thereby increasing their risk of discovery. Search operations have become more advanced due to greater sophistication in hiding weapons.

b. The purpose of search operations is to--

- (1) Protect potential targets,
- (2) Gain intelligence and information,
- (3) Deprive belligerents of resources, and
- (4) Gain evidence for subsequent prosecution.

c. Joint Search Operations. Search operations are often in conjunction with local police forces with the objectives to--

- (1) Capture wanted persons, arms, explosives or other equipment,
- (2) Disrupt hostile activities, i.e. bomb making or weapon manufacture, and
- (3) Eliminate influence of belligerent parties in a specific locality.

d. AO Assessment. An area assessment is required before conducting search operations. Detailed procedures will depend on the environment, whether benign or hostile and the technical threat. The following factors require assessment:

- (1) Civil or military primacy.
- (2) Level of opposition to law and order.
- (3) Level of civilian support for opposition.
- (4) Level of technical expertise and degree of extremism of belligerents.
- (5) Access to arms and other combat related materials.
- (6) Ability of civil authorities to handle crises.

e. Considerations. Search operations often require planning and liaison with other units. Tenets of a successful operation include:

- (1) Operation is based on accurate intelligence.
- (2) Surprise based on good operations security (OPSEC).
- (3) Adequate numbers of search teams and equipment.
- (4) EOD team availability if required.
- (5) Executed at the most opportune moment.

(6) Availability of adequate cordon or protection troops.

f. Search Pattern Planning Factors. Assume that every operation is observed and documented. When planning, be mindful that rigid search patterns often invite surprises for the search teams. Varying procedures and drills is useful, but planners cannot and should not vary some procedures to ensure consistency and safety. The recommended planning factors for a search operation are:

(1) The objective. Once decided, coordinate the search objective with other military operations during the same period. This consideration should provide the guidelines of time and duration for the search.

(2) The 'Need to Know' principle. Introduce commanders and staffs to the plan according to a carefully calculated planning sequence.

(3) Deception plan. A deception plan is paramount to achieve surprise or protect sources. Planners may deem it necessary to conceal the true nature of the operation from the participants until just before the operation to ensure it is not compromised.

(4) Intelligence. Reliable intelligence is the basis for search operations. When unavailable, utilize other intelligence assessment tools.

(5) Tasking. Clear direction covering the operational, legal, and political considerations is required before any searching commences.

(6) Training. The AO will dictate the requirements for training and types of specialists required. If beyond unit resources, obtain advice and support from engineers.

(7) Systematic work pattern. This applies to the planning and conduct of search operations. Carefully and systematically approach search operations in detail to avoid error or oversight.

(8) Thoroughness of work. Search operations require a high level of thoroughness before, during, and on completion of any task.

g. The planning sequence of a search (Figure III-7). Having covered the main factors that affect planning of a search operation, it is necessary to consider the more detailed planning. These points include:

(1) Anticipation of hostile action. Constant assessment is required to pre-empt reactions of belligerent parties. The commander should determine the threat and whether the search forces may make themselves targets or antagonize the local populace.

(2) Isolation of the target area. The use of a cordon or other form of protection party is recommended. At no time allow any person in or out of a search area, once the operation has started.

(3) Coordination of action. Coordinate all actions to ensure a systematic and integrated search operation. Coordination should include:

(a) Interaction within a search team and between different teams.

(b) Coordination between search teams, troops, and the local authorities.

(4) Minimizing risks. Normally, a search is most dangerous upon or soon after arrival in the area. If belligerents are surprised, violent action may rapidly ensue. If civilians are involved, attempts to distract or delay the search may occur. Once military control is established, risks occur if searches move out of sequence or a sudden "find"

leads to neglect of procedures. Be aware of “Find’s” acting as decoys to divert attention from more valuable targets.

(5) Maintenance of records. Records are invaluable in the case of finds and the provision of evidence in subsequent prosecutions. Additionally, records provide information about the area and are useful for future operations. If a search uncovers evidence, record and preserve the evidence in compliance with established procedures.




Figure III-7 Search Operations Flow Diagram

Chapter IV

PEACE OPERATIONS TASKS

1. Patrolling

a. Patrolling is the basis of operations in a hostile area. It is aimed at acquiring information, identifying and apprehending persons, and neutralizing hostile groups. The kind of patrol depends on the mission and can be either mounted or dismounted.

b. Types of patrols can include the following:

(1) Presence patrols. PO forces use presence patrols when the situation in the area is stabilized and there is no direct danger for the forces. The patrol is recognized as a unit of the PO force. The intention is to show the local people that forces are in the area and alert. The patrol is armed, but is acting in a friendly and frank way. The patrols are conducted during daylight hours.

(2) Combat patrols. Conducted in areas where forces may encounter armed, organized groups may be encountered, it may be necessary to conduct combat patrols. In such circumstances, imposing a curfew will ensure that the combat patrol is not placed at a disadvantage it will usually be sensible to impose a curfew so as not to place the combat patrol at a disadvantage.

(3) Ambush patrols. Ambushes are sometimes useful in rural operations. If conducted under cover of a curfew and the necessary precautions are taken to ensure that innocent people do not get involved, it is possible to set a conventional style ambush designed to capture hostile persons.

(4) Reconnaissance patrols. Reconnaissance patrols play a major role in PO for several reasons. They will need to visit all outlying communities in order to both acquire information and provide the reassurance of a security force presence. These patrols may have to search areas and they may need to set up hasty roadblocks.

(5) Air and space assets. Use air and space assets to cover large areas and gain certain types of information quickly. For example, the use of thermal imaging cameras can gain timely information, both day and night, for monitoring movement and activity. The threat of applying lethal air power can limit movement of hostile forces.

(6) Naval Patrolling. Naval assets provide operational support, including anything from patrolling inland waterways to major ocean coastlines. Other missions commonly performed can include search and rescue (SAR) operations, observation and reporting on pollution damage to the marine environment, and combined training missions with ground elements of the PO force. Examples of training missions include insertion and extraction of personnel at coastal remote sites, resupply, SAR exercises, small arms live fire exercises, and familiarization rides to encourage mutual understanding and cohesion among contingents. As with their land and air counterparts, naval patrolling activities ensure round the clock presence in their area of responsibility while also performing joint training missions.

2. Observing and Reporting

a. An OP is the basic working platform for military observance. Observing and reporting are the cornerstones of PO. Observers, both military and nonmilitary, observe and report information on activities within their operational areas. Observers must

provide timely and accurate reports on every situation or incident that develops in their operational area. Factual and impartial reporting constitutes the basis of all successful PO and, when required, includes maps, field sketches, diagrams, videotapes, photographs, and references to specific agreements or instructions. Likewise, inaccurate and biased reporting can adversely affect the operational situation, thus damaging the image and credibility of the PO force. A thorough analysis of these reports by the force commander's staff is critical. Observation requires a complete understanding of the situation and the political and military implications resulting from PO actions.

- (1) Observation tasks commonly cover--
 - (a) The status of military installations,
 - (b) Activities within the operational area related to personnel or weapons,
 - (c) Violations of international agreements or conventions,
 - (d) Observance of BZ and DMZ restrictions, and
 - (e) Adherence to approved local agreements by the parties of the dispute.
- (2) Observers report any violations of agreements, such as--
 - (a) Movements of the disputing parties' forces,
 - (b) Shootings, hostile acts, or threats made against the PO force or civilians,
 - (c) Improvements to the defensive positions of the disputing parties, and
 - (d) Overflights by military or civilian aircraft when air movement in the BZ

is restricted.

(3) Observers exercise discretion in official business. They do not communicate any official information, except in the course of their duties or when authorized by higher authority.

b. Observing and reporting is accomplished using OPs. The purposes of OPs are to--

- (1) Demonstrate the presence of the peace force to all parties and to the population,
- (2) Enhance confidence building in the peace process,
- (3) Monitor, record, and report actions in support of the stipulations of the peace agreements, and
- (4) Prevent violations of the peace agreements.

c. Principles of Observing and Reporting.

- (1) Only report what is observed.
- (2) In the event of uncertain observations - verify.
- (3) Submit clear, unambiguous, and timely reports.

d. Types of OPs.

(1) Static. The static OP is semi-permanent site established for long term observation.

(2) Mobile. The mobile OP is temporary in nature and is useful to detect and deter violations to the peace process to include smuggling and infiltration.

e. Planning Considerations.

- (1) Site selection criteria are as follows:

- (a) What needs to be observed according to the task?
 - (b) Where are the opposing parties located?
 - (c) Where are the borders/frontiers?
 - (d) Where are the villages and camps of refugees/DP?
 - (e) What is the geography of the location?
 - (f) Where are the access routes?
 - (g) Can it be tactically and logistically supported?
 - (h) From what distance can it be seen, and how many people will see it?
 - (i) What are the traffic and movement patterns of the locals?
- (2) Preparation of OP.
- (a) Conduct IO to support the establishment. Inform the conflicting parties and the local population of the location and purpose of the OP.
 - (b) Develop manuals of instructions for the OP that includes ROE and QRF.
 - (c) Select the site and obtain the materials.
 - (d) Conduct risk assessment of the site.
- (3) Establishment of OP.
- (a) Occupy the site.
 - (b) Clearly mark the location.
 - (c) Establish communication.
 - (d) Establish force protection procedures.
 - (e) Rehearse initial reaction force.
- (4) Improvement of OP.
- (a) Continue to improve the position.
 - (b) Maintain contact and an active information program with the local community and the parties.
 - (c) Communication. Maintain constant, reliable, redundant, and secure communications with the next superior authority and other OPs as the situation dictates. Timely reporting of activities is the key to success. Consider communication security, especially if the belligerent parties are intent on taking advantage of the situation.
- (5) Logistics. The type and amount of equipment and support will depend on the mission but the following are general guidelines:
- (a) Sufficient observation equipment to support a 24-hour mission.
 - (b) Keep sufficient supplies on hand to sustain the OP for a period if cut off from support. This should include Class I (food), III (fuels, petroleum, oils and lubricants [POL]), and IV (construction materials). The unit commander determines appropriate levels.
 - (c) Locate firefighting and first aid material onsite.
 - (d) The OP may require power and lighting support.
 - (e) Provide signs and identification markings.
- (6) Command and Control (C2).

- (a) Establish clear lines of C2, especially with a multinational OP.
- (b) Conduct reaction drills to ensure that everyone understands the authorities and responsibilities of the OP. This should include a media plan to address informational aspects of any crisis.
- (c) Rehearse and understand ROE.

3. Movement Control (Roadblocks and Checkpoints)

a. Roadblocks and CPs are a means of controlling movement on roads, tracks, and footpaths. A roadblock is used to block or close a route to vehicle or pedestrian traffic. Checkpoints may have a more limited and specific purpose, usually apparent from their title, as vehicle CP, personnel CP etc. For simplicity, they are all referred to as roadblocks. Roadblocks are set up for one or more of the following reasons:

- (1) Maintain a broad check on road movement to increase security and the assurance of the local population.
- (2) Frustrate the movement of arms or explosives.
- (3) Assist in the enforcement of movement control of people and material.
- (4) Gather information and related data on suspected persons, vehicles, and movement.

b. Types of roadblocks are as follows:

(1) Deliberate. Permanent or semi-permanent roadblocks placed on a main road, perhaps near a border, on the outskirts of a city, or on the edge of a controlled area. View deliberate roadblocks as a deterrent to movement. They are unlikely to be productive sources of information/contraband material once their positions and activities are observed.

(2) Hasty. Make roadblocks easy to set up and dismantle. Ground troops, already on patrol, or a rapid reaction force deployed by helicopter can deploy the roadblock. Two vehicles placed diagonally across and road with a search area in between is a simple roadblock. In a rural area, helicopters can place hasty roadblocks, in which case, forces can improve obstacles, such as narrow bridges or level crossing gates, with a single coil of barbed wire.

(3) Triggered. This is a variation of the hasty roadblock, usually used under circumstances where it is often easy for anyone to take avoiding action on sighting a block in operation. This roadblock is particularly effective in defeating the use of convoys and 'scout cars' by hostile groups. Allowing a suspected 'scout car' to pass through the roadblock triggers the roadblock to catch the target vehicle. Units operating the roadblock must occupy covered and concealed positions and wait for selected targets. Additionally, they can stop and search personnel out of sight of anyone approaching on the road. As with hasty roadblocks, a covert protection force and a helicopter borne reaction force are required. Foot and vehicle insertion, from a carefully sited patrol base, are most common.

(4) Reactionary. This is a version of the hasty roadblock, but is used in reaction to an incident or attack in another area. Ground or helicopter based, this roadblock is useful in interdicting hostile activity following the occurrence.

c. Tactical guidelines for setting up a deliberate roadblock are as follows:

(1) Concealment. Site the roadblock tactically where people cannot see it from more than a short distance away. Sharp bends or dips in the road provide good positions if the requirements of road safety are met. Leave no room for an approaching vehicle to take avoiding action by turning, leaving the road, or reversing.

(2) Security. Assign enough troops to protect the roadblock, particularly during the initial occupation. Site sentries to act as backstops on both sides, well clear of the search area, to watch approaching traffic and prevent evasion. Where the threat of an attack on a roadblock is likely, then the block must have a back up force.

(a) A roadblock is vulnerable to attack by car bombs. Possible counters to this are:

- Stopping vehicles well short of the block.
- Using rock ramps to shake up vehicles.
- Means to puncture tires.

(b) Booby-traps and ambushes.

- Check likely roadblock sites against booby-trapping and ambushes.
- Avoid patterned use of roadblocks.
- Sniping.
- Uniformed and nonuniformed threats.

(3) Construction and Layout. A simple construction is two parallel lines, each with a gap across the road approximately 50 meters apart. Then use the enclosure as a search and administrative area. The search area there could contain--

(a) Separate male and female search areas,

(b) Vehicle waiting area,

(c) Vehicle search area,

(d) A holding area for detaining persons before their being handed over to the local authorities,

(e) Roadblock headquarters, and an

(f) Administrative area.

(4) Manning. The number of troops required will depend upon the number of roads and expected volume of traffic. If searching women, forces must have women searchers, and provide special accommodation. The military commander should have, where possible, the rank of sergeant or above. Keep a police presence at a military roadblock, whenever possible, especially when military powers of search, arrest, or control of movement is limited. Interpreters are also useful. Normally, man a control point with at least a platoon, but relate the strength required to the number of roads controlled and the anticipated traffic. At a minimum man the roadblock at the following:

(a) Control point headquarters. Commander, signaler, and runner.

(b) Barrier Sentries. One noncommissioned officer (NCO) for each road or lane of traffic blocked, and one sentry for each barrier.

(c) Covering party. Two military personnel covering each set of barrier sentries.

(d) Assault Force. A designated unit is critical in the event an element breaks through a roadblock or CP.

(5) Standing patrol. Where possible, man an OP on a nearby rooftop.

(6) Surveillance Devices. Early warning devices are valuable to give warning of approaching vehicles. Use of airborne surveillance assets may assist in triggering vehicles or warning of vehicles approaching the roadblock.

(7) Search Equipment. Forces searching heavy vehicles or certain types of load may need additional special search equipment.

(8) Communication. External communication is essential to give revised instructions. Use communication to report quickly information about wanted persons passed and incidents at the roadblock. Internal communications within a large roadblock can speed reaction time.

(9) Legal Issues. Troops operating roadblocks must know their powers and duties under the law with regard to search, arrest, and use of force.

d. Checkpoints (CP)

(1) Principles. Routinely, CPs are established to check and control traffic, and or prevent the movement of illegal items i.e. weapons, drugs or persons.

(2) Missions. CPs are normally established pursuant to:

- (a) Monitoring actions.
- (b) Security actions.
- (c) Separation of forces.
- (d) Route opening and maintenance.
- (e) Presence or relief actions.

(3) Types. There are normally two types of CPs: static or mobile.

(a) Static CPs are routinely associated with fixed or semi fixed structures i.e. guard shacks, barriers etc. When planning the location of a static CP consider:

- The road network and traffic patters in and out of the AO.
- Traffic in or out of the areas by one or more of the belligerent parties.

(b) Position static CPs where walking and mounter traffic cannot bypass it. Narrow valleys, routes through marshy areas, embankments, dams, and bridges are well suited for a static CP. Craters, pits, 50-gallon drums, or barbed wire entanglements are examples of obstacles to channel traffic for a CP. Often, static CPs are established or positioned on or near:

- Existing borders/frontiers (internationally recognized).
- Cease fire lines.
- Infiltration routes.
- Towns and villages.
- Vital ground.

(c) Position static CPs so unit personnel can observe and react to traffic in a timely fashion. Additionally, a thorough reconnaissance of the area is recommended on the chance a minor shift in the CP location is required. Unlike the traditional warfighting scenario, clearly mark CPs in a PO should be clearly marked to recognize it

from both the ground and air. While this practice also applies to OP, it is particularly important for CPs since belligerents frequently set up illegal CPs.

(d) Mobile CP. Use of mobile CPs is effective since belligerents do not know when and where PO forces will establish them. A mobile CP is often established where suspected mandate or treaty violations occur, possibly because of information received from OPs, other units, patrols, or the local populace. It is further recommended the unit have the capability to establish a mobile CP on short notice (within 30 to 60 minutes). Locate the mobile CP to create complete surprise for the motorist, much the same as a civilian police speed trap. While it is important to mark clearly the CP, place it so approaching traffic can only spot it when immediately close to the CP. Locations immediately following a hairpin turn or some other concealing terrain feature are ideal. Additionally, approaching traffic should have no possibility of bypassing the CP. In addition, if the location of a mobile CP is compromised, it is recommended it move to a new location.

(4) Collocation. Collocation of CPs and OPs is another effective technique in PO. Location of an OP is often predetermined by terrain features or fields of observation that preclude the relocation of the OP to a CP site. Collocation is also beneficial due to the synergy effect of increased security for both the OP and CP. Organizing a combined OP/CP, instead of two separate posts, conserves forces, equipment, and facility considerations (i.e. communication equipment, generators, shelters, water tanks, showers, and latrine facilities).

(5) Interim Static Checkpoint. At the start of an operation, establish an interim static CP as soon as possible. However, only construct semi-permanent or permanent facility once the best CP location is determined. An example of an interim CP could consist of a vehicle (tank or other armored vehicle with crew) and a couple of signposts. Do not confuse an interim CP with the mobile CP established if a sudden need arises to monitor traffic in a particular area.

(6) Manning. Normally, a CP is manned on a 24-hour basis. However, commanders may decide to man the site by only day or night. Situation dependent, if a 24-hour, CP is established with relief, no less than four personnel, two on duty, and two resting (reserve), is the recommended number of personnel. If OPs were positioned near a CP, it is advisable for CP personnel to 'live' on the OP and be committed from there. This also conserves resources when establishing a CP. Heavily trafficked CPs require an increase in personnel to properly carry out their duties and be prepared to quickly deny passage to anyone trying to force their way through or bypass the CP.

(7) Procedures. Often, the frequency of checks and CP location are part of the cease fire agreement. Alternating the CP routine of checking is also important. Both total and spot-check methods are effective, especially spot checks because incoming traffic is unaware which procedure is being used. Procedures for CP operations are categorized as individual personal checks or vehicle checks. Procedures are further categorized as:

(a) Total check occurs when everyone passing the CP is searched. This form of checking is hard on resources (both time and personnel) and is often performed only when the CP is located on borders, frontiers, etc. (e.g., national frontiers or cease fire lines).

(b) Spot-checks refer to a certain number of persons/vehicles being searched. The remainder can pass freely, be briefly questioned, or will have to show their identity

cards. Over a period, spot checks should prove effective in curtailing illegal movement of people or material in the AO. This method conserves resources compared with the total check method.

(8) Higher headquarters will determine the performance of individual and vehicle checks. Guidelines should include:

- (a) Which persons/vehicles are allowed through a CP?
- (b) Forms of identification required.
- (c) Illegal items (i.e. weapons, ammunition, explosives, narcotics, etc.)

(9) Communication. Normally covered by the unit's standing operating procedures (SOP), all CPs should possess reliable communication with higher headquarters (company or battalion) and adjacent units. Communication is important for a variety of reasons, i.e. advanced warning of vehicles attempting to force passage.

(10) Equipment. Again, usually a unit SOP item, CP type and amount of equipment and materiel depends on the mission. After a CP has been established, equipment requirements may change based on experience gained. Additional equipment may include:

- (a) Technical manuals for the dismantling/stripping of vehicles.
- (b) General list of 'hiding places', found in vehicles.
- (c) Tools, jack, mirrors, etc. for vehicle checks.

(11) Organization. In general, a CP is organized as follows:

- (a) Unit Headquarters.
- (b) Observation tower(s)/platform(s) to monitor all surrounding.
- (c) Speed limiting capabilities (i.e. speed bumps, oil drums, and sign posting).
- (d) Barriers, gates, etc. to close or open CP.
- (e) Check areas.
- (f) Waiting areas.
- (g) Living quarters (rest, recuperation, cooking, showers, latrines).
- (h) Shelters.
- (i) Local defense positions.
- (j) Generators.
- (k) POL stockpile.
- (l) A helicopter-landing site.

e. Establishing a Roadblock or Checkpoint

(1) Site Criteria. Use the following criteria when choosing a roadblock or CP site:

(a) Avoid bends of the road, brows of hill, etc., so vehicle have sufficient time to stop after seeing the roadblock/CP.

(b) Place the roadblock/CP in an area where there are no turnoffs between the roadblock/CP and the first time vehicle operators can view it.

(c) Establish cut offs, where military members from the roadblock/CP can give early warning, allowing time to add extra blocking equipment if needed.

(d) The patrol is mutually supported.

- (e) The area is thoroughly checked before use.

4. Establishing Search Operations

a. Insertion Drill. Assuming a patrol contains at least 12 service members, an insertion drill could be as follows:

(1) Patrol is operational, ideally with the commander watching the area of the roadblock. The patrol commander carries out a visual check of the area, and then decides to put all teams on the road, have one in a watch location, or one conducting satellite patrol activity.

(2) The patrol commanders' team, which will be the road party, remains in overwatch while cut offs insert.

(3) Cut-offs approach their locations, establish positions, and carry out clearance checks on their positions. The patrol commander and lead service member (or team member) occupy a position by the road. Have the remainder of the patrol cover the position from an overlook position at least 50 meters away. The lead scout should position barriers or caltrops to lay across the road. Make sure everyone stays concealed. The tactics the commander decides to employ will dictate who remains.

(4) Road party carries out a check of their position. Detailed tasks include:

(a) The patrol leader remains off the road, uses radio to run a check of vehicle registration number, and selects vehicles to be searched. The patrol leader must have an alternate signal, e.g., a whistle, to trigger the cut offs.

(b) A stopper stops vehicles, speaks to the occupants, and completes appropriate forms.

(c) The searcher, once tasked with searching a vehicle, removes personal web gear and weapon and leaves it with the cover-man. The searcher then targets areas of vehicle to search and searches the occupants.

(d) The cover-man covers the vehicle occupants, from a concealed position, and protects the searcher's equipment. The road party should not close in to a small space, but stay spread out in case a problem should arise.

b. Extraction Drill. Normal extraction drill could be as follows:

(1) Road party moves off to an overwatch position.

(2) Cut-offs regroup, collect roadblock equipment, and extract from their positions.

(3) Consider deception when moving off as hostile persons could have pinpointed the patrol in the intervening period of disengagement.

c. Action Drills at Roadblocks or CPs: Below are listed several common occurrences encountered in past operations.

(1) Complete the following at the discovery of illegal items and persons:

(a) Inform the operations center.

(b) Arrest, search, bag, restrain, and reconsider the application of minimum force.

(c) Treat the vehicle as a crime scene.

(d) Consider forensic evidence preservation.

(e) Cut-off personnel affect a cordon of area until they can receive assistance.

- (2) Person Refusing to Allow Search. In the event of the person refusing the search of their vehicle, the patrol commander should:
 - (a) Inform the operations center and request police assistance.
 - (b) If police are unavailable, ask again for an agreement to search the vehicle.
 - (c) If a person refuses to comply with a legitimate search then take action against that person in accord with the SOPs prevailing at the time.
 - (d) If nothing is found in the subsequent search, complete a report form (driver to retain a copy,) and allow the driver to continue on his way.
 - (e) Report full details on return to base.
- (3) Persons Trying to Leave Vehicle while Search in Progress:
 - (a) Ask to stay with vehicle.
 - (b) Explain legal powers. Use common sense.
 - (c) Use minimum force to retain occupants with vehicle until search is complete. Keep the operations center updated.
 - (d) Arrest only as a last resort.
 - (e) Several suggestions are provided below for roadblocks in urban areas (figure IV-1), rural areas (figure IV-2), and for a mobile roadblock (figure IV-3)




Figure IV-1 Suggested Roadblock in Urban Areas




Figure IV-2 Suggested Roadblock in Rural Areas




Figure IV-3 Suggested Mobile Roadblock

d. Conducting Searches

(1) Personnel Search.

(a) Conduct searches in accordance with the appropriate authority. Make search personnel aware of that authority. Authority normally available for personnel searches include:

- As a routine, where they voluntarily enter a building or area and the search is a condition of entry.
- At a security or post incident CP.
- When reasonable grounds for suspicion exist (i.e. possible possession of illegal or prohibited items).
- When a person is taken into custody.
- As a precautionary measure while in custody.

(b) Take care when conducting personnel searches, due to allegations of brutality or unethical behavior. Belligerents often attempt this tactic when trying to discredit the PK force. Therefore, conduct these operations demonstrating professionalism and courtesy at all times. Factors for consideration in conducting personnel searches include:

- Search circumstances are legally justified.
- Follow predetermined procedures that minimize accusations by belligerents.
- Female search personnel available to search women and children.

(c) Constraints involving personnel searches normally include:

- Same sex searches are important. When possible, conduct same gender searches; however, this is not always possible due to speed and security considerations. Therefore, perform mixed gender searches in a respectful manner using all possible measures to prevent any action that could be interrupted as sexual misconduct or assault.

- Normally, no legal authority exists requiring removal of other than outer garments in public (i.e. coat, jacket, or gloves). When not done in public and under protest legal authority may exist to search beyond the norm.

(d) The two categories for search of persons include quick body search (in the public eye) and detailed body search (out of the public eye).

- Quick body search (in public). Normally carried out when dealing with a large number of people. Can also be part of a detailed search detecting anything that could be used to harm the searcher, the person being searched, or others. The quick body search is also used to preserve evidence that could be quickly disposed of or destroyed.

- Procedure. If possible, work in pairs, one person doing the physical searching, the other observing (both the searcher and the subject). The second person acts as cover for the first. Pertinent points to consider are shown in Table IV-1.

Table IV-1 Quick Body Search Considerations

DO NOT stand directly in front or behind the subject to avoid confrontation.
DO NOT become distracted. Avoid eye contact with the subject.
WATCH for non-verbal communications, e.g., increased nervousness or silent gestures to others.
DO NOT cross the line of fire of the cover man.
POSITION the subject with legs slightly apart and arms extended parallel to the ground. Do not spread-eagle the subject as this may interfere with the collection of forensic evidence.
CONDUCT the search quickly and systematically from head to toe, down one side and up the other, covering all body parts, front, and back. PAY ATTENTION to pockets and waistbands. PAY ATTENTION when searching the small of the back, armpits, crotch areas and closed hands.
USE a stroking squeezing movement when searching. When searching limbs, both hands are used with thumbs and index fingers touching. This method increases the chances of detecting foreign object through the clothing.
SEARCH and be respectful of any baggage or removed clothing.
The use of metal detectors or X-ray machines can be a force multiplier especially when searching large groups (i.e. CP operation).

- Detailed body search (not in public). Normally carried out when reasonable doubt exists.

- Procedure. Conduct a detailed body search using the same procedures as the quick body search, considering the points in Table IV-2.

Table IV-2 Detailed Body Search Considerations

Establish the identity of the subject and the ownership of baggage and other articles.
Invite the subject to empty all pockets and remove all items.
If necessary to remove clothing, the subject may do so voluntarily (should be recorded) or powers exist to require the removal of certain items in or out of the public eye. Typically, the outer coat, jacket, and gloves may be removed in public. In private, there may be grounds to remove other clothing. Note that only outer clothing may be removed.
PAY ATTENTION to every detail i.e. clothing seams, waistbands, belts, collars, lapels, padding, shirt, and trouser cuffs. Socks and shoes provide easily missed hiding places. Medical dressings are always suspected and medical personnel should examine dressings if necessary. Clothing nametags, manufactures labels, and laundry tags can be valuable.
DO NOT SHOW EMOTION upon finding illegal or prohibited items. Significant articles should not be separated from others but all should be out of reach of the subject.

