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APPENDICES TO U.S. - BRITISH

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENT

(agreed at U.S.-British Technical Conference
15th-26th July 1948)

Introduction

Appendix	A	Terms to be used.
"	B	Principles of U.S.-British Communication Intelligence Security and Dissemination.
"	C	Designation of Intercept Targets.
"	D	Co-ordination of Traffic Analysis and Exchange of Traffic Analysis Material.
"	E	Co-ordination of and Exchange of Information on Cryptanalysis and Associated Techniques.
"	F	Exchange of Communication Intelligence and Co-ordination in Translation.
"	G	Exchange of Collateral Material.
"	H	Comint Communications.
"	I	Liaison and Channels of Exchange.
"	J	Interpretation of Certain Provisions of the U.S.-British Comint Agreement.
"	K	Agreement for U.S.-British collaboration in the plain text field.
"	L	Exchange of Information on Intercept Equipment, Facilities, Production, Research and Development.
"	M	Exchange of Raw Material and Standardisation of Raw Material Format.
"	N	Interim Comint Emergency Plan.

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TECHNICAL CONFERENCE

FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE U.S. - BRITISH

COMINT AGREEMENT

15th - 26th July, 1948

INTRODUCTION

1. The following arrangements governing the collaboration between the U.S. and British Comint Agencies have been agreed between USCIB and ISIB in implementation of and as Appendices to the U.S. - British Comint Agreement of 5th March, 1946.
2. None of these arrangements shall be construed as contravening any clauses of that agreement but shall take effect within the scope and limitations established thereby.
3. The object of these arrangements is to ensure that maximum advantage is obtained from the combined available personnel and facilities of both parties.
4. In accordance with these arrangements, each party will continue to make available to the other, continuously, currently, and without request, all raw traffic, Comint items and technical matter acquired or produced, and all pertinent information concerning its activities, priorities and facilities, both present and planned, subject only to the proviso contained in paragraphs 3(b) and 4(b) of the U.S. - British Comint Agreement.
5. In addition, each party will continue to maintain liaison personnel at the agency or agencies of the other party.
6. The two parties will continue to effect such standardisation - e.g. of technical terminology, layout, procedure and organisation - as may be possible.
7. By the close collaboration thus established, and by means of suggestion, agreement, and arrangement as to changes to be made, the two parties will continue to effect elimination of unnecessary duplication in order to ensure the maximum exploitation of foreign communications. However, the activities undertaken by each party must be basically suited to its own needs and therefore neither is in a position to accept any formal and fixed commitments for the allocation of specific tasks to their respective agencies. Such an allocation would prevent the shifting of emphasis to tasks which those agencies may themselves wish to undertake or which they may be required to undertake by the consumers of their product. But it is agreed that an informal and flexible allocation of tasks, subject to alteration by either party at need and sometimes without prior notification, is possible and desirable; that where one party accepts the informal allocation of a specific task it will, as a matter of highest priority, make available to the other party the end-products of that task; that, if the party which accepts an informal allocation is compelled to relinquish it, it will inform the other party as soon as possible; and that, in the event of either party giving up a task to the other, every endeavour will be made by

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Introduction

the surrendering party to maintain its intercept coverage on the task surrendered if that party has been obtaining unique material.

8. Each party may call upon the other for assistance when necessary and such requests will be met whenever practicable.

9. Although progress has been made in the provision of adequate Comint telecommunication facilities, it is agreed that each party will continue to keep under review this, and the associated problem of safe hand routes for the passage of Comint material of all kinds, and will take all reasonable steps towards further improvement.

10. The two parties have foreseen the need for joint emergency plans, ready to be put into operation at or before an outbreak of hostilities with a third party.

11. Each party will provide the other with two or more copies of all reports mentioned in the following appendices and of such-like documents.

12. All arrangements are subject to review and to modification by agreement.

13. These arrangements will become effective on approval by USCIB and LSIB, in accordance with paragraph 12 of the U.S. - British Comint Agreement.

14. In Annex A to this Introduction are listed those items which for any reason have not been resolved and on which a further exchange of ideas is considered desirable.

15. Annex B to this Introduction shows how the Appendices to the U.S. - British Communication Intelligence Agreement, as produced at the U.S. - British Technical Conference of March, 1946, have been ratified or superseded by the Appendices agreed at the 1948 Technical Conference, and which of the latter are new.

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INTRODUCTION

ANNEX A

1. The following is a list of items which for any reasons have not been resolved at the 1948 U.S. - British Technical Comint Conference and on which some further exchange of ideas between the two parties might be fruitful.
2. Standardisation of raw material format.
 - (a) The exact detail of the Exhibits to be included with Appendix.
 - (b) A satisfactory method of exchanging raw traffic where an exact hand-for-hand reproduction over a continuous run is required.
 - (c) The elimination of communication difficulties in exchanging traffic in non-standard codes.
3. Revision of T/A notations and exchange of T/A information.
 - (a) The final form of the element to be used to designate service or function in an ITA case-number.
 - (b) The exact position in an ITA case-number of the letter denoting emission type.
 - (c) The use of the 3 and 2-digit parts of an ITA case-number.
 - (d) The use of terms or symbols to indicate the validity of T/A inference and reconstruction.
 - (e) The use of standardised names to describe T/A elements such as emission-systems, call-sign-systems, procedure codes etcetera.
4. Specific nomenclature for traffic types.
Revision of Status Reports with specific objectives.
Division of present Interim Report series.

Items H, I and J, tabled by LSIC for discussion at the Conference but the proposals of which the representatives of the U.S. Comint Agencies had no authority to agree without reference back to their Agencies.
5. Exchange of end-products by radio.

Item L, tabled by LSIC for discussion at the Conference but withdrawn from the Agenda after a statement of the British proposals, with the intention that it should be handled direct between the Coordinator of Joint Operations, U.S. Agencies, and the Director, LSIC.

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6. Standardisation of technical radio nomenclature.
Future plans for interception and training of operators.
Liaison in IBM and RAM fields.
Review of agreed "style and layout" with particular reference to use of validity-gradings.
Closer co-operation in equivalents and abbreviations.

Items D, G(3), H, O and P, tabled by LSIC but not accepted by USCIB for discussion at the Conference.

