




(U//FOUO) Does NSA Look Different from the Outside? What's in Store for SIGINT Analysis and Production? -- An Interview with Wayne Murphy

FROM: The SIDtoday Editor

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(U//FOUO) SID *today* sat down this week with SID's new Assistant Deputy Director for Analysis & Production (S2), Wayne Murphy (pictured), who recently returned to the Agency after spending four years working at FBI and participating in a study program. Here's what Mr Murphy had to say:



1. (U) Did your four years away from NSA give you a different perspective on NSA than you had when working here as an "insider"?

(U) Yes it did, in a couple of aspects... The most profound insight I gained was an appreciation for how much it means to be part of the NSA workforce. When I was working at the FBI, a lot of our time was spent advancing FBI's presence in the Intelligence Community, to try to put the Bureau's intelligence mission on an equal footing with its well-established law enforcement mission. As an NSAer, I had always taken for granted what it means to do foreign intelligence, because here at the Agency it's just a natural part of what we do. That's a tremendous advantage for NSA. But on the flip side, I came to realize that it's easy to get complacent about NSA's success and capabilities when you are surrounded by amazing people every day, and we can't succumb to that.

(U) I also developed a tremendous sense of pride in having an association with NSA. People in the Community viewed NSA product as **so** valuable. To sit in [DNI](#) and [IC](#) forums and see firsthand how much of value the NSA representative could contribute to the discussions made me proud to have been a part of NSA.

2. (U) You worked at the FBI as their Assistant Director for Intelligence for 2.5 years, leaving that position about a year ago. What was that experience like?

 (U//FOUO) It was one of the hardest things I've done in my professional career, but also one of the most enjoyable. To be part of the leadership team at another agency was an extraordinary opportunity. I learned to manage a [HUMINT](#) program that was global in scope. I learned to manage an analytic workforce that was working a broader range of issues than I'd experienced here at NSA. Finally, I had to think of the domestic context of the job -- something I hadn't needed to do very much at NSA. So, in those respects, it was very challenging. But I could draw upon my experiences at NSA and (hopefully) used them to good advantage at the Bureau.

3. (U//FOUO) Post-9/11 you led SID's Counterterrorism Product Line, and you were involved in CT-related issues while at FBI, as well. In your view, what's the key to defeating al-Qa'ida and other international terrorist groups?

(U) I certainly think the increased level of collaboration across the intelligence and operational communities has been a powerful force-multiplier, but as a nation we've also broadened our strategy to confront these groups in a more comprehensive way. By that I mean that we aren't just targeting them directly, but rather are working to undermine their ability to take hold. So, I believe a balance of force projection and diplomacy is the key to defeating them and their ideology.

4. (U) What do you think separates a good manager from a poor one?

(U) Good managers are those who recognize that their responsibility is to create an environment wherein the best that each of their employees can achieve is possible. It's about staying focused on creating a productive environment, rather than trying to control or dictate day-to-day operations. I think one has to be a good listener, and one must take criticism and learn from it. Managers should clear the "noise" out of the system and allow people to concentrate on their duties.

5. (U//FOUO) Although you've been back at the Fort only a short time, do you have any specific goals in mind for what you would like to achieve as ADDAP? ...any particular areas you'd like to focus on?


(U//FOUO) One thing I'd like to be part of is to truly deliver an environment in which S2 employees have a technological base that matches the skills they bring. I think we ask too much of the workforce when we ask them to **work around** technical applications rather than be **enabled by** them. The S2 leadership needs to take the time -- and exercise the discipline -- to develop sound requirements for the technology, and work with the developers to help them build capabilities that are matched to our needs.

(U//FOUO) Also, I would like to contribute to Rick Ledgett's [SID's Deputy Director for Analysis & Production] stated goal of creating an ops [operations] tempo that is more sustainable than we have now. We need to give employees confidence that they can take leave, spend time with family and friends, get training and generally lead a more "normal" life. We've done as well as we have only because people have made extraordinary personal commitments to the mission, but we must learn to operate at a sustainable level.

6. (U) In terms of analysis and production (small "a" and "p"), what are the greatest strengths and weaknesses of the USSS at this time?

(U//FOUO) The greatest strength by far is the depth of target knowledge and experience that resides in the NSA workforce, by virtue of the analysts' talent and the persistent nature of our access to our targets' communications. A contrasting weakness is that we haven't come far enough in communicating that experience and knowledge through our products and services. We have much more to offer, and have to find a means to express it.

(U//FOUO) This isn't just a matter of adding more comments to SIGINT reports, but also of using A-Space and other forums for communicating that knowledge. If you read a SIGINT report, you derive a specific benefit from it, but if you pick up the phone and talk about it with the analyst who wrote the report, or the linguist who worked with the intercept, you get a much richer experience... you get nuances based on the analyst's experience with the target. That knowledge is very powerful, and we need to find a way to get that information into our products and services.



(U//FOUO) Another great strength is the operational potential that resides in much of what we do -- the capacity for our understanding of the targets to be much more involved in shaping the decision-space of a broader range of customers. We need to support policy-makers in the same way that we support warfighters; we need to provide intelligence driven by the policy-makers' calendars. In that way, we can provide information in time to affect the decisions they make. We're already doing that to some degree, but I think we can take it up a notch. For decades we thought we knew what the warfighters needed to know, but it was only when we became embedded in their operations that we discovered that there was a **lot** more we could do for them -- other information we could provide that would help them immensely.

(U) ...How do we find out what the policy-makers need to know?

(U//FOUO) We have to be exposed to them and work more closely with them, so that we can shape the intelligence to their ops tempo. We do need to be careful to keep an ethical divide between intelligence and policy -- we don't want to lose our objectivity -- but we can still get a better understanding of what they really want. For example, they may want to know what the target **thinks**, not just what he says or does. This is the type of information we've traditionally gotten from HUMINT, but I think we can get it from analyzing SIGINT, too. That kind of detail

can be very valuable.

Officials hold a meeting

(S//SI//REL) For example, it's great to know the talking points a foreign official plans to address with his or her US counterpart, but maybe the target shows signs of reluctance about a certain aspect... That nuance would not necessarily be apparent if one were reading the transcript of what he actually said; it is contextual information that in the past would have been left out of a SIGINT report. Nowadays we put such information in assessment reports, and they generate some of the most enthusiastic feedback we receive... Likewise, if we do social-network analysis on a target, we may detect some surprising relationships. We can

pass that along to the customers, saying "Just thought you would find this interesting." There is some risk in providing this kind of information, but I believe our workforce has the knowledge and experience to pull it off. There's a range of options we can explore for communicating this information.

(U) Finally, another great strength we possess is the diversity of our workforce and our openness to listening to new ideas and different points of view. There was an atmosphere in the NSA I grew up in that one had to wait his turn to be heard, and acquire a certain amount of experience before participating in the discussion. Nowadays we are open to good ideas from any source, junior or senior, from across the entire workforce.

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