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Propaganda

PERSPECTIVES

24 JULY 1972

VIETNAM PERSPECTIVE

MOSCOW'S NEW TREATIES

THE HERETIC'S HOMECOMING

SHORT SUBJECTS

JUST FRIENDLY SUBCONTINENTAL MEDDLING?



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24 July 1972

VIETNAM PERSPECTIVE

On 30 March 1972, the North Vietnamese regime launched a massive, unprovoked attack by first-line North Vietnamese Army divisions spearheaded by hundreds of tanks and supported by massed artillery across the borders of South Vietnam. The attack openly and blatantly violated the agreement reached in 1954 that both North and South Vietnamese forces remain on their own sides of the Demilitarized Zone. It also violated the understanding to de-escalate the war reached in the fall of 1968 when the U.S. unilaterally ceased the bombing of North Vietnam. In one stroke, the NVN wiped out its carefully developed and nurtured false image of the war in South Vietnam as a civil "war of liberation" conducted by freedom-loving, anti-imperial Southern guerrillas with the aid of the North. As a result, new and different perspectives on the Vietnamese conflict were revealed:

--- Many fictions assiduously cultivated by North Vietnam stood exposed (see below).

--- The South Vietnamese government (GVN) and its military forces responded with unexpected unity and effectiveness, giving evidence that the initiative has passed to the Southern forces.

--- The U.S., while holding to its unilateral commitment to continue withdrawing its troops from Vietnam, responded to the North Vietnamese action with an air offensive of unprecedented magnitude and effectiveness, both against the North's war-making capacity and against the North Vietnamese invading troops in the South.

--- More unexpectedly, it mined North Vietnamese harbors, including Haiphong, severely restricting North Vietnam's main source of supply of Soviet materiel.

--- Free world public opinion, which has evidenced substantial support for the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong stand, experienced a major reversal.

--- While voicing their continued moral support, North Vietnam's major allies, the Soviet Union and Communist China, in the middle of long-sought negotiations to normalize relations with the U.S., were clearly dismayed by the misbegotten North Vietnamese strategy, and pursued their own wider national interest over and above Hanoi's.

The supreme irony of it all is that in the above respects the reckless North Vietnamese gamble has achieved exactly the opposite of what their offensive was designed to achieve. The North Vietnamese are sacrificing thousands of lives lost, a significant portion of their economic and industrial base, and whatever support they enjoyed in the world community in a fruitless effort to achieve domination of the South. Yet it seems they would have been just as close to their goal if they had followed the path of negotiation instead of embarking on the uncertain course of seeking a military victory.

Some North Vietnamese Fictions

The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) has now made it unequivocally clear that the conflict is not a matter of a purely South Vietnamese civil war, a war of "national liberation," carried on against the Government of South Vietnam by Viet Cong insurgents indigenous to the South. A Blitzkrieg reminiscent of North Korea's invasion of South Korea in 1950, it is plainly a cross-border invasion, launched by North Vietnamese regular troops. This despite the fact that the North Vietnamese leaders --- incredible as it may seem --- still maintain that the NVA is not participating. (Hanoi refers to its forces in the South simply as the "People's Liberation Forces.") The fact is that North Vietnam committed 11 Divisions to the invasion. Even pro-North Vietnamese supporters throughout the world no longer are willing to maintain the fiction that the conflict is a southern civil war.

Another fiction dissipated by the aggression is the assertion that the conflict is designed to free South Vietnam from U.S. "imperialism." It is amply clear that, far from seeking to retain a territorial hold in Vietnam, the U.S. has sought to withdraw altogether from the area. It has reduced its armed forces from over 500,000 to less than 50,000. This massive withdrawal of troops, in accordance with an announced schedule, with the similarly announced promise of complete withdrawal on release of U.S. prisoners of war should have convinced any remaining doubters of U.S. intentions.

Yet another fiction is the notion propagated by the North Vietnamese that "the South Vietnamese population welcomes Viet Cong and North Vietnamese liberation from the oppression of the Thieu government in the South." But the southern population quite clearly "voted with their feet" and fled their "liberators" by the tens of thousands. Even the most critical observers on the scene could not help but note that though the NVA temporarily gained a certain amount of territory, they retained only a small fraction of the population inhabiting that territory. The vast majority of the civilian population elected to live with the imperfections of the South Vietnamese government in preference to suffering the terrorism

characteristic of the invading regime. Over 800,000 South Vietnamese have fled from their "liberators."

Miscalculation of Allied Reaction

The GVN and U.S. response to the North Vietnamese aggression evidently was totally miscalculated by Hanoi's leaders, who in their isolation and obsession with their own distorted view of reality, underrated the will and capabilities of the South Vietnamese government forces as well as the determination of the U.S. government and people not to permit a forcible takeover of South Vietnam. After some local initial retreats, the South Vietnamese forces, aided only by U.S. air support, withstood the combined strength of the NVA and the Viet Cong (weakened by the ill-fated 1968 Tet offensive and subsequent attrition) equipped with the best of Soviet weapons, and have taken the initiative to regain the territory lost in the NVA's initial surprise assault.

The South Vietnamese government itself, an incipient democracy with difficulties typical of many in the so-called Third World, is admittedly beset by dissension among various groups. But the significant fact is that the dissidents are able to express their views in elected legislatures and are working to establish a better form of government more responsive to the competing needs and desires of the people. Moreover, the South Vietnamese government has gained wider popular support than ever before in opposition to the common enemy. Whatever the internal differences and the imperfections of their government, the overwhelming majority of South Vietnamese reject the grim prospect of being subjected to the ruthless rule of the North, one of the most truly closed and monolithic societies in the world. It is significant that when the North Vietnamese threat was the greatest in the early phases of the invasion, the people of South Vietnam were the most united.

While misreading the temper of their southern neighbors, Hanoi's leaders made an equally serious miscalculation in considering the U.S. response. Misled by the patent attempt of the U.S. to withdraw from Vietnam and to make concessions in the interest of an honorable, negotiated settlement, Hanoi's leadership thought they could attack with relative impunity from U.S. retaliation. They did not foresee that the U.S. government, strongly supported by public opinion at home, would not abdicate its essential responsibilities, and so were unprepared for the resumption of massive bombings of the North on a scale greater and more effective than ever before. These bombings are striking both military and industrial targets which contribute to Hanoi's war-making capabilities. At the same time, the accuracy of the laser-guided "smart" bombs reduces the extent of the unavoidable accidental damage to non-military objects accompanying the bombing of military targets. The allegations of the NVN and its supporters that U.S. bombing is targetted at the dikes in North Vietnam are incorrect

and cannot be taken seriously. If they were indeed a target, they would long ago have been destroyed, given the new effectiveness and accuracy of the "smart" bombs.

The bombings plus the equally unexpected mining of the harbors, which have supplied some 80% of North Vietnamese military needs, will sooner or later affect North Vietnamese offensive capabilities.

The ultimate outcome of the military struggle is still uncertain. It is obvious that the North Vietnamese have failed thus far to attain their maximum objective: a military takeover of the South or destruction of the GVN. It also seems more and more certain that the South will succeed in its efforts to regain most of the lost territories. What is clear is that the North Vietnamese have paid an enormous cost in lives, in destroyed military equipment, and in bomb damage to military and industrial installations in the North for a tenuous hold on a small bit of South Vietnamese territory. As of the end of June, the best available estimate of NVA casualties in those killed, wounded and taken prisoner, since 30 March of this year, ranges between 40,000 and 45,000. It is a measure of the cynicism and moral bankruptcy of the North Vietnamese leadership that they show every intention of going on sacrificing human life and property apparently in total disregard of civilized values, obsessed with their vision of a mandate to rule over Indochina and beyond.

North Vietnam's Isolation in the World Community

North Vietnam's invasion of the South has gone far to isolate it in the world community. The mass protest demonstrations of the late 1960's by youth and other groups in the non-Communist world have not been repeated now that it is clear Hanoi was responsible for the escalation of a war that had been winding down. Communist front groups have indeed tried to mobilize non-Communists in order to match the demonstrations of the earlier period, but obviously have struck no responsive chord among those outside their own disciplined ranks. Indeed they appear confused and working at cross purposes, engrossed in their own quarrels over prestige, to the despair of North Vietnamese representatives abroad whose exhortations to Communist and other pro-North Vietnamese front groups have been met with an unenthusiastic response.

The free world's disapproval of Hanoi's action is evident from the statements of influential leaders and groups throughout the world, and from the columns of the world's major newspapers and journals.

The realization that North Vietnam is becoming increasingly isolated in the international Communist community as well has tended to be obscured by the equivocal verbiage commonly used in international Communist communications and by the compulsion of

Communist countries to profess unity, if not unanimity of views. But in the case of Moscow and Hanoi, actions speak louder than words.

Although it may be true that the nature, and especially the timing, of Hanoi's armored onslaught on the eve of the Moscow talks was contrary to Moscow's wishes, it is also true that without the massive military aid the Soviet Union has continually provided to North Vietnam, the current offensive could not have been launched, and the Soviet Union must bear a heavy responsibility for the North Vietnamese escalation of the war. There also can be little doubt that, despite their evident competition for influence with North Vietnam, both the Soviet Union and Communist China for many years saw their ideological and national interest served by energetically supporting the North Vietnamese effort to destroy South Vietnam and eliminate the U.S. presence from Indochina.

However, now one cannot but conclude that Soviet and Chinese priorities have changed. Each in its own national interest has placed a higher priority on reaching an accommodation with the U.S. than on supporting North Vietnamese war plans. Under these circumstances, the North Vietnamese revival of the fighting and their clamorous insistence on continued moral and material support may well have become an embarrassment to the USSR and China.

One indication of the importance to Moscow of its larger priorities and of its downgrading of the North Vietnamese problem was the Soviet response to U.S. measures to counter the North Vietnamese invasion. Moscow maintained a silence of some days concerning the resumption of bombing and the mining of Haiphong harbor and when it did respond it did so in mild terms, much to the dismay of Hanoi.

The Sino-Soviet conflict has become a matter of the deepest concern to each of these protagonists and this seems to be the main reason for their proceeding with the summit meetings with the U.S. despite North Vietnam's barely concealed denunciations. The Soviet Union has other reasons as well for normalizing relations with the U.S. and its European allies. These reasons center around the necessity to avoid a nuclear war with the U.S. and the Soviet need for Western trade and technology to rescue the domestic economy, which has long been stagnating and is reaching an impasse. Thus, for good reasons, the Soviet Union has downgraded the importance of the North Vietnamese war effort, in favor of its own more important objectives.

Some of the propaganda exchanges between Moscow and Hanoi illustrate their differing views. On 21 May, the eve of President Nixon's visit to Moscow, Nhan Dan, the principal Lao Dong Party newspaper in Hanoi, harshly denounced "Communists who set national interest above the common interests of the

world revolution and serve national selfishness at the expense of ~~the~~ world revolution." Moscow's response to this kind of attack appeared in its multilingual international journal New Times (#22 of May 1972) in an article by Vadim Zagladin, deputy chief of the foreign affairs department of the Soviet Party's Central Committee:

"Soviet policy is a truly national policy determined by the fundamental interests of the working people of our country, by the interests of the entire nation in building communism. . . . Socialist policy never derived its strength from primitive, stereotyped patterns, and least of all from imitation of devices and methods employed by the class enemy. . . . The experience of past years has shown beyond the shadow of a doubt that any tendency to be guided by considerations of the moment (emotional or other reasons), to confine oneself to the interests of the present while ignoring the long-term perspectives, has never led to anything good. . . ." (Emphasis added).

It may also be significant that the invasion was not launched during the Peking summit, but rather some six weeks before President Nixon met with the Soviet leaders late in May. It was the Soviet Union, as the mainstay of North Vietnam's war effort, which had to be pressured against reaching agreement with the U.S., and the North Vietnamese did their utmost, though in vein, to prevent the success of the Moscow summit.

It seems quite evident that Hanoi and Moscow differ on how the Vietnam problem should be solved. While both are technically in agreement in their public insistence that the problem will be solved at the Paris negotiating table, most observers have interpreted Moscow's statements as urging immediate negotiation and cessation of the fighting, while Hanoi has given little sign that it will stop the bloodshed.

The trend in the Communist world toward settling differences by negotiation rather than by the North Vietnamese method of armed aggression was dramatically illustrated by the joint announcement by North and South Korea concerning their negotiations to seek reunification of the two halves of the country and their agreement to refrain from armed provocations. This effort to settle differences peacefully was undertaken while South Korean troops continue to share the burden of the military conflict in Vietnam and highlights the extent of North Vietnamese isolation in the Communist community. Hanoi's refusal to abandon military means to achieve its goals is a measure of the degree to which they are removed from today's realities.

The Obsessed North Vietnamese Leadership

Vietnam war protesters have tried to make conventional wisdom of the supposition that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese effort to destroy the South Vietnamese government is somehow a just cause, a popular rising up of sentiment in behalf of a superior ideology and morality. Whatever the origins of these sentiments, the current aggression should strip away any remaining illusions about the North Vietnamese leaders. After years of iron-handed control by the North Vietnamese leadership, during which all spirit of dissent and all dissenting elements of the population were eliminated, the leaders have been able to mobilize an army to fight for a cause that only a benighted leadership can still believe in as the self-appointed would-be dictators of a Greater Indochina. What the current North Vietnamese attack demonstrates is that the leadership has now been willing to be identified with the very creed of imperialistic aggression of which they accuse the U.S., the GVN, and their allies. North Vietnamese actions have once more been clearly revealed as based on a creed that can only be described as chauvinistic imperialism, in the truest sense of this much misused expression.

For their part the South Vietnamese have sought nothing more than to be left alone to work out their own form of government, free from the threat of forcible takeover whether by southern insurgents or by northern invaders armed by the Soviet Union and Communist China, and U.S. involvement has been limited to making it possible for the South Vietnamese people to realize South Vietnam's aim.

NEW YORK TIMES

4 June 1972

South Vietnam;

Again the Refugees Are on The Roads

SAIGON—"Three months ago," an American official here said last week, "we were virtually out of the refugee business. The next thing we knew there were refugees all over the place." By the weekend, American officials were estimating that nearly 800,000 South Vietnamese had been driven from their homes since the North Vietnamese offensive began more than two months ago.

Nobody knows exactly how many civilians have been killed and maimed in this latest round of fighting. Informed estimates range from at least 20,000 to as many as 50,000 wounded and between 5,000 and 15,000 killed.

In the months of calm that preceded the North Vietnamese attack, the number of war victims being assisted by the United States and the South Vietnamese Government had fallen to one of the lowest levels in

eight years. The refugee count, however, did not include the millions of South Vietnamese who had fled to the cities or were living in ramshackle camps and had long been off the Government relief rolls. Most of these people had been given the standard issue of rice, blankets, money and tin roofing, and, officially, they were no longer refugees.

By conservative estimates, more than a quarter of the 27 million people of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have been uprooted at least once since the United States intervened in the Indochina struggle, and half of them still live somewhere other than the place they call home. Most of them are not officially regarded as refugees. The Governments of the three countries have done as much as they intend to do for them. And though in some cases that has meant no help whatever, these war victims are viewed officially not as refugees but as people who have changed addresses.

Over the years in Indochina it has come to be generally accepted that allied bombs and artillery have been major "refugee-generating" factors. The reason, of course, is that the Communist guerrillas have sought to entangle themselves with the village population. American or other allied troops, for instance, would find themselves under fire from a supposedly pro-Government village and would retaliate with bombing and artillery. The civilians killed or chased out during the action would thus be seen as victims of allied fire power, though it was

the Communists who had started the firefight.

In the latest frontal attacks of the North Vietnamese, however, it has been clear to victim and outsider alike that it was Communist troops and Communist firepower that generated the new refugee wave. The greatest concentration of refugees—by some calculations more than 400,000—has been in Danang, the first available haven of safety in the path of the North Vietnamese advance in the northern part of South Vietnam.

For most of the refugees there was no time to ponder ideological questions. They simply ran south because the house-wrecking shells and the troops were coming from the north. At first the weather was bad for flying, and it was a few days before allied planes began striking back.

Initially the refugees jammed into schools, pagodas, churches and abandoned buildings in already overcrowded Danang. Many felt the safest places were in the heart of the city, and they resisted efforts to move them to more functional quarters on the outskirts. By last week, however, the majority of the refugees were living in the former American military camps in the Danang area.

In recent days, as the fighting has eased in intensity, the floodtide of refugees has slackened. But no one believes the current round of fighting is over. "And the minute it heats up again," said one American official, "there are going to be more refugees."

—JOSEPH B. TREASTER

JAPAN TIMES
29 May 1972

550,000 S. Vietnamese Have Fled Into Camps

SAIGON (Kyodo-Reuters)—More than 550,000 people in South Vietnam have fled into Government refugee camps since the North Vietnamese began their current offensive in the South on March 29, according to Social Affairs Minister Tran Nguon Phieu.

Speaking in a television interview Saturday night the minister said this figure did not include an estimated 200,000 to 300,000 more refugees believed to be living outside the camps either with friends or family.

The big majority of the refugees came from the northern

military district where the North Vietnamese are in control of Quang Tri Province bordering North Vietnam and heavy fighting occurs daily around the former imperial capital of Hue a little farther south.

Phieu put the number of refugees from the five northern provinces at 330,000, those from the second military district in the heavily contested Central Highlands at 122,000, those from the third military district around Saigon at 74,000 and those from the fourth military district in the Mekong Delta at 22,000.

They were distributed among

267 Government camps. The Government was providing 500 grams of rice per day for adults and 200 grams for children at a total cost of 25 million piastres (£25,000) a day.

Phieu said the Government planned to resettle the refugees on some of the islands just off the South Vietnamese coast in the South China Sea.

He stressed that all those involved should understand that this in no way meant that they would be held in detention but was intended as a move to protect them from possible Communist shelling attacks.

THE TIMES, Blantyre
1 MAY 1972

NORTH VIETNAMESE CREWMAN

CHAINED IN HIS TANK

FREELANCE photographer Gerard Hebert of Montreal who spent five days in the besieged provincial capital of An Loc, witnessed heavy fighting there and was wounded during one of the tank battles. Brought safely out of the city by helicopter on April 18, he cabled the following story:

AN LOC, APRIL 18 "The first dead North Vietnamese

tank crewman I saw had been chained inside his tank. I was photographing one of the tanks that had been knocked out in the middle of the town in the battle and there was a body outside the tank, apparently that of the tank commander.

Down inside were two more bodies — dead. From a direct hit by an M72 anti-tank rocket, I saw something glint in the darkness. I felt the man's ankle. It was chained to the inside of the tank

with quarter-inch-thick chain links.

I had heard of this happening with North Vietnamese tank crews in Laos last year. Still, I was surprised. South Vietnamese soldiers told me all tank crewmen were chained although tank commanders were not.

One captured North Vietnamese crew chief told interrogators he had been assured before he entered An Loc that the town was already in North Vietnamese hands.

That explains why the tanks moved into town at an easygoing pace with their turrets open and their commanders looking idly around as if they owned the place. South Vietnamese infantrymen couldn't believe their eyes.

Unsuspecting tanks got to within 50 yards of the South Vietnamese positions before the infantrymen started firing their M72's. I saw 11 tanks and seven of them were knocked out...."

WASHINGTON STAR
30 May 1972

WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP

North Vietnam Being Devastated

Something terrible is happening.

North Vietnam, a country of some 20 million persons, is being rapidly and completely taken apart by the cumulative effects of the mining of its harbors, the shelling of its coastline and the bombing of a wide variety of targets throughout the country.

Nothing remotely like this has happened since the final days of World War II, when the air defense and fire-fighting systems of Germany and Japan collapsed, leaving them virtually defenseless—and yet what is happening to North Vietnam is different in significant ways from the situation in those last days of World War II.

The full impact of Operation Linchbacker has not dawned on the American public, at least partially because of the old argument on the military effectiveness of bombing and mining. Some opponents of the bombing argue that it is not militarily effective—and thus give the impression that it is not having a major effect within

North Vietnam.

No one, however, can read the bomb damage reports—now issued daily—without coming to the conclusion that the attacks are having a devastating effect and that, while there is relatively little direct loss of life, the impact on the people will be severe.

The bombing campaign of 1965-68 was also devastating, but there are major differences that will make the effects of the current campaign, if continued for even a few more weeks, much more severe.

A major difference, of course, is that the port of Haiphong remained open throughout the earlier campaign. While major efforts were made to block the movement of supplies after they had been unloaded, there always was a significant amount that did get through. Now, according to reports from both sides, the mining of the harbors has totally cut off the movement of supplies by sea.

In the earlier bombing campaign, different classes of targets were hit over a period of years. While the destruc-

tion of these targets caused major difficulties, there was almost always time to make repairs or find an alternate way of doing things. In the three weeks of the current campaign, almost all these classes of targets have been attacked in rapid succession, leaving little time for repairs or adaptation.

A major, and perhaps crucial, difference is that the enemy's air defense system, or important parts of it, remained off limits most of the time during the earlier bombing campaign. Pilots were specifically forbidden to attack MIG airfields or certain air defense control points. The North Vietnamese air defense system not only survived, but improved remarkably, between 1965 and 1968, making the Hanoi-Haiphong area one of the most dangerous places in the history of aerial warfare.

In the current campaign, the air defense system was a priority target. Naval gunfire smashed virtually every radar station along the coast. Large numbers of planes were used in the early raids to destroy surface-to-air missile sites and to confuse the remaining ra-

dar. A major air defense center on the outskirts of Hanoi was bombed. American pilots don't yet have a free ride over Hanoi, but the air defense system already has been badly degraded.

With the use of laser- and television-guided bombs American bomber crews have knocked out hundreds of bridges and probably can keep them down. This is a key part of the strategy of keeping supplies from reaching the fighting front. But this disruption of the lines of communication throughout the country also is the part of the bombing that will have the major impact on the civilian population.

There is no way of telling how long the bombing will go on. President Nixon clearly indicated his determination to retain the pressure on the North Vietnamese when he permitted continued heavy raids on the Hanoi area while he was in the Kremlin. On the other side, the North Vietnamese have given every indication that they intend to go ahead with their offensive in the South, at least until the issue is decided on the ground at Hue.

It thus seems likely that the bombing and the mining operation will go on for at least another month and that virtually insures a human disaster of historic proportions for the people of North Vietnam.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 June 1972
**LOCAL HANOI RADIO
HINTS AT TROUBLES**

**Home Broadcasts Denounce
Crime and Indiscipline**

Special to The New York Times

HONG KONG, June 14—North Vietnam projects abroad an image of a selfless, dedicated people and a valiant, unbeatable army, but in broadcasts intended only for home consumption there are hints of problems and pressures among the civilian population and the members of the armed forces.

Translations provided by a monitoring agency of broadcasts on the home service of the Hanoi radio since the Communist offensive began in South Vietnam at the end of March give a more balanced picture of the nation at war than the English-language broadcasts of the same station or the transmissions of the official North Vietnamese press agency.

The broadcasts intended for abroad concentrate on hailing Communist victories in the

South and denouncing American bombing raids against the North. The home-service broadcasts include calls for intensified security to combat crime, blackmarket operations and sabotage and campaigns on the war front to tighten military discipline, counter defeatism and heighten morale.

'Bad, Rioting Elements'

If there has been open opposition to the war in North Vietnam, this has not been reported by Hanoi. But Nhan Dan, the official publication of the Communist party, reported in April that the authorities were determined to "punish bad, rioting elements." The assertion was made without further explanation in an editorial broadcast in Vietnamese over the Hanoi radio.

Early in May, the Government promulgated "regulations on the maintenance of security and order and on running the economy in wartime" which called for stepped-up "guarding and patrolling to detect and prevent crime and bring delinquents to court for prosecution."

The regulations, broadcast over the home service of the Hanoi radio, said that severe punishment would be meted out to persons "taking advantage of war conditions to sabotage production and combat

against life or socialist property."

They stipulated that it was "strictly forbidden to engage in speculation, illegal trade or the sale and purchase of food ration cards or to exploit, evacuated people and agencies responsible for their transportation, or to sell them food products, grain and other staple goods."

Warns of Punishment

The regulations also stated that security personnel who did good work would be rewarded while those who deserted their posts or made use of their positions to harm the state and people would be punished.

Problems of a military nature have been aired in Quan Doi Nhan Dan, the armed forces publication. An article from the paper broadcast over the home service of the Hanoi radio on May 30 said that war required that the army make outstanding efforts and move forward rapidly. It said that in order to generate a "revolutionary impetus" among members of the armed forces, political education must be stepped up.

On June 4 a front-page editorial in Quan Doi Nhan Dan called for strict discipline both on the front line and in the rear. According to excerpts broadcast by the home service

of the Hanoi radio, it stated that discipline must be enforced "conscientiously and strictly" and brought into a "new, better pattern in order to suit a unit's present combat and living conditions."

Stresses Security

The editorial stated "It is necessary to execute strictly all orders issued by higher echelons, to overcome resolutely all difficulties and not retreat because of any fierce challenge."

The need for security against possible enemy landings in the North has been stressed in a number of broadcasts over the home service of the Hanoi radio. One, taken from a Nhan Dan editorial, commended security forces in inland coastal and border areas for having spotted and captured or annihilated "many groups of enemy spies, commandos and armed scouts." It warned that the United States might "brazenly launch surprise raids and attacks against a number of areas in the North."

A few days later Quan Doi Nhan Dan carried an editorial that said, that United States imperialism had "sent armed agents to land in secret." It called for the protection of territorial waters and the smashing of "all enemy sabotage activities."

NEW YORK TIMES

6 July 1972

**Enemy Is Facing Floods,
U.S. Says, Denying Role**

WASHINGTON, July 5—State Department officials said today that there was a strong likelihood North Vietnam would be flooded later this summer, but they said North Vietnam's dike system would be responsible rather than American bombing raids.

In separate interviews, responsible State Department officials did not deny that some bombs were falling on the dikes. But they again insisted that there has been no systematic targeting of the dike system, which runs throughout the Red River basin.

In recent weeks North Vietnam repeatedly accused the United States of intentionally bombing the dikes to cause flooding during the monsoon season, which has just begun.

Last summer, when there was no American bombing of the area, North Vietnam suf-

fered its worst flooding in years. Administration experts say the dikes were heavily damaged by those floods, and they back up their views with citations from the Hanoi press.

A State Department senior official showed a translation of an article that appeared in the June 20 issue of a Hanoi newspaper, Hanoi Moi. Written by Tran Duy Hung, chairman of the Hanoi Administrative Committee, the article said: "In some places, the repair of the dike portions that were damaged by torrential rains in 1971 has not yet met technical requirements."

"A number of thin and weakened dikes which are probably full of termite colonies and holes have not been detected for repair," it said.

The article said that each individual and locality must actively take part in the current dike-

"there is not much time before the torrential rain season."

"Repair methods must be firmly grasped in case the dikes are eroded, eaten away, broken through or washed over by water," it said. "We must organize many dike repair exercises, including cases in which the dikes are attacked by the enemy."

The article also accused what it called "the warlike Nixon clique" as having destroyed parts of the dike system by bombing.

The State Department officials interviewed said that in view of the heavy air campaign against North Vietnam, accidental bombing of the dikes could not be ruled out.

One official said that such bombing could take place under at least three circumstances: the first, when North Vietnamese antiaircraft guns are situated at or near dikes, and are attacked; the second, when American fighter-bombers, engaged in aerial combat, un-

speed, and the third, when to-ground missiles directed against North Vietnamese radar become "undirected" when the radar is shut off.

Administration experts, studying the over-all situation in North Vietnam, have concluded that there is "a higher than normal probability" that floods similar to last year's may strike next month.

Because North Vietnam has charged repeatedly that the dikes have been bombed deliberately, the Administration has become sensitive to the possibility that world opinion would blame the United States for any flooding that develops.

Therefore, the State Department has been eager to publicize any internal evidence, such as the Hanoi Moi article, that supports, even indirectly, the American contention that flooding may occur for reasons unconnected with the bombing.

President Nixon and Administration spokesmen have regularly denied that the dikes are targets for destruction.

WASHINGTON STAR
31 May 1972

Hanoi's Silence on Summit Reveals Fears on Support

By HENRY S. BRADSHER
Star Staff Writer

SAIGON — The slowness of North Vietnam to comment on President Nixon's Moscow talks reveals Hanoi's fear that it can no longer expect effective support from the Soviet Union.

The fear has been made more real by what Moscow has said recently, and what it has failed to do.

During Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union, the Kremlin leadership kept the Vietnam issue very cool and secondary in public comments.

The Soviet statement of support for Hanoi in the final communique was considered by Communist affairs analysts here to be perfunctory.

Moscow radio broadcasts in Vietnamese to Vietnam for the past week have been emphasizing the need to negotiate an end to the war rather than keep fighting.

These indications of attitude have been matched by Moscow's failure thus far to do anything about trying to get supplies through the U.S. mines off the North Vietnamese coast.

Neither has China, Hanoi's other main source of supplies, done anything to try to overcome the U.S. military actions since May 8.

And Peking, like Hanoi, has been slow to comment on the Nixon visit to Moscow. It was silent on the visit's implications for Vietnam.

In places like Paris and London, East European sources

have begun to speculate on another secret Soviet mission to Hanoi.

One led by a Soviet Communist party secretary, Konstantin Katushev, went to Hanoi after Henry A. Kissinger's April visit to Moscow. Although details have never come out, it seems to have been an abortive Soviet attempt to get Hanoi to negotiate.

Now, the East European sources are speculating on another mission to try to reassure Hanoi that the Soviet Union did not sell them out in Moscow talks with Nixon.

A similar visit was reportedly paid to Hanoi by Premier Chou En-lai shortly after Nixon was in China last February. Hanoi criticized the Nixon-Chou talks in indirect but very strong terms.

Some reports say Chou only met North Vietnamese leaders in southern China, rather than going to Hanoi. But it seems certain that he spoke with them.

Since then, however, China has been noticeably cool toward the current North Vietnamese offensive against South Vietnam.

Hanoi has held its tongue on the Moscow talks so far, with one possible exception.

Broadcast Cited

The Associated Press said May 23 it had picked up a Hanoi broadcast calling Nixon's trip to Moscow an "attempt to undermine the solidarity of those who support the Vietnamese."

U.S. government monitors

said they had not heard this.

A possible indirect comment by the North Vietnamese military newspaper, People's Army, said true Communists do not place national interests above help to the world revolution.

Moscow has indicated that it is sensitive to this kind of criticism. It has tried to head it off by arguing that its policies have not changed.

A Vietnamese-language broadcast from Moscow on Thursday—the day after Nixon and Communist party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev had their long evening talk about Vietnam—had a very defensive tone on this.

It said Soviet policy "is consistent with the fundamental interests of the U.S.S.R., world socialism and the national liberation movement."

Conditions for "the anti-imperialist struggle of various nations depends to a great measure," the broadcast argued, on the satisfactory settlement by the big powers of major problems like nuclear disarmament and European security.

The Soviet Union is supporting and aiding "the heroic Vietnamese people," whose victories are partly a result of that "enormous support of the U.S.S.R.," it said.

But it added that "the war of aggression in Vietnam can be ended only through negotiations." Moscow supports "the legitimate proposals of the Vietnamese patriotic fighters" for negotiations.