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ANNEX B

The following tabulations show how the Appendices to the U.S.-British Comint Agreement, as produced at the U.S.-British Technical Conference of 1946, have been ratified or superseded by the Appendices agreed at the 1948 Technical Conference, and which of the latter are new:

Table I

1946 Appendices

A (Terms to be used)	Unchanged.
B (Principles of Security and Dissemination)	Revised in 1948 Appendix B.
C (Collection and Exchange of Raw Material)	Paragraphs 1-3 (Exchange of information on interception facilities) superseded by 1948 Appendix L. Paragraphs 4-13 (Division of interception tasks and of search programmes, exchange of reports etcetera) revised and transferred to 1948 Appendix D. Paragraphs 14-19 (Designation of intercept targets) revised in 1948 Appendix C. Paragraphs 20-33 (Exchange of raw traffic and standardisation of raw material format) superseded by 1948 Appendix M.
D (Co-ordination of and Exchange of information on T/A, D/F and <input type="text"/>)	Revised in 1948 Appendix D.
E (Co-ordination of and exchange of information on cryptanalysis)	Revised in 1948 Appendix E.
F (Exchange of Comint and co-ordination in translation)	Revised in 1948 Appendix F.
G (Exchange of collateral material)	Unchanged.
H (Comint communications)	Revised in 1948 Appendix H.

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| I
(Liaison and channels of exchange) | Revised in 1948 appendix I. |
| J
(Interpretation of certain provisions of agreement) | Unchanged. |
| <u>Table II</u> | |
| <u>1948 appendices</u> | |
| K
(Collaboration in plain text field) | Subject matter not covered by 1946 Appendices. |
| L
(Exchange of information on intercept equipment facilities etcetera) | Revision of paragraphs 1-3 of 1946 appendix C. |
| M
(Exchange of raw material and standardisation of raw material format) | Revision of paragraphs 20-33 of 1946 Appendix C. |
| N
(Interim Emergency Plan) | Subject matter not covered by 1946 Appendices. |

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APPENDIX A

TERMS TO BE USED

1. CHANNEL: A unit or sub-division of a circuit will be known as a channel.
2. CIRCUIT: A telecommunications system between two points will be known as a circuit.
3. COMINT ITEM: Any item of Special Intelligence or of Traffic Intelligence which is distributed or released by a COMINT agency will be known as a COMINT item.
4. COMINTSUM: A summary or commentary based on related COMINT items, which may interpret those items in the light of one another or of information from other sources, will be known as a COMINTSUM.
5. COMMENT: Information appended to COMINT items either in emendation or elucidation, or in expansion of the information contained therein, will be known as a comment.
6. DECRYPT: A foreign communication which has passed through the stages of cryptanalysis and decryption and is in its original language prior to translation will be known as a decrypt.
7. DIGRAPH: A two character group will be known as a digraph.
8. EXTRACT: A translation in part or only of a decrypt or plain text will be known as an extract.
9. GIST: A statement of the essential substance of a decrypt or plain text or an abridged version of a translated text or extract will be known as a gist.
10. HEADING: Communication instructions for the delivery of a foreign communication, such as call-signs, serial numbers, external addresses, delivery instructions, indications of priority, group counts, date/time of origin, etcetera, will be known as a heading.
11. LANGUAGE EQUIVALENT: A word or phrase and its proposed or agreed rendering in English as found in a Supplemental Glossary will be known as a Language Equivalent.
12. PLAIN TEXT: An unencrypted foreign communication will be known as a plain text.
13. POSITION: The total assemblage of equipment used as a unit for an interception or transcription purpose will be known as a position.
14. SCANNING: The process of examining decrypts or plain texts to determine if they shall be issued and, if so, in what form and with what priority, will be known as scanning.
15. SUPPLEMENTAL GLOSSARY: A list prepared by a COMINT agency containing the proposed or agreed renderings in English of words or phrases which, though appearing in Standard Dictionaries, have additional meanings not given in those dictionaries, and of words or phrases of which the meanings are not to be found in a Standard Dictionary, will be known as a Supplemental Glossary.

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16. TRANSLATED TEXT: A translation of a decrypt or plain text will be known as a translated text.
17. TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: A remark or remarks added to a translated text, extract or gist by the translator, in expansion, clarification or annotation of his rendering of the text, will be known as a translator's note.

(It differs from a "Comment" in that it should not bear upon the Intelligence implications of the text).

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APPENDIX B

PRINCIPLES OF U.S. - BRITISH COMMUNICATION
INTELLIGENCE SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION

INTRODUCTION

1. These principles shall be the basis of all regulations for the security and dissemination of Communication Intelligence issued by or under the authority of USCIB or LSIB and other appropriate officials of the Governments of the two parties. The scope and phrasing of such regulations may vary in accordance with the requirements of the Parties, Agencies, Departments and Ministries to whom they are designed to apply, but all shall be in accord with these basic principles in every respect. To ensure uniform interpretation of what constitutes such accord, each party shall forward all such regulations to the other for information.

2. It is recognised that, while the following principles are in general of universal application, certain of those primarily applicable to peacetime must be modified in time of war or emergency, to ensure that the maximum operational benefit consistent with security is derived from the source. Provision is made hereunder for the necessary modifications. In time of war or emergency, or exceptionally as agreed by USCIB and LSIB, Emergency Regulations embodying the emergency principles contained herein shall be brought into force by the respective parties.

DEFINITIONS AND CATEGORIES


3. Communication Intelligence (COMINT) is the name given to products derived from the work of agencies, the operations of which are co-ordinated by USCIB and LSIB and which study radio transmissions and other communications not originated by United States or British authorities. The terms Communication Intelligence (COMINT) and Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) are synonymous. Communication Intelligence is divided into two categories, as follows:-

- (a) Special Intelligence.
- (b) Traffic Intelligence.

4. Special Intelligence is

(a) that Communication Intelligence which results from:-

- (1) the decryption of texts in whole or in part (except as provided in para. 5(b) below);



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- (iv) the interception of certain types of transmission as may be specified by USCIB and LSIB;
- (v) plain texts as provided in para. 6 below;
- (b) that Traffic Intelligence which:-
 - (i) clearly reflects the use of Special Intelligence or
 - (ii) is, in the case of individual items, specifically upgraded to Special Intelligence by either party if it is considered that its content is such as to warrant this action.