(e) Records and Reports. For all categories of search, apart from initial searches, a record should be maintained containing:

- Details of the person.
- The reason for the search.
- The probable cause for the search.
- The date and time group.
- The location.
- Details of anything significant.
- Details of damage or injury to person or property.
- If done in conjunction with an investigation, do not identify search team members. Call signs or other identification should be used.

(2) Vehicle Search

(a) Search techniques are divided into three categories. The categories vary according to the intensity of the search. There is no clear boundary between the categories and the extent of the investigation as each stage depends on the suspicion aroused. Categories include:

- Initial check. The initial check is the first part of the searching process carried out on all vehicles and used to select vehicles for a more detailed examination. This check is normally carried out without the occupants dismounting, although search personnel may ask the driver to open the trunk and hood. Search personnel at the entrance to barracks and other installations should know the threat from large vehicle mounted bombs. Up to three personnel are required for the search, and the search normally takes about 3 minutes per vehicle.

- Primary search. The primary search is done on the vehicles selected for a more detailed examination, due to either intelligence or suspicion aroused during the initial check. During the primary search, if any of the search unit becomes suspicious for any reason, a more detailed search may be conducted.

- Secondary search. The secondary search is a thorough search of highly suspect vehicles. It is recommended that search unit members work in pairs, examining the relevant section of the vehicle. For a more detailed search, have the occupants exit the vehicle, and then search them.

(b) Hostile parties are likely to use all types of vehicles to move their resources. The search of vehicles at CPs or other types of vehicle control points deter movement and subsequent evidence enhances prosecution. The volume of vehicles can make search operations appear difficult. Use efficient intelligence to back up vehicle searches. This involves close liaison with police records, vehicle registration authorities, etc. The alertness and intuition of search personnel can achieve much. Suspicious persons will try to avoid being searched. Search personnel must watch for the following:

- Those avoiding the search and signaling to others (e.g., by flashing brake lights or the using radios).

- Exiting vehicles before the CP.
- Disturbances that cause congestion at the CP.

(c) Take consideration into the following during a search:

- Be quick, thorough, and efficient. This will reduce complaints.
- Children, babies, pets, old people, young women, and infirmed civilians should not deter operations. If necessary, request special or additional assistance.
- Do not damage the vehicle

(d) Make searchers aware of the general vehicle appearances that indicate the vehicle is suspect. Personnel should note the following points:

- Use common sense. Look for anything unusual, i.e. scratched screw heads, repaired upholstery, new bodywork etc.
- Remembering details of searched vehicles could be useful in future operations.

(e) Vehicle searches are divided into area 1 (interior), area 2 (exterior), area 3 (trunk), area 4 (engine compartment), and area 5 (undercarriage). Figure IV-1 describes the specifics of searching each area.




Figure IV-4 Diagram of Passenger Car

(f) Privately owned vehicles/Passenger cars. Searches should follow the guidelines outlined in table IV-3 through table IV-7.

Table IV-3 Area 1 Interior Vehicle Inspection

<i>Ensure search team members are clean. Areas to check include:</i>
Roof Linings. Access gained by removing door sealing strips or if sunroof fitted by removing trim.
Sun visors.
Front, rear, and center window/door pillars.
Door Panels
Wind down window first. Can the search be conducted without removing trim? Avoid damage to spring clips, etc.
Rear Side Panels. (2 door vehicles etc)
Remove and check through the trunk.
Back Seat.
Cushion – some spring in, some bolted in.
Back Rests.
Front Seats.
Space under seats
Check inside padding.
Dashboard Area.
Check battery disconnected – be mindful of wiring etc.
Behind dashboard panels.
Ventilation and heater hoses.
Radio, speakers, etc.
Glove compartment - behind and above.
Ashtray - contents.
Console area.
Front Foot Wells.
Remove panels - access to wing space, door seals etc.
Floor.
Remove carpets - mats.
Check for signs of false floor - welding etc.

Table IV-4 Area 2 Exterior Vehicle Inspection

<i>Areas to check include:</i>
Check headlights, sidelights, rear lights. Alignment- leave as found.
Bumpers,
Check wheel trims and hubs. Check tires pressures. Bleed small amount of air-smell.
Examine under wheel arches, bolt-on mud deflectors.
Check for signs of recent welding or new undercoating (soft?). Tampering with bolts on mud deflectors.
Does the shape of the inside of the wing conform to the outside?
Examine bodywork and roof for signs of adaptation.
Front and rear panels and spoilers.

Table IV-5 Area 3 Trunk Vehicle Inspection

<i>Before searching stand back and look at the contents. (including load space of station wagon, hatchbacks, etc.). Check the following:</i>
That the contents are as described by the driver.
For any glue, undercoating, pop rivets, etc.
For spare gas tanks or false tank.
Spare wheel - deflate, check thoroughly.
Check floor, roof, back, and sides of trunk.
Remove all mats, carpets, etc.
Any signs of weld, new paint, or lack of dirt.
Check for double skins and carpet stuck down.
Check and pay particular attention to the space between the trunk and rear seat.
Spaces in wings etc., of station wagon type cars.
Natural false floor.
Space in tailgate.

Table IV-6 Area 4 Engine Compartment Vehicle Inspection

<i>Areas to check include:</i>
Under battery tray.
Windshield washer bottle.
Heater and ventilation hoses and vents.
Heater and ventilation motor.
Air filter.
Hood,
Sound deadening material under the hood or heat shield.

Table IV-7 Area 5 Undercarriage Vehicle Inspection

<i>Areas to check include:</i>
Chassis sections.
Drain plugs in seals.
For new welding or undercoating,
Exhaust system
Oil pan.
Gas tank. Beware of the FIRE RISK! (Hardest detection to make), but also:
How does fuel gauge behave, full tank?
Does the tank match the vehicle? Age, etc.




Figure IV-5 Truck Diagram

(g) Commercial vehicles. Search commercial vehicles the same as passenger vehicles. However, pay particular attention to the following:

- Fifth wheel. There is a hollow compartment above the trailer hitch, or fifth wheel, on most trailers. Gain access underneath the trailer and check the compartment with a flashlight and mirror. Fiber-optic search instruments when available are recommended for searching the fifth wheel area; they are simple to use and more versatile than a flashlight and mirror. Sometimes the only way into the compartment is remove the floorboards inside the trailer.
- Fuel tanks and side lockers. Some trailers are fitted with belly tanks for extended range. There is usually a space between the top of the tank and the floor of the trailer where goods are attached to the top of the tank. Also, check the tank for recent welds or bolted panels. In addition, often there is space between the back of the side lockers and the chassis.
- Spare wheel. Prime place for concealment and usually mounted under the trailer. (Positions vary).
- Chassis cross-members. Most trailers are constructed with two 'U' section girders. Drivers can construct a large concealment area by placing boards on the reverse ledges bridging the gap between the girders.
- Battery boxes. There is usually space behind the battery. To open the box, remove the wing nuts.

- Crash bar. Located at the rear end of most trailers, the crash bar is hollow and usually plugged at each end with rubber plugs. Plugs are easily removed to gain access.
- Open trailers. Where the wiring goes from tractor to trailer, the connections on the trailer are contained in a triangular shaped plate.
- Refrigerator motors, refrigerated trailers.
- Refrigerator motors usually consist of a diesel engine mounted outside the trailer on the front bulkhead. The motor drives a cooling unit mounted on the inside of the bulkhead.
- Open the engine compartment and the compartment behind the switch panel for inspection. Panels are normally held in place by screws, which require a half turn with a screwdriver to undo. The size of this possible concealment area varies but some are large.
- There is usually an inspection panel on the interior unit, which also reveals a space. Drivers have used The cold air plastic hoses to conceal illegal or prohibited items.

WARNING: Make sure the whole unit is switched off before searching. Units are thermostatically controlled and switch on when temperature rises unless the motor is switched off. The exposed fan is particularly dangerous.

- Search door panels and side panels at the rear of the cab. Some cabs also have space behind the roof linings.
- Check the space behind console and glove compartment and the space behind radio speakers.
- Air Filters. Usually accessible from beneath the vehicle. Clips hold the cover and are sometimes filled with oil.
- False floors and bulkheads. Usually found in single units.
- Belly tanks. Any sign of recent welds/clean area - tank and trailer.
- Loads. Excess packing, use of pallet spaces. These are just some of the concealments that have been used. There are others both under and inside tractor units and trailers.




Figure IV-6 Diagram of Buses and Coaches

(h) Camper type vehicles. The construction of camper type vehicles makes them ideal for concealment. It is recommended to consider the following:

- Do panels look unusually thick?
- Does refrigerator work - insulation intact?
- Gas (butane/propane) bottles adapted?
- Does water tank contain water?
- Is toilet in use?
- Any access to space between skins?

(i) Additionally, general points to consider checking include:

- Check for smell of fresh glue, paint, etc.
- Smell of cannabis, etc?
- Towing trailer or boat?

(3) Urban Areas (Inhabited).

(a) Referred to as cordon-and-search operations, this subparagraph discusses the principles, command, control, and procedures for this type of search. When intelligence identifies the search requirement, an operation is mounted. It is recommended to use police when practicable. Base the search on probable cause and act on the warrant issued by the appropriate legal authority. In circumstances that are

more dangerous, i.e. PEO, emergency laws, and regulations may dispense temporarily with some of these legal protections. Use the least severe method to accomplish the mission. Care should be taken to preserve evidence for future legal action.

(b) Cordon and Search. Plan this operation like a raid. Divide built-up search areas into zones and with search parties assigned to each. A search party consists of the following:

- Security element (to encircle the area, to prevent entrance and exit, and to secure open areas).
- Search element (to conduct the search).
- Reserve element (to help as required). Figures IV-7 and IV-8.




Figure IV-7 Typical Organization for Search Operations




Figure IV-8 Conduct of Search

(c) Establishing the cordon. An effective cordon is critical to the success of the search effort. Cordons are designed to prevent escape and protect the forces conducting the operation. Forces can establish the cordon without being detected in remote areas. In volatile urban areas, forces may have to use a double cordon to protect the operation from outside threats and the other to prevent the escape of those inside the cordon. Know and strictly enforce the ROE. Develop plans to handle detained personnel. The unit will accompany police and intelligence forces that identify, question, and detain suspects. The principal role of the unit is to reduce any resistance that may develop and provide security, but it may also conduct searches and assist in detaining suspects. Keep the use of force to a minimum. Deploy rapidly, especially if belligerents are still in the area. Ideally, surround the entire area at once. The security element should surround the area while the search element moves in. Members of the security element focus mainly on people evading the search but may be used to monitor and stop reinforcement efforts by belligerents. CPs and roadblocks are established. It is also recommended that subways, sewers, and other subsurface routes of escape be secured and searched.

(d) Conducting the search. Conduct searches of built-up areas with limited inconvenience to the populace. However, inconvenience the populace enough to discourage belligerents and sympathizers from remaining in the locale, but not drive them to collaborate. Often a large-scale search of a built-up area is a combined civil police and military operation. Plan and rehearse such a search in detail. Physical reconnaissance of the area immediately before a search is not recommended. Obtain terrain information from a variety of sources; including aerial photographs. In larger towns or cities, local police may have detailed maps showing sizes and building locations. To ensure success, make the search plan simple and conduct it swiftly. The search element conducts the mission assigned for the operation. The element is often organized into teams. These teams can include personnel and special equipment for handling of prisoners, interrogations, documentation (using a recorder with a camera), demolitions, PSYOP/CA, mine detection, fire support, employment of scout dogs and tunnel reconnaissance. Three methods used to search populated areas include:

- Assemble inhabitants in a central location. This method provides the most control, simplifies a thorough search, denies an opportunity to conceal evidence, and allows for detailed interrogation. The disadvantage is looting may occur while homes are vacated, increasing the potential for ill feelings.
- Restrict inhabitants to their homes. This prohibits movement of civilians, allows them to stay in their dwellings, and discourages looting. The disadvantages are control and interrogation is difficult and gives inhabitants time to conceal evidence.
- Control the heads of the households. The head of each household is told to remain in front of the house while everyone else in the house is brought to a central location. During the search, the head of the household accompanies the search team. This method allows the head of the household to observe the search team in operation giving confidence they will respect the dwelling. This is the best method for controlling the populace during a search.

(e) Objective. The object of a house search is to screen residents to determine if any are belligerents, sympathizers, and look for controlled items. It is recommended a search party assigned an occupied building consist of at least one local police officer, a protective escort, a female searcher and interpreter. Arrange escort parties and

transportation before the search. Forced entry is necessary the property is vacant or the occupant(s) refuse entry. If a house is searched while the occupant(s) are away, secure it to prevent looting. Before departure, the commander should arrange for security of the houses until the occupant(s) return.

(f) Other Considerations. Additionally, pay attention to anything appearing out of place i.e. freshly excavated ground etc.

- Reserve element. The reserve element is a mobile force located in a nearby area. Its mission is to assist the other elements where required. They can replace or reinforce either of the other two elements if needed.

- Booby-traps. Treat any material found as booby-trapped until proven otherwise.

- Below ground. Search underground areas and waterways thoroughly. Use mine detectors or dogs to locate metal objects underground and underwater.

(g) Aerial Search Operations. Leveraged, wherever and whenever possible, helicopters and fixed wing assets, as they provide the unit with exceptional search capabilities. However, use helicopters only when sufficient intelligence is available and in conjunction with ground operations.

(4) Urban Areas (Uninhabited)

(a) Assume all buildings are booby-trapped. Check SOP and other publications for the following. Usually lethal explosives, booby-traps are designed to catch the unwary. They are aimed at creating uncertainty, lowering morale, and hindering movement. Often constructed from household items (i.e. clothes pegs, mousetraps, flashlight batteries etc), they are usually set off by opening a door, switching on a light, or walking on the floor. An effective operator knows the methods of working and habits of search teams. The trap can be activated in several ways including:

- Pull - Opening a drawer
 - Pressure - Standing on a floorboard or sitting in a chair.
 - Release/Antilift - Picking up an object.
 - Tilt - Turning an object on its side to look underneath.
 - Tremor - Vibration or movement.
 - Collapsing circuit - Cutting or breaking a circuit. Will also go off when the battery expires.
 - Light sensitive - Functions when either exposed or hidden from light.
 - Anti-Submerge - Placing in water will activate device.
 - Anti-Probe - Relies on a search probe or prodder to complete the circuit.
 - Combination - Can have more than one means of activation.
- (b) Procedures of approach and entry into an unoccupied building include:
- Initiate a visual reconnaissance of the building and area.
 - Check for wires leading to a command-detonated device.
 - Team leader sets up a control point and decides upon a place of entry.
 - Details a two-man team to enter and check for booby traps.

- Enter building through one of the main entrances. While considering the obvious, it saves time and makes subsequent access easier if cleared early.

(c) The searching of an unoccupied building takes place by checking the building for booby traps, then performing a detailed and systematic search. If the search personnel cannot use the front door, they should clear a path to another door. The team leader then clears the outside of the door and opens it, preferably using some device to protect search personnel from a possible blast, i.e. pulling cable. While clearing for traps consider the following points:

- Never open any door, until both sides are cleared of traps.
- Leave all doors, drawers, and cupboards open after checking.
- Make extensive use of tools, i.e. pulling cable or weights for remote opening of doors, etc. to ensure safety of search personnel.

- Clearly mark routes cleared of traps with white tape.

(d) Check SOP and other publications for the following. Search teams must be alert to the presence of booby traps. Clues to assist the teams include:

- Attractive items in the open.
- Spoils, wrappings, sawdust, etc. in unlikely places.
- Out of place pegs, wires, or lengths of cord.
- Loose floorboards, window ledges, or stair treads.
- Fresh nails or screws.
- Lumps or bulges in chairs or under carpets.

(e) After clearing the house/building, the team leader enters and initiates a detailed search.

(5) Search of Rural Areas

(a) General. Open areas are often used as hiding places because belligerents have the advantage of observing from nearby dwellings without being detected. Although normally associated with a rural environment, open spaces also occur in an urban setting, i.e. parks, gardens, or vacant lots. Therefore, using this procedure may vary depending on the area and circumstance.

(b) Planning. Area searches are especially dependent on good planning. The IPB process is essential before conducting a search. Re-evaluate planning the search progresses to consider the following:

- The location of the center of the area is indicated by an eight-figure grid coordinate (with an address if possible). The boundaries are recorded as a series of eight-figure grid coordinates.

- The identity of the owner or tenant.
- Use of air reconnaissance, avoid giving advanced warning.
- Details of local belligerents and sympathizers.
- This covered in Other Considerations.

(c) Divide area into sections and assigned to teams. Boundaries clearly defined and marked by features such as hedges and ditches. Each team should complete the search area in one day.

(d) Other Considerations:

- Ensure that engineers are present not only to detect mines and obstacles but also to repair damages to structures caused by the search.
 - Consider using military working dogs (MWD) trained to detect explosives. They are useful to speed up searches especially around outside areas.
 - Take sufficient number of metal detectors.
 - Record everything on digital camera not just for evidence but also for PSYOP and counterpropaganda. This supports transparency.
 - Take large quantities of confiscated items and property damage forms and use them.
 - Take gloves and other protective garments, as many search situations will be unsanitary.
 - Insist that personnel conducting searches maintain their professionalism and under no circumstances will they remove property for personal gain or as a souvenir.
- (e) Consider using aerial assets both for reconnaissance, security, and guidance for the units on the ground in urban areas.

5. Verification of Weapons and Forces

a. This section concerns verification of the location, movement, readiness, and level of weapons and forces as specified by agreements and understandings. Commanders must understand their responsibilities under these agreements and understandings. Often peace agreements or subsequent international accords will establish the parameters for weapons verification and force reductions.

b. Principles.

(1) HN and belligerent forces are responsible for compliance with the agreements and their accountability.

(2) The PO force is responsible for verifying compliance, and, in the case of peace enforcement, compelling compliance.

(3) The PO force must have total access to all sites and locations. This is a fundamental issue of freedom of movement.

c. Weapon and Force Levels.

(1) Cantonment and Storage Sites. Divide these into four categories:

(a) Combat sites, consisting of heavy weapons, air defense, air fields, naval ports, barracks, operational munitions stocks, and combat loads.

(b) Infrastructure sites, consisting of support activities such as logistics, communications, headquarters, and depots.

(c) Police sites, consisting of weapons, vehicles, and munitions.

(d) Ordnance sites, consisting of civilian production plants and factories, production storage, and new weapons holding areas.

d. Procedures.

(1) Commanders should establish the priority of inspections related to the above four categories of sites. Combat sites and police sites usually will have the highest priority.

- (2) Schedules for inspection should include a combination of pre-inspections, announced inspections, and unannounced inspections.
- (3) IO should support the program of inspections.
- (4) A verification board should coordinate the inspection and develop a collection plan.
- (5) The reporting system, when feasible, should include nonmilitary organization such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the International Police Training Force (IPTF), or representatives of some international body overseeing the agreement.

e. Military Movements and Exercises

- (1) Types of Movements.

- (a) Operational: Activities of ground, air, or maritime forces or of war related materiel that are connected to training, operations, or readiness.

- (b) Nonoperational: Activities of ground, air, or maritime forces or of war related materiel that are connected to ceremonies, or funerals.

- (2) Procedures. Establish rules, in accordance with agreements, for notifying peace forces before various types of operational and non-operational activities. Establish, and ensure all servicemembers comply with, criteria and approval authority for these events. Apply different levels of monitoring to these events. The following are levels of monitoring:

- (a) Be Advised: This does not require action by the peace force. The peace forces retain the option to check, control, or escort the activity. There is no need to monitor more than 10 percent of these activities.

- (b) Check: Check these activities daily. Check movement missions at their destination to ensure that movement of all approved items has occurred.

- (c) Control: Similar to Check missions, but with the observer present at the beginning of the event.

- (d) Escort: Providing continuous physical presence during the entire event from start to finish.

f. The following are various possible sanctions. Determine the exact type of in coordination with the senior civil authority overseeing the peace operation.

- (1) Restricting movement and training.

- (2) Destroy systems and munitions.

- (3) Impound systems and munitions.

- (4) Close facilities.

- (5) Increase the level of monitoring. Inform all parties of the violation.

6. Demilitarization

a. Background. Demilitarization or arms control may be one of the tasks given to a military force under the terms of its mandate, or they may be local, tactical initiatives attempted to reduce tension in a specific area. In general, the possibility of demilitarization and arms control measures will only arise once a cease fire or peace agreement is in place.

b. Methods of demilitarization and arms control. Demilitarization and arms control will normally be a progressive process. Steps, which will require considerable verification and policing by the military force, are likely to be as shown in the following paragraphs:

(1) Withdrawal from front lines. Following a cease fire agreement, military forces are normally deployed along the old front lines the ADL. The first stage of demilitarization is a withdrawal from these wartime positions, either to barracks or behind a BZ. The aim of this zone is to move the belligerents back, beyond small arms range and ideally outside line of sight.

(2) Withdrawal of heavy weapons. Withdrawing heavy weapons a specified distance from the cease fire line will offer a significant confidence building measure. Heavy weapons should include main battle tanks, towed and self-propelled artillery pieces, mortars, and all types of armored fighting vehicles.

(3) Decommissioning of air defense (AD) weapons. Make military forces aware of the AD capability of former belligerents. Neutralize all active AD systems and then remove them as soon as possible as they pose a high potential threat to all types of aircraft and helicopters.

(4) Return to barracks/cantonment sites. Having separated the former belligerents, the next step is to return the troops to barracks or to new cantonment sites. The aim of this is to move troops into peacetime locations that the PO forces can monitor. Such a move will also assist with the demilitarization of the civilian population as weapons are collected. Establish ad hoc cantonment sites because it is unlikely that there will be sufficient tailor-made military barracks available to accommodate all troops and equipment in the appropriate areas. Base the cantonment sites around large public buildings, factories, or tented camps. Sites that use the civilian infrastructure may, in the long-term, cause problems for community recovery if they continue to be occupied by military forces and denied for their primary purpose. Depending on the mandate or the peace agreement, the military force may or may not have authority to allocate sites.

(5) Force levels and restructuring. The next stage in demilitarization and arms control is the agreement of force levels and the restructuring of former belligerents into peacetime organizations. Force levels are normally agreed on at the national level, often as part of any cease fire agreement or peace agreement. The restructuring will generally follow direction from the senior military headquarters and involve suitability assessments, verification, and advice from units at the tactical level.

(6) Restructuring. Restructuring will normally include the following elements:

- (a) Setting a ceiling on military personnel by unit and/or location.
- (b) The confinement of arms to designated armories.
- (c) The separation of arms and ammunition.
- (d) Military approval for proposed sites with regard to the potential for a future threat.

(e) The relocation of heavy weapons to authorized sites.

(7) Verification will depend on the mandate. If the situation allows, the military force may restrict all military movement and training. In such cases, authorized activities are monitored to ensure compliance. Similarly, the military force may inspect

and monitor activities within barracks and cantonment sites. This provides an assessment of readiness, capability, intent, morale, and any attempt to deploy forces.

(8) Enforcement will also depend on the mandate and may involve restrictions on a faction's military activity, training, or movement; it may involve punitive inspections or even confiscations of weapons or equipment.

7. Civil Disturbances

a. The likelihood of civil disturbances during PO is high. The handling of these incidents can have a decisive effect on mission accomplishment. Handled poorly, the reaction to a civil disturbance can quickly escalate out of control with potential long-term negative effects for the mission. Conversely, a well-handled situation will lead to an enhanced view of the PO force's discipline, professionalism, and potentially result in fewer such incidents in the future.

b. A possible TTP description could be: isolate, dominate, maintain common situational Awareness, and employ multidimensional/multiecheloned actions (IDAM).

(1) Isolate, in time and space, the trouble spot from outside influence or interaction. Unit tactical operation centers in the theater must develop TTP that "isolate" riots or demonstrations to keep them from spreading into bigger and potentially more violent explosions of emotional expression. The idea is to close access in and out of the demonstration location (figure IV-9). Once access is closed, rioters tend to tire within hours, and the demonstration dies down, eventually resulting in a peaceful conclusion. Figure IV-10 provides a technique for positioning a tactical control point, given the mission to isolate a riot. Controlling the major road networks into and out of the demonstration area increases their effectiveness, if the riot escalates.




Figure IV-9 Isolate the Disturbance




Figure IV-10 Isolate the Riot with Checkpoints

(2) Dominate the situation through force presence and control of information resources. Units can demonstrate an overwhelming show of force at CPs, and dispatch attack helicopters to conduct over flights above demonstrations and massing civilian mobs. In addition, using appropriate air assets can give commanders a "bird's-eye view" of events on the ground. Over flights provide real-time situation reports, ensuring units know the "ground truth" at all times. This knowledge gives commanders a decisive advantage in both negotiations with potentially hostile elements and tactical maneuvers.

(a) Units can dominate a civil disturbance using nonlethal munitions. However, it is important to consider force protection issues. Always have nonlethal weapons and munitions accompanied by lethal munitions and the capability to employ them. One technique is to have M-203 grenadiers carry sponge rounds while other personnel carry the same equipment and ammunition they would use in a combat situation. In addition, if aviation assets are available, attack helicopters can provide a show of force.

(b) The task organization that has emerged as the "minimum required" to respond to a civil disturbance is an infantry rifle company, or like-sized unit, augmented with battalion scouts/snipers, a CA team, and a PSYOP team. One platoon is positioned either to prevent collateral damage from occurring or to separate opposing factions; one platoon assists with the linkup of local police or the IPTF; and one platoon postures to serve as a QRF. If aviation is available, it can provide an excellent bird's-eye view of vehicular movement into and out of the civil disturbance. In addition, the rotor wash of a helicopter is an excellent nonlethal technique that is used effectively to disperse crowds.

(c) Forces may need to detain group leaders or instigators to dominate a civil disturbance. An instigator is identified as a person that is "prodding" others to commit disruptive acts or the one who is orchestrating the group. Often, an instigator carries a

bullhorn or hand-held radio. Forcibly snatching instigators from demonstrations or riots can alleviate organized violence in a crowd. The nonlethal TTP that has been developed for a unit conducting riot-control operations is to first positively identify instigators, and then send in a "snatch-and-grab" team to forcibly remove them.

(d) The smallest unit that can employ the "snatch-and-grab" technique is a platoon. Before a platoon deploys to quell a riot, identify a four-person snatch-and-grab team, two to secure the individual and two to provide security. Once an instigator is identified in a hostile crowd, the snatch-and-grab team deploys into the crowd, grabs the assailant, and returns back behind the friendly picket line. Figure IV-11 portrays this technique.

(e) It is imperative that the four-person snatch-and-grab team wears the Kevlar helmet with face shield and flak vest, but the team should not bring weapons or load bearing equipment with them into the crowd. The two-person team should only carry batons into the crowd. The snatch-and-grab team needs to remain in contact with the adjacent PO forces on the line formation as they pass through. That formation should remain ready to respond to any crowd actions that threaten the snatch-and-grab team. Once the snatch-and-grab team has apprehended the riot instigator, it needs to go directly to a secure location out of the crowd's line of sight.




Figure IV-11 Deploying a "Snatch-and-Grab" Team

(f) Employing military working dog (MWD) teams in conjunction with riot-control formations can increase the crowd's apprehension about approaching or engaging the formation. Place the MWD teams behind the crowd-control formation, in plain sight of the crowd, but in front of the command element. The MWD teams work back and forth behind the formation as an intimidation measure. The presence of MWDs, coupled with the presence of personnel prepared to conduct civil disturbance operations, produce a profound psychological effect on the crowd.

CAUTION: MWD teams must depart the area before the use of riot-control agents (RCA). MWD teams must move a safe distance from the crowd to ensure the safety of the dogs.

(g) Per Executive Order 11850, the President of the United States must approve the use of RCA. The US policy is to employ RCAs in limited circumstances during PO and/or armed conflict, though never as a method of warfare. Yet, commanders should be conscious that use of RCAs might pose a risk of escalation or public panic as use of RCAs may invite the erroneous perception that a chemical weapon is being used.

(h) Another element that is crucial for successful civil disturbance operations is the use of combat camera personnel. Document events to hold personnel, factions, and gangs or groups accountable. To ensure that the right message is being presented, control the information environment through the synchronized efforts of the PAO, Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), PSYOP, and CA offices.

