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NEW YORK TIMES
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C.I.A. Says Lon Nol Sold Reds Rice

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 29—A report of the Central Intelligence Agency asserts that Premier Lon Nol of Cambodia, who led the ouster of Prince Norodom Sihanouk as Chief of State in March, sold rice to the Vietcong on several occasions a few years ago.

Reliable sources say that an intelligence document prepared to inform high American officials on Cambodia reports that General Lon Nol, who is now anti-Communist, sold the rice at a time when Cambodia was formally neutralist and, at the same time, was allowing the North Vietnamese to use her territory as a staging area for attacks on American and South Vietnamese forces in Vietnam.

The C.I.A. report, apparently prepared in 1967, said that Vietcong representatives stopped buying from the General when they came to distrust him. It did not say what had prompted the distrust.

The sources could not say what Government position General Lon Nol held when he was engaged in the reported transactions with the Vietcong. He was made commander in chief of the armed forces in 1960, Deputy Premier in 1963 and Premier in 1966.

There have also been frequent reports from intelligence sources and Cambodian officials that members of Prince Sihanouk's family, including his wife, Monique, were heavily involved in smuggling operations. This is thought to have been one of the factors that caused dissatisfaction against the Prince and led to the coup d'état in which he was ousted.

While confirming the report about General Lon Nol, some sources pointed out that since Cambodia was neutralist at the time, there was nothing illegal in his actions. One official added: "You have to put this in the Asian context. These are pragmatic people, this is a pragmatic guy."

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U.S. Reported Recruiting Cambodians in Vietnam

By RALPH BLUMENTHAL

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, May 27—American soldiers were reported today to be recruiting ethnic Cambodian residents of the Mekong delta for fighting in Cambodia.

Col. Richard W. Ellison, senior American adviser in Vinhbinh Province, said that Special Forces soldiers in the company of "a head of the Khmer Serai"—the Cambodian rightist movement—recruited and "shipped out" 230 Cambodian militiamen last week.

He said, however, that the drive in his province came to "a screeching halt" when the South Vietnamese province chief complained to President Nguyen Van Thieu that the recruiting had been going on without his knowledge.

Informed American officials confirmed the account and acknowledged that the drive was under way in other delta provinces with large Cambodian populations, but they declined to provide extensive details. One said that the matter was "classified" and "in the hands of the green berets," or Special Forces.

600,000 Men Sought

The recruitment campaign appears to be an aspect of an effort reported earlier to sign up some of the 600,000 ethnic Cambodians in South Vietnam for military service in Cambodia, as the Cambodian Government had requested of the South Vietnamese.

However, the indications then were that the Cambodians would be integrated into the Cambodian armed forces. The involvement of the Special Forces leaves open the possibility that they could command the recruited Cambodian forces as they are commanding similar mercenary troops now in South Vietnam and Laos. There was no information available on who was paying the newly recruited Cambodians.

The reported presence of Khmer Serai with the Special Forces in Vinhbinh was the first recent indication that the Green Berets were again working with the loose right-wing movement that long opposed Prince Norodom Sihanouk when he was Cambodian Chief of State. The Special Forces, however, dealt with the Khmer Serai shortly after they were formed for operations inside Cambodia several years ago.

Of the 230 ethnic Cambodians recruited last week in Vinhbinh, about 200 were described as members of Khmer Serai or sympathizers.

According to Colonel Ellison, who along with the Vinhbinh province chief, Col. Ton That Dong, was interviewed at the Cantho Airport, Colonel Dong was startled to hear last week that Green Berets and "a head of the Khmer Serai" were recruiting at camps of the Regional and Popular Forces.

Colonel Dong immediately sent a message to the chief military adviser of President Thieu asking whether the recruiters had any authority. The drive was stopped the next day although some sources reported that President Thieu had himself ordered the recruitment drive.

'Bad Moral Effect'

Colonel Dong said his concern over seeking members for Civilian Irregular Defense Groups — the term used for United States-led mercenary soldiers — among the Regional and Popular Forces was based on "the bad moral effect of the money offer." He did not name the amount, but it is believed to be many times more than the $30 a month that members of the Regional Forces earn.

Colonel Dong said he did not raise any objection to orders from the Government "but I just expressed my concern over how to carry out orders wisely and logically."

He called the recruiting "illogical."

"Fighting on the border and in Cambodia is the responsibility of the South Vietnamese army," he said, "and defending the province is the job of Regional and Popular Forces. So if the Regional and Popular Forces are pulled out of my province, how can I defend the province?

There was no official estimate available of the number of ethnic Cambodians who have been accepted for special training or already sent into Cambodia. Early in May, about 2,000 were reported sent there, but under Cambodian leader-

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fulfilling their own responsibilities as Members of Congress in this area of war-making.

Mr. McKay. I think we're all in agreement on that.

Mr. Chayes. I think it is important to say that is true, regardless of whether you think the President was within his authority of going in, even if you think he wasn't within his authority of going in, you still have the Constitutional power to stop him now.

Senator Kennedy. Let me ask one final question: In terms of the Church-Cooper Amendment, if that were to pass, what kind of restrictions do you think that places upon the President in terms of any future activities and expansion back into Cambodia under his stated reasons for the protection of American lives? Do you feel that it serves as a sufficient kind of restrictions upon his activity for future Cambodian ventures, even within his so-called declaration that it is essential and necessary for the protection of American lives?

Mr. McKay. Speaking only for myself, it is an important restriction, and here Senator Fulbright is right, it would have a political impact. But it is not in my judgment, as great a restriction as might be ultimately desirable.

Senator Kennedy. Say it passes. If it is enacted, does that bar the President in the future from going on into Cambodia, or will he be able to say the Senate has acted but still the action in Cambodia is for the protection of American lives and, therefore, I feel no compulsion not to move?

Mr. McKay. As I read the amendment, it is clearly designed to say he would no longer have that power.

Mr. De Wind. I think the question goes to the heart of our Constitutional arrangement. This is a sweeping declaration of Congressional viewpoint. And if the President follows the dictates of history, he would observe it.

Our tradition has been that there is a response to this sort of thing, but if a President is determined to seek a confrontation of Constitutional power, there is no very satisfactory way of testing; the Constitution doesn't provide for it; you can't take it as a practical matter to court, I think, and one must ultimately rely on our Constitutional system having built into it that kind of accommodation and restraint that makes it work, and all you can say that history indicates that Presidents faced with this kind of thing do back down and I see no reason to conclude at this point that our present administration would be any different.

Senator Saxbe. I can't help fear we are tying a lot of legal nicities here that are proper, and as a lawyer who was actively engaged in Constitutional Law as Attorney General, I recognize that most of these things that we are discussing are the real meat of our Constitution. But I think that we have an area where the will is much more important, perhaps, than the substance of what we are talking about.

Now, the will of Congress to enter this area has to be very determined today, because Congress itself has not exercised the powers that they now have under the Constitution, and they can die, and many have died or withered, anyway, from disuse.

Now, if Congress exerts this will, then I believe that the Constitution will become alive in these various areas. This is where we must work and the people that come in, the lawyers who represent, and others say what can we do?

One of the big questions is: How determined is this effort? Will it die in two weeks? Will they go back to the routine business as usual? Will the students go back home this summer or will this interest continue?

I, personally, am not convinced, because we had a crisis in ecology three weeks ago; we had a crisis in something else before that. We live in a period of crises.

Now, I feel that the only way Congress can assert its will is to cut off the money, because this is one thing where we definitely have not given up this power. If we cut off money we can effectively assert ourselves. And I am prepared to vote for a 25 percent reduction in all defense spending, if it will curb this runaway bureaucracy, but this is where Congress has to assert itself.

You know the story of Richard the Second. I certainly don't recommend what happened after his funds were cut off. But the power of the purse strings goes back to 1350 when that happened under the English concept, and I certainly feel that it exists today just as powerful as it ever was.

Mr. DeWind. Justice Jackson in 1951 put it very succinctly: "While Congress cannot deprive the President of the command of the Army and Navy, only Congress can provide him with an Army and Navy he may command."

Mr. Bickel. I want to make a point about the language of the Cooper-Church Resolution. I don't think that it deprives the President of the power in an emergency situation where he has to react to attack, to go into Cambodia and protect in combat as he sees it, American troops. All it prevents him from doing is going into Cambodia and engaging in combat activity in support of Cambodian troops. It does not prevent a reactive decision on his part to defend the threat of attack or react to an attack on American forces in Vietnam, and that is one reason I don't think this job is complete until you get to the McGovern Resolution, of course, though I favor this one.

Senator Kennedy. Gentlemen, I want to thank all of you very much. I want to extend the thanks of the offices of Senator Pearson and myself and my colleagues who have been able to come this morning, for your discussion and your comments and insight into some of these most complex and difficult questions.

I think this has been extremely constructive and positive and enormously useful. I know it has been to me and I know it will be to the other members in the Senate who will have access to the transcript, and I want to thank you and the people that you represent for your attendance here.

(Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m. the meeting was adjourned.)

CBS TELEVISION COMMENTARY ON NOMINATION OF JUDGE CARSWELL

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, lest anyone get the idea I am going out of my way to pick on the Columbia Broadcasting System, let me set him straight.

Once in a while CBS does something that offers encouragement to those of us who see unbiased media as the hope of our country.

On April 10, I wrote to CBS and asked them to indicate who had appeared on CBS network television for and against Judge Carswell.

Accordingly, I received a reply that indicates that CBS had 24 Senators on behalf of Judge Carswell and 24 opposed to him.

I must say that one could not ask for fairer treatment, unless one goes so far as to ask that the commentators observe the same balance in inflection, lifted eyebrow, and choice of adjectives.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the list of pro- and anti-Carswell Senators who appeared on CBS television between January 19 and April 8, according to CBS President Frank Stanton.

There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

APPEARANCES OF SENATORS ON CBS TELEVISION NETWORK BETWEEN JAN. 19, AND APR. 8, 1970

Pro-Carswell		Con-Carswell	
Name	Date	Name	Date
Scott [1]	Jan. 19	Bayh [1]	Jan. 28
Eastland [1]	Jan. 19	Proxmire [2]	Jan. 28
Griffin [1]	Jan. 27	Goodell [3]	Feb. 8
Gurney [2]	Jan. 28	Tydings [1]	Feb. 16
Scott [1]	Jan. 28	Bayh [2]	Feb. 17
Ervin [2]	Jan. 29	Bayh [2]	Mar. 11
Hruska [1]	Feb. 2	Case [2]	Mar. 13
Eastland [1]	Feb. 16	Bayh [1]	Mar. 16
Griffin [1]	Feb. 16	Bayh [1]	Mar. 20
Hruska [2]	Mar. 11	Tydings [2]	Mar. 25
Hruska [1]	Mar 16	Packwood [2]	Mar. 25
Thurmond [1]	Mar. 20	Fulbright [1]	Mar. 26
Scott [3]	Mar. 22	Hatfield [1]	Mar. 26
Scott [4]	do	Spong [1]	Apr. 1
Hruska [2]	Mar. 26	Cranston [2]	Apr. 3
Saxbe [1]	Apr. 1	Hart [1]	Apr. 3
Griffin [1]	Apr. 3	Fong [3]	Apr. 5
Gurney [3]	Apr. 5	Tydings [3]	Apr. 5
Gurney [5]	Apr. 5	Dodd [3]	Apr. 5
Dominick [1]	Apr. 5	Prouty [3]	Apr. 5
Dominick [2]	Apr. 6	Tydings [5]	Apr. 5
Griffin [2]	Apr. 6	Tydings [1]	Apr. 6
Gurney [1]	Apr. 6	Brooke [1]	Apr. 6
Hruska [1]	Apr. 6	Bayh [2]	Apr. 7

[1] The Evening News with Walter Cronkite.
[2] The Morning News with Joseph Benti.
[3] The Evening News with Roger Mudd.
[4] The Sunday News with Harry Reasoner.
[5] Face the Nation.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

AMENDMENT OF THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ACT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask that the unfinished business be laid before the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Holland). The bill will be stated by title for the information of the Senate.

The Assistant Legislative Clerk. H.R. 15628, to amend the Foreign Military Sales Act.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill.

Mr. STEVENS obtained the floor.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Alaska yield without losing his right to the floor?

Mr. STEVENS. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I think that the distinguished Senator from Alaska is entitled to a more attentive audience than is in the Chamber at the present time and, therefore, with his permission, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Eagleton). Without objection, it is so ordered.

INTRODUCTION

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, for the past 2 weeks I have listened to a great number of statements on the recent ac-

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tions in Cambodia. I feel that this concentration of attention on the actions in this one area have caused some loss of perspective on the Indochina conflict, and I would like to bring some salient facts to the attention of my fellow Senators.

By way of quantitative importance of these recent actions, I think it important to note that even at the height of the recent campaign, only 10,000—or a little over 2 percent—of our forces in Vietnam were in Cambodia, and they are already on their way out. Similarly, something less than 5 percent of South Vietnam's military forces are in Cambodia.