5. Traffic Intelligence is that Communication Intelligence which results from:-

- (a) the study of procedure signals, call signs, message headings, D/F bearings and other external of communications (except as provided in para. 4(a)(iii) above);
- (b) the decryption of the whole or parts of communications in codes or cyphers of such low security grading that they are specifically classed as Traffic Intelligence by USCIB and LSIB; or



Traffic Intelligence shall be designated by a separate codeword agreed on from time to time by USCIB and LSIB.

6. Communication Intelligence derived from plain texts (including R/T) may be classed by USCIB and LSIB as either Special Intelligence or Traffic Intelligence according to the needs of either and preferably after agreement between them, except that, in time of emergency, plain texts derived from tactical Armed Forces circuits shall be treated as Traffic Intelligence.

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7. In time of war or emergency, or exceptionally as agreed by USCIB and LSIB, the Traffic Intelligence category as defined in paragraph 5 above shall be extended to include the products of certain field and medium-grade cyphers which shall be downgraded from Special Intelligence; and, if required, Traffic Intelligence may then be subdivided into separate categories in order to permit tactical Communication Intelligence (the compromise of which would not endanger the more important sources) to be disseminated to special agencies and lower echelons of the Armed Forces. In order to prepare for this contingency, mutually agreed lists shall be prepared and maintained in current status by USCIB and LSIB to indicate which field and medium-grade cyphers fall within the provisions of this paragraph. In the event that it is found necessary to subdivide Traffic Intelligence as contemplated above, it may be necessary to institute an additional Traffic Intelligence codeword to permit differentiation in the dissemination of the products of medium- and low-grade cyphers.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION

8. The value of Communication Intelligence in war and in peace cannot be over-estimated; conservation of the source is of supreme importance. It is essential, therefore, that the dissemination accorded to all related or resultant information be strictly controlled and limited. The physical security of related documents is not alone sufficient; it is essential that all reference to its existence either direct or indirect be avoided except among those to whom the knowledge is necessary for the proper performance of their duties. The time limit for the safeguarding of Communication Intelligence never expires.

9. Every effort shall be made to ensure that, unless special authority is given:-

- (a) In time of peace, no person who is a current recipient of Special Intelligence or who is engaged in its production shall be assigned to or be engaged in activities which might reasonably be expected to place him in a position where he might be forced to submit to questioning by a third party;
- (b) In time of war or in a state of emergency, no person who is a current recipient of Special Intelligence or who is engaged in its production shall be committed to a hazardous undertaking which might subject him to capture by the enemy or a third party.

It is considered, on a basis of present communications techniques, that a person who has ceased to be a recipient or producer of Communication Intelligence should not be so assigned or committed before the elapse of a period of one year in the case of Special Intelligence, or of three months in the case of Traffic Intelligence.

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10. It is of the utmost importance that complete and absolute silence on all Communication Intelligence matters be maintained by those who have ever been connected with the Communication Intelligence organization, and by all individual recipients of Communication Intelligence, whether past or present, unless they are freed from this obligation by unmistakable and categorical order of proper authority as shall be designated by the respective parties. If at any time indiscreet matter referring to Communication Intelligence is broadcast or published, even by prominent people, this does not free those other persons who are, or have ever been, producers or recipients of Communication Intelligence from maintaining absolute silence, and special precautions may have to be taken.

11. In time of war, the full value of Communication Intelligence cannot be realized unless operational use is made of it. However, before the decision is made to take action based on Communication Intelligence, studied effort shall be made to ensure that such action cannot be attributed to this source alone. In every case, unless completely impracticable, action against a specific target revealed by Communication Intelligence shall be preceded by appropriate reconnaissance or other suitable cover to which the enemy can reasonably be expected to attribute the action. Any action taken in the absence of such safeguards must be considered in the light of the possibility of compromising the source. The extent of military advantage to be gained must be weighed carefully against the risk of losing the particular source and related Communication Intelligence sources and against the effect of such a loss on other Commands and on future operations. Only after it has been decided that the overall military advantage to be gained clearly outweighs the irretrievable loss which would probably result from a compromise of the source should action be taken in the absence of suitable cover.

12. When action as contemplated in para. 11 above is finally ordered, particular care shall be taken on all occasions to ensure that personnel who may become engaged with the enemy in the course of such action are given only the minimum information, with no unnecessary detail.

13. In time of peace the principle that the conservation of Communication Intelligence sources is a paramount consideration affecting any action taken in the light of Communication Intelligence shall be rigidly upheld.

14. The principle of dissemination is based on "the need to know". Each item of Communication Intelligence shall therefore be made known only to those individuals who require it in the performance of their duties and who have been appropriately indoctrinated. Every effort shall be made to restrict the number of indoctrinated persons to an absolute minimum.

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15. Any Intelligence including in whole or in part items from Communication Intelligence sources is to be handled in accordance with these regulations.

16. No national of one party shall be permitted access to the other party's Comint agencies or to the products, or knowledge of the existence thereof, unless he be approved by his parent agency or Board and be properly indoctrinated.

17. It is recognised that both parties will produce Special Intelligence which by virtue of its source or content will require exceptional safeguards and which should therefore be limited strictly in dissemination. Such Special Intelligence will fall into two categories:-

- (a) Individual items which must be restricted in dissemination to the highest level only. The procedure in such cases will be as prescribed in para. 22 below.
- (b) Particular classes of Comint which it is necessary to restrict to limited categories of personnel. Such a class may with the consent of USCIB or LSIB as appropriate, be indicated by an agreed subsidiary codeword.

It is for the originating party to request that the other party should afford similarly restricted distribution to such individual items or classes of Communication Intelligence.

18. Except in categories and individual cases agreed upon from time to time by USCIB and LSIB, personnel to be indoctrinated as recipients of Communication Intelligence or assigned to Communication Intelligence duties shall be the subjects of special security enquiries. However, in time of war or emergency, exceptional occasions may arise when it is considered essential for an individual to take up his duties before the special security enquiries can be completed. In such cases, the person concerned may be suitably indoctrinated on the authority of such senior officers or officials as are designated by the respective parties. In all such cases, steps shall be taken to ensure that special security enquiries are completed as soon as possible after indoctrination.

19. USCIB and LSIB shall maintain complete lists of persons currently indoctrinated for Special Intelligence in their respective Governments.

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20. USCIB and LSIB shall keep each other fully informed of the Departments, Ministries, Agencies, Offices, Headquarters and Commands receiving Special Intelligence and of the approximate number of indoctrinated persons in each.