Another Moscow broadcast in Vietnamese the same day said "practical experience clearly shows that the Vietnam problem cannot be solved by military means."

Accent on Talks

Both broadcasts seemed to be an indirect way of saying North Vietnam must negotiate rather than simply expect Soviet help for continuing the war.

"In view of the present international situation, the unity of thought of all Socialist countries has an especially important meaning" for Vietnam, the first broadcast said.

Communist affairs analysts felt this qualification, making clear that unity is of thought rather than of action, was particularly significant.

Both this broadcast and the joint communique on Nixon's visit downgraded Vietnam to the status of just another world problem being viewed from Moscow along with the Middle East and others.

Hanoi would prefer to have its struggle be given top priority in Communist thinking.

The North Vietnamese might also be apprehensive about the basic principles of relations signed Monday by Nixon and Communist party chief Leonid Brezhnev.

It said the two superpowers "will do their utmost to avoid military confrontations."

With the United States determined to maintain its naval and aerial strength around North Vietnam, this pointed to a lack of intention by the Soviet Union to interfere.

The principles also talked about "the recognition of the security interests" of each other. While primarily directed to direct nuclear threats, this could be read in Hanoi as signifying Soviet acceptance of the American role in Vietnam.

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

WASHINGTON POST
14 June 1972

Moscow-Hanoi Schism

EVIDENCE of a deeply significant schism between Hanoi and Moscow has now become inescapable in Hanoi's vituperative outpourings against the Kremlin for consorting with President Nixon—"this Number One cruel, diabolic thug of the world," in the words of a senior North Vietnamese commentator writing in the June 3 issue of the party newspaper, Nhan Dan.

Although Hanoi's fury against the Soviet Union is partially cloaked in innuendos and subtleties, there is no mistaking its meaning, by inviting Mr. Nixon to Moscow, particularly after Soviet shipments of war supplies were blocked by the mining of North Vietnam's harbors, the Kremlin is playing the U.S. game of splitting the world Communist movement.

Thus, on May 21, the day before Mr. Nixon arrived in Moscow, the North Vietnamese army newspaper charged that "wherever he sets foot, he carries out counterrevolutionary acts." By permitting the President to "set foot" in Moscow, in short, the Kremlin was an accessory before the fact in one of the most heinous crimes of communism—

counterrevolutionary activity.

Developing the charge of counterrevolution, the May 21 polemic accused the Soviet Union of putting its own "national interests" over those of the world revolution in the following thinly veiled doctrinal sermon:

"Communists always consider the revolution of each nation an inseparable part of the world revolution. They never set national interests against the interests of the world revolution nor place private national interests above the common interests of the world revolution, much less serve their own national selfishness."

The only way to deal with Mr. Nixon's latest offensive in Vietnam is by "a relentless attack against the U.S. imperialists."

But what did the Soviet Union do? Hanoi hurls the accusation in polemical terms:

"By ignoring the tolerating the U.S. imperialists' crimes, one cannot repel their aggression. By showing weakness, one cannot punish their aggressiveness."

ADDING INSULT to injury, another article in the tightly controlled North Vi-

etnamese party newspaper boasted that although the Vietnamese people have been fighting "for thousands of years," they "do not beg for peace and security" from their enemies. The implication by inviting President Nixon to Moscow, the Soviet Union became a supplicant.

Nowhere in these veiled attacks against the Russians did the North Vietnamese publish the facts concerning Mr. Nixon's summit trip to Moscow or discuss the agreements that emerged. But the Russians themselves in a counterattack aired to North Vietnam over the Soviet overseas radio, attempted to put the Nixon visit in perspective and blunt the anti-Soviet overtones of Hanoi's propaganda.

On May 25, in the middle of the Moscow summit, Radio Moscow invoked "Leninist principles" in defense of the Kremlin's strategic decision to welcome Mr. Nixon despite escalation of the Vietnam war.

"Peaceful coexistence" with nations of different political systems, the broadcast in Vietnamese stated, is not only essential to prevent world war but also "in complete conformity with the in-

terests of world socialism (communism)."

Reminding Hanoi that it owes much to the "enormous support" of the Soviet Union in the 10-year war against the South, Radio Moscow sang the praises of the Vietnamese Communists but added a pointed warning: "The war of aggression in Vietnam can be ended only through negotiations . . . practical experience clearly shows that the Vietnam problem cannot be solved by military means."

More pointedly, a lengthy May 26 article in New Times, signed by a deputy chief in the Central Committee's foreign Affairs Department, strongly defended the Kremlin's refusal to make a military response to the U.S. blockade of North Vietnam.

The strength of international communism, New Times said, "has never lain in primitiveness and stereotype nor in an identical repetition of the methods (armed force) used by the class enemy." In an unprecedent rebuke, the article attacked Hanoi's "inaccurate and extremely arbitrary interpretation" of Moscow's supposed duty in the face of the Nixon-imposed blockade.

NEW YORK TIMES

20 June 1972

SOVIET INDICATES
COOLNESS IN HANOIHints at Differences Over
Improved Ties With U.S.

By HEDRICK SMITH

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, June 19—The Soviet press today provided indications of unresolved Soviet-North Vietnamese differences over Moscow's improved relations with the United States in its first reports on the special mission to Hanoi of President

Nikolai V. Podgorny.

The tenor of these reports, in Tass, the Soviet press agency, and Izvestia, the Government newspaper, routinely reaffirming solidarity and calling for negotiations, sharply underscored how sharply Mr. Podgorny had toned down Soviet pledges of support for Hanoi and criticism of the United States in comparison with his last trip to North Vietnam in October.

At that time he declared that Moscow would "resolutely support" the Vietnamese against the United States "until full victory" with aid on three levels—military, political and diplomatic. A joint statement affirmed their "unanimity of views."

By contrast, during his visit from

Podgorny was reported to have pledged that the Soviet Union would "continue to render all the necessary assistance" to the Vietnamese struggle against "imperialist aggression" and sincerely wished them "fresh successes."

Frankness, Not Unanimity

There was no mention of unanimity. Instead, there was a reference to the "comradely frankness" of the talks, a normal euphemism for disagreements. The absence of a joint statement was also seen as an indication of continuing strains.

No specific mention was made of military aid and, unlike last fall, no senior military figures were included in Mr. Podgorny's delegation.

Missing from the group of Vietnamese offi-

cials who normally meet with top Soviet leaders were Premier Pham Van Dong and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap. Their absence could also

have signaled particularly strong personal approval of Moscow's willingness to play host to Mr. Nixon rather than respond to his mining of Haiphong harbor with tonnage.

The Soviet press gave indication whether, as sources had said he would, Podgorny had tried to persuade Hanoi to agree to a cease-fire in Indochina to open the way for a resumption of peace negotiations.

The Soviet reports today, largely repeated over the Hanoi radio, quoted the two sides as joining in a demand that Washington "resume constructive

tlaks in Paris" and end immediately all air attacks on North Vietnam and the mining of its ports. But there was no reference to remarks attributed to President Podgorny in press reports from India that the Vietnam negotiations in Paris would resume soon.

Briefing Isn't Mentioned

The Soviet reports did not touch on what was widely presumed to have been Mr. Podgorny's primary mission — to brief the North Vietnamese leaders on the results of the meetings with President Nixon in Moscow last month and to patch up differences stemming from Moscow's decision to go through with the summit meet-

ing. Approved for Release: 2018/04/25 C02599106

On the day before President Nixon arrived in Moscow, the North Vietnamese Army newspaper accused the Kremlin of having showed weakness toward the American President and of having put its own "national interests against the interests of the world revolution." The charges did not mention Moscow by name but it was clearly the target.

Five days later, on May 26, *Novoye Vremya*, a Communist party weekly on international affairs, carried a sharply worded and unusually explicit rebuttal written by Vadim V. Zagladin, deputy chief of the Central Committee's department for re-

minist parties.

The article denied that Moscow was shirking its socialist duty. It argued for proceeding with the summit meeting in the interest of major achievements, such as an agreement to limit arms, through the policy of peaceful coexistence, Communist terminology for better relations with the West.

Hanoi Demands Talks

PARIS, June 19 (Reuters)—North Vietnam today followed up President Podgorny's prediction of a speedy resumption of the Paris peace talks by demanding that the United States return to the negotiating table

here.

"We demand that the United States negotiate seriously and resume the work of the Paris conference on Vietnam each Thursday as usual," the North Vietnamese delegation said in a statement.

HANOI, North Vietnam, June 19 (Agence France-Presse)—The North Vietnamese Government today broke its silence over the visit by President Podgorny, issuing a laconic communiqué stating that he had been on a "nonofficial" mission.

The clear indication was that he had not met Premier Pham Van Dong.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

21 June 1972

'Diplomatic shock' in Hanoi

Hanoi is in a state of diplomatic shock induced by the visit of presidential adviser Henry Kissinger to Peking and the visit of Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny to North Vietnam.

Perhaps the clearest indication of this is the change in the plans of Hanoi's chief negotiator, Le Duc Tho, who left Paris for a leisurely visit to Bulgaria, only to cut it short before its announced duration had expired, and to rush home for consultations amid signs of growing friction with its allies.

When passing through Moscow, he was met by a party official of such low rank as to suggest that the Kremlin was being deliberately offensive. In Peking, the Chinese leaders took advantage of this to score a point over the Russians by arranging a "very cordial" meeting for him with Chou En-lai.

But the continuing restraint in Peking's public utterances about the war, after registering its formal protest that the bombing was getting too close to China's borders, makes it clear that the Chinese leaders, too, favor a compromise settlement.

Podgorny's announcement after his visit to Hanoi that the Paris talks would be resumed "soon" meant that he had prevailed upon the North Vietnamese leaders to make the concessions that would make the resumption possible.

They made the concessions unwillingly, as is indicated by the evidence of disagreement between them and Podgorny in the official communiqué on his visit. This means that he had managed to mobilize the doves in the North Vietnamese leadership to do what the Soviet Union wanted, and that he has left behind him in Hanoi a stronger peace faction than he found on arrival there.

The chances are, therefore, that more rapid progress will now be made toward a peace settlement. The constellation of forces suggest that the progress will be rapid enough to bring peace to Vietnam before the American general elections in November.

It is the combination of the three separate forces for peace, in Moscow, Peking, and in Hanoi itself, that makes this outcome likely. The shock caused in Hanoi by what it sees as the "betrayal" of its interests by both Moscow and Peking has obviously weakened the hawks and made it possible for the doves to begin moving toward a settlement.

The bitterness with which the Hanoi press has denounced, almost openly, the Nixon visits to both Peking and to Moscow has now given way to a pained silence, which suggests that it sees little point in resisting its allies as well as the United States. The almost transparent hint in the Hanoi press after the Moscow summit, that the "major powers" were ganging up on smaller countries like Vietnam, is now being translated into the hard language of politics.

What it all amounts to is that Hanoi's "big brothers" are, in spite of their protestations to the contrary, trying to impose a settlement. The signs of this were evident at the beginning of the year, when Hanoi first complained that the big powers were trying to "bully" the small countries. This coincided with the announcement that the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Moscow had a "frank" exchange of views with Mr. Kosygin, the Premier, which indicated that Moscow had begun putting really heavy pressure on Hanoi.

Few people in the West were prepared to accept at that time the evidence suggesting that this pressure, combined with pressure from Peking, was real enough or could prove powerful enough to make a difference. Some skeptics still stick to this view. But the Podgorny and Kissinger trips are the culmination, not the beginning, of the Nixon grand design to end the war in Vietnam by summitry in Peking and in Moscow.

Hanoi is still capable of a show of force, particularly in the Saigon area, but the purpose of any such operation would be to strengthen its position in the final round of negotiations.

NEW YORK TIMES

4 July 1972

HIGH-LEVEL TALKS HELD BY 2 KOREAS ON REUNIFICATION

North and South Agree to
Avoid Armed Incidents and
Seek Better Relations

By The Associated Press

SEOUL, South Korea, Tuesday, July 4—North and South Korea have held top-level meetings in Pyongyang and in Seoul to discuss problems concerning improving relations and territorial reunification of the country, South Korea announced today.

They agreed, among other things, to refrain mutually from armed provocations and to install a hot line between Seoul and Pyongyang "in order to prevent the outbreak of unexpected military incidents," an announcement said.

The announcement was made simultaneously in Seoul and Pyongyang, the North Korean capital.

Tension Reduced

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 3—The announcement of new contacts between the two Koreas was preceded by months of reduced tension during which preliminary

NEW YORK TIMES

5 July 1972

Text of the Joint Korean Communiqué

SEOUL, South Korea, Tuesday, July 4 (Reuters)—Following is the text of a joint North and South Korean communiqué made public simultaneously in Seoul and Pyongyang today, as issued in an official South Korean Government translation:

Recently there were talks held both in Pyongyang and Seoul to discuss problems of improving South-North relations and unifying the divided fatherland.

inary negotiations between the Red Cross societies of North and South were carried on successfully.

The Red Cross talks, officially aimed at humanitarian goals of establishing contacts between members of divided families, and eventually at reuniting them, have had important political implications. Each side has used the 10 months of Red Cross talks at Panmunjom as a means of sounding out the other's intentions.

The two sides at the Panmunjom sessions, which began last August, have agreed on an agenda for substantive negotiations, which are to be held alternately in Seoul and Pyongyang.

In recent months, Premier Kim Il Sung of North Korea has voiced an interest in contacts not only with South Korea but with Japan and the United States, seemingly looking toward an end of his country's long, self-imposed isolation.

He has given interviews to Japanese and American correspondents, and said last month that he would be willing to meet with President Park Chung Hee of South Korea to discuss issues.

Concern Over Allies Noted

Many Western diplomats have speculated that the decision to begin contacts was inspired in both Seoul and Pyongyang by parallel concern that their principal allies—the United States in South Korea's case, and China and the Soviet Union in North Korea's—were heading toward a period of conciliation in which they would be un-

Director Lee Hu Rak of the Central Intelligence Agency of Seoul visited Pyongyang from 2 to 5 May, 1972, to hold talks with Director Kim Yong Ju of the Organization and Guidance Department of Pyongyang. Second Vice Premier Pak Sung Chul, acting on behalf of Director Kim Yong Ju, also visited Seoul from 29 May to 1 June, 1972, to hold further talks with director Lee Hu Rak.

With the common desire to achieve peaceful unification of the fatherland, have

willing to go to war in support of the interests of either Korean state.

President Nixon's trip to Peking last February came as a shock to North Korea and was believed to have heavily influenced Premier Kim to enlarge his country's foreign contacts. The South Koreans, with their economy expanding and their political situation relatively stabilized, had already begun a policy of seeking contacts with East European Communist nations.

Tensions between the two Koreas have been high for most of the post-Korean war period, and have been marked by propaganda exchanges of extreme invective. In the peak year, 1968, there were hundreds of casualties from clashes along the demilitarized zone and in coastal areas where northern agents were infiltrated.

But despite the tensions, both sides have always called for reunification as a primary national goal. The South Koreans have generally insisted on fulfillment of the United Nations General Assembly call for free elections in both North and South and on formal renunciation by Pyongyang of any use of force to achieve unification.

Federation Is Held Possible

But recently, South Korean officials have said that they could envision some kind of federation after a long period of gradual improvement in relations. President Park has said that discussion of political problems such as unification should come at the end of a three-stage program: First, agreement on humanitarian questions involving divided families, then nonpolitical matters such as trade and commu-

nication, and finally political questions.

That outline appears not much different from recent suggestions made in the North Korean press calling for gradual improvement in the atmosphere, to be followed by a confederation of the two Koreas in which each side would maintain its own form of government.

Among important issues to be resolved would be the status of the 40,000 American troops based in South Korea, under the flag of the United Nations Command, and South Korea's defense relationship with the United States. In the past, Premier Kim said that withdrawal of American troops was a precondition for better North-South relations, but more recently in interviews he has been less demanding.

First Direct Negotiations

The Red Cross talks aroused considerable international interest when they began last summer because they marked the first time representatives of the two Koreas had met in their own country on bilateral matters since the Korean war, which ended in 1953.

Both Governments have been under some pressure to improve contacts and respond to the strong pull of Korean nationalism, which has remained strong despite 35 years of Japanese occupation, from 1910 to 1945, and 27 years of division following the end of World War II.

The South Korean leaders have argued that this effort to negotiate might loosen the rigid totalitarianism of North Korea. The North Korean leaders, by holding out the hope of eventual unification, may feel that this could produce a loosening of Seoul's ties with the United States and Japan.

reached full agreement on the following points:

[1]

The two sides have agreed to the following principles for unification of the fatherland:

First, unification shall be achieved through independent Korean efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference.

Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through the use of force against each other.

Third, as a homogeneous people, a great national unity shall be sought above all.

transcending differences in ideas, ideologies and systems.

[2]

In order to ease tensions and foster an atmosphere of mutual trust between the South and the North, the two sides have agreed not to slander or defame each other, not to undertake armed provocations whether on a large or small scale, and to take positive measures to prevent inadvertent military incidents.

[3]

The two sides, in order to restore severed national ties,

promote mutual understanding and to expedite independent peaceful unification, have agreed to carry out various exchanges in many fields.

[4]

The two sides have agreed to cooperate positively with each other to seek early success of the South-North Red Cross talks, which are under way with the fervent expectations of the entire people.

[5]

The two sides, in order to prevent the outbreak of unexpected military incidents and to deal directly, promptly

and accurately with problems arising between the South and the North, have agreed to install a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang.

[6]

The two sides, in order to implement the aforementioned agreed items, solve various problems existing between the South and the North, and to settle the unification problems on the basis of the agreed principles for unification of the fatherland, have agreed to establish and operate a South - North coordinating

committee co-chaired by Director Lee Hu Rak and Director Kim Yong Ju.

[7]

The two sides, firmly convinced that the aforementioned agreed items correspond with the common aspirations of the entire people, who are anxious to see an early unification of the fatherland, hereby solemnly pledge before the entire Korean people that they will faithfully carry out these agreed items, upholding the desires of their respective superiors.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

6 July 1972

Picking up the pieces in Korea

The sudden and dramatic agreement between the two Koreas this week earnestly to seek reunification, after 27 years of total separation marked by sporadic fighting and steady verbal abuse, is as welcome as it is important for history present and history future.

It is hardly coincidental that the overtures between the two capitals of Seoul and Pyongyang followed close behind President Nixon's visits to Peking and Moscow. In the family of nations, as in the families of men, strong and positive examples set by the higher levels in the hierarchy influence those at the lower levels to act positively.

The agreement between the two major Communist capitals of the world and Washington to look beyond differences in social, political, and economic systems, and to put ideologies to one side, is reflected in the agreement between Seoul and Pyongyang. Thus the establishment of a hot line between the two Korean capitals to prevent any military flareups along their joint border. Thus their setting up of a joint coordinating committee to "unify the fatherland." Thus their declaration of intent to reunify on a national basis in such a way as to transcend differences "in ideas, ideologies, and systems."


It will not be easy. Those ideological differences are great. The virulence of propaganda, hurled against each other during 27 years of division has left scars, bitterness, and suspicion. And there are practical problems to be compromised. South Korea wants United Nations-super-

vised elections in both countries to elect an all-Korean Legislature. North Korea, with a population of 13 million against its southern neighbor's 31 million, wants to cut both sides' armed forces to 100,000 men each, then follow with a confederation, in which each side would retain its own government and its own social and political systems. It will take time, patience and determination to achieve the necessary compromise.

In favor of success is the deep desire of the Korean people to be reunited. This is underscored by the continuing effort of the International Red Cross to arrange for reuniting divided families, an effort that has gone on for years without results. If that work begins to bear fruit, as now seems more likely than ever, the opening up of communications and eventually a flow of people across the long-sealed border would start a process difficult for either government to halt.

The new moves toward reunification have a world significance beyond the Korean peninsula. The point will not be missed in the two Vietnamese capitals that the desire of their respective big power patrons for a relaxation in world tensions only begins at the top international level. It extends down to their own. It is to be hoped that North and South Vietnam, recognizing their rapidly diminishing capability to play Peking and Moscow against Washington, will ponder seriously the precedent of their Korean brothers to the north. The direct distance from Hanoi to Saigon is shorter than via Paris, Washington, Moscow, or Peking.

THE OPEN INVASION OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM BY COMMUNIST NORTH VIET-NAM



THE COMMUNISTS OPENLY CROSSED THE DMZ AND BLATANTLY ATTACKED...



On March 29, 1972, several North Vietnamese regular units have openly crossed the DMZ and attacked the Republic of Vietnam outposts, in an attempt to occupy the territory of South Vietnam below the demarcation area.

The DMZ, the symbol of a reasonable solution for the two Zones pending a negotiated formula for the eventual peaceful reunification of Vietnam, is being trampled by the Communist North Vietnam who, in so doing, has violated the 1954 Geneva Agreements as well as the 1968 secret understandings on the cessation of the American bombing over North Vietnam.

The invading forces include the elite infantry Divisions 304, 308 and 324B, supported by 6 other infantry regiments, 3 artillery regiments, extensive anti-aircraft units, one tank regiment and one surface-to-air missile regiment. The North Vietnamese invaders also used MIG planes in support of their offensive. Columns of Russian made PT. 76, T. 55, T. 54 tanks moved down openly along Road No. 1 to attack the RVN outposts south of the DMZ. The strength of the Communist forces is later estimated at around 15 divisions including « Farming Sites » No. 2. and 3 and « Working Sites » No. 5, 7 and 9.

At the Cambodian frontiers bordering the provinces of Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Phuoc Long, the enemy supported by long range artillery and T. 54 tanks massively attacked the province of Binh Long, meanwhile in the tri-border area, Vietnam — Cambodia — Laos, bordering the provinces of Kontum and Pleiku, a North Vietnamese division attempted to attack the province of Kontum.

In these three areas, fierce and bloody fighting has taken place in the past months and is still continuing, and the RVN troops have inflicted very heavy losses to the enemy. But the civilian population have suffered much harm caused by North Vietnam indiscriminate shellings into the densely populated areas. More than 650,000 people have had to take refuge in more distant areas.

This is eloquent evidence that North Vietnam is the real aggressor and the NLF was created for the only purpose of misleading world opinion. The objective of the North Vietnamese leaders, when ordering the invasion of the RVN territory, is to occupy the two provincial capitals of Quang Tri and Thua Thien in order to use them as capital for that which the North Vietnamese Communists have been forging for a long time, the so-called Government of the National Liberation Front, and as a gate for their domination of the whole South Vietnam.

This open invasion of the Republic of Vietnam is a campaign that the North Vietnamese Communists have prepared for a long time and which they called the 1972 general offensive, general uprising and general revolt. That proved the Communists do not advocate peace, they do not seek to end the war by negotiations, but they on the contrary advocate aggression.

the pursuit of the war and the annexation of South Vietnam by force and by military victory.

The Vietnamese people and troops are determined to win over the communist aggressors and wipe them out of the Republic of Vietnam territory.

A MEASURE OF DESPERATION...

THE regular Army of North Vietnam has launched an attack on South Vietnam, supported by massive quantities of Russian and Chinese arms and equipment, including tanks and giant guns.

The South Vietnamese are containing the multiple thrusts across their borders, and in some areas counter-attacking and inflicting heavy defeats on the North Vietnamese. Thus despite the tremendous resources of regular soldiery and equipment that the North Vietnamese war-makers have thrown into this invasion, they have been thwarted by the defence forces of South Vietnam from attaining their initial objectives.

No doubt the invasion will continue. In the totalitarian society of the North nobody can protest against the terrible losses of men. Appreciating how vital has been the aid given to South Vietnam over the years by the United States, Australia and other free-world nations, Hanoi will try to sustain its aggression in the hope of weakening the resolve of South Vietnam's friends and stirring the flagging support given to the Northern communists by their friends outside Vietnam. In particular Hanoi hopes to influence the United States Presidential Elections, to further their « peace » plans.

In the meantime the South Vietnamese people and government deserve the congratulations of all freedom-loving people. The support for South Vietnam is fully vindicated. The return of Australian ground troops does not arise since the South Vietnamese are confident that they can handle the attack from the North themselves. But in view of the Russian and Chinese provision of huge quantities of modern war materials, allied air support and economic aid will still be needed on a large scale. The Australian government should be willing to consider sympathetically any request for air and naval support, as well as increased economic and arms assistance.

The fraudulent nature of the leftwing propaganda campaign is now clear. The internal insurgency in South Vietnam is now no more than a minor irritant because of the progressive reforms of the South Vietnamese government. The communist leaders in Hanoi have been forced to abandon the pretence that there is an internal war against the South Vietnamese government by domestic dissidents. The Viet Cong, always buttressed by Hanoi, has so withered on the vine that war by proxy is no longer possible and the North Vietnamese communists have been reduced to outright invasion.

This is a measure of their desperation.

Professor David AMSTRONG
Chairman of The Committee
of THE FRIENDS OF VIETNAM,
AUSTRALIA

Hanoi and its supporters abroad are now hard put to explain away the invasion of its own ally's territory, for by Hanoi's definition South Vietnam belongs to the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRGSVN) and only one-fifth of it is still « temporarily occupied » by the GVN. It would be pretty torturous thinking to believe that Hanoi's 15 divisions are needed to « repel » the « aggression » coming from only one-fifth of the territory of South Vietnam. That this hardly makes sense is no deterrence to Hanoi's friends abroad who recently go so far as to request that the Soviet Union increases arms shipments to Hanoi so as to strengthen Hanoi's killing capacity. It is thus clear that the Government of Vietnam and the anti-war groups abroad are agreed on at least one point: the strength of Communism in Vietnam does not reside in the « revolutionary fervor » of the Communist troops native to South Vietnam, rather it is the direct translation of Russian weaponry engaged in a classical confrontation where Hanoi's troops merely play the role of cannon fodder. In the resulting clash of steel the « revolutionary war » of Hanoi appears in its naked garb, a full-scale invasion, ideologically motivated, in which the Soviet Union expects to put the world in front of a fait accompli with Hanoi acting as a willing proxy.

« I CONDEMN THE INVASION... »

The troubled and tragic states of Indo-China — the Republic of Vietnam in particular — are struggling to cope with enormously difficult problems. They face a North Vietnam which remains determined to impose by force on the South a government of the North's choosing. North Vietnam has launched its regular forces in attacks in great strength outside its own borders into the Khmer Republic and Laos as well as into South Vietnam.

« North Vietnam is supported in this by extensive aid from the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries, and from China. The bulk of this aid, much of it in the form of the most modern weapons, now comes from the Soviet Union.

« I emphasise that what we are watching now is not a « people's uprising ». It is not a civil war. It is an invasion of one country by another. The great bulk of North Vietnam's regular army is now deployed in the South.

« Why has North Vietnam persisted in this war policy ?

« It is not for lack of alternatives. The peace proposals put forward by President Thieu and President Nixon on 25th January this year offered the opportunity for the people of South Vietnam, on whose behalf the North Vietnamese claim to be acting, to determine their own future through elections conducted by an independent commission and under international supervision. President Thieu offered to resign prior to these elections. But the communists are still not prepared to face the test of elections.

« Why did the North act when it did ? No doubt a number of factors were involved in the timing. There is some evidence that Hanoi wanted to attack earlier, in the region of the Central Highlands, but that its plans were disrupted by South Vietnamese and United States pre-emptive operations. Another factor was probably the weather — suitable for campaigning while providing some cover from air attack. Another may have been a wish to demonstrate, at a time of increasing contacts between

the United States and the Soviet Union and the United States and China, that it is Hanoi which determines events in Indo-China. Yet another factor, which was evident at the time of the unsuccessful Tet offensive in 1968, appears to be a deliberate attempt to exert pressure on United States opinion, and through it on the United States administration. They are mindful that this is a Presidential Election year.

• It also seems clear that a compelling reason for the invasion at this time was an assessment on the part of the North Vietnamese leadership that South Vietnam was doing too well.

• Hanoi needed to disrupt the consolidation that has been going on in the Republic of Vietnam, both within its armed forces (ARVN) and in its society generally: and to act before South Vietnam became too tough a nut to crack. Their offensive had been foreseen: but it is one thing to foresee events and another to live through them, preserve one's balance, and, in circumstances where the aggressor naturally has the initiative, to withstand them.

• The South Vietnamese forces have suffered reverses. There may be further setbacks before the situation clarifies. But it is worth remembering the experience of the offensive of Tet 1968, which showed the importance of reserving judgment on the outcome of the fighting. In 1968 hasty judgments allowed the communists to make great propaganda gains, although subsequent events showed that Tet 1968 had, in fact, been a major setback for the communists, both in terms of military casualties and of damage to their organisation and infrastructure in the South.

• On behalf of the Government, I condemn the invasion of the Republic of Vietnam by North Vietnamese regular army units. It has been launched, and could only have been launched, with massive support from the Soviet Union and China. I believe the overwhelming majority of Australians have deep sympathy for the people of the Republic of Vietnam. They were fighting courageously in defence of their country even before their allies came to their assistance with ground troops. They have continued to fight with great courage notwithstanding that the ground troops of their allies are being withdrawn.

• We are continuing with our civil aid. We are despatching urgently needed supplies to assist them in coping with the flood of men, women and children fleeing as refugees before the advance of the invading armies.

• If the South Vietnamese fall before this onslaught not only will it be a sad day for all who believe small countries and their peoples should be free to determine their own government, but the repercussions of their fall will reverberate in the South-East Asian region for years to come. »

NIGEL BOWEN

Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs

LIBERATION MYTH SHATTERED

WHATEVER the outcome of the Communist offensive in South Vietnam may be, the record of the past four weeks has robbed Hanoi and the local Viet Cong of any pretence of playing the noble role of « Liberators » in the South.

For despite setbacks suffered, the resistance of the Southern Armies and the refusal of the civilian population to rise in support of the Red Invaders clearly show the true sentiments of most people in the South.

These sentiments are fear of and hatred for the aggressors.

No army kept together by American money and driven by Saigon's whip, as the red have claimed, would have fought as well as the Southern soldiers have fought so far.

And no downtrodden and grossly exploited people would either flee from its presumed liberators or refuse to rise in their support as the South Vietnamese have done, despite Viet Cong efforts to call them to revolt.

CLEAR LESSON

The lesson is clear : South Vietnam can only be « liberated » in the sense which the Communists gave to this word in 1956 in Hungary and in 1968 in Czechoslovakia.

The unfortunate Hungarians and Czechs had no chance against the tanks of their « Liberators ».

The South Vietnam forces, having been given a chance by their Allies, have grabbed it with both hands.

In the meantime, thousands die, are maimed or become homeless because of Hanoi's savage fanaticism.

Whether the restarted Paris peace talks will end this suffering entirely depends upon the comrades in the North Vietnamese capital.

It is to be hoped that they noted well President Nixon's pledge that America, despite its troop withdrawals, would not stand idly by and see South Vietnam submerged.

Daily Telegraph

*The Massive Exodus of Refugees :***THEY FLED AWAY FROM THE INVADING FORCES . . .**

A steady stream of refugees has been moving south from tiny hamlets and villages between Dong-Ha and the Demilitarized Zone since the North Vietnamese invasion of Quang-Tri Province. Most of them were making for the ancient Vietnamese capital of Hue, scene of the 1968 North Vietnamese Tet offensive. About 20,000 refugees have arrived at Hue, according to a news agency report. It could rise drastically in the next few days.