(3) Awareness is maintained through timely, accurate, and complete multi-source reporting. Commanders can receive reports from a broad spectrum of sources. Unit CPs, air assets, and close liaison with international police and other civil monitors all contribute to an accurate assessment of any situation. In addition, use unmanned aerial vehicles, such as Predator and Pioneer, to better observe large sectors of an AO. Analyze the reports produced and relay them to each unit involved in the operation.

(4) As part of IDAM, multi-dimensional/multi-echeloned actions could require the following considerations:

- (a) Policy and legal considerations.
- (b) ROE.
- (c) Standards of conduct.
- (d) High visibility of civil disturbance operations with the media and for leaders who must interact with the media.
- (e) Crowd dynamics.
- (f) Communication skills for leaders who must manage aggressive and violent behavior of individuals and crowds.
- (g) Use of electronic warfare to monitor and control belligerent control and communications.
- (h) Tactics.
- (i) Lethal overwatch.
- (j) Search and seizure techniques.
- (k) Apprehension and detention.
- (l) Neutralization of special threats.
- (m) Recovery team tactics.
- (n) Cordon operations to isolate potential areas of disturbance

8. Curfews

a. Commanders may impose a general curfew over a wide, but clearly defined, area such as a city, district, or region or restrict it to a small area such as a town center, a housing estate, or a particular series of streets. The size of the area and the duration of time for which a curfew is imposed will depend on the situation.

b. Commanders may need the curfews to—

(1) Assist the security forces in re-establishing control after rioting and serious disturbances have taken place, by restricting civil movement and allowing tempers to cool.

(2) Prevent civil movement in a selected area while a search or incident investigation is carried out.

(3) Disrupt hostile groups by making movement of individuals difficult.

(4) Allow the security forces greater freedom of operation.

c. Cautions. Do not impose a curfew for punitive reasons or as a threat to impress on the civil population the inconvenience and hardship that could arise should hostile activities take place. The population will usually obey a curfew, but boredom, shortage of food, or even the feeling that the curfew is being unfairly or ineffectively enforced can lead to curfew breaking and consequential incidents. Good planning based on a proper understanding of local conditions is essential.

d. Guidance.

(1) Planning. The civil authorities are responsible for imposing a curfew, but as the need is usually a military one, always consult the security forces, especially if they will have to enforce it. Effective curfews always absorb large numbers of police and troops.

(2) Area. Clearly define the area. In towns where houses are close together and streets narrow, forces may find it necessary to either enlarge the area under curfew until a clearly defined perimeter is achieved, or to prohibit movement into the street that constitutes the boundary. The integrity of the perimeter of the curfew area is essential to exercise full control. The civil authorities in conjunction with the security forces must decide on the curfew area.

(3) Timing. Commanders can impose a curfew for short periods without hardship. If it is unduly prolonged, it can cause grave difficulties to innocent civilians. A study of the pattern of local conditions can be helpful in arriving at timings, which are both effective and workable. Forces will find it useful to know—

(a) The time that the inhabitants normally get up, go to work, and return home.

(b) The time that shops normally open and close.

(c) The time it will take to implement the curfew after the public announcement has been made.

(4) Security. If a curfew is imposed unexpectedly, the PO forces may catch hostile groups unprepared without time to adjust their plans, disrupting and their courier services. An unpredicted curfew, swiftly imposed, also avoids undesirable street gatherings where agitators may try to influence people to break the curfew. Security of planning is essential.

(5) Example Sequence of Events. The likely sequence of events is:

(a) The decision to impose a curfew is made by the civil authorities in consultation with the police and military commanders.

(b) Plans are made to cover timings, area, boundaries, troops required, and administrative arrangements.

(c) Local representatives of the police and military should make detailed plans. Avoid overt reconnaissance of the area.

(d) Cordon parties, road and static patrols move rapidly into position.

(e) The curfew and subsequent control instructions are announced by the appropriate means, e.g., press, radios, siren, and police announcements by loud hailer. Forces can also use helicopters and light aircraft as voice aircraft to make public announcements.

(6) Imposing a Curfew. The existing security force headquarters should control a curfew coordinating all aspects affecting the civil authorities, the military, and the police. If no joint headquarters exists, set one up.

(7) Curfew Passes. The civil administration and the police are normally responsible for the issue of passes. Certain people, such as doctors, nurses, clergy, and workers in essential services, need to move about more or less freely, and the civil authorities should devise a pass system, easily understood by troops, well in advance.

(8) Patrols. Mobile patrols and static posts will establish the curfew. Once operational, reduce the number of static posts and maintain the curfew mainly by mobile patrols. Forces may use Standing patrols on rooftops to watch for illegal movement between houses and to help cover street patrols.

(9) Surveillance. Surveillance devices will assist in the enforcement of the curfew and will reduce the number of static posts.

(10) Control of Visiting Vehicles and Personnel. Imposing curfews may strand some residents outside the area. Prepare a system of removing and checking such people. Do not allow them re-entry into the area during the curfew.

(11) Curfew Breakers. Clearly define the actions troops are allowed to take against curfew breakers. Normally, arrest, search, and hand them over to the civil police. Take care to ensure that evidence of the offence and arrest is recorded for subsequent production in court.

(12) Police Duties. The police are responsible for—

(a) Announcing the curfew to the public.

(b) Issuing any curfew passes.

(c) Disposing of all curfew breakers, including any that may be arrested by troops.

(d) Providing police patrols in conjunction with the military forces in the operational area.

(13) Administrative Issues. The civil authorities are responsible for devising measures to meet administrative difficulties that will arise if a curfew is imposed for a long period, but they may need military help. The sort of problems that could arise are:

(a) Lack of water in houses.

(b) Shortage of food in shops.

(c) The need to purchase essential food.

(d) Essential food deliveries in areas with no shops.

(e) Clearance of refuse from houses and streets.

(f) Fuel supplies for lighting, cooking, and heating houses.

(g) Treatment of the sick and maternity cases.

(h) Care of animals.

(i) Lack of indoor sanitation.

- (j) Homelessness.

9. Convoy Operations

a. Basic convoy techniques are described in FM 55-30, *Army Motor Transport Units and Operations* and in FM 55-50, *Army Water Transport Operations*, and MCWP 3-35.4, *Doctrine for Navy/Marine Joint Riverine Operations*.

b. The PO forces organize convoys to ensure the safe movement of forces, humanitarian supplies, and support civilian/commercial movements authorized or required to implement the peace agreement(s).

(1) Convoys are allocated road space in accordance with theater policy, standardization agreements, and the law of the HN, as applicable to the situation. JP 4-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control*, provides more detail regarding movement control procedures.

(2) Types of Convoys. Conduct convoys on highways, roads, rivers, along coastlines.

(a) Ground convoy elements are normally organized into march units, serials, and columns as described in FM 55-30, *Army Motor Transport Units and Operations*. Other countries often use the term “packet” to describe the concept of march and serials.

(b) Watercraft convoy operations are also described in FM 55-50, *Army Water Transport Operations*, and MCWP 3-35.4, *Doctrine for Navy/Marine Joint Riverine Operations*.

(3) Security Elements.

(a) Advance Elements. The column head is the first vehicle of each column, serial, and march unit. The security element positioned with the column head is called the advance guard. The advance guard serves as the point element for the convoy and consists predominantly of security vehicles. It should travel far enough ahead to enable small obstructions to be cleared without getting the main body involved (The USA Military Police standard is 3-5 minutes ahead of the main body to ensure that if the advance guard is hit, there is still time for the main body to react). Position a point patrol element in front of (but within visual range of) the advance guard to provide surveillance of the route, monitor CPs before arrival of the convoy, and detect mines or booby-trapped areas.

(b) The Main Body. The Main Body includes the majority of the cargo/passenger-carrying vehicles/vessels. Intersperse escorts with or on board these elements. A typical order of march could be as follows:

- Armored vehicles.
- Convoy vehicles/VIP vehicles.
- APC/infantry fighting vehicle containing the column commander.
- Mounted infantry.

(c) The Rear Guard/Trail. The trail is normally equipped to provide recovery, maintenance, and medical support. When the threat is high, give consideration to locating a rear guard security force with the trail. The rear guard defends the rear of the convoy and prevents infiltration from the rear. It also assists the advance guard or main body should a local counterattack be required. The rear guard should move far enough behind the main body to allow freedom of action if the latter is held up or

attacked. The commander may task a helicopter borne QRF as a reserve force. Ideally, this should include at least two helicopters to allow for greater flexibility of movement and action.

(4) C2. Establish clear lines of C2 for each convoy. This is especially difficult with multinational and mixed civilian/military convoys. Civilian elements of the convoy are not part of the military C2 structure; however, the convoy commander must exercise control over their actions. This is true regardless of the rank of military/civilian VIPs traveling with the column.

(5) Communication. The convoy commander commands the column from his position in the convoy. Maintain good secure radio communication throughout the column and with the local security force, any mobile reserve forces, supporting artillery, aircraft, and other security forces operating on or astride the route. Use light signals and colored smoke grenades with a prearranged code for passing information and for indicating targets.

(6) OPSEC. The PO forces must avoid establishing regular patterns of movement. Make every effort to create irregular patterns in the routes followed, in convoy composition/organization, and in vehicle speeds and convoy timings. Failure to do this places lives and equipment at risk. Never divulge plans in advance to anyone who does not have a need to know them; always consider deception measures.

(7) Liaison. The staff responsible for arranging the move must coordinate with local commanders concerning the measures to protect the convoy as it passes through their areas. This includes the means of travel, the route, timings, the size of the escort, and the presence of soft skinned vehicles if there is a risk of incident.

(8) Intelligence. Convoy planners must obtain timely, accurate intelligence regarding potential hostile activity on proposed routes, and must conduct careful reconnaissance. Conduct reconnaissance using suitable deception measures to ensure preservation of secrecy. Aerial imagery and photographs can assist this process, without compromise or risk to personnel. Current observations of activity along the route may assist in providing quality intelligence. Collect and process information from all convoy commanders, drivers, operators, and security elements at the completion of each convoy mission. Use latitude/longitude coordinates when possible to report—

- (a) Identification and location of belligerent elements.
- (b) Identification, affiliation, ethnicity, location, and status of CPs along the route.
- (c) Problem or hazardous areas along the route.
- (d) Areas where crowds have been observed or are likely to assemble.
- (e) Local weather conditions.
- (f) Road/sea conditions along the route

(9) Recovery and repair of vehicles. Plans should exist for the prompt recovery and repair of vehicles. Include recovery vehicles in any large convoy with vehicle mechanics in each group. Include a recovery and repair policy in convoy orders. A convoy element will normally halt long enough to take a broken down vehicle in tow, or to hand it over to a recovery section traveling with the convoy. However, forces may deal with circumstances when it is necessary to abandon a vehicle rather than hold up the convoy.

(10) Medical assistance. Include medical vehicles in any large convoy with medical personnel in each group. Include the medical policy in the convoy orders. In case of emergency, it is possible for evacuation by helicopter, CASEVAC.

10. Convoy Security

a. General. Convoy defense techniques are described in FM 55-30, *Army Motor Transport Units and Operations*, FM 55-50, *Army Water Transport Operations*; and MCWP 3-35.4, *Doctrine for Navy/Marine Joint Riverine Operations*. Security forces must accompany convoys where contact is likely. The composition of the escort will depend upon the threat, the size of the vehicle column, and the forces available. High threats may require the use of combined arms escort forces comprised of armor, infantry, artillery, aviation, and engineer elements for ground convoys. Similarly, water convoys may require escort forces comprised of patrol boats and aviation assets.

b. Position. Position security elements where they can best support the convoy. If only one security element (or vehicle) is available, consider placing it at the rear of a ground convoy column; it is usually easier for vehicles to move forward on a road in reaction to a threat.

c. Ambush tactics are described in FM 3-90, *Tactics*. Passive ambush defensive measures include the vehicle preparation, command, control, and communications measures described earlier. Devise the C2 arrangements so that there is always a march unit, serial, or convoy commander on the spot with the necessary communications to call for supporting fire and air support. Although no single defensive measure, or combination of measures, will prevent or effectively counter all ambush situations, passive and active defense measures have proven effective.

d. Securing a Route. Screening is a means of securing a road or track by dominating the route for a limited period, allowing the safe passage of a convoy. It requires additional security elements; only carry it out when there is a grave threat of ambush, or when other methods of protecting the route are impracticable.

(1) Establishing security. The security force is made up of an advance guard, a main body (to include the screening force) and a rear guard.

(a) The advance guard clears a designated area.

(b) The main body establishes the screens.

(c) The rear guard calls in the screens when the convoy has passed.

(d) The screening force may move on foot or in vehicles depending on the terrain and the nature of the convoy, and may need to include armor, mortars, and artillery to support screens movement into position and cover their withdrawal.

(2) Distance between Screening Positions. The initial task of a screening force is to ensure that there is no ambush in position. Thereafter, dictate the distance between screens by the nature of the terrain. Although ideal, it unrealistic to cover all intervening ground by fire. Screening certain parts of the route or selected features may be necessary.

(a) Although, in this case there is a risk that an ambush is set up in an intervening position, the existence of screens and uncertainty amongst an ambush party as to their whereabouts is an important deterrent.

(b) The distance at which screens are established from the convoy route also depends on the nature of ground and on the time available. Ideally, site screens at such

a distance as to prevent direct fire from small arms and hand-held antitank weapons being brought to bear on the convoy.

(3) Size of a screening force. Relate the size of a screen to the threat and the type of terrain. If forces are already operating in the area through which a convoy route passes, use them to screen the route.

(4) Communication. Communication is particularly important in close country. There is an obvious danger of confusion should a hostile force evade the screens and succeed in attacking a convoy. Each screening element must have a radio or be in direct contact by hand, voice, or light signals with a post that has a radio.

e. Rehearsal. Convoy commanders should ensure that the following are included in the mission rehearsal:

(1) Rehearse the movement using maps, photographs, and terrain models.

(2) Rehearse communications procedures.

(3) Conduct reaction drills to ensure everyone understands the ROE and procedures for individual and collective action/reaction to potential situations:

11. Demining and Unexploded Ordnance

Demining and UXO issues are detailed in the MTTP, *Multi-Service Procedures for Unexploded Ordnance Operations*, (FM 3-100.38, MCRP 3-17.2B, NTTP 3-02.41, and AFTTP(I) 3-2.12). This publication is also found on the World Wide Web at: <https://lad.dtic.mil/alsa/uxo.htm>.

12. Refugees and Displaced Persons

a. Refugees and DPs are a central feature of many PO. Military forces do not have primary responsibility for the international response that assists refugees and DPs. However, they may support the activities of their civilian partners. Refugees and DPs operations are a subset of DC operations under populace and resources control (PRC). For a full discussion of PRC, see JP 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Military Operations*, and JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*.

b. IDPs are frequently confused with refugees or other DPs. The distinction between the two categories is essentially a matter of location. A refugee gains that status crossing an international border. An internally DP, on the other hand, remains within the boundary of the country of origin.

c. Responsibilities.

(1) The distinction between refugees and IDPs has less to do with reasons for movement and more to do with technical and legal considerations associated with the individual's ultimate destination. Both the refugee and IDP may be fleeing the same threat, and both may experience the same requirements to alleviate the threat. Virtually every humanitarian agency has the flexibility to respond to the needs of both refugees and IDPs. The UNHCR, whose mandate specifically charges the organization to respond to the needs of refugees, can serve the interests of IDPs on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs must work to ensure the UN system protects and assists persons who are not covered by other UN mandates. This office, as the title implies, coordinates the humanitarian response to emergencies, and advocates the interests of the internally displaced community.

(2) Population Movement

(a) A fundamental point of population movement is that it does not occur without reason. Usually, indicators exist that individual rights are, or soon will be, in jeopardy. They may request that the military provide intelligence support to assist in determining the direction and magnitude of these movements.

(b) Stages. The five stages of movement are preflight and flight, arrival, asylum, repatriation, and reintegration.

- Preflight and flight. Call on military forces to provide intelligence support to determine the timing, magnitude, and direction of the population movement.
- Arrival. Depending on timing and the security at the arrival location, call on the military to assist international organizations, NGOs, and the HN during the initial arrival of the refugees.
- Asylum. Army forces may secure refugee camps and settlements in the host country while at the same time assisting with stabilization of the refugees' country of origin.
- Repatriation. When conditions in the operational area improve, and the displaced community returns to its native country, they may need military support to secure repatriation crossing points, screening points, transit sites, and returnee movement to local communities.

(3) Reintegration. Reintegration is the final phase. During this phase, commanders may require military forces to assist with the security of returnees as they are absorbed into their local communities. This support would be especially critical in the absence of a capable host-nation public safety establishment or active resistance to resettlement. International civilian police normally assume the primary responsibility for community law and order.

(a) The UNHCR has established the following five conditions for resettlement:

- Security.
- Shelter.
- Adequate local infrastructure.
- Functioning institutions.
- Economic potential.

(b) Controlling Movement. Coordinate the following with UNHCR and the NGO/international governmental organization community.

- Selection of routes. CA personnel in coordination with MP and transportation officer should coordinate routes with the international support community.
- Identification of routes. After the movement routes have been agreed upon, CA personnel should coordinate the marking of the routes with UNHCR and the HN. Mark them in languages and symbols the civilians, US forces, and allied forces can understand. PSYOP units, HN military, and other allied military units can help mark the routes, CA, the international support community and HN authorities establish control and assembly points at selected key intersections.

- Coordinates with the provost marshal, the movement control center, and the G4 for the locations of these points for inclusion in the traffic circulation plan.
- Emergency rest areas. UNHCR or ICRC may establish these points. CA personnel should coordinate to see if water, food, fuel, maintenance, and medical services are available.
- Local and national agencies. Use of local and national agencies is essential for three reasons. First, it conserves military resources. Second, civilian authorities normally have legal status and are best equipped to handle their own people. Third, the use of local personnel reduces the need for interpreters or translators.

13. Environmental Restoration

Effective environmental stewardship programs emphasize: compliance, restoration, prevention, and conservation. Units engaged in PO should place particular emphasis on the task of environmental restoration. The combined efforts of engineer, chemical, CA, and other specialized units may be required in order to effectively restore the environment within the AO to acceptable levels.

Chapter V FORCE PROTECTION

1. Background

Force protection is the preservation of the fighting potential of a force, so the commander can apply maximum force at the decisive time and place. The political dynamics of PO place enormous pressure on commanders to avoid casualties. Every commander has the inherent responsibility to protect the force, but accomplishing the mission must take precedence over taking casualties.

2. Definition

a. Force protection refers to measures taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel, facilities, and equipment that conduct or support national defense missions. JP1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines force protection as, “Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease.”

b. Protection has four components: force protection, field discipline, safety, and fratricide avoidance.

(1) Force Protection.

(a) Force protection consists of those actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against PO forces, resources, and facilities. Often unable to challenge the US’s forces in conventional combat, adversaries seek to frustrate military operations by resorting to asymmetric means, weapons, or tactics. Force protection counters these threats.

(b) Force protection at all levels minimizes losses to hostile action. Aggressive counterintelligence activities, comprehensive threat assessments and appropriate follow-on actions decrease the vulnerability of friendly forces. Effective OPSEC keeps adversaries from exploiting friendly information. Proper dispersion and standoff reduce losses from terrorist action. Camouflage discipline, local security, and field fortifications do the same. At the operational level, rear area and base security contributes to force protection.

(2) Field Discipline. Commanders should ensure that combat operational stress control measures are in place and practiced by unit leaders. Field discipline guards personnel from the physical and psychological effects of the environment. Oppressive environments can sap troop strength and morale far more quickly than enemy action. Commanders must take every measure and precaution to keep their forces healthy and maintain their morale. Such actions include securing equipment and supplies from loss or damage. Commanders should ensure systems are in place for adequate health support (to include preventive medicine) and the quick return to duty of minor casualties. They provide effective systems for maintenance, evacuation, and rapid replacement or repair of equipment.

(3) Safety. Operational conditions often impose significant risks to lives and health and make equipment operation difficult. Trained crews and operators must know the capabilities and limitations of their weapons systems and how to employ them. In designing operations, commanders should consider the limits of human endurance. They balance the possible benefits of sustained, high-tempo operations with the risks involved.

(4) Fratricide Avoidance. The destructive power and range of modern weapons increases the chance of fratricide. Good leadership resulting in positive weapons control; control of troop movements; understanding of, and adherence to, well-conceived ROE; and disciplined operational procedures contributes to achieving this goal.

3. Threat Assessment

a. Conduct a threat assessment. The first step in developing a force protection program is to identify and characterize the potential threats to the force. Understanding the threat enables US personnel to assess their vulnerability to attack and to develop effective protective and response measures. The following is an overview of the elements within a threat assessment. US forces should follow basic security planning steps and principles when planning force protection. These steps and principles apply whether planning at the individual, team, or unit level. They also apply to teams conducting mobile operations or operating from a fixed site. They are focused on all threats the force may encounter.

b. Conduct a vulnerability assessment. A vulnerability assessment addresses the susceptibility of the force to the threats identified during the threat assessment. This very essential step helps to identify and prioritize the resources required to defeat the threat. It provides a basis for determining antiterrorism measures that can protect personnel and assets from terrorist attacks. The vulnerability assessment applies to fixed sites as well as to mobile operations. It is an ongoing process that includes all three dimensions: OPSEC, physical security (PHYSEC), and personnel security (PERSEC).

(1) OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information and analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities, identifying actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems.

(2) PHYSEC is that part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft.

(3) PERSEC is the application of standards and criteria to determine whether an individual is eligible for access to classified information, qualified for assignment to or retention in sensitive duties, and suitable for acceptance and retention in the total US forces consistent with national security interests.

c. Determine appropriate countermeasures. Countermeasures are those measures taken by a unit or individual to counter a specific threat at a specific time and place. Countermeasures take many forms. They include specialized procedures, personal equipment, unit or team equipment, facilities, and training. They may require reorganization of land use, reorientation of roadways, security improvements to installation entries and existing structures and the surrounding site area, and coordination with HN military and civilian police. They may also require the creation of

specialized elements that are task organized to mitigate threats, respond to threats, and recover from the aftermath of threats. Some threats may require the identification of multiple scenarios, or alternatives, for achieving the desired goal. All alternatives should undergo a suitability analysis that takes into account factors that may limit the feasibility of an action or project. Limiting factors consist of physical, resource, and political constraints such as land area restrictions, limited availability of construction materials, and HN or civilian sensitivities.

d. Implement countermeasures. Implement countermeasures as soon as possible after identifying a threat. The least costly and often the most effective protection measures are those incorporated during the planning phase. Implementing appropriate force protection measures at the planning stage can preclude the need for piecemeal and costly security enhancements later in the mission.

e. Evaluate effectiveness of the countermeasures. Over time, threats change as situations change. Countermeasures may have been effective yesterday and may no longer be effective today.

4. Threat Countermeasures

a. When the threat of terrorism exists, commanders implement and enforce measures according to the force protection condition (FPCON) procedures outlined in JP 3-07.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism*, and Appendix B of DOD 2000.12-H, *Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorist and Political Turbulence*.

b. FPCON NORMAL exists when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists but warrants only a routine security posture.

c. FPCON ALPHA applies when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel and facilities, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and circumstances do not justify full implementation of FPCON BRAVO measures. However, it may be necessary to implement certain measures from higher FPCONs resulting from intelligence received or as a deterrent. The measures in this FPCON must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.

d. FPCON BRAVO applies when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this FPCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardship, affecting operational capability, and aggravating relations with local authorities.

e. FPCON CHARLIE applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating some form of terrorist action against personnel and facilities is imminent. Implementation of measures in this FPCON for more than a short period probably will create hardship and affect the peacetime activities of the unit and its personnel.

f. FPCON DELTA applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or after receiving intelligence that terrorist action against a specific location or person is likely. Normally, this FPCON is declared as a localized condition.

g. Threat specific countermeasures are described in Table V-1.

Table V-1 Threat Specific Countermeasures

Threat ID	Threat Definition	Threat Level	Countermeasure
Civil Areas			
Criminal enclave	History of criminal violence against passers-through	Significant	<p><u>Mitigation</u> - Travel according to supported unit force protection guidelines (e.g., 2 man rule, 2 vehicle rule, etc.) Maintain situational awareness, weapons security, and radio contact with base unit. ID patterns and methods of operation.</p> <p><u>Response</u> - Follow mission ROE. Notify base unit. ID characteristics, personalities, and methods used by hostiles.</p> <p><u>Recovery</u> - Return to base. Report any compromised information or equipment. Debrief. Refine policies, as necessary.</p>
Structures			
Chemical processes on adjacent property	Hazardous chemicals may spill, explode, or pollute the air.	Medium	<p><u>Mitigation</u> - ID HAZMAT areas and pertinent safety precautions. Monitor HAZMAT situation. Coordinate with local and military HAZMAT managers to ID response plans and agency capabilities.</p> <p><u>Response</u> - Follow approved response plans. Report all information to base unit.</p> <p><u>Recovery</u> - Coordinate for cooperation and assistance between organizations involved. Review response plans. Refine response plans as necessary. Assist in upgrading response capabilities.</p>
Capabilities			
Local militia or hostile community	Capability to organize and mobilize rapidly when provoked.	Low	<p><u>Mitigation</u> - Identify what provokes the community to become hostile or to mobilize the militia. Train the force in how not to provoke the community. Establish positive relationship with militia, political, law enforcement, and other leaders. Engage the populace with normal CA activities. Establish a plan that includes assistance from local authorities.</p> <p><u>Response</u> - Follow approved response plans. Perform as liaison between supported unit and local authorities to help diffuse the situation. Maintain awareness of personal security situation. Report all information to base unit.</p> <p><u>Recovery</u> - Conduct projects or other activities to reestablish or enhance a positive relationship between the force and the community. Refine response plans as necessary.</p>
Organizations			
Terrorist organization	History of truck/boat bombings against US targets in region.	High	<p><u>Mitigation</u> - Travel according to supported unit force protection guidelines (e.g., 2 man rule, 2 vehicle rule, etc.) Maintain situational awareness, weapons security, and radio contact with base unit. Observe indicators among populace, such as excessive interest in military activities, unexplained or suspicious cancellation of civilian activities, unusual movement of vehicles, materials, or people. Report observations to appropriate channels.</p> <p><u>Response</u> - Take a protective posture according to unit SOP. Notify base unit. ID characteristics, personalities, and methods used by aggressors.</p> <p><u>Recovery</u> - Assist investigators as liaison between supported unit and local authorities. Refine SOP as necessary.</p>

Threat ID	Threat Definition	Threat Level	Countermeasure
People			
Thieves	Penetration of military facilities, vehicles, or personal space for equipment/information.	High	<p><u>Mitigation</u> - Employ strict PHYSEC, OPSEC, PERSEC measures. Maintain situational awareness. Keep civilians no closer than one-arm distance from personnel.</p> <p><u>Response</u> - Apprehend thieves, if possible. Secure the scene and notify military authorities and local law enforcement. Assist investigators as liaison between supported unit and local authorities. Take photos.</p> <p><u>Recovery</u> - Prosecute thieves according to appropriate law. Publicize incident through PSYOP and public information assets. Hold meeting with local authorities or public forum to discuss the implications of stealing equipment/information from military forces. Get commitment from local authorities to prevent future incidents.</p>
Events			
Disease	Sickness caused by poor sanitary conditions among populace	Medium	<p><u>Mitigation</u> - Conduct early assessments of local conditions in coordination with preventive medical assets, if available. Conduct training programs for locals, possibly as MCA projects, to correct deficiencies. Coordinate with local health officials, NGOs and IOs.</p> <p><u>Response</u> - Notify base unit. Coordinate with military and local medical agencies. Implement containment, treatment, and cleanup plans.</p> <p><u>Recovery</u> - Assess results of containment, treatment, and cleanup plans. Continue/modify as necessary. Train the populace in sanitation procedures.</p>

h. Possible Force Protection Countermeasures.

(1) Personnel.

(a) Establish standard operating procedures for handling weapons and ammunition.

(b) Establish weapons clearing sites for all personnel who return from outside the wire with loaded weapons.

(c) Create and establish credentials for entering military facilities.

(d) Search all material carried in by individuals.

(e) Emplace metal detectors.

(f) Establish personnel search areas for non cleared personnel.

(2) Vehicles.

(a) Establish vehicle CPs entering the military installation.

(b) Place barriers to prevent vehicles from driving up to or parking near buildings.

(c) Restrict non cleared vehicles from either coming on the military facility or coming near buildings.

(3) Compounds and Buildings.

(a) Improve boundary security of military facility(ies) through berms, fences, light poles, and obstacles.