The real question then—and the issue I would like to see discussed more fully—is what can we do to bring the remaining American troops in South Vietnam home. The proposed amendment, which is now the pending business on the floor of this body, would deal only with the smaller question of specific tactics in the larger scale conflict. If this amendment is to be properly assessed, it must be considered in light of our overall policies in Indochina—and indeed in the whole Southeast Asian area.

OUR NATIONAL INTEREST

The first and most basic question that must be asked here is precisely what is our national interest in Southeast Asia. A number of elements could form the basis for our interest in sustaining the South Vietnamese Government. They include:

First, strategic military significance of the area;

Second, critical resources important to our economy; and

Third, protection of American lives and property.

I would like to discuss each of these in turn.

First, I do not believe our interest is based on the strategic geographic importance of the area as either a direct threat to our territorial security or as a useful military base. Guam is closer to Peking than Saigon, and the city of Anchorage in my home State of Alaska is closer to Moscow than Saigon. We have major military installations in Thailand and the Philippines. We have repeatedly indicated that we have no desire to establish permanent military bases in this area. President Nixon made that clear when he said in May of last year:

> The United States has suffered over a million casualties in four wars in this century. Whatever faults we may have as a nation, we have asked nothing for ourselves in return for those sacrifices. We have been generous toward those whom we have fought. We have helped our former foes as well as our friends in the task of reconstruction. We are proud of this record, and we bring the same attitude in our search for a settlement in Vietnam.

In this spirit, let me be explicit about several points:

We seek no bases in Vietnam.

We seek no military ties.

It is thus safe to conclude that South Vietnam is not of direct strategic importance to our territorial security nor as a military base for operation in Southeast Asia.

However, the area is strategically important to surrounding territories. It borders on Burma and the Indian subcontinent, on Thailand, the bridge to Malaysia and Indonesia and is only a few hundred miles from the Philippines. It is this basic strategic importance that led to the development of the "domino theory."

THE DOMINO THEORY

Stripped to its bare essentials, the "domino theory" states that the fall of one country will provide the base from which attacks against geographically contiguous states may take place. These states in turn will fall and thus provide the bases from which attacks can be launched against even more distant countries. These attacks can be overt aggression or a more subtle "liberation movement" supplied and given sanctuary by the adjacent, recently fallen "domino" country.

There are two conditions which must be present if the "domino theory" is to apply. First, there must be a series of contiguous states whose geography and ethnic and political structure provide no substantial opposition to engulfing conquest. Second, there must be a force with the desire and the ability to carry on this extended conquest.

Let us now apply these criteria to the Southeast Asian situation.

First, we do have a number of contiguous countries whose geography does not offer natural borders which can be easily defended. These countries include Vietnam, China, Laos, Cambodia, and northeast Thailand. Beyond these areas, we have open seas or mountain ranges which do offer substantial natural impediments to advancing armies. Beyond these areas we also have decidedly different ethnic peoples with, in some cases, traditional and long-lived governments. The "domino theory," therefore, can be validly applied only to the areas I have set forth; that is, Indochina and northeast Thailand.

The second criterion—a force both capable and desirous of carrying forth the conquest—is also apparently present in Hanoi, supported by China. However, there is no reason to believe that Hanoi has interests beyond the traditional Indochina area. The long and protracted war fought between the Vietminh under Ho Chi Minh and France was envisioned by the supporters of Ho as a war for the national independence of Indochina from French colonial rule. The French, on the other hand, saw it as an effort by an avowed Marxist—Ho Chi Minh—to extend the international Communist movement into Southeast Asia.

This country agreed at that time with the French View, as is evident from this excerpt from President Eisenhower's memoirs:

> Ho Chi Minh was, of course, a hard-core Communist, while the Vietminh, the Forces under his command, were supported by the Chinese Communists in the north. Although guerrilla fighting was sporadic, the French controlled the deltas nad the cities and an area along the waist of Vietnam, whereas the back country, including most of the province of Tonkin and a sizable area in central Annam, was controlled mainly by the Vietminh.
>
> In early 1951 the Indochina affair had come emphatically to my attention when I was Allied commander of the NATO troops with headquarters in Paris. The NATO defense needed greater French participation, but this was largely denied because of France's Losses and costs in the Indochina war, as mentioned earlier.
>
> These losses and costs to the French might be lessened, I believe, if allies could be brought in to carry part of the load in defending Indochina. Such a development would depend, of course, upon a clear appreciation throughout the Free World that the war was in no sense an effort on the part of the French to sustain their former domination over the area, but was in fact a clear case of freedom defending itself from Communist aggression. To bring about such an appreciation, there would have to be a definite and public pledge on the part of the French to accord independence and the right of self-determination upon the Associated States as soon as military victory should be attained.
>
> Eventually, the French did indicate their intention to establish the independent states of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

However, world conditions have changed decidedly since 1951. Nationalism is still stronger than any internationalist ideology and allegiances based on national interest, not ideological ideals, are the strongest ties we know. Thus, we see that the Soviet Union appears to get along better with the United States than with her ideological partner—China. Yugoslavia is a well-known example of an independent Communist state. Had it not been for the ruthless and cold-blooded suppression of the reformed Czechoslovakian Government, another version of a Communist State would have been born.

We also recognize that Hanoi is not an extension of Chinese will in Southeast Asia, but rather is a nationalistic state carefully playing off her two giant benefactors, one against the other, to achieve her own national ends.

Viewed in these nationalistic terms, we see that extension of the "domino theory" beyond the Red River and Mekong River basins will not survive the second criterion—the presence of a power with the desire and ability for extended conquest. North Vietnam's national interests are not served by expeditionary incursions into southwestern Thailand or Malaysia. Nor does North Vietnam have the navy to carry revolution to the Philippines even if she were so inclined.

From this analysis we can see that, while the "domino theory" does extend to Indochina and northeastern Thailand, it does not extend outside this area. The natural conclusion to be drawn from this determination is that we must seek an areawide settlement in Indochina and not just a settlement affecting South Vietnam. If we do not take into account actions in Laos and Cambodia, we will find that ultimately South Vietnam will be engulfed by the "domino theory". It is just as easy for the "dominos" to fall in the order of Laos—then Cambodia—then South Vietnam as it is for them to fall South Vietnam—then Cambodia—then Laos.

We must examine the entire area if we are to reach a long-lasting solution for South Vietnam.

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In summary, while Indochina has no direct strategic military importance to the United States, Laos and Cambodia, as well as North Vietnam, are profoundly important to the military security of South Vietnam.

RESOURCES

If our desire to maintain South Vietnam as an independent state is not based on the military importance of the real estate, perhaps it is in the resources of the area.

It is true that great quantities of tin and molybdenum, both of which are strategically important metals, are found in Indochina. But we have substantial deposits of both these metals in my State of Alaska.

Indochina is considered to be the rice bowl of Asia. But we are a rice-exporting nation, so that cannot be the reason.

It has been suggested that we would like to deny the resources of this area to our enemies. But Russia has no need for either the metals or the rice. And China seems to be able to buy sufficient foodstuffs.

Nor are there large American investments in private industry in Indochina which we might want to protect. The area was largely developed by the French, and all industrial development took place in that part of Indochina which is now North Vietnam. Any large landholdings will soon be broken up as part of a land reform program we urged the government of South Vietnam to adopt.

It can be safely concluded, I believe, that we do not have as our national interest in this area a desire to have access or dominion over the resources, either agricultural or mineral, of the area.

Since neither military geographic significance nor critical resources can be assigned to the Indochinese area, our national interest in Indochina must not be based on either, but rather on some less tangible factor.

U.S. ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

An analysis of the intangible benefits of involvement in Southeast Asia must necessarily include an examination of the role we feel the United States should perform in that area.

Following World War II, we assumed a custodial role in the Pacific and in Asia. There were no other nations in this area who could provide leadership, security, a sense of law and order, or the capital necessary to rebuild a war-torn area. One item that was high on our priority list was to end colonialism in the area and to establish independent viable nations in the region.

We began, as was fitting, by cleaning our own house. In 1946 we granted independence to the Philippines. We then urged the Netherlands to establish the independent state of Indonesia, which was accomplished in 1953. We also felt deep concern that the French should indicate an end to colonialism in Indochina, as is evident from this excerpt from President Eisenhower's memoirs, in which the former Chief Executive discusses the consequences of France's failure to renounce any colonial interest in Indochina:

> I repeatedly urged upon successive French governments the wisdom of publishing to the Free World such an unequivocal commitment. But the French government did not make its position unmistakably clear, especially to the people most concerned, the Vietnamese. Had it done so, the effect would soon have been—we in NATO believed—to make the war the concern of all nations outside the Iron Curtain, and could have assured France of material help, as well as the support of world opinion. Furthermore, it would have immeasurably raised the fighting morale of the loyal Vietnamese. At that time the French government apparently saw no need to publicize any such sincere, simple and selfless pronouncement. As far as I could tell, this reluctance seemed to have its source in the French conviction that making an all-out statement would weaken their leadership in the war and might have serious effects in other portions of the French Empire, including Algeria; moreover, the civil officials with whom I often talked invariably agreed that while in this one special situation their difficulties could be greatly diminished by making clear their intention to offer freedom to Indochina, they felt also that an announcement of voluntary withdrawal from the area during hostilities would be a tremendous blow to French prestige and influence in the world.
>
> In the absence of such a statement, the war was naturally looked upon in most cases as a domestic difficulty between France and one part of her empire. This attitude precluded the possibility that other free nations could help in what the French themselves considered so much a family quarrel that it could not even be submitted to the United Nations for adjudication.
>
> * * * * *
>
> The strongest reason of all for United States refusal to respond by itself to French pleas was our tradition of anticolonialism. This tradition, violated—almost accidentally—for a time in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was born in the circumstances of our own national birth in 1776. Our deep conviction about colonialism has often brought us embarrassment in dealings with our friends in Western Europe, whose histories as colonialists are largely alien to our history. But the standing of the United States as the most powerful of the anticolonial powers is an asset of incalculable value to the Free World. It means that our counsel is sometimes trusted where that of others may not be. It is essential to our position of leadership in a world wherein the majority of the nations have at some time or another felt the yoke of colonialism. Never, throughout the long and sometimes frustrating search for an effective means of defeating the Communist struggle for power in Indochina, did we lose sight of the importance of America's moral position.

It was our basic goal to foster the growth and development of independent, viable nations in Southeast Asia and to end colonialism in the area. In this role we provided military security from aggression and financial assistance for economic development.

AGGRESSION AGAINST LIBERATION

Korea offers the clearst example of our attitude toward overt military aggression. When the North Koreans invaded without warning the independent nation of South Korea, the United States took immediate action, both militarily and diplomatically. But it was not until we had the approval of our allies and eventually of the United Nations that we actually threw the full force of our powerful military machine into the conflict. This was overt aggression condemned by the entire free world and we dealt with it quickly and decisively.

During this period of overt aggression in Korea, A number of "wars of liberation" were also being conducted, the most well known, of course, being the French-Indochina conflict. But similar, although smaller scale, conflicts were also going on in parts of the Dutch East Indies, British Malaya, and the Philippines. A look at each of these will help make clear our overall policy toward these wars.

First, as already noted, we encouraged the Dutch to establish the independent state of Indonesia, which came into being as a friendly pro-Western nation. As it took on greater and greater pro-Communist leanings under the leadership of President Sukarno, we attempted to encourage it to hold a more neutral course; but at no time did we directly interfere with the internal affairs of this relatively stable new country. Instead, we continued to offer economic assistance to help develop the vast store of natural resources and fledgling industry of Indonesia. Eventually, through an unfortunately violent and bloody catharsis, Indonesia returned to its friendly status.

Second, in Malaya the British fought a protracted war with guerrilla opposition. It was the announced intention of Britain to establish an independent state once the guerrillas were suppressed. Since this was consistent with our own national policy of ending colonialism and establishing viable, independent nations, we supported the British effort. However, at no time did we introduce American military forces into the Malaya conflict.

Third, in the Philippines guerrillas who had fought the Japanese had now turned their attentions to the new Philippine Government. This was another protracted jungle war in which we supplied both economic and military aid to the recognized government. Again, however, we did not commit our own military forces to the guerrilla war, despite the fact that American forces were on the island at the time. We recognized that in order for a government to be viable and independent it must develop the ability to police its own internal affairs. We would help, but we would not do the policing for the government.

Finally, in Indochina we did carefully consider the possibility of committing our own combat forces to help the French. We decided against this for several reasons. One I have already outlined. France refused to make a clear commitment to end her colonial rule in Indochina. To support a colonial power would be inconsistent with our basic national policy in the Southeast Asian area.

A second powerful influence was the refusal of other free world powers to join with us in aiding France. In Korea we acted with the approval of the entire free world and with substantial material and manpower aid from a number of other countries. In Indochina we would have had to act unilaterally, and we were unwilling to do this.

A third factor was the growing belief that the French did not really want help. As President Eisenhower pointed out in his memoirs:

> Some of my advisers felt that the French had actually reached the point where they would rather abandon Indochina, or lose it

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as a result of a military defeat, than save it through international intervention.