21. Communication Intelligence shall never under any circumstances or in any form be disseminated to any Ministry, Department, Agency, Organisation, Office, or individual from which or from whom it might reasonably be expected to find its way, officially or extra-officially, into the possession of any person or group who could use it for commercial competition or commercial gain or advantage.

CLASSIFICATIONS AND PROCEDURES

22. Special Intelligence. Special Intelligence is classified TOP SECRET. The words TOP SECRET and the appropriate codeword shall appear on every sheet of paper which contains, or discloses the existence of, this class of Communication Intelligence. This rule applies to maps and charts on which are plotted data and information derived from Special Intelligence.

[REDACTED] In order to indicate that the specially limited dissemination referred to in para. 17(a) above has been applied, either party will prefix the Special Intelligence codeword with the word "Special".

23. Traffic Intelligence. Traffic Intelligence is classified SECRET. The word SECRET and the Traffic Intelligence codeword shall appear on every sheet of paper which contains or discloses the existence of this class of Communication Intelligence, unless TOP SECRET and the appropriate Special Intelligence codeword appear on the same sheet. This rule applies to maps and charts on which are plotted data and information derived from Traffic Intelligence.

24. Codewords. The Special Intelligence and Traffic Intelligence codewords used as such bear the TOP SECRET and SECRET classification respectively. These codewords and their implications shall not be made known to non-indoctrinated persons, nor shall these codewords be used in their codeword sense in the presence of non-indoctrinated persons.

25. Technical Matter. Technical matter appertaining to the production of Special Intelligence is normally classified TOP SECRET and designated by the appropriate codeword. Technical matter appertaining to the production of Traffic Intelligence is normally classified SECRET and designated by the Traffic Intelligence codeword. The appropriate classification and codeword shall appear on every sheet

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of paper which contains or discloses the existence of such technical matter. The appropriate codeword shall be encrypted in the text of every encrypted despatch (signal) conveying such technical matter and shall appear in plain language at the head of the decrypted version.

26. Raw Traffic. Raw traffic (i.e. intercepted traffic showing no evidence of processing for Communication Intelligence purposes) is normally classified CONFIDENTIAL, except where a higher classification is mutually agreed upon.

27. Technical success. Communications among cognizant officials of the British and U.S. Governments which reveal actual success, progress or processes in the production of Special Intelligence or Traffic Intelligence in specific instances or fields shall bear the appropriate codeword designations even though they do not themselves reveal Communication Intelligence as such.

28. Documents. Except as implicitly involved in the operation of paragraphs 15 above and 29(a) below, documents containing Communication Intelligence and technical matter shall remain exclusively in the custody of persons who have been appropriately indoctrinated, secure from examination by non-indoctrinated persons.

29. Special Intelligence and TOP SECRET technical matter shall not be transmitted in plain language (unencrypted) except as follows:-

- (a) sealed, by safe-hand channels over routes specifically approved by USCIB or LSIB. Such approval will be the exception where such routes involve air or land transport over the territory of a third party;
- (b) via completely protected local communication systems exclusively internal to Agencies or Offices producing or utilising Communication Intelligence of the appropriate categories;
- (c) via completely protected external landlines only as specifically approved by USCIB or LSIB in each instance.


30. Traffic Intelligence and SECRET technical matter shall not be transmitted in plain language (unencrypted) except as follows:-

- (a) as provided in paragraph 29 above;
- (b) by protected postal channels over routes approved by USCIB or LSIB.

31. Raw Traffic classified CONFIDENTIAL and CONFIDENTIAL technical matter shall not be transmitted unencrypted except as follows:-

- (a) as provided in paragraphs 29 and 30 above;
- (b) via external landlines only as specifically approved by USCIB or LSIB in each instance;
- (c) in the case of raw traffic classified CONFIDENTIAL only, the restrictions on the conveyance of CONFIDENTIAL material over the territory of a third party may be relaxed at the discretion of USCIB or LSIB to permit such transport by air or land.

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32. Except in circumstances contemplated in paragraph 15 above:-

- (a) Special Intelligence and TOP SECRET technical matter transmitted in encrypted form shall be encrypted in special cryptographic channels or ciphers expressly provided for these subjects.
- (b) Traffic Intelligence and SECRET technical matter transmitted in encrypted form shall be encrypted in special cryptographic channels or ciphers expressly provided for these subjects, those listed in para. 32(a) above, or in the highest grade cipher available.
- (c) However, in the case of [redacted] or similarly secure ciphers, the transmission of Communication Intelligence, TOP SECRET and SECRET technical matters and raw traffic over the same channel is authorized, provided that such channels are reserved for these subjects exclusively.

EXCEPTIONS

33. The guiding principle of the expression "the need to know" shall be rigidly upheld in all circumstances. However, certain limited exceptions from other provisions of these principles shall be recognized:

- (a) With the approval of USCIB or LSIB dissemination need not be confined to indoctrinated persons, and the applicable codeword will not be employed in connection with the exchange use and dissemination contemplated in the following instances:-
 - (1) Certain D/F fixes and bearings graded CONFIDENTIAL.
 - (2) Certain categories and series of plain text [redacted] which must be graded at least CONFIDENTIAL.
- (b) A Centre engaged in the production of Communication Intelligence may, at the discretion of the Senior Officer concerned, after full consideration of the risks involved to the source, omit the classification and the appropriate codeword from its worksheets and similar documents used within the Centre, or used between the Centre and its Interception and D/F stations in its technical operations.



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APPENDIX B

ANNEX A

CLASSIFICATION OF PLAIN TEXTS

With reference to paragraph 6 of Appendix B to the U.S. - British Communication Intelligence Agreement as revised at the 1948 Technical Conference it is mutually agreed that the present peacetime practice with regard to the grading of plain texts, including R/T, in dissemination to Intelligence recipients is as follows:

- (a) all are treated as Special Intelligence by both parties.
- (b) all other plain texts are normally treated as Traffic Intelligence by LSIB and as Special Intelligence by USCIB. On exchange, it is open to either party to alter the grading to conform with its own practice.

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
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ANNEX B

HANDLING OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE DISSEMINATED
TO INTERCEPT STATIONS



3. All such items of Traffic Intelligence disseminated to Intercept stations will therefore bear the appropriate codeword and will be passed in this form only to individuals appropriately indoctrinated.