(b) Place guards at key locations around military installation.

(c) Conduct active patrolling around military installation; possibly out of indirect fire range, depending on threat.

(d) Secure and establish observation points on key terrain overlooking military facility.

5. Terrorist Tactics

a. When considering terrorists or other human threats, threat identification focuses on three components: the person, the weapons, and the tactics.

(1) The Person. Terrorists generally perform hostile acts against people, facilities, and equipment. Their objectives include:

- (a) Inflicting injury or death on people.
- (b) Destroying or damaging facilities, property, equipment, or resources.
- (c) Stealing equipment, material, or information.
- (d) Creating publicity for their cause.

(2) The Weapons. To achieve their objectives, terrorists use various tools, weapons, and explosives, as follows:

- (a) Forced entry, vehicles, and surveillance methods are terrorist tools.
- (b) Weapons, such as incendiary devices, small arms, antitank weapons, manpads, and mortars.
- (c) Explosives, such as homemade bombs, hand grenades, and vehicle bombs.
- (d) WMD

(3) Tactics. Tactics refer to the offensive techniques employed by adversaries, reflecting their capabilities and objectives. Some of the more common tactics include:

(a) Moving-vehicle bomb. The moving-vehicle bomb is a suicide attack where an explosive-laden air, ground, or waterborne vehicle is flown or driven into a site and detonated.

(b) Terrorists can detonate stationary vehicle bombs by time delay or remote control.

(c) Exterior attack at close range of a facility or exposed asset. Using clubs, rocks, improvised incendiary devices, hand grenades, or hand-placed bombs, the intent is to inflict destruction and death.

(d) Standoff weapon attacks are executed using military or improvised direct- and indirect-fire weapons, such as antitank weapons and mortars.

(e) Covert entry. The attempt to enter the facility covertly using false credentials. The adversary may attempt to carry weapons or explosives into the site/facility or attempt to remove items/information from the site.

(f) Mail bombs. Small bombs or incendiary devices are incorporated into envelopes or packages that are delivered to the targeted individual for facility.

(g) High Explosive. Bombs or incendiary devices, larger than those found in mail bombs, are incorporated into various containers, and delivered to facilities or installations.

(h) Airborne contamination. The use of chemical or biological agents to contaminate the air supply of a facility or installation.

(i) Waterborne contamination. The use of chemical, biological, or radiological agents to contaminate the water supply of a facility or installation.

6. PSYOP in Force Protection

a. PSYOP units support force protection by assessing the psychological climate in the AO and determining the most effective application of PSYOP to influence selected target audiences. The PO commander uses PSYOP to project and define his intentions to the HN government, military, and populace. PSYOP forces also disseminate the ROE to the indigenous population.

b. PSYOP elements can enhance the force protection efforts of a supported unit by a variety of means, some of which are:

- (1) Influencing foreign populations by expressing information subjectively in order to influence attitudes and behavior to obtain compliance in support of the PO.
- (2) Minimizing casualties.
- (3) Emphasizing the legitimacy of the PO force's mission and presence in the AO.
- (4) Projecting a favorable image of the US government and US forces.
- (5) Enabling the commander to deliver the message directly to a specific target audience through novelty, print, audio, radio, or television products and face-to-face interaction with a target audience on a regular basis. The products should reflect the target audience's media consumption habits.
- (6) Providing assistance in completing area assessments.
- (7) Provide PSYOP support to displaced civilian and refugee operations, when directed.
- (8) Providing feedback to the commander on the effectiveness of IO activities.
- (9) Amplifying the effect of IO efforts.

7. Intelligence

a. Each Service maintains its own terrorist threat analysis capability. Differences in perspective among Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Services, or combatant commanders' threat analysis may lead to divergent conclusions about specific terrorist threats. While the threat to all DOD assets in a country may be at one level, the local commander may decide it faces no threat or a greater threat of terrorism in the country or locale in question.

b. Threat level. Force protection planning responds to the threat level. The threat level for an area is determined after information on the threat factors is gathered and analyzed. The greater the presence of threat factors, the higher the threat level. Five of the six factors are used together to define the threat level; the sixth, security considerations, is used separately as a modifying factor. Table V-2 depicts the relationships of the threat factors and threat levels.

Table V-2 DOD Terrorist Threat Level (Source: Change 2 DOD 2000.12.H)

<i>FPCON</i>	<i>THREAT LEVEL</i>	<i>THREAT ANALYSIS FACTORS</i>			
		Capability	Intentions	Activity	Environment
D	High	a	a	a	a
C	Significant	a	a	a	b
B	Moderate	a	a	b	
A	Low	b	b		
Normal	Negligible				
a - Factor must be present			b - Factor may or may not be present		

c. Unit commanders rely on local intelligence and counterintelligence personnel to provide warnings and indicators about specific and general threats to the installations, resources, and personnel. The DIA identifies threats and sets watch conditions outside the continental US for DOD installations and provides recommendations to combatant commanders for force protection levels. This information, coupled with the vulnerability assessment discussed in the following section, will influence decisions as to which force protection measures are applied to installation assets.

8. Medical Role in Force Protection

a. Medical Response and Consequence Management Program. Medical personnel must play an active role in force protection. Commanders must integrate the medical response and consequence management program into the force protection plan (FPP).

b. Preventive Medicine Threats. Commanders will ensure the preventive medicine threats are addressed (i.e., protection from and education on insects/rodents which carry diseases; weather related injuries heat/cold/wind/humidity; unsafe/contaminated food/water, importance of good personnel hygiene) and include these threats in their FPP.

c. Combat operational stress control (COSC). COSC must be part of the commander's overall force protection program. Previous and current PKO have often been extended periods of boredom and inactivity for peacekeepers who do have adequate morale support systems in place. Morale has suffered and incidents of stress misconduct have risen

9. Force Protection Checklist

The unit is participating in PKO where not all parties in conflict have consented to the imposition of a PK force. The belligerents have military and paramilitary organizations capable of employing all implements of war including high-performance aircraft and chemical weapons. The unit has guidance from the ROE and the SOFA that specify limitations and constraints.

Table V-3 Task Standards

TASK STANDARDS:		
1. Unit conducts risk assessment to manage risks.		
2. Unit defines threats, determines attack probability, identifies vulnerabilities, and develops effective countermeasures.		
3. Unit develops, disseminates, and updates force protection policy to mitigate the threat.		
4. Unit leaders recognize force protection as the most importance element of the PK mission.		
5. Unit adheres to the ROE.		
SECONDARY STANDARDS	GO	NO GO
Unit develops a force protection policy that balances—		
a. Attack probability		
b. Cost of adequate protection.		
c. Cost of inadequate protection.		
2. Unit concentrations, compounds, sites, and facilities are evaluated. Evaluations should include—		
a. Protection against vehicle-delivered explosives.		
b. Protection against exterior attack.		
c. Protection from standoff weapons attack.		
d. Protection from covert entry or insider compromise attack.		
e. Electronic and acoustical eavesdropping denial.		
f. Visual surveillance denial.		
g. Prevention of mail- or supply-truck-delivered explosives.		
3. Unit develops plans to react to belligerent demands to search vehicles.		
4. Unit OPSEC measures (active and passive) are consistent with higher headquarters policy.		
5. Unit establishes and sustains a situational awareness program (for example, mine awareness, regional political and military, and contingency force posture [TOR, SOFA, ROE]).		
6. Unit establishes and enforces requirements for local security.		
7. Unit ensures that guards are prepared to perform their duties. All guard posts have special instructions for that certain post. It may include special ROE instructions.		
8. Unit develops and enforces safety guidelines. It includes high-risk countermeasures.		
a. Weapons handling and clearing procedures.		
b. Use of stoves, fuels, and combustibles in personnel areas.		
c. Driving.		
d. Weather extremes.		
9. Unit considers weapon effects and fratricide reduction measures in base defense planning.		
10. Unit provides adequate field hygiene and sanitation resources.		
11. Commander determines arming posture for personnel in execution of duties and when in compound.		
a. Arms must be secured when not in possession of peacekeepers to prevent theft.		
(1) Weighs effect of centralized security (arms room) versus decentralized (squad hut weapon rack) on defense reaction time.		
(2) Considers peacekeeper sense of vulnerability.		
b. Unit develops procedures for ammunition storage and authority for issue.		
12. Commander designates and assigns security and safety duties to specific individuals.		

Chapter VI CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. Background

PO contain an inherent civil component that military commanders must address early and continuously. CMO include all activities that establish and maintain positive relations between the PO force and the nonmilitary entities in the AO – e.g., civil authorities and institutions, the general populace, NGOs/IOs, and nonmilitary resources. As a central feature of PO, CMO help harmonize civilian and military activities to maximize the use of resources designed to redress the deprivation and suffering of the people. CMO enhance the credibility of the friendly force, promote consent legitimacy, and encourage the parties of the conflict to work toward a peaceful settlement. Early in PO, when critical and immediate tasks normally carried out by civilian organizations temporarily exceed their capabilities, the military may have to perform those tasks or cooperate to ensure they are accomplished. In these situations, the PO force provides immediate relief and helps to create a sustainable infrastructure. Properly executed CMO provide an environment that enables military commanders at all levels of command to achieve the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic objectives of the PO. This chapter will focus on only those aspects of CMO that are usually associated with PO: FHA, civil administration, elections, rule of law, restraints, police, judiciary, and penal. A complete discussion of CMO and related functions is contained in JP 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Military Operations*. Commanders and staffs should also use the CA area assessment and study contained in Army FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*, as the basis for all planning analysis and mission execution.

2. Principles

a. Harmonization is the integration and synchronization of the civil and military effort. It must occur across the various institutions and agencies at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The following four conditions will enhance the prospect of achieving this harmonization of effort:

(1) Political leadership must establish a framework so that the objectives of the military and civilian components are coordinated and harmonized.

(2) Military and civilian agencies must develop an integrated interagency plan at the strategic and operational level. Such a plan will facilitate coordination at the various national capitals, the UN, and the various NGO/international organizations.

(3) If possible, use concurrent and integrated planning. The commander should establish mechanisms to support harmonization. Examples are, using extensive liaison, establishing joint commissions and CMOC, and using CA assets to avoid duplication of effort and wasting of resources.

(4) Empowerment. CMO in a peace operation should focus on empowering civilian agencies and organizations to assume full authority for implementing the civil portion of the peace effort. As the operation progresses, civilian organizations should assume greater responsibilities for civil functions and require a decreasing amount of assistance from the military force. The relationships established in the initial stages coupled with accurate assessments of progress achieved in civil-military implementation are crucial to affecting a smooth transition of responsibility and the ultimate extraction

of the force. Complete plans for transition and termination of the PO before deployment or as soon as possible during the initial phase. The best way to understand the skills, knowledge, and capabilities of international organizations and NGOs, as well as US government agencies, is to establish relationships with them before entering a mission. Accomplish this by including civilian agency personnel in selected field training exercises to developing working relationships based on trust and understanding. Commanders should press for such team building exercises with all entities before deployment on a mission. Do not overlook the essential roles of indigenous leaders and organizations. Appropriately involving local institutions and agencies with the international effort is a challenging but essential task.

(5) Appropriate use of military assets. Commanders should use military assets sparingly when civilian assets are more appropriate in promoting the overall objectives of the mission. For example, military assets can be used to repair roads quickly and efficiently but providing work to unemployed civilians may be a better solution, promoting support for the political settlement that the mission is seeking to implement.

3. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

a. FHA encompasses programs conducted to relieve or reduce conditions that present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. These conditions may be the results of natural or manmade disasters, including combat operations, or they may be endemic to an area.

b. FHA programs are normally the responsibility of the HN civil authorities. In addition to, or sometimes in lieu of, HN humanitarian assistance efforts, NGOs from the local area and around the world respond to disasters to provide FHA in various forms and for varied duration.

c. The PO force may find itself participating in FHA operations by mandate, as the result of mission analysis, or as the result of a disaster in the AO. Military forces may provide emergency services to the HN when the situation is beyond the capabilities of civil government and the NGO community. The military can provide coordination, supplement the efforts of the agencies that have primary responsibility, or provide assistance directly under a special form of FHA, humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) that authorizes the expenditure of military resource. Assistance provided under HCA is limited to:

(1) Medical civic action programs, dental civic action programs, and veterinary civic action programs provided in rural areas of a country.

(2) Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.

(3) Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.

(4) Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

d. HCA operations must fulfill valid unit training requirements. The fact that HCA operations incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace is secondary. Plan and program HCA as part of a centralized CMO campaign and conducted according to the senior commander's CMO guidance.

e. Legality of these programs is covered under various laws, title 10, United States Code, Chapters 20 and 152; and title 22, Chapter 32, which are covered in detail in FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*.

f. FHA operations are inherently complex operations that require a significant amount of interagency coordination. Unity of effort is facilitated through coordination entities such as the CMOC, humanitarian assistance coordination centers, and humanitarian operations centers. The US Agency for International Development is the lead agency for coordinating FHA. Command, control, and coordination of FHA are covered in detail in JP 3-07.6, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.

g. The following are general procedures for assessing and executing FHA tasks:

(1) Understand the command's overall objectives and the end state for the political military operation.

(2) Understand the legal and fiscal requirements.

(3) Determine and establish contact with local authorities and the NGO in the region.

(4) Work through the coordination and communication means for synchronizing the relief effort. This may be the UN Joint Logistical Center, an NGO Forum, UNHCR, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan regional office, or a lead NGO such as Cooperative for American Relief Anywhere, Inc. (CARE). Use the military coordination mechanisms, CMOC, as described above.

(5) Plan and execute the operation in accordance with the internationally recognized standards for FHA

(6) Consider purpose, short and long-term goals, consequences, and perceptions (of local populace, HN authorities, international community, others). Depending on US goals and objectives, it may be prudent to include HN civilian and military resources (perhaps in the lead), as in military-civic action (MCA) projects, to promote the legitimacy of the local government.

(7) Integrate IO into all projects.

4. Civil Administration

a. The Civil Affairs Command (CACOM) is the only force structure requisite in DOD specifically designed to support the mission of civil administration. Support to civil administration may be mandated in PO or may temporarily occur in the PO. In most cases, the military will assist an established or interim government. See JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*, for additional information.

b. The CACOMs organic CA specialty teams are especially suited for the civil administration mission. The teams are organized as follows with the listed functions:

(1) Government Team.

(a) Legal. Advise local judicial agencies of the legal system and assist them in administering it.

(b) Administration. Implement government functions, policies, and procedures for the conduct of the government.

(c) Education. Evaluate current education systems and provide guidance to foreign nation agencies responsible for the administration of indigenous education institutions.

(d) Public Health. Develop and implement public health education programs on issues such as sanitation, maternity and child health, nutrition, immunization, and first aid.

(e) Public Safety. Advise, assist, or supervise local police, firefighters, rescue agencies, and penal institutions. Supervise enforcement of laws and ordinances.

(2) Economic Team

(a) Economic Development. Recommend monetary and fiscal policies to coincide with local laws and practices.

(b) Civilian Supply. Coordinate the movement of essential civilian supplies. Establish policies and procedures concerning custody and administration of private and public property.

(c) Food and Agriculture. Advise and assist in establishing and managing crop improvement programs, agricultural training, use of fertilizers and irrigation, livestock improvement, and food processing, storage, and marketing.

(3) Public Facilities Team

(a) Communications. Provide engineering and technical expertise in the identification, assessment of capability, rehabilitation, development planning, and operational oversight/supervision of indigenous public and private communications assets and facilities during the conduct of CMO.

(b) Transportation. Advise and assist in establishing transportation facilities. Direct civilian transport agencies and functions.

(c) Public Works and Facilities. Coordinate public works and utilities operations.

(4) Special Functions Team

(a) Civil Information. Advise, assist, supervise, control, or operate civil information agencies; assist in providing TV, radio, or newspaper services.

(b) Cultural Relations. Advise, assist, or direct the restoration of cultural properties.

(c) Dislocated Civilians. Advise and assist HN and US agencies on camps and relief measures for DCs.

(d) Emergency Services. Advise, assist, or supervise local officials in emergency services, to include disaster relief.

(e) Environmental Management. Conduct environmental policy analysis. Survey the capabilities of the HN to plan/administer environmental programs.

5. Elections

a. Background. Not all PO missions have an electoral dimension. However, elections have become a critical part of POs. Elections are one of the most important aspects of the mission. Conducting an election could be a fundamental element of the overall political agreement and holding the election will be a milestone that marks a step toward the successful conclusion of the mission and transition from military to full civil control. Elections are demanding, requiring an efficient marshaling of the entire resources of the mission, often supplemented by additional resources from outside the command. They are part of a broader process of democratization in which the military has a role. Successful elections are a prerequisite to establishing a stable and self-

sustaining peace and positive step toward transition. There is a tendency for the military to want to withdraw after the election is over. However, the post election transition of power is one of the most vulnerable times for a nation and requires military attention.

b. Principles.

(1) The HN is responsible for free and fair elections.

(2) The electorate must feel that these elections are under the control of their own country.

(3) The HN populace should see the international community assisting the process, not running it.

(4) The military is not responsible for conducting elections.

(5) To ensure free and fair elections, PO forces must ensure—

(a) A secure and stable environment.

(b) Freedom of movement.

(c) Freedom of assembly and association.

(d) Freedom of expression.

(6) The military should enable the HN and international agencies to conduct successful elections. The extent of the support depends on the capacity of the agencies to conduct elections and the authority of the military force to act.

(7) The election process is not over until power has transitioned to the newly elected officials.

c. Considerations for military support to elections

(1) Provide a secure and stable environment. Deploy large numbers of auxiliary electoral staff recruited on a volunteer basis from all occupations and countries to assist during the most active phase of the electoral process. This will increase the security and management challenge already existing in the HN.

(a) Area Security: Establish security areas based on the location of the polling stations. The HN populace should not see the military within 100 meters of the station. The security of the station is the responsibility of the local authorities and CIVPOL.

(b) Route Security. Secure routes to the polling areas. This is a coordinated action between the military and the local authorities and the CIVPOL.

(c) Security of the Ballots and Counting Houses. If support by the local authorities is considered inadequate or untrustworthy, prepare the military to provide this support.

(d) Focus on Hot Spots. Determine those areas that may cause significant security problems and focus assets. In some cases, the voter desire to exercise suffrage rights may draw threats to their homes, lives, and property. Secure radio and TV transmitters and stations that may be key facilities.

(e) Provide protection for designated international personnel. Election monitors from the international community may supervise the election. These may consist of international VIPs who require military protection.

(f) Provide protection for designated HN candidates. Threats may exist against members of campaigning political parties. The protection of the candidates and

the political process may exceed the abilities of the local police and the UN civilian police (UNCIVPOL). The military should analyze and prepare appropriate contingency plans to assist local authority. This may include a close protection mission. At a minimum, share intelligence information with local authorities and UNCIVPOL.

(2) Provide Intelligence Support.

(a) Electoral planners need to know or decide on electoral boundaries and promulgate this information. The basic intelligence requirement may go beyond the need for maps but include a basic understanding of the geographic and boundary issues.

(b) Use a computer database to support the organization, supervision, and verification of the electoral process. The HN may ask the military to assist in developing this database.

(3) Ensure distribution of election materiel.

(a) Beyond security, the enormity and complexity of the problem may exceed the capacity of the international election supporting organization. Prepare the military to provide logistical support.

(b) Establish control and coordination mechanisms.

(c) Establish an election cell that is a counterpart to the international community and the HN's joint election control center.

(d) Establish liaison and communication with the joint election control center, local police, CIVPOL, election monitors, and key local election centers.

(4) Develop contingency plans.

(a) Emergency Evacuation. Anticipate the emergency evacuation of the international personnel in the polling and counting stations.

(b) Establish QRF to respond to crisis. Prepare the QRF to be highly mobile and handle urban unrest and disturbances.

(c) Establish Communications. It is possible that the central coordinating agency for the elections will require the establishment of a means of communicating that may exceed their capabilities. Ensure that key nodes have communication. Nodes are the polling stations, counting stations, international joint elections operations center, elections cells, CIVPOL, police, and the VIP elections monitors.

(5) Develop Supporting Information Campaign. Voter education is key to the success of the election. The military contingent is likely to play a central role in publicizing the elections, explaining who is eligible to vote, and how, where, and when to vote. Leaflets, newspapers, local radio and TV, the Internet, personal meetings, or a combination of all may do this. The international electoral commission will have the lead but the military must closely coordinate. The military personnel involved must act in an impartial manner.

(6) Coordinate Logistical Support. HN may also require the military to provide logistical support, such as transport for civilian coordinators, voting slips and ballot boxes as well as billets, rations and water for international elections support personnel. In some cases, the supporting organization may need assistance in producing the ballots. The following are some items to consider:

(a) Identify the locations of voter registration points or polling stations.

(b) Identify the requirements for premises such as counting centers and warehouses and liaison with those components of the international community and HN officials responsible for obtaining and supporting such premises.

(c) Identify vehicle requirements.

(d) Delineate the military responsibility for planning and execution of the distribution of forms and materials.

(e) Develop a contingency plan for the movement of forms and materials during and after polling.

(f) Coordinate the planning of the movements and logistical support of the international supporting staff.

d. Procedures.

(1) Pre-Election Coordination: Pre-election coordination meetings among all organizations and factions involved in the elections are essential. The military should request such meetings if the international supporting organizations do not. These meetings should include all the key players in the process. The intent of these meetings is to prepare the operational area and ensure full integration and coordination among all parties involved in the elections. Answer the following issues during the early stages of the election support:

(a) The lead international civil agency needs to define terms and descriptions for the elections process. Publish a glossary of terms in an order and units should conduct standardized leader seminars to ensure understanding and compliance.

(b) Establish the political and legal framework for the electoral process. Specify the registration requirements, especially for the displaced people internal and external to the country. Promulgate the electoral laws and procedures.

(c) All participants in the electoral process should establish administrative structures to plan, supervise, and verify. The military should understand how to interact with these structures.

(d) Select polling stations, counting houses, and routes to and from the stations early in the process to allow the military to conduct appropriate supportive planning.

(e) The responsible agencies need to consolidate and standardize the polling station database. Decide on the location for polling station database early, with a GPS grid and sketches or pictures provided to assist units in locating the actual polling station.

(f) The agencies should determine the magnitude of the additional personnel that will be arriving to conduct and monitor the election.

(g) Registration. This can be a sensitive time in the election process, especially if there are numbers of displaced peoples and property disputes. Prepare the military for unrest and confusion among the population concerning registration. The military force must ensure that all of its members are fully briefed so that they can consider the populations' questions.

(h) Campaigning. During the actual campaigning, make sure the military stays alert for incidents of intimidation and coercion. The military should coordinate closely with the CIVPOL.

(2) Post Election Installation of the Elected Officials. The post election transfer of power can be a vulnerable time for a nation. Develop contingency plans to ensure stability and security during the transition period.

(3) Establish liaison and communication with the joint election control center, local police, CIVPOL, election monitors, and key election centers.

(4) Figure IV-1 is an example of an election support form.

MEMORANDUM FOR _____
SUBJECT: Election Support

1. NOTE: The following format must be completed by the organization tasked for election support. Election support forms are for discrete activities/missions and not to compile multiple activities/missions.

2. Unit reporting: _____

3. Date: _____ Location: _____

4. Description of support:

5. Vehicles, Equipment, and Supplies Used:

ITEM	QUANTITY	TOTAL MILES USED	PASSENGERS TRANSPORTED	HOURS OF USE
HMMWV				
M925 FOV				
HEMTT				
PLS				
M1				
M2/M3				
TENT, GP MED				
LIGHTSET				
GENERATOR				
FUEL				
AIRCRAFT				
UH-60				
KW-58D				

6. Point of contact for this report is: (Name, Rank, MSE No.).
\\SIGNATURE BLOCK OF S3\\

Figure VI-1 Election Support Form

6. Rule of Law

a. Background. The rule of law is fundamental to peace and stability. There must be a safe and secure environment maintained by a civilian law enforcement system operating in accordance with internationally recognized standards and with respect for internationally recognized human rights and freedoms. Rule of law includes the three related fields: police, judicial, and penal. Focus attention on all three areas to make progress. Civilian organizations in concert with the HN are primarily responsible for civil law and order. However, the military might need to provide limited support, especially during the initial "emergency phase" when the military may be the only organization that can ensure public security.

b. Principles

(1) Public security is the responsibility of the HN. If HN institutions are incapable or obstructive, employ an international police force, supported by a PO force, to advise and train the local police force. The situation may be such that this police force will be granted executive authority to carry weapons and arrest.

(2) The military complements the HN and international efforts to establish effective police, judiciary, and penal systems.

(3) The military may have to fill the gap until the international community can generate sufficient capacity to ensure public security.

c. Considerations for Military Support to Rule of Law. This task is primarily a civilian function since it involves providing assistance to design new institutions, draft new legislation that gives these institutions the authority to function effectively, train professionals to work in these new institutions, and educate the public on what the rule of law means. Upon request, however, and for a period, the military contingent could provide significant targeted assistance. Once the environment is reformed to the point where the new institutions are no longer obstructed from operating in a manner consistent with the rule of law, then civilians will be able to assume the sole responsibility to empower democratic institutions.

(1) The commander and staff should consider preparing a detailed assessment of the law and order conditions in the country and region where the mission is launched. The document should evaluate the power base of those who may obstruct the peace process. In addition to traditional intelligence analysts, review of law and order conditions should include specialists on transnational crime (e.g., drug trafficking, money laundering, arms smuggling) and criminology in general, as well as political specialists and sociologists who can analyze the strengths and weaknesses of existing institutions. Conduct this staff preparation at an advanced stage in order to incorporate required resources (Special Forces, CA, PSYOP, special police units, a multinational specialized unit, technical intelligence means, and relevant analytical capabilities) into the force flow and structure. The deployed peace operation force should use this information and continue to update it as the situation dictates.

(2) Intelligence. Proper intelligence is essential. The commander must include public security issues in his CCIR. The command must learn what to look for with respect to crime. The advice of the SJA, MP, CID, and other national and international experts must be obtained in reporting what could assist future criminal investigation and can be turned into evidence in future criminal investigations. Establish the following mechanisms to coordinate intelligence:

(a) Fusion Cell. Establish a fusion cell with links to the special advisor for rule of law or the coordinating body established by the task force or the international authority for coordinating public security. This cell would integrate intelligence from deployed military units, Special Gendarmerie (French) units, special police units, UNCIVPOL, DOJ trainers, and other public security organizations. It should have the analytical capability to exploit innovation in information technology as it related to crime mapping and link analysis.

(b) Information Sharing. Establish a mechanism to share actionable intelligence among the military, policy, judiciary, and penal authorities. Such a "council" may already exist and the commander should understand how it works. Pass on relevant law enforcement information, collected by the military assets, UNCIVPOL

station chiefs for their use. Likewise, check information collected by the police against the military database, names, and pictures of individuals produced and collection efforts refined. Military can establish a “Be on the Look Out” list for key individuals.

7. Restraints

a. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prohibits the military from training HN civilian police. However, MP may provide initial assistance and training to foreign military or civilian police forces or assist in the creation of these forces, where the local national authority has broken down. This is an exception to Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act. MP, when directed, can conduct training for foreign military police and assist in reorganizing local constabulary forces during stability and support operations. MP can provide short-term emergency law and order capabilities until the foreign military or civilian police forces are functional.

b. US military training assistance to the rule of law normally includes the following:

(1) Special Forces. These detachments teach basic skills needed to perform security duties such as small arms training, unit security tactics, radio procedures, and human rights observation and safeguard.

(2) Military police. MP can teach investigative techniques, law enforcement skills, and penal operations. They may also assist and monitor.

(3) Civil affairs. CA coordinates with the HN to effectively integrate training with the established political system. They also provide language interpreter support and support to Judiciary and Penal system.

(4) Judge Advocate General. Provide advice to the commander as well as assistance to Judicial and Prosecutorial Process.

(5) PSYOP personnel work to gain and maintain acceptance of the training effort by the civilian population and encourage their acceptance of the new or reconstituted civilian police force and judicial system.