Most of the people moving south in battered buses and trucks, motor-cycles and old cars and carrying all their vital possessions look unafraid. They are doing what one million Vietnamese did when Vietnam was divided into North and South. They are fleeing from Communist domination. By regrouping at great personal sacrifice in territory protected by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) the residents of the DMZ area are showing confidence in the ability of the South Vietnamese Government to guarantee their future well-being.

The mass exodus is a clear sign that the civilian population of Quang-Tri Province rejects the North Vietnamese. By crossing the DMZ, the North Vietnamese has given a clear-cut choice to the people : they could remain at home to welcome the self-proclaimed « liberators » from the North or flee to the South. They chose the South, despite all the misery and suffering they will undergo as refugees. And, also, despite claims that the Thieu Government is a harsh and oppressive tyranny.

By walking away from the « liberators », the people of Quang-Tri are virtually « voting with their feet ». Similar popular referendums in recent history were : the fleeing of masses of Dutch, Belgian and French people before invading Nazi hordes ; the exodus from the East German « socialist paradise » which compelled the Soviets to build a wall to keep the East German population from running away to the West ; and the flight of thousands of Hungarians in 1965 and Czechs in 1968 from Soviet tanks.

BANGKOK POST

NORTH VIETNAMESE INVASION OF SOUTH : « UNPARDONABLE DEED »

THE invasion in force of South Vietnam by North Vietnamese armies is unquestionably a deed of unpardonable aggression. What do the North Vietnamese want to prove? They want to discredit the Government of Nguyen Van Thieu as well as the United States. They want to fulfill the well-known Communist objective to dominate peoples — and even their kith and kin.

The whole world knows that the United States forces are being withdrawn from the territory of the South Vietnamese in order that the Republic of Vietnam may be able to carve its own destiny without interference by any force outside their territory.

REDS CAN'T BE TRUSTED

There is no question that the North Vietnamese who are dyed-in-the-wool communists are violating the principle of self-determination which is the keynote to peace and prosperity not only in Asia but in the rest of the world. South Vietnam wishes to be free. It does not want to crook its knee to any outside power be it American or North Vietnamese. Therefore, the invasion of South Vietnam will serve only to emphasize one fact: that the Communists can never be trusted.

The transgression on the life, land and treasure of South Vietnam by the North Vietnamese is exactly what would be the case if the North Koreans were to cross the demilitarized zone and disturb the peace, progress and prosperity of South Korea.

PROTEST CALL

With such an aggressive neighbor as Communist North Vietnam, how can we feel secure and happy in this part of world?

Therefore, I call on all free peoples to protest vigorously against the violation of covenants and the plighted word which has been perpetrated by the North Vietnamese in recent weeks. Let us all uphold with all the strength of our collective will the principle of self-determination.

Sen. JOSE J. ROY, Chairman,
World Anti-Communist League

THE WHOLE NATION IS UNITED AND OF ONE MIND...

IN the last few days, the North Vietnamese Communists have used three divisions of regular troops, identified as Divisions 304, 308, and 324B. with the support of three artillery and anti-aircraft regiments, one heavy armored regiment and many surface-to-air missile units to openly cross the Seventeenth Parallel and invade the Republic of Viet-Nam at the border area with North Viet-Nam.

This belligerent and aggressive action on the part of the North Vietnamese Communists represents a blatant violation of the 1954 Geneva Accord of which North Viet-Nam was a signatory, and reveals that country's scheme of a military takeover of the Republic of Viet-Nam. North Vietnam is not interested in seriously negotiating a solution to the war whereas the Republic of Viet-Nam is ever ready to search for a just peace.

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For the reasons detailed above, the National Assembly of the Republic of Viet-Nam solemnly proclaims to the nation and to the world:

First, We vehemently condemn the act of open aggression of the North Vietnamese Communists as they send their troops across the border to invade the territory of the Republic of Viet-Nam, blatantly violating the 1954 Geneva Accord of which North Viet-Nam was a signatory.

Secondly, We denounce the cruel action of the North Vietnamese Communists as they indiscriminately shell our cities, causing much suffering and loss of lives and property to our innocent compatriots.

Thirdly, The whole nation is united and of one mind in firmly supporting the Armed Forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam as they fight and smash the North Vietnamese invasion, protecting our independence and territorial integrity.

Fourthly, We urgently appeal to the United Nations and all the peoples of peace loving nations in the world to support the legitimate struggle of self-defense of the people and army of the Republic of Viet-Nam, while at the same time to apply every necessary measure aimed withdraw all their troops and cadres to the North of the Seventeenth Parallel at forcing the North Vietnamese Communists to stop their aggression and

Saigon, the 4th of April, 1972
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE

MANIFESTO

by The Political Parties of South Viet Nam

AFTER a full examination of the situation as created by the North Vietnamese invasion of Quang-Tri Province, the political parties present at the session of April 5, 1972 of the Joint Committee of Vietnamese Political Parties hereby resolve:

1. To severely condemn North Viet-Nam for having launched its regular troops across the Seventeenth Parallel, violated the status of the Demilitarized Zone and attacked the province of Quang-Tri, thus once more violating in the most flagrant manner the Geneva Accords of 1954 of which North Viet-Nam was a signatory.

2. To request that Great Britain and the Soviet Union, the two Co-Chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference, condemn North Vietnam's aggression committed against the Republic of Viet-Nam and force North Viet-Nam to withdraw to its territory all the military units just brought across the Seventeenth Parallel and the Demilitarized Zone, as well as all the forces infiltrated into the Republic of Viet-Nam since the beginning of the war.

3. To request that the International Control Commission acknowledge the invasion of North Vietnamese troops across the Seventeenth Parallel and the Demilitarized Zone. In case International Control Commission keeps its silence in the face of the brazen invasion by North Vietnamese troops and North Viet-Nam's clearcut violation of the 1954 Geneva Accords, the International Control Commission should dissolve itself for reasons of

4. To request ^{Approved for Release: 2018/04/25 C02599106} that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam refuse to meet with the Communist side at the Paris talks as long as the other side has not called off its aggressive actions in violation of the understandings that they themselves have agreed to in exchange for the 1968 cessation of bombings over North Viet-Nam.

5. To request that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam make ready a punitive action plan against North Viet-Nam in case the latter refuses to withdraw its troops north of the Seventeenth Parallel and to respect the Demilitarized Zone.

6. To urgently appeal to the members of all political parties included within the Joint Committee and to all compatriots to heighten their vigilance so as to avoid being hoodwinked by the Communist propaganda into disrupting our ranks while at the same time positively participating in the efforts to help refugees generated by the border fighting and the families of our combattants being engaged in the border fighting.

7. To ardently salute the fighting spirit of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam and to support to the full the units that are fighting heroically at the Demarcation border and on the other battlefields.

COMMUNIST INVASION CONDEMNED BY WORLD OPINION

« ... In the past month Hanoi has been openly sending regular North Vietnamese Army units, armed with tanks and heavy artillery, directly across the demilitarized zone into South Vietnam. This is an invasion in the true sense. It is a clear violation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements, in which North Vietnam explicitly undertook to respect the demilitarized zone and the integrity of South Vietnam... »

SIR KEITH HOLYOAKE
Foreign Minister of New Zealand

« The British Government are in no doubt that the North Vietnamese, by conducting a flagrant invasion of the territory of the Republic of South Vietnam, are acting in violation of the Geneva Agreements. »

« ... The present invasion to the South Vietnamese territory showed clearly to us that Hanoi had chosen the way of force to achieve its goal. »

ADAM MALIK
Foreign Minister of Indonesia

« Communist North Vietnam's attacks against South Vietnam in the past few days had been prepared for a long time, when the Paris peace talks were still in progress. This testified to the usual Communist trick of using the so-called peace negotiations for propaganda purposes, with a view to make the outside world believe that the situation was calming down. »

CHOW SHU KAI
Foreign Minister of The Republic of China

« The violent military offensive unleashed by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the south of the 17 th Parallel in the so-called « Demilitarized » Zone on March 29 against the Republic of Vietnam shows once again the warlike character of the ruling group of Hanoi, which, despite the Geneva Accords of 1954, has not hesitated to deliberately launch open aggressions against the three countries of former Indochina and to maintain permanent subversive activity throughout our whole region. »

LONG BORET
Minister of Information
of the Republic of Khmer

« The Government of Belgium finds that the offensive launched by North Vietnam and by the Provisional Revolutionary Government and the escalation of all forms of military activity now taking place are contrary to the objectives of negotiated settlement. »

...« In this outmoded expansionist venture, North Vietnam has received massive support in military hardwares from another major power, without which the present offensive could not have been carried out. »...

THANAT KHOMAN
Special Envoy, National Executive Council
Delegation Chief of Thailand

« The grave escalation of the war in Vietnam had started by a massive invasion of regular troops from North Vietnam. This constituted a North Vietnamese violation of the Geneva Agreement. »

SCHMELZER
Foreign Minister of the Netherlands

« The recent large scale communist assaults on South Vietnam were most deplorable and might even reduce hope for peace in Indochina. The escalation of Communist offensive was taking place just at the time when other countries including Indonesia were striving for a peaceful solution to the protracted crisis in Vietnam. »

DOMO PRANOTO
House Speaker of Indonesia

« The Republic of Korea expressed the sincere desire of Korean Government that North Vietnam immediately withdrawn her armed forces back to the North in cessation of her flagrant violation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements. »

« The Government of Japan deplores the intensification of fighting caused by the massive invasion by North Vietnamese forces across the DMZ into South Vietnam and hopes the fighting will end as soon as possible, the Geneva Agreements will be respected, and fruitful talks will take place at the Paris negotiations. »

...« The North Vietnamese aggression constituted an action which trampled over the Geneva Agreements about Indochina. Therefore we strongly condemn the North Vietnamese aggression. »...

Journalists, Politicians,
Students and the World Anti-Communist
League in Indonesia.

« Le Cercle des Etudiants Libéraux de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles s'élève de la façon la plus formelle contre les actes inqualifiables d'agression contre le peuple du Sud Vietnam perpétrés par les forces armées nord vietnamiennes en contradiction avec les accords de Genève de 1954. »

« The Philippines — Vietnam society has been saddened by the news received here that several North Vietnamese regular infantry divisions, supported by tanks, artillery and surface-to-air missiles, had crossed the DMZ and invaded the territory of the Republic of Vietnam. »

« The open aggression is not only a condemnable violation of the 1954 Geneva agreements but it would irreparably further divide the Vietnamese nation which has been at war for more than a quarter of a century. »

« Unable to overthrow a legally-elected government by subversion and insurgency within the country, the North has had to resort to a full-scale invasion in its efforts to impose totalitarian rule and deny liberty to its southern neighbours... »

« I am at a loss to understand why the protesters were so quiet when the North's invasion was in full cry. »

« Why are they not demanding that Hanoi stop the war in Vietnam? Perhaps the invasion by North Vietnam is what they agree with. »

McCREADY
Defense Minister of New Zealand

«... The Hanoi Regime has been damned by all freedom and peace loving peoples of the world due to its evil deeds of aggression and killing. The Buddhist Association of the Republic of China therefore, calls on all buddhist brothers of the world to condemn the North Vietnamese Communists' aggressive move and render without reservation our spiritual support to the South Vietnamese people. »

PAI SHENG
Director-General of the Buddhist
Association of the Republic of China

Harian Nusantara
(Indonesian Newspaper)

« North Vietnam is waging a war of aggression in the South. It explains everything. For years people have tried to make us believe that the South Vietnamese people — oppressed by a military dictatorship — were instinctively revolting and, with armed force, were demanding independence.

« Something has dispelled that idyllic view: The Communists in the South are imposing terror. They torture, they murder, and they are responsible for provocations and attacks. They resort to those barbaric actions because they haven't succeeded in convincing and in rallying the people. »

LE RAPPEL
(Belgian paper)

« Though Hanoi keeps denying that its troops are fighting in the South of the divided country some 50,000 members of the North Vietnamese People's Liberation Army have crossed the demarcation line. »

ARBEITER ZEITUNG, VIENNA.

« Hanoi had sent its troops to overtly cross the 17th parallel and the demilitarized zone (DMZ) regardless of the 1954 Geneva Agreements since it realized that communist underground elements left in the South had become impotent before the gallant fighting spirit of the RVN government and people.

Communist North Vietnam will bear full responsibilities for the sufferings and mournings it has caused to the civilian people both in South and North Vietnam. »

FRENCH-VIETNAMESE FRIENDSHIP
ASSOCIATION.

« I wish the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam can resist the North Vietnamese invasion. Your victory is our victory.

CARLOS ROMULO
Foreign Minister of the Philippines

« Why such an overt invasion and why now? It must be assumed that Hanoi well understood the success of Pacification and Vietnamization within South Vietnam. If both were allowed to continue uninterrupted for another year, then the Viet-Cong might be completely finished as an internal threat and South Vietnam might become the strongest military power in Southeast Asia. »

Sir ROBERT THOMPSON
The Times of London

« We severely condemn communist offensive which violated agreements signed by Hanoi itself. We pay homage to valiant ARVN and courageous Vietnamese people under President Thieu leadership which crush this offensive as they crushed the 1968 Tet offensive. »

ARGENTINO VIETNAMESE ASSOCIATION

« We strongly condemn the violation of the DMZ committed by communist North Vietnam because it was in violation of existing agreement. With this large scale invasion of South Vietnam territory by North Vietnam it became clear that North Vietnam is the real aggressor while the so-called NLF in South Vietnam was created only for the purpose of misleading world opinion. In this connection we should support the struggle of the South Vietnamese people who are defending their sovereignty from this communist invasion. North Vietnam should withdraw immediately her armed forces from South Vietnam and if it failed to do so and continued with its policy of aggression then she will have to bear full responsibilities for any consequences brought about by her own action. »

MUHAMMAD BUANG
Chairman of the World Anti-
communist League, Indonesia.

« Hanoi has shown its real face, that of an aggressor... This flagrant violation of Geneva Accords... shows what would be awaiting South Vietnam if the Communists from North had their hands free. »

GAZET VAN ANTWERPAN, HOLLAND.

« What remains of the myth of non-intervention in the South by Northern forces, a myth so long cultivated by Hanoi? »

« While the Americans have chosen disengagement in an irreversible manner, the other side increases its own engagement. How can one, then, fail to conclude that Hanoi envisages no other solution of the drama than the annexation of South Vietnam — either by placing a reunified Vietnam under its one control or else by imposing in Saigon a communist regime? »

COMBAT, PARIS.

« We condemn unequivocally the brutal invasion by the regular forces of Hanoi across the DMZ and into other areas of the territory of the Republic of Vietnam. »

FREDERICK STOCWELL
Society for Individual Freedom.

« The Free World must maintain a defense shield against communist aggression in the face of the current open invasion of South Vietnam by Communist North Vietnamese forces.

« The Communist had made a big mistake militarily and politically in launching an invasion of the South and they would suffer reverses on both counts. »

SEATO Secretary General.
Gen. JESUS VARGAS

« We demand Hanoi authorities to immediately withdraw their aggressive troops from South Vietnam and put an end to the killing and to embark on serious negotiations to settle the conflict. »

THE FRENCH COMMITTEE FOR SAFEGUARD
OF FREEDOM IN EUROPE,

« Nous élevons une protestation formelle contre l'invasion ouverte du Sud-Vietnam par les troupes du Gouvernement d'Hanoi. La preuve est faite que les communistes du Nord veulent annexer purement et simplement le Sud-Vietnam tandis que la population Sud Vietnamienne est déterminée à ne pas se retrouver sous la houlette des communistes et de leurs complices du Viet-Cong. »

COMITE FRANÇAIS POUR SAUVEGARDER
LES LIBERTES EUROPEENNES

« The Young Democratic Labour Association calls upon the Australian Government to assist South Vietnam in a greater military capacity in its endeavour to protect itself from blatant aggression from North Vietnam. »

YOUNG DEMOCRATIC LABOUR ASSOCIATION, AUSTRALIA

« No fair minded person can be in any doubt whatsoever about the cause and the nature of the latest offensive in Vietnam. The undeniable truth is that it is the result of a full scale invasion by the regular Armed Forces of North Vietnam, in flagrant and brutal violation of the Geneva Agreements. This is a callous and calculated aggression that pays no attention either to international law or human suffering. It could be perpetrated only by a Government that is impervious to moral outrage.

The fact that the North Vietnam has had to use regular troops is proof of the failure of their guerilla activities in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong have proved in this invasion a force of no significance. The people of South Vietnam have, by their actions during the last few weeks of the invasion, demonstrated their loyalty to the democratic regime in Saigon.

The morale of the people of South Vietnam remains high. I have no doubt that they are fighting with high courage for the cause of free peoples everywhere. The British Government supports totally the action of South Vietnam, and condemns the invasion of that country by the North. »

IAN SPROAT
Secretary General of the All Party
Anglo-Vietnamese Parliamentary Group.

« Vietnam is again wracked by intense warfare as the result of a massive Vietnamese invasion of the South.

« No amount of rhetoric or use of euphemism such as « People's Liberation » or « Viet-Cong Liberation Movement » can mask the reality that North Vietnam has again openly violated solemn agreements.

« The root cause of the « tragedy in Vietnam lies not in what is happening

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in the air, but what has happened on the ground since 1954 when North Vietnam decided to conquer the South by force. In that year, thousands of people living in the North fled from their « liberators » to an uncertain future in the South.

« Today, even as the North Vietnamese claim to « liberate » areas of the South as part of their latest offensive, new refugees are again in flight. They flee not North but farther South .. farther from their « liberators. »

KENNETH B. KEATING
U.S. Ambassador to India.

« General Giap is indulging in illusions if he counts on a crumbling of the South Vietnamese regime. The failure of the TET Offensive in 1968 has shown that the South Vietnamese population — even if it is not satisfied with the present regime, which is a consequence of the war — is not at all disposed to accept domination by the North.

« The South Vietnamese army now is infinitely stronger and more pugnacious than it was a few years ago, and it is obvious that Washington will not fail to react in the face of this sudden re-escalation of the conflict.

« In trying this Poker bluff, Hanoi has taken a calculated risk that may cost it a very high price. »

MICHEL VOIROL
Combat

...« The great majority of the soldiers in the fierce battles at Bastogne near Hue, and at An Loc, demonstrated outstanding morale which surprised the skeptical observers »...

DIE WELT
German Newspaper in Hamburg

« To mount the present attack, it has been necessary (for Hanoi) to drop the fiction that the war is being fought by the Viet-Cong. The offensive is an undeniable invasion across the Demilitarized Zone ».

NEW ZEALAND HERALD

NOW IS THE DECISIVE TIME ...

IN short, our troops from all arms in the front line and in all the battlefields are valiantly fighting to destroy the enemy and to hold every inch of our land, and they are fighting with high morale.

In the rear, our people are providing support to the Army and are determined not to let the Communists take over any land and kill people, disrupt the pacification and development program and the security which all our people and armed forces have brought back to the country since many years.

Today, I earnestly call upon

- All the combatants from the Army, Navy, Air Force at the front line to continue to destroy the enemy and to secure our borders ;
- All the troops, cadres, members of the Peoples Self-Defense Forces at the rear to maintain firm the territorial security, to maintain stability in the rear, to implement the laws correctly and to preserve the Community Pacification and Development endeavor.

I earnestly call upon people from all walks of life, the peoples' representatives in the provincial towns to do all that can be done both spiritually and materially to further increase the support to the front.

I earnestly call upon the press to praise and widely publicize the brilliant victories of our fighting men and not print false, inaccurate or exaggerated information which is detrimental to the fighting spirit in the front and the political stability in the rear.

I have often told you that :

Once we win, everything remains ;

Once the Communists win, everything is lost.

Now is the decisive time for the loss or the survival of our nation. The actual fight is the decisive fight for the loss or the survival of the people of SVN. To let the Communists occupy two provinces of Central Vietnam or two provinces of the Highlands does not mean that we only lose those provinces. It does not either mean a communist limited military victory.

A communist global military victory will lead to a political solution which is totally disadvantageous to South Vietnam.

Consequently, at any cost we should prevent the Communists from obtaining a military victory, we should also not let the Communists free to force us to accept any disadvantageous political solution.

All our people and troops are determined to win over the Communist aggressors, and we will defeat them.

I believe that they will be defeated.

Excerpts from the Address of
President NGUYEN VAN THIEU
to all the People, the Combatants
and Cadres on the situation at the
Demarcation Line, April 5, 1972.



UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

TALKING PAPER

OFFICE OF POLICY AND PLANS

No. 55
June 20
1972

Facts on the Current North Vietnamese Invasion

1. QUESTION: What preparations did North Viet-Nam make for the offensive which began March 30?

ANSWER: The decision on the offensive and invasion was made long in advance. The NVA built roads across the DMZ and accumulated huge stocks of supplies and war material in three major areas focused on the South Vietnamese provincial capitals of Quang Tri in the north, Kontum in the Central Highlands and An Loc just north of Saigon. The war material included hundreds of T54/55 and PT76 Russian-supplied tanks and 130mm, long-range artillery pieces which are useful primarily for offensive warfare.

2. QUESTION: How did the offensive begin?

ANSWER: The NVA offensive began on March 30 with intensive long-range artillery and rocket fire against South Vietnamese defensive positions south of the Demilitarized Zone followed by a massive invasion on the ground by regular NVA troops. On April 5 the NVA opened a second front against Binh Long Province north of Saigon. They opened the third front in the Central Highlands against Kontum on April 11.

3. QUESTION: Why did the NVN forces make such rapid progress during the first few days?

ANSWER: Attacking forces always have a certain advantage of surprise by picking the time and place to fight. The NVA launched a broad frontal attack across the DMZ in blatant violation of agreements which had been largely respected since 1954. They picked a moment when unusual weather inhibited air support and resupply for ARVN forces. They utilized long-range artillery and tanks on a scale unprecedented in the Indo-China war. Despite these advantages, the NVA after the first several days had advanced only 16 kilometers. The South Viet-Nam armed forces dug in and held along the Cua Viet River, the first defensible line below the DMZ.

4. QUESTION: How many NVA troops have invaded South Viet-Nam since the spring offensive began March 30?

ANSWER: At the outset North Viet-Nam openly committed ten of its thirteen regular divisions to the invasion. Two divisions were operating in Laos. Only one unit -- infantry division 325C -- was within its own borders. Elements of this division crossed the DMZ on May 22.

- 2 -

5. QUESTION: Have the SVN forces counterattacked?

ANSWER: Yes, SVN Marines carried out three heliborne/amphibious/ground operation raids behind NVA lines in Quang Tri Province on May 13 and 24 and on June 8. ARVN troops recaptured Firebase Bastogne and re-occupied high ground west of Hue. In fact, every front has seen local counterattacks which have forced the enemy to halt, regroup, and fall back. SVN Air Force planes and naval ships have also struck at the enemy in every theater.

6. QUESTION: What is the record of the ARVN as a fighting force?

ANSWER: The most eloquent testimony for the ARVN is its record. After a maximum effort over a period of two months by ten regular NVA divisions supported by independent regiments, Viet Cong units and other elements, the NVA has not taken any one of its major objectives, which POW's revealed to be An Loc, Kontum, and Hue. As with any army anywhere in the world the record of individual ARVN units varies. The Third Division and the 22nd Division, which absorbed the brunt of the NVA invasion across the demilitarized zone and in Kontum, are being reconstituted. On the other hand, soldiers and elements of the 5th and 18th Divisions with airborne and ranger units in An Loc have held longer under siege than the French did at Dien Bien Phu.

7. QUESTION: How have the South Vietnamese territorial forces measured up in conventional warfare?

ANSWER: South Vietnamese territorial forces, known as the RF and PF--for regional forces and popular (local) forces--were trained to protect their homes and villages against Viet Cong guerrilla attacks. Yet, according to American advisers, they are standing up against NVA regular forces even when outnumbered. They are highly motivated--as one would expect since they are defending their own homes--and have a thorough knowledge of the terrain in which they operate. They are often the first to make contact with enemy units. Their job is to hold the ground until regular army units come to their support. In some instances these units have outmaneuvered, outfought, and even driven off their NVA attackers before help arrived from regular ARVN forces.

8. QUESTION: What are the comparative losses of military personnel on both sides?

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ANSWER: Official GVN figures show enemy forces as having lost 33,000 killed in action during April and May compared with 12,000 friendly forces KIA. The GVN figures also showed 34,000 ARVN and territorial forces wounded and 15,000 missing in action during the same period.

9. QUESTION: How many NVA soldiers has South Viet-Nam been holding as POW's, and how many have been captured during the current offensive?

ANSWER: On March 30, 1972, when the North Vietnamese offensive began South Viet-Nam was holding about 9,000 North Vietnamese soldiers as POW's. As of June 15, more than 250 additional NVA soldiers had been captured. This figure does not include NVA and VC soldiers who have rallied to the side of the GVN (Hoi Chanh).

10. QUESTION: How many South Vietnamese citizens have fled southward from Quang Tri and other areas of SVN entered by NVA troops or occupied by Viet Cong forces?

ANSWER: As of June 15 there were estimated to be 808,100 war refugees in South Viet-Nam. More than half a million--509,100--fled southward from Quang Tri and other areas of Military Region I, to escape the invading NVN army and the fighting. Another 169,400 fled the invaders in western SVN to coastal areas of MR II in central Viet-Nam. In MR III, where An Loc is located 82,700 persons left their homes to evade the North Vietnamese; and in MR IV, the Delta region, 46,900 persons chose to leave home rather than come under communist control. Of the total, 691,200 are being housed in refugee camps. The rest are living with friends and relatives until they can return home.

11. QUESTION: How is South Viet-Nam financing the cost of caring for the war refugees?

ANSWER: The GVN as an emergency measure has increased taxes on luxury items such as cigarettes, beer, imported liquor, restaurant meals and theater admissions for the specific purpose of providing funds for refugee relief.

A portion of the costs is financed through the sale of donated American produce on the Vietnamese market, i. e. --counterpart funds. However, numerous Vietnamese volunteer agencies such as Buddhist associations, the Cao Dai Church, Catholic relief associations, businessmen, boy scouts, local Red Cross chapters, etc.

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have made an all-out effort to raise funds and supplies to care for the refugees. University and high school students have plunged themselves into relief work. Thousands have opened their homes to the homeless. In addition, substantial contributions in food, medicines and cash have come from Australia, Canada, Taiwan, West Germany, New Zealand, Great Britain and the Republic of Korea.

12. QUESTION: How has the invasion affected the GVN's pacification program?

ANSWER: Pacification is judged by the attitudes of people and their confidence in the GVN to provide security in their daily lives. The degree of apprehension among the Vietnamese rural and urban population is directly proportional to the proximity of combat. Where there is no serious combat, apprehension and damage to pacification is slight. The example of Hue following the fall of Quang Tri is illustrative. The loss of Quang Tri to the communists and the massive influx of refugees caused near panic among the citizens of Hue. Yet as soon as the newly appointed commanding general of Military Region I demonstrated his ability to restore order and protect the city, panic subsided, people returned to their normal lives, and many who had fled the city returned to their homes.

13. QUESTION: What has been the record of VC terrorist incidents in 1972 compared with previous years?

ANSWER: With extensive fighting going on it is difficult to sort out the purely terrorist type incident from military combat, but a record on abductions is a good index. In "normal" years there has been an average of 6,000 abductions. In 1968, the year of the TET offensive, the figure was over 10,000. During the first five months of 1972 there were 6,000, an annual rate even higher than 1968. People abducted may be used for work details, forced to fight for the communists, moved into areas the communists control, or they may be held for several days, given an intensive communist indoctrination, and then released to carry out propaganda activities in their villages or suffer reprisals if they fail to comply.

14. QUESTION: What is the actual population of areas of SVN that have fallen under NVA communist control since March 30? What percentage of this is of SVN's communities?

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ANSWER: Before March 30 the communists controlled only seven hamlets with fewer than 20,000 South Vietnamese citizens. Since the NVN invasion and as of May 31, an additional 1,157 hamlets with 575,000 people had come under their control. This is approximately 3 per cent of the total SVN population. The communists now control 1,164 hamlets out of 12,032, or 9.7 per cent of the total number of hamlets. Only 14 out of 272 districts have been entirely occupied by the NVN. There are large unpopulated areas along the western fringes of the country under no one's control.

15. QUESTION: How valid are the communist claims to having established "revolutionary governments" in the conquered areas?

ANSWER: Communist broadcasts have claimed the establishment of "revolutionary administrations" in several districts and a number of villages. Only in Quang Tri, immediately adjacent to North Viet-Nam, do they claim a province level "revolutionary committee" is functioning. The names of its leaders have not been announced.

It is interesting to note that in contrast to the South Vietnamese government, which passed out guns to the populace for self defense, one of the first acts of the communists is to pick up all firearms from the people.

16. QUESTION: How have the North Vietnamese treated the SVN population in areas which have come under their control?

ANSWER: Quang Tri is the only province to come under NVA control. Some 250,000 of the Province's 320,000 people moved southward to escape the invading army, leaving only 70,000 who remained voluntarily or were trapped by the NVA. Since the communists took over on May 1, several thousands more have escaped on foot or with the help of SVN marines who made daring sorties into the areas. In interviews with newsmen some of these escapees say the communists have impressed every able-bodied individual into forced labor battalions to harvest rice, dig weapons caches and build bunkers for the NVA. The penalty for trying to escape, if caught, is death. The escapees also say individuals are compelled to wear different color identity tags indicating whether they are pro-communist, neutral, or pro-GVN.

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17. QUESTION: What steps did the United States take to assist South Viet-Nam in countering the North Vietnamese invasion?

ANSWER: The United States Government immediately denounced the invasion and ordered U. S. naval and air reinforcements to support its South Vietnamese allies, promising to consider all options short of reintroducing American ground troops or use of nuclear weapons. On April 16 U. S. aircraft raided military supply depots in Hanoi-Haiphong area. On May 8 President Nixon announced his decision to interdict supplies to the DRV--that is, to mine all entrances to North Vietnamese ports to shut off supply channels by sea, and to use air power to halt over-land deliveries from other countries needed by Hanoi to keep its offensive going.

18. QUESTION: Have the U. S. actions hurt Hanoi's military efforts?

ANSWER: Yes, Nhan Dan, Hanoi's official communist party newspaper, tacitly admits serious damage to North Viet-Nam's transportation and communications system and to her industrial production capacity in a three-part series of articles published June 1, 3 and 5. The articles, signed by Hong Ha--a pen name meaning Red River--discussed the DRV's tasks under wartime economy. They urged the North Vietnamese people to accept ever greater sacrifices and exert ever greater efforts to prosecute the war in the South. On June 8, one month after the mining of seven North Vietnamese ports, Vice Admiral William P. Mack--who directed the mining operation--said the blockade has cut the communist war-making capabilities radically. He cited the following as evidence: anti-aircraft fire, surface-to-air missile launchings and short battery fire--all intense during the first month of the interdiction campaign--dropped off markedly in May. There is reduced highway traffic throughout the country. On the same day Lt. General George Eade, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, told newsmen: The interdiction campaign has virtually isolated Hanoi from outside sources of supply and continues to destroy stockpiles of fuel and war material already in the country. North Viet-Nam imported about two million short tons of war material in 1971. Since May 11 it has received practically nothing. Railway shipments from China are almost completely stopped as a result of the destruction of bridges and the sealing of a railway tunnel near the Chinese border. U. S. pilots report some truck traffic from China, but nothing close to the magnitude of the previous rail shipments.