At the height of the conflict we did supply 200 technicians, but that was the limit of our manpower aid.

We can see, I think, from these examples of actions taken in Southeast Asia that we do not hesitate to act when overt aggression takes place, but that we restrict our aid to material and technical assistance where the internal stability of a nation is involved. This is policy under which President Eisenhower operated, and this is essentially the policy that President Nixon has reaffirmed in his now famous Guam speech.

OUR POLICY IN VIETNAM

While this policy of restrained aid to governments involved in internal struggles has been followed consistently in all other areas of Southeast Asia, the conflict in Vietnam raised difficult questions not raised by the other conflicts I have briefly discussed.

Indochina, while under coordinated French rule, had consisted at various times of three relatively independent, if not fully sovereign, states. The division of Vietnam into two states by the Geneva accords was based more on military and political necessity than on traditional national boundaries, although it should be noted that Vietnam was actually three countries—north, middle, and south—before the French colony of Indochina was established.

The viability of the two new Vietnams was also problematical. The north had all the industry, since that was the center of French influence, while the south was an agrarian economy based on rice production.

The proximity of North Vietnam to China gave increased credibility to the idea that this was a Communist-inspired aggression directed, supplied and perhaps even manned to some extent by Chinese Communists. The inability to demonstrate conclusively that the Vietnam conflict really was expansion on the part of China was of considerable importance to our decision not to intervene As President Eisenhower pointed out in his memoirs:

As I viewed the prospects of military intervention in the relative calm of early 1954, it seemed clear that if three basic requirements were fulfilled, the United States could properly and effectively render real help in winning the war. The first requirement was a legal right under international law; second, was a favorable climate of Free World opinion; and third, favorable action by the Congress.

Regarding the legal right, the course was clear. Any intervention on the part of the United States would scarcely be possible save on the urgent request of the French government, which request would have to reflect, without question, the desire of the local governments.

World opinion represented a different question. We carefully examined methods and procedures calculated to win the approbation of most of the Free World. One method would have been for the three Associated States of the French Union to go to the United Nations and request help of that body. Another would be to confine United States intervention to participation in a coalition, including Britain, the ANZUS powers, and some of the Southeast Asian nations. While we recognized that the burden of the operation would fall on the United States, the token forces supplied by these other nations, as in Korea, would lend moral standing to a venture that otherwise could be made to appear as a brutal example of imperialism. *This need was particularly acute because there was no incontrovertible evidence of overt Red Chinese participation in the Indochina conflict.* (Emphasis added.)

Because of a basic conflict between our policy of not intervening militarily in internal conflicts on the one hand and simultaneously employing military force to prevent the overt expansion of Chinese Communist domination on the other hand, our activities in Vietnam took on the nature of a holding action while we attempted to determine precisely what our policy toward Indochina should be. This difficulty was further complicated by the fact that it was not yet clear whether this was an internal struggle or aggression of one nation against another.

When President Ngo Dinh Diem decided not to participate in the elections which were contemplated by the Geneva accords, the United States supported his decision. We had not been a party to the accords, so we were not bound to see that they were carried out. Support of Diem was consistent with our policy of containing Communist China and with ending colonialism. However, the question of creating a viable, independent state in South Vietnam remained open.

In reaction to Diem's refusal to participate in the elections North Vietnam and those in the South who wanted Ho as their President began undermining the Diem government. As the level of violence increased, we became concerned that South Vietnam could not survive as an independent state. Consistent with our policy in internal conflicts, we provided material and technical assistance to the South Vietnamese. But we did not lose sight of the fact that we were, at least initially, dealing with an internal conflict.

When President Kennedy decided to send in advisers to aid the South Vietnamese in developing an effective military force, he made this point absolutely clear in a CBS interview with Walter Cronkite on September 2, 1962. In response to being asked what he thought of the recent actions taken by the Diem government to repress the Buddhist opposition to the policies of his government, President Kennedy said:

Our best judgment is that he (Diem) can't be successful on this basis. We hope that he comes to see that; but in the final analysis it is the people and the government itself who have to win or lose this struggle. All we can do is help, and we are making it very clear.

We can see then that at this point our reliance was still on the South Vietnamese to win their war and put their own house in order.

CHANGE IN POLICY

This policy was changed with the introduction of U.S. combat forces into Vietnam in 1965. The buildup was incredibly rapid, and it was anticipated that the addition of troops in such numbers would decisively turn the tide of battle. By the end of 1965, we had 184,300 American soldiers in Vietnam. By the end of the following year this number had reached 385,300, but the tide had turned.

The introduction of American combat soldiers represented a departure from our previous policy of not committing American military manpower to what had, up to this point, been deemed a conflict that could only be resolved by the people of South Vietnam itself. This step indicated that this Government had apparently decided to view the conflict as an overt aggression of one country against another rather than a problem of internal order. The presence of North Vietnamese regular army troops in South Vietnam contributed to this decision.

I think at that point we may have lost sight of our real objective in Southeast Asia. As I have indicated, this objective was basically to end colonialism and establish independent and viable states to replace the former colonies. Our goal then should have been to make South Vietnam viable.

Instead of focusing on this goal, we continued to increase our military presence. By the end of 1967, our troop strength had increased another 100,000 to 485,600. By the end of 1968 we had 536,100 American soldiers in South Vietnam, and, when President Nixon took office in January of 1969, the authorized troop level in Vietnam had reached 549,500.

President Nixon realized that this policy would not end the Indochina conflict, and he set about finding a way to achieve our goals in Southeast Asia.

THE EMERGING POLICY

On May 14, 1969, the President explained how he would proceed toward our goals in Southeast Asia. The points he made in this address to the Nation are exceedingly important in understanding America's policy in Indochina.

First, he explained his initial steps after being elected President:

Our first step began before inauguration. This was to launch an intensive review of every aspect of the Nation's Vietnam policy. We accepted nothing on faith, we challenged every assumption and every statistic. We made a systematic, serious examination of all the alternatives open to us. We carefully considered recommendations offered both by critics and supporters of past policies.

An example of the extent to which the administration went in challenging the old assumptions is given by the following excerpt from Don Oberdorfer's March 27 Washington Post column:

One result of the initial Key Biscayne meeting about Vietnam was a day-long session of the National Security Council shortly after January 20 at which intensive discussion and study was devoted to four possible military options, and five possible international political results, in the Vietnam situation. In each case, consideration was given to the costs of the course of action, to the specific instruction, which would have to be given, and to the consequences of failure. About the same time, a series of toughly-worded questions was dispatched to the major U.S. agencies dealing with Vietnam in an effort to establish the facts on which policy could be based. In Saigon, the field headquarters of each agency—including the Embassy, the military and the CIA—was encouraged to give its own honest assessment without clearance with the other. When the answers were in, they showed that the Vietnam-related empires of the U.S. Government do not agree even on the facts, much less on the solution.

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The analysis was not easy and it occupied a good deal of the President's time. But some important conclusions were reached within a short time, as President Nixon explained in his May address:

From the review, it became clear at once that the new Administration faced a set of immediate operational problems. The other side was preparing for a new offensive.

There was a wide gulf of distrust between Washington and Saigon.

In eight months of talks in Paris, there had been no negotiations directly concerned with a final statement.

It was clear to the President that some action had to be taken to move the Vietnam stalemate off dead center. An increasing military buildup was not the answer, since this was being consistently met by an increasing buildup of North Vietnamese counterforces.

The President described the action he took in response to the "operational problems" he had found:

Therefore, we moved on several fronts at once.

We frustrated the attack which was launched in late February. As a result, the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong failed to achieve their military objectives.

We restored a close working relationship with Saigon. In the resulting atmosphere of mutual confidence, President Thieu and his Government have taken important initiatives in the search for a settlement.

We speeded up the strengthening of the South Vietnamese forces. I am glad to report tonight, that as a result, General Abrams told me on Monday that progress in the training program had been excellent, and that apart from any developments that may occur in the negotiations in Paris, that time is approaching when South Vietnamese forces will be able to take over some of the fighting fronts now being manned by Americans.

In weighing alternate courses, we have had to recognize that the situation as it exists today is far different from what it was two years ago or four years ago or ten years ago.

One difference is that we no longer have the choice of not intervening. We have crossed that bridge. There are now more than a half million American troops in Vietnam and 35,000 Americans have lost their lives.

We can have honest debate about whether we should have entered the war in Vietnam, We can have honest debate about how the war has been conducted. But the urgent question today is what to do now that we are there.

Against that background, let me discuss first what we have rejected, and second, what we are prepared to accept. We have ruled out attempting to impose a purely military solution on the battlefield.

We have also ruled out either a one-sided withdrawal from Vietnam, or the acceptance in Paris of terms that would amount to a disguised American defeat.

* * * * *

Let me put it plainly: What the United States wants for South Vietnam is not the important thing. What North Vietnam wants for South Vietnam is not the important thing. What is important is what the people of South Vietnam want for South Vietnam.

* * * * *

We are willing to agree to neutrality for South Vietnam is that is what the South Vietnamese people freely choose.

We believe there should be an opportunity for full participation in the political life of South Vietnam by all political elements that are prepared to do so without the use of force or intimidation.

We are prepared to accept any government in South Vietnam that results from the free choice of the South Vietnamese people themselves.

We have no intention of imposing any form of government upon the people of South Vietnam, nor will we be a party to such coercion.

We have no objection to reunification, if that turns out to be what the people of North Vietnam and the people of South Vietnam want; we ask only that the decision reflect the free choice of the people concerned.

In this manner, the President set forth our policy toward South Vietnam: Self-determination for the South Vietnamese. Our goal then was to create an environment in South Vietnam which would permit the people of that area to make a free choice, not a coerced choice, as to the type of government under which they would like to live.

In order to create this environment, it was clear that eventually all foreign military forces would have to be removed from South Vietnam.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ALLEN). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I continue my statement about our policies in Vietnam.

As I have said, the President set forth our policy toward Vietnam, which was self-determination for the South Vietnamese.

Our goal, then, was to create an environment in South Vietnam which would permit the people of that area to make a free choice—not a coercive choice—as to the type of government under which they would like to live. In order to create this environment, it was clear that eventually all foreign military forces would have to be removed from South Vietnam. To this end, the President made the following offer:

To implement these principles, I reaffirm now our willingness to withdraw our forces on a specified timetable. We ask only that North Vietnam withdraw its forces from South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos into North Vietnam, also in accordance with a timetable.

We include Cambodia and Laos to insure that these countries would not be used as bases for a renewed war. Our offer provides for a simultaneous start on withdrawal by both sides; for agreement on a mutually acceptable timetable; and for the withdrawal to be accomplished quickly.

The North Vietnamese delegates have been saying in Paris that political issues should be discussed along with military issues, and there must be a political settlement in the South. We do not dispute this, but the military withdrawal involves outside forces, and can, therefore, be properly negotiated by North Vietnam and the United States, with the concurrence of its allies.

The political settlement is an internal matter which ought to be decided among the South Vietnamese, themselves and not imposed by outsiders. However, if our presence at these political negotiations would be helpful, and if the South Vietnamese concerned agreed, we would be willing to participate, along with the representatives of Hanoi, if that also were desired. Recent statements by President Thieu have gone far toward opening the way to a political settlement. He has publicly declared his government's willingness to discuss a political solution with the National Liberation Front, and has offered free elections. This was a dramatic step forward, a reasonable offer that could lead to a settlement. The South Vietnamese Government has offered to talk without preconditions. I believe the other side should also be willing to talk without preconditions.

The South Vietnamese government recognizes, as we do, that a settlement must permit all persons and groups that are prepared to renounce the use of force to participate freely in the political life of South Vietnam. To be effective, such a settlement would require two things: First, a process that would allow the South Vietnamese people to express their choice; and, second, a guarantee that this process would be a fair one.

We do not insist on a particular form of guarantee. The important thing is that the guarantee should have the confidence of the South Vietnamese people, and that they should be broad enough and strong enough to protect the interests of all major South Vietnamese groups.

This, then, is the outline of the settlement that we seek to negotiate in Paris. Its basic terms are very simple: Mutual withdrawal of non-South Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam, and free choice for the people of South Vietnam. I believe that the long-term interests of peace require that we insist on no less, and that the realities of the situation require that we seek no more.

And now, to make very concrete what I have said, I propose the following specific measures, which seem to me consistent with the principles of all parties. These proposals are made on the basis of full consultation with President Thieu.

As soon as agreement can be reached, all non-South Vietnamese forces would begin withdrawals from South Vietnam. Over a period of twelve months, by agreed-upon stages, the major portions of all U.S., Allied, and other non-South Vietnamese forces would be withdrawn. At the end of this twelve month period, the remaining U.S., Allied and other non-South Vietnamese forces would move into designated base areas and would not engage in combat operations.

The remaining U.S. and Allied forces would complete their withdrawals as the remaining North Vietnamese forces were withdrawn and returned to North Vietnam.

An international supervisory body, acceptable to both sides, would be created for the purpose of verifying withdrawals, and for any other purposes agreed upon between the two sides.

This international body would begin operating in accordance with an agreed timetable and would participate in arranging supervised cease fires in Vietnam.