4. Within the stations, however, such items may be further disseminated with the codeword omitted to intercept personnel not so indoctrinated. This is subject to the understanding that the provisions of paragraph 18 of Appendix B regarding special security enquiries apply equally to intercept operators as to other members of the Communication Intelligence family, and that all unindoctrinated operators shall be suitably briefed as to the security aspect of their work.

5. All other Communication Intelligence items disseminated to Intercept stations shall bear the appropriate classification and codeword and shall be handled in the manner proscribed for normal Intelligence recipients.

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
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APPENDIX C

DESIGNATION OF INTERCEPT TARGETS



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
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
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APPENDIX C



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


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APPENDIX C

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APPENDIX D

CO-ORDINATION OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS AND EXCHANGE OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS MATERIAL

1. It will be the joint objective of the parties to ensure that the required field of traffic analysis problems is covered as thoroughly as possible but general rules cannot be laid down for the division of T/A responsibility between the two parties.
2. With this objective in view, unproductive duplication of detailed work will be eliminated and it is recognised that the best method of furthering this process of elimination is to exchange information wherever possible in the form of partly or fully processed material.
3. Published reports on Traffic Analysis will always be made available to the other party.
4. Where the exchange of published reports is inadequate the requirements for a more detailed exchange will be stated. These requirements will be satisfied as far as possible from the material being currently produced - e.g. work sheets, log digests, daily diagrams and other predigested material - but both parties will endeavour to meet any additional requirements by modifying the form or content of these partly-processed reports.
5. Where in any specific case the exchange of material provided for in paras. 3 and 4 above is inadequate either party may request copies of the unprocessed logs or chatter sheets. Such requests will be satisfied within the limits of the resources available.
6. The method of exchange in all cases will be by radio or by bag according to the nature and urgency of the material.
7. In order to facilitate the exchange of material a degree of standardisation will be aimed at in the use of names or abbreviations to describe T/A features, e.g., transmission-systems, call-sign systems, procedure codes, traffic types etc.
8. The methods used to indicate validity should be extended from their present limited application to all suitable T/A material, so that the weight of evidence attached to the component elements of any T/A conclusion may be assessed on a common basis.

CO-ORDINATION OF INTERCEPT CONTROL

9. The objective of both parties will be to ensure that the total intercept resources available are used so as to give as efficient cover as is possible to the whole field of intercept tasks required by them both. There will be co-ordination between the parties to eliminate any avoidable duplication by continuous suggestion as to changes and by mutual agreement. Some duplication of cover may remain necessary to secure complete and accurate interception, or for training purposes, or where the arrangement for the exchange of T/A information and raw material cannot meet both parties' requirements.

APPENDIX D

- 2 -

10. The basis for the continuous co-ordination involved will be an exchange of reports consisting of:-

- (i) reports on intercept results (monthly, or more frequently as is required),
- (ii) lists of tasks allotted to stations (on a monthly or weekly basis as is required),
- (iii) information on major changes in the cover situation (exchanged by signal).

CO-ORDINATION OF EFFORT ON D/F,

11. In general the division of work must fall naturally according to the locations of D/F and intercept stations, and the intercept tasks and search programmes undertaken by each party.

12. Collaboration between the parties in the field of D/F shall be in the form of:-

- (i) requests from any agency direct to any other for bearings and fixes on specified targets and
- (ii) the exchange of results.

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APPENDIX E

CO-ORDINATION OF, AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
ON CRYPTANALYSIS AND ASSOCIATED TECHNIQUES

ALLOCATION OF TASKS

1. Allocation of major tasks, conferring a one-sided responsibility, is undesirable and impracticable. As a main principle, however, in order that the widest possible cover of foreign cypher communications be achieved, parties should exchange proposals for the elimination of duplication in cases where certain portions of a task or related tasks are not being worked. In addition collaboration between the parties will take the form of suggestions and mutual arrangements as to the undertaking of new tasks and changes of status in old.

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
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APPENDIX E.

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
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
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APPENDIX E

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
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APPENDIX E

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
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APPENDIX E

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APPENDIX E

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
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TABLE C



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
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
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APPENDIX E

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
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APPENDIX E

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TABLE A



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
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


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APPENDIX B

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
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APPENDIX E

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


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APPENDIX E

Exhibit 3



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
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
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APPENDIX E

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
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APPENDIX E

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APPENDIX F

EXCHANGE OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE
AND CO-ORDINATION IN TRANSLATION

1. Decrypts of foreign communications will not be exchanged between the U.S. and British Communication Intelligence Agencies, except as provided in paragraph 6 of Appendix E or as may be arranged for cryptanalytic or other technical reasons, but any decrypt or series of decrypts will be made available on specific request by one Centre to the other, if not prohibitively inconvenient.
2. Scanning, translating and exchange of the material in the field is covered in Appendix K. In other fields, as the Centres will probably be unable to translate all decrypts, plain texts or R/T intercepts in full or even in extract, each will carry out a process of scanning such as to meet its own Communication Intelligence requirements. The liaison officers will therefore be free to scan this material to ensure that any particular interests of their own party are being served.
3. Translations will be assumed to be in full unless labelled "gist" or "extract".
4. If either party considers that decrypts, or plain texts serve its intelligence needs without translation, such decrypts, or plain texts, will be regarded by the other as if they were translated texts and their exchange between the Agencies will be precisely the same as that of translated texts and extracts (see paragraph 6 below). It is the intention of each party to limit such cases to the minimum.
5. Comments will be clearly distinguishable as such and will be prefaced by the word "comment".
6. Unless excepted in Appendix K, all translated texts, extracts, gists (unless excepted by paragraph 7 below), items of Traffic Intelligence and comments appended thereto, will be exchanged between the U.S. and British Communication Intelligence Agencies continuously, currently and without request unless otherwise arranged in specific instances. Such exchange, complete or partial, will be effected by radio when specifically requested by the parties and in addition a complete exchange will be effected with the least possible delay through the regular liaison channels.

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APPENDIX F

7. Gists which are made by an agency for its own use but not issued will not be exchanged but will be at the disposal of the liaison officers who may ask for such decrypts or plain texts as may be required.

8. All Comintsums will be exchanged between the producing Agencies in Washington and London, whenever they are issued and without request.