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19. QUESTION: When will the effect of the mining be felt by the NVA offensive action in South Viet-Nam?

ANSWER: The immediate results are most apparent in the tie-up of NVN supply lines; but the combined effects of the mining and air strikes on the offensive are already being felt in the South, particularly in fuel supplies for NVA tanks and trucks used in logistic support for the invading forces. Monsoon rains also play a role in slowing down the offensive. The continued NVA artillery fire against cities like An Loc and Kontum (which has been slowly declining) shows that the NVA had laid in a massive supply of ammunition in preparation for the invasion. It may be some weeks yet before the full effect is felt by NVN's invading forces.

20. QUESTION: Did President Nixon offer on May 8 to withdraw remaining U.S. troops from Viet-Nam, and, if so, under what conditions?

ANSWER: On May 8 President Nixon said the United States "will proceed with a complete withdrawal of all American forces from Viet-Nam within four months" on these conditions: "First, all American prisoners of war must be returned. Second, there must be an internationally supervised ceasefire throughout Indochina. Once prisoners of war are released, once the internationally supervised ceasefire has begun, we will stop all acts of force throughout Indochina."

21. QUESTION: How many American military personnel are left in South Viet-Nam?

ANSWER: As of June 8, 1972, there were 61,900 U.S. military personnel in SVN. There were another 42,000 naval personnel manning ships offshore. The President has stated that American troop strength in SVN will be reduced to 49,000 by July 1, that is, 500,000 less than the ceiling established for U.S. forces in Viet-Nam in 1968.

22. QUESTION: Did the Peking and Moscow Summit talks between the U.S. and the PRC and the U.S. and USSR make any contributions toward resolving the Viet-Nam conflict? If so, what were they? Were there any secret agreements concerning Viet-Nam?

ANSWER: First, there were no secret agreements concerning Viet-Nam at either Peking or Moscow. In each of the two summit meetings there were extensive conversations concerning the Viet-Nam conflict.

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The views of both sides are summarized in the final communiques. Perhaps the most significant contribution of the talks toward the resolution of the conflict was in clarifying each power's viewpoints. As Presidential adviser Dr. Henry Kissinger said in a Kiev press conference: "When two great powers deal with each other, one of the best things they can do for each other is to make absolutely sure that they understand each other's point of view. What actions they then take, based on the understanding of that point of view, only the future can tell." In his address to the Congress of the United States immediately upon his return from Moscow June 1, President Nixon said: "I emphasize to you once again, this Administration has no higher goal--a goal that I know all of you share-- than bringing the Viet-Nam war to an early and honorable end. We are ending the war in Viet-Nam, but we shall end it in a way which will not betray our friends, risk the lives of the courageous Americans still serving in Viet-Nam, break faith with those held prisoners by the enemy, or stain the honor of the United States of America."

SECRET

24 July 1972

MOSCOW'S NEW TREATIES

1. Since May 1971, the USSR has concluded treaties of "friendship and cooperation" with Egypt, Iraq, and India --- each with the primary objective of securing the type of political and military gains that can enhance the Soviet position at the expense of Peking and the non-communist world. Moscow views these treaties as valuable adjuncts to its policy of maintaining a permanent great-power position in the Mediterranean and of establishing a similar position in the Indian Ocean.

2. For the immediate future, anyway, the Soviets are present in the Middle East and on the Indian subcontinent. Our main task then is to try to ensure that the Soviet position will not be at the cost of the security of the U.S. and its allies. To this end, a primary propaganda (and/or political action) aim is to neutralize Soviet covert political actions and potential (e.g. see the short subject in this issue on Soviet meddling in Bangladesh student affairs and concerning Soviet attempts to influence Indian journalists). In the attached backgrounder is an overview of the implications of the new treaties for Soviet foreign policy and for Soviet relations with its three new partners and with their neighbors. One of the backgrounder's underlying themes is that unless the Soviets maintain diplomatic propriety in executing these treaties, they risk alienating not only their cosigners but some of their equally strategically important neighbors as well.

3. All three treaties practically guarantee an increase of Soviet military-technical personnel (particularly in Iraq) on the cosigner's soil. For some audiences this is open to interpretation as analogous to Soviet encroachments under the "Brezhnev Doctrine" --- i.e., as an effort to extend a Soviet "protective umbrella" over the Third World. Also, in discussion of steady Soviet naval expansion into the Indian Ocean, press and media assets, particularly in countries bordering on that ocean, should as often as possible refer to the Soviet naval presence as the "Soviet Indian Ocean Fleet." In connection with these two themes, see also "The Reach of the Brezhnev Doctrine" and "Soviet Naval Strength in Third World Waters", respectively in the August 1971 and March 1972 issues of Perspectives. Extra copies are available on request.

SECRET

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24 July 1972

MOSCOW'S LATEST TREATIES

Just as Egypt has always been the key factor in Soviet strategy aimed at a permanent presence if not domination of the Mediterranean, so now India and Iraq appear to be emerging as two key factors in Soviet designs on the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Since May 1971, the USSR has signed "treaties of friendship and cooperation" with all three and, while the provisions in each are different, each to some extent guarantees the Soviets the kind of presence they are after. On the other hand, without the exercise of a considerable degree of diplomatic flexibility and subtlety (traits for which Soviet diplomacy is not famous), the treaties could turn out to be disruptive factors in Moscow's relations with the signatories as well as with their neighbors.

Why's of the Treaties

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The new treaties are the first that Moscow has signed with countries that are neither neighbors of the USSR nor Communist. She has had treaties of "friendship and good-neighbor relations" with Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey off and on since 1921. And with the Warsaw Pact countries and with Finland she maintains and consistently renews treaties of "friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance" --- all of which bind the signatories to the canons of the Brezhnev Doctrine. There are those who see the latest treaties signed with Egypt, Iraq and India as a calculated move to extend the umbrella of the Brezhnev Doctrine into the Middle East and onto the subcontinent and into Southeast Asia.

It is apparent that with the Egyptian and Indian treaties, Moscow was the instigator while it is suspected that Iraq asked for her treaty. The Soviet approach to India is seen as reflecting Moscow's concerns with the Sino-Soviet border disputes and the politburo's eagerness to get Indian political support for its dealings with China. India, on the other hand, viewed the treaty as a means of discouraging Soviet aid to Pakistan (to say nothing of guaranteeing military support for India) should the Indo-Pakistani crisis heat up --- as indeed it did.

In Egypt, Moscow pressed for a friendship treaty because of fears that, following Nasser's death, Sadat might well drift a bit from the "anti-imperialist direction" in his approach to foreign policy. Sadat, on the other hand, wanted concrete evidence of Moscow's intentions to continue its military and economic maintenance program and its diplomatic support of Egypt in the Arab-Israeli crisis.

As for Iraq, she may well have looked to a treaty of mutual support with the Soviet Union as a means of enhancing her reputation among the radical Arabs, enhancing the regime's status at home, getting more Soviet military goods and help with her oil industry, and finally as a useful political lever in the troubled Iraqi-Iranian relations. Thus, with Iraq viewing herself as possibly having the most to gain, in the short run anyway, the Soviets were able to set several preconditions such as guaranteed access to Iraqi ports and airfields, broader Communist participation in running the government, and a commitment to consult with Moscow before launching any military undertakings.

Differences of the Treaties

Soviet President Podgorny has said that the three treaties "represent a new, practical embodiment of the strengthening link and expanding interaction of world socialism with the forces of national liberation." Not quite so. A review of the published texts of the three treaties shows marked differences in approach. The Indo-Soviet treaty, for example, makes no mention of Soviet military aid to India while Article 8 of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty says that both parties "will continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements . . ."

In contrast, Article 9 of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty says that both "will continue to develop cooperation in the strengthening of their defense capabilities": clear implication that the Soviet Union gets access to military installations on Iraqi soil. With Egypt and Iraq, it is a matter of coordinating foreign policy approaches, while with India it is a matter of "mutual cooperation."

Lip service is given to India's "nonalignment" whereas Soviet influence in Egyptian and Iraqi internal affairs is implied by their cooperation with the Soviet Union to preserve their "socio-economic gains." Whereas no mention is made of Indian or Egyptian natural resources, Article 5 of the Iraqi treaty takes note of "cooperation...in the working of oil and other natural resources." The treaty fails, however, to commit the Soviet Union to anything specific in its economic "cooperation" with Iraq.

Reactions to the Treaties

The Soviet-Iraqi treaty has not done much to enhance the latter's reputation with some radical Arabs. Libya's former chief of state Qadhafi not only vociferously denounced the Soviet-Iraqi treaty as anti-Islam treachery, he also withdrew his ambassador from Baghdad. Following the treaty announcement, Syria has become noticeably cool to both Iraq and the Soviet Union and is reportedly actively trying to reduce the Soviet military presence in Syria.

Despite Soviet attempts to reassure the Shah of Iran that the Soviet-Iraqi treaty cannot become a disruptive element in Soviet-Iranian relations, the Iranian head of state remains wary. His misgivings will be borne out if he sees the Iraqis getting sophisticated, more modern weaponry and if Soviet naval squadrons start berthing at the head of the Persian Gulf. From Moscow's standpoint, Libyan and Syrian coolness are tolerable and probably interpreted as a passing phase. Soviet-Iranian relations, however, are much more precariously balanced and Tehran's reactions to closer Soviet-Iraqi ties could well be a long-term worry for Moscow.

As a result of the Indo-Pakistani war, India has emerged as the unchallenged leader of the subcontinent. Some of India's neighbors see the Indo-Soviet treaty as signalling Soviet takeover of the subcontinent by proxy. But, if the Soviets in their haste to spread their own influence, fail to give India the voice she feels she deserves --- India's sense of goodwill towards Moscow could easily reverse itself. For example, if India finds that the Soviets are meddling in internal affairs in Bangladesh --- as they were known to have done during recent student disturbances in Dacca --- such meddling is open to interpretation as, at the very least, a violation of the spirit if not the terms of the Indo-Soviet treaty.

The Soviet quest for naval bases for its Indian Ocean fleet as well as the expected increase in the Soviet naval presence in that ocean, near Indian shores, will irritate Indian sensitivities over potential outside interference. In time, India may well decide that as the undisputed power on the subcontinent, she is secure enough not to have to depend on such intimate bilateral relations as are implicit in the Indo-Soviet treaty.

The Soviet-Egyptian treaty cannot but have raised hopes in Cairo that the USSR would somehow break the deadlock with Israel and Soviet failure to do so cannot help but foster Egyptian resentment against the USSR. Persistent criticism of the USSR by some Egyptian officials and outspoken journalists in recent months have been indicative of increasing Soviet-Egyptian disagreements which, from Moscow's point of view could suggest that the treaty is actually fostering a deterioration in Soviet-Egyptian relations. In the long run, for the Soviets this treaty may well be diplomatically the most troublesome of the three.

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Whatever misgivings some in the Soviet leadership may have concerning the long-range benefits to be derived from these three treaties, there is every indication that the majority views them as highly useful for two very basic Soviet foreign policy aims: to maintain a great power role in the Mediterranean and to establish

the Soviet in the same type of role in the Indian Ocean. Thus, the Soviet search for additional durable ties with strategically important countries in both areas will intensify rather than diminish. With each willing candidate that the Soviets approach and/or possibly win over (such as Malta, Bangladesh, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Ceylon, or others) the real question will be how to ensure that the Soviet presence takes forms that are tolerable to the security of all.

BASLER NACHRICHTEN, Basel
17 May 1972

Damaskus gegen einen Pakt mit Moskau

Spielt Syrien die chinesische Karte?

Der sowjetische Verteidigungsminister Marschall Gretschkö beendete seinen im ganzen Nahen Osten mit grosser Aufmerksamkeit beobachteten viertägigen offiziellen Besuch in Syrien und flog von Damaskus weiter nach Kairo. Die Befürchtung, nach Aegypten und Irak werde auch die syrische Regierung einen langjährigen Freundschafts- und Beistandspakt mit der Sowjetunion schliessen, hat sich jedoch nicht bestätigt.

Von unserem Korrespondenten

Gretschkö hatte während seines Aufenthaltes in Damaskus nahezu pausenlos mit Staatspräsident General Asad, dem syrischen Premierminister, Aussenminister und Verteidigungsminister konferiert. Er konnte seine Gesprächspartner jedoch offenkundig nicht davon überzeugen, dass ein Vertrag nach dem Muster der Abkommen mit Aegypten und Irak im Interesse des Gastlandes liege. Weder aus amtlichen noch aus den inoffiziellen Angaben nach der Abreise des sowjetischen Gastes geht hervor, dass sich das syrisch-sowjetische Verhältnis in nächster Zukunft intensivieren wird. Beirut Sowjetkreise zeigten am Sonntag denn auch deutliche Enttäuschung über Verlauf und Ergebnis der Gretschkö-Mission in dem Nachbarland.

Während der Anwesenheit des Moskauer Verteidigungsministers in Damaskus war aus Ostblockquellen in der nächstlichen Nachrichtenbörse Beirut durchgesickert, der Kreml betrachte den Abschluss eines Pakts mit Syrien als vorläufigen Schlußstein seiner vorderorientalischen Einflußsphäre. In Moskau scheint man damit gerechnet zu haben, gestützt auf gesicherte langfristige Positionen in den drei wichtigsten arabischen Hauptstädten Kairo, Bagdad und Damaskus nicht nur eine «Pax sovietica» diktieren, son-

dern auch den amerikanischen Präsidenten Nixon bei seinen bevorstehenden Besprechungen mit Brezhnev, Kossygin und Podgorny mit einem zum kommunistischen Einflusbereich gehörenden Nahen Osten konfrontieren zu können. Der Widerstand des Präsidenten Asad und seiner Regierung verwarf den Russen zunächst dieses Konzept. Uebereinstimmend erzielt wurden nach syrischen Quellen die schon während des geheimgehaltenen Besuches von Generalstabschef General Chakkur grundsätzlich vereinbarten neuen Waffenlieferungen. Syrien wird demzufolge unter anderem Sam-3-Raketen erhalten und durch weitere moderne Sowjetwaffen sein Sicherheitsbedürfnis gegen den nur rund 40 Kilometer vor seiner Hauptstadt stehenden israelischen Gegner besser als bisher stillen können. Es könnte sich jedoch erfolgreich gegen einen politischen Preis für diese Hilfen wehren.

Staatschef Asad hat für diese Zurückhaltung im Umgang mit den Sowjets vor allem zwei Gründe: Die Russen sind in Syrien womöglich noch weniger populär als in Aegypten. Alles, was mit den sowjetischen Rüstungslieferungen zu tun hat, wird daher hierzulande seit langem äusserst geheim gehalten. Selbst hohe Regierungsbeamte, deren politische Zuverlässigkeit ausser Zweifel steht, müssen sich auf abenteuerlichen Umwegen aus der westeuropäischen

Presse über den Umfang der roten Waffenhilfe informieren. Spricht man amtliche Vertreter der syrischen Regierung auf die Sowjethilfe an, bekommt man zur Antwort, das Land habe gegenüber den Israeli ein wesentlich grösseres Sicherheitsbedürfnis als andere arabische Staaten, habe aber gegenwärtig keine anderen potentiellen Waffenlieferanten. Zweitens ist Damaskus von seinen Verbündeten Aegypten und Libyen in der «Föderation Arabischer Republiken» (FAR) offenbar ein besonderer Part zugedacht. Das Land soll eine wichtige Rolle bei der Installierung einer neuen Art «Schaupolitik» zwischen zwei ausserarabischen Mächten spielen. Während Aegypten gezwungen ist, ganz auf die sowjetische Karte zu setzen, spielt Syrien den chinesischen Trumpf. Das zeigte sich deutlich in der Behandlung des Gretschkö-Besuches durch die gelenkte Damaszener Presse. Sie berichtete verhältnismässig zurückhaltend über die Gespräche des Moskauer Gastes, während seiner Anwesenheit aber erstaunlich detailliert über die bevorstehende Reise des Damaszener Aussenministers nach Peking.

Die Sowjets verhehlten in Gesprächen mit westlichen Beobachtern am Wochenende nicht ihre Enttäuschung über dieses «Doppelspiel Syriens». Die Araber erwiesen sich, so fügten Ostblockdiplomaten hinzu, immer mehr als «schwierige Verbündete».

BASLER NACHRICHTEN, Basel
17 May 1972

IS SYRIA PLAYING THE CHINESE TRUMP CARD?

Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Grechko ended his four-day official visit to Syria, a visit which was followed with great attention throughout the Near East, and flew from Damascus to Cairo. The fear that the Syrian government, following Egypt and Irak, would also conclude a long term friendship and support pact with the Soviet Union, proved unjustified, however.

During his stay in Damascus, Grechko conferred almost uninterruptedly with State President General Asad, the Syrian Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Defense Minister. But evidently he was unable to convince these officials that a treaty modelled on the agreements with Egypt and Irak would be in the interests of their country. Nothing in official or unofficial statements following the departure of the Soviet guest indicates an intensification of Syrian-Soviet relations in the near future. Soviet circles in Beirut showed on Sunday that they too were plainly disillusioned with the way the Grechko mission in the neighboring country went and with its outcome. While the Soviet Defense Minister was in Damascus, the news seeped through in Beirut from East bloc sources that the Kremlin regarded conclusion of a pact with Syria as the final move, for the time being, in its Near Eastern sphere of influence. With its long term positions assured in the three vital Arab capitals of Cairo, Bagdad and Damascus, Moscow seemed to count not only on dictating a pax Sovietica, but also on confronting President Nixon during his forthcoming discussions with Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny with a Near East belonging to the Communist sphere of influence. As of now, the resistance of President Asad and his government has spoiled the Russian plan. According to Syrian sources, Final agreement was reached on the new weapons deliveries that had already been agreed upon in principle during the secret visit of General Staff Chief General Chakkur. Under its terms Syria will receive, among other things, SAM 3 rockets, and thanks to additional modern Soviet weapons will be able to meet its security requirements against the Israeli opponent. That opponent is only about 40 kilometers away from the Syrian capital. And yet Syria successfully avoided paying a political price for that assistance.

Chief of State Asad had two reasons in particular for his reserve in dealing with the Soviets: if anything, the Russians are even less popular in Syria than in Egypt. Everything having to do with Soviet arms deliveries has therefore been kept very secret in this country for a long time. Even high government officials, whose political reliability is above doubt, must resort to elaborate roundabout ways to learn from the Western press about the extent of Red arms aid. When Syrian government officials are asked about this Soviet aid, they reply that their country has considerably higher security requirements vis-a-vis Israel than other Arab states, and yet has no other potential source of weapons supply at present. Secondly, Damascus is evidently assigned a special role by its allies Egypt and Libya in the Federation of Arab Republics.

The country is supposed to play an important part in getting a new kind of "seesaw" policy started between two non-Arab powers. While Egypt is forced to play everything on the Soviet card, Syria plays the Chinese trump. This was clearly seen in the way the controlled Damascus press handled the Grechko visit. The Moscow visitor's talks were reported with comparative restraint, but during his visit the press gave amazingly detailed coverage to the forthcoming trip of the Syrian foreign minister to Peking.

On the weekend, Soviets conversing with Western observers made no secret of their disappointment over Syria's "double game." East bloc diplomats added that the Arabs are proving to be increasingly "difficult allies."

DER BUND, Bern
17 May 1972

Kommunisten in der Bagdader Regierung

Moskau verlangt seinen Preis für den sowjetisch-irakischen Pakt ²⁹

A. Beirut. Zwei Kommunisten, die Zentralkomitee- und Politbüro-Mitglieder Abdullah El-Amir und Makram El-Talabani, sind seit Anfang dieser Woche Mitglieder der am Sonntag überraschend umgebildeten Regierung des Militärdiktators General Achmed Hassan El-Bakr in Irak. Das Paradoxe darin ist, dass die irakische Kommunistische Partei offiziell noch immer verboten ist und Hunderte ihrer Mitglieder hingerichtet wurden oder ohne ordentlichen Prozess in den Zuchthäusern stecken.

Die Ernennung zweier KP-Politiker zu Ministern ohne Geschäftsbereich ist die Erfüllung einer Klausel des auf 15 Jahre befristeten Freundschafts- und Beistandspaktes, den Staatspräsident El-Bakr und Ministerpräsident Kossygin im April in Bagdad unterzeichnet hatten. In dieser Klausel verpflichtete sich die irakische Regierung, die Verfolgung der Kommunisten zu beenden und ihnen eine politische Willensbildung im Rahmen der regierenden Partei «Baath» zu gewährleisten. Der Umstand, dass bisher weder das formelle Parteiverbot aufgehoben wurde, noch die inhaftierten Parteimitglieder aus ihrer teilweise jahrelangen Haft entlassen wurden, lässt jedoch darauf schliessen, dass das irakische Militärregime die Beteiligungsmöglichkeit für die Kommunisten in engen Grenzen zu halten bestrebt ist. Die beiden kommunistischen Minister haben denn auch nicht viel mehr als Alibifunktion. In Bagdad sind nämlich auch die Kabinettsmitglieder nur Erfüllungshelfen der obersten Führung. El-Amir und El-Talabani haben zudem nicht einmal ein Kabinettsressort. Bagdader politische Kreise bezeichnen sie denn auch als «staatlich bezahlte Politpensionäre».

Keine Sowjetunterstützung für die Kurden mehr

Das Kabinettsrevirement, das den beiden Kommunisten zu einflusslosen Dekorationsposten verhalf, ist der irakische

Teil eines politischen Geschäftes mit der Sowjetunion, bei dem die Vorteile eindeutig auf Seiten Bagdads liegen. Der Krenl hat sich laut Beirut Gewährsleuten auf exilirakischer und kurdischer Seite verpflichtet, die kurdischen Autonomiebestrebungen im Norden Iraks künftig nicht mehr zu unterstützen. Die Kurden kämpfen seit über 50 Jahren für einen unabhängigen Staat oder doch für die politische und wirtschaftliche Autonomie innerhalb des arabischen Iraks. Ihr Anführer ist der heute über 70jährige General Mustafa Mulla El-Barzani, der - ohne Kommunist zu sein - in Moskau ausgebildet wurde und nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg Oberhaupt einer kurzlebigen Kurdenrepublik im aserbeidschanisch-persischen Grenzgebiet unter dem Protektorat Stalins war. Die Kurden lieferten der irakischen Regierung zehn Jahre lang blutige Kämpfe, und erst Militärdiktator El-Bakr machte diesem kräftezehrenden Ringen scheinbar ein Ende. Er gewährte den Kurden Autonomierechte und ernannte El-Barzani zu seinem Vizepräsidenten. Das kurdische Misstrauen blieb jedoch so gross, dass sich der Kurdenführer weigerte, nach Bagdad zu gehen und sein Amt anzutreten. Er blieb lieber in seinem Hauptquartier Hadsch Umran im unzugänglichen gebirgigen Norden des Landes. In letzter Zeit kam es sporadisch zu neuen Gefechten zwischen irakischen Regierungstruppen und kurdischen Partisanen.

El-Barzani hatte den sowjetischen Ministerpräsidenten während dessen Aufenthaltes in Irak zu einem Gespräch in sein Hauptquartier eingeladen. Kossygin ignorierte jedoch die Offerte und verpflichtete sich gegenüber den arabischen Gastgebern, die Unterstützung der Kurden einzustellen. Seitdem preist Radio Moskau den antiimperialistischen Freiheitskampf des kurdischen Volkes für seine legitimen Rechte nicht mehr, und die Kurden erhalten auch keine sowjetischen Waffen mehr

DER BUND, Bern
17 May 1972

COMMUNISTS IN THE BAGDAD GOVERNMENT

As of the beginning of this week, two communists, members of the Central Committee and of the Politburo, Abdullah El-Amir and Makram El-Talabani, have become members of military dictator General Achmed Hassan El-Bakr's Iraqi government, which was restructured unexpectedly on Sunday. The paradoxical element in this situation is that the Iraqi Communist Party is still officially banned, and hundreds of its members have been executed or jailed without due process.

The appointment of two communist party politicians as ministers without portfolio is the fulfillment of a stipulation in the friendship and assistance treaty, limited to 15 years and signed in April by the President of the Republic, El Bakr and Premier Kossygin in Bagdad. The Iraqi government committed itself in this clause to cease persecuting the communists and to guarantee them influence in the determination of policy within the framework of the ruling Baath Party. The fact that the formal ban of the communist party has not been repealed as yet, and that arrested party members have not been set free from their, in some cases year-long, imprisonment, raises the thought that the Iraqi military regime is trying to keep the possibility for action by the communists within narrow limits. Therefore the purpose of the two communist ministers is not much more than a mere excuse. In Bagdad, even cabinet members are only assistants executing orders of the highest leaders, and El-Amir and El-Talabani do not even have an area of responsibility. Political circles in Bagdad therefore call them "political pensioners paid by the state."

No More Soviet Support for the Kurds

The restructuring of the cabinet which helped the two communists obtain decorative positions without influence, is the Iraqi portion of a political deal with the Soviet Union, in which the advantages lie clearly with Bagdad. According to reliable sources, exiled Iraqi and Kurds in Beirut, the Kremlin has committed itself to cease supporting the efforts of the Kurds in the north of Iraq for autonomy. The Kurds have been fighting for more than 50 years, for the establishment of an independent state, or, at least for political and economic autonomy within Arabian Iraq. The now 70-year-old General Mustafa Mulla El-Barzani is their leader; he was trained in Moscow without having been a communist, and after World War II he was head of a short-lived republic of Kurds under the protectorate of Stalin, in the Azerbaidjani-Iranian borderland. For ten years the Kurds fought bloody battles with the Iraqi government, and only the military dictator El-Bakr has seemingly put an end to this energy-consuming struggle. He granted autonomous rights to the Kurds and appointed El-Barzani as his vice president. However, the Kurds remained so suspicious, that the leader of the Kurds refused to travel to Bagdad to take up his office. He preferred to remain in his headquarters, Hadj Umran, in the inaccessible mountainous

north of the country. Lately, new fights between Iraqi government troops and Kurd partisans have flared up sporadically.

El-Barzani invited the Soviet Premier for talks at his headquarters, while the latter stayed in Iraq. Kossygin, however, ignored this offer and committed himself vis-a-vis his Arabian hosts, to cease supporting the Kurds. Since then, Radio Moscow no longer praises the anti-imperialistic struggle for freedom of the Kurdish people to obtain their legitimate rights, and the Kurds no longer receive Soviet weapons.

GUARDIAN/LE MONDE WEEKLY
15 April 1972

Moscow: still busy making friends

Alexei Kossygin's visit to Bagdad last week — the first ever by a Soviet Premier to Iraq — marks an astonishing improvement in relations between the two countries after a long period in the shadows.

The greater degree of cooperation between the two nations initiated during the February visit to Moscow of Iraqi "strongman" and deputy chairman of the Council of the Revolution Saddam Hussein, was consolidated last Sunday with the signing of a treaty of friendship and cooperation. There can be no doubt that this pact represents another success for the Soviet Union in its bid to strengthen its influence in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.

The treaty is also an indication that the Kremlin, set on its guard by anti-Communist repression in Khartoum and

Cairo's momentary flirtation with Washington, wants to increase and diversify its alliances in the Arab World.

The text of the Bagdad agreement is virtually identical to that signed between the USSR and Egypt on May 27, 1971, except that this earlier pact spelled out greater involvement by the two signatories in the Middle East conflict, in the military sphere, and in constructing and defending Egyptian Socialism.

But if the Egyptian-Soviet pact falls squarely into the framework of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the agreement with Iraq testifies to Moscow's concern with assuring its presence in the Persian Gulf, which harbours the world's largest oil reserves. In a transparent attempt to upstage China in this region and rival the United States, which is well established in Turkey

and Saudi Arabia, the USSR already maintains diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates.

It was unable to do as much with Qatar and Bahrein, but it does have a port of call in Aden for its warships from the Indian Ocean, while its fishing vessels sail at will through the Gulf, thanks to agreements with Iraq and the People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen. Some of these vessels on "special missions" have been sighted regularly at the entry to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

As part of its design to secure its position in the region, the USSR, while maintaining good relations with Tehran, seeks at state level to exercise a tripartite mediation mission — along with Damascus and Bagdad, whose own relations have improved — between Kurds and

Arabs to maintain peace in Kurdistan. And finally to eliminate differences between the Baath and Communist parties so as to pave the way to a "national front" in Iraq.

Success of such a policy would be certain to strengthen the hand of the "progressive" Arab oil producers in their dealings with Western petroleum interests — particularly the Americans. The treaty just signed in Bagdad also represents an important card in the Soviet hand only weeks before the Nixon-Brezhnev summit in Moscow. Paradoxically, even though Saddam Hussein is soon to visit Paris, Europe, which is the main user of Iraqi crude oil as well as the petroleum products of the Persian Gulf, remains a virtual spectator in a part of the world that is vital to its interests.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
11 April 1972

Soviet gains in Persian Gulf

Soviet Premier Alexei Kossygin's visit to Iraq and the signing of a 15-year Soviet-Iraqi friendship treaty have manifold meanings, but the most immediately significant are these:

The Russians have gained an important foothold in the Middle East oil industry, and they have greatly strengthened their position in the Persian Gulf.

Mr. Kossygin's visit was timed to coincide with the formal inauguration of the Soviet-financed North Rumeila oil field, which was taken away from the Western-owned Iraq Petroleum Company in 1964

and is now owned by the Iraq National Oil Company. Not only the Russians but other East European countries will presumably be major purchasers of crude oil from Rumeila. As Soviet tankers ply the gulf, Soviet warships are likely to be frequent visitors to Iraqi ports.

The treaty with Iraq is similar to those that the Soviet Union concluded last year with Egypt and India. Both sides undertake not to join alliances without consulting the other, nor to allow bases hostile to the other to be established on their territory. They pledge to "cooperate in strengthening each other's defense poten-

tial." The defense commitment is noticeably vague, but undoubtedly it means more Soviet arms aid for Iraq.

The Persian Gulf states in general and Iran in particular may feel considerable concern at Iraq's opening the door to a Russian presence in this strategic waterway. Since the withdrawal of the British military forces from the area at the end of last year, Iran has sought to fill the leadership role in the gulf. Iraq is traditionally jealous of Iran, and by signing the treaty with the Soviet Union undoubtedly hopes to enhance its own posi-

tion and thus offset Iran's ascendancy in the region. On the other hand, the Russians have cultivated good relations with Iran in recent years and sought to reassure the Shah as to their intentions by emphasizing that the treaty with Iraq is not directed at any other country.

For the Soviet Union, the new treaty is clearly part of an overall strategic pattern of winning friends and strengthening ties around the periphery of Asia. It comes at a time when the United States once again has its attention focused on Indo-China and the war in Vietnam.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
11 April 1972

Moves in east, south, and west

Soviets push interests in Asia

Since the United States is deeply occupied in Southeast Asia by the new North Vietnamese offensive, the Soviets are rapidly advancing their own interests at Asia's southern and eastern limits.

There is expectation here that the Soviet-Iraqi 15-year treaty signed in Baghdad April 10 may be followed by one with Syria.