8. Police

a. To assist in meeting police obligations, the HN may request that the UN establish a UNCIVPOL and/or an IPTF to assist in community policing. When the indigenous security and police forces are non-existent, incapable or obstructionist and the CIVPOL cannot generate sufficient capacity quickly enough, the military may assist in establishing general public security. However, the military does not have the capability for community policing. The military force may have to work with UNCIVPOL, International Crime Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), other police assistance agencies, or special police units.

b. UNCIVPOL, CIVPOL Component. From the operational standpoint, the civilian police are a separate component of the PO mission under the command of a police commissioner, who reports directly to the special representative. The CIVPOL component will complement and work closely with other components, e.g., military, humanitarian, electoral, and administrative components in the mission. The CIVPOL may or may not be granted “Executive Authority” to carry weapons and make arrests. The military must understand the exact authority of the CIVPOL. The principal function of the UNCIVPOL is the supervision and control of the local police and the

protection of human rights. In several missions an additional function has been training of local police or assistance in such training. In missions where an election is scheduled during the mandate period, UNCIVPOL will perform tasks related to the election and assist the electoral component. Other functions are: assisting humanitarian agencies and observing the conduct and performance of the local police and judicial investigative authorities in the arrest, detention, and interrogation of persons charged with a crime, the general handling of prisoners, and the searching of residences. Reference: United Nations Civilian Police Handbook

c. ICITAP. Through the ICITAP, the DOJ provides training to police forces and judiciaries in the Western Hemisphere. ICITAP works in tandem with overseas prosecutorial development assistance and training, a DOJ program offering administration of justice assistance. ICITAP seeks to

- (1) Enhance prosecutorial and judicial capabilities.
- (2) Enhance investigative and forensic capabilities.
- (3) Assist in development of training curricula for law enforcement personnel.
- (4) Improve administrative capabilities of law enforcement agencies.
- (5) Improve penal institutions and the rehabilitation process.

d. Gendarmerie Type Units. The military commander may require the addition of such units to increase the military ability to care for public security. The Italian Carabinieri, the Spanish Guardia Civil, the French Gendarmerie, and the Argentine Gendarmerie are examples of such units. Their mission includes such tasks as deter civil disturbances, riot control, collection, and analysis of criminal intelligence.

e. Special Police Units. Create these units to participate in high-risk arrest cases or close protection of VIP or election candidates.

f. To work together successfully, the police and military must coordinate the ROE and ROI, establish combined SOP, conduct combined supportive information operations, conduct combined planning, and ensure C2 interoperability.

g. Following are guidelines for combined military and police operations:

- (1) Understand ROE and ROI.
- (2) Allow the HN authorities to handle situations involving local nationals as much as possible. Military force can assist and provide backup and security but the HN, or the UNCIVPOL if so authorized, must make the arrest. In a crisis, the military unit can detain suspected criminals pending the arrival of the arrest authority.
- (3) Ensure that the military member does not embarrass or demean HN agents, especially in view of the populace. Negative behavior toward their HN counterparts could seriously damage their authority and affect consent and legitimacy.
- (4) Ensure that military members are aware of and sensitive to the cultural traditions and standards of the HN. What may be acceptable in one culture may be, at best, ill mannered and possibly a serious insult or even criminal behavior in another culture.
- (5) Ensure that military members are respectful of the agents and leadership and be confident in the abilities of the HN officials and UNCIVPOL. Problems should be addressed out of the public eye.
- (6) Coordinate with the police authority in combined operations, especially as to its purpose and what evidence is being sought.

h. Following is a list of the potential tasks that the military could perform in support of the police function:

- (1) Providing back up for high-risk arrests.
- (2) Safeguarding institutions of governance and key officials.
- (3) Providing advisors to police in accordance with US Law.
- (4) Assisting in the arrest of war criminals.
- (5) Conducting security patrols at times combined with police.
- (6) Supporting police presence and search patrols.
- (7) Controlling crowds, riots, and urban unrest.
- (8) Detaining suspected felons.
- (9) Deterring violent acts.
- (10) Eliminating snipers.
- (11) Enforcing curfews.
- (12) Facilitating freedom of movement.
- (13) Handling detainees.
- (14) Providing intelligence.
- (15) Performing local area security.
- (16) Performing wide area security.
- (17) Preventing looting.
- (18) Preventing pilferage.
- (19) Securing key facilities, culture properties.
- (20) Providing limited logistical support.

9. Judiciary

The military may assist in the establishment of a workable judicial system with SJA and CA support. The legal standards, and their effect on SOFA and memorandum of understanding, are important considerations. Engage the commander's legal and political advisors in the development of the system to ensure that military concerns are addressed. The DOJ and or the DOS ministerial advisory efforts along with the international efforts will be in the lead in building judicial capacity.

10. Penal

Commanders may require forces establish and run temporary confinement facilities until civilian agencies take the lead. Prepare the engineer and MP community to deal with the temporary confinement of civilian prisoners accused of civil crimes. Consideration should be given to deployment of the appropriate MP military occupational specialty for confinement duties. The international community should establish standards and rules of confinement during the planning phase to allow proper preparation.

Chapter VII CONFLICT RESOLUTION

1. Introduction

The following discussion provides techniques to assist the military member in concluding situations that require two or more parties to come to a mutual agreement. Knowledge of these techniques does not qualify a military member to act as a hostage negotiator or a trade negotiator for international, national, or regional trade agreements. Those types of agreements require specific expertise and legal status that is beyond the normal scope of PO activities. There are three basic methods to reach an agreement: negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. Each method has its place in PO, but mediation is normally the most effective, least divisive, and the preferred method of reaching agreements.

a. Negotiation is conferring, discussing, or bargaining to reach an agreement. It is a central technique in conflict resolution. Service members will rarely negotiate a major agreement between belligerents, but they should have a basic understanding of the art of negotiation. Under normal circumstances, the DOS conducts international negotiations on behalf of the US. Once a US military representative is a party to a negotiation, that member is now injected into the problem and is seen as a competitor and not as a disinterested party and surrenders, the cloak of impartiality, and all actions become suspect. It is very difficult to shake the ensuing suspicion and mistrust, even by subsequent US actions or representatives.

b. Mediation is a conflict settlement, where decisions are made by the disputing parties with the assistance of a neutral third party. During mediation, the military member acts as a facilitator who aims to guide the local parties toward an agreement that supports the goals of the US government. The mediator is not representing the aspirations of any of the disputing parties, but acts to further the goals of lasting peace, stability, and cooperation within the framework of the military commander's intent and the international agreements.

(1) The mediator should assume some level of resistance from the involved parties. Numerous groups or individuals may actively and/or passively hamper attempts to establish peace. The US military member does not support the aims or goals of the disputing parties, but should fully understand each side's position. Keeping an impartial position will help to reduce the likelihood of animosity/aggression directed at the US forces or civilian organizations.

(2) The mediator should anticipate the participants' behavior and outline all possible outcomes should mediation fail. The mediation process does carry the risk of upsetting a participant, but can prevent long-term friction through effective communication.

c. Arbitration is the conflict resolution method where a neutral party makes the final decision.

(1) Binding and non-binding are the two forms of arbitration:

(a) Binding arbitration refers to situations where local representatives agree to comply with the arbitrator's decision before the proceedings.

(b) Non-binding arbitration refers to situations where parties are not compelled to comply with the arbitrator's decision.

(2) Arbitration is a method of conflict resolution where the military member acts as judge, and as such, will make a decision that may adversely affect one or more parties. Normally, the military member will conduct arbitration at a higher level than the other forms of conflict resolution. The tangible advantage to arbitration is the ability for the military member to end the conflict after impasse, but having the parties adhere to the arbitrator's decision may be extremely difficult. Without mutual support for the decision, the local military commander may lose some influence with those belligerents who feel slighted by the decision.

d. When resolving disagreements between parties, military members must display a combination of patience, tenacity, creativity, and focus. To succeed, they must show tolerance, patience, innovation, flexibility, and resourcefulness. The military member must take charge, expect change, and work toward a mutual agreement. Vigilance is critical to long-term success. Some examples of conflict resolutions that may require military personnel to broker include:

(1) Getting local leaders to implement a "stay put policy" to prevent displaced civilian movement during combat operations.

(2) Appeasing competing vendors who disagree with HN support contracts.

(3) Assisting former belligerents in working out relocation agreements during post-hostilities operations.

(4) Deconfliction of military FHA activities with those of NGOs/IOs.

e. A successfully negotiated agreement has the following characteristics - it is fair, efficient, wise, and enduring.

(1) Fairness implies that all sides are treated impartially.

(2) Efficiency refers to producing a desired outcome with minimum of effort.

(3) Wisdom pertains to following the soundest course of action.

(4) Endurance refers to the stability of the agreement or the ability of the agreement to last.

2. Negotiations

Battalion commanders, company commanders, platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, and, often, squad leaders can find themselves in the role of a negotiator during PO. Sometimes their role is similar to a mediator, but with a distinct difference - the military leader has interests in the outcome, e.g., consistent with the unit's missions and objectives. In the role of quasi-mediator in these situations, the leader is helping to manage the negotiation process. Leaders may negotiate for rights of passage; mediating between hostile factions; bartering for use of facilities, buildings, roads, and services; or seeking to get a group of people to comply with the curfew without having to resort to the use of force.

a. Considerations. The following four considerations should guide the analysis and preparation of negotiations: negotiations do not exist in a vacuum, negotiation is an exercise in persuasion, study alternatives to negotiating an agreement, and be attuned to cultural differences.

(1) Negotiations do not exist in a vacuum. Leaders must understand the broader issues of conflict and their changing nature. These include maintaining dialogue with all parties, groups, organizations, and governments. Prevent any one incident from

destroying dialogue (even if force is applied). Creating an atmosphere of hostility will not lead to a resolution.

(2) Negotiation is an exercise in persuasion. Negotiation is a way to advance US interests by jointly decided action. Both parties must cooperate.

(3) Study alternatives to negotiating an agreement. What are both parties' alternatives to reaching a negotiated agreement?

(4) Be attuned to cultural differences. The use of language can be different. Actions can have different connotations to members of other cultures. The negotiating parties' culture shapes how they reason, what they accept as fact, and what principles they apply to decision making. Nonverbal behavior such as symbolic rituals or protocols of the arrangement of a meeting also is important.

(5) Conduct negotiations at several levels: negotiations among US agencies and departments; between multinational partners; between the military and UN agencies; and between the military and local leaders. This complex web of negotiations in a joint, combined, and interagency environment requires the following to build consensus: tact, diplomacy, honesty, open mindedness, patience, fairness, effective communications, cross cultural sensitivity, and careful planning.

b. Procedures. For success, base negotiations on the following nine steps.

(1) Establish communications.

(2) Identify common ground on which to build meaningful dialogue.

(3) Consider cultural aspects of negotiations.

(4) Set clear goals and objectives.

(5) Set clear and reasonable code of conduct for negotiation process.

(6) Develop a plan and diagram the results of the analysis.

(7) Determine composition of negotiating forum and decisionmaking mechanisms.

(8) Establish the venue (keep it neutral).

(9) Implementation.

c. Negotiation training.

(1) Negotiation training is essential for military leaders in PO. Training should include platoon sergeants and, often, squad leaders. CA personnel are instrumental in this area, but the nature of PO means that all leaders will need this skill to accomplish the mission.

(2) Leaders need a conceptual foundation of conflict management and resolution, and conceptual skills to help them in analyzing and selecting approaches to deal with the conflicts. Ideally, organizations that may participate in PO should include negotiation education as part of the leader development before any alert for a possible deployment. Staff officers at battalion, the battalion commander, company commanders, and selected platoon leaders would greatly benefit from such training.

(3) The following institutions provide expertise in negotiation and conflict resolution:

(a) The Foreign Service Institute at Arlington, Virginia, offers a one-week Negotiation Art and Skills course several times a year. (Phone number for course director is 703-301-7186.)

(b) The US Institute of Peace at Washington, DC, is one of the foremost institutions for its expertise and practical work with governmental and nongovernmental organizations. (Phone number is (202) 429-3872.)

(c) John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, offers a one-week course once a year entitled “Strategic Public Sector Negotiation.” (Phone number is 617-495-1142.)

(d) Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts, offers several one week courses under its Program of Instruction for Lawyers, which is open to all participants and always has a significant number of non-lawyers in attendance. (Phone number is 617-495-3187.).

(e) Conflict Management Group, Cambridge, Massachusetts, is a nonprofit organization that tailors programs for organizations and has extensive international experience

3. Mediation

a. During most mediation, the mediator will negotiate with one party of a dispute at a time to find common ground among the belligerent parties. Mediators must remain impartial.

(1) Facilitation. Mediators provide practical assistance to all parties by passing messages, providing a hot line, or securing a safe, practical venue for a meeting and/or further discussion. Mediators must ensure that the parties understand the meaning of agreements that they reach, and the resulting obligations of the international community and the parties in implementing the agreements.

(2) Identify incentives and disincentives. Support mediation with a comprehensive range of incentives and disincentives to the parties, to encourage them to take positive steps and dissuade them from taking action detrimental to the peace effort. This “carrot and stick” approach will vary according to circumstances. Identification of effective incentives and disincentives is vital in the preparatory stage of the mediation strategy.

(3) Languages. The mediator must place a premium on basic language skills for effectiveness. For most tactical level mediation, the commander (going down to the patrol leader) will usually work through interpreters; improve this skill through training. The use of locally recruited interpreters may provide a short-term solution, but do not rely on it indefinitely. There are various pitfalls to using local interpreters (e.g., ethnic identifications, political orientation, social standing, etc.). All may have an unintended consequence. The military member can never be 100 percent sure that the hired interpreter is working in concert with the PO force. In the long term, the demands of PO negotiations and mediation require the military commander to emphasize language training.

(4) Location. The mediator should try to conduct meetings/negotiations at a site that is viewed as neutral by both parties. The individual who is allowed to negotiate on his “home turf” is normally considered to have the upper hand. The following locations are commonly used:

(a) UN Locations.

(b) Embassies.

(c) Other neutral sites.

- (5) Site selectors should consider the following factors:
 - (a) Security. Can forces physically secure the venue with protection provided by the host authorities or another appropriate agency?
 - (b) Accessibility. Do not waste time traveling to remote venues, unless this promotes either secrecy or a positive approach to the negotiations.
 - (c) Communications. If necessary, the negotiating team should provide communications facilities that parties can also use to liaise with their authorities.
 - (d) Comfort. During protracted negotiations, ensure a basic level of comfort to facilitate a successful outcome.
- (6) Techniques. Use the following factors to leverage the mediation process:
 - (a) Identify the decision makers at the negotiations.
 - (b) Use and exploit the media during and after the negotiations.
 - (c) Maintain secrecy and confidentiality.
 - (d) Recognize political and military parties to the negotiation.
 - (e) Use of interpreters and translators.
- (7) To be effective mediators, military members must develop competencies in conflict style management, the dynamics of conflict, verbal communications skills, and cultural awareness.

4. Arbitration

a. Arbitration is a formalized process of dispute resolution, involving the appointment or designation of a neutral party by an appointing authority (commander), or representative, in a formalized dispute resolution procedure. Two or more parties with opposing views meet to resolve their differences in a formal setting similar to the less formal methods of negotiation and mediation. The central goal of arbitration is to resolve controversy between parties after negotiation and/or mediation efforts failed or are deemed inappropriate under the circumstances.

b. At the very outset of the dispute resolution process, the parties to the dispute must agree formally (in writing) to the selection of the arbitration process as the chosen means of dispute resolution. This includes, agreeing to the appointment of an arbitrator, abiding by the rules and procedures of the arbitration proceeding, and agreeing to respect and comply with the final decision of the arbitrator.

c. The arbitrator's role is formal, convening sessions or hearings necessary to hear the arguments of the opposing parties, listening to witness testimony, if any, reviewing any available written (documentary) or real (tangible) evidence, and considering any other relevant evidence. At the conclusion of the arbitration hearing, the arbitrator renders a final decision based on the facts and circumstances presented by the parties. The arbitrator also prepares a written decision, complete with supporting facts, and a summary of the evidence supporting the decision. The arbitrator's final decision is provided to the appointing authority (commander) and to the parties in dispute. The threshold proposition in the area of arbitration is that the decision of the arbitrator is final.

d. The arbitration procedure is often a useful tool in reaching finality, resolving rather complex issues, unusual factual questions, or matters in which the parties reach an impasse, despite the application of less formal negotiation sessions. Some key

considerations in arbitration are the structured nature of this method of dispute resolution, the selection of an impartial, yet trained arbitrator, the willingness of the parties to a dispute to be bound by the finality of arbitrator's decisionmaking power, and the rigid nature of the arbitration process (adherence to strict rules and procedures).

Appendix A

SETTING UP AND CONDUCTING MEETINGS

1. Background

a. Meetings are negotiations. Successful outcomes of meetings are a function of a conceptual framework of negotiations combined with solid preparation and meeting management techniques.

b. Meetings can range from informal one-on-ones to large group gatherings. Some examples in a PO context include:

(1) Periodic meetings - such as with the various international organizations and military units that are working in the area to harmonize their efforts.

(2) Voice concerns - Local NGO representatives desiring to voice their concerns to the commander regarding the nature of military operations in the area and to resolve conflicting priorities.

(3) Discuss mutual concerns - The company or battalion commander meets with the local mayor or faction military leader in a bilateral meeting to discuss topics of mutual concern.

(4) Coordination - The PO mission needs to coordinate with local leaders or facility managers to facilitate access to areas, structures, people, etc., in support of a detailed assessment or survey.

(5) Introduction - The ranking military officer in the theater, region, or local area introduces himself to prominent political leaders and discusses issues of significance to all parties.

(6) Incidents - A serious incident occurred in which coalition or US forces are implicated and military investigators must work with local authorities to investigate the incident.

(7) Joint committees - Joint committees are often established in the peace agreement to assist in its implementation.

2. Preparation

Always plan and use preparation time before a meeting, just as the military uses as the axiom of publishing an order so two-thirds of the time available before its execution is available to its subordinate units to prepare for its execution.

3. Meeting Management Techniques

a. Meeting Worksheet

(1) For each issue that may be discussed in the meeting, prepare a meeting worksheet, an example is Figure A-1. This forces the organizer to explicitly think about the participants' likely positions on the issue as well as the underlying concerns and values that are behind those positions. These concerns and values - called interests - are the raw material to fashion agreements and are a much better guide to reaching agreement than stated positions on what a party wants on a particular issue. Forces may need to link issues to reach good agreements.

(2) Equally important is the desired outcome of meeting. The desired outcome for example may be achieving a certain agreement or establishing rapport with the other party, to convey specific information, or learn certain information. Clarity on your desired outcome makes for more effective meetings, even if that outcome is not achieved.

(3) Finally, the worksheet helps the meeting facilitator think explicitly about conveying a certain demeanor on the particular issue (i.e., firmness and leadership, or open and receptive).

b. Rehearsal

(1) When significant interests are at stake, conduct a full dress rehearsal, using colleagues and staff to play other parties in a scrimmage of the meeting. Rehearsing the logic and reasoning while others respond, as the real parties will, will sharpen the meeting facilitator's presentation, identify weaknesses, and potentially adjust the agenda to better advance the interests. If there are several members in your party, this rehearsal will also resolve how to communicate with each other during the meeting, who speaks, and other procedures to ensure your party presents a coherent and unified approach.

(2) Where time or resources prevent a full rehearsal, the meeting facilitator should divide preparation time between thinking about the problem and thinking about the perspective of the party(s) invited to the meeting. Insights here on the other party's interests will help better achieve your desired outcome of the meeting.

c. Setting the Ground Rules

(1) Meetings can have well-established structures, agendas, and procedures. All can change with the arrival of new agency members.

(2) Other meetings do not have established ground rules, making it easy for the parties to come to a meeting with their own conception on how to run the meeting. Making assumptions, like everyone has agreed on the ground rules, in these cases is easily a cause for misunderstanding. In fact, one of the first items on which agreement is needed is the ground rules of the meeting or negotiation. Often, these discussions on ground rules are best started informally in meetings away from the table before the actual meeting. The ground rules become more important as the meeting grows larger and covers more critical topics.

d. Breaks

(1) Many meetings are straightforward and follow an agenda proposed and accepted before the meeting. Time is often of the essence and the instinct is to stay at the table throughout the meeting. Taking frequent breaks for informal discussions and consultations can better advance your interests than remaining at the table repeating the same points over and over.

(2) Plan for breaks, and how and when to use them, during preparation and setting the ground rules.

e. Observer

(1) Conducting the meeting will demand the full faculties of the meeting facilitator. Have someone from the staff observe the meeting to lend a second set of eyes and ears to record what happened, what was agreed, and other aspects that may escape the facilitator as the spokesperson. One party may understand and agree with a

particular point, but the observer may catch a nuance or other reaction that the facilitator did not observe.

(2) If time or resources prevent the use of an observer in smaller meetings, one useful technique to use is to summarize at the end of the meeting to ensure that everything was understood and review what had taken place. Paraphrasing is an excellent technique to check your understanding of a point made by others.

(3) For larger meetings, an observer is essential.

f. Promise to Recommend versus Promise to Act

(1) At certain meetings, parties will make decisions with actions that must follow from them. Many meetings, however, reach agreements or approaches that the superiors of the parties at the table must accept or ratify. It is important to have a clear understanding of what the superiors want. Preparation with superiors on the substance and procedures of the meeting is important.

(2) In these situations, it is wise to promise to recommend to superiors vice agreeing - promising to act. This protects credibility and the trust built with other parties if the superiors change guidance after the meeting. Moreover, promising to recommend can give needed time to make sure nothing was forgotten or overlooked certain other effects of agreeing to a particular proposal.

Meeting Worksheet	
Issue:	
Position (Party 1)	Position (Party 2)
Interests (Party 1)	Interests (Party 2)
Desired Outcome:	
Demeanor:	

Figure A-1 Meeting Worksheet

Appendix B

LIAISON OFFICER

1. Liaison Officer

a. The LNO is a special staff officer or noncommissioned officer (NCO) responsible for representing the commander at the headquarters of another unit to effect coordination, integration, and cooperation between the two units. Liaison, with its accompanying responsibilities of coordination and integration, is a particularly important part of command, control, and coordination. Liaison is the most commonly employed technique for establishing and maintaining close, continuous physical communication between commands, and reducing the “fog of war” through direct communication.

b. Duties and Responsibilities. LNOs ensure that all levels of command remain aware of the operational situation by providing urgent, priority, or routine information; verification of information; and clarification of operational questions. Liaison activities augment the commander’s ability to synchronize and focus critical assets, ensuring precise understanding of the implied or inferred coordination measures needed to achieve results.

(1) Be familiar with all references listed before linkup.

(2) Establish primary, alternate, and contingency communications plans before linkup and report means to contact higher headquarters.

(3) Integrate directly into the supported unit’s operations staff and ensure inclusion/integration.

(4) Report any problems with the supported unit to the main unit immediately.

c. Reporting and Handling of Message Traffic. Proper information distribution and message handling are essential duties of an LNO. LNOs are responsible for keeping both the supported and main units updated on all activities impacting applicable operations. The following procedures outline the proper format for conducting this task:

(1) Maintain a daily staff journal/log.

(2) Log all message traffic.

(3) Log all actions taken.

(4) Log all reports submitted to higher units and maintain a paper and/or digital file copy.

(5) Submit situation report (SITREP) to the operations staff twice daily at the times directed by the operations director.

(6) Report action complete on all Urgent/Priority traffic to the message center immediately and BDA if available.

2. LNO SITREP Form

a. Use the LNO SITREP in a standardized format, to convey information from one location to another to avoid misinterpretations. Figures B-1 and B-2 are examples of standardized formats when reporting to higher headquarters: When reporting the SITREP verbally, use of the phonetic alphabet is recommended. Always remember that a SITREP reported using non-secure means must contain **NO** classified information.

Limit these SITREPs to personnel status, sensitive items status, and a plan for transmitting a full SITREP through secure channels.

- A. Unit or Task Organization
- B. Time Period Covered (in DTG form)
- C. General Situation - gives a general overview of the operational environment.
 - 1. Summary of last 24 hours of operations conducted in the last day.
 - 2. Planned operations for next 24 hours - operations to be conducted in the next day.
 - 3. Disseminates information impacting applicable operations (chart/attachment), product numbers disseminated per city or location, by product name.
 - 4. Operational Impact indicators - recurring events or observations, major events that seem to be part of a trend, or something out of the ordinary. Evidence that a particular event, product, series, or program is or is not having an effect on the intended audience or unintended audience.
 - 5. Survey results from AO - summary of survey results; surveys being conducted (attachment)
- D. Operational Issues - directives from the supported unit that affect your mission.
 - 1. Urgent and Priority actions complete during reporting period
 - 2. Urgent and Priority actions ongoing as of report submission
- E. Personnel Issues - personnel status.
- F. Logistical Issues - any logistic issues, requests for equipment, parts, supplies, etc (in Red/Yellow/Green form).
- G. Sensitive Items Report - initial report will be a complete by serial number inventory; subsequent reports will give status only.
- H. Other Issues

Figure B-1 SITREP Format

- A. FROKA LNO
- B. 121730ZJUL00 through 130545ZJUL00
- C. ROK/US FORCES HAVE ADVANCED FROM xxxxxx TO xxxxxx AND HAVE DISPLACED xxx CIVILIANS. xxx EPW HAS BEEN TASKED WITH ASSISTING THE REMOVAL OF THESE DCs. SITUATION HAS IMPROVED. 2 NK COMPANIES HAVE SURRENDERED VIC GRID xxxx.
 - 1. SPOKE TO CA REP ABOUT EPW SITUATION. SENT MINI SITREP TO C3 TO NOTIFY TAAD/TED.
 - 2. KEEP IN TOUCH WITH CA REP. CONTACT FROKA S6 REP TO TROUBLESHOOT LAN CONNECTION.
 - 3. EPW'S STAYING OFF MSR, 2 NK COMPANIES SURRENDERED
 - 4. SEE ATTACHED CHART
 - 5. SEE ATTACHED CHART
- D. FROKA WILL CONDUCT JUMPTOC OPERATION 20JUL00. WILL MOVE WITH S2 ELEMENT
 - 1. REPLY TO URGENT MESSAGE: GCCS-K SENT 13 0218ZJUL00
 - 2. PRIORITY PIR'S 'STILL NOT READY DUE TO FROKA S2
- E. NONE
- F. NEED PENS, BLACK, BALLPOINT TYPE 14 EACH, 2 REAMS OF COPIER PAPER NLT 15JUL00
- G. ALL ACCOUNTED FOR
- H. NONE

Figure B-2 SITREP Example

Appendix C

INTERPRETERS

1. Background

During PO, there are occasions when peacekeepers will lack the linguistic ability to communicate personally and effectively with the local populace in the AO. The use of interpreters is often the best or only option. The proper use and supervision of interpreters can play a decisive role in the mission.

2. Selecting an Interpreter

a. In some operational or training settings abroad, CA personnel will not face the problem of selecting an interpreter; the chain of command or host government will assign one. In other cases, interpreters are chosen from a pool provided by the host government. Finally, in many operational situations, hire interpreters from the general HN population. Whatever the case, the following guidelines are critical to the success of mission accomplishment. This is an opportunity for the peacekeeper to truly influence the outcome of the mission.

b. Considerations for selecting an interpreter are as follows:

(1) Native Speaker. Find interpreters who are native speaker of the socially or geographically determined dialect. The interpreter's speech, background, and mannerisms should be completely acceptable to the target audience so that attention is given only to what is said.

(2) Social Status. In some situations and cultures, if an interpreter is considered in lower social standing than the audience, that interpreter is ineffective. This may include significant differences in military rank or membership in an ethnic or religious group. Regardless of the peacekeeper's personal feelings on social status, the job is to accomplish the mission, not to act as an agent for social reform in a faraway land. Accept local prejudices as a fact.

(3) English Fluency. An often-overlooked consideration is how well the interpreter speaks English. As a rule, if the interpreter understands the peacekeeper and the peacekeeper understands the interpreter, then the interpreter's command of English is satisfactory. Check the interpreter's "understanding" by asking to paraphrase a statement in English.

(4) Intellectual Intelligence. Find interpreters who are quick, alert, and responsive to changing conditions and situations. An interpreter must be able to grasp complex concepts and discuss them without confusion in a reasonably logical sequence. Although education does not equate to intelligence, the better educated the interpreter, the better the interpreter will be able to perform due to exposure to diverse concepts.

(5) Technical Ability. In certain situations, the peacekeeper may need an interpreter with technical training or experience in special subject areas. The interpreter may need to translate the "meaning" as well as the "words."

(6) Reliability. Be aware of the candidate interpreter who arrives late for the interview. Throughout the world, the concept of time varies widely. In many less developed countries, time is relatively unimportant. Make sure that the interpreter understands the military's concern with punctuality.

(7) Loyalty. If the interpreter is a local national, it is safe to assume that the interpreter's first loyalty is to the HN, or sub-group, not the US military. The security implications are clear. Be very cautious in explaining concepts to give the interpreter "a greater depth of understanding."