As soon as possible after the international body was functioning, elections would be held under agreed procedures and under the supervision of the international body. Arrangements would be made for the release of prisoners of war on both sides at the earliest possible time.

All parties would agree to observe the Geneva Accords of 1954 regarding South Vietnam and Cambodia, and the Laos Accords of 1962.

I believe this proposal for peace is realistic, and takes into account of the legitimate interests of all concerned. It is consistent with President Thieu's six points. It can accommodate the various programs put forth by the other side. We and the Government of South Vietnam are prepared to discuss its details with the other side.

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This new policy was hailed by many persons who were critical of the policies the United States had been pursuing up to that point.

My good friend, the distinguished Senator from Kentucky stated:

The President's report to the Nation on Vietnam was welcome and necessary. It was a summation of the effort he has made during the 4 months of his administration to bring the United States closer to peace in Vietnam.

It was a clear statement of the President's purpose to secure a settlement through negotiation, rather than the use of military force which has only deepened the tragedy of Vietnam, and which could go on for many years.

In my view the decisive statement, and one which marked an advance over past positions, was his unambiguous affirmation that the administration was prepared and willing to consider in negotiation, in addition to the concrete proposals he made, "Hanoi's four points, the NFL's 10 points, provided it can be made consistent with the few basic principles I have set forth here." For while the President's proposals are certainly reasonable, and consonant with the principle of self-determination which is a basic one for our country, we may not be dealing with a reasonable Government or people in terms of our own values and we must consider carefully their proposals.

I liked particularly that part of his speech in which he affirmed that the United States and "all parties should agree to observe the Geneva Accords of 1954 regarding Vietnam and Cambodia, and the Laos Accords of 1964." It has been my view, as I have expressed in a number of speeches in the Senate, that the accords provide the best basis for a settlement of the Issue of Vietnam, and of Cambodia and Laos, and would have influence in all of Southeast Asia.

In 1965, I opposed the commencement of the bombing of North Vietnam. In the following years, I urged on numerous occasions that the United States cease the bombing as a means of testing North Vietnam's often declared statement that such a cessation would bring about negotiations. I recognized that the cessation of bombing would not necessarily mean that negotiations would be fruitful or satisfactory to the United States, but I considered that it was the only means of opening negotiations. Unfortunately, negotiations thus far have not been very productive, but a start has been made. It is my hope that the President's address has opened the way for active and innovative negotiations, that will be successful in bringing about a settlement and peace in Vietnam. I hope also that his concrete proposals will immediately bring about a reduction in the fighting and violence in South Vietnam on both sides.

If North Vietnam and the NLF want peace, the President has opened the way toward a negotiated settlement and peace. I believe the Congress and the people should support the President in his initiative to achieve peace through negotiations and peaceful means, (Congressional Record, May 16, 1969)

And the distinguished Senator from Illinois:

Mr. President, Wednesday night President Nixon spoke wisely as he discussed the status of the Vietnam war and made proposals to end that war. His remarks were honest. They were constructive. They indicated a flexibility of approach which gives promise of breaking the impasse at Paris. Speaking as one who has been critical of the handling of the Vietnam war over a period of 3 years, I can now say that I have confidence that President Nixon is doing his utmost to bring the war to an end and to do it responsibly.

I was especially pleased to hear the President say that "the time is approaching when South Vietnamese forces will be able to take over some of the fighting fronts now being manned by Americans." And I was pleased to hear the President say that he has ruled out attempting to impose a purely military solution. These are important points with which I agree completely.

The President's report to the Nation was certainly the most comprehensive Presidential statement on the war so far. It was a contribution toward a peaceful solution of the conflict. And it was a contribution toward public understanding of the complex issues involved.

Mr. President, I am very pleased to offer every possible degree of support that I can to the President of the United States. (Congressional Record, May 16, 1969.)

Unfortunately, Mr. President (Mr. METCALF), this offer of reconciliation was not accepted by the North Vietnamese and no workable joint program for mutual withdrawal of troops has been worked out.

But our basic policy still requires that the Vietnamese must settle their own problems and that we cannot remain forever in South Vietnam. To this end, a parallel—and essentially unrelated—second step was begun.

WITHDRAWAL

An indication of this change in policy was reported to this body by the distinguished Senator from Tennessee:

Mr. President, in recent weeks, there have been many news stories about phased withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam. Some of the hints or trial balloons have emanated from the Pentagon, some from the White House, some from the State Department, and, significantly, some from Saigon.

Since early last fall, there have been unconfirmed "reports" that increments of U.S. troops would be withdrawn as the South Vietnamese troops improved their capabilities. The flow of such "reports" has been stepped up since the inauguration of President Nixon.

President Thieu was quoted on February 28 in the Washington Post as saying: "One and possibly two United States divisions can leave South Vietnam during the last 6 months of 1969."

He indicated that one more division might leave in 1970.

Upon his return from an inspection trip to South Vietnam in March, Secretary of Defense Laird spoke of implementing what he called phase II of a program to train and develop the South Vietnamese army to take over a larger role in the fighting. There were two clear implications in what Secretary Laird had to say: One, that the Johnson administration had not done very well with this phase of the "program"; and, two, that the Nixon administration had adopted the program but would do better with it.

In his press conference on April 7, Secretary of State Rogers was asked about reports of troop withdrawal. In his reply, he emphasized U.S. willingness to proceed with a plan for mutual withdrawal of troops, stating that this could be done "at once" if the "other side", a famous phrase of his predecessor, agreed to it. But the Secretary did not rule out the possibility of unilateral withdrawal, saying with respect thereto, "we are considering all possibilities."

Mr. President, the return of U.S. troops from Vietnam would surely be welcomed by the American people. The return of even a small segment of the more than 500,000 servicemen we have there would likely be widely interpreted as a de-escalation of U.S. efforts, and as offering hope of "withdrawal" of all our troops in due course. (Congressional Record, May 8, 1969)

The program of withdrawal of our soldiers from Vietnam continued, and it became clear that considerable support for the President's program was developing. Congressman BOLAND, speaking on the floor of the House of Representatives indicated this growing support:

The peace negotiations in Paris have given all sides to the Vietnam dispute an opportunity to sit down and discuss the issues and the conflict at great length. Nevertheless, the apparent deadlock at the peace table and the shooting in South Vietnam continues.

Mr. Speaker, after years of war, after years of new "military solutions," we have learned that the kind of conflict the United States is engaged in at present in Southeast Asia cannot end in military victory.

What can we do to achieve peace?

One proposed solution—further military escalation—is senseless. A new buildup in our military strength would only plunge us deeper into the military morass in Vietnam and might even push us to the brink of a nuclear war.

The record of the past 6 years shows—plainly and indisputably—that military escalation has not worked. The bombing of North Vietnam, for example, was trumpeted as the final step toward peace.

It was supposed to bring North Vietnam to its knees, convincing Hanoi that its war effort was futile. The bombing, instead, merely steeled North Vietnam's resolve to continue pressing for victory. A small agrarian nation with few cities and little industry, North Vietnam weathered the most intense bombing raids since World War II. Renewed bombing—or renewed military strikes of any kind—would be equally fruitless. The only way to extricate ourselves from this war—short of a sudden meeting of the minds in Paris—is to begin an orderly withdrawing of our troops from South Vietnam.

Senator Edward Kennedy, in a mojor foreign policy speech delivered last August, in Worcester, Massachusetts, suggested troop withdrawal. He pointed out—rightly, I think—that a significant decrease in our military activity and military personnel would make clear to Saigon that a netgotiated peace is the only tenable solution. He emphasized, too, that such a withdrawal would help convince North Vietnam of our genuine desire for peace. Senator Aiken last week also made this proposal, calling for what he termed an "orderly withdrawal." His proposal, I think, is sound. I am not talking here about a sudden overnight flight from South Vietnam, leaving the country in chaos and its leaders stranded naked before their enemies. Mr. speaker, I am talking about a steady and measured withdrawal of American forces—a withdrawal that would increase commensurately, step by step, with South Vietnam's growing ability to defend itself.

The briskly disciplined new Army that South Vietnam is developing should take over the bulk of the war effort. We must convince the Government of South Vietnam that we will not remain there forever.

The prospects for a negotiated settlement in Paris should be hopefully brighteer once Saigon and Hanoi are convinced that the United Staetes is not prepared to fight an interminable guerrilla war in Asia. (Congressional Record, May 6, 1969)

On November 3 of last year the President explained what had happened to his efforts to obtain the mutual withdrawal agreements he had described in his May 14 speech.

The President said:

In order to end a war fought on many fronts, I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts.

In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, and on a number of other occasions, I set forth our peace proposals in great detail.

We have offered the complete withdrawal

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of all outside forces within one year. We have proposed a cease-fire under international supervision.

We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force. The Saigon Government has pledged to accept the result of the election. We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that we are willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side and that anything is negotiable except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future. At the Paris peace conference, Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 public meetings.

Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms; that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the government of South Vietnam as we leave.

* * * * *

It has became clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States. And it is not the South Vietnamese Government.

The obstacle is the other side's absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace. It will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession, and the next until it gets everything it wants. There can be now no longer any doubt that progress in negotiation depends above all on Hanoi's deciding to negotiate seriously.

But Hanoi's intractable position did not preclude us from taking independent and unilateral action to terminate our involvement in this conflict. President Nixon described that action by recounting what he had said in Guam:

At the time we launched our search for peace, I recognized that we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiation. I, therefore, put into effect another plan to bring peace—a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front.

It is in line with a major shift in U.S. foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 25. Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon doctrine—a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam, but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams.

We Americans are a do-it-yourself people—an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. This trait has been carried over into our foreign policy.

In Korea and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression. Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen: "When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, U.S. policy should be to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them."

In Guam, I laid down these three principles as guidelines for future American policy toward Asia:

1. The United States will keep all of our treaty commitments.

2. We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

3. In cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea and other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy. The defense of freedom is everybody's business—not just America's business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. The policy of the previous Administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war but even more significantly it did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left.

Not only did this new doctrine meet with favorable response from our Asian allies, but it was also greeted as a positive step in the right direction here at home. Three days after President Nixon's Guam press conference, the distinguished majority leader of the Senate made the following remarks:

The President is moving with caution and consideration but also with a sense of reality based on the changes which have occurred on this globe. He is not advocating isolationism, nor is he advocating the abandonment of Asia. In his candid statements, both in this country and in Guam, he has emphasized that the United States is a Pacific power with peripheral interests on the Asian mainland.

The first two steps on the journey of understanding were in the Philippines and Indonesia, two nations which are primarily Pacific powers but with greater interests on the Asian mainland than the United States. What the President has done, in short, is to signal the less likelihood of American participation in wars on the Asian mainland in the future. The President has also encouraged the Asian nations to depend more on themselves in both internal security and military defense which, to me, seems to be a sound long-range policy.

Consistent with this new policy, President Nixon announced in his November 3 address his plan to bring our boys home:

The Vietnamization Plan was launched following Secretary Laird's visit to Vietnam in March. Under the plan, I ordered a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces.

In July, on my visit to Vietnam, I changed General Abram's orders so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new policy. Under the new orders the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam.

Our air operations have been reduced by over twenty percent.

We have now begun to see the results of this long overdue change in American policy in Vietnam.

After five years of Americans going into Vietnam, we are finally bringing American men home. By December 15, over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn from South Vietnam—including twenty percent of all of combat troops.

The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result they have been able to take over combat responsibilities from our American forces.

* * * * *

We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. ground combat forces and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater.

I have not and do not intend to announce the timetable for our program. There are obvious reasons for this decision. As I have indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts:

One is the progress which may be made at the Paris talks. An announcement of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive for the enemy to negotiate an agreement.

They would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in.

The other two factors on which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training program of the South Vietnamese forces. Progress on both these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when we started the withdrawal program in June. As a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than when we made our first estimate in June. This clearly demonstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable. We must retain the flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at that time rather than on estimates that are no longer valid. Along with this optimistic estimate, I must—in all candor—leave one note of caution. If the level of enemy activity significantly increases we might have to adjust our timetable acccordingly.

Under the President's program of withdrawal, our troop strength has dropped from a high of 549,500 authorized by the previous administration to 429,550 as of May 21 of this year. And the President has indicated that this level will decrease to no more than 285,000 by next April 15.

U.S. PRESTIGE

There is one aspect of our policy in Southeast Asia which I have not yet discussed. The United States has been effective in maintaining peace in this area and in the rest of the world because of two factors: prestige and credibility. China backed down from its planned invasion of Quemoy and Matsu because they knew the 7th Fleet was ready to repel their efforts. They respected both our position as a world power and our determination to use that power in the defense of those islands. Prestige and credibility—these two factors make the United States a world power.

In the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union also decided that discretion was the better part of valor and withdrew their missiles from that island. Again, prestige and credibility prevented World War III.

When the Chinese invaded India in 1962, we indicated our intention to help India repel this attack and the Chinese withdrew. Again prestige and credibility were our key to success.