9. ISIC will be the channel through which all Communication Intelligence items produced by the other British Commonwealth Agencies (except Ottawa), will be forwarded to the U.S. Communication Intelligence Agencies and through which the same materials produced by the U.S. Communication Intelligence Agencies will be forwarded, whenever appropriate, to other British Commonwealth recipients, (except Canadian).

10. The U.S. Communication Intelligence Agencies will be the channel through which all Communication Intelligence items produced by British Commonwealth Agencies will be forwarded, whenever appropriate, to U.S. recipients.

DIVISION OF LABOUR IN TRANSLATION.

11. Each Agency will undertake such scanning and translation tasks as are suited to its own requirements and those of its recipients, Any exception will be by prior agreement between the Agencies.

12. The continuous exchange between the Agencies of their translated material will allow either party to eliminate unwanted duplication in translation.

STANDARDISATION OF TRANSLATION FORM.

13. To avoid ambiguity and to promote ease of reading, reference and recording, it will be the aim of the U.S. and British Agencies to adopt a standard style and layout for headings, translated texts, gists, extracts, comments and translators' notes.

STANDARDISATION OF TRANSLATION CONTENT.

14. Each Agency will furnish to the other, continuously, currently and without request, copies of all Supplemental Glossaries and other compilations which it prepares as a result of and for use in its translation processes. The materials thus exchanged will be the basis for continuous discussion between the Agencies with a view to increasing standardisation.

15. In order to develop a common standard of validity-grading in language equivalents, each Agency will inform the other of the significance of such gradings as it currently uses in its Supplemental Glossaries.

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APPENDIX G

EXCHANGE OF COLLATERAL MATERIAL

DEFINITION

1. Paragraph 2 of the British - U.S. Communication Intelligence Agreement specifies that the Agreement governs the relations of the contracting parties "in Communication Intelligence matters only".
2. In the same paragraph it is agreed that the exchange of such collateral material as is applicable for technical purposes and is not prejudicial to national interests will, however, be effected between the COMINT Agencies in both countries.
3. In accordance with this paragraph, collateral material is defined as that material from any source other than COMINT which, though of assistance to the COMINT Agencies (i.e. "applicable for technical purposes"), is not directly a Communication Intelligence matter.
4. Consequently, material listed in paragraph 3(a) (2) and (6) of the Agreement, though obtained from sources other than Communication Intelligence, is not collateral material because it is directly a Communication Intelligence matter. The exchange of such material will be unrestricted, except as provided in paragraph 3(b) of the Agreement.
5. Similarly, information concerning COMINT methods and techniques, which are developed by the COMINT Agencies under U.S. or British patent, is not collateral material, and its exchange is governed by paragraph 4 of the Agreement.

EXCHANGE

6. Collateral material available for technical purposes to a COMINT Agency of one party will be made available (through the machinery of liaison) to the other, unless precluded by paragraph 2 of the basic Agreement or unless there is objection by the Ministry, Department, Agency, Office or person which originally made the collateral material available or which bears the responsibility for the control thereof.

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APPENDIX H

COMINT COMMUNICATIONS.

1. TELECOMMUNICATIONS ORGANISATION REQUIRED

Exclusive and readily extensible telecommunications between Centres, and between Centres and their outlying stations will be maintained in order to make possible the rapid flow of all types of raw traffic from the points of interception to the several Centres; the rapid exchange of all types of raw traffic, technical matter and Communication Intelligence between the Centres; and the efficient control of interception coverage.

2. INSTALLATION, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF TERMINALS

The terminals of circuits or channels intended exclusively to carry Comint traffic between the British Commonwealth and the United States will be installed, maintained and operated as arranged by the appropriate Comint Authorities of the countries concerned and, although normally such terminals will be installed, maintained and operated by the appropriate U.S. or British Commonwealth authority on whose territory the terminals are situated this will not be obligatory.

3. TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES

- a) The United Kingdom authorities in conjunction with the Canadian authorities will make the following radio teletype channels available exclusively for Comint traffic between the United Kingdom and the North American continent.
 - i) From the Foreign Office U.K./Canada circuit - 2 channels.
 - ii) From the R.A.F./R.C.A.F. U.K./Canada circuit - 2 channels.
- b) The United States authorities will be responsible for providing land line facilities between Canada on the one hand and the United States Agencies and the London Sigint Liaison Unit in the U.S.A. on the other.
- c) The Canadian authorities will be asked to take responsibility for providing the following:-
 - i) Facilities for switching the Foreign Office U.K./Canada circuit to the United States land line network.
 - ii) Facilities for switching the R.A.F./R.C.A.F. U.K./Canada circuit to the Canadian Sigint Centre.

[Continued overleaf]

APPENDIX W

- 2 -

- iii) Emergency facilities for switching the Foreign Office U.K./Canada circuit to the Canadian Sigint Centre and the R.A.F./R.C.A.F. U.K./Canada circuit to the United States land line network, to provide communication in the event of breakdown of one or other of the radio channels.
- d) In addition to the facilities provided by 3(a) above, a minimum of two channels of the Londonderry/Washington circuit will be allocated exclusively to Comint traffic. This circuit will be operated, in accordance with paragraph 2 above, by the United States and/or British as may be mutually arranged.
- e) Both parties recommend that, in those areas which are potentially operational, facilities be established for the direct transmission of raw material from the intercept stations operated by one party to a designated centre or station of the other party.

On the specific request of one party the other party agrees to make every endeavour to provide these facilities which, if and when provided, will be brought into operational use as mutually agreed.
- f) On demand "quick exchange" communication facilities will be provided between the United Kingdom and Washington as may be mutually arranged.

4. PROCEDURE AND OPERATING SIGNALS

Procedure and operating signals appropriate to a particular circuit will be used.

5. COMMON CRYPTOGRAPHIC AIDS

Common cryptographic aids will be used for Combined Comint Communications. The matter of cryptographic aids will be kept continuously under review with the object of maintaining and increasing security and of facilitating communications.

6. COMMUNICATIONS LIAISON

A representative of the Director of L.S.I.C. and a representative of the Co-ordinator of Joint Operations, U.S. Agencies will be given the specific duty of keeping under review Comint communications problems and of raising and advising on such problems as they occur.

7. PROVISION OF EQUIPMENT

The provision of equipment will be by mutual assistance where necessary and practicable and as agreed in each specific case.