(a) Certain tactical situations may require the use of uncleared indigenous personnel as "field expedient" interpreters. Be aware of the increased security risk involved in using such personnel and carefully weigh the risk versus the potential gain. In addition, if uncleared interpreters are used, limit any sensitive information to a minimum.

(8) Gender, Age, and Race. Gender, age, and race have the potential to seriously affect the mission. One example is the status of females in Muslim society. In predominantly Muslim countries, cultural prohibitions may affect the gender of the interpreter used under given circumstance. Another example is the Balkans, where the ethnic divisions may limit the effectiveness of an interpreter from outside the target audience's group. Since traditions, values, and biases vary from country to country, it is important to check with the in-country assets or area studies for specific taboos or favorable characteristics.

(9) Compatibility. The peacekeeper and interpreter work as a team. The target audience is quick to recognize personality conflicts between the team members that can undermine the effectiveness of the communication effort. If possible, when selecting an interpreter, the peacekeeper needs to look for compatible traits and strive for a harmonious working relationship.

(10) Choose more than one interpreter. If several qualified interpreters are available, select at least two. Interpreting is an exhausting job; four hours is about the maximum active interpreting time for an interpreter's peak efficiency. Whatever the mission, with two or more interpreters, the peacekeeper can provide quality control and assistance to the active interpreter. Additionally, this technique comes in useful when conducting coordination or negotiation meetings as one interpreter is used in an active role and the other can pay attention to the body language and side conversations of others present. Many times, the peacekeeper will gain important side information that aids negotiations from listening to what others are saying outside of the main discussion.

c. Implied throughout the preceding points is the need for a careful analysis of the target population. Mature judgment, thoughtful consideration of the audience as individual human beings and a genuine concern for their receiving accurate information will go a long way toward accomplishing the mission.

d. Hire only honest interpreters who are free from unfavorable notoriety among the local inhabitants, and whose reputation or standing in the community is such that persons of higher rank and standing will not intimidate them.

e. The interpreter is a vital link to the target audience. An uncooperative, unsupportive interpreter could jeopardize the mission. Mutual respect and understanding between the peacekeeper and interpreter are essential to effective teamwork. Establish rapport early in the relationship and maintain it throughout the joint effort. Most of the time, the difficulty of establishing rapport stems from the lack of personal contact.

(1) Background. The peacekeeper begins establishing rapport even before meeting the interpreter for the first time by obtaining basic facts about the HN. Basic

information may include population, geography, ethnic groups, political system, prominent political figures, monetary system, business, agriculture, exports, etc. Obtain a good general outline from recent almanacs or encyclopedias. More detailed information is available in the area handbook for the country, current newspapers, and magazines such as *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Newsweek*, and *US News and World Report*.

(2) Interpreters' background. The peacekeeper should show a genuine concern for the interpreter's family, aspirations, career, education, etc. The investigation of the interpreter's home life should reveal the comparative emphasis based on family versus career. Another potential area to research is cultural traditions, both to find out more about the interpreter and the HN. Though the peacekeeper should gain as much information on culture as possible before entering a HN, the interpreter can be a valuable source to fill gaps.

(3) The peacekeeper should gain the interpreter's trust and confidence before embarking on sensitive issues such as religion, likes, dislikes, and prejudices in conversation. The peacekeeper should approach these areas carefully and tactfully. Although very revealing and useful in the professional relationship, draw deeply personal beliefs gently and tactfully out of the interpreter.

(4) Orientation. Early in the relationship with the interpreter, the peacekeeper should ensure that they are briefed on their duties and responsibilities. Orient the interpreters with the nature of their duties, standards of conduct expected, interview techniques, and any other requirements necessary. The orientation may include the following:

- (a) Current tactical situation.
- (b) Background information obtained on the source, interviewee, or target audience.
- (c) Specific objectives for interview, meeting, or interrogation.
- (d) Method of interpretation to be used – simultaneous, alternate, etc.
 - Simultaneous – when the interpreter listens and translates at the same time.
 - Alternate – when the interpreter listens to an entire phrase, sentence, or paragraph, then translates during natural pauses.
- (e) Conduct of the interview, lesson, or interrogation.

(5) Interpreters must not inject personality, ideas, or questions into the interview.

(6) Interpreters should inform the peacekeeper of inconsistencies in language used by interviewees. Example – an interviewee who claims to be a college professor yet speaks like an uneducated person. During interrogations or interviews this information will be used as part of the assessment of the information obtained from the individual.

(7) Physical arrangements of site – if applicable.

(8) Possible need for interpreter to assist in after action reports, assessments, etc.

3. Training the Interpreter

a. As part of the initial training with the interpreter, tactfully convey that the military member must always direct the interview. Put the interpreter's role in proper perspective. Stress the interpreter's importance as a vital communication link between the military member and the target audience. Appeal to the interpreter's professional pride by clearly describing how the quality and quantity of the information sent and received is directly dependent upon their interpreting skills. Also, mention how they function solely as a conduit between the peacekeeper and the subject.

b. Some interpreters, because of cultural differences, may attempt to "save face" by purposely concealing a lack of understanding. The interpreter may attempt to translate what is said or meant without asking for a clarification or vice versa. Because this can result in misinformation and confusion, and impact on credibility, the peacekeeper should emphasize the need to ask questions when there is any doubt.

(1) Other points the peacekeeper should cover while orienting and training the interpreter are:

(a) Importance of the training, interview, or interrogation.

(b) Specific objectives of the training, interview, or interrogation, if any.

(c) Outline of lesson or interview question, if applicable.

(d) Background information on the interviewee, or target audience.

(e) Briefing, training, or interview schedules. It may take two to three times as much time using an interpreter to convey the same information. For that reason the interpreter may be helpful in scheduling enough time.

(f) Copy the briefing, questions, or lesson plan if applicable. Give special attention to develop language proficiency in expected technical fields. This will give the interpreter time to look up unfamiliar words or ask questions to clarify anything confusing.

(g) Copies of handout material – if applicable.

(h) General background information on subject.

(i) Glossary of terms – if applicable.

4. The Interview

a. Preparing for an interview. Select an appropriate site for the interview. Position and arrange physical setup of the area - this can be significant when conducting interviews with VIPs, or individuals from different cultures. Instruct the interpreters to mirror your tone and personality of speech.

b. Conducting the interview. Whether conducting an interview, or presenting a lesson, avoid simultaneous translations; that is, both of peacekeeper and interpreter talking at the same time. The peacekeeper should speak for a minute or less in a neutral, relaxed manner, directly to the individual or audience. The interpreter should watch the peacekeeper carefully and mimic your body language as well as interpret your verbal meaning during the translation. Do not to force the interpreter into literal translation by being too brief. Present one major thought in its entirety and allow the interpreter to reconstruct it in their language and culture.

(1) Although your interpreter will be doing some "editing" as a function of the interpreting process, it is imperative that the exact meaning without additions or

deletions is transmitted. A good interpreter, especially if they are local, can be invaluable in translating subtleties and hidden meanings.

(2) During an interview or lesson, if questions are asked, the interpreter should immediately relay them to the peacekeeper for an answer. The interpreter should never attempt to answer a question, even though the correct answer is known. Additionally, neither of peacekeeper or interpreter should correct the other in front of an interviewee or class; settle all differences away from the audience.

5. Communication Techniques

a. An important first step in communicating in a foreign language is to polish personal English language skills. This is true even if no attempt is made to learn the indigenous language. The clearer the peacekeeper's English, including diction, the easier it is for the interpreter to translate. Other factors to consider include use of profanity, slang, and colloquialisms or military jargon. In many cases, such expressions cannot be translated. Even those that can be translated do not always retain the desired meaning. Examples such as "Gee Whiz" or "Golly" are hard to translate. In addition, if a using a technical term or expression, be sure the interpreter conveys the proper meaning in the target language. Speak in low context, simple sentences. For instance, the military member may want to add words usually left off such as "air" plane. This ensures the meaning will be obvious, and not talking about the Great Plains or a wood plane.

(1) When speaking extemporaneously, think about what to say, break it down into logical bits, and give it out a small piece at a time. Use short, simple words and sentences and low context, for quick and easy translation. As a rule of thumb, never say more in one sentence than the interpreter can easily repeat word for word immediately after saying it. Each sentence should contain a complete thought.

(2) Transitional phrases and qualifiers tend to confuse and waste valuable time, so use them sparingly. Examples are "for example," "in most cases," "maybe," "perhaps," etc. Be cautious of using American humor. Cultural and language differences can lead to misinterpretations by foreigners. The peacekeeper should determine early on what the interpreter finds easiest to understand and translate meaningfully. In summary:

- (a) Keep the entire presentation as simple as possible.
- (b) Use short sentences and simple words (low context).
- (c) Avoid idiomatic English.
- (d) Avoid flowery language.
- (e) Avoid slang and colloquial expressions.

(3) Whenever possible, identify any cultural restrictions before interviewing, instructing, or conferring with particular foreign nationals. For instance, when is it proper to stand, sit, or cross one's legs? Gestures, being learned behavior, vary from culture to culture. Have your interpreter relate a number of these cultural restrictions, and observe them, whenever possible, in working with the particular group or individual.

b. Working with an interpreter:

(1) Position the interpreter by the peacekeeper's side (or even a step back). This will keep the subject or audience from shifting their attention, or fixating on the interpreter.

(2) Always look at and talk directly to the subject or audience. Guard against the tendency to talk to the interpreter.

(3) Speak slowly and clearly. Repeat as often as necessary.

(4) Do not address the subject or audience in the third person through the interpreter. Avoid saying, "tell them I'm glad to be their instructor," rather say, "I'm glad to be your instructor." Address the subject or audience directly.

(5) Speak to the individual or group as if they understand English. Be enthusiastic and employ the gestures, movements, voice intonations, and inflections that would normally be used before an English-speaking group.

(6) Side comments to the interpreter that are not for translation tend to create the wrong atmosphere for communication and are a distraction.

(7) While the interpreter is translating and the subject or audience is listening, avoid doing anything distracting. Do not pace the floor, write on the blackboard, teeter on the lectern, drink beverages, or carry on any other distracting activity while the interpreter is actually translating.

(8) Periodically check the interpreter's accuracy, consistency, and clarity. Have another American, fluent enough in the language sit in on a lesson or interview. This should assure that the translation is not distorted, intentionally or unintentionally. Another way to be sure, is to learn the target language, which will allow a check of the interpreter's loyalty and honesty as well. Check with your audience whenever misunderstandings are suspected, and clarify immediately. Using the interpreter, ask questions to elicit answers that will tell whether the point is clear. If not clear, rephrase the instruction differently and illustrate the point again. Use repetition and examples whenever necessary to facilitate learning. If the class asks few questions this may mean the peacekeeper or the interpreter are talking "over the heads" of the audience, or not getting the message across.

NOTE: Finally, when the military member has acquired an effective interpreter, make them feel like a valuable member of the team. Give the interpreter recognition commensurate with the importance of their contribution.

Appendix D

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

1. Information Operations

Information operations involve actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while protecting one's own information and information systems.

2. Nature of Information Operations in Peace Operations

a. In PO, the fundamentals of transparency and legitimacy demand that the military commander engage openly within a complex environment.

b. Normally, The PO forces are latecomers to a situation that has a long, complex, and convoluted history. The various factions will use information as a weapon through censorship, propaganda, and disinformation. The local, as well as the international, media are usually operating before the forces arrive and may be one of the causative factors in the military's engagement.

c. Additionally, allies and partner countries participating as a multinational force may have troops engaged before US military involvement. The operational area will not be a blank tablet. Information superiority will be transitory in this environment, making absolute and sustained superiority impossible.

d. The commander must carefully consider the effects of IO before taking action. For example, destroying a belligerent's radio/TV broadcast capability in order to diminish his means of propaganda making may bring favorable tactical results, but it may also have a destabilizing effect on the peace process. By permitting belligerents to monitor activities of each other, and the PO force, may provide the transparency that eases tension and increases trust.

e. The information environment will extend down to the average person and the peacekeeper at the CP. Individuals, by interacting directly with the media or on-line, can become a powerful source of information that can challenge the more traditional sources. Local events and the immediate impressions of individuals about those events can have international significance as the global media broadcasts them. The aim of IO in PO is to reassure, persuade, and influence the local community or communities within the operational area and local region to consent to the PO and to work with the force for peace. If the population was subject to propaganda by the belligerent parties, the population may urgently need objective factual, truthful, and credible information. IO need to propagate the core message, explaining the objectives and role of the forces, in advance of the arrival of the force and update the message in a consistent manner. Be mindful the belligerent parties will exploit any gaps in the message with propaganda. IO should emphasize that the belligerents must resolve their own problems by highlighting the responsibility of various local groups.

f. Additionally, IO may undertake the more specific function of disseminating warnings, the future intentions of the controlling authorities, and the details of any agreements reached between opposing parties. US PSYOP units will disseminate information using various means to include: leaflets, posters, handbills, interviews, as well as loudspeaker, radio, and TV broadcasts. Public affairs officials will conduct regular information sharing sessions with local, national, and international media. The

PO commander will also conduct regular briefings to media and government officials. IO may also require electronic warfare assets to locate and counter the radio/TV transmitters of belligerents, secure our own use of the electronic spectrum, and reduce the usage of any party who may oppose the operation. Start IO planning early and form an integral element of the overall operation.

3. Fundamentals

a. The commander takes the lead. Although supported by a staff and IO cell, commanders set the tone and drive the operation. Commanders must involve themselves to make IO succeed. They must make this their personal focus so that the entire force can speak with one voice. Only commanders can provide the vision and the guidance that will unify the effort.

b. In PO, commanders will often be the chief negotiators in sensitive situations, as well as the focus of the media. Some actions they can take to unify the effort include:

- (1) Establish critical information requirements.
- (2) Develop a media policy.
- (3) Provide daily IO guidance.
- (4) Implement an IO decision cycle that allows commanders to obtain situational awareness (SA), conduct decisionmaking, and issue appropriate guidance before entering into negotiations and before the media exploits a situation.
- (5) Incorporate relevant multinational participants into the IO cells and ensure that IO fully integrates into the joint and combined targeting process. Integration and synchronization should extend down to individual personnel.
- (6) Support IO with intelligence. Without detailed intelligence that encompasses the complete spectrum of cultural, social, political, economic, and psychological issues, the military member cannot properly plan or execute IO. The IO planner will require such products as nodal and link analysis based on accurate and up-to-date intelligence.
- (7) Establish and sustain an integrated team approach. Successful IO requires synchronizing all participants involved in the peace process. The combined effort must include nonmilitary agencies. Additionally, the public affairs office and the PSYOP staff must continuously coordinate with each other and have access to current and proposed military actions.
- (8) Anticipate and respond with speed, accuracy, and truth. Journalists provide immediate impressions and judgments, while the military relies on verified information. For the military, accuracy overrides immediacy. However, belligerents can base perceptions and decisions on initial impressions. Timing is essential in shaping perceptions. Allow the public affairs officer to know operations as they unfold and release information as quickly as possible.
- (9) Involve every military member. The most powerful way to influence populations is for every member of the force to be an information transmitter. Ensure that all members of the force understand the information operations plan and can articulate its themes to others. Under these circumstances, disseminate relevant information, including bad news and mistakes, as quickly as possible to gain and maintain credibility with the international media and the HN.
- (10) Gain and maintain access to the information environment. The military force must actively participate in the information environment. The outside media will be

present outside the military headquarters and interested parties will be visiting the force's web site.

(11) Prepare for IO before deployment. The belligerent parties will have been waging an information campaign long before the US. US forces should not wait until they receive deployment orders to build an awareness of the informational aspects of a pending operation. Commanders should consider pre-deployment preparation, anticipating future involvement in PO.

4. Information Support Agencies

a. Several agencies are established and structured to support the IO process. Each of the Services has an IO unit to directly support the Service needs. Request assistance and representatives from these organizations to plan and conduct IO in support of PO at the tactical level.

b. Below are examples of agencies that can support the tactical PO commander.

(1) The First Information Operations Command (formerly Land Information Warfare Activity) is under the command of the US Army Intelligence and Security Command and is located at Fort Belvoir, VA. The 1st IO Command's mission is to provide full-spectrum IO support to Army commands, specifically tailored to support the land component commander. The First Information Operations Command—

(a) Deploys tailored Field Support Teams (FSTs) to help operational and tactical battle staffs integrate IO with plans, and operations within PO.

(b) Provides access to DOD intelligence as well as IO-related intelligence from other government agencies.

(c) Coordinates multidisciplined intelligence and other support for PO planning and execution. Its mission areas include IO database support, HUMINT, and counterintelligence.

(2) The 67th Information Operations Wing (67 IOW), under 8th Air Force (8AF), and the Air Intelligence Agency (AIA), a Primary Subordinate Unit (PSU) to ACC, located at Lackland AFB, TX, provides full spectrum information operations for the Air Force and the nation. The 67th IOW assets include Electronic Systems Security Assessment Centrals, the Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team, Information warfare Flights and other activities which participate in airborne, ground, space and computer network operations in support of Air Force, Combatant Command and national taskings. AIA provides 24-hour access to multi-source intelligence products, applications and services, and such resources as a PSYOP Division (DO-2) and the Air Force Information Warfare Center that supports specific information operations activities. During contingencies, 67 IOW and AIA assets can be requested through the ACC contingency action team.

5. Media

a. Background. The journalist in an operational area has a tough, highly competitive, and, sometimes, dangerous job. Apply the following basic principles in dealing with the media:

(1) Freedom of the media. Do not offer any unnecessary hindrance to a journalist's freedom to operate. It is in the interests of law and order that the press

should have facilities to expose terrorism, acts of violence, and the intimidation of civilians.

(2) Rights of the media. A journalist, like any civilian, has the right to speak to anyone, visit anywhere, and photograph anything, provided this does not conflict with the law, does not involve any entry into prohibited areas, and does not impair operations or endanger life. However, coordinate all media activity with public affairs to set media ground rules.

(3) Access of the media to military personnel. Any entry into military premises and any contact with military personnel should be in accordance with the prevailing instructions issued by the appropriate formation HQ.

(4) Accreditation. Normally media representatives are accredited before they are eligible for official media operations support. The accreditation should require the representatives to abide by a clear set of rules that protect the operational security of the PO force. If the rules are violated, give consideration to excluding those representatives from access to further official public information services.

(5) Transparency. Open and independent reporting is the norm. Allow accredited media representatives unrestricted access in most situations. Give specific warnings of dangers in certain areas without precluding media access. Threats to personal security are an occupational hazard for media representatives. They are ultimately responsible for the consequences of the risks they take.

(6) Liaison. Given the potential for political repercussions, keep commanders informed of all significant developments of potential media interest. Make the media operations available for detachment to incidents on short notice when necessary.

(7) Quality of Service. Make media operations support prompt, accurate, balanced, and consistent. High quality officers with a proper understanding of the operation and the military capabilities involved should assist media personnel where necessary.

b. In practice, this means that members of the media may conduct their business subject to the following:

(1) They have no right to enter military property without the permission of the officer responsible for that property.

(2) The final coordination as to whether or not to give an interview rests with the media operations staff. Politely remind the journalist to contact the unit press officer or the appropriate media operations staff before conducting an interview.

(3) Journalists may not photograph personnel, equipment, or property within military premises without permission. If there is a security reason why the security forces do not wish a photograph to be published, e.g., an EOD team at work, this should be clearly explained to the photographer, together with the consequences of noncompliance.

(4) If the commander on the spot believes that members of the media are prejudicing security, the matter should be dealt with by persuasion, admonition, or, as a last resort, and only if a criminal offence is suspected, call the police to assist.

(5) It is possible that a reporter will deliberately wish to expose himself to danger against the advice of the security forces. If persuasion does not work, give warnings in front of witnesses as to the possible consequences of their actions and tell them that they must accept total responsibility.

c. The media may ask for priority at a CP. They have no right to this but their livelihood depends upon deadlines and news is highly perishable. Where possible the local commander should grant this priority after satisfying that the request is bona fide and the operational situation permits.

d. Information for the Media. The media operations staff or those authorized by the media staff should be the only ones to give operational information to the media.

e. Commanders, or those authorized by them, may communicate directly with the media when the information given is strictly factual, where it relates solely to the commander's particular unit, and when the information requested is not politically controversial or operationally sensitive.

f. Media operations staff approval is required before any member of the forces agrees to give a statement or interview for TV or radio. Before considering any request, the staff must know who will do the interview, which program it is for, and the agreed scope and line of questioning of the statement or interview. Whenever possible, use the best spokesperson, irrespective of rank, particularly if that person can speak with firsthand knowledge of the subject in question. The chief media operations officer or his representative should be present during any interview with the media.

g. Identification of the Media. Any person claiming to be a member of the media should produce a press card of which there are many versions. Unless the military are satisfied that a journalist is bona fide, do not grant access. In certain particular circumstances, accredit members of the media and authenticate credentials with the MP.

Appendix E

CIVIL INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE AND TEMPLATING

1. Civil IPB

a. IPB is the process commanders and their staffs follow to analyze the enemy (threat) situation and its effect on military operations. Civil IPB is the process by which commanders and their staffs analyze the civil component of an AO to determine how it can help, hinder, or affect military operations. During some PO, the military has major civil-military components, such as during FHA operations, MCA, and support to civil administration operations.

b. IPB is a function of all staff members, with the staff intelligence officer normally taking the lead in guiding the staff through the process. Civil IPB is also a function of all staff members, but the civil IPB process is most effective when guided by the staff CMO staff officer.

c. The basic civil IPB process is as follows:

(1) Identify civil information requirements.

(2) Identify current conditions (e.g., conduct a preliminary assessment) in the civil component of the AO. See analyzing the civilian component of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops available, time available and civil considerations (the US Army uses METT-TC, the USMC uses METT-T) below.

(3) Review civil information requirements and identify information shortfalls.

(4) Task appropriate elements (sensors) to obtain civil information shortfalls during on-the-ground deliberate assessments.

(5) Task-organized elements gather information, using deliberate assessments/surveys, and report results to a central location (e.g., the CMOC).

(6) Analyze results and share information with appropriate lateral and vertical agencies.

d. Analyzing the civilian component

(1) Guided through the process by CA-trained personnel, the commander and staff conduct a preliminary assessment using all available sources. The initial assessment is continuously updated on reports of first hand observation of events, personal reconnaissance of the AO, interaction with civilians, and research of applicable data sources.

(2) Civil considerations are a factor in every PO. At both the operational and tactical levels, civil considerations generally focus on the immediate impact of civilians during the operation being considered. An appreciation of civil considerations enhances the commander's selection of objectives, location, movement, control of forces, use of weapons, and force protection measures. It also helps him avoid a phenomenon known as "mission creep." Mission creep occurs when commanders choose to use, or are forced to use, their resources to address (allegedly) unforeseen civilian factors after they have begun an operation.

(3) Civil considerations also affect larger, long-term diplomatic, economic, and informational issues. Discounting these issues can tax military or government

resources and can hinder the transition of operations to follow-on elements. If the military mission is to support civil authorities, civil considerations define the mission.

e. A simple technique for analyzing civil considerations, used by untrained analysts or when time is too short for in-depth research, is for the commander or planner to ask the following questions:

- (1) Who are the civilians we might encounter in the AO?
- (2) What activities are those civilians engaged in that might affect our operations?
- (3) How might our operations affect civilian activities?

2. Civil Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People and Events

The following paragraphs describe a more appropriate and enlightened technique used by professional civil area personnel. The mnemonic for Civil Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People and Events, CA SCOPE, is used to analyze civil considerations.

a. Civil areas:

(1) In tactical operations, key terrain is any locality or area whose seizure or retention affords a marked advantage to either combatant. The leader considers key terrain in his selection of objectives, support positions, and routes in the offense, and on the positioning of his unit in the defense.

(2) Civil areas are key localities or aspects of the terrain within a commander's battlespace that are not normally thought of as militarily significant. Failure to consider key civilian areas, however, can seriously affect the success of any military mission.

(3) The commander must analyze key civil areas from two perspectives: how do these areas affect the military mission and how do military operations affect civilian activities in these areas? At times, the answers to these questions may dramatically influence major portions of the COAs being considered.

(4) Examples of key civilian areas that a commander should closely analyze are:

(a) Locations of government centers. These areas are often richer, more populated, better educated, and contain greater and more advanced infrastructure than outlying areas. They are often the center of influence over the populace in outlying areas. Depending on mission priorities, commanders may consider aggressively engaging these areas rather than bypassing them.

(b) Areas defined by political boundaries (e.g., districts within a city, municipalities within a region). Political boundaries are often well defined and respected not just by political leaders but also by the area's population. Commanders might consider overlaying unit boundaries on political boundaries for practical control purposes during long-term operations.

(c) Social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves. These are sources of potential problems and may threaten force protection.

(d) Agricultural and mining regions and trade routes. Routine economic activities may hinder the movement or staging of military resources. Likewise, interfering with operations related to the economy of an area may bring an unnecessary burden on military units or logistical resources in the area.

(e) Possible sites for the temporary settlement of DPs or other civil functions. Often, the same considerations that make a site ideal for positioning a military unit will also make it ideal for a DC camp or other such settlement. Commanders must consider the long-term practical and environmental consequences of occupying certain civil areas.

b. Structures. Existing civil structures take on many significant roles. Some, such as bridges, communication towers, power plants, and dams, are traditional high pay-off targets. Others, such as churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitals, are cultural sites that are generally protected by international law or other agreements. Still, others are facilities with practical applications, such as jails, warehouses, schools, television stations, radio stations, and print plants that may be useful for military purposes. Analyzing structures involves determining the location, function, capability, and application in support of military operations. It also involves weighing the consequences of removing them from civilian use in terms of political, economic, religious, social, informational implications, the reaction of the populace, replacement costs, etc.

c. View civil capabilities from several perspectives. The term capabilities may refer to—

(1) Existing capabilities of the populace to sustain itself, such as through public administration, public safety, emergency services, and food and agriculture systems.

(2) Capabilities with which the populace needs assistance, such as public works and utilities, public health, economic, and commerce.

(3) Contract resources and services to support the military mission, such as interpreters, laundry services, construction materials, and equipment. Local vendors, the HN, or other nations may provide these resources and services. In hostile territory, military forces can take and use civil capabilities and resources, consistent with international law.

(4) CA uses sixteen specialties to identify existing capabilities of the HN to address various issues. They also identify the capabilities of partner countries and organizations involved in the operation. In doing so, they consider how to address shortfalls as well as how to capitalize on strengths and capabilities.

d. Organizations. Civil organizations are organized groups that may have affiliations with government agencies. They can be church groups; fraternal, patriotic, or service organizations; or community watch groups. They might be international organizations of the NGO community. Organizations can assist the commander in keeping the populace informed of ongoing and future activities in an AO and influencing the actions of civilians. They can also form the nucleus of self-help programs, interim-governing bodies, civil defense efforts, and other activities.

e. People. Individually or collectively, nonmilitary personnel can affect a military operation positively, negatively, or in a neutral manner. The term “people” includes all the civilians one can expect to encounter in or around an AO whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the military mission. In stability and support operations, US forces must prepare to work closely with civilians of all types. At this point in analyzing civil considerations, the analyst answers the questions that were asked earlier:

(1) Who are the civilians we might encounter in our AO? Since there can be many different kinds of civilians living and operating in and around a given AO, it is useful to separate the term into distinct categories. In foreign operations, these categories might include local nationals, HN civil authorities, expatriates, foreign employees of multinational corporations (MNC), international relief organizations (IRO), US Government and third nation government agency representatives, UN representatives, contractors, morale welfare, and recreation personnel, DOD civilians, and the media. In domestic support operations (DSO), they might include local disaster victims, emergency service agencies, NGO, industry, media, and local, regional, or national domestic civil authorities.

(2) What activities are those civilians engaged in that might affect operations? Civilian activities are dictated primarily by the type of environment in which they occur. Consider each category of civilian activity separately, as these activities will have different effects, both positively and negatively, on planning factors (Battlefield Operating Systems/Warfighting Function). The following are examples of the types of questions CA personnel and supported unit staff planners must carefully consider for the BOS activities in foreign operations. Similar questions apply in DSO. The answers should, at a minimum, provide awareness of what units can expect to encounter in their AO.

(a) Local nationals – these include town and city dwellers, farmers and other rural dwellers, and nomads in the AO.