The conflict in Indochina has done, I believe, some damage to our credibility. We have not achieved a military victory, because we have not sought one. But in the eyes of those who think we were trying for such a victory, it appears that we were incapable of achieving it. This has resulted, I believe, in the feeling among some revolutionary elements in the world that the United States can-

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not be effective in aiding a government beset by guerrilla warfare.

It is therefore important that our policy toward Vietnam also consider the credibility of the United States as a power that can effect its will once it has decided that such action is in its national interest.

"Precipitous withdrawal"—that is, the immediate and pellmell retreat with enemy soldiers chasing our last troops out—is unacceptable. It would, indeed, be a humiliating defeat that would severely cripple our credibility as a world power. For this reason President Nixon has rejected "precipitous withdrawal."

But "precipitous withdrawal" is a far cry from the orderly withdrawal that President Nixon has announced. By replacing our combat units with newly trained and equipped South Vietnamese combat units, we can withdraw without military defeat, leaving the South Vietnamese to defend their nation after we have gone. This policy will permit us to end our direct military involvement in this area which retaining our credibility and simultaneously accomplishing our other goals.

The second factor in our ability to keep world peace—prestige—has, contrary to much that has been said by critics of this war, not seriously been injured. No one doubts our sincerity or purpose at this point. But our prestige could suffer serious damage if we "precipitously withdrew." Even a country with credible power is not to be believed if it does not have will to carry out its announced intentions in international affairs. All four of our most recent Presidents have commented on the importance of our prestige to keeping world peace.

President Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs:

> One possibility was to support the French with air strikes, possibly from carriers, on Communist installations around Dien Bien Phu. There were grave doubts in my mind about the effectiveness of such air strikes on deployed troops where good cover was plentiful. Employment of air strikes alone to support French forces in the jungle would create a double jeopardy; it would comprise an act of war and would also entail the risk of having intervened and lost. Air power might be temporarily beneficial to French morale, but I had no intention of using United States forces in any limited action when the force employed would probably not be decisively effective.

And President Kennedy, in an interview with NBC newsmen Chet Huntley and David Brinkley, said:

> The fact of the matter is that with the assistance of the United States and SEATO, Southeast Asia and indeed all of Asia has been maintained independent against a powerful force, the Chinese Communists. What I am concerned about is that Americans will get impatient and say, because they don't like events in Southeast Asia or they don't like the Government in Saigon, that we should withdraw. That only makes it easy for the Communists. I think we should stay. We should use our influence in as effective a way as we can, but we should not withdraw.

President Johnson, in a message to Congress, stated:

> There are those who ask why this responsibility should be ours. The answer is simple. There is no one else who can do the job. Our power is essential, in the final test, if the nations of Asia are to be secure from expanding communism. Thus, when India was attacked, it looked to us for help, and we gave it gladly.
>
> We believe that Asia should be directed by Asians. But that means each Asian people must have the right to find its own way, not that one group or nation should overrun all the others.
>
> Make no mistake about it. The aim in Vietnam is not simply the conquest of the South, tragic as that would be. It is to show that American commitment is worthless. Once that is done, the gates are down and the road is open to expansion and endless conquest. That is why Communist China opposes discussions, even though such discussions are clearly in the interest of North Vietnam.

President Nixon addressed himself to the importance of our prestige in his November 3 address to the Nation:

> A Nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends. Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam would without question promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest.
>
> This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain peace—in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere.
>
> Ultimately, this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace but more war.

We must, therefore, accomplish our announced goal of withdrawing all combat troops from Vietnam in a manner which will preserve both our prestige and credibility.

This course has been suggested on many occasions by numerous critics of this war. On February 17, 1965, the distinguished Senator from South Dakota stated:

> This is basically a political fight . . . That in the long run will have to be settled by the Vietnamese people rather than by outsiders. (Senator GEORGE MCGOVERN).

The Senator on June 27, 1965, endorsed a consolidation of our present position, keeping our casualties at a minimum. He said:

> The strategy I have suggested—the tightening of our defense in South Vietnam and the holding of the cities and the enclaves in the coastal area—is a policy that involves primarily political patience and military restraint.
>
> It will demonstrate to friend and foe alike that we have the staying power to keep our commitment according to the guidelines that are most practical for us, rather than playing the game according to guerrilla rules, which includes the jungle ambush, at which they are the admitted masters.

A speedy resolution of the conflict is the policy the President has attempted to follow. Unfortunately, the intractability of North Vietnam has made a negotiated settlement impossible, at least for the moment. I am hopeful that this situation might change, but, if it does not, the President has also been following a path that will end our combat role in South Vietnam without negotiated agreement.

VIETNAMIZATION

The purpose of my lengthy remarks and liberal quotation of the statements of others has been to provide the background necessary to understand the merits of Vietnamization. In short, they are:

First. It is essentially an action we can take with our South Vietnamese ally regardless of what other nations do. In this sense we are in control of our destiny.

Second. Our national goal of anticolonialism and the creation of viable independent states will be served.

Third. Our prestige and credibility in international affairs will be preserved and even enhanced.

The major difficulty that has developed in this country over the policy of Vietnamization is one of opinion. An increasing segment of our society does not believe it will work. The actions in Cambodia have been viewed by some as an indication that it is not working, a view with which I do not agree. The mere fact that the South Vietnamese army, which a few years ago could hardly defend Saigon, is now functioning effectively in the very sanctuaries of the enemy, is to me an indication of its success rather than its failure.

But if this one factor is not adequate to dispel the feeling that Vietnamization cannot work, let me describe to you the success this program has been meeting in South Vietnam.

When we speak of Vietnamization we are essentially speaking of the process by which the major military, paramilitary and civil responsibilities that Americans have assumed in South Vietnam are returned to the South Vietnamese Government.

The war has patterned the entire fabric of South Vietnamese living. As the United States withdraws from its considerable involvement in the affairs of that country, we have sought to be assured that the South Vietnamese Government could provide for the legitimate needs of the South Vietnamese people who have depended on us. As we reduce our committment in Vietnam, it is encumbent upon us to coordinate with the South Vietnamese and our other allies. We must not pull the rug out from under this nation after defending it for so many years. Vietnamization is the program we have chosen to fulfill our commitment in Vietnam and at the same time fulfill the commitment we have to our own Nation to terminate U.S. involvement in the fighting there.

IMPRESSIONS FROM PERSONAL VISIT

The responsibilities which the South Vietnamese people want to resume for themselves are many-fold and encompass socioeconomic and political activities as well as military activities. I see this implementation of the Vietnamization program as possible primarily because of the success of the pacification program carried out since our early participation in the war.

When I visited South Vietnam last summer I was greatly impressed by the success of the relatively unheralded pacification program. At that time, 76.4 percent of the rural population of South Vietnam lived in areas under control of the Thieu government; and only 11.8 percent of their rural population were in areas not controlled by the government. If all urban and rural areas are considered together 84.2 percent of the total

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population—17,219,100—were in pacified areas under complete South Vietnamese Government control while 8 percent lived in areas occupied by, but not completely pacified by, the Thieu government and only 7.8 percent of the total population did not live in pacified areas.

The observations reflect an increasingly stable government structure in South Vietnam. My visit there was after President Nixon's withdrawal of the first 25,000 troops, as I reported then, my strongest impression was that it is only a matter of time before the very capable South Vietnamese forces, trained by U.S. forces, will replace our fighting men. The Vietnamization program has given the South Vietnamese time; time to train and arm themselves to resist further aggression.

Timing is the essence of the Vietnamization program. Most of us agree with President Nixon's goal of withdrawing our forces. The element of time is the only dispute.

The village of Gia Dang, which I visited last summer with Senator BELLMON, is a graphic illustration of what the Vietnamization program can achieve. The people there told us how their former homes and villages had been destroyed by the war. They hid in caves and scrounged for food along the rivers. Not until the ARVN was able to wrest control of that area were these displaced persons able to establish new homes in the village of Gia Dang. With their security established by their own army, Gia Dang is an active fishing village, self-supported by the initiative of the residents. Gia Dang showed me the sound utility of the Vietnamization program. If we can provide the South Vietnamese forces time to train for the general protection of their country as we did in Gia Dang, our troops will return home and remain home.

EVALUATING VIETNAMIZATION

In the national media and here on the Senate floor we have heard much about different methods of calculations to measure successes or failures in the Vietnam war—the Vietnamization program should be subject to the same scrutiny. The perspective offered by Lt. Col. Vince Tocci writing in May's Armed Forces Journal is pertinent to this point:

> There are statistics on nearly every conceivable activity in the war. How many indirect attacks? How many fish? How much rice? How many weapons? How many deserters? How many bars? It's a wonder someone doesn't ask, "How many—'how manys' are kept?" The real question is, "What does it all mean?"
>
> It is important if it fits into a proper context. In the wrong framework these statistics are practically worthless. Unfortunately, statistics have become ends in themselves rather than substantive items which help to explain or clarify the situation. The wrong framework—oversimplified and overquantified—will not clarify this problem. For its part, the U.S. Government, while keeping the American public apprised of all these numbers, has probably added to the confusion.
>
> What is needed is a new device for measuring progress in a guerrilla war. The measuring devices currently in use do not really measure progress in a war of insurgency.
>
> The statistics reported to date have been measuring United States effort and not United States achievement. As the United States effort increased, the public expected a corresponding advancement toward victory and peace, since there is no measurement of achievement the public cannot see the progress. As a result, the war appears to some people to be a hopeless quagmire.
>
> Conversely, the enemy gets all the credit. In spite of the enormous military effort against them they continue to exist. Ergo: the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese are victorious. Some people actually believe this fantasy. Some go so far as to claim that the United States forces are immoral, illegal, and have lost the war.

Colonel Tocci served in Vietnam from May 1966 to May 1967 as an air briefer and later as chief of combat news for the Seventh Air Force. That experience developed for him an intimate and independent knowledge of Vietnam operations. When he addressed himself to Vietnamization in the Armed Forces Journal, he too spoke of the element of time:

> In this program emphasis is placed on training and equipping the Vietnamese. As they increase their capability and assume a stronger defensive posture, the United States redeploys its troops. More than 115,000 Americans have departed Vietnam in less than a year; more will follow as the Vietnamese potential becomes fact.
>
> But first it will take time. Training, equipping, and building an experienced fighting team is not an overnight project. And second, since this is a war for people, progress must include many nonmilitary aspects. Economic, social and internal security development must advance along with the military. And third, the Communists must disrupt the Vietnamization of the war or find themselves without popular support and facing a strong all-Vietnamese armed force capable of protecting its own people's freedom. The attempts at disruption may cause temporary slowdowns in the Vietnamization process.
>
> Vietnamization combines the best elements of United States involvement with Vietnamese aspirations. The end result, given time for implementation, is in keeping with the American commitment and position as a responsible leader in the free world.

When considering the Vietnamization program, we cannot overemphasize its broad effect—military, political, and socioeconomic. Each of these aspects so interacts with each other and this is the complexity of the subject. I asked the Department of Defense for information on each of these aspects. Let me present this report on the progress of Vietnamization to you:

PROGRESS IN VIETNAMIZATION—MILITARY

I would particularly like to direct interest to two areas of progress resulting from purely military operations. The first is the increased presence throughout the Vietnamese countryside of stabilizing agencies of the government of Vietnam which promote increased basic security for the people; secondly, the social and economic improvements throughout the countryside which are visible to, and directly assist, the Vietnamese people at the lowest level.

We are making visible progress in Vietnamizing the military portion of the war. The results of our efforts to turn over the fighting to the RVNAF are encouraging. Foremost among the results, of course, is the 21 percent reduction in our total troop strength to below the 434,000 directed by the President. The recently announced reduction of an additional 150,000 will, of course, be paced by the progress of Vietnamization, as well as the level of enemy activity.

As part of our overall United States troop reduction in Vietnam, the number of infantry-type maneuver battalions has been reduced by approximately 29% from one year ago. The forthcoming redeployment will, of course, include more maneuver battalions as well as support forces.

We have also turned over to the South Vietnamese, or withdrawn some of our ground forces from about 26% of the tactical areas for which we once had complete responsibility.

As a direct result of our efforts at Vietnamizing the war, we have seen a 63% decrease in United States personnel killed in action from the first quarter of 1969 to the same period in 1970. Similarly, the number of United States military wounded in action has been reduced by 54% during the same period.

We have provided more effective equipment to the Republic of Vietnam Air Force to allow them to prosecut the war. Their use of this equipment to assume a greater portion of the combat role is encouraging. For example, attack sorties flown by the Vietnam Air Force between first quarter 1969 and 1970 have increased more than 40% while the United States Air Force has decreased its sorties by over 47%.

To provide the Republic of Vietnam Air Force with adequate facilities not only to conduct military operations, but also to assist in the economic development of the country, the United States has turned over several key installations no longer required. The 9th Infantry Division Base at Dong Tam is now the home of the ARVN 7th Infantry Division. The United States Navy Base at My Tho is now a Vietnamese navy facility. The 3rd Marine Division Base at Dong Ha is now used by the ARVN 1st Infantry Division. The Vietnamese Air Force now operates the air base at NHA Trang with remaining United States units as tenants. Recently, the base camp of the 4th United States Infantry Division at Camp Enari, near Pleiku, was turned over to the Republic of Vietnam. Additional facilities at Danang, Vung Tau, Bien Hoa, Lai Khe, Can Tho, and Binh Thuy are also programmed for turnover in the near future.