A Soviet-Turkish friendship pact, following Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny's scheduled visit to Turkey April 11 to 18, might also be brewing.

If so, this would be the boldest Soviet diplomatic advance yet into what Washington used to call the "northern tier" states — which United States administrations, beginning with that of President Truman in 1946 and 1947, sought to erect as a barrier to Soviet influence.

By 1958—when the Iraqi revolution dashed the U.S. plan of an anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact including Arab states anchored on Iraq—Moscow already had leaped over Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, where U.S. influence was strong, and was concentrating instead on the Arab states of Syria and Egypt.

Today, West Pakistan—after losing East Pakistan in last December's war with Soviet-backed India to the new secessionist state of Bangladesh—finds itself in direct economic and political trouble.

Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto faces breakaway movements in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan regions,

and a rising wave of protest over India's failure to release about 90,000 Pakistani war prisoners.

In Iran — where President Nixon is due to stop May 30 and 31 for talks with Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi after President Nixon's Moscow visit — Moscow has an improving image and growing economic investments.

Possible topic

One of the points that President Nixon and the Shah might discuss is the real meaning of the new Soviet-Iraqi pact — and the meaning of whatever new Soviet-Turkish arrangements might come out of this week's Podgorny visit to Turkey.

Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin returned from Baghdad to Moscow April 10 after signing the 15-year treaty with Iraqi President Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr.

Earlier, Mr. Kosygin attended the inauguration of Iraq's Soviet-backed North Rumeila oil field. Arrangements were announced for first tanker deliveries of Iraqi crude oil to the Soviet Union during a forthcoming new Soviet naval visit to Iraq's Persian Gulf ports.

The Soviet-Iraqi pact provides for political, cultural, and defense links—like the old Western-sponsored Baghdad Pact and its now-feeble successor, the Central Treaty Organization.

Along the lines of last year's Soviet-Indian and Soviet-Egyptian treaties, both Iraq and the Soviet Union pledge themselves not to

allow each other's territory to be used for hostile bases.

Interest expressed

Interest in Iraqi oil, and Iraq's apparent interest in substituting Russian for Western technology for developing it, is expressed in clauses on economic, scientific, and technical cooperation.

In his speech at the North Rumella oil ceremonies, Mr. Kosygin promised Soviet help to Arab peoples to "free their wealth" from "Western monopolies."

Neither Mr. Kosygin nor the treaty text, however, referred directly to Israel, according to Baghdad Radio reports. Article four of the treaty does say both states will continue fighting "imperialism, zionism, and colonialism."

Analysts here believe use of the word "Zionism" spells continued Soviet refusal to promise publicity to fight Israel.

Treaty scorned

The anti-Soviet Beirut newspaper Al-Hayat said the treaty "ignores the liberation of Arab territory."

The state radio of Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi's Libyan regime scorned it as "a new pact of the imperialist type." After a Moscow visit by Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein al-Takriti in February, the Libyan Government condemned signing of Arab-Soviet pacts as reviving "imperialism" and as a violation of the Arab League charter, which pledges preservation of independence and sovereignty of member states.

The Soviet commitment to Iraq's defense is less rigid than that to Egypt in the May, 1971 Egyptian-Soviet treaty.

Before the 1967 Arab-Israel war, Moscow was Iraq's main arms supplier. It replaced some of Iraq's 1967 aircraft losses.

From 1968 to 1970, Iraq bought tanks, armored cars, transport planes, and helicopters from France.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
10 August 1971

Soviets thrust into Asia's flank

New pact stiffens Indian alliance

With dramatic suddenness, the Soviet Union has moved to bolster its influence in turmoil-ridden southern Asia.

It has signed a 20-year treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation with India which, in the opinion of diplomatic observers here, seeks two broad goals:

- To deter an outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan by making clear which side the Soviet Union would back.

- To consolidate the already solid Soviet position in India in the face of Washington's diplomatic rapprochement with Communist China.

Article 9 of the treaty provides that the two sides will consult in the event of attack on either country by a third party and "take appropriate effective measures" to ensure peace and security. It also provides that in the event of an armed conflict involving one country the other signatory will not give the third country any assistance.

Western diplomats believe that this article also gives the Russians leverage to put pressure on India to prevent a conflict. However, if hostilities were to break out between India and Pakistan, Moscow has pledged itself not to help Pakistan.

Sequel to U.A.R. accord

The treaty was signed in New Delhi Aug. 9 by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko and Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh. Mr. Gromyko immediately hailed the pact as a document contributing to stronger peace in Asia.

Significant in an historical context, this is the second time in three months the Russians have adopted long-term commitments with non-Communist countries. In May they signed a 15-year treaty with the United Arab Republic. The Soviet Union is thus moving vigorously to formalize and consolidate its relations with nonaligned countries.

It is generally agreed here that in the subcontinent Moscow's role has been one of a pacifier. Because conflict and hostility merely invite Chinese involvement, the Russians have a strong interest in maintaining stability in the region.

Since the Tashkent Declaration of 1966, which put an end to the Indian-Pakistani war, the Russians have sought good relations with all countries in south Asia, including Pakistan, although their primary influence and investment is in India.

In this connection, what will now be closely watched is Pakistan's reaction. Some ob-

servers suggest that a possible effect of the new treaty will be to impel Pakistan to seek closer ties with Peking. This would lead to a polarization of the area which the Russians have sought to avoid.

Diplomats think the Russians, however, concerned about an outbreak of war, had to weigh the risks of polarization against the gains of securing their interests and voice in India.

New Delhi, for its part, apparently wanted an increased commitment from the Soviet Union in view of the latter's policy of balancing its relations as between Pakistan and India. In this respect the treaty is seen to be a victory for the Indians.

Status quo backed

It is also suggested that in Article 10 India has recognized Moscow's present obligations to Pakistan. Under this article, each party declares it has no commitments and will not undertake any commitments with other states that may cause military damage to the other party. This seems to confirm the status quo.

Political observers note that the treaty differs from the Soviet-U.A.R. pact in many respects, a fact that reflects Moscow's different relationship with India. The Soviet-

The pact with Egypt outlaws all unions and groupings aimed against a side, thus leaving India far more freedom of maneuver and independence.

The New Delhi pact, to cite another contrast, states that the U.S.S.R. respects India's policy of "nonalignment." This term is not spelled out in the U.A.R. treaty, although Egypt considers itself a nonaligned nation.

Other provisions

Other provisions of the Soviet-Indian treaty call for regular contacts on major international problems and a pledge to strengthen economic, scientific, and technical cooperation. The agreement will come into force only after ratification.

Meanwhile, since the tragic events in East Pakistan, Moscow has been scrupulously correct in its relations with both New Delhi and Islamabad. In April President Podgorny sent a message to President Yahya Khan in which he expressed concern, as well as hope for a "peaceful political settlement."

While measures have been urged to stop the repressions, Pakistan has not been condemned outright.

The Soviet press treats the two halves of Pakistan as one country, referring carefully to "East Pakistan."

The treaty announcement came against the teeming backdrop of Delhi's largest-ever rally supporting the ruling Congress Party. An estimated 1 million people poured into the capital over the weekend to join a Congress-sponsored show of national solidarity. The treaty news was greeted by jubilant shouts. "Hindi, Russi, bhai bhai" ("Indians, Russians, brothers").

Four points for talks

Speculation preceding the treaty focused on the Bangla Desh issue, touchstone of current Indian domestic and foreign thinking. Talks between Indian officials and M. Gromyko were slated to cover four points: Bangla Desh; socioeconomic strains caused by the refugee influx; the Chinese-American thaw, and separate Chinese and American assurances of support to Pakistan.

Indian anticipation was limited to a joint communiqué, not a treaty. But concern that the Russians would propose Tashkent-style negotiation were floated mainly by pro-West elements. After weeks of weathering blistering attacks on their ineffectual foreign policy, government circles now feel vindicated.

Hope that the Russians would consider India a worthy junior partner in restoring the balance of power upset by the Chinese-American thaw was tenuous. But foundations for strengthening Soviet-Indian relations were laid soon after the visit of U.S. presidential assistant Henry A. Kissinger to Peking. Mr. Kissinger's trip was cited here as a triggering factor in the Indian invitation to Moscow. Indians think the first hint of Pakistani belligerency dates from

the Kissinger trip, giving the impression that China would back Pakistani pugnacity and that American reluctance to weaken the thaw would prevent American opposition to the Chinese stance.

Visit not isolated

India sent former ambassador to Moscow D. P. Dhar posthaste to meet Kremlin leaders with minimum fanfare for a top-level mission.

There is little doubt that the urgency expressed in the Dhar-Moscow mission found responsive echoes in the Kremlin. Prompt Soviet acceptance of the bid for bilateral talks is seen here as recognition of the need for both countries to make public long-standing ties.

Mr. Gromyko's visit is not an isolated episode but an important first step toward a probable new perspective in India's foreign relations. Relations with the United States are heading for a new low.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told massed crowds Monday that the treaty does not mean the end of nonalignment but the strengthening of India's hands. Indian initiative in arranging the Gromyko visit is not being concealed here.

New Delhi now feels assured of Soviet backing on Bangla Desh but will probably heed Moscow's advice to avoid giving Pakistan excuses to escalate rumblings of war.

Speculation now is focused on prospects of Soviet help in tackling refugee-care costs and general deepening of economic relations. Mr. Gromyko so far has neither accepted nor refused an invitation to visit refugee camps.

HINDUSTAN TIMES
10 August 1971

WAS THIS NECESSARY?

Mr Gromyko was not exaggerating when he described the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation as a "most important landmark" whose significance "cannot be overestimated". Mr Swaran Singh was more blunt in describing the pact as a "Treaty of Non-Aggression" and a "credible...deterrent to any powers that may have aggressive designs on our territorial integrity and sovereignty". He called it a Treaty of Peace against War and one that would strengthen non-alignment — "a dynamic policy which can be adapted to...changing situations".

When the gloss is removed, what stands revealed is a 20-year mutual security treaty. Although the Treaty might not quite commit India to a formal or automatic military alliance with the Soviet Union, there is absolutely no doubt that entering into a security arrangement with one of the world's two superpowers India has abandoned non-alignment and will in the eyes of many third countries be regarded as having aligned itself with the Soviet bloc. The United States and other western powers will interpret it as such and China and Pakistan are likely to react even more sharply since these

are obviously the two countries against which India would need a "credible deterrent" against "an attack or a threat thereof". The text of the Indo-Soviet Treaty is strikingly similar to the text of the UAR-Soviet Treaty signed last May. The global reactions may not be very dissimilar.

We have often argued that non-alignment ceased to be a policy as such with the end of the cold war in a bi-polar world and the emergence of multi-polar power constellations. Thereafter, non-alignment could only be regarded as an attitude (underlying an independent foreign policy)

rather than a policy in itself. The Indo-Soviet Treaty, however, entails alignment with the Soviet Union which is ranged against the United States and, more acutely, China. Two years ago Mr Brezhnev made a proposal for collective security in Asia. This immediately caused a lifting of eyebrows round the world. India itself questioned this idea and Soviet spokesmen were quick to explain that all that had been intended was regional economic co-operation and the renunciation of force in the settlement of disputes, or peaceful co-existence. Obviously it is collective security of a more positive kind that Mr Swaran

Singh is now promoting in suggesting that the Indo-Soviet Treaty "will provide a pattern for similar treaties between India and other countries in this region". Would this exclude a similar treaty with the US? And collective security against whom? (Mr. Nehru asked this question when in 1958 President Ayub Khan proposed joint defence between India and Pakistan.)

For more than two years now the Government of India has from time to time stated its willingness to open a dialogue with Peking. This sentiment was reiterated in Parliament last week when Mr Swaran Singh said that if necessary India would be willing to "create conditions" for this purpose given a favourable Chinese response. But all along there has been a fear of Chinese support to Pakistan in the event of a crisis in Indo-Pakistan relations. This fear has continued to haunt policy-makers in Delhi with rising tension between India and Pakistan over Bangla Desh. Mr Swaran Singh in fact made reference to this in his speech on the occasion of the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty. He told Mr Gromyko that his visit coincided "with developments in this part of the world which are a matter of common concern to both our countries and could jeopardise peace and security." For its part, the Soviet Union is locked in an ideological and nationalist-territorial power struggle with China. The signs of a Sino-US thaw have caused some unease in Moscow which is accordingly anxious to buttress its own position. It has quite expectedly turned to India as among the countries on which it can anchor itself in Asia. The United States, in turn, is being impelled to withdraw from Indo-China and the South-East Asian mainland by virtue of

the pressure of its own domestic public opinion. It would like to seek a rapprochement with China, which cannot seriously threaten it for at least another decade or more. Despite the growing detente in Europe the United States' principal contender for global supremacy during the seventies remains the Soviet Union which is sought to be prevented from thrusting south to the oil rich areas of West Asia and North Africa and down to the Indian Ocean. Hence the importance of West Pakistan in American strategic thinking and President Nixon's military and political support to President Yahya Khan's regime despite its possible distaste for what has happened in East Bengal. Washington's complete insensitivity to India's thinking in this matter and Dr Henry Kissinger's reported statement to Mr L. K. Jha that India must not count on a positive American response should China intervene in favour of Islamabad in any Indo-Pakistan conflict has probably mistakenly added to the Government of India's sense of loneliness on the Bangla Desh issue and encouraged it to seek security assurances from the Soviet Union which Moscow has been glad to offer against the background of its own global interests. The United States has pushed India much further along than where it might have ventured on its own. And such has been the dismay at American support to Pakistan in recent weeks that Delhi has lodged a diplomatic protest with Washington over these "hostile acts".

In our judgment the Government has overreacted to the prospect of an Indo-Pakistan conflict, the possibility and scale of Chinese intervention in any such event, and the American attitude towards

interests do not centre on Pakistan and it would not lightly venture to launch on a major trans-Himalayan war to pull Islamabad's chestnuts out of a revolutionary fire. Were it to do so, India has ten mountain divisions poised to meet just such a threat. And in the remote possibility of their being overwhelmed, the superpowers, especially the Soviet Union, could not afford to stand by idly in their own global interests. In other words, in a situation of real crisis, Soviet support would have been forthcoming without a treaty. And if it was merely sought to deter Pakistan politically, a firmer enunciation of the earlier Podgorny thesis might have sufficed.

Now it is quite conceivable that the Indo-Soviet treaty will antagonise China, bring China and Pakistan even nearer, and widen the gulf between India and the West. President Nixon's foreign policy report to Congress last March expressed a US interest in ensuring that the sub-continent did not become a focus of great power conflict. It added that American activities in the area would be kept in balance with those of the other major powers concerned, namely, the Soviet Union and China, which it stated had "legitimate" interests in the area. But it went on to assert that "no outside power has a claim to predominant influence in the region." In view of this declaration the Americans may, for other reasons as well, wish to strengthen Pakistan or China and the RCD group to counter the Indo-Soviet entente. Thus the Indo-Soviet Treaty might well mark the beginning of a new cold war in this part of the world with India in the eye of the storm. Could it be that India has entered into a long-term commitment on

short-range considerations and might it perhaps unwittingly be sucked into the Sino-Soviet conflict? Whether it has in return gained any leverage or flexibility over Bangla Desh remains to be seen.

It is quite clear that a Treaty of such far-reaching implications could not have been negotiated overnight even though the preparations may have been hastened by more recent developments. It is surprising that the Prime Minister should not have thought fit to give Parliament or the country the slightest inkling of such a profound change despite numerous opportunities for doing so, whether in the External Affairs Ministry's annual report or in the course of parliamentary debates or other public pronouncements. There is a coincidence of interests between India and the Soviet Union in Asia. Even otherwise, we would welcome a strengthening of the close and cordial economic and political ties that subsist between the two countries. But we do regard India as a potentially great power, and certainly a major factor in Asia which is neither so weak nor even so lonely as to accept any arrangement that might reduce it to the status of being anything less than equal in its relations with any other country. The Soviet Union needs India as much as India needs the Soviet Union. There is also no reason to suppose that this country cannot secure an honourable resolution of its differences with China or place its relations with the United States on a more rational and mature footing. These objectives must still be pursued so that India's foreign and domestic policies remain completely independent and are guided by the national interest and are not overshadowed by the global interests of however friendly a superpower.

HINDUSTAN TIMES
10 August 1971

Text of Indo-Soviet treaty

NEW DELHI, Aug. 9—The following is the text of the treaty of peace, friendship and co-operation between the Republic of India and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Desirous of expanding and consolidating the existing relations of sincere friendship between them. Believing that the further development of friendship and co-operation meets the basic national interests of both the States as well as the interests of lasting peace in Asia and the world.

Determined to promote the consolidation of universal peace and security and to make steadfast efforts for the relaxation of international tensions and the final elimination of the remnants of colonialism.

Upholding their firm faith in the principles of peaceful co-existence and co-operation between States with different political and social systems.

Convinced that in the world today international problems can only be solved by co-operation and not by conflict.

Reaffirming their determination to abide by the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

The Republic of India on the one side, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the other side, have decided to conclude the present treaty, for which purposes the following plenipotentiaries have been appointed:

On behalf of the Republic of India: Sardar Swaran Singh, Minister of External Affairs.

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs who, having each presented their credentials, which are found to be in proper form and due order, have agreed as follows:

Article I

The high contracting parties solemnly declare that enduring peace and friendship shall prevail between the two countries and their peoples. Each party shall respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other party and refrain from interfering in the other's internal affairs. The high contracting parties shall continue to develop and

consolidate the relations of sincere friendship, good neighbourliness and comprehensive co-operation existing between them on the basis of the aforesaid principles, as well as those of equality and mutual benefit.

Article II

Guided by the desire to contribute in every possible way to ensure enduring peace and security of their people, the high contracting parties declare their determination to continue their efforts to preserve and to strengthen peace in Asia and throughout the world, to halt the arms race and to achieve general and complete disarmament, including both nuclear and conventional, under effective international control.

Article III

Guided by their loyalty to the lofty ideal of equality of all peoples and nations, irrespective of race or creed, the high contracting parties condemn colonialism and racialism in all forms and manifestations, and reaffirm their determination to strive for their final and complete elimination.

The high contracting parties shall co-operate with other States to achieve these aims and to support the just aspirations of the peoples in their struggle against colonialism and racial domination.

Article IV

The Republic of India respects the peace-loving policy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics aimed at strengthening friendship and co-operation with all nations.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects India's policy of non-alignment and reaffirms that this policy constitutes an important factor in the maintenance of universal peace and international security and in the lessening of tensions in the world.

Article V

Deeply interested in ensuring universal peace and security, attaching great importance to their mutual co-operation in the international field for achieving these aims, the high contracting parties will maintain regular contacts with each other on major international problems affecting the

interests of both the States by means of meetings and exchanges of views between their leading statesmen, visits by official delegations and special envoys of the two Governments, and through diplomatic channels.

Article VI

Attaching great importance to economic, scientific and technological co-operation between them the high contracting parties will continue to consolidate and expand mutually advantageous and comprehensive co-operation in these fields as well as expand trade, transport and communications between them on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit and most-favoured-nation treatment, subject to the existing agreements and the special arrangements with contiguous countries as specified in the Indo-Soviet trade agreement of Dec. 28, 1970.

Article VII

The high contracting parties shall promote further development of ties and contacts between them in the fields of science, art, literature, education, public health, Press, radio, television, cinema, tourism and sports.

Article VIII

In accordance with the traditional friendship established between the two countries each of the high contracting parties solemnly declares that it shall not enter into or participate in any military alliance directed against the other party.

Each high contracting party undertakes to abstain from any aggression against the other party and to prevent the use of its territory for the commission of any act which might inflict military damage on the other high contracting party.

Article IX

Each high contracting party undertakes to abstain from providing any assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the other party. In the event of either party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the high contracting parties shall immediately enter into

mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries.

Article X

Each high contracting party solemnly declares that it shall not enter into any obligation, secret or public, with one or more States, which is incompatible with this treaty. Each high contracting party further declares that no obligation exists, nor shall any obligation be entered into, between itself and any other State or States, which might cause military damage to the other party.

Article XI

This treaty is concluded for the duration of 20 years and will be automatically extended for each successive period of five years unless either high contracting party declares its desire to terminate it by giving notice to the other high contracting party 12 months prior to the expiration of the treaty. The treaty will be subject to ratification and will come into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification which will take place in Moscow within one month of the signing of this treaty.

Article XII

Any difference of interpretation of any article or articles of this treaty which may arise between the high contracting parties will be settled bilaterally by peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.

The said plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty in Hindi, Russian and English, all texts being equally authentic and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in New Delhi on the ninth day of August in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy one.

On behalf of the Republic of India
(Sd.) Swaran Singh
Minister of External Affairs.

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(Sd.) A. A. Gromyko
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

BALTIMORE SUN
11 August 1971

India Welcomes Pact Of Friendship With Soviet

By PRAN SADIHWAL
New Delhi Bureau of The Sun

New Delhi—The Indian public and its representatives in Parliament welcomed yesterday what they considered an "alliance" with the Soviet Union.

"Nothing in recent times has electrified the people so much as signing" of the 20-year pact of friendship Monday, the Indian minister of external affairs, Swaran Singh, told the Indian Parliament yesterday.

The minister declared that the pact represented no deviation from India's non-alignment. In a listless six-hour debate on the treaty in the Parliament, members gave the treaty massive support not for what the treaty said but for what it meant in view of threats of general war by the Pakistani president A. M. Yahya Khan, if India continues to support the East Pakistan Bengali rebels.

A typical interpretation of the treaty in the Indian press yesterday was: "The Soviet Union will come to India's help in case of an attack or threats of an attack by Pakistan, China or any other country."

Members of Parliament interpreted the treaty to mean a defense alliance between two nations. They expressed hope and expectation that the Russians

will come to aid India in case of war with either China or Pakistan.

Hiren Mukherji, the leader of the pro-Moscow Communist party of India, asked the government "to shed our approach of cold feet, now that we have this treaty." He asked the government to extend recognition not only to the Bengali nation provisional government but also to North Vietnam, North Korea and East Germany.

Some members called the signing of the treaty a "red-letter day in Indian history." And there was general criticism of the United States and the western powers in their relations with India.

Members said the U.S. approach to India has always been partisan toward Pakistan.

A spokesman from the ruling Congress Party said that the Soviet Union has always been a "true friend of India" in many of the critical times faced by the nation. They said in all the wars, including the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, it was Russia which came to the aid of India.

Soviet Neutrality

The United States gave India emergency arms aid in 1962 while the Soviet Union remained neutral. In 1965 the United

States cut off arms aid to both Indian and Pakistan, hurting Pakistan more, while the Soviet Union mediated the conflict.

Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Hindu leader of the orthodox Jan Sangh party, welcomed the treaty because it won India a friend at a critical juncture. It indicated India was not friendless as in the Sino-Indian war of 1962. The pact will also check Pakistan's aggressive designs against India, he added.

Mr. Vajpayee ridiculed the government's defense of non-alignment and said non-alignment was not sacrosanct at a time when international relations were being forged for "naked self-interest."

Mr. Singh admitted that timing of the treaty during a period of tension with Pakistan has been such that "even those who want to oppose it know that the people are behind it" and dare not oppose it.

He also assured the Parliament that the pact would not "restrain" India from taking unilateral action in East Pakistan or continuing the support of the Bengali rebels. Not even the Soviet Union can restrain India from exercising its sovereign rights, he said.

It was not a defense pact nor a military alliance, Mr. Singh

said. By the provision of mutual consultations, the pact only provides a framework within which two nations could take steps to maintain security.

This provision makes the friendship treaty different from the Warsaw Pact and other military pacts as there is no clause for automatic commitment "of armies by either side," Mr. Singh asserted.

In reply to a question, the minister said that anything in the perpetual Sino-Soviet friendship treaty which is inconsistent with Indo-Soviet friendship pact is "not binding."

No vote was taken on the treaty, because the Cabinet has the constitutional power to ratify it on its own.

Nevertheless, the government still took the treaty to Parliament for debate.

Little Opposition

Of the eight major parties in the country, six extended their support and only two—the conservative Swatantra and the Socialist party—opposed it.

Speaker after speaker of all political sentiments used the debate to criticize the U.S. policy of shipping arms to Pakistan after March 25, when the civil war erupted in East Pakistan.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
27 May 1971

Delicate sparring in Cairo

By Geoffrey Godsell
*Overseas news editor of
The Christian Science Monitor*

Soviet President Podgorny and Egyptian President Sadat are shrewdly trying to get the measure of each other in their talks in Cairo.

Mr. Podgorny will want to discover the effect on the Soviet investment in Egypt—military, economic, and political—of the recent purge of those in the Egyptian leadership generally deemed most pro-Soviet.

Mr. Sadat will want to reassure the Russians that what has happened is no cause for Moscow to weaken its support of Egypt or to try to put the skids under him and restore to power any of the men whom he has ousted.

If in the process, Mr. Sadat can give the Russians the impression that their backing of any move from within Egypt against him would be at their peril, he will probably seize the opportunity.

It can hardly be a coincidence that the front page of the leading Cairo newspaper, Al-Ahram, carried alongside a report of Mr. Podgorny's arrival in Cairo a report on the Egyptian Prosecutor General's statement that the "mastermind" behind this month's alleged plot to depose President Sadat was former Vice-President Ali Sabry.

News report cited

Mr. Sabry has long been considered the most pro-Soviet of the men at the top in Egypt. He was dismissed from office at the beginning of the month and since mid-May has been in detention.

Al-Ahram, writing of the first round of talks between Mr. Podgorny and Mr. Sadat,

Another base for Mr. Sabry's friends until Mr. Sadat's purge was the newspaper Al-Gomouria. Through its columns earlier this year Mr. Sadat's willingness to reopen the Suez Canal before total Israeli withdrawal from

Sinai was vigorously challenged.

Another of Al-Gomouria's arguments was that Mr. Sadat was naïve to put so much trust in the United States as a benign influence to secure a settlement with Israel acceptable to Egypt.

said that two facts had already emerged. First, the Soviet Union had renewed its pledge of political, economic, and military support for Egypt. And second, both Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to work for the liberation of all Arab territories occupied by Israel.

This was in keeping with the amenities which attended Mr. Podgorny's arrival in the Egyptian capital. Mr. Sadat was at the airport to welcome him and embraced him. There was also a 21-gun salute, together with the cheering crowds and banners which Egyptian officialdom can usually produce as the occasion demands.

All facets of the Soviet Union's involvement in Egypt are reflected in the team that President Podgorny has brought with him. In putting Mr. Podgorny in charge of the delegation, the Kremlin is honoring Mr. Sadat by making the talks a genuine summit, with president talking to president.

Members of party

At Mr. Podgorny's side are: Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, his country's highest foreign-policy expert; the First Deputy Defense Minister, Gen. Ivan Pavlovsky; and Boris Ponomarev, secretary of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee.

The latter's inclusion in the Soviet delegation can probably be explained by the disrupting effect which President Sadat's purge has had on the bureaucracy of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), Egypt's single-party organization.

Ali Sabry's main power center within Egypt had long been the ASU. Mr. Sadat has dismissed Mr. Sabry's friends from the ASU machine and has announced his intention of rebuilding the party organization almost from scratch.

Interview run

On Thursday, Al-Gomouria carried an interview with the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo, Vladimir Vinogradov, who is participating in Mr. Podgorny's talks with President Sadat. Mr. Vinogradov is quoted as saying

that he believes "it is possible to achieve a political solution" in the Middle East "if efforts are stepped."

The way to a just settlement, he said, depended to a large extent on a strong Egyptian position and on convincing Israel and its supporters of the strength and capability of

the Egyptians.

Mr. Sadat's present efforts are concentrated on getting the United States to use its good offices to persuade Israel to match the concessions which — in Egyptian eyes — have already been offered by Cairo in the interest of a settlement.

Soviet view

To the Russians, this would be tantamount to peace under American auspices. They would prefer peace under Russian auspices—which could be represented as having been achieved through joint Soviet-Egyptian military pressure on the Israelis.

THE GUARDIAN, Manchester
29 May 1971

Friendship sealed—on paper

The Soviet Union likes to see things written down in black and white. Whenever its friends have taken unilateral action and speculation has followed sooner or later, Moscow has felt the need to set the record straight once and for all. This has been the case in Eastern Europe many times. With some significant differences the 15-year "Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation" between Egypt and the Soviet Union falls into this category. It comes against the background of President Sadat's purge of plotters, many of whom were senior officials known to be sympathetic to the Soviet Union. At the same time the rapprochement between Cairo and Washington had encouraged Mr Rogers to take a direct personal lead in trying to guide Egypt and Israel towards peace. The Soviet Union must have been apprehensive that its massive economic and military investments were at stake. Worse still, the geographical and military facilities it had in Egypt, if threatened, could have undermined the Soviet Union's global strategy. President Podgorny's visit was primarily to find out what had happened. But both he and President Sadat had compelling reasons for keeping things as they were. What better way of showing this than through a treaty?

The published clauses of the treaty suggest nothing more than "a further concrete expression of the relations which have brought us together over many years"—to use Mr Sadat's words. The points about mutual non-interference, cooperation in economic, cultural, and other fields, commitments not to join anti-Soviet alliances, and pledges to pursue socialism at home are all either old hat or ambiguous enough to afford a way out if needed. The military clause is, essentially, defensive and connected with training in supplied arms (though Israel will not like the sound of the clause "with a view to strengthening Egypt's capacity to eliminate the consequences of aggression as well as increasing its ability to stand up to aggression"). This stops well short of the stronger clause in the "Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance" signed by Rumania and the Soviet Union last August, for example. That said "in case one of the high

contracting parties is subjected to an armed attack . . . the other party, implementing the inalienable right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Article 51 of the UN Charter, will immediately render it all-round assistance with all the means at its disposal, including military."

If the treaty marks no change in relations, why was it necessary at all? The clause dealing with consultation on matters of interest and with coordinating policies gives a clue. The extent of Mr Sadat's purge and Moscow's muted reaction indicated that Russia's direct influence on Egypt's internal affairs is limited. It did not know fully what was going on and it was not consulted. There are also indications that the contents of Mr Sadat's exchange of letters with Mr Nixon and Mr Rogers were being kept very largely among themselves. The Soviet Union is seeking in this treaty some right to a share in the secrets of Cairo's goings on both inside the country and in its Middle East policies. The Soviet Union must also hope that it will now be in a better position to ensure that Egypt does not strike out on its own militarily or indulge in negotiations harmful to Moscow's long-term interests.

The treaty and an accompanying communiqué said the search for peace would continue. But it may make the search tougher. The two sides have strengthened their relations and increased responsibilities just by putting their terms in writing. The Egyptian side has a new diplomatic card to play and this may make it harder to get negotiations with Israel going again or to open the Suez Canal as part of an overall peace settlement. The main danger is that the polarisation between Egypt and Israel and their patrons may be hardened. It may cause Israel to press for further military guarantees from the United States—and push the potential conflict up on to a higher plane. But it would pay both sides to regard this treaty as marking the conclusion (as far as can be told) of Mr Sadat's probationary period as absolute ruler of Egypt. For whatever is in the treaty, it remains on paper. In moments of stress such treaties often become no more than pieces of paper.

THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH
30 May 1971

Soft Soap

THE Egyptian-Soviet "Friendship Treaty" just signed in Cairo is a natural by-product of that savage counter-coup in which President Sadat recently imprisoned or immobilised those plotting to unseat him. Some of the plotters were held to be Soviet protégés and the Kremlin must have been pressing Sadat hard for something to save Russia's face as well as Russia's vast strategic and economic investment in Egypt.

This the treaty has now provided. But it does no more than formalise an existing situation.

Indeed, one passage—where the two signatories promise "non-interference" in each other's internal affairs—can only be regarded as a plus for Sadat. Egypt is hardly likely to interfere in Russia's domestic politics.

As to the general prospects for a Middle East settlement, Sadat is a peace-maker, and anything which strengthens his personal position, as this treaty does, can only help those prospects in the long run.

Meanwhile, like his discomfited rivals at home, the Russians have learnt how deceptive those sleepy eyes of Anwar Sadat can be.

NEW YORK TIMES
28 MAY 1971

Text of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Signed by Soviet and Egypt

Following, as transmitted in English by Tass, the Soviet press agency, is the text of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty of friendship signed in Cairo yesterday:

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic,

Being firmly convinced that the further development of friendship and all-around cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic meets the interests of the peoples of both states and helps strengthen world peace,

Being inspired by the ideals of struggle against imperialism and colonialism, and for the freedom, independence and social progress of the peoples,

Being determined to wage persistently the struggle for stronger international peace and security in accordance with the invariable course of their peaceable foreign policy,

Reaffirming their allegiance to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter.

Being driven by a desire to consolidate and strengthen the traditional relations of sincere friendship between

the two states and peoples through concluding a treaty of friendship and cooperation and thus creating a basis for their further development,

Agreed on the following:

Article 1

The high contracting parties solemnly declare that unbreakable friendship will always exist between the two countries and their peoples. They will continue to develop and strengthen the existing relations of friendship and all-around cooperation between them in the political, economic, scientific, technological, cultural and other fields on the basis of the principles of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, noninterference in the internal affairs of each other, equality and mutual benefit.

Article 2

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a socialist state and the United Arab Republic, which has set itself the aim of reconstructing society along socialist lines, will cooperate closely and in

all fields in ensuring conditions for preserving and further developing the social and economic gains of their peoples.

Article 3

Being guided by a desire to contribute in every way toward maintaining international peace and the security of the peoples, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic will continue with all determination to make efforts toward achieving and ensuring a lasting and fair peace in the Middle East in accordance with the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter.

In pursuing a peace-loving foreign policy, the high contracting parties will come out for peace, relaxation of international tension, achievement of general and complete disarmament and prohibition of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction.

Article 4

Being guided by the ideals of freedom and equality of all the peoples, the high contracting parties condemn imperialism and colonialism in

all their forms and manifestations. They will continue to come out against imperialism, for the full and final elimination of colonialism in pursuance of the U.N. declaration on the granting of independence to all colonial countries and peoples, and wage unswervingly the struggle against racialism and apartheid.

Article 5

The high contracting parties will continue to expand and deepen all-around cooperation and exchange of experience in the economic and scientific-technological fields—industry, agriculture, water conservancy, irrigation, development of natural resources, development of power engineering, the training of national personnel and other fields of economy.

The two sides will expand trade and sea shipping between the two states on the basis of the principles of mutual benefit and most-favored nation treatment.

Article 6

The high contracting parties will further promote co-

operation between them in the fields of science, arts, literature, education, health services, the press, radio, television, cinema, tourism, physical culture and other fields.

The two sides will promote wider cooperation and direct connections between political and public organizations of working people, enterprises, cultural and scientific institutions for the purpose of a deeper mutual acquaintance with the life, work and achievements of the peoples of the two countries.

Article 7

Being deeply interested in ensuring peace and the security of the peoples, and attaching great importance to concertedness of their actions in the international area in the struggle for peace, the high contracting parties will, for this purpose, regularly consult each other at different levels on all important questions affecting the interests of both states.

In the event of development of situations creating, in the opinion of both sides, a danger to peace or violation of peace, they will contact each other without delay

in order to concert their positions with a view to removing the threat that has arisen or reestablishing peace.

Article 8

In the interests of strengthening the defense capacity of the United Arab Republic, the high contracting parties will continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements between them. Such cooperation will provide specifically for assistance in the training of the U.A.R. military personnel, in mastering the armaments and equipment supplied to the United Arab Republic with a view to strengthening its capacity to eliminate the consequences of aggression as well as increasing its ability to stand up to aggression in general.

Article 9

Proceeding from the aims and principles of this treaty.

Each of the high contracting parties states that it will not enter into alliances and will not take part in any groupings of states, in actions or measures directed against the other high contracting party.

Article 10

Each of the high contracting parties declares that its commitments under the existing international treaties are not in contradiction with the provisions of this treaty and it undertakes not to enter into any international agreements incompatible with it.

Article 11

The present treaty will be operative within 15 years since the day it enters into force.

If neither of the high contracting parties declares a year before the expiry of this

term its desire to terminate the treaty, it will remain in force for the next five years and so henceforth until one of the high contracting parties makes a year before the expiry of the current five-year period a written warning on its intention to terminate it.

Article 12

The present treaty is subject to ratification and shall come into force on the day of exchange of ratification instruments, which will take place in Moscow in the nearest future.

The present treaty is done in two copies, each in Russian and Arabic, with both texts being equally authentic.

Done in the city of Cairo on May 27, 1971, which corresponds to 3 Rabi' as Sani, 1391, Hejira.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

N. PODGORNYY.

For the United Arab Republic.

ANWAR SADAT.

THE HERETIC'S HOMECOMING

1. The attached backgrounder deals with the latest Soviet effort to win back Yugoslavia and treats the subject within the framework of the current Soviet policy of detente with the West.

2. A ministerial meeting of nonaligned countries is scheduled for Georgetown, Guyana, early in August. The meeting can serve as a peg for keeping the significance of Tito's June trip to Moscow in proper perspective. Depending on target audiences, we suggest some of the following propaganda points which are supported in the backgrounder:

a. Moscow's attempt to warm up relations with Tito is illustrative of the Soviet Union's opportunism in its foreign policy dealings; reversals in Soviet policy are commonplace whenever the USSR sees its power position challenged (as it does by the growing influence of China worldwide and especially in Europe).

b. The latest move was made only because the USSR needs Yugoslavia to consolidate its base in Europe as a preparatory step to any conference dealing with European security.

c. In bilateral relations, the Soviet goal is to be in a position to directly influence Yugoslav policies in the post-Tito era.

d. The lip service given Tito's independent policies typifies Soviet duplicity and can be contrasted with the vehement hardline campaign instigated early this year against "those who would place national interests ahead of the interests of the Socialist commonwealth."

e. Finally, the Yugoslavs are fully aware of Soviet motives. Tito succeeded in keeping firmly to his own political line, and if anything he has succeeded in renewing Soviet acquiescence for his policy of nonalignment.

THE HERETIC'S HOMECOMING

Yugoslav President Tito, responding to a Soviet initiative, visited the Soviet Union from 6 to 10 June. Soviet media gave extensive coverage to Tito's visit, playing up the warmth of his reception and the prospects of further Yugoslav-Soviet cooperation. On the day of his arrival in Moscow, Tito was given the Order of Lenin, the first time in his long and controversial career as a Communist, dating back to the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, that he was so honored by the Kremlin. Before he left Moscow, Tito became the first foreigner ever to be awarded a Soviet marshal's sabre. Despite this ostentatious wooing of Tito and the openly warm response on the part of the Yugoslavs, there is no indication that significant new agreements were reached that would change the basic positions of either country.

Ever since Tito's break with Stalin in 1948, a constant factor in Yugoslavia's relations with the Soviet Union has been Belgrade's adamant insistence that such relations be based on "mutual recognition of the principles of full sovereignty, independence, equality, mutual respect and noninterference in internal affairs for any reason whatever." As the only sovereign nonaligned Communist state in East Europe, Yugoslavia has also demanded of the Kremlin recognition of these same principles in party-to-party relations.

The lowest points in Yugoslav-Soviet relations have invariably stemmed from Soviet policies and actions in direct disregard for these principles, such as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Yugoslavs had followed the exciting days of the "Prague Spring" with high expectations that a moderate Soviet reaction to Czech attempts to find their own democratic way to socialism would signal basic changes in Kremlin policies that could lead to a democratization of the Soviet Union itself and a general easing of world tensions.

Tito himself played an active role in trying to influence the Kremlin leaders toward moderation. There was shock and dismay in Belgrade when Soviet tanks rumbled into Prague in August 1968 and Yugoslav-Soviet relations reached their lowest point since the break with Stalin.

Then, just three years later, the man who advocated the "limited sovereignty of states in the socialist commonwealth", found it necessary to go to Belgrade and pay lip service to

Yugoslavia's "sovereignty, independence, and equality." The task could not have been pleasant or easy for Brezhnev. Furthermore, warming up to the maverick Communists in Belgrade risked encouraging feelings of independence and nationalism in the other Communist states of East Europe. It could also add to the already confused and divided situation existing among many Communist parties by providing further stimulus for those "naive and misguided" nationalists who, disdainful of Moscow's leadership, seek their own roads to Socialism. It could, in addition, further inflame nationalistic and liberal elements in the ethnic republics of the USSR itself. Clearly, in taking this initiative, the men in the Kremlin must have been motivated by reasons they considered to be of the highest priority to Soviet foreign policy objectives -- reasons that extend well beyond even the broadest concept of bilateral Yugoslav-Soviet relations.

True, Moscow fully appreciates Yugoslavia's strategic geographical location, its hundreds of miles of Adriatic coastline, ideal for naval bases adjacent to the Mediterranean, as well as Yugoslavia's location astride air and land routes from Europe to the Middle East. The Kremlin also appreciates the fact that Tito has recently celebrated his 80th birthday and that once his charisma and forceful leadership have left the scene his successors will be faced with difficult political problems in keeping the six Yugoslav republics and various nationality groups united. In the post-Tito era, good relations with Yugoslavia could facilitate broader Soviet contacts with Yugoslav leaders and might even provide an opportunity for a greater degree of Soviet influence in Belgrade's future policies.

The above factors were undoubtedly considered by Brezhnev and his foreign policy advisors. However, in view of the major risks involved, other factors, broader in scope and more vital to Soviet interests, probably played the decisive role in Brezhnev's courting of Tito. The basic decision appears to have been made in line with "a sweeping program for world peace" presented by Brezhnev to the 24th Congress of the CPSU, just five months before he went to Belgrade. The overriding concern of the CPSU at this congress was the problem of China and the need to consolidate the Soviet position in Europe.

Brezhnev's "peace program" emphasized "peaceful coexistence" between the Socialist and non-Socialist camps, to include specifically, "detente in Europe" and "the convocation of an all-European conference"; the "conclusion of treaties banning nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons"; "invigoration of the struggle to halt the race in all types of weapons"; and "mutually advantageous cooperation in every sphere with other interested states."

To lessen the possible negative consequences of embracing Tito and engaging in detente with the West, Moscow, in a move that appears to many Westerners as a puzzling contradiction, also laid the groundwork at the 24th Party Congress for a concerted hard-line campaign for ideological unity in the communist camp subsequently has included some of the strongest attacks against "revisionism" and "separate roads to socialism" that have emanated from the Kremlin since the days of Stalin. A central thesis in this campaign appeared in the main journal of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Kommunist (issue No. 3, February 1972), entitled, "The Falsifiers of Scientific Communism and Their Bankruptcy."

The vehemence and scope of this Soviet drive against both "right-wing" and "left-wing" revisionism was such that some responsible Western observers predicted a Kremlin move to formulate a new Comintern or Cominform. It does, indeed, reflect the duality of current Soviet policies that this concerted drive against "revisionism" reached its highpoint only after Brezhnev had gone to Belgrade where he acknowledged the continued validity of Yugoslavia's independent form of Socialism and policy of nonalignment.

Underlining Yugoslavia's determination to make this acknowledgment a reality and to remain politically independent and nonaligned, at Yugoslav insistence the joint communique issued at the conclusion of the Tito visit made no mention of "proletarian" or "socialist internationalism" or "socialist commonwealth," terms which had been defined by Moscow since the Brezhnev Doctrine to rationalize its political hegemony over its East European satellites.* Perhaps more striking evidence of Yugoslavia's continued nonalignment was provided when, just two days after Tito's return to Belgrade, the USS Springfield, a modern cruiser of the NATO Mediterranean Fleet, dropped anchor at the Yugoslav Adriatic port of Dubrovnik for a three-day visit.

*Last September the Soviets had been able to persuade Tito to refer to "proletarian internationalism" in the Communique issued after Brezhnev's visit to Belgrade. The disappearance of this phrase from the latest Communique may seem to be a small point -- but for the Yugoslavs it is a very important one.

WASHINGTON POST
14 June 1972

Soviets Court Tito In Detente Drive

By Robert G. Kaiser
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, June 13—President Tito of Yugoslavia had planned to be in Poland today, but instead he is at home in Belgrade. The Poles are most anxious for Tito to pay them a visit, but they asked him please not to stop

News Analysis

on his way home from Moscow, as Tito suggested. Warsaw, it seems, would prefer a separate, diplomatically distinct Tito visit. They'll get one next week.

Josip Broz Tito, just 80 and the newest recipient of the Soviet Union's highest honor, the Order of Lenin, seems to be ending his career with unprecedented respect from all quarters, including his old adversaries in the orthodox Communist world. His comings and goings have not always been so carefully orchestrated.

His visit last week to Moscow, which produced no dramatic results, reconfirmed the new understandings Tito has reached with the heirs of Stalin—who regarded

him as an enemy. The Soviets went even farther than they had last September, when Leonid Brezhnev went to Belgrade, to demonstrate tolerance for Yugoslavia's special brand of communism.

The final communique reflected Yugoslav positions on all important points. It reiterated Soviet understanding that Yugoslavia was on its own path to socialism. Last September, the Soviets persuaded Tito to refer to "proletarian internationalism" in the communique after Brezhnev's visit, a phrase typically used only by Moscow and its satellites. Last week that phrase disappeared from the communique. A small point, perhaps, but one taken seriously by the Yugoslavs.

It is arguable that the Russians are happier with Tito than they were last September, because in the interim he showed a firm hand to wayward Croatian nationalists. The Soviet press praised him on this count before he arrived last week.

Nevertheless, the fundamental differences of policy

and attitude which have long separated Moscow and Belgrade still exist. The Soviets have obviously decided to accept these differences, and to bestow all the symbols of warm friendship on Tito despite them. The question remains, why?

Embracing Tito's unorthodox policies—and an embrace, plus kisses, is just what the Yugoslav leader got here more than once—may not be easy to explain to the satellites of East Europe, as Yugoslavs here point out. The leaders of Poland and Hungary, to mention two, might be interested in such blessing for their own unorthodoxies in the future.

The Soviets are obviously prepared to take this risk (and Poland's courting of Tito suggests that it may be real.) What do they get in return?

First, as diplomats and other observers here note, they win friends in Yugoslavia, perhaps hedging against the post-Tito era, whenever it may come. From the Yugoslav point of view, Brezhnev's new reasonableness is merely a sensible recognition of the realities. Yugoslavs seem impressed by Brezhnev's calm, rational approach to foreign policy,

and they are happy to see it applied to them.

In a broader sense, the Soviet position improves the Soviet Union's image at an important moment in European history, on the apparent eve of a European security conference. The Soviets are aware that their intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 had disastrous consequences on Moscow's standing in other world capitals. It certainly helps overcome memories of Czechoslovakia to see Brezhnev kissing Tito at a Moscow airport.

The Yugoslavs believe the new rapprochement with Moscow is more than symbolic. They now expect significant economic agreements to be signed before the end of the year, for instance, and they hope for long-term development of Soviet-Yugoslav trade relations.

The Yugoslavs have serious and immediate needs for investment capital and technological assistance and they are looking to Moscow to provide both, as well as markets for Yugoslav consumer goods.

If these Yugoslav expectations prove justified, and if Moscow adheres to its promises to respect Yugoslavia's independent path to socialism, then Tito's visit to Moscow—perhaps the last he'll make as Yugoslavia's president—may seem more important in the future than it does today.

THE NEW YORK TIMES
11 JUNE 1972

Order of Lenin to a Former Pariah

MOSCOW—To a man once vilified by Moscow as a counterrevolutionary and an agent of American imperialism and of whom Stalin once angrily de-

clared, "I shall shake my little finger and there will be no more Tito," the tributes of the current masters of the Kremlin must have seemed sweet indeed, especially since he was able to keep firmly to his own political line.

No sooner had President Tito of Yugoslavia landed last Monday in Moscow for his first visit since Soviet troops rumbled into Czechoslovakia in 1968, provoking his most recent political clash with Moscow, than he was hustled off to a Kremlin ceremony where he was honored with the Order of Lenin. He was praised for participation in the 1917 Bolshevik revolution and even for contributions to Soviet-Yugoslav friendship. No one uttered a word about the confrontations of the past.

a vindication of his independent foreign policy course and a demonstration of his durability at 80.

For the Soviet party leader, Leonid Brezhnev, and the other Kremlin rulers, President Tito's arrival constituted a tacit, though belated, acceptance of the Soviet triumph in Czechoslovakia and a demonstration of the present normalization in Moscow's ties with Belgrade after the post-1968 chill.

For the long run there was a more delicate balance.

With Europe moving into an era of détente, Moscow wanted to draw Yugoslavia back toward closer cooperation with the Warsaw Pact group and away from affiliation with the West European Common Market, as well as to bolster its influence among Tito's potential successors.

Marshal Tito saw the trip as an opportunity to renew Soviet acquiescence for his nonalignment policy and his own brand of socialism, as well as to bolster his own party apparatus, which has been under strain from nationalist tensions in Croatia.

The public emphasis was on friendship, harmony, and mutual dedication to Leninist principles; but for all the cordiality, Marshal Tito and Mr. Brezhnev talked like men on two different wave-lengths in their speeches to a Kremlin banquet Monday and later in the week.

While Mr. Brezhnev was claiming that the new mood of East-West détente sprang from the increased might of Communist states and was talking big-power politics, Marshal Tito credited the "substantial" role of the non-aligned states in promoting peaceful coexistence. He dwelt on the need to meet the "aspiration and desires of the younger generation" and to "bridge the gap" between rich and poor nations—categories that make Moscow uncomfortable because it gets lumped with the Western powers.

Moreover, after a midweek overnight trip to the Latvian capital of Riga, Marshal Tito found occasion to vaunt Yugoslav economic achievements to workers at a Moscow ball-bearing factory Friday. Not only did he claim that Yugoslavia's system of worker self-management socialism had produced one of the highest growth rates in the world, but he ticked off statistics likely to make Soviet workers envious—170 radio sets, 100 TV sets and 42 cars per thousand of population—and he invited them to come see for themselves.

"Our frontiers are peaceful and open—crossed by more tourists each year than we have population," he said in outlining the benefits of Belgrade's policy of nonalignment and friendship toward virtually all nations.

When it came to writing the joint communiqué at the end of the week, this bold language was muted. The communiqué spoke of a "cordial, friendly and frank" atmosphere. In the Communist lexicon the word "frank" was a tipoff to continuing differences. But the differences were not made public.

Instead there was a catalogue of topics—Vietnam, the Middle East, disarmament—on which Soviet and Yugoslav views largely coincide, and there were routine references to past agreements that have been taken as affirming Yugoslavia's right to pursue a policy on nonalignment and ideological independence.

The language, in fact, was considerably less clear-cut than a similar Tito-Brezhnev declaration issued last September, and there was no immediate indication whether President Tito had gotten promises of more access to Soviet markets, as some of his aides

had hoped. In order to reverse the Approved for Release: 2018/04/25 C02599106 trade of the past year.

Nonetheless, among the thousands who flocked to watch the maverick Yugoslav leader being driven to Vnukovo airport in an open limousine with Mr. Brezhnev at his side, there were some Muscovites who privately respected him as "a fox", deftly playing off East and West until the end of his career.

The real question was whether his deftness and his subtly maintained independence would become more of a model for other East European states in the new era of détente in Central Europe, or whether Moscow had successfully signaled to its Warsaw Pact allies that Marshal Tito was a special case, now carefully contained—and that the example they had better remember was Czechoslovakia.

In his talks with Japanese officials, Kissinger emphasized that relations with Tokyo remain the basis of U.S. foreign policy in Asia. And he insisted: "We are not casting Japan adrift." (That theme was also underscored by U.S. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Elliot Richardson, who told a session of the influential Japanese-American Assembly in Shimoda, "Japan continues to be the United States' prime ally in Asia.")

But for their part, the Japanese made it clear that they wanted more than a mere ego massage. Instead, they expected "substantive discussions" and specific guidance as to what role Washington envisions for Japan in Asian defense. They also wanted a line on U.S. thinking regarding China: how rapidly and in what ways the U.S. plans to cultivate relations with Peking and whether the U.S. strategic commitment to Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime on Taiwan is really solid. At the same time they wanted to be filled in on the Peking and Moscow summit meetings to reassure themselves that President Nixon had not made secret agreements that might leave Japan out in the cold.

Suspicion: Kissinger's task was made all the more difficult because the Japanese regard him as the prime architect of many of the policies that have strained U.S.-Japanese relations. They pointedly note that Kissinger does not have a single recognized expert on Japanese affairs on his staff and some of them even charge him with indulging in a "love affair" with China—a suspicion reinforced by occasional Kissingerian remarks contrasting the alleged elegance of Chinese culture with what he sees as the stiffness and commercialism of the Japanese. Thus, many Japanese leaders viewed Kissinger's fence-mending visit as an opportunity to educate Mr. Nixon's chief foreign-policy adviser on the tremendous importance of Japan in the global scheme of things.

As part of that educational process, Kissinger was scheduled to talk not only

the Minister Eisaku Sato, who is expected to retire in the next few weeks, but also with the two leading candidates to succeed Sato—Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda and Minister of International Trade and Industry Kakuei Tanaka. In addition, the Japanese Government deliberately arranged for Kissinger to meet with members of the opposition Socialist Party as well as with scores of businessmen, journalists, scholars and officials representing virtually every political point of view in Japan. Given these circumstances, it seemed unlikely that the swift-moving Kissinger would indulge his penchant for flying off secretly to some other capital just because he happened to be in the neighborhood. In fact, his Japanese hosts had crammed so many appointments into his three-day visit that the Nixon Administration's leading swinger was left with little time even for nightclubbing in the Ginza.

SOVIET UNION:

Wooing an Old Adversary

Compared with the coolly correct reception given President Nixon when he first touched down in Moscow last month, the welcome that Soviet leaders bestowed on Marshal Josip Broz Tito last week was downright fervent. Though he had been notably absent for the Nixon arrival, party chief Leonid Brezhnev was on hand at Vnukovo Airport to plant a comradely kiss on the Yugoslav President's cheek. And while Mr. Nixon was sped into town in a closed car, Tito was driven slowly in an open limousine along a route lined with hundreds of thousands of cheering Muscovites. To show that they harbored no ill feelings toward the man who broke with Stalin and the Soviet bloc almost a quarter of a century ago, the Soviet leaders presented Tito with their country's highest civilian award, the Order of Lenin.

Given his long and stormy relationship with Moscow, however, it was doubtful that the crusty old marshal was overly impressed by this show of friendship. In fact, since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Tito has been warier than ever of Russian objectives. Just last summer, concerned over rumors that the Russians might intervene in Rumania, the Yugoslav President reiterated his determination to defend his own country's independence against "anybody." By last fall, Yugoslav-Russian relations were so strained that Brezhnev traveled to Belgrade in an effort to assure Tito that the "Brezhnev doctrine," under which the Soviet Union claims the right to intervene in Socialist-bloc countries, did not apply to Yugoslavia.

In Moscow last week, however, Tito made it plain that these assurances had not been enough to erase his suspicions of Soviet intentions. "No threat to independence, wherever and under whatever pretext it is made," he bluntly told

his hosts at a Kremlin banquet, "should be tolerated." In response, the Soviet leaders reportedly gave him private promises that they had no designs on Yugoslavia. To sweeten the pot, the Russians were expected to hold out the possibility of increased Soviet investment in Yugoslavia and improved trade relations between the two countries.

Goals: In taking such a conciliatory line, the Soviets had a number of objectives in mind. They wanted Tito's stamp of approval on the Soviet-American summit accords and on their proposal for a European security conference—both of which the marshal did endorse during

his stay in Moscow. They may also have wanted his agreement to the establishment of Soviet bases in the Adriatic—a proposition that Tito has repeatedly rejected in the past. Beyond that, the Soviets were anxious to improve their long-term ties with Yugoslavia in the hope that they will be in position to exert increased influence in Belgrade after Tito, now 80, passes from the scene. Until that time, however, it seemed unlikely that there would be any fundamental change in relations between the two countries. "Important differences still remain," commented a Yugoslav in Moscow last week. "We still have our own theories and our own Yugoslavian path to socialism."

TIME

19 June 1972

COMMUNISTS

Heretic's Homecoming

For years he was reviled as an arch-traitor of Communism, the heretic who destroyed the unity of the Marxist faith. But last week, in a dramatic culmination of a historic reversal of Soviet policy, Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito was treated to a hero's welcome in Moscow. At a state dinner in Tito's honor, Soviet Party Leader Leonid Brezhnev did not even allude to the earlier disagreements that led to the 1948 break between Stalin and Tito. Instead, Brezhnev praised Tito for "your friendly attitude toward our country." In perhaps the most ironic turnabout of all, Tito, who reached 80 last month, was awarded the Order of Lenin, the highest Soviet decoration, which is reserved for the Communist faithful. It was more or less as if Pope Leo X had conferred Rome's blessings upon Martin Luther.

Twice before, the Soviets have made major efforts to win back Yugoslavia, but each time those overtures collapsed because of troubles within the East bloc. This time the Soviets seem more deter-

mined than ever, at least in part because Yugoslavia's independent brand of Marxism exerts an unsettling influence upon the rest of Eastern Europe.

Moscow is also motivated by a desire to consolidate its position in Europe as a preparatory step to the Conference on European Security. Owing to the growth of Soviet seapower, Yugoslavia is strategically far more important than ever to Moscow, which wants a naval base on the Adriatic for its warships in the Mediterranean. The Soviets also seek to reassert their former "elder brother" status in Yugoslavia so that they will have a direct influence in the maneuvering that is bound to follow Tito's death or retirement.

The Yugoslavs are fully aware of the Russian motives. Nonetheless, they believe that the timing is promising for improving relations with Moscow without sacrificing their own unique political and economic system. The Yugoslavs would like to sell more goods to Russia in return for technical equipment and raw materials. Now, they feel, the Soviets could not put undue pressure on them for political concessions without jeopardizing Moscow's policy of *détente* with the West.

SHORT SUBJECTSJUST FRIENDLY SUBCONTINENTAL MEDDLING?

New Delhi questions whether those monthly Soviet-sponsored press parties are a matter of public relations or a matter of monkey business. The attached reprint of an article from the New Delhi Organizer of 20 May cites several cases of known Soviet attempts to bribe Indian journalists and to warn them against publishing anti-Soviet commentaries -- all of which do little to ease India's sensitivities about foreigners meddling in their internal affairs.

In addition, India cannot be too elated over apparently justified Bangladesh suspicions that the Soviets had a hand in helping the Bangladesh Student Union (the Bangla Chhatra Union) come out the winners in last spring's stormy student elections. In Bangladesh, student politicians are taken very seriously because the campuses have spawned and spearheaded many important movements, including the agitation for independence from Pakistan.

Sources in Dacca say that the pro-Moscow faction of the Student Union never has had the popular following that would have permitted it to score the sweeping victory it achieved in universities in Dacca, Rajshahi and Mymensingh in late May. In fact, they say, during the late 1950's and through the 60's its members (then the East Pakistan Student Union) did the students and people of Bangladesh a disservice by acting in such an irresponsible fashion as to invite a crackdown against the whole student movement of which the Student Union was only a small part. In the late 60's the Union had split into pro-Moscow and pro-Peking factions and were not really reconciled until the pro-Peking faction decided (despite Chinese aid to Pakistan) to support the Bangladesh independence struggle. They say in Dacca that it has been with the Bangladesh Student Union, and especially its leadership which retains a warm spot for Peking that Soviet "cultural" officers in Dacca have been the most active. Active, in fact, to the extent to having given a financial subsidy to the Bangla Chhatra Union for the purpose of fighting the elections. Some in Dacca are even going so far as to suggest that the Soviets, actually uncomfortable with Sheikh Mujib's moderation, saw the undercutting of his party affiliate in the universities as a step toward strengthening the pro-Soviet National Awami Party with whom the Student Union group is affiliated.

ORGANISER, New Delhi
20 May 1972

SOVIET BID TO BRIBE INDIAN PRESS

NEW DELHI.— An impression is gaining ground that ever since the signing of the 20-year Treaty, Soviet Russia has begun to treat this country as its domain. There are a number of pointers to confirm such an opinion.

Recently a number of MPs have written to the Prime Minister complaining of political interference by some Russian diplomats in our internal matters. They have asked for a probe into the incidents they have mentioned in this context.

For example, it is said that Shri Morozov and Shri V. I. Gurgenov of the USSR Information Centre in Calcutta have recently tried to influence the editor of "Satyajug", a Bengali newspaper published from Calcutta, and supporting CPI(M) policies. Large financial assistance was offered by the Russian diplomats to this paper to persuade it to lend support to the CPI.

They also warned the editor against publishing anti-Soviet articles. When the said editor refused the said Russian offer, he was reportedly threatened with consequences which might even lead to the closure of the paper by the Government of India. This means that the Russians took the backing of the Government in the matter for granted.

Again, Shri A. A. Filipenko of the Madras Information Office of the Russian Embassy is reported to have visited Kerala some-time back and met a num-

ber of editors and publishers. The mission was aimed at enlisting support of Indian journalists and intellectuals to write articles in favour of the Soviet Union.

Shri Filipenko wanted articles and material prepared by the Russian Information centre to be published in as many journals and newspapers as possible, of course, on fancy payments. But he was told by the persons approached that whatever material he wanted to be published could be accommodated, but as paid advertisements.

Even otherwise, a study of pro-Russian articles or propaganda material appearing in a number of newspapers, particularly in some regional papers, show that Russians buy space in regular editions rather than putting out advertisements in special supplements.

Shri Filipenko, it is stated, had to face hostile questions when he tried to influence "Deepika", a Catholic daily and "Chandrika", a journal operated by the Muslim League in Calicut. There may be many such examples which have not come to light.

An Indian employee of

the USSR Information Centre at Calcutta, who is a member of the local CPI, and against whom a few criminal cases are pending, is busy doing public relations for the Russians. This particular employee was involved in a scuffle with a member of the CPI(M) in which he is stated to have stabbed the CPI(M) man in the back, causing him grave injury.

But in spite of his involvement in criminal cases which are pending against him at the Khardah police station, this employee continues to work in the Russian Embassy without being challenged by the local authorities.

Obviously, Russians have influenced the local authorities so much that they do not take any notice of the activities of this 'efficient' employee of the USSR Information Centre.

In Delhi, too, almost every month, the USSR Information Centre throws a grand party where a big crowd of journalists—and others who parade as journalists, or even those who do not pretend as such—are invited and drinks flow in gallons.