8. USE OF UNRELEASED CABLES

Unreleased commercial cables will not be used for the transmission of unencrypted raw material except as a communications emergency measure.

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APPENDIX E9. BAG ROUTES

Bag routes will be kept under review with the object of taking full advantage of improved sea and air services.

10. USE OF MICROFILM

All centres will be equipped to handle microfilm so that it may be available for use when it is not practicable to send the original material.

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APPENDIX I

LIAISON AND
METHODS OF EXCHANGE

LIAISON PERSONNEL

1. Each party shall maintain, in the country of the other, a senior liaison officer accredited to the other. Such officers shall be responsible each in the country to which he is accredited for all liaison matters.
2. Upon agreement between USCIB and LSIB, additional liaison personnel may be accredited, and working groups may be assigned, to agencies of either party by the other. All such additional liaison personnel shall be under the control and direction of the senior liaison officer.
3. Suitable office facilities will be made available as necessary by the party to whom the liaison officers are accredited.
4. Liaison officers of one party shall normally have unrestricted access to those parts of the other's agencies which are engaged directly in the production of Comint, except such parts thereof which contain unexchangeable information. The points of contact of liaison officers within agencies for requests and inquiries shall be as determined, established and delimited by the party to which they are accredited.
5. In addition to the above regularly assigned personnel, visits by selected personnel for short periods of time to deal with special problems will be encouraged.

METHODS OF EXCHANGE

6. Requests by one party for information or material shall be made by that party via its senior liaison officer who shall act through prescribed liaison channels. The senior liaison officer of the requesting party shall forward whatever information or material is made available to him normally by means of facilities under the control of his own country. Normally the senior liaison officer of the providing party shall be kept informed.
7. When the request by one party is for information or material to be supplied as a matter of routine procedure, the supply, after the initial request, may be direct between the parties by means of facilities available to the senior liaison officer of the requesting party. The senior liaison officers of both parties shall be kept fully informed of all such routine exchanges. The receiving party shall give the senior liaison officer of the providing party whatever share in the distribution and utilization of such information or material as may be agreed locally.

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APPENDIX I

- 2 -

8. Exceptionally, technical exchanges between the parties may be effected directly over "on demand" quick exchange communication channels jointly and exclusively maintained for that purpose. But the use of these direct channels will be kept to the minimum and in each case the senior liaison officers of the two parties will be kept informed.
9. No provision of paragraphs 6 and 7 above shall be construed as preventing either party from accommodating the other by transporting or communicating material for the other party.
10. Each party shall normally assist the other's senior liaison officer by making available to him facilities for packaging and preparing material for transportation. Each party shall, to the extent of facilities operated by or available to it, assist the other's senior liaison officer with safe-hand and other transportation within its own country.

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APPENDIX J
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INTERPRETATION OF
CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE
U.S. - BRITISH COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENT

INTRODUCTION

Consequent on meetings held in December 1947 between USCIB and the Director LSIC representing the London Signal Intelligence Board, the following interpretations to certain paragraphs of the British - U.S. Communication Intelligence Agreement, dated March, 1946 and of the appendices thereto are hereby agreed to by USCIB and LSIB and will become Appendix J to the aforementioned Agreement.

INTERPRETATIONS

1. It is understood that the LSIB will not initiate or pursue any contact with any nation of the British Commonwealth on Sigint matters other than with the Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand (with each of which agreements already exist) without first obtaining the views of USCIB. (It is noted that at the present time LSIB does not envisage any collaboration with Commonwealth Nations other than the above.)
2. It is noted that the Melbourne Sigint Centre (MSIC) is, in contrast to the Communications Branch at Ottawa, not a purely national Centre. It is and will continue to be a joint U.K. - Australian - New Zealand organisation, manned by an integrated staff.
3. It is noted that a pre-requisite for collaboration by Canada, Australia and New Zealand with U.K. was an unequivocal acceptance of the provisions of the "Explanatory Instructions and Regulations concerning the Handling of Signal Intelligence (IRSIG)" which has already been given by the Sigint Governing Bodies of the Nations concerned and that continued collaboration is dependent upon their adherence to these regulations.
4. It is the intention of LSIB to obtain from the Sigint authorities of the collaborating Dominions formal assurance that they will abide by the terms of paragraphs 5, 8 and 9 of the British - U.S. Communication Intelligence Agreement and of paragraph 5 of Appendix E to that agreement. Such assurance will be transmitted to USCIB from LSIB.
5. LSIB will notify USCIB of the present assignment of cryptanalytic tasks for MSIC and will notify USCIB in advance before authorising any new or altered cryptanalytic tasks for that Centre.

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APPENDIX J

- 2 -

6. Both USCIB and LSIB will:

- (a) Not pass to any of the collaborating Dominions Centres COMINT items originated by agencies of the other party without the consent of that party, except as laid down in paragraphs 7(c) and (d) below or as may be from time to time mutually agreed.
- (b) Pass to the collaborating Dominions via the agreed channels only such technical matter and portions of the Status reports as are deemed by the originating agency to be relevant to the agreed tasks upon which each Dominion is engaged.

7. USCIB takes note that, as regards LSIB's policy towards the integrated Centre at Melbourne, LSIB intends in future:

- (a) To give every encouragement and assistance to pursue [redacted] as the main cryptanalytic task of the Centre together with minor tasks of local interest.
- (b) To employ Melbourne-controlled interception stations (some of which are U.K. manned) on tasks to which they are best suited by reason of their location, which inevitably include [redacted]
- (c) To pass to MSIC (in order that MSIC may carry out (a) above), the technical and background matter relevant to these tasks, whether it be obtained from U.S. or British sources, except matter of U.S. origin designated by U.S. authorities as for U.K. use only.
- (d) To pass to MSIC for its internal use only (and to enable that Centre to carry out (b) above) the necessary technical matter required for such interception control, whether obtained from British or U.S. traffic analysis or cryptanalytic sources, except matter of U.S. origin designated by U.S. authorities as for U.K. use only.

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
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APPENDIX K

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
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
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APPENDIX K

- 3 -



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
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APPENDIX K

EXHIBIT 1



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


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APPENDIX *k*

Exhibit 1.