The task of training the RVN serviceman not only in the basic skills of his branch but also in the technical skills required to operate and maintain the newer equipment, has been formidable. We have assisted the GVN in establishing more and better training facilities to accommodate the requirement for training centers and service schools. These facilities currently have a student training load of over 600,000, up 27% from 1969 and up over 50% from 1968.

In addition, a substantial number of Republic of Vietnam Air Force personnel are brought to the United States each year to receive technical training not yet available in Vietnam. This year, over 7,000 Vietnamese military personnel will be trained in a wide variety of advanced skills in the United States, compared with approximately 2,600 last year, and 1,900 in 1968. Over half of the 1970 student load in the United States consists of helicopter and fixed wing pilot trainees and mechanics.

As you know, the regular forces of the Republic of Vietnam Air Force have been allowed to devote more and more attention to purely tactical operations due to the formation of paramilitary security forces ranging from the popular forces to national police to peoples self-defense forces.

These security forces provide visible evidence of GVN presence to the villagers. The National police have expanded from a force level of approximately 17,000 in 1964 to nearly 90,000 today. The national police have two distinct roles: support of pacification measures and national development. In both roles, attention is focused on creation of a stable government with an effective civil police force throughout urban and rural

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areas. In its paramilitary role in pacification, trained police field forces companies are employed in the villages, hamlets, and urban areas to identify and neutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure.

As a civil police body, the national police protection and services have been expanded downward from province and district locations into the villages. Currently, more than 6,000 uniformed police are assigned to approximately 1,700 villages. During the next several months, the bulk of police increases will be at village level. To be effective in both roles, police training (with United States assistance) is provided in three basic training centers which have a combined training capacity of over 4,500 trainees for the 12-week cycle. Additional training facilities for medium and higher level police command training are in operation. To date, approximately 140,000 Vietnamese police have been trained in Vietnam while about 300 have received specialized training in the United States. An additional 1,900 have been trained in selected third countries.

Approximately 50% of all police now operate outside urban areas, with increasing numbers being assigned to district and village level. Their presence complements the paramilitary functions of the popular forces, who also operate under the direction of the village chiefs.

The popular forces have been increased in size by over 20% in the past year and are the military arm of the village chief. They are organized and trained as platoons and assigned as local area security for villages and hamlets. They live with the population they serve and are tangible examples of the government's efforts to provide security to all the population. The PF have been equipped with M-16 rifles and newer radios for better effectiveness.

I think we can see here that the bolstered South Vietnamese forces—on all levels—the extensive training programs and the modernized equipment are all substantial contributions to the Vietnamization program.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC

Land reform and other assistance to the predominantly agrarian interests of the South Vietnamese people have secured social and economic benefits under the Vietnamization program. Again I quote the Defense Department briefing paper:

The farmer requires land on which to grow his crop, seed to start the growth, and a means of getting his crop to market. To provide more land to the farmers, the Vietnamese Government has redistributed over 267,500 acres of land to the people during the past two years. Of this total, approximately 75% was turned over in the past 12 months.

The recently enacted 'land-to-the-tiller' law (commonly referred to as the Land Reform Law) will provide approximately 2¼ million acres of land ownership to farmers who actually cultivate the land. Under this law, the government will direct the transfer of land from approximately 50,000 absent land owners to approximately 500,000 tenant farmers with appropriate compensations. The new program will be administered at village level.

Improved strains of rice (IR-8) which increase the yield up to 150% have been introduced under the accelerated rice production program. By the end of 1970, Vietnamese rice farmers should be producing sufficient quantities of rice for Vietnamese consumption to no longer require imports of rice from the United States.

How does the farmer then get his product to market? Roads and waterways are the primary means of moving farm-to-market products. The RVN highway system includes 12,500 miles of roads comprised of national highways (2,400 miles), interprovincial highways (1,600 miles), and 8,500 miles of provincial roads. United States efforts have been directed toward upgrading about ⅔ of the 4,000 mile national and inter-provincial system, not only to facilitate military operations, but also to assist in the economic development of the nation.

Of these approximately 2,570 miles of highway, upgrading construction is underway or completed on nearly 1,800 miles or about two-thirds of the total. 25,000 meters of bridges are included in the line of communication upgrading program, of which over 40 percent have been completed. The construction effort required to pave these roads has been provided primarily by U.S. military engineer construction units (80%).

About 65% of the total road network in Vietnam is now classified as secure ('open during daylight') with the bulk of these roads being in areas necessary for economic development.

U S and Vietnamese river and canal operations have provided security for over 70% of the commercial waterways in Vietnam.

A major effort during the last half of 1969 has opened railways which have been closed for many years. 55% of the 1,240 kilometers of main line and branch lines are now open to traffic. Approximately 64% of the railroad is now considered secure, as compared with approximately 21% at the beginning of 1967.

Medical care and health facilities in the villages has been a pressing need, while the number of doctors available in the country is far below the requirement, ambitious efforts are underway to provide health care programs to every citizen. A coordinated military-civilian health plan is in effect in which joint utilization of health facilities and exchange of personnel is being carried out, first at province hospitals and then at district and military sub-sector dispensaries.

In a nation of 17 million people, 20 million smallpox, cholera and plague immunizations were administered in 1969 as compared with 16 million the previous year.

To provide an education to as many Vietnamese children as possible, massive strides have been made in educational facilities. The Elementary Education System is now capable of enrolling approximately 85% of the school age population.

I wish I could say the same for my State of Alaska.

The most recent statistics show that over 2,340,000 or 80% of the school age children are enrolled in public and private schools.

Enrollment in secondary education schools increased from 472,000 in 1968 to 543,000 in 1969. Total teachers in the secondary (high school) education system increased from 11,500 to 13,400 during the same period.

Enrollment in the 21 vocational schools (which include junior technical, trade technical and polytechnic schools), has increased by over 3,000 to 11,360 from 1968 to 1969.

In the five universities and five normal schools, over 41,000 students are enrolled.

I have dwelt in some detail on the measures of progress which have been made in Vietnamization. The continuation of this progress, with the ultimate objective of a self-reliant government in South Vietnam, is dependent on a climate of security throughout the country. Threats to, or actual disruption of this security is of grave concern to the program.

POLITICAL

It can be said of the political aspect of the Vietnamization program that the Government of South Vietnam is more stable now than at any time in the past decade. Since 1966 seven election periods have been held in South Vietnam. As Marine Gen. Lewis Walter put it, elections are important—

Not only because they reflect the nature of the government, but also because they indicate the degree of commitment which the Vietnamese people have made to their government.

In each of the seven election periods the Vietnamese have demonstrated resounding support for the democratic process. More than 80 percent of all the eligible voters turned out in each election. I might add that this compares favorably with the United States, where only about 60 percent of eligible Americans exercise their right to vote.

VIETNAMIZATION AND THE NIXON DOCTRINE

Vietnamization is the embodiment of the Asian doctrine President Nixon enunciated at Guam last year. Secretary Laird has stated that this program "supports our obligations to our allies in South Vietnam, and, at the same time, implements our expectation and insistence that in the future military defense will and must be a responsibility increasingly shouldered by the Asian nations themselves." Vietnamization is our first application of that doctrine. And as Secretary Laird has aptly pointed out:

If the test succeeds in Vietnam, other nations in Asia which wish to live in peace will be encouraged, and nations that seek conquest by war—waged directly or by proxy—will be deterred from aggression. In short . . . Vietnamization provides the American people with a practical middle course between isolationism and the role of world policeman.

Mr. President, I have asked the Department of Defense to provide me with a list of the countries to which we provide military aid or training under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This is dated May 28, 1970. This information shows that we provide assistance to the following countries:

Afghanistan	Lebanon
Australia	Korea
Argentina	Liberia
Bolivia	Libya
Brazil	Malaysia
Ceylon	Mexico
Chile	Morocco
Nationalist China	Nepal
Colombia	Nicaragua
Congo	Pakistan
Dominican Republic	Panama
Ecuador	Paraguay
El Salvador	Peru
Ethiopia	Philippines
Ghana	Portugal
Greece	Saudi Arabia
Guatemala	Senegal
Honduras	Spain
India	Tunisia
Indonesia	Turkey
Iran	Uruguay
Jordan	Venezuela

Three countries are receiving assistance under the defense appropriations bill—namely, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam.

I note that the pending amendment would prevent the executive branch from furnishing military instruction to Cambodian forces or providing military instruction in Cambodia.

AMENDMENT NO. 663

I send to the desk—and request that it be printed—an amendment to the

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Cooper-Church amendment No. 653 which would delete from subsections 2 and 3 the prohibition against providing military training to Cambodians or military training in Cambodia.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. METCALF). The amendment will be received and printed, and will lie on the table.

The amendment is as follows:

AMENDMENT NO. 663

Delete the following:

(1) Sec. 47, subsection 2. ". . . furnish military instruction to Cambodian forces or . . ."

(2) Sec. 48, subsection 3. " . . . to provide military instruction in Cambodia, or . . ."

Mr. STEVENS. I cannot see why we should cut off from Cambodia the training we are giving to so many other nations to increase their own ability to defend themselves. I can understand full well why some of the other provisions of the Cooper-Church amendment were offered, but I do not understand the prohibition against military instruction to Cambodian forces or military instruction in Cambodia. It would prevent us, for example, from training their pilots. It would prevent us from training any of their people in Vietnam or in Cambodia itself. This is a provision of the Cooper-Church amendment which I just do not understand, and I would be very willing to listen to anyone who wants to explain it.

I am informed that every time we either give or sell military equipment to a foreign nation, we provide advisers who instruct them in the use of that equipment. Why is it that Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam should receive this advice and this service in providing for their own defense, while we simultaneously prevent the President from giving similar instruction—or ordering the military to give similar instruction—in Cambodia or to Cambodians? I think this is one of the serious defects of the Cooper-Church amendment.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, on yesterday I offered an amendment to the pending Cooper-Church amendment. The purpose of the amendment I have offered is to foreclose any possibility of denying rescue to Americans being held captive in Cambodia.

So that there will be no mistake as to the language of my amendment, I will state it again:

On page 4, line 21, insert "(a)" after "Sec. 7.".

On page 5, between lines 18 and 19, insert the following new subsection:

"(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall be inoperative during any period that the President determines that citizens or nationals of the United States are held as prisoners of war in Cambodia by the North Vietnamese or the forces of the National Liberation Front."

Mr. President, this amendment has but one purpose. It has but one aim. It is addressed to but one issue.

That issue is the plight of Americans held prisoner by the enemy. Primarily these Americans are servicemen, but there have been instances of journalists being captured.

Mr. President, the amendment which I have offered will serve not only as notice to the enemy of the U.S. determination to do whatever is possible and necessary to secure the release of American captives. It will also stand as an expression of the Senate's concern to the parents, wives, and families of captured and missing American servicemen.

This is not an idle gesture. Those who await the return of their loved ones believe—and with reason—that every bit of pressure which is put on the enemy results in better treatment for their men. And every action taken by our Government—whether at the negotiating table in Paris, at the White House, or in the Halls of Congress—everything done to show concern, interest, and awareness gives some measure of comfort and strength to the brave and courageous families who keep watch for their absent fathers, sons, and husbands.

Earlier this month, I received a letter from the wife of an Air Force major missing since November 1967. In closing she said:

Our five children and I have been sustained by the belief that our Government will not abandon my husband and his fellow servicemen.

Mr. President, what more clear-cut notice of abandonment could be given than through legislation which would forbid American troops to cross an imaginary, meaningless line in an Asian jungle—even if that crossing were to secure the freedom of captive Americans?

The Cooper-Church amendment, as it now reads, would forbid U.S. forces from entering Cambodia, even if the purpose of their mission were to rescue Americans being held prisoners of war by the enemy.

Mr. President, the Senate cannot serve such cold and abrupt notice on the men who are being held prisoner, on the men who daily risk capture, or on their families.

I urge my colleagues to consider these points and to join in approving this amendment as an expression of concern for our military personnel and their loved ones. An expression to them and to the enemy as well.

Mr. President, I would urge my colleagues seriously to consider the amendment I offered yesterday, to give the President the right to say, in effect, that the provisions of the Church-Cooper amendment shall become inoperative if the President determines that Americans are being held captive by the North Vietnamese and by the National Liberation Front in the country of Cambodia.

I think the amendment would express the concern that we feel in the Senate and Congress as a whole for those who are now prisoners of war or missing in action, not only in Cambodia but also throughout Southeast Asia.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SPARKMAN). Without objection, it is so ordered.

CORRECTION OF VOTE (NOS. 150 AND 151 EXEC.)

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, during the vote taken yesterday on the two treaties, the Senator from Indiana was standing at his seat as the rollcall proceeded for the first time. I voted.