U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT
12 June 1972

WHY THE BURST OF OPTIMISM ON GROUND WAR IN VIETNAM

A new spirit—part willingness to fight, part confidence Reds can be whipped—is found on major battlefields visited by James N. Wallace of "U. S. News & World Report." Still ahead: difficult days for Saigon, and no guarantee of survival.

Top Allied officers—once privately pessimistic over South Vietnam's chances of military survival—now are starting to predict openly that the tide could be turning against the Communist "go for broke" offensive.

Is this just another case of misplaced optimism?

American commanders have been misled by South Vietnamese performance in the past. On more than one occasion expectations of victory have been erased by lightning success of the enemy on the battlefield.

No responsible commander believes Hanoi has yet been defeated. Heavy fighting—even defeat—could still come at An Loc, Kontum or Hue.

New spirit. Yet, from air-conditioned conference rooms in Saigon to stifling-hot front-line command posts, a new confidence is replacing the despair that was so prevalent just a few weeks ago when South Vietnamese troops, deserted by their commanders, fled in panic from Quang Tri Province. The reasons:

- Saigon's long-denigrated Army has proved it has the ability—when it has the leadership and the will—to hold on against seemingly impossible odds.

- American air power, still essential to South Vietnam's military survival, is stiffening Saigon's willingness to fight.

- Hanoi is suffering tremendous battle casualties. U. S. warplanes and Navy ships have cut the flow of Soviet and Chinese war supplies into North Vietnam to "close to zero," according to U. S. Defense Department officials.

- Most significant, perhaps, South Vietnam's people are displaying a determination to hold on that seldom had been seen in earlier years of fighting.

Visits to the three "hot spots" in South Vietnam provide a closer look at what's behind the official optimism.

ON HIGHWAY 13 NEAR AN LOC

The bloody slugging match along this rocket-scarred highway and in the devastated provincial capital of An Loc a few frustrating miles to the north is dramatic evidence of the shift in attitudes and determination seen elsewhere in South Vietnam.

An Loc, 60 miles north of Saigon, hardly is a town any longer. It is a battered rubble heap, looking more like a bombed-out German city in World War II than a once sleepy trading center for nearby rubber plantations.

The town was not even a particularly significant military target, except as an obstacle to the quick Red thrust toward Saigon, which some military analysts believe was one of Hanoi's early goals in the current invasion.

But, under siege, An Loc became both a symbol and an example of how the newest phase of the war is being fought.

An idle boast. The Communists, who evidently wanted An Loc as a provincial capital for their "liberation front" government, proclaimed in early April that it would be captured within a few days. South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu, stung by the collapse of his forces at Quang Tri, ordered the town held "at all costs."

The fight for An Loc, which started April 7, turned into a house-to-house, bunker-by-bunker contest. Air strikes were ordered on houses as close as 50 feet to South Vietnamese positions. When Communist soldiers fled to neighboring buildings, Saigon troops shot them.

An Loc undoubtedly would have fallen quickly except for massive U. S. air support, military experts believe. The Communists had overwhelming superiority in artillery, much of it captured from South Vietnamese forces farther north. An average of 2,000 rounds of artillery, rocket and mortar fire poured down on An Loc every day. Some days, more than 7,000 rounds slammed in.

The only available offset to this enemy shelling has been U. S. air power, includ-

ing the most concentrated B-52 bombing of the entire war—21 strikes within 5 miles of the town's besieged garrison in a single 24-hour period in mid-May.

Trading punches. On one recent day, described by field commanders as fairly typical, Communist gunners fired 2,100 rounds at An Loc, and were hit in turn by 150 air strikes—B-52s, fighter-bombers and helicopter gunships.

On Highway 13, where a drive to relieve An Loc creeps forward with agonizing slowness, criticism is heard that South Vietnam's troops are too dependent on American air power. A U. S. adviser complains:

"They do not push out hard enough on the ground. They figure every tree line is full of the enemy, so they wait for it to be arc-lighted [the code name for B-52 strikes]. They want to walk to An Loc through bomb craters."

But military observers emphasize that air power alone did not save An Loc from early capture. The decisive factor was that the defenders, unlike those at Quang Tri, did not break and run from artillery barrages. A similar will to stand under fire, these experts stress, would be equally decisive elsewhere.

Both sides have taken punishing losses at An Loc, which some officers say may be the most costly single battle of the war. South Vietnamese dead and wounded have been estimated at 40 to 50 daily. The entire Fifth Division defending the city will have to be "completely overhauled," sources report.

But Hanoi has lost at An Loc the equivalent of an entire infantry division—more than 10,000 killed and wounded. The Communists' Ninth Division was reported so badly mauled that it has merged with two other units.

Has the effort been worthwhile?

Very much so, say Allied officers. According to a ranking South Vietnamese: "Hanging onto An Loc has been a big morale booster. It proves that, man for man, we are as good as the enemy."

Equally important, says this officer:

"An Loc shows the vital importance of the commanding general, his staff and his American advisers staying in the midst of battle. The panic at Quang Tri started when the commanding general and his U. S. advisers pulled out."

KONTUM

In this isolated, mountain-ringed provincial capital, which is reachable only by helicopters that duck in through Communist rocket and artillery fire, harassed South Vietnamese officers and U. S. advisers have little time to think about the U. S. naval blockade and the air war against North Vietnam.

Almost daily, nevertheless, the see-saw fighting for Kontum shows the degree to which the fighting is shaped by Russian and Chinese supplies given Hanoi, and American weapons given Saigon. On the ground, it is North and South Vietnamese who are dying. But the real contest in one recent night battle was between Soviet tanks and American missiles.

In a single assault, seven Red tanks grinding toward Kontum's defense perimeter were knocked out, mostly by a new wire-guided missile mounted on American helicopters and jeeps. The missiles had just been flown in to help counter the enemy's tank forces, which, it was discovered, greatly exceeded early estimates.

The missiles won that mini-battle. The big question for the future is whether Hanoi—harassed by U. S. air strikes and mines—can keep supplying its forces in the South with tanks, artillery, ammunition and fuel.

Two tired armies. One American adviser who has served three tours of duty in Vietnam explains the situation as he sees it:

"Maybe the South Vietnamese Army is not very good. But neither is the enemy any more. We are seeing North Vietnamese units break and run. They are putting 15 and 16-year-olds into the line with only a few months' training.

"South Vietnam does not have to do that. Saigon's best units now are better than anything Hanoi has left. I am con-

vinced that the South Vietnamese, even without the Americans, could handle the Communists—if the enemy did not have all those Russian tanks and guns."

South Vietnamese troops around Kontum demonstrated that they could stand their ground against tanks.

Soldiers demand M-72 rockets, a light, shoulder-fired weapon that can destroy a 40-ton tank with one well-placed round. This may be partly bravado, but officers insist that there also is a genuine willingness to meet the enemy. Says a U. S. adviser:

"Every infantryman fancies himself a tank-killer. A couple of years ago it was the M-16 rifle that was going to make him a tiger. Now it's the M-72."

Another reason behind South Vietnamese aggressiveness is a \$50 reward that goes to any soldier who knocks out an enemy tank. A U. S. officer recalls the tactics of one man who collected the bonus:

"It was right out of the book. He let the tank roll right over his bunker, jumped up and zapped it from behind."

HUE

For the old women selling lottery tickets outside the Hue citadel, the war strikes home when buildings start to shake from the concussion of B-52s bombing troop concentrations in enemy-held mountains to the west.

The war is even closer to the tough young Vietnamese marines dug in along the My Chanh River who regularly engage Communist attackers at hand-grenade range.

For all Vietnamese, the war is the biggest fact of life. Here in Hue, in Saigon and in other cities there is evidence of a rising determination among both soldiers and civilians to defeat the Communists.

Military morale is rated especially good in Hue. The city is defended by South Vietnam's best troops—the First Army Division and the Marines. Some officers here even urge more-ambitious offensive thrusts than Saigon planners or American advisers think wise. Among some units, say American sources, there is a kind of eagerness for the "Battle of Hue" to begin.

Some U. S. advisers see a danger in this attitude. One explains:

"These men are the best Saigon has to offer. If they are attacked and crack, then Vietnamization has failed, and nobody can hide it. But they are not going to crack."

A stronger will. South Vietnamese civilians seem more resolved to defend their country than in the past. Many are shamed, even angered, that Quang Tri was given up. There is an apparent willingness to pay the costs. So far, heavy battle casualties do not seem to be creating as much resentment as usual.

Except for a few political opportunists, there is little support in Saigon or in menaced cities like Hue or Kontum for a "coalition" settlement with Hanoi.

Instead, there is growing conviction among articulate South Vietnamese that their nation has a future. A young Hue-born Army captain puts it this way:

"We now believe that we have a nation of our own, that it is worth saving, and that it can be saved. We are going to save it."

An almost conventional war of attrition is being fought on the battlefronts. For the next few months, at least, this should favor Saigon's Army—backed by U. S. air power.

South Vietnam has no guarantee of survival. But now—with the Communist advance slowed—people who should know say there is reason for hope.

AFTENPOSTEN, Norway
14 June 1972

Some circles believe that 'the war of Liberation in Vietnam is supported by the masses of the people'. However, the North Vietnamese 'Liberation' of South Vietnam has now lasted for more than two months and we can see no signs that 'the Masses' in the south greet the soldiers from the north as liberators. On the contrary, the South Vietnamese have defended themselves in a way which deserves the highest respect. Of course they could not fight the invaders without American support from the air, but American bombs do not force them to fight so determinedly as they do. The bombing could not either prevent the civilian populace from attacking its soldiers from the rear if it wished such. But this did not occur.

Instead of uniting in a 'People's Revolt' for the benefit of the communist invaders, the people of South Vietnam have more clearly than ever demonstrated that they do not want to open doors for the

North Vietnamese. They are very certainly not satisfied with the regime in Saigon, which is both corrupt and insufficiently democratically developed, but it must also be clear that they do not want to exchange this for what the North Vietnamese offer them as an alternative. This is the only conclusion one can draw from the war developments in the last couple months.

Neither militarily nor politically have the ones in power in Hanoi attained what they had strived for when they in March sent the first tanks over the DMZ. Their goal was clearly to collect on the battlefield what they had not won through negotiations. It is certainly too early to maintain that the invasion from the north has been repulsed, but there is currently very little doubt that it is very close to being stopped. During this military and political lull, the effects of the American bombing of North Vietnam are beginning to become apparent. The situation must gradually have become so problematical for the regime in Hanoi that it is looking around for possibilities to returning to the conditions prevailing before the invasion into South Vietnam.

This can only happen with resumption of peace negotiations in Paris. In these days there is a gratifying sign which suggests that the parties are willing to meet again. The likelihood for such a new confrontation in the conference hall has increased gradually as North Vietnam after the lightning offensive began to lose its military grip, no longer can have any hopes about conquering South Vietnam by force. Now at least Hanoi ought to be interested in a new negotiation round, not only because such will afford the communists an opportunity to obtain at any rate the limitation of bombing attack in the North, but also because the point of departure at the negotiation table is so much better than before.

President Nixon has in reality put forward a generous offer to North Vietnam. His peace proposal aims at a cease-fire under international control (without a demand for North Vietnamese withdrawal from areas which have been conquered in the course of the last two weeks), the release of the American prisoners of war, sincere peace negotiations and American withdrawal after four months. While Hanoi, up to now, has not been willing to discuss this peace plan, it cannot be accused of anything other than that the master strategist, General GIAP, had counted on taking South Vietnam in a single blow. But his calculations have so clearly not held up that it will not come as any surprise if the difficult military situation in which North Vietnam finds itself leads to the parties again approaching each other politically.

President Nixon's closest political security adviser, Henry Kissinger, has let it be understood that he is counting on the resumption of the peace negotiations when the invasion from the north peters out. With the rainy season right around the corner it can only be a question of time. Kissinger has shown himself as a formidable foreign affairs politician and has turned out to be right for the most part in what he has assumed about the opponent's moves. He must prove right also this time. But above all, a new round of negotiations must lead to a result which once and for all brings the people in both North and South Vietnam out of the long lasting state of war.

LE FIGARO, Paris
16 June 1972

THE TRUTH AND VIETNAM

With the renewal of their offensive in the border region of the Parrots Beak, will the North Vietnamese divisions accomplish anything capable of compensating for or disguising what, after two and one half months of murderous, pitiless fighting, appears to everyone as a semi-defeat. The results to date are the conquest of a narrow strip of territory south of the de-militarized zone and a city of mediocre importance, Quang Tri. Around Hue, Kontum and An Loc, proof has been furnished of the impossibility of breaking the fighting strength of the South Vietnamese forces which -- except for the local panic at Quang Tri, which opened the way to Hue for a few hours but which the Northerners were unable to exploit -- fought extremely well.

The disorganization of the Northern supply system by the blockade and by new bombing techniques of the American air force (guided bombs and anti-missile protection) has already seriously reduced the possibility of maintaining at maximum strength a "classical" offensive involving tanks and artillery. It is probable (let's not go too far) that when it realizes that it had under-estimated the extent of Southern resistance and American reaction at a time when the United States had accepted the idea of disengagement, the North Vietnamese command will attempt to exploit the meager results achieved by returning to tactics of dispersion, mobility, clandestinity, thus, to guerrilla warfare as was done following the failure of the Tet offensive.

It remains a mystery how it could happen that the initial successes of the invasion were exaggerated by international media to the extent of being presented as a decisive defeat for the South, whose military disintegration, a few weeks ago was not only predicted as imminent, but announced as a fait accompli. Certainly, Saigon -- which had one division routed and the others engaged in difficult struggle -- had some bad moments.

However, it was as if the large news agencies -- and in Vietnam this means the Americans -- wanted to blacken the picture of the situation in the South. Not, certainly, as part of a plot to discourage Mr. Nixon from intervening in a contest presented as already lost (Mr. Nixon doesn't get his information on the Vietnamese situation from news agency dispatches) but solely as a result of the prejudices or personal preferences of many correspondents. The penetration of various leftists groups in the U.S. mass media is wide and active.

This ideological bias can work against even those it presumes to favor. Perhaps by trusting a bit too much in their successes on the decisive battlefield of international opinion and in particular of its adversary's opinion, Hanoi convinced itself that the moment for the final offensive was at hand. This is the result of self-intoxication, a propaganda boomerang.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
20 June 1972

IAN WARD on the unwitting aid given to Hanoi
by the international Press corps in Saigon

THE one constant factor in Vietnam's decade of turmoil has been the unabashed pessimism of the Western Press corps. Since the 1963 assassination of President Diem—an event that could never have occurred without the role played by international Press and television—Saigon has been the originating point for endless streams of negatives both in print and on celluloid.

Never has a war been subjected to such public scrutiny. Never have so many prizes been awarded for journalistic excellence. Never has distortion reached such limits, through both wilful and unintentional means.

The reason is simple. Bad news makes infinitely better headlines than good and selling it is a competitive business. As a result the Western Press has emerged as the most effective weapon in Hanoi's arsenal.

The 1968 Tet attack was immediately portrayed as a disaster for Saigon. Startling headlines, but untrue. The joint U.S.-South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1970 was presented as foolhardy adventurism. Another gross misrepresentation. Saigon's drive into Southern Laos early last year rang through the Press columns like the death knell for South Vietnam's army which, of course, it wasn't.

With this unwavering track record the Western Press could scarcely have been expected to give the South Vietnamese much hope against Hanoi's massive invasion which rolled across the demilitarised zone on March 31.

True to form, out poured the pessimism—only this time it came bigger and faster than ever before. Somehow the conventional battles on the Quang Tri, Central Highlands and An Loc fronts added a certain scope for interpretive distortion that had been lacking in bygone years when the accent was on guerrilla action.

Within days, predictions of doom brought an influx of some 350 journalists, TV news crews, cameramen and broadcasters. In the early stages, the fall of Quang Tri and the double collapse of the South Vietnamese Third Division provided ready headlines. But then the combined action of Saigon troops and American firepower appeared to blunt the enemy push.

A static battlefield has limited news value. So, in a remarkably

South Vietnam's other enemy

short time-space, the visiting correspondents headed homeward.

Meanwhile, what of the South Vietnamese Army that the world had been led to believe was on the brink of collapse?

At the outset a handful of American and South Vietnamese who dared to be optimistic were the objects of ridicule. But now their predictions for Government successes at Hue, in the north, Kontum in the Central Highlands, and An Loc, north of Saigon, gather credence by the hour.

A glance at battlefield statistics helps to fill in some of the gaps in the current Vietnam picture.

On the northern front Hanoi fielded its 504th and 308th Divisions as the primary punch for the armour-supported drive across the DMZ and into northernmost Quang Tri Province. From the notorious A-Shau valley, close to the southern Laos frontier west of Hue, came the 324B Division with orders to thrust towards the old imperial capital.

Also committed on the front was a regiment of Hanoi's 320B Division, the Fifth and Sixth Independent Regiments and elements of the 325th and 711th Divisions. Just north of the DMZ the 312th Division was kept in reserve along with uncommitted units of the 325th.

Of the estimated 44,000 combat, logistic and support troops Hanoi actually fed into the Quang Tri—Thua Thien battles, say conservative American estimates, at least 21,000 were wiped out. The 304th and 308th Divisions each suffered 60 per cent. casualty rates and finally combined into a single fighting unit of some 8,000 men.

Likewise the 324B has taken fearsome casualties in its attempt to reach Hue with at least 4,000 troops alone dying in one general area around Firebase Bastogne, 11 miles southwest of the city.

Manpower shortage

Despite numerous predictions of an imminent Communist campaign

by both American and South Vietnamese teams indicate the North Vietnamese now face an acute manpower problem on the Quang Tri-Thua Thien front. Far from planning a major advance, Communist field commanders are more concerned with holding captured territory.

On the Central Highlands front where the key target has been the provincial capital of Kontum, Hanoi threw in its NT 2 and 320th Divisions plus four independent regiments. There were some anxious days for Saigon when the headquarters of the ARVN 22nd Division fell on April 24. But the defenders regrouped and together with the ARVN 23rd Division rallied strongly and Kontum held. Here the campaign is reckoned to have cost the North Vietnamese 10,000 killed and probably twice that figure wounded.

Sixty miles North of Saigon Hanoi committed their entire Seventh and Ninth Divisions plus elements of the Fifth to fighting for An Loc, the capital of Binh Long Province. Perhaps intending a mini-Dien Bien Phu, the Communist strategists obviously underestimated Saigon's determination to hold this relatively insignificant rubber growing centre. An Loc swiftly emerged a prestige factor when President Thieu ordered it held at all costs. North Vietnamese commanders tried wave attacks with armour-backed infantry.

Of the 6,000 original Government defence force in An Loc at least 1,500 died with almost 7,000 wounded. Even today Highway 15, the vital supply link between An Loc and Saigon, is subject to severe Communist harassment. Military spokesmen balk at declaring the siege broken.

But casualties in the region of 11,000 killed and 25,000 wounded is the price Hanoi paid on a campaign front that failed in every military objective.

Cynics argue that American firepower accounted for a substantial proportion of North Vietnamese casualties on all fronts

and without it the South Vietnamese would have been roundly defeated. While the first observation is unquestionably true, the deduction from it is less than fair.

Battle strategists devise tactics to suit prevailing conditions. If vast airpower is available and can be employed to inflict maximum enemy casualties while conserving friendly manpower it is, quite naturally, used in this fashion. But should such airpower be unavailable different tactics must be formulated. The whole nature of the war then changes and entirely new yardsticks present themselves for judging the combatants.

None of this constitutes an argument for a Saigon victory at

this stage. It does, however, seriously undermine the credibility of those who, early in April and in years past, all too readily predicted calamity for Saigon.

The latest South Vietnamese figure for ARVN deaths in the offensive is 8,934. In addition the ARVN have lost 696 tanks and 1,746 trucks and vehicles.

Since Jan. 1 this year the South Vietnamese Air Force has flown 277,954 air sorties within the Republic up to this weekend. The U.S. Air Force has flown 57,038 in the same period.

Strategic Air Command pilots have flown 4,881 B52 sorties within Vietnam since Jan. 1. This is more than seven-and-a-half times the number flown in the same period last year.

In March Saigon claimed to control 99.9 per cent. of the population. Five weeks later with one province lost and heavy fighting in 14 districts Government control was estimated to be effective over 91.8 per cent. of the population.

By the end of this month U.S. forces in Vietnam will be reduced to 49,000. Koreans to 38,741, Australians to 141, Thais to 188, New Zealanders to 58, Filipinos to 62 and Taiwanese to 31.

Since mid-1968 the South Vietnamese armed forces have increased from 680,000 to 1,100,000. The most dramatic increase is in Air Force manpower from 16,000 to 61,000 and equipment from 400 to 1,600 aircraft.

DIE WELT, Hamburg
22 June 1972

CRITICISM OF VIETNAM POLICY GROWS WEAKER

"Photographs of the destroyed Soviet tanks which the North Vietnamese left behind on the main street of An Loc do not appear on the front pages of the large American papers. Since it now looks somewhat better for America's allies in the theater of war, the Saigon poolside-strategists, who only a few weeks ago gloatingly exaggerated the anticipated debacle of South Vietnam's army, have become remarkably vague. "An Loc was not really worth the attention -- so many reporters discovered with hindsight. Nonetheless, the Communist siege, which lasted eleven weeks, left this unimportant city only a pile of rubble. The North Vietnamese didn't consider it unimportant, or they would not have advertised at the beginning of the offensive the announcement that An Loc would be the seat of a Communist opposition government of South Vietnam.

"The Pentagon readily admits that Saigon's troops would hardly have mastered the situation without U.S. Air Force support. But the fact that the enemy never achieved a decisive break-through in almost three months has perceptibly strengthened the morale of the defenders. In contrast to the 1968 Tet offensive, which was for Hanoi a military fiasco but an overwhelming psychological success which deeply influenced the American public and led to Lyndon Johnson's fall, this time there is little psychological impact on the USA to be felt. Since the dire consequences which were warned when Nixon undertook the intensive air war and blockade against North Vietnam have not materialized, criticism of his Vietnam policy is now sharply circumscribed.

" 'President Nixon,' wrote the New York Times in an editorial on 11 May, 'has embarked on a dubious game of chance which risks the fundamental interests of the USA for questionable gains. He is not only balancing military confrontation with the Soviets on a question which is not vital to America's security; he risks the hardly less dangerous collapse of so carefully achieved progress toward a genuine diplomatic relaxation of tension which has already begun to take form in the SALT

agreements. He thereby invites Soviet retaliatory action, if not in East Asia, then in another sensitive area. In view of Hanoi's current military successes, there is little attraction for North Vietnam to agree to a cease fire. The only salvation lies now in the hands of Congress. Mr. Nixon has led the country to the brink of a constitutional crisis. Only Congress can save the President from himself and the nation from a catastrophe.'

"Two weeks later champagne glasses clinked in the Kremlin at the signing of the SALT agreements. Three weeks later Congress, which should have blocked him, received the President's report of his Moscow successes in a ceremonial session of both houses. And today, six weeks later, not one East-Bloc freighter has yet broken through the blockade, which had been denigrated by the New York Times as an ineffective 'half-blockade.' It is questionable whether the Podgorny visit to Hanoi will change this Soviet position. The Soviet Chief of State on his return from North Vietnam predicted the resumption of the Paris peace talks, in the progress of which America and the Soviet Union unquestionably have a common interest. He reported that the Soviet Union will do everything for the de-escalation of the war.

"A direct relation between the Podgorny mission and the almost simultaneous visit of Henry Kissinger to Peking exists only insofar as they both served to inform the North Vietnamese and the Chinese leaders on the Moscow summit. Podgorny's mission was to cool North Vietnamese anger over Moscow's passive reaction to the blockade. As the Washington Post reports, Podgorny rejected Hanoi's proposal that the Soviet Union must break the American blockade. While the communique at the end of the visit demanded the 'unconditional' cessation and promised North Vietnam 'all necessary aid,' it did not say that the Kremlin is prepared to break the blockade.

"On the American side, it is believed probable that Podgorny, in his discussions with Xuan Thuy, chief North Vietnamese delegate to the Paris peace talks, urged a realistic position -- the communique speaks of 'constructive' talks. It is clear to Washington that neither Moscow nor Peking have the intention or the capability to force the North Vietnamese to a solution. It is certain that Podgorny emphasized to Hanoi the difficulties encountered in getting Russian shipments through, not only due to the American blockade but also due to Chinese obstruction of Soviet transport. But the decision as to what conclusions to draw from this situation and the stagnation of the North Vietnamese offensive remains with Hanoi.

Kritik an Vietnam-Politik wird schwächer

Von unserem Korrespondenten
HEINZ BARTH

Washington, 21. Juni

Die Fotos der abgeschossenen Sowjetpanzer, die von den Nordvietnamesen auf der Hauptstraße von An Loc zurückgelassen wurden, sind nicht auf den Titelseiten der großen amerikanischen Informationspresse erschienen. Seit es für die Verbündeten Amerikas auf dem Kriegsschauplatz etwas besser aussieht, sind die militärischen Analysen der Sai-

goner Poolside-Strategen, die noch vor wenigen Wochen das sich abzeichnende Debakel der Armee Südvietsams genüßlich ausgekostet hatten, merkwürdig vage geworden.

An Loc, so entdecken viele Berichterstatter jetzt nachträglich, war eigentlich den Aufwand nicht wert. Ohnehin habe die kommunistische Beschießung, die elf Wochen dauerte, von der bedeutungslosen Stadt nur einen Schutthaufen übriggelassen. Die Nordvietnamesen hielten sie nicht für bedeutungslos, sonst hätten sie nicht zu Beginn der Offensive mit der Ankündigung aufgetrumpft, An Loc sei als Sitz einer kommunistischen Gegenregierung Südviets-

Es wird im Pentagon ohne weiteres zugegeben, daß die Truppen Salons ohne Unterstützung durch die US Air Force der Invasion kaum Herr geworden wären. Aber die Tatsache, daß der Gegner in fast drei Monaten nirgends einen entscheidenden Durchbruch erzielte, hat die Moral der Verteidiger fühlbar gestärkt. Im Unterschied zur Tet-Offensive von 1968, die für Hanoi ein militärisches Fiasko, aber ein vorübergehender psychologischer Erfolg war, der die amerikanische Öffentlichkeit tief beeinflußte und zum Sturz Lyndon Johnsons führte, ist diesmal von einer psychologischen Wirkung auf die USA wenig zu spüren. Nachdem die unabschbaren Folgen nicht eingetreten sind, die Nixon nach der Aufnahme des

intensiven Luftkriegs gegen Nordvietnam und nach Verhängung der Blockade angedroht worden waren, ist die Kritik an seiner Vietnampolitik jetzt in ihrer Bewegungsfreiheit stark behindert.

„Präsident Nixon“, schrieb die „New York Times“ am 11. Mai in einem Leitartikel, „hat sich auf ein verzweifeltes Vabanquespiel eingelassen, das für den fragwürdigen Gewinn fundamentale Interessen der USA riskiert. Er wagt nicht nur die militärische Konfrontation mit den Sowjets in einer Frage, die für Amerikas Sicherheit weder lebenswichtig war noch ist. Er riskiert den kaum weniger gefährlichen Zusammenbruch der so mühsam erzielten Fortschritte in Richtung auf eine echte diplomatische Entspannung, die schon im SALT-Abkommen Formen anzunehmen begann. Er fordert dadurch eine sowjetische Vergeltungsaktion heraus, wenn nicht in Ostasien, dann in einem anderen neuralgischen Punkt der Erde. Angesichts der gegenwärtigen militärischen Erfolge Hanois hat es für Nordvietnam keinen Reiz, einer FeuerEinstellung zuzustimmen. Die einzige Rettung liegt jetzt in den Händen des Kongresses. Mr. Nixon hat das Land an den Rand einer Verfassungskrise geführt. Nur der Kongreß kann den Präsidenten noch vor sich selbst und die Nation vor einer Katastrophe retten.“

Zwei Wochen später klirrten bei der Unterzeichnung des SALT-Abkommens im Krenil die Champagnerkelche. Drei Wochen später nahm der Kongreß, der dem Präsidenten in den Arm fallen sollte, in einer feierlichen Sitzung beider Häuser seinen Moskauer Erfolgsbericht entgegen. Und heute, sechs Wochen später, hat noch kein Ostblockfrachter die Blockade durchbrochen, die von der „New York Times“ damals als wirkungslose „Halb-Blockade“ abqualifiziert worden war. Es ist fraglich, ob der Podgorny-Besuch in Hanoi etwas an dieser sowjetischen Haltung ändern wird. Das sowjetische Staatsoberhaupt sagte bei der Rückkehr aus Nordvietnam die baldige Wiederaufnahme der Pariser Friedensgespräche voraus, an deren Fortschritt Amerika und die Sowjetunion unverkennbar ein gemeinsames Interesse haben. Er kündigte an, die Sowjetunion werde alles für die Deeskalation des Krieges tun.

Ein direkter Zusammenhang zwischen der Podgorny-Mission und dem fast gleichzeitigen Besuch Henry Kissingers in Peking existiert nur insoweit, als es sich in beiden Fällen darum handelt, die nordvietnamesischen und die chinesischen Führer über den Moskauer Gipfel zu unterrichten.

Podgorny war beauftragt, den Zorn der Nordvietnamesen über die passive

Aktion Moskaus auf die Blockade zu beschwichtigen. Wie die „Washington Post“ meldet, lehnte Podgorny die Forderung Hanois ab, die Sowjetunion müsse die amerikanische Blockade brechen. Zwar fordert das Kommuniqué zum Abschluß des Besuches ihre „bedingungslose“ Einstellung und verspricht Nordvietnam „jede notwendige Hilfe“; aber es sagt nicht, daß der Krenil zur Brechung der Blockade bereit ist.

Man hält es auf amerikanischer Seite für wahrscheinlich, daß Podgorny bei der Unterredung, die er mit Xuan Thuy, dem nordvietnamesischen Chefdelegierten bei den Pariser Friedensverhandlungen, hatte, dringend zu einer realistischen Einstellung riet — von „konstruktiven“ Gesprächen ist in dem Kommuniqué die Rede. Weder Moskau noch Peking, darüber ist man sich in Washington klar, haben die Absicht oder die Möglichkeit, den Nordvietnamesen eine Lösung aufzuzwingen. Aber es ist sicher, daß Podgorny Hanoi auf die Schwierigkeiten verwies, die für die russischen Lieferungen nicht nur durch die amerikanische Blockade, sondern auch durch die chinesische Obstruktion gegen die Sowjettransporte entstanden sind. Aber die Entscheidung, welche Konsequenzen aus dieser Situation und aus dem Stagnieren der nordvietnamesischen Offensive zu ziehen sind, bleibt Hanoi überlassen.

SVENSKA DAGBLADET, Stockholm
30 May 1972

UNANIMITIES ABOUT VIETNAM by Professor Goran Lindahl

No current event is more unsuited to one-sided and uncritical partisanship than the Vietnam war, according to Professor Lindahl. But no country outside the Eastern European Bloc has accepted all propaganda oversimplifications unanimously and with such meager exchange of opinions as Sweden, maintains Professor Goran Lindahl in the article below. He suggests some possible explanations.