- Are the local nationals peacefully going about their daily life activities, or have their daily lives been disrupted to the point that they require outside assistance?
- Are they evacuating their homes for safer rear areas, clogging the MSR, and placing a burden on our limited resources to sustain them?
- Are they staying put in basements and other temporary shelters?
- Are they supportive or non-supportive of our presence?
- What resources do they have that we can purchase or obtain by contract to augment our logistics needs?

(b) HN civil authorities – these include elected and traditional leaders at all levels of government.

- How much influence do the leaders have over their constituents?
- Are they supportive of our presence or are they inciting the local nationals against us?
- Do they have viable civil defense plans and the capabilities to put them in effect?
- Are they seeking our direct assistance to alleviate their plight?
- Can they provide useful information about our AO?

(c) UN representatives – these include high-level UN representatives and lower-level employees.

- What UN agencies are present and what are their charters?
- What is the relationship between our operations and UN operations?
- Can we expect VIPs in our AO?

(d) US government and third nation government representatives – these include members of the country team, the US agency for international development, and similar agencies of foreign nations involved in the operation.

- What US and third nation government agencies are in the AO and how do their operations relate to ours?

- What useful information might they have?

- Do LNOs need to be furnished?

(e) Contractors – these include US citizens, local nationals, and third nation citizens providing contract services to our operation.

- What contractors are present and what support activities are they providing?

- Do they need resources from us such as security, subsistence, real estate, etc.?

(f) DOD civilians – these are not contractors; they are members of table of organization and equipment and table of distribution and allowances units. DOD civilians are playing an increasingly greater role in combat support and combat service support. They will be there even in the absence of the categories of civilians listed thus far.

- How many DOD civilians are in the AO and what roles do they play in the organization?

(g) The media – this includes journalists from print, radio, and visual media.

- Are they self-sufficient, or do they require support such as transportation and security?

- Can we expect their coverage of military activities to help or hinder the overall mission?

- What aspects of the area are the media focused on?

(3) How might our operations affect civilian activities? Military operations affect civilian activities in various ways throughout the spectrum of conflict. In war, conflict, or stability and support operations, commanders should consider the political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal impact of their operations on the categories of civilians they have identified in their AO. What follows are examples of the types of questions CA personnel and staff planners must carefully consider for the BOS activities in foreign operations.

(a) Political – at the local, regional, national, or international level.

- Do our operations support the overall political objective of the military mission?

- Do our actions tend to improperly or inappropriately favor one group, faction, or leader over another?

- Can opposing political groups, factions, or leaders exploit our actions?

(b) Economic – this pertains to local economic activities as well as the activities of MNC and IRO.

- Is military seaport, airport, or highway traffic interfering with commercial or developmental traffic in the AO?

- Are military operations attracting large numbers of vendors to our AO?

- Is the local community truly benefiting from our presence or are the actual beneficiaries inappropriate or criminal elements?

(c) Psychological – needless to say, military operations can have a tremendous psychological impact on noncombatants. What we do to mitigate hardship will influence the amount of cooperation we receive from the populace.

- Are we ignoring the innocent victims of our actions or are we doing everything possible to ensure they are cared for?

Note: Negative public sentiment directed towards US forces often creates force protection issues from asymmetric threats. Commanders must consider this in the operations security plans.

(d) Environmental – Military operations affect the civilian environment in various ways.

- What effect are our operations having on shelters, infrastructure, and subsistence mechanisms in the AO?

- At some point, US forces must begin to consider what its role will be to help civilians recover from the effects of our operations. With respect to contractors and DOD civilians, how are do military operations affect their ability to support the mission?

- Will contractors be allowed freedom of movement throughout the AO in order to be effective?

(e) Legal - During all overseas operations, US forces are bound by customary international law (CIL) to protect fundamental human rights, and minimize harm to noncombatants and their property. The commander's primary responsibilities are to the mission and to the PO forces under his or her command. Pursuant to the law of war (e.g., Geneva Conventions and CIL), US forces are under no affirmative legal obligation to provide food, water, or shelter to noncombatants, detainees, or refugees, unless there has been a declaration of occupation ordered by higher headquarters, as part of a PO mission. In all other cases, the responsibility is with local civil authorities and/or international relief agencies.

f. Events. Many categories of civilian events may affect the military mission. Some examples are planting and harvest seasons, elections, riots, and evacuations, both voluntary and involuntary, that create DPs. Likewise, there are military events that affect the lives of civilians in an AO. Some examples are combat operations, including indirect fires, deployments and redeployments, and payday. Once the analyst determines what events are occurring, it is useful to analyze the events for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications. An example of the types of seasonal events, from "Seasonal Civilian Events" of the KFOR 2 OPLAN that should be considered during analysis is in Figure E.

<i>Months</i>	<i>Season</i>	<i>Civilian Events</i>
December – February	Winter	Period of establishing policies and prepositioning stocks for spring (periods of reconstruction) Winter Holidays
March – April	Spring	Harvest winter wheat, planting (Transition Period) Continue to preposition stocks; initiate reconstruction; seasonal floods; high birth rate from summer weddings; get organized for children back on the streets in summer
May – September	Summer	Period of reconstruction; summer holidays; prepare for winter wheat planting; weddings; seasonal labor migration by young adults; foreign tourist season
September – November	Fall	School starts, children are off the streets, young adults back in school; harvest; plant winter wheat (transition period); prepare for winter and establish contingency plans; elections and installation of government; first frosts (follows elevation)

Figure E-1 Seasonal Civilian Events

Appendix F

CONTROL OF LARGE AREAS

1. General.

Cities and towns are the focus of economic and political power. Because of large populations, this makes them vulnerable to street violence and other disturbances that can adversely affect the peace process. Urban operations are an important feature of almost any PO.

2. Controlling Urban Areas

a. The intensity of operations. The intensity of operations may vary from a relatively passive policy, designed to curtail hostile activities so that community life can continue to a more active policy, involving military forces, moving against activists and their supporters. The appropriate authorities should carefully consider the level of intensity at which operations are conducted.

b. Belligerent Tactics. The adversary could adopt a wide range of potential tactics in an urban area, including:

- (1) Disrupting industry and public services by strikes and sabotage.
- (2) Generating widespread disturbances designed to stretch the resources of the security forces.
- (3) Attacking resupply routes by damaging roads, bridges, rail links, or air bases.
- (4) Provoking military forces in the hope that they may overreact and provide material for hostile propaganda.
- (5) Sniping at roadblocks, static posts, and sentries.
- (6) Attacking vehicles and buildings with rockets and mortars.
- (7) Planting explosive devices, either against specific targets, or indiscriminately to cause confusion, destruction, and a lowering of public morale.
- (8) Ambushing patrols and/or firing on helicopters.
- (9) Attacking sympathetic members of the civilian population or employees.

c. Need for alertness. PO forces in an urban area have to be constantly alert, both to avoid exposing themselves as a target and to protect those with them. Sentries, observers in OPs, foot and mobile patrols, and administrative vehicles can all present attractive targets. Support all movement with available fire support. Make troops aware of the danger of discussing anything of a military nature, whether it is names, locations, or movements of themselves, their friends, or their units, with casual civilian acquaintances.

d. Deployment. The two broad alternatives are to base troops outside the locality in which they are to operate or to base them within their operational area. The advantages and disadvantages of the two are the following:

- (1) Bases outside the area.
 - (a) Advantages. Commanders can set up a secure base where off-duty forces can relax, rest, and possibly enjoy some recreational facilities. They can assure the protection of such a with fewer sentries and less defenses. It is reasonably accessible to

administrative transport, thus resupply and the repair and maintenance of equipment and transport could well be carried out on the spot.

(b) Disadvantages. Reaction time is much longer and, therefore, commanders may have to keep reserves at short notice and possibly deployed them in anticipation of their being needed. If unable to return to base between patrols, etc., consider sending some administrative transport forward into the operational area, which will require an escort and possibly provides a target. The journey time to and from the base decreases the period available for rest and personal administration.

(2) Bases in the area.

(a) Advantages. Commanders can speedily and readily deploy reserves in response to anticipated events, thus reducing the need to hold a large QRF of forces at relatively short notice. Troops become more closely identified with the area in which they live, improving their chances of getting to know the local population, the detailed geography, and the habits of adversary groups. The ability to dominate the area is probably made easier.

(b) Disadvantages. Troops can rest but not relax, they are constantly exposed to the danger of attack, and as more forces are needed for local protection, their duty hours will extend. Escort all administrative traffic, but understand that this will put a strain on servicemembers.

e. Inter-Unit Boundaries. An operational area is usually allocated to units and further allocated to sub-units. Clearly define the boundaries between areas. When a boundary runs down a street, make that street the responsibility of one unit only. Additionally, when establishing boundaries for units, keep in mind the boundaries of police districts, either local or UN civilian police. If possible, these boundaries should correspond.

f. Tactics. Make troops, employed in urban operations, well rehearsed and practiced in the following tactical procedures:

- (1) Guarding bases and installations.
- (2) Roadblocks and CPs.
- (3) Control points.
- (4) Curfews.
- (5) Search operations.
- (6) Crowd dispersal and riot control.
- (7) Some elementary aspects of covert surveillance.

g. Snipers. Immediate action drills should be devised for such circumstances as a patrol coming under fire from a sniper. This is always a particularly difficult situation as the source of the firing is seldom obvious. Depending on the situation, it may be more suitable and appropriate to improve force protection procedures to prevent this from occurring or mount a quick cordon and search operation if locations can be identified. In certain circumstances, deploy friendly snipers reduce the risk of this type of action.

h. Control of movement. Banning vehicle movement and parking in shopping and other public amenity areas where activists are using explosives to terrorize and disrupt the public may be necessary. It may also be necessary to require that all pedestrians entering such areas be searched. While this may control movement and help to canalize

hostile activity, it is expensive in labor and increases public resentment at the curtailment of unimpeded movement.

i. Night operations. Night patrolling may be conducted on foot because vehicle movement may be too obvious in quiet streets. However, many built up areas are noisy and busy at night and mobile support could be a vital back up to foot patrol activity at any time. Street lighting may be an advantage but it does make unobtrusive patrolling difficult.

j. Helicopters. Helicopters must hover if they are to see into narrow streets and enclosed areas, making them vulnerable to missiles and sniper fire. However, these, and certain fixed wing assets, are useful for observing crowds as they form and move. They can act as airborne command posts and rebroadcast stations; resupply and reinforce standing, rooftop patrols; and evacuate casualties. It is routine now for helicopters to be fitted with surveillance devices, such as optical and terminal imaging sights, video cameras, and night vision goggles; all have many applications in any role. However, note that the prolonged use of helicopters over localized areas, particularly at night, would normally produce a large number of protests from the population. Reference the ALSA Center's *Multi-Service Procedures for Aviation Urban Operations* publication.

3. Controlling Underground Areas

a. Operations below ground. Movement below ground is usually feasible in main towns and cities; it may also be possible in smaller urban and suburban areas and even in some country districts. Underground passages provide additional approaches and escape routes, which commanders must take into account when planning the defense of installations. Most underground tunnels have a circular cross section so, if they carry any sort of roadway or rails, there is flat decking with a space beneath it. This space may be big enough for movement, but it will certainly provide hiding places for persons and their weapons and equipment. Tunnels have access points, usually at both ends and at intervals throughout, allowing fresh air to circulate. Access points or fresh airshafts may, however, be sealed up in disused tunnels. There is always a danger from an accumulation of gases and foul air in any tunnel; because respirators may not give protection, provide servicemembers working in the area with breathing apparatus. The underground systems include the following:

(1) Sewers. These are the most common underground systems that exist in every large urban area. They may be as much as six meters in diameter and they always have frequent access points. Where they incorporate a roadway, speedy movement by large parties is possible.

(2) Railway tunnels. Underground railways are found in large cities and under high ground in the country. Passage of trains and the presence of maintenance gangs make such tunnels more hazardous to anybody attempting to pass through the area. They are the most attractive as a means of access, at night or at weekends when activity will be less frequent.

(3) Pipeline subways. Tunnels designed to carry gas; water and electricity services will often be too small to admit the passage of a man. They do have frequent access points and may be as much as four feet in diameter, thus allowing for slow movement along them, and the opportunity to hide weapons and other stores.

(4) Cellars and connection passages. Cellars are commonly found in urban areas, and even where connection doors and passages do not exist, they can easily be constructed to make an extensive underground system. This of course requires the connivance or coercion of the occupants.

(5) Mineral mining operations. Coal or other mineral mining operations are common and can occur anywhere. Access will depend on what type of mining operation it is and the pattern in which the shafts are connected.

(6) Subterranean rivers. Any large town built in a valley will almost certainly include streams and perhaps small rivers within its boundaries. If enclosed, usually to carry off storm water or other like purposes, they will have frequent access points.

(7) Road tunnels. Because they are usually open to the public, they do not offer a covered approach for clandestine movement. However, road tunnels below key or vulnerable points may be used for surprise attacks.

(8) Natural caves and catacombs. In some areas, there are extensive handmade and natural caves under most towns and villages.

b. Intelligence. Maps of all underground systems, including details of accessibility, are typically held in the surveyors or public works departments of the local government. The officials responsible for the services using the tunnels, and for their maintenance, can give valuable additional information on physical characteristics such as the following: fresh air supplies; volume, rate, and time of flow (if an underground waterway); useful control, blocking points, etc. Supplement the information gained from civil sources with reconnaissance. Check for subterranean access and underground systems by other individuals or groups.

c. Denial of access. Deny access either by sealing entry points or making the system unusable. The methods will vary considerably with the type of underground tunneling, and success may depend on the ability of the military forces to maintain a degree of observation. Some methods are:

(1) Spot welding access points; but where only occasional access is needed, as any other form of seal is relatively ineffective.

(2) Installing remote sensors or intruder alarms; however, these will need maintenance and communications, and employees using the tunnel system will know of their existence.

(3) Sealing off parts of the system by erecting internal barriers; forces will have to weld these into place.

(4) Flushing out the system with crowd suppressor (CS) smoke at low concentration or by flooding with water. Forces can permanently neutralize parts of a tunnel system in this way.

d. Patrolling underground passages. This is always necessary in any system, for example, sewers or an underground railway, which forces cannot seal. It has the dual advantage of discouraging unauthorized use and of enabling the security forces to become familiar with the tunnel system.

e. Clearance operations. If hostile groups use an underground system in spite of the precautions listed above, then forces may have to mount operations to clear the tunnels. The main points to be noted are the following:

(1) Locating unauthorized users. Comprehensive maps are essential. If there is no indication of where to look, then search the tunnel systems systematically. Guard

each part after it is cleared. Coordinated surface patrolling must support every subterranean patrol.

(2) Flushing out. Use water or CS smoke, at low concentration, to selectively in different parts of a tunnel system; the aim is to force those escaping into the open rather than into other tunnels. Exercise strict control over the use of riot control agents in confined spaces.

(3) Siege. It may be possible to block all escape routes and then wait for cold and hunger to take effect.

(4) Physical assault. This is a matter of applying ordinary tactical principles in a cramped and unusual environment.

f. C2. It will be more difficult to maintain close C2 of operations underground. The following points should be noted and simple solutions considered:

(1) Communications. Radio may not work well and line may have to be laid. Maintain good communication between troops working underground and those on the surface.

(2) Orientation. It is easy to lose all sense of direction when underground. The need for good maps has already been stressed; supplement maps with gyrocompasses and overt signposting.

(3) Combat identification. Good communication and strict control of badges, insignia, or special items of clothing will help avoid clashes between different parties of the security forces.

4. Controlling Rural Areas

a. The characteristics of rural operations are that--

(1) The adversary has to rely more on force of arms, stealth, or field craft for protection.

(2) Rural operations resemble conventional operations.

(3) Forces may find it difficult to distinguish between neutral and hostile members of the population, but once hostile groups have been identified by some aggressive act, forces can engage them with less chance of involving innocent people.

(4) The relatively open nature of countryside, in comparison to a town, provides more scope for mobile operations and the use, where justified, of heavier weapons and aviation.

(5) Rural communities are often small, isolated, more vulnerable to local intimidation, and difficult to protect. This makes it easier to impose hostile control over a scattered rural community than over a neighboring town. Also, even in areas where the authority of the elected government is recognized, hostile groups may operate with relative freedom because local people go in fear of intimidation and reprisal. This gives rise to the following two broad types of rural operations:

(a) Control by the authorities still exists, but, in this case, force can use relatively minor operations effectively to control, if not eliminate, the threat of hostile activity.

(b) Authority has been so eroded that officials can no longer move freely about their business, and effective control of an area may even lie in hostile hands. This

calls for a wider scale of operation with, possibly, the need for measures falling not far short of those employed in full-scale military operations.

(6) Minor operations. Tactics for rural operations usually involve relatively small bodies of troops, although large numbers may be required if several mutually supporting operations are mounted concurrently. The following techniques and procedures are particularly applicable to describe a rural setting:

- (a) Protection of personnel and guarding installations.
- (b) Protection of VIPs, small convoys, large convoys, rail movement, and picketing a route.
- (c) Movement planning, roadblocks, CPs, and curfews.
- (d) Patrols and covert surveillance.
- (e) Search operations.

(7) Operations to regain control of an area. This section also describes the tactical operations that units can conduct with the aim of imposing control in a rural area, which is cultivated and has some small villages and isolated farmsteads. In heavily forested, sparsely populated, or generally underdeveloped terrain, the inevitably long distances, and poor communications could require the deployment of several units.

(8) Controlled areas. A controlled area is one in which the civil administration and local police are able to work effectively. Hostile elements may still be able to infiltrate, and isolated security incidents may occur, but the forces in the area should be capable of limiting such acts.

5. Gaining Control of an Area

a. General. In an area where hostile forces prevent the civil administration and the local police to go about their duties, operations may have to be mounted to reintroduce control. The establishing of any secure base within a new area could have severe operational risk and complicated logistic support arrangements. This would imply that there is a need for artillery units, air resupply, CASEVAC and some degree of fortification and dumping of supplies. The following will directly influence the conduct of these operations:

- (1) The strength and organization of the hostile activity.
- (2) The support accorded to hostile forces, whether this comes from outside the country or is self-supporting and dependent on internal assistance.
- (3) The nature of the countryside, its accessibility, and density of population.
- (4) The forces available.
- (5) The operating mandate.

6. Land Borders

a. Concept of Operations. The aim of rural operations is to create stable conditions where the law will be respected and observed, the civil administration can function without the backing of enlarged security forces, and the civil community can move and live freely without fear. This requires a dual approach, with the overall objective of separating the hostile element from the population. These tasks are normally complementary and require a careful assessment of priorities and allocation of resources, but their combined purpose is:

- (1) To achieve and maintain the neutralization of the hostile forces.
- (2) To protect the population by denying free movement for hostile forces anywhere in the operational area.

b. Attrition. The basis of successful attrition is the contact intelligence provided by constant close surveillance of suspected persons and their supporters. The surveillance plan should be coordinated with every agency at the highest appropriate level, and full use should be made of the entire range of techniques and equipment available including: covert operations, covert patrols, and the use of attended and unattended surveillance devices. Based on the information from the surveillance operations, security forces can maintain a constant pressure on these persons by instituting specific search operations, and by using selective personnel checks, head checks, house searches, area searches, and screening. Effective surveillance will help gather information on activists so they can be tracked down, neutralized, or prosecuted by law.

c. Denying free movement. This task is of equal importance to that of attrition, and contributes to it by sealing off the activists from their support, forcing them to take risks, and limiting their ability to concentrate for aggressive action. It is achieved by in-depth road blocks and vehicle CPs, covering main lines of communications, and on border patrols and special measures to combat specific tactics; for example train and vehicle hijacking. Make towns secure using the normal techniques for urban operations, and security force bases should themselves be employed as strong points from which offensive operations can be mounted.

d. Approach to Tasks. The planning principles for rural operations are similar to those applying elsewhere, but because of the necessarily greater dispersion of forces and the larger distances place more emphasis on the following:

- (1) Planning and intelligence. Carefully plan and control all operations to make optimum use of resources, and base them on the best information and intelligence gained of hostile tactics and habits.

- (2) Strength and reserves. Mutual support is often difficult to achieve, and security forces can easily become isolated. Therefore, mount operations with sufficient strength to match the threat, and, in addition, maintain adequate reserves at all times.

- (3) Use of air and space capabilities. Recent experience in land-based operations has shown that air and space surveillance of a situation is useful. The increased situational awareness for all involved forces has an overall positive effect on the outcome of the operation.

7. Firm Base

a. Tactical Points. Mount all operations from a firm base, such as:

- (1) Either the site of the local civil administration, or an area from which it can operate initially.

- (2) Accessible by land, over easily secured routes.

- (3) Able to provide at least a helicopter landing point if not a suitable airstrip.

- (4) Easily defensible with the minimum of force, preferably surrounded by natural obstacles.

- (5) Large enough to accommodate the necessary logistic support and transport, but not so large as to make local defense a problem.

(6) Provided with physical protection commensurate with the prevailing threat.

b. Location. Locate such a base on the edge of an already controlled area so that its rear is secure. If set up outside a controlled area, the requirements for local defense and securing communications will almost certainly be too big for a single unit.

c. Establishing controlled areas. The methods employed to establish and expand controlled areas are launched from the base area and forward operational bases. Military forces are usually employed in the early stages of such operations with local paramilitary forces being moved in to consolidate and eventually take over the areas, which have been cleared. This frees the armed forces for further operations designed to continue the expansion process. However, it is a great asset if the paramilitary forces with their local knowledge are able to carry out or assist with the initial operations. Although some activists will undoubtedly penetrate into and through controlled areas, their opportunities for doing so in strength and for achieving surprise will lessen progressively as the civilian population is won over to the local government's side. As the countryside is cleared and secured, the defense commitment for forward operational bases will be reduced and more troops will be free for further operations.

8. Local Defense

a. Give the responsibility for local defense to a sub-unit because the commander needs to concentrate on operations throughout the operational area.

b. Do not use troops assigned to base defense in pursuit of the main aim of re-establishing control over the area

c. Hostile attacks on the base, even if they are unsuccessful, tend to undermine public confidence in the security forces.

d. Intelligence. Closely-knit rural communities are difficult to penetrate, making intelligence very hard to come by in the early stages of operations. The need to set up a firm base on the edge of an already controlled area is helpful in this context because information on the operational area may initially have to come from sources within the controlled area. As soon as operations start achieving success, information should become more plentiful, and therefore, take measures to provide means for those who wish to get in touch with security forces to do so without undue risk.

e. Patrolling. In PO, patrolling is the primary combat activity in a hostile area. For more in-depth information on patrolling, refer to Chapter IV, Section 1, "Patrolling".

f. Extended Operations. It may be necessary to conduct concurrent operations around controlled areas to relieve pressure, prevent reinforcement, or cut off an escape route. Such operations will usually have a limited objective. Insert the committed force to carry out its task, and then withdrawn within a comparatively short time. Accurate intelligence of hostile activities is essential to ensure that the target is worthwhile, and to give the maximum chance of success in an area that may be largely hostile. Holding ground is not important, as forces must evacuate any position gained as they withdraw. Usually, a separate unit or formation carries out extended operations, coordinating at higher level. Communication between the units, which are establishing control and conducting operations, is essential. Special Forces may be particularly suitable for this type of operation. Helicopter and fixed wing assets may do extended operations. This method of introducing the force saves time clearing a route and helps achieve surprise. Aviation is also useful for reinforcing or resupplying such a force, evacuating casualties

and persons wanted for questioning, for extracting the force, and for local reconnaissance.

g. Control Measures.

(1) Measures within an area that are under control should be designed to protect the people and enable the authorities to function. Take account of the need to do the following:

- (a) Redress grievances and, where necessary, improve standards of living.
- (b) Deter hostile activity, particularly subversion.
- (c) Encourage the provision of information.
- (d) Make the conduct of operations by the security forces easier.

(e) The decision to impose such control measures as the authorities allow will be taken by the local operations committee, who should consider the possible advantages and disadvantages of various measures.

(2) Explain the reasons for imposing control measures, but discontinue the measures if they fail to produce the desired result. Some possible measures include:

- (a) Banning all political activities.
- (b) Registering civilians. Frequent inspection at irregular intervals of identity cards, permits, and passes.
- (c) Controlling food, crops, arms, ammunition, explosives, drugs, and medicines.
- (d) Restricting on civilian movement.
- (e) Establishing curfews.

(3) In this context, a commander should not rule out the use of infantry support weapons, artillery, air power, and possibly the availability of Naval capabilities. The ROE for the use of these weapons in a PO situation is provided by the force commander and cleared by each nation contributing troops for the operation. The tactical deployment and use of the troops concerned would be like that utilized in general war. For instance, deploy artillery to support patrolling activity, OP, and in larger scale operations.

h. Safe Area.

(1) The requirement to establish and supervise a protected or safe area can arise when any community is at risk from persistent attack. Proceed with caution, because, unless those within the safe area are disarmed, they may use this as a base from which to conduct raids. Give clear guidance on what is demanded of any force tasked with establishing and supervising a protected or safe area. Inevitably, efforts are needed to counter the accusations from those within and beyond the safe area that the operation is designed to assist the other side. Having received guidance on the required nature of the operation, resolve other tactical questions, such as the protection of area and the nature of the threat. Whether the threat is from small arms, artillery, or other indirect weapons, including air or sea launched weapons, it has a significant effect on the force profile.

(2) Protected or safe areas may contain residents, refugees, DPs, and substantial numbers of forces of one or more of the belligerent forces. Forces may be charged with the establishment and supervision of such areas and to provide support and assistance to other organizations within the safe area. The first stage, in any PO designed to

protect or make an area safe, is to demilitarize that area. This may require enforcement actions. Having accomplished that, and taken all necessary measures to defend the area, other specific military tasks may include:

- (a) Establishing, monitoring, and enforcing weapon exclusion zones.
- (b) Establishing and maintaining cantonment areas and weapon holding areas and sites.
- (c) Occupying the ground.
- (d) Dominating avenues of approach.
- (e) Conducting patrols and searches.
- (f) Manning CPs and other control measures.
- (g) Developing of reinforcement and extraction plans.

Appendix G

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS/INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. Background

a. For purposes of this publication, NGOs are defined as transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the UN. NGO is a term normally used by non-US organizations.

b. International organizations are defined as organizations with global influence, such as the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

c. The list of nongovernmental organizations (NGO)/international organizations found in a peace operation could be very large. Approximately 350 agencies capable of conducting some form of humanitarian relief operation are registered with the USAID. USAID publishes a yearly report, entitled “Voluntary Foreign Aid Programs” that describes the aims and objectives of the registered organization. Make this part of the commander’s library. This appendix gives a brief description of various humanitarian NGOs and humanitarian relief organizations (HROs) that could be found working alongside PO forces.

2. Organizations

a. UN Organizations. UN organizations primarily concerned with PO include the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Disaster Management Team (UN-DMT), and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA).

b. The UNHCR has a major role in coordinating aid to refugees, returnees, and DPs. Except in special circumstances, its material assistance activities are conducted through national or local authorities of the country concerned, other organizations of the UN system, NGOs, or private technical agencies. Coordination with the UNHCR is critical for any humanitarian relief effort. Failure to coordinate with UNHCR before and during the operation, or failure to meet UNHCR standards, may preclude the UNHCR from accepting transfer of equipment, supplies, and facilities as the military disengages. To preclude this, establish a working relationship with UNHCR immediately upon notification of a mission with UNHCR. Make a copy of the UNHCR text that outlines specifications for refugee camp construction.

c. The UN-DMT is the primary agency responsible for coordinating assistance to persons compelled to leave their homes because of disasters, natural and otherwise.

d. The UNOCHA is the focal point for disaster management in the UN system. It mobilizes and coordinates international disaster relief, promotes disaster mitigation (through the provision of advisory services and technical assistance), and promotes awareness, information exchange, and the transfer of knowledge on disaster-related matters. UNOCHA is responsible for maintaining contact with disaster management entities and emergency services worldwide, and is able to mobilize specialized resources. The appointed UNOCHA resident coordinator has a crucial role in providing leadership to the UN team at the country level and coordinates locally represented NGOs. The resident coordinator convenes the UN-DMT at country level, seeking unity of effort

among all the various NGOs and agencies. The following UN programs help form the UN-DMT when the UN system is mobilized to assist in the emergency and is expected in the AO:

(1) UN Development Program (UNDP). The UNDP promotes the incorporation of disaster mitigation in development planning and funds technical assistance for all aspects of disaster management. Work is long range. The UNDP senior member may be appointed as a regional coordinator and may also serve as the UNOCHA in-country coordinator. UNDP also provides administrative assistance support to the resident coordinator and to the UN-DMT.