One of the officials of the Senate at the table here recorded my vote, but for some reason or other, it was not recorded in the official rollcall.

I therefore ask unanimous consent that my vote be cast as "aye," as I audibly cast it yesterday in person.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the correction will be made.

AMENDMENT OF THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ACT

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 15628) to amend the Foreign Military Sales Act.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT REQUEST

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SPARKMAN). The Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) is now recognized.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arkansas yield, without losing his right to the floor?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, with the concurrence of the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, who now holds the floor, and with the proviso that he does not lose his right to the floor, I ask unanimous consent that the vote on the pending Dole amendment occur at the hour of 11:30 o'clock on Wednesday morning next.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Reserving the right to object——

Mr. GRIFFIN. Reserving the right to object——

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, does that exclude, may I ask, the right to move to table——

Mr. MANSFIELD. No. Every Senator's right is preserved.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. In other words, I would still be free to move to table prior to the rollcall vote.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The vote would occur at that time, otherwise——

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not make myself clear——

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would state that——

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I withhold the motion.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Let me restate it. If I can still move to table, I have no objection.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Will the Chair please clarify that point?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SPARKMAN). I am advised by the Parliamentarian that a motion to table would not be in order, unless that specific pro-

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vision is included in the unanimous-consent request.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. If it would allow me to move to table before that time, then I have no objection to a vote. It would come either in the form of a motion or on its merits. I think there should be a right to move to table. That is customary.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Every Senator's right on that is understood.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I want it clear by agreeing to this that I would not be foreclosing a move to table prior to a vote.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, may I inquire of the Senator—oh, just prior, he said—I caught that last part—It would not allow a motion to table on Monday or Tuesday——

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am not trying to be technical, just reserving the right to make a motion to table before the vote on its merits.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana included that in his unanimous-consent request. Is there objection?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, reserving the right to object——

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, for the moment, I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I believe I have the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

PETITIONS RECEIVED PRO AND CON REGARDING THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, on two previous occasions, May 13 and May 19, I have reported to the Senate on the large numbers of petitions I have received in recent days.

These petitions are only a part of the tremendous amount of correspondence I have received. Altogether I have heard from more than 260,000 people, and the mail is still being counted.

I have received petitions from 145,486 people—counted thus far—who are opposed to the continuation and widening of the war in Indochina. I have also received petitions from 1,202 persons in support of President Nixon's policies.

Once again I have summarized the petitions, and I ask unanimous consent that this additional list be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the petitions were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SUMMATION OF PETITIONS

Petitions circulated by Friends Seminary, New York, containing 3,411 signatures. They oppose the Administration's policies in Indochina and call for withdrawal of U.S. troops.

A statement from 10 faculty members of the Graduate School of Social Work of the University of Arkansas stating:

It is our belief that the violence in Indochina is related to the current climate of violence, repression and distrust which is increasingly prevadi..g our nation . . . We deplore the senseless murders of college students at Kent State University and at Jackson State College . . . We urge an immediate cessation of unlawful attempts to quell any participation in public protest against so costly and so inhumane a war.

A petition from 27 students at the Arkansas Graduate School of Social Work calls for a withdrawal of troops from Indochina and a re-ordering of national priorities.

A petition from 29 persons in Hope, Arkansas, favoring the "Amendment to End the War".

A petition from 50 persons in Gassville, Arkansas, and another from nine persons in Little Rock, average age 51, supporting the "Amendment to End the War."

Thirty signatures on a petition from Little Rock in support of the Cooper-Church amendment.

A petition with 24 signatures from the College of Liberal Arts at Arkansas State University in support of the "Amendment to End the War."

120 additional signatures on petitions from the University of Arkansas.

A petition from 18 members of the Arkansas Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers backing the amendments to discontinue funds for the war in Indochina.

Petitions with 20 signatures from Mountain Home, Ark., five from Monticello, Ark., 23 from Little Rock, 30 from Jonesboro, 13 from Fayetteville, 31 from Batesville, 46 from Sheridan, 20 from Searcy, 41 from Camden, seven from Bentonville, 65 from Texarkana, and 40 from Henderson State College, all in support of the "Amendment to End the War." These were hand written petitions, circulated among friends and neighbors.

A petition from 62 federal employees of the Western Regional Office of Economic Opportunity stating:

"We fervently oppose America's presence in Southeast Asia . . . The war may be the greatest threat to America's security and its future in our history. . ."

Petitions from 21 persons in Iowa City, Iowa, and 68 in Granada Hills, Calif. supporting the "End-the-War" Amendment.

A petition from 37 faculty and students of the graduate religious studies program at Mundelein College, Ill.

Petitions from 27 persons in Los Altos, Calif., 16 in Sacramento, 35 in Chicago and 12 in Pontiac, Mich., calling for American withdrawal from Indochina.

Petitions and letters from 12,324 persons throughout the New York area calling for withdrawal from Southeast Asia as "the only path to a just and honorable peace." The signatures were collected by the Women Strike for Peace, East Meadow, N.Y.

Petitions from 645 persons in Forest Hills, N.Y., supporting the Foreign Relations Committee's position against military involvement in Cambodia.

A petition from 15 workers and the management of Central Molded Products Co., Chicago calling for an end to the war and "a beginning in the fight to improve our quality of life at home."

A petition from 278 students and faculty of the College of Engineering, University of Wisconsin which concludes:

"Repression by force will only fan the flames of conflict and will tear to shreds the fabric of our society. To end violence at home we must first put an end to violence abroad. The invasion of Cambodia must stop at once. The war in Vietnam must be ended quickly. Then we must work together toward the goal of a better society for all."

A petition from 38 faculty and staff members at Sequoia High School, Redwood City, Calif., urging Congress to exercise its Constitutional powers to halt the war, and a similar petition from the Department of History and Social Science of Rye Neck, N.Y., High School.

A petition from 27 faculty members of Queens College, Charlotte, N.C. urging increased efforts for early termination of U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia.

A petition with 116 names from the School of Architecture and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology urging "withdrawal of all funds spent on military action in Southeast Asia, with the exception of money needed to bring the troops home."

A petition with 180 names from Yuba College, Marysville, Calif., opposing the President's policies in Southeast Asia and "his disregard for Constitutional and democratic processes."

A petition from 72 persons in Los Angeles supporting the Cooper-Church and McGovern-Hatfield Amendments.

A petition with 37 signatures from Oswego, N.Y., and one from Harrisburg, Pa., with 33 signatures opposing further American military action in Southeast Asia.

Petitions with 19 names from Redwood City, Calif., 23 from Evanston, Ill., seven from East Boston, Mass., 17 from Davis, Calif., 19 from Fort Worth, Texas, all favoring the "Amendment to End the War."

A petition with 186 names from Rice University, Houston, Texas, opposing the President's action "without seeking the advice and consent of the Senate."

A "petition for peace" from Princeton, N.J., with 122 signatures, urging "immediate Congressional passage of legislation to limit and end the war."

Petitions from Houston, Texas, with 106 signatures opposing the President's actions and additional petitions with 14 signatures favoring the Cooper-Church Amendment and 16 signatures supporting the "Amendment to End the War."

A petition from 23 students and faculty of the School Psychology Training Program at the University of Minnesota strongly disagreeing with President Nixon's expansion of the war.

Sixteen signatures on a petition from Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, Pa., "wholeheartedly opposing the Nixon Administration's actions in Indochina."

A petition from 60 citizens of Oak Park, Ill., expressing "strong opposition to our country's economic and military involvement in Southeast Asia."

A petition from 83 persons at Willamette University, Salem, Oregon, supporting an end to American military involvement in Southeast Asia.

Petitions from 51 persons in Detroit and 12 persons in Crawfordsville, Ind., opposing the President's actions in Cambodia.

A petition from the faculty and students of Albany Medical college, N.Y., with 86 signatures calling the war in Indochina "unnecessary, illegal, militarily hopeless, morally wrong and destructive to our society."

A petition from 51 correctional workers for the Adult and Juvenile Probation Departments, Santa Clara County, Calif., supporting the Foreign Relations Committee and calling for withdrawal of American troops from Southeast Asia.

A petition from 14 members of the Department of Linguistics, University of Hawaii supporting the Foreign Relations Committee and opposing the "invasion of Cambodia".

A statement signed by 28 faculty members and students professional involved in East and Southeast Asian Studies at Indiana University which concludes:

. . . We deeply doubt the assumptions that the United States may become a second-rate power unless we win a military victory in Vietnam, and that American "credibility" and the future of the free world are at stake . . . Real victory for America lies in a speedy military disengagement from the internal conflicts of the Southeast Asian peoples.

A petition from 60 persons in Millis, Mass., opposed to the expanded war.

A petition from 30 employees of a State of Connecticut agency and another from eight persons in Boulder, Colo., calling for

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withdrawal of our forces from Southeast Asia.

A petition from a group of 35 psychotherapists in the New York area which concludes:

We call upon the Congress to use its Constitutional powers to bring the war in Indochina to an immediate end. This may be the only means of retrieving into America the thousands of disaffected young people who are—ultimately—the people who will save or fail to save the country.

A petition from 237 members of the academic community of the Stevens Institute of Technology, N.J., calling for an end to the war.

A petition from 29 members of the faculty of The Lawrenceville School, Lawrenceville, N.J., deploring the action in Cambodia and a petition from 23 faculty members at Kellogg High School, St. Paul, Minn., expressing "overriding concern over President Nixon's dangerous and ill-advised course of action in Cambodia."

A petition from 325 students at Balboa High School, San Francisco, who "non-violently protest the action of President Nixon in Cambodia."

A petition from 132 New Jersey citizens opposing further appropriations for war in Cambodia, Vietnam or Laos.

A petition from 106 persons in Newfolden, Minn., opposing the President's actions in Cambodia.

A petition from 75 persons in Columbus, Ohio, deploring "the United States' military intervention in Cambodia."

Petitions from 31 computer industry employees in Cupertino, Calif., 14 persons in Kansas City, Mo., 43 persons in Fresno, Calif., and 35 persons in Houston, Texas, supporting the "Amendment to End the War."

Petitions with 80 signatures from staff members of the Northwestern University Library advocating withdrawal of U.S. troops from Southeast Asia.

A petition from 60 persons in Skokie, Ill., and one from 18 persons in San Jose, Calif., opposing the President's actions.

A petition signed by 51 United States citizens in Florence, Italy, strongly opposing the President's move in Cambodia.

A petition from 246 persons at Wellesley College calling upon the Congress to reassert its Constitutional powers.

A petition from 16 persons at Meadville Thoelogical School, Chicago, calling for withdrawal from Cambodia, a planned program with withdrawal from Vietnam, and upholding the right of dissent.

A petition from 11 faculty members of the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, expressing "strong opposition to the United States incursion into Cambodia and the resumption of bombing of North Vietnam."

Petitions signed by 170 students and adults in Middlesex, N.J., calling for an end to our involvement in Cambodia and Vietnam.

A petition from 17 students and 20 teachers at Saint Elizabeth High School, Oakland, Calif., supporting efforts to change our policy in Southeast Asia and "bring a speedy end to U.S. involvement in the affairs of Vietnam and Cambodia."

A petition from 35 staff and students of the Center for Research in Human Learning, University of Minnesota, urging U.S. withdrawal from Cambodia and a petition from 165 students and faculty of the University of Minnesota Law School calling the "invasion of Cambodia" an "unconstitutional exercise of executive power" and a "shameful expansion of an already immoral and inhumane war."

A petition with 65 names from Cornvallis, Ore., opposing further American involvement in Cambodia.

A petition with 142 names from medical and paramedical personnel of St. Luke's Hospital Center, New York, opposing the escalation of the war "because of its dire effects on the health and welfare of the peoples of Indochina and of the United States."

A petition from 250 students and professors of the School of Law, University of California, Berkeley, urging Congress "to reassert Constitutional power over the declaration and conducts of foreign wars."

A petition from 141 faculty, staff and graduate students in the Department of Biological Sciences, Purdue University, Lafayette, Indiana, deploring the escalation of the war and calling for a rapid, orderly withdrawal of American troops.

Petitions with 183 signatures from Albany, N.Y., 15 from Schenectady and 52 from Poughkeepsie, supporting the Foreign Relations Committee and stating that "the tragic experience in Vietnam must not be repeated in Cambodia."

Telegrams signed by 21 art critics, art historians and educators in New York and 17 medical social workers in Contra Costa County, Calif., opposing the President's actions.

A petition from 420 persons in Racine, Wis., calling on Congress "to exercise its prerogatives to oppose this undeclared war and to reduce all military activity in Southeast Asia as quickly as possible."

Statements of support from 102 persons at San Francisco College for women for the Foreign Relations Committee's efforts to "defend the Constitutional rights of the Senate."

A petition from 58 students, staff and faculty in behavioral science at the University of Colorado calling for an American withdrawal from Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand.

A petition from 58 members of the faculty and administration of Hamilton College, Clinton, N.Y., deploring the Cambodian action and urging instead "a rapid acceleration of American withdrawal from Vietnam."

Forty-six letters from citizens of the community of Hauppauge, L.I., New York, expressing deep disapproval of the "continuation and furtherance of the war."