The world has long known what happened in Hue during the winter of 1968 -- more and more facts have gradually become known. But it may not be quite proper to recall these facts -- since they do not strengthen the stylized total picture of the war in Vietnam which is the only view acceptable to public opinion today.

Supported by North Vietnamese troops, the NLF units captured the old imperial city of Hue during the Tet offensive in January 1968. For 25 days they held out against frenzied attacks by American and South Vietnamese forces, making Hue the only city the Communists were able to occupy for any length of time. It is now possible to get a relatively clear picture of what happened in the city during that month. It was known quite early that there had been executions -- now we know that the number of those killed amounts to at least 3000. That means more than 100 executions a day out of a population of 150,000 people. The mass graves that were discovered bear witness to violent excesses. Most of the dead were shot, but others had been beaten to death or

buried alive. Unplanned violence may have occurred and certainly mistakes were made in the hunt for suitable victims. Largely, however, it seems to have been a question of carrying out a precisely prepared plan. Its aim was to wipe out the political and ideological leaders, anyone who could in any way be classified as enemies of the revolution. The intention moreover was to involve the popular masses as much as possible. During that month it was supposed to be praiseworthy to denounce those who worked for the Saigon regime, to point out where they lived, to assist in searching for them, to participate in hastily established courts, or to take part directly in killing itself. In this way, revolutionary hatred was to be fanned and the masses were to be bound to new leaders and new political goals.

One of the goals of the Tet offensive was to destroy the social groups making up the strongest support of the Saigon government, starting with its cadre of political leaders, officials in the administration, and specially trained experts. However, the violent and definitive element in this plan distinguishes it from the tactics the Communists used earlier and also later -- although nothing is known of what is happening right now in captured cities and towns. What has been characteristic of the Communist side's course of action ever since the war against South Vietnam began has been largely a kind of selective terror, a more limited killing.

Actions that were too senseless and too widespread would also have aroused such strong popular opposition that continued infiltration would have been impossible. A much better method was the series of perpetual and seemingly implacable murders and kidnapings they resorted to. In this way the efforts of the Saigon government to pacify and reorganize the people were constantly disturbed and the group of reliable leaders and officials right down to the most unassuming at the village level was being steadily bled dry. The number of murders and kidnapings in the period 1958-65 has been reported to be 46,500. For the period 1966-69 the figure is 44,000.

This achieved another goal at the same time -- frightening those who were unwilling into passivity, silence, or at best active cooperation. The special command in the National Liberation Front in charge of terror works with a system of warnings that make it possible for all those who have supported the South Vietnamese government in any way to resign from their service or go over to active work, such as intelligence activity or assisting with murder attempts and sabotage. If they refuse, punishment follows. Of course it is easier for those who are highly placed to refuse -- they can count on armed protection. The actions of the NLF have reached relatively few in this group. It is the leaders and officials at lower levels who are killed mainly, especially those who work out in the villages. There have also been actions of revenge on a larger scale, directed against entire villages cooperating with the enemy, and these actions have affected as many as 200 to 300 people at one time. This then is a question of a carefully thought-out, entiring, and implacable system of terror, adjusted in its extent to suit different purposes.

With this kind of background, the question of the popular support of the NLF becomes quite meaningless. The number of those who are really active, militarily and politically, the hard core, has been the object of certain ^{In relation to the total population}

of South Vietnam the Approved for Release: 2018/04/25 C02599106a few percent. The Tet offensive noticeably decimated these groups of hardcore activists -- in the assault now taking place North Vietnamese regular units appear to be playing the most decisive role. The extent and content of the popular response out in the provinces is even more difficult to estimate. How many have given their support voluntarily, and how many have received warnings that their own life or that of someone close to them was in danger unless those exerting the pressure got their own way? What is conviction and what is adaptation to a merciless reality?

The experience of other countries has shown that rebel and terrorist activity of basically the same type as that in Vietnam has had enormous consequences even when it was carried out by very small groups of fanatics whose faith never faltered. Open countries whose goal is to live under peaceful conditions have limited opportunities to protect themselves against the consequences of terror. The very polarization of society which the attackers try to achieve is gradually forced upon them. Nations that once had something of a democratic system are forced successively into the severity and inhumane measures which eventually tend to give the rebel movement meaningful substance in the eyes of larger groups.

No one can deny the incredible resolution and ability to resist the North Vietnamese have displayed. The way this attitude was created is part of the picture too. At least some of the main facts are well known. After the division of Vietnam by the Geneva agreement, a stream of 850,000 refugees fled southward -- some of them later played leading roles in the Saigon government... At the same time a land reform program of the most drastic type was introduced. As was the case earlier in the Soviet Union and China, this was not just a matter of redividing land ownership but a bloody settling of accounts with an entire class of landowners which was extended to include others considered to be enemies of the new regime. A wave of killing swept the country guided by quickly-organized people's courts and accompanied by an intensive campaign of indoctrination and hatred. There are varying estimates of the number of victims, the lowest being 50,000 dead and the highest figuring more than five times that. Since that time the country has been completely closed, and its inhabitants have received no messages other than those the 11 members of the Politbureau saw fit to give them. What does it mean in such a case to talk about popular unity? The only thing to be said is that such means create a homogeneous military state prepared to make whatever sacrifices are needed to achieve its political goals.

Few current events are less suited to one-sided, uncritical partisanship than the war in Vietnam. That is not the view of Swedish public opinion. No country outside the East bloc has so unanimously and with such a low level of debate swallowed all the simplifications of propaganda. The people in South Vietnam, we have been assured over and over, are united in their support of the National Liberation Front. Outside of this popular fellowship there is only a little clique of traitors, but they are the ones courted by the United States, led by two equally war-crazy presidents. The role of North Vietnam has long caused uncertainties in public opinion -- the increasing extent of its support was evidently seen as something that downgraded the NLF, something that raised doubts about the strength and the popular base of the National Liberation Front.

Now the facts are recognized and all doubts have been blown away in enthusiasm over the successes on the battlefield. The military capability becomes a kind of proof -- the victor must, of course, have right on his side, while the retreating side represents something fundamentally sick and unjust.

The notable aspect of Swedish public opinion is not the views and the arguments -- those are largely the same all over the world. What is astonishing and perhaps frightening is the uniformity, the almost total lack of all-round debate. This judgment can be extended to other areas besides the Vietnam war. Strictly speaking, there is only one international political problem that has been fully and broadly presented to Swedish public opinion in recent years -- the conflict between Israel and the Arab states. In that case the liars and misinterpreters have found it difficult to get a firm hold -- constantly renewed criticism has seen to it that one-sided propaganda has not remained uncontradicted for long. But that was an exception. In normal cases the facts seem to interest people only to the extent they strengthen an already established opinion, while anything else is smothered in the almost intolerable mixture of unctiousness and moralism that has replaced true discussion.

There are a number of circumstances behind this one-sidedness -- one of them is briefly suggested below.

In most western nations, free radicals play an important and sometimes decisive role in shaping political and cultural opinion. At the moment most of them call themselves socialists, while previously they saw themselves more often as liberals, more or less far out on the left wing. Naturally it is difficult to define this group in any meaningful way. The inner core consists of academically trained people, mostly from the areas of social science and the humanities, but it also includes other categories, such as those in artistic professions and the professional opinion molders of the press, radio and TV. As a whole this is a talented and alert group, more concerned than other groups in our society with obtaining conscious opinions, with reading and writing and debating. A significant part of any discussion is initiated and led by this group. Taken as a group, these people make up perhaps the most important opinion-forming force in the western democracies, at any rate in groups other than the most tradition bound.

This group plays an exceptionally important role in Sweden. This has been true for a long time. It might be said that this has been strengthened in recent years along with the growth of opinion-forming activity and the growing concentration in Stockholm, the expansion of educated society, and the enormous number of young people in search of opinions, all of which gives the big megaphones a bigger audience than ever before. This has also made both the strengths and the weaknesses of this group more apparent. It can be both alert and well-informed, but also faddish and faithless in an amazingly excessive way. A number of people moving in these circles -- most strikingly those in the artistic professions -- were for a long time totally uninterested in politics. Then an awakening took place which has had the nature of a revival movement, of a long series of personal conversions.

The result is a mixture of newly-acquired faith, enthusiasm, intelligence, and an incredible lack of political training. It is not just a matter of partisanship concerning political events here at home and

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out in the wider world, about reality that at times approaches the idiotic. Everything is interpreted according to a stylized scheme offering some kind of total explanation or the chance to divide people and entire nations into good and evil. This attitude is combined with an obvious distaste for facts -- for it is not a question of finding out what really happened but of keeping one's enthusiasm or indignation at fever pitch.

Of course these groups of people who are aware of ideas are in many ways an asset to society, because of their sensitivity to new shifts in the wind and their ability to express their opinions. But they are also a danger to society because of their lack of understanding that power involves obligations even in the area of opinion forming. Intensive involvement in world affairs does not have to exclude every trace of intellectual discipline.

To a large extent international political propaganda is aimed at social groups of this kind. Up to now, its success has been remarkable and apparently this will continue to be the case. And clever political propagandists all over the world will continue to impose upon these easily-moved and credulous people who make such a mark on the political and cultural climate in the western democracies.

ENIGHETEN OM VIETNAM

Världen vet sedan länge vad som hände i Hué vintern 1968; fler och fler fakta har efter hand blivit kända. Att erinra om dem är ändå inte riktigt comme il faut -- de bidrar ju inte till att stärka den stiliserade helhetsbild av kampen i Vietnam som i dag är den enda opinionsmässigt gångbara.

Stödda av nordvietnamesiska trupper erövrade FNL-förband den gamla kejsarstaden Hué under Tet-offensiven i januari 1968. I 23 dagar höll de sedan stånd mot frenetiska attacker av amerikanska och sydvietnamesiska styrkor; Hué blev därmed den enda stad kommunistisidan lyckades hålla besatt under någon längre tid. Det går numera också att få en relativt

klar bild av vad som skedde i staden under denna månad. Att avräkningar förekom blev tidigt bekant -- nu vet man att siffran uppgår till minst 3000 dödade. Det betyder mer än 100 avrättade om dagen ur en befolkning på 150 000 personer. De massgravar som upptäckts, bär vittne om våldsamma excesser. De flesta av de dödade hade skjutits medan andra slagits ihjäl med påkar eller begravts levande. Planlöst våld kan ha förekommit, säkert också misslag i jakten på lämpliga offer. I stort sett tycks det dock ha varit fråga om att genomföra en noga förberedd plan. Dess syfte var att utplåna det politiskt och ideologiskt ledande skiktet, alla som på något sätt kunde rubri-

ceras som revolutionens fiender. Avsikten var vidare att i görilgasto mån engagera folkmassorna. Det blev under denna månad berömvärda handlingar att ange dem som verkat för Saigonregeringen, att peka ut var de bodde, att hjälpa till i sökandet efter dem, att medverka i hastigt tillkomna folkdomstolar eller att direkt delta i själva dödandet. Därmed kunde det revolutionära hatet underblåsas och massorna bindas till nya ledare och nya politiska mål.

Ett av Tetoffensivens mål var att krossa de samhällsgrupper, som utgjorde Saigonregimens starkaste stöd, i första hand dess kader av politiska ledare och funktionärer i förvaltningen

och specialutbildade experter. Det våldsamma och definitiva i denna plan skiljer sig dock från den taktik kommunisterna tillämpat -- om vad som händer just nu i erövrade städer och byar är dock ingenting bekant. Utmärkande för kommunistisidans tillvägagångssätt ända sedan kampen om Sydvietnam inleds har i stort sett varit ett slags selektiv terror, ett mer begränsat dödande.

Alltför meningslösa och omfattande aktioner skulle också ha väckt ett så starkt folkligt motstånd, att fortsatt infiltrations omöjliggjorts. Som ett vida lämpligare medel framstod en sländig och till synes obehövlig serie av mord eller bortrövningar.

den. Därmed kunde Saigonregimentens strävanden att pacificera och reorganisera oavlatligt stödas och skiktet av pålitliga ledare och funktionärer, ned till de anspråkslösaste på bynivå, ständigt åderlätas. Antalet mord och bortrövanden har för tiden 1950—65 angivits till 46 500, för perioden 1966—69 till 44 000.

Dessutom kunde ett annat mål nås samtidigt: att skrämna de ovilligt inställda till passivitet, tystnad eller i bästa fall till aktivt samarbete. De specialkommandon inom FNL, som haft terrorn om hand, har arbetat med ett system av varningar för att förmå alla som på något sätt verkat till regeringens stöd att avstå sina tjänster eller övergå till aktiv handling t. ex. i form av undermåttseverksamhet eller sabotage. Vid vägran har straffet följt. De högst uppsatta har givetvis haft lättast att vägra — de har kunnat räkna med effektivt väpnat skydd. FNL:s aktioner har också nått relativt få ur detta skikt. Det är ledare och funktionärer på lägre nivå som främst drabbats, i första hand de som arbetat ute i byarna. Hämndaktioner i större skala har också förekommit, riktade mot hela byar, som samarbetat med fienden och som på en gång berört upp till 200—300 människor. Det är således fråga om ett noga övervakat, uttömligt och oblidligt terrorsystem, till sin omfattning avpassat för olika syften.

Mot en bakgrund av detta slag blir frågan om FNL:s folkliga stöd egentligen alldeles meningslös. Antalet verkligt aktiva militärt och politiskt, den hårda kärnan, har gjorts till föremål för vissa uppskattningar. I förhållande till totalbefolkningen i Sydvietnam rör det sig om små siffror, sannolikt högst ett par procent. Tetoffensiven decimerade dessa grupper avsevärt; i den nu pågående anföringen tycks också reguljära nordvietnamesiska förband spela den helt avgörande rollen. Omfattningen och innebörden av det folkliga gensvaret ute i provinserna är rimligtvis ännu svårare att ange. Hur många lämnar sitt stöd frivilligt, hur många har nåtts av varningar att deras eget eller någon anhörigs liv står på spel om inte påtryckarna får som de vill? Vad är övertygelse och vad är anpassning till en skoningslös verklighet?

Från andra länder är det välbekant att upprors- och terrorverksamhet av i princip samma slag som i Vietnam har enorma konsekvenser, också då den ut-

övas av betydligt mindre grupper av fanatiker, vilkas tro inlosviktat ett ögonblick. Öppna länder, som har som mål att leva under fredliga förhållanden, tycks ha begränsade möjligheter att skydda sig. Just den polarisering i samhället, som är attackernas syfte, tvingas så småningom fram. Stater, som tidigare haft något av demokratisk ordning, pressas successivt till den hårdhänhet och omänsklighet, som antligen kan ge upprorsrörelsen en meningsfull innebörd för större grupper.

Ingen kan bestrida den oerhörda beslutsamhet och motståndskraft, som Nordvietnam visat prov på. Till bilden hör också hur denna attityd skapats. Minst ena några huvuddata är väl kända. Efter Vietnamsdelning genom Genèveavtalet gick en ström av 850 000 flyktingar söderut — några av dem har sedan dess spelat en ledande roll inom Saigonregimenten. Samtidigt inleddes arbetet med en jordreform av det mest genomgripande slag. Liksom tidigare Sovjet och Kina gällde det inte bara en omfördelning av jordägandet utan en blodig uppgörelse med en hel klass av besuttna; den utsträcktes också till andra som kunde uppfattas som nya regimens fiender. En våg av dödande gick över landet lett av snabbt organiserade likdomstolar och beledsagade av intensivt indoktrineringss- och bakkompanjer. Uppfattningen om antalet offer skiftar, den lägsta räknar med 50 000 dödade, den högsta med mer än fem gånger så många. Sedan denna tid har landet varit i fullständigt slutet, dess invånare har inte nåtts av andra budskap än vad Politbyråns elva medlemmar funnit lämpligt. Vad är det för mening med att i ett fall som detta tala om folklig enighet? Det enda som kan sägas är ju att med sådana medel skapas en homogen militärstat, beredd till vilka uppoffringar som helst för att nå sina politiska mål.

På händelser i nutiden är så litet lämpade för ensidigt och reservationslöst partitagande som kriget i Vietnam. Detta är inte den svenska opinionens syn. Inget land utanför östblocket har så enhälligt och under så torfligt meningsutbyte anammat alla propagandans förklaringar. Folket i Sydvietnam, försäkras det om och om igen, sluter enigt upp bakom FNL. Utanför folkgemenskapen står bara en liten klick av förädlare, men det är med dem som USA slagit följe, lett av två lika krigsgalna presidenter. Nordvietnams roll har länge varit en viss tyckan — det allmer omfattande stödet därifrån har tidigare omfattats

som något nedsättande för FNL, något som kunnat väcka tvivel om FNL:s styrka och folkliga förankring. Nu har fakta erkänts och tvivlet blåst bort i entusiasmen över framgångarna på slagfältet. Den militära kapaciteten blir något slags bevis: segrarna måste naturligtvis ha rättan på sin sida, den retröerande parten däremot företräda något i grunden sjukt och orättfärdigt.

Det anmärkningsvärda med den svenska opinionens hållning är inte åsikterna och argumenten — de är i stort sett desamma världen runt. Det förväntande och kanske skrämmande ligger i själva enigheten, den nästan totala avsaknaden av allsidig debatt. Orömdömet kan utsträckas också till andra följt än just Vietnamkriget. Strängt taget är det bara ett enda problem i internationell politik, som under senare år blivit verkligt allsidigt belyst inför svensk opinion: konflikten mellan Israel och arabstaterna. I det fallet har lögnen och vantolkningar haft svårt att få definitiva fäste; ständigt återkommande kritik har sört för att ensidig propaganda inte lämnats oemotsagd länge. Den insatsen är dock ett undantag. I normala fall tycks fakta intressera bara i den mån de kan förstärka en redan etablerad uppfattning, resten drunknar i den nästan outhärdliga blandning av salvelse och moralism, som fått ersätta en verklig diskussion.

Det finns en rad omständigheter, som kan förklara denna ensidighet; en av dem skall här i korthet antydas.

I flera västerländska stater spelar fria radikaler en viktigt, ibland avgörande roll som politiska och kulturella opinionsbildare. För tillfället torde de flesta av dem beteckna sig som socialister, tidigare såg de sig nog snarast som liberaler mer eller mindre långt ut på vänsterkanten. Naturligtvis är denna grupp svår att avgränsa på något meningsfullt sätt. Kärntruppen består av akademiskt utbildade, företrädesvis i samhällsvetenskapliga och humanistiska ämnen, men dit hör också andra kategorier, t. ex. konstnärliga yrken och professionella opinionsbildare från press, radio och TV. Som helhet är det en begåvad och rörlig grupp, mer än andra inom samhället sysselsatt med att skaffa sig medvetna åsikter, att läsa och skriva och debattera. En betydande del av diskussionen initieras och leds från detta håll. Tillsammans utgör dessa människor den kanske viktigaste opinionsbildande kraften i västerns demokratier, i varje fall på områden utanför

de mest traditionsbundna.

I Sverige spelar denna grupp en exceptionellt viktig roll. Så har det varit länge. Kanske man t. o. m. kan tala om en förstärkning under senare år i takt med den opinionsbildande verksamhetens tillväxt och allt starkare koncentration till Stockholm; utbildningsområdets ansvällning och den enorma mängden av åsiktsökande ungdom ger också de stora megafonerna ett gensvar som aldrig förr. Därmed har också både styrkan och svagheten hos denna grupp blivit alltmer uppenbar. Den kan vara både rörlig och välinformerad men också modebunden och trolös på ett häpnadsväckande ytligt sätt. En mängd personer ur dessa kretsar — allra mest påfallande — de konstnärligt verkamma — var länge politiskt totalt ointresserade. Sedan dess har ett uppvaknande ägt rum, som haft karaktären av väckelserörelse, av långa serier av personliga omvändelser.

Resultatet är en blandning av nyförvärvat tro, av entusiasm, intelligens och oerhörd politisk utbildning. Det är inte bara fråga om partiskhet inför politiska händelser inom landet och ute i världen, det är också en aningslöshet inför verkligheten, som ibland stegras till det narraktiga. Allt tokas efter stilliserade scheman, som ger något slag av totalförklaring eller möjlighet att sortera upp människor och hela stater i onda och goda. Attityden kombineras med en påtaglig skygghet för fakta: det gäller ju inte att tränga fram till vad som verkligen sker utan att hålla sin entusiasm eller indignation brinnande.

Naturligtvis är dessa grupper av idémässigt medvetna människor ändå på många sätt en tillgång för samhället; de är det i kraft av sin känslighet för nya vindriktningar och sin förmåga att ge uttryck åt sina åsikter. Men de är också en fara genom sin brist på förståelse för att makt förpliktar också på opinionsbildningens område. Intensivt engagemang i världens affärer behöver inte utesluta varje gnutta av intellektuell moral.

Den internationella politiska propagandan tar i sig utsträckning sikte på sådana grupper av detta slag. Framgångarna har hittills varit avsevärda och ser ut att förbli det. Också i fortsättningen kommer skickliga politiska propagandamakare runt om i världen att skjuta in sig på dessa snabbbrörliga och godtrogna människor, som i så hög grad sätter sin prägel på det politiska och kulturella klimatet i västerns demokratier.

BERITA BUANA, Djakarta
16 June 1972

PLANS TO COMMUNIZE INDOCHINA FALL THROUGH

Observing statements made by Hanoi and Peking, we know that struggle for people's communizations launched by North Vietnam applies not only to Vietnam but also to all of Indochina. Even when North Vietnam moves its forces through Cambodia and Laos, it does not feel it is in other people's territory but in its own territory. It is this pretension that has brought about difficulties in talks with Hanoi, because point of departure of its thinking is different from fact. Hanoi just does not consider itself committing aggression, even when it is encroaching upon other countries in Indochina. However, its last offensive has shown that it cannot prove the truth of its theory, even though it has used force. After having been trained by the U.S. not only in the technology of war but also in the administration of a democratic country, South Vietnam is able to match the strength of North Vietnam and even supersedes it in some cases, although U.S. air support has played a decisive role. The persistence shown by South Vietnam has even surprised U.S. public, as reflected in their press, because they once thought that South Vietnam was no match for North Vietnam.

Since South Vietnam has succeeded in defending Hue, An Loc, and Kontum, those who were pessimistic are now showing up to declare that the fighting quality of South Vietnam is reliable. Most outstanding fact is that despite the deep infiltration committed by the Viet Cong, no rebellion of South Vietnamese people has taken place against Saigon government.

The resistance shown by South Vietnam will certainly infuse enthusiasm into anti-communist nations such as Cambodia, Laos, and even Thailand, which were once contaminated by defeatism, assuming that communist forces were undefeatable."

WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
31 May 1972

Village leaders face trial by firing squad

By JAMES FOSTER
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

North Vietnamese firing squads apparently are systematically shooting officials of captured South Vietnamese villages, a White House source said today.

The source, who declined to be identified, said the number of victims is unknown because it may be years before their graves or bones are found.

"All we can confirm," he continued, "is that (South Vietnamese) village officials are being rounded up and led off into the jungle never to be seen again."

But it is known that the North Vietnamese are under orders "to eliminate the most stub-

born, cruel, diehard individuals" as the first step toward reducing resistance, coercing the local populace and destroying South Vietnam's governmental cohesion. And scattered intelligence reports indicate that this is being done, he said.

This same practice was followed at Hue during the 1968 Tet offensive, it was noted. Mass graves of Tet victims still are being found and the unofficial count of victims exceeds 5,000.

A clandestine radio broadcast monitored in South Vietnam April 24 ordered the attacking northern units "to annihilate the top archvil-

lains and cruel units one after the other. "I identified "archvillains" as administrative personnel and others responsible for controlling the masses.

The broadcast quoted an official named Cuu Long as saying annihilation of enemy leaders was "absolutely necessary" and "most important" to achieve North Vietnam's goal of over-running South Vietnam.

Intelligence sources say Cuu Long is the name often used by Gen. Tran Do, North Vietnamese headquarters political officer and an alternate member of the Hanoi Central Committee.

ACCORDING TO STATUS

Potential victims are graded for execution according to their importance in the community. Executioners start at the top with an eye toward scaring less important individuals into cooperating.

"We must constantly create conditions for those who have followed the wrong path to forsake their evil ways and return to the right

NEW YORK TIMES

15 June 1972

'The Human Cost of Communism'

'If the North takes over the South, what will the bloodbath be?'

By ROBERT THOMPSON

LONDON—The present invasion of South Vietnam and the intense fighting of the last few weeks draw attention once again to the human suffering caused, on an almost unprecedented scale, to the Vietnamese people by the continuing war. I am not here considering the battle casualties which, although on each side they have probably reached 500,000, can at least be regarded as "legitimate" in war.

Nor am I considering the refugees who, although their plight may be tragic, are at least still alive.

What should most concern us is the number of civilians who have been killed in both halves of Vietnam, and those who may yet die in the future, as part of the human cost of Communism.

The Western conscience is immediately pricked by an American-committed atrocity, such as Mylai, and by the civilian casualties caused by the bombing of the North (although such casualties are now likely to be far less than during 1965-68 because of the development of the extremely accurate "smart" bomb).

Little or no attention, however, and certainly no equivalent reporting, has been given to similar Vietcong or North Vietnamese atrocities which have occurred on a scale that makes Mylai almost insignificant. These have

path," Cuu Long declared.

"The best way . . ." he continued, "is to annihilate the top villains in the hamlets and warning, educating and disbanding lower-ranking villains."

This also applies, he said, to policemen, spies, pacification agents and security agents.

CASE-BY-CASE

"We should deal with the civil self-defense corpsmen on a case-by-case basis," he added. Self-defense corpsmen usually are very young or very old villagers left behind to protect the homefront when young men of an area march off to war.

North Vietnamese cadre and guerrillas have been told to mingle with the local people in order to identify the "most dangerous" individuals.

By killing only the "top ringleaders," Cuu Long said, the people will be impressed by the North Vietnamese's humanitarianism, be less afraid, and more helpful in establishing permanent bases.

not occurred because of some aberration, accident or inaccuracy of bombing. They have occurred, both selectively and indiscriminately, as a matter of deliberate policy.

At the time Hanoi complained of six civilian casualties, as a result of the first American raid on the North after the invasion began, she was firing 122-mm. rockets indiscriminately into Saigon and Phnompenh, killing more than ten times that number.

Her Russian 130-mm. guns have pounded Anloc and Quangtri to rubble. They will do the same to Kontum and Hue if they get within range without any consideration whatsoever for the civilian population.

Everyone has heard of Mylai, but who has heard of Caibe where the Vietcong, after its capture, lingered only to murder the wives and children of all the local militia? Or of the Montagnard village of Dakson, where they moved from hut to hut with flame-throwers incinerating more than 250 villagers, two-thirds of them women and children?

Most people have heard of the massacres at Hue in 1968 where the Vietcong and North Vietnamese, after its capture, executed 5,700 people (as assessed from the mass graves found afterwards) but who knows that in captured documents they gloated over these figures and only complained that they had not killed enough? These were

not aberrations, nor savagery for savagery's sake, nor the work of undisciplined soldiers acting in violation of

instructions, but part of a ruthless deliberate policy designed to break a people who would not otherwise bend to their will.

The world cannot plead ignorance because it has all been well documented. The evidence has been authoritatively put together in a compendium prepared, surprisingly, for the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary (the meat was obviously too red for Senator Fulbright and the Foreign Affairs Committee).

There are distressing implications for the future. If the invasion succeeds and the North takes over the South, what will the bloodbath be? Four years ago I estimated that it would be several hundred thousands.

I now wish to amend that figure to well over one million (out of eighteen million people).

The critics of the war may claim that the forecasts are exaggerated. But Colonel Tran Van Duc, a North Vietnamese officer who defected after twenty-four years in the Communist party, stated that the Communists if they win, would slaughter up to three million South Vietnamese, and another colonel, Le Xuan Chuyen, who defected after twenty-one years, stated that five million people in South Vietnam were on the Communist "blood debt" list and that 10-15 per cent of these would pay with their lives. When asked in an interview if the possibility of a bloodbath had been exaggerated he replied: "It could not be exaggerated. It will happen."

ments of late have been few and
tween. He recognizes, however,
is still very much a popular figure with
large segments of the Argentine masses.
Many believe he could, if he chose to
run, be elected easily despite his 17-year

President Lanusse's government lifted
the ban against the Justicialista Party,
in March, 1971, and since then the party
has been increasingly active in politics,
preparing for the scheduled 1973 elec-
tions that are to return Argentina to
civilian rule.

Mr. Perón's wife, Isabel, spent three
months in Argentina recently, talking
with government and political officials.
She said on her return to Madrid that
Mr. Perón might return this year and
that "the country needs him and they

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there are many in Argentina who
believe that a Perón return would help
bring about some sort of national recon-
ciliation and heal the breach in Argen-
tine political life. Ever since Mr. Perón
was ousted in 1955, the country has ex-
perienced a wide variety of political
problems, which successive civilian and
military governments have been unable
to solve.

Whether the return of Mr. Perón
would help in the solution is a large
question mark, but those favoring his
return—including many who disagree
vigorously with his populist social and
economic policies—argue that nothing
else has solved the problems and that
perhaps the Perón return might be a
favorable factor.

WASHINGTON POST
30 June 1972

Villagers Tell of Occupation Of Their Town by Hanoi

PHONGDIEN, South Viet-
nam, June 29 (AP)—On
April 28, about 300 North Vi-
etnamese soldiers entered
the village of Haixuan, six
miles south of Quangtri
City.

On Thursday, two months
later, South Vietnamese pa-
ratroopers reoccupied the vil-
lage in the new counterdrive
into Quangtri Province in
South Vietnam's northern
sector.

The villagers told this
story of the North Vietnam-
ese occupation:

The soldiers who occupied
the village were accompa-
nied by 10 Vietcong agents,
all former residents of Haix-
uan who had fled to the
North after the 1968 Tet of-
fensive.

The enemy soldiers confis-
cated all the villagers' gov-
ernment identification cards
and promised new ones.
They also took a large
quantity of rice, saying they
would pay for it later.

The village was organized
into associations of youths,
farmers, women and a mili-
tia defense force of boys
and girls between the ages
of 17 and 21.

The militia was armed by
the North Vietnamese with
M-16 rifles captured from
the South Vietnamese. The
young people received only
two days of training before
they were left to guard the
village under some North
Vietnamese officers. The
rest of the Communist com-
mand troops moved on to
another district.

Early in the occupation,
the North Vietnamese told
the villagers that Saigon
had been captured. They
also said they delayed at-
tacking Hue until June 20
"to give the people a chance
to get away from the city
and guns."

The North Vietnamese
then told the villagers that
Hue was captured just this
past Wednesday, but the

people did not believe them.
They could hear Radio Hue
and Radio Saigon on their
own transistor radios.

The South Vietnamese air-
borne troops' move into
Haixuan met almost no re-
sistance.

Residents said the militia
force of young boys and
girls was taken from the vil-
lage by North Vietnamese
troops a few hours before
the paratroopers arrived.

The government forces
found only old men, women
and young children when
they entered the village.
Half decided to remain in
their homes once the area
had been liberated by gov-
ernment forces, the other
half chose to move to a
more secure area farther
south.

The 156 villagers who de-
cided to leave were brought
to the village of Phongdien,
about 20 miles northwest of
Hue, aboard government
trucks.