(2) World Food Program (WFP). The WFP is an operational, relief-oriented organization. It provides targeted food aid and supports rehabilitation, reconstruction, and risk-reducing development programs. Targeted food aid is special subsistence aligned to a special segment of the population. This organization mobilizes and coordinates the delivery of complementary emergency and program food aid from bilateral and other sources.

(3) United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). UNICEF is a relief-oriented organization. It attends to the well-being of children and women, especially child health and nutrition. The activities of this organization may include social programs; food, in collaboration with WFP; water supplies; sanitation and direct health intervention, in coordination with the World Health Organization (WHO). UNICEF provides related management and logistical support.

(4) The WHO is an organization involved more in long-range programs. It provides advice and assistance in all aspects of preventive and curative health care. This assistance includes the preparedness of health services for rapid response to disasters.

(5) The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). FAO is an organization also involved in long-range programs. It provides technical advice in reducing vulnerability and helps in the rehabilitation of agriculture, livestock, and fisheries. The organization emphasizes local food production. It also monitors food production, exports, and imports, and forecasts any requirements for exceptional food assistance.

e. Other International Organizations. Other international organizations include the American Council for Voluntary International Action and NGOs.

(1) American Friends of Action Internationale Contre La Faim (AIFC). AIFC promotes development efforts and provides emergency assistance in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean. It focuses on primary health care, potable water, environmental sanitation, and agriculture-based income generation. The most basic commitment is to enhance local capacities at both the community and central levels.

(2) Catholic Relief Services. Catholic Relief Services operate relief, welfare, and self-help programs in 74 countries to assist refugees, war victims, and other needy people. They emphasize the distribution of food and clothing and the provision of primary health care. Their capability to provide technical assistance and social services has steadily increased in recent years.

(3) CARE. CARE conducts relief and development programs in over 40 countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Programs are carried out under three-way partnership contracts among CARE, private or national government agencies, and local communities in the areas of health, nutrition, AIDS, population

management, natural resources management, agriculture, small economic activities, and emergency assistance. CARE provides technical assistance, training, food, other material resources, and management in combinations appropriate to local needs and priorities. Their particular strength is in food distribution, emergency transport, and general logistics.

(4) Doctors without Borders/Médicines Sans Frontières (MSF). MSF provides medical assistance to victims of disasters, accidents, and war. The US organization is closely associated with its counterparts in Belgium, Holland, Spain, and France. Medical relief teams depart on over 700 yearly missions to areas of conflict, refugee camps, national disaster sites, and areas lacking adequate health care facilities. Their particular areas of expertise are emergency medicine, vaccinations, and basic hygiene services.

(5) The International Medical Corps (IMC). IMC provides health care and establishes health-training programs in undeveloped countries and distressed areas worldwide. It specializes in areas where few other relief organizations operate. The goal of IMC is to promote self-sufficiency through health education and training. Its particular areas of expertise are immunizations and primary health care.

(6) The International Rescue Committee (IRC). IRC assists refugees and internally displaced victims of war and civil strife. Services range from refugee resettlement in the US to emergency relief and assistance programs. IRC monitors human service delivery and refugee processing for US resettlement. IRC can provide emergency medical support, public health, and small-scale water and sanitation capabilities.

(7) Irish Concern (IC). IC is one of the foreign NGOs that receive funding from USAID and US Aid Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance. Its primary area of expertise is supplementary and therapeutic feeding and sanitation.

(8) Lutheran World Relief, Inc. (LWR). LWR provides financial, material, and personnel support, usually through counterpart church-related agencies, in the areas of disaster relief, refugee assistance, and social and economic development. LWR is also competent in the provision of health care.

(9) Save the Children Federation-UK (SCF-UK). SCF-UK programs are guided by a set of principles that include identifying project goals, implementing projects, transferring necessary skills, encouraging self-help, and using available resources. This organization is more relief-oriented than its US counterpart. It concentrates on supplementary feeding, seeds, tools, and general infrastructure.

(10) World Vision Relief and Development, Inc. (WVRD). WVRD or Vision provides cash, gifts in-kind, services in-kind, and technical resources for large-scale relief and rehabilitation and development projects in over 90 countries throughout the world. Development programs include child survival, vitamin A, prosthetics and handicap rehabilitation, child development, and AIDS prevention and education.

(11) The ICRC works for the faithful application of the provisions of international humanitarian law that applies in armed conflicts and undertakes the tasks incumbent upon it under this law. ICRC is an independent organization based in Geneva. It derives its mandate from the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the additional protocols of 1977. Although, at times, it may get involved in strictly humanitarian operations, its mandate is to function only during armed conflict. ICRC neutrality is a vital aspect of its involvement in any relief operations. The ICRC protects its neutrality in terms of

reality and perception because it operates on all sides of a dispute to protect victims of armed conflict, to include internal disturbances and tension. ICRC neutrality is a key consideration for military planners and operators.

(12) International Red Cross Movement. The International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies form the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement give the movement other tasks in situations not covered by the Geneva Conventions.

(a) International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The member organizations are the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies that normally operate within the borders of their own country. Their mandate is to provide humanitarian relief during disasters. Red Cross organizations may assist other federation members through their international alliance provisions. The basic considerations for planners are to remember that these organizations also go to great length to preserve their neutrality. NGOs are normally categorized into four groups--

- Humanitarian organizations such as CARE and Mèdicines Sans Frontières USA.
- Human Rights such as Amnesty International.
- Civil Society and Democracy Building such as National Endowment for Democracy.
- Conflict Resolution such as American Friends Service Committee.

(b) For detailed information of specific NGOs, refer to JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol II*.

Appendix H

JOINT COMMISSIONS

1. General

a. Joint commissions have been used recently during PO in Cambodia, Mozambique, Somalia, Angola, El Salvador, Namibia, and Bosnia. Historically, commissions were used in other operations such as the withdrawal of the Nationalist Chinese troops from Burma from 1953 to 1954.

b. Joint commissions may take place at various levels. In any case, they may involve battalion units in the outcomes of joint commissions. Battalion commanders may attend commission meetings held by their higher headquarters. The techniques and procedures in this appendix are applicable for the informal mechanisms that the battalion and subordinate elements establish in their area for working with the local leaders and population.

c. In a broad sense, PO seek to create the opportunity for the parties to negotiate or implement a peace settlement. The terms of settlement should provide mechanisms to help initiate and sustain the peace process; commanders can use well-crafted peace settlements as guidelines toward a deeper resolution of the conflict.

d. Commanders have used joint commissions to provide useful structure and process in the implementation of the peace settlement. Joint commissions are one aspect of a number of actions that are fundamentally about political decisions carried out along political, military, and humanitarian lines.

e. Dependent on the terms in the peace agreement that establish the joint commissions, and the tasks given to the military forces in the PO, the integration of efforts by the military forces may take place in the staff section overseeing the joint commission process. In contrast to the normal situation, the integration effort is not located in the operations section, but rather the synchronization of efforts is orchestrated through the joint commission system.

2. Objectives of Joint Commissions

a. Joint commissions serve three main functions: translate political agreements into actions on the ground, act as a dispute resolution mechanism, and assist in peace building.

(1) Translate political agreements into actions on the ground. Often, gaps in the peace settlement document (e.g., treaty) aren't sufficiently covered - often deliberately, in order to gain agreement - that the political and military mission will have to resolve with the parties in order to implement the treaty.

(a) This is a double-edged sword. It may allow for the filling of gaps at the next level of decisionmaking, when the momentum and other aspects of closing the deal on the treaty so dictate. On the other hand, it means that the negotiation that must take place at the commission level needs to have the political and military mission members well conversant with the context of the compromise forged at the peace treaty level.

(b) In other cases, the commission must answer questions of interpretations that the treaty does not answer.

- In Mozambique the commission had to negotiate what was meant by the term “offensive military action.”

- In Bosnia, factions often had interpretations of the treaty that seemed reasonable and plausible, but were incorrect. Implementation Force (IFOR) commanders worked with the factions at the joint military commissions to develop a joint interpretation of how to execute a clause in the treaty.

(c) Another aspect of translating agreement into action that will arise is problems in implementation due to resources, events not predicted, and terrain considerations. Solve these at the commission level.

- In Cambodia commissions spent four hours defining the term “troops” and “forces” in relationship to the presence of Vietnamese troops; even afterwards it remained a difficult area.

- In El Salvador the treaty called for a separation of forces. The commission addressed questions including where the encampments would be, how the personnel would be fed, their health and sanitation needs provided for, and their safety.

(2) Act as a dispute resolution mechanism.

(a) Joint commissions are a way for the parties to resolve disputes that come up over the course of time. Commission concerns may well cut across the strictly military aspects of the agreement, often involving a separation of forces:

- Facilitating delivery of FHA.
- Movement of DPs.
- Violations by civilians in the zone of separation.
- Human rights allegations (someone tries to detain a person as a human rights offender).

(b) Do not use the joint military commission for purely civil matters, carefully coordinate any decision to use that forum for nonmilitary issues with political authorities at the highest level. Nonmilitary issues might surface through the joint military commission channels if there is a lack of alternate institutions, refer these issues to the long range plans staff and joint civil commission channels for action.

(c) Each peace operation is unique; so evaluate these guidelines to the applicability of the military operation. The military commission will have to resolve some issues that are not purely military.

(3) Assist in peace building.

(a) Often overlooked in the initial planning, are the contributions joint commissions - including joint military commissions - can make as a vehicle to assist in the reconciliation of the parties so they can build a sustainable peace.

(b) Peace building includes efforts to identify and support structures that will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people.

- It may include disarming, restoration of order, custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions, and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.

- Formulate how the joint commissions can use this process of working together to build other mechanisms or institutions that promote a sustainable peace. The “political” aspect of peace building needs to precede other actions.

- As an illustration, consider the ramifications a military member might encounter when disarming individuals. Consider other nonmilitary aspects (psychological, economic, etc.) of the rifle and other weapons.

(c) The other aspect of peace building is to understand that subsequent agreements may give rise to other disputes and questions while implementing the treaty. Even more reason to build in processes in those agreements that provide for how to handle disputes.

Appendix I

KEY DOCUMENTS

1. Background

The following is a list of key documents for peace operations. Not all are applicable to every operation nor are all necessarily as important at every level. Some examples have been provided and in most cases references are provided where to find example documents.

2. Mandate

- a. Mandates are usually in the form of a UNSCR. The PO force conducts operations based on a mandate that describes the scope of operations.
- b. Generally, a mandate should address the following points.
 - (1) Role of the peace operation.
 - (2) Mission of the peace operation organization.
 - (3) Performed tasks or functions.
 - (4) Size and organization of the force or mission.
 - (5) Appointment of the commander and any special mediators and their terms of reference (TOR).
 - (6) Nomination of the office responsible for the supervision of the operation.
 - (7) General arrangements for financial and logistic support.
 - (8) Division of sponsoring organization and national responsibilities.
 - (9) Time limit of the mandate.
 - (10) Terms or conditions the HN intends to impose on the presence of the force or mission.
 - (11) Statements of the rights and immunities of force or mission members.
- c. UN PKO's mandates can be found at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/cu_mission/body.htm.
- d. Examples of a United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) authorizing member states unilaterally or as a multinational coalition or regional organization to conduct PKO at <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>.
- e. JP 3-07.3 *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, Appendix A, Annex A presents a generic example.
- f. The UN Charter is located at <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html>.

3. Status of Force Agreement

A status of forces agreement (SOFA) is an agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. The military member can consider agreements "CA agreements" if the agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population. With the advice of the concerned military commander, the diplomatic

elements establish these stationing agreements. These agreements between the HN, sponsor, and contributors establish the detailed legal status of PO forces. (See JP 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, Appendix A, Annex B):

4. Terms of Reference

Based on the mandate and the situation, Terms of Reference (TOR) are developed to govern implementation of PO. TOR, which may be subject to approval by the parties to the dispute, describe the mission, command relationships, organization, logistics, accounting procedures, coordination and liaison, and responsibilities of the military units and personnel assigned or detailed to the PO force. (See JP 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, Appendix A, Annex C):

5. Rules of Engagement

ROE are directives issued by competent military authority, which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (See JP 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, Appendix A, Annex D):

6. CJCS Standing Rules of Engagement

a. The standing ROE (SROE) apply to US forces during all military operations and contingencies, to include PO. Commanders may augment the SROE for specific operations. Commanders must assess the capabilities and intent of other forces and make recommendations for supplemental ROE through the chain of command. Clearly state the ROE in simple language. (See CJCSI 3121.01A, 15 January 2000, *Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces*).

b. These SROE are intended for the following:

(1) Implementing the right of self-defense, this is applicable worldwide, to all echelons of command.

(2) Providing guidance governing the use of force consistent with mission accomplishment.

(3) Use in peacetime operations other than war, during transition from peacetime to armed conflict or war, and during armed conflict in the absence of superseding guidance.

7. Rules of Engagement Card

a. See Figure I-1 for an example of an ROE Card.

b. See also JP 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, Appendix A, Annex D

AS OF Date
IFOR - OPERATION DECISIVE ENDEAVOR
Commander's Guidance on Use of Force

1. Mission

Your mission is to stabilize and consolidate the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina

2. Self Defense

- a. You have the right to use force (including authorized weapons as necessary) in self-defense.
- b. Use only the minimum force necessary to defend yourself.

3. General Rules

- a. Use the minimum force necessary to accomplish your mission.
- b. Do not harm hostile forces/belligerents who want to surrender. Disarm them and turn them over to your superiors.
- c. Treat everyone, including civilians and detained hostile forces/belligerents, humanely.
- d. Collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe.
- e. Respect private property. Do not steal. Do not take "war trophies."
- f. Prevent and report all suspected violations of the Law of Armed Conflict to superiors.

4. Challenging and Warning Shots

- a. If the situation permits, issue a challenge:
 - (1) English: "IFOR! STOP OR I WILL FIRE!"
 - (2) Serbo-Croat: "IFOR! STANI ILI PUCAM!" (Pronounced as: "IFOR! STANI EEL LEE PUTSAM!")
- b. If the person fails to halt, the on-scene commander may authorize standing orders to fire a warning shot.

5. Opening Fire

- a. You may open fire only if you, friendly forces, or persons or property under your protection is threatened with deadly force. This means—
 - (1) You may open fire against an individual who fires or aims his weapon at you, friendly forces, or persons with designated special status under your protection.
 - (2) You may open fire against an individual who plants, throws, or prepares to throw an explosive or incendiary device at you, friendly forces, or persons with designated special status or property with designated special status under your protection.
 - (3) You may open fire against an individual who deliberately drives a vehicle at you, friendly forces, and persons with a designated special status or property with designated special status under your protection.
- b. You may also fire against an individual who attempts to take possession of friendly force weapons, ammunition, or property with designated special status, and there is no other way of avoiding this.

6. Minimum Force

- a. If you have to open fire, you must—
 - (1) Fire only aimed shots
 - (2) Fire no more rounds than necessary,
 - (3) Take all reasonable efforts not to unnecessarily destroy property, and - stop firing as soon as the situation permits.
- b. You may not intentionally attack civilians or property that is exclusively civilian or religious in character, except if the property is being used for military purpose and your commander authorizes engagement

Figure I-1 Example ROE Card

8. General Orders

Commanders may issue general orders for various reasons, including conduct of personnel participating in PO.

9. NATO Documents

a. The following NATO documents comprise the orders and ROE implementation process for operations.

b. The NATO orders process (See MC 133/3, *NATO's Operational Planning System*, 1990) includes three NATO requests/orders and three responses by the nations. These document formats are NATO classified, but definitions are provided below. The current MC is under revision to reflect changes imposed upon the system by NATO operations in the 1990s.

(1) Activation Warning (ACTWARN). A decision taken by NATO that brings the organization to a new state of military preparedness by allowing nations to identify military used if operations take place. Answered by the nations with an initial Force Preparation (FORCEPREP).

(2) Activation Request. A decision taken by NATO to prepare for action those military assets identified for use should operations occur. This decision generates a formal force generation process through the issuance of a statement of requirements (SOR). This will formalize the informal request for forces made in the ACTWARN phase. This is not a political decision to use military force. This is answered by the nations with a final FORCEPREP.

(3) Initial and Final FORCEPREP. Statements by the nations to a NATO strategic commander (SC) of their commitment to provide forces to his control for a specific operation.

(4) Activation Order. A NATO order authorizing the execution of a military operation and requesting that nations transfer authority of forces committed via the final FORCEPREP. Approval of this order is the final political decision by the North Atlantic Council that is required before executing a military operation.

(5) Order of Battle Transfer of Authority. Statement by the nations transferring authority of units committed via the final FORCEPREP to a NATO SC for execution of a specific operation.

c. The NATO ROE process (See MC 362, *NATO Rules of Engagement*) includes three requests/orders.

(1) ROE Request. Request by a NATO SC to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) for authorization to implement ROE measures as previously approved in an operation plan (OPLAN). Not all measures in the OPLAN need be requested.

(2) ROE Authorization. Approval by the NAC to a NATO SC authorizing implementation of the requested ROE measures.

(3) ROE Implementation (ROEIMPL). Order by a NATO SC to his forces implementing ROE measures previously authorized by the NAC. The NATO SC need not implement all ROE measures authorized. The ROEIMPL includes any known national caveats.

Appendix J

TRAINING

1. Sources

a. PO forces must prepare to conduct operations across a wide range of missions. The PO force may have to transition rapidly from PK techniques to combat with little time to retrain. The following outlines sources of information for commander's use in developing pre-deployment training programs.

b. Individual and Collective Tasks: Chapter IV of JP 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, outlines the individual and collective areas to consider when developing a training program.

c. Universal Tasks and Operating Systems: CJCSM 3500.04C, *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)*, lists the universal joint tasks at the tactical level as: develop intelligence, develop/conduct maneuver, employ firepower, perform logistics and combat service support, exercise C2, and protect the force.

(1) When planning training, commanders must consider the differences between combat operations and PO and adapt the Universal Joint Tasks List (UJTL) accordingly. The lack of air threat and a reduced requirement for indirect fire support, can allow the responsible headquarters to relegate air defense and fire support functions to a lesser priority, unless a substantial conventional threat arises. However, intelligence, civil-military operations, and information operations take on added significance. The following discusses the change in emphasis in each of the JUTL.

(a) Environmental. In addition to general environmental awareness training, specialized training is required based on certain duties and responsibilities. Address this specialized environmental training and much of the awareness training through integrated instruction or supplemental material as part of ongoing unit training programs. See Chapter 3, FM 3-100.4/MCRP 4-11B *Environmental Considerations in Military Operations*, for further details.

REFERENCES

Joint

- ATP 3.4.1.1, *Peace Support Operations, Techniques, and Procedures*
CJCSM 3500.04C, *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)*, Jul 02
DOD 2000.12-H, "Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorist and Political Turbulence," Feb 93
JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Jun 03
JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, Apr 98
JP 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, Jun 96.
JP 3-07.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism*, Mar 98
JP 3-07.3 *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, Feb 99
JP 3-07.6, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, Aug 01
JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations, Vol II*, Oct 96
JP 3-11, *Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments*, Jul 00
JP 3-16 *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, Apr 00
JP 3-57 *Joint Doctrine for Civil Military Operations*, Feb 01
JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*, Apr 03
JP 4-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control*, Apr 02

Army

- FM 3-05.401, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, Aug 02
FM 3-19.1, *Military Police Operations*, Mar 01
FM 3-19.40 *Internment/Resettlement Operations*, Aug 01
FM 3-90, *Tactics*, Jul 01
FM 8-42 *Combat Health Support in Stability Operations and Support Operations*, Oct 97
FM 9-15 *Explosive Ordnance Disposal Service and Unit Operations*, May 96
FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*, Feb 00
FM 55-30, *Army Motor Transport Units and Operations*, Sep 99
FM 55-50, *Army Water Transport Operations*, Sep 93

Marine Corps

- MCWP 3-35.4, *Doctrine for Navy/Marine Joint Riverine Operations*, Apr 87

Air Force

- AFI 32-3001, *Explosive Ordnance Disposal Program*,

AFJI 32-3002, *Interservice Responsibilities For Explosive Ordnance Disposal*

Multi-Service

FM 3-100.4/MCRP 4-11B *Environmental Considerations in Military Operations
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical Aspects of Consequence Management*, Jun 00

*Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Employment of
Nonlethal Weapons*, Jan 03

Multi-Service Procedures for Unexploded Ordnance Operations, Aug 01

Joint Combat Camera Operations, Mar 03

GLOSSARY

PART I – ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

A

ACTREQ	Activation Request
ACTWARN	Activation Warning
AD	air defense
ADL	armistice demarcation line
AFI	Air Force Instruction
AFSC	American Friends Service Committee
AFOSI	Air Force Office of Special Investigation
AIA	Air Intelligence Agency
AIDS	acquired immune deficiency syndrome
AIFC	American Friends of Action Internationale Contre La Faim
ALSA	Air Land Sea Application Center
AO	area of operations
AOFDA	US Aid Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance
AOL	area of limitation
APC	armored personnel carrier
APOD	aerial port of debarkation
ATP	Allied Tactical Publication

B

BDA	battle damage assessment
BOS	battlefield operating system
BZ	buffer zone

C

C2	command and control
CA	civil affairs
CACOM	Civil Affairs Command
CARE	Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere, Inc.
CA SCOPE	Civil Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People and Events
CASEVAC	casualty evacuation
CCIR	commander's critical information requirements
CHL	cease-hostility line
CID	criminal investigation division
CIL	customary international law
CIVPOL	civilian police
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
COSC	Combat operational stress control
CP	checkpoint
CS	combat support, crowd suppressor

D

DC	dislocated civilian
DENTCAP	dental civic action program
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DMZ	demilitarized zone
DOD	Department of Defense
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOS	Department of State
DP	displaced person
DSO	domestic support operations
DTG	date time group

E

EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
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F

FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FORCEPREP	Force Preparation
FPCON	force protection condition
FPP	force protection plan

G

GPS	global positioning system
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H

HAZMAT	hazardous material
HCA	humanitarian and civic assistance
HN	host nation
HUMINT	human intelligence

I

IC	Irish Concern
ICITAP	International Crime Investigative Training Assistance Program
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDAM	isolate, dominate, awareness, and multi-dimensional/multi-echeloned actions
IDP	internal displaced personnel
IFOR	Implementation Force
IMC	International Medical Corps
IO	information operations
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlespace
IPTF	international police training force
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IRO	international relief organizations
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

J

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JMC joint movement center
JTF joint task force
JUTL Joint Universal Tasks List

L

LNO liaison officer
LPB legal preparation of the battlefield
LWR Lutheran World Relief, Inc

M

MCA military civic assistance
MCPDS Marine Corps Publication Distribution System
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available, civil considerations
MOOTW military operations other than war
MNC multinational corporations
MP military police
MSF Médecines Sans Frontières
MSR main supply route
MWD military working dog

N

NAC North Atlantic Council
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCIS Naval Criminal Investigative Service
NCO non commissioned officer
NGO nongovernmental organization
NLCS NLW capability sets
NLW nonlethal weapons
NWDC Naval Warfare Development Command

O

OP observation post
OPLAN operation plan
OPR office of primary responsibility
OPSEC operational security

P

PA public affairs
PAO public affairs officer
PEO peace enforcement operation
PERSEC personnel security
PHYSEC physical security
PIR priority intelligence requirements

PKO	peacekeeping operations
PM	provost marshal
PO	peace operations
POL	petroleum, oil, and lubricants
POLAD	political advisor
PRC	populace and resources control
PSYOP	psychological operations
Q	
QRF	quick reaction force
R	
RCA	riot control agents
ROE	rules of engagement
ROEIMPL	rules of engagement implementation
ROI	rules of interaction
S	
SAR	search and rescue
SC	strategic commander
SCF-UK	Save the Children Federation-UK
SITREP	situation report
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SOF	special operations forces
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
SOP	standing operating procedure
SOR	statement of requirements
SROE	standing rules of engagement
T	
TOR	terms of reference
U	
UN	United Nations
UNCIVPOL	United Nations civilian police
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UN-DMT	United Nations Disaster Management Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UXO	unexploded ordnance
V	
VETCAP	veterinary civic action program
VIP	very important person

W

WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WVRD	World Vision Relief and Development

Z

ZOS	zone of separation
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PART II – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

asylum - Protection and immunity from extradition granted by a government to a political refugee from another country.

battle damage assessment (BDA) - The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or nonlethal, against a predetermined objective. Battle damage assessment can be applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems (air, ground, naval, and special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military operations. Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment.

Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) - The movement of casualties. It includes movement both to and between medical treatment facilities. Any vehicle may be used to evacuate casualties. Also called CASEVAC. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

civil affairs - Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA.

civil disturbance - Group acts of violence and disorder prejudicial to public law and order.

civil-military operations (CMO) - The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces.

civil-military operations center (CMOC) - An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent.

combat camera (COMCAM) - The acquisition and utilization of still and motion imagery in support of combat, information, humanitarian, special force, intelligence, reconnaissance, engineering, legal, public affairs, and other operations involving the Military Services.

commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) - A comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decisionmaking process that affect successful mission accomplishment. The two key subcomponents are critical friendly force information and priority intelligence requirements.

curfew - A regulation requiring certain or all people to leave the streets or be at home at a prescribed hour or the time at which such a restriction begins or is in effect.

demilitarized - To eliminate the military character of an operation or to replace military control with civilian control.

detainee - A term used to refer to any person captured or otherwise detained by an armed force.

displaced person (DP) - A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his or her country.

environmental stewardship - The integration and application of environmental values into the military mission in order to sustain readiness, improve quality of life, strengthen civil relations, and preserve valuable natural resources.

excessive force - A quantity, amount, or degree of force that is more than what is justifiable, tolerable, or desirable for the situation.

force cap - The maximum limitation of employed forces in terms of the size of a force capability that is based on mission or duration of an operation.

force protection (FP) - Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DoD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease.

foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) - Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that

might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions.

host nation (HN) - A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory.

host-nation support - Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations.

human intelligence (HUMINT) - A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources.

humanitarian and civic assistance - Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US Forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by title 10, United States Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to: medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in areas of a country that are rural areas of a country or are underserved by medical, dental, and veterinary professionals, respectively; construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; or rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities; detection and clearance of landmines, including activities relating to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to the detection and clearance of landmines .

human rights - The basic rights and freedoms to which all humans are entitled, often held to include the right to life and liberty, freedom of thought and expression, and equality before the law.

international organizations - Organizations with global mandates, generally funded by contributions from national governments. Examples include the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, and United Nation agencies

interoperability - The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.

Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander - The commander of a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a sub-unified commander, or an existing joint task force commander.

law of war - That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. Also called the law of armed conflict.

looting – To engage in robbing or plundering, especially in war.

military operations other than war (MOOTW) - Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war.

mission creep - Occurs when armed forces take on broader missions than initially planned.

multinational operations - A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance.

nongovernmental organizations (NGO) - Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). “Nongovernmental organizations” is a term normally used by non-United States organizations.

nonlethal weapons (NLW) - Weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or material, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. Unlike conventional lethal weapons that destroy their targets through blast, penetration, and fragmentation, nonlethal weapons employ means other than gross physical destruction to prevent the target from functioning. Nonlethal weapons are intended to have one, or both, of the following characteristics: (1) they have relatively reversible effects on personnel or materiel. (2) They affect objects differently within their area of influence.

operations security - A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)

peace enforcement (PE) - Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.

pilferage – To steal stealthily in small amounts.

peacekeeping (PK) - Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate

implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

peace operations (PO) - A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.

psychological operations (PSYOP) - Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective, reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.

quick reaction force (QRF) - Any force with a specific mission to respond on very short notice, typically less than 15 minutes.

reconnaissance - A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.

regulatory - To control or direct according to rules, principles, or law. Used to adjust to a particular specification or requirement.

reintegration - To restore to a condition of integration or unity.

repatriation - The release and return of enemy prisoners of war to their own country in accordance with the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

risk management - The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits.

rules of engagement (ROE) - Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US Forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.

status of forces agreement (SOFA) - An agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as CA agreements.

statutory - Enacted, regulated, or authorized by statute.

terrorism - The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.

traffic control point - A designated spot on the ground or road network--in a static garrison type environment--where military forces control the traffic flow.

unexploded ordnance (UXO) - Any kind of bomb, bullet cartridge, grenade, shell, or mine that has been primed, fused, armed, or otherwise prepared for action so as to constitute a hazard. Unexploded ordnance remain unexploded either by malfunction, design, or any other cause.

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
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