A petition with 490 signatures from Springfield, Mass., opposing our involvement in Cambodia.

Petitions with 553 names from Park Forest, Ill., opposing the expanded war and calling for American withdrawal.

A petition from 50 members of the Iliff School of Theology, Denver, Colo., which states:

We are convinced that President Nixon's policy can serve no rational or moral objective. The policy only perpetuates and intensifies the needless suffering of countless peoples and the destruction of lands not our own. The policy makes a mockery of values such as peace, justice and freedom . . .

Petitions from 154 persons in Northville, Mich., 84 in New York and 41 in Santa Monica, Calif., in support of amendments to cut off further funding for military action in Southeast Asia.

A petition from 160 faculty and students of the Music Department of San Fernando Valley State College, Northridge, Calif., opposing the expansion of the war.

Petitions from 23 persons in Syracuse, N.Y. and 43 in Euclid, Ohio, favoring action to prohibit further funding for military operations in Cambodia.

Petitions from 3,681 persons in San Diego "opposed to United States military intervention in Cambodia."

A "Declaration of Peace" from 195 women in the Bethlehem, Pa., area.

Petitions supporting the "Amendment to End the War" signed by 15 persons in Los Angeles, 18 in Hyannis, Mass., 21 in Norman, Okla., 117 in Columbus, Ohio, seven in Orinda, Calif., 30 in Fremont, Calif., and 141 in Santa Cruz, Calif.

A petition from 171 employees of the Manhattan State Hospital Complex, N.Y., calling for "the withdrawal of all American troops from Southeast Asia and the protection of our rights to protest and petition as guaranteed by the Constitution."

A petition from 10 Southern New Jersey lawyers stating that "law and order becomes a hollow chant" when the President ignores or violates Constitutional duties and limitations.

A petition from 34 members and friends of the Episcopal Seminary of the Caribbean supporting termination of U.S. involvement in Cambodia and a rapid withdrawal from Vietnam.

A petition with 108 signatures from Minneapolis opposing the extension of the war and favoring a "total reordering of American priorities."

Petitions containing 1,440 signatures gathered by students of the Berkeley, Calif., High School "condemning President Nixon's invasion of Cambodia", "the resumption of bombing in North Vietnam", and "the murder of four students in Kent, Ohio."

Petitions from 114 persons in Brooten, Minn., and 200 in Chicago supporting the "Amendment to End the War."

A petition from 57 staff members of the Family Service Association of America opposing the expanded war.

A petition from 24 students and professors of the Associated Colleges of the Midwest Central American Field Program in Costa Rica opposing further U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia.

A petition signed by 72 faculty, students and staff of the Department of German, University of California, Berkeley, opposing the escalation of the war, and a petition signed by 380 members of the Department of Chemistry expressing "opposition to the Administration's current policy in Southeast Asia" and urging Congressional action to bring about withdrawal of U.S. forces.

Petitions signed by 7,100 persons in Brooklyn, N.Y., "supporting the Foreign Relations Committee's position against any escalation of the war" and favoring a withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Southeast Asia. The petitions were collected by the Brooklyn Communication Action Committee for Peace.

Petitions containing 1,222 signatures from the New York area in support of the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment and a reassertion of Constitutional power by the Congress.

A petition from 408 San Francisco Bay Area trade unionists and a copy of a letter to President Nixon which states:

The economy of our country is steadily being eroded . . . Promises to stabilize the economy and control inflation have become less meaningless. Our paychecks buy less for our families; our standard of living has been assaulted. We are suffering increased inflation and unemployment. Now Cambodia! What next? There must be an end to these military adventures . . .

Eighty-two letters from Chicago citizens, forwarded by the Roosevelt University Student Senate, advocating withdrawal from Cambodia and Vietnam and repeal of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.

Petitions with 1,274 names gathered in the New York area and forwarded by the Women Strike for Peace in support of the Hatfield-McGovern Amendment and other actions to halt further funding of military operations in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

A petition from 609 persons in Honolulu calling for the rapid withdrawal of American military forces from Indochina and urging all citizens "to the higher patriotism—Help save your country."

Petitions bearing 3,176 names from Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill. The petitions read:

Four students at Kent State University have been unjustifiably slain in reaction to what we consider an immoral and unconstitutional decision made by President Nixon. We strongly urge Congress to take action

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to see that our men are taken out of Cambodia immediately, and that we become disengaged from Southeast Asia without delay . . .

1,303 signatures on petitions gathered by students at New York University calling for a withdrawal of American troops from Southeast Asia.

Petitions containing 3,766 names collected by students and faculty of Hofstra University. The petitions read:

We . . . who live, work or study in Nassau County, N.Y., oppose the involvement of American forces in Cambodia and implore the President and the Congress to take whatever steps are necessary to withdraw American forces from Southeast Asia immediately.

Letters from 15 students at Mount Vernon, N.Y., High School opposing our involvement in Cambodia.

Petitions from 21 persons in the Hillside, N.J., area, 26 in Chicago and a group of seven architects in Kalamazoo, Mich., all protesting our involvement in Cambodia.

Petitions from 34 staff members of the Survey Research Center, seven members of the Yale faculty, University of California, Berkeley, and 26 members of the staff of International Social Service, American Branch, Inc., New York, urging an end to the war and return of U.S. troops.

A petition from 60 law enforcement officers employed by the Alameda County Probation Department, California, expressing deep concern over our increasing involvement in Southeast Asia and urging curtailment of further funding for military operations in that area.

A petition from 12 members of the faculty of St. Patrick's Seminary, Menlo Park, Calif., calling for "swift and orderly de-escalation of military action in Southeast Asia and for total effort at the diplomatic table. The peace and unity of our country is at stake."

A petition from 114 students at Ganzaga University, Sookane, Wash., calling for "a rapid and consistent withdrawal of our fighting men."

Petitions from 42 persons in the Santa Ana, Calif., area, 21 in Simi, Calif., 26 in Rancho Cordova, Calif., 12 in Sonora, Calif., 40 in Santa Cruz, Calif., nine in Akron, Ohio, and 20 in Dallas, Texas, opposing further funding for military operations in Southeast Asia.

A petition from 60 law students and professors at California Western School of Law, San Diego, Calif., calling for "firm and forthright Congressional action" to reverse U.S. policies in Southeast Asia.

A petition with 133 names from Farmington, Conn., opposing the extended war and calling upon Congress "to reverse the President's misguided decision".

A petition from Graceland College, Lamoni, Iowa, with 458 signatures supporting Amendment 609.

Petitions from 247 persons in the San Francisco area supporting the "Amendment to End the War."

2,889 additional signatures on petitions from the San Francisco area calling for "cessation of the invasion of Cambodia"; "withdrawal from Indochina"; and "that the President, in keeping with the Constitution and his oath of office, take no further military action without the advice and consent of the Congress." This brings the total of names on such petitions from the San Francisco area to 7,967.

Petitions bearing the names of 1,565 Massachusetts residents calling for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Congress to "take whatever strong action is necessary to reverse this latest tragedy in United States foreign policy." The total of names on these petitions is 2,231.

934 additional signatures on petitions from the New York area "in support of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's position against any military involvement in Cambodia."

Petitions containing 2,765 additional signatures from the New York area opposing further funding for military operations in Southeast Asia.

2,205 additional signatures on petitions gathered by the Queens College community in New York for a total of 7,532 persons protesting "President Nixon's unconstitutional escalation in Indochina" and reaffirming the right of peaceful dissent.

A petition signed by 704 persons at the Mount Sinai Medical Center, New York, urging that we "end the killing in Indochina by bring our troops home now. Human lives are too valuable to be lost in order to save the Thieu dictatorship."

A petition from Knoxville, Tenn., with 21 names in support of the Foreign Relations Committee and calling the intervention in Cambodia "a constitutionally unauthorized, presidential war in Indochina."

A petition with 815 signatures collected by students and faculty of Evanston, Ill., Township High School supporting efforts in the Senate to bring about the withdrawal of Americans troops from Cambodia and calling their presence in Cambodia "uncalled for and a threat to world peace."

Petitions containing 185 signatures gathered by chemistry students at the University of California, Berkeley, expressing opposition to the deployment of U.S. forces in Cambodia, urging "continued withdrawal of American forces from Southeast Asia" and opposing "any increase or extension of that war."

A petition from 293 members of Phi Beta Kappa at Stanford University expressing "strongest opposition to the immoral invasion of Cambodia." The petition continues:

We share the concern of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the unconstitutionality of this escalation of the war and request immediate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Cambodia.

A petition with 75 signatures from the Boston Area Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam calling for withdrawal from Cambodia, a halt of bombing of North Vietnam and "that the war in Indochina be ended with all possible speed."

A petition with 610 names from the American Humanist Association. The petition reads:

The war in Vietnam has gone on too long. We demand that the Congress exercise its Constitutional power to end a war that has never been declared. We . . . support the Amendment to End the War . . . which will stop appropriations for wars in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

209 additional signatures on a petition from the University of Iowa, opposing the President's policies.

Petitions collected by students, staff and faculty of the Department of Anthropology, Stanford University, from 420 California citizens supporting efforts "to restore Congressional control over military appopriations."

A petition in support of the Hatfield-McGovern amendment signed by 190 persons from various Virginia communities.

A petition from 44 staff members of the Leake and Watts Children's Home, Yonkers, N.Y., expressing "horror and indignation at the immoral extension of the war in Indochina."

A "protest register" from the American Center for Students and Artists in Paris with 200 signatures protesting President Nixon's "extension of the Indochinese War" and calling for withdrawal of American troops from Southeast Asia. A petition from five American students at Rennes, France, supports the protest.

A petition from 53 persons at the Idlehour Lodge, Murfreesboro, Ark., a home for senior citizens. The petition supports the move to restrict further funding for the war except for the safe withdrawal of American troops. The petition continues . . .

We should all be blushing with shame that our United States of America has been a partner in the Southeast Asian War . . . We are an "association of retired persons" but we don't believe in retiring from our responsible duty to our Creator and our fellow-beings. In other words, we strongly believe in standing for what we are strongly convinced is right.

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AMENDMENT OF THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ACT

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 15628) to amend the Foreign Military Sales Act.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, having participated in a filibuster or so myself in the past on issues that were, I thought, quite legitimate, I am sympathetic to those now conducting a filibuster. Thus, I thought it would not be inappropriate for them to give me some time today so that I could make a few remarks and relieve them of some of the onerous duties of holding the floor until some time next week. I hope that they will appreciate that properly, because my remarks are germane to the matter of the Church-Cooper amendment.

THE HEART OF THE MATTER

Mr. President, President Nixon keeps assuring us that he wants peace, as if his decision for peace were a matter in doubt. In fact, I know of no one in the Senate who questions the President's desire for an end to the war, but many of us are very doubtful, indeed, that his present course can lead to peace, or to anything but endless, spreading war in the jungles of Indochina.

When we come right down to it, the enemy almost certainly wants peace too but, like the President, they want peace on their own terms. Neither side can be said to have shown a fondness for fighting for its own sake, but neither side has shown any willingness to make significant concessions for peace. Both are bent on a victory as they conceive that term, and until one side or the other achieves it, the fighting will go on.

That is the heart of the matter, and it benefits us not at all to use the enemy's stubbornness as an excuse for our own. If we want peace, someone must take the first step, and while many of us would welcome such an initiative on the part of the Vietnamese, we also should recognize that as the smaller, weaker party to the war, fighting as they are on their own part of the world where they belong, they must find it far more difficult than should we, to break the impasse. Even if it were clear on the merits that they ought to take the first step, that judgment should not serve as a policy for us. The fact is they have shown that they are settling in for the long haul of indefinite guerrilla warfare, and we are not able to control the decisions that are made in Hanoi. We can only control the decisions that are made in Washington, and that, basically is why it is up to us to take an effective step toward peace.

It is indeed incumbent upon us, and

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urgently so, because this war has become a domestic disaster for the American people. Our economy is racked by unchecked inflation and, perhaps even worse, by signs of collapsing confidence in the economy on the part of the financial community. Morally and socially, we are in a condition beyond mere division among ourselves. We are in a condition indicative of social disintegration. The students are not the only people who have become alienated from the Government and its policies; as the stock market shows, the bankers and businessmen are losing confidence in the Government's policies, if not indeed in our national leadership altogether. If it was not clear before, it is crystal clear now that this war has become a moral and economic disaster for America. That is why we cannot wait the enemy out. That is why we must take the first step.

The primary obstacle to peace is the administration's unbending commitment to the Thieu-Ky military dictatorship in South Vietnam. Thieu and Ky, of course, have no real power of their own. Lacking both a reliable military force and the support of their own people, they have survived as clients of the late Johnson and the present Nixon administrations. Their enormous influence over American foreign policy derives almost exclusively from their astonishing success in persuading two American Presidents that their own personal loss of power would represent "defeat and humiliation" for the United States. This disastrous notion has given the Saigon dictators something more than a veto on American policy. It is a case, as the majority leader recently put it, of "Saigon being the tail wagging and