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
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EXHIBIT 2

APPENDIX K



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
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APPENDIX K

EXHIBIT 3



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
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APPENDIX *K*

EXHIBIT 3(a)



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


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APPENDIX K

Exhibit 3(a)



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
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APPENDIX K

Exhibit 3(a)

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APPENDIX K

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
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APPENDIX ~~K~~

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
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APPENDIX *X*

EXHIBIT 6



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


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


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Exhibit 6



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


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


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APPENDIX *K*

Exhibit 6



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


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


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APPENDIX *K*

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


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APPENDIX *K*

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


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APPENDIX K

Exhibit 6



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EO 1.4.(d)


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APPENDIX K

EXHIBIT 7



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
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APPENDIX **K**

Exhibit 7



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
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APPENDIX K



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
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APPENDIX K

Exhibit 7



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
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APPENDIX **X**

Exhibit 7



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
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APPENDIX K

Exhibit 7



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


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APPENDIX K

EXHIBIT 8



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APPENDIX L

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON INTERCEPT EQUIPMENT,
FACILITIES, PRODUCTION, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

1. Intercept Equipment Facilities and Production

A comprehensive report (to be known as the Annual Technical Report) concerning

- I. All interception facilities installed and available for use at intercept and D/F stations, whether or not such facilities are in use
- II. Details of the numbers, types and descriptions of intercept equipment under contract and/or in production, together with probable delivery dates.

will be exchanged annually. Reports are to show the position as at 1st July in each year, and should normally be exchanged by 1st August.

2. Section I of the Report will be arranged to provide information to cover the items set out in paragraph 3, for each Intercept and D/F Station. Types, Makes and numbers (and where applicable, normal and maximum speeds) of equipments should be included. No attempt has been made to lay down an exact format for the Report, as such a format might soon become out of date, and might prevent flexibility.

3. A. HAND SPEED MORSE EQUIPMENTS

- (i) Single Positions (H/F)
- (ii) Single Positions (L/F)
- (iii) Single Positions (All-wave)
- (iv) Double Positions (H/F or All-wave)
- (v) Which of the above (i) to (iv) are capable of double or triple diversity working?
- (vi) Which of the above (i) to (iv) are fitted with wire, tape or wax recorders?

B. HIGH SPEED MORSE EQUIPMENTS

- (i) Single Positions (H/F)
- (ii) Single Positions (L/F)
- (iii) Single Positions (All-wave)
- (iv) Double Positions (H/F or All-wave)
- (v) Which of the above (i) to (iv) are capable of double or triple diversity working?
- (vi) Types of recording (i.e. undulator) apparatus fitted.
- (vii) Types of recording bridge fitted, and whether capable of accepting frequency shift transmissions.
- (viii) Any other High Speed equipment.

C. TELEGRAPHIC PRINTING EQUIPMENTS

- (i) Single Channel Radio Teleprinter (International)
- (ii) Single Channel Radio Teleprinter (National)
- (iii) Multi-channel or Multiplex T/P (International)
- (iv) 3-channel T/P (National)
- (v) 2-channel Baudot
- (vi) 6 and 9-channel Baudot
- (vii) (i) to (vi) above refer to 5 unit systems. Equipments fitted for any other systems (6, 7-unit etc.)



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APPENDIX L

- 2 -

D. V.H/F AND U.H/F EQUIPMENTSE. FACSIMILE OR PICTURE EQUIPMENTSF. HELLSCHREIBER EQUIPMENTSG. DIRECTION FINDING EQUIPMENTS

Whether fixed or mobile.

H. TRANSMITTER IDENTIFICATION EQUIPMENTSI. FREQUENCY MEASURING EQUIPMENTSJ. AERIALS

Information to include number, types, whether used in diversity, frequency to which cut, directivity, associated amplification equipment.

K. AERIAL EXCHANGESL. CONTROL EQUIPMENT

Details and use of equipment fitted for control of interception within a station.

M. SPECIALISED TEST EQUIPMENT Not to include standard maintenance equipment for general use.N. AUDIO FREQUENCY RECORDING EQUIPMENT
 P. ANY OTHER SPECIAL EQUIPMENT
Q. SHORTCOMINGS EXPERIENCED ON OPERATIONAL EQUIPMENTR. SPECIAL MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS, IF ANYNotes:

- (i) A Single Position may consist of 2 or more receivers, used in diversity, or in order to increase the frequency range.
- (ii) A Double Position is one at which a single operator can cover two ends of a duplex circuit, where this is possible.

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- 3 -

4. Intercept Equipment Research and Development

(a) Intercept Equipment Reports will be exchanged twice yearly on 1st March and 1st November. These Reports will be in two sections,

- I. Equipment under development. This to include details of all projects on which development is being conducted together with a statement of the object to be attained.
- II. Research and Development trends. This to include a statement of all outstanding problems together with an indication of trends in research and development aimed at their solution. In the event that no work is contemplated on certain specific problems, these problems should nevertheless be listed amongst those current.

(b) Technical Notes will be exchanged as and when necessary on specific subjects. These notes to be designed primarily for the information of personnel actually engaged on engineering and research and development work on interception equipment. These notes also to include data on signal analysis, frequency lists, and other material associated with intercept problems,

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Note by Conference Secretaries

The Exhibits for attachment to Appendix M cannot be satisfactorily reproduced during the Conference. They will be produced and made available in their finally agreed form as soon as possible after the Conference.

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APPENDIX MEXCHANGE OF RAW MATERIAL
AND STANDARDISATION OF RAW MATERIAL FORMATEXCHANGE OF RAW MATERIAL

1. Except as otherwise agreed in Appendix K each party will furnish to the other as promptly as practicable without request and as a matter of routine, one copy of every item of raw traffic collected by its operating agencies, regardless of source. Either party may request specially rapid delivery, or additional copies, of specific categories of raw traffic, and each shall endeavour to meet the needs of the other in this respect.
2. In so far as practicable raw traffic exchanged will be in the forms contained in paragraphs 4 - 9 below.
3. The inclusion of a case-number in an item of raw traffic will not be deemed to show evidence of processing for Communication Intelligence purposes, and therefore the material may still be classified "Confidential".

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
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


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


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


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
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


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
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~~TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY - NEVER TO BE REMOVED FROM THE OFFICE~~



~~TOP SECRET~~




OGA
EO 1.4.(c)
EO 1.4.(d)

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY - NEVER TO BE REMOVED
FROM THE OFFICE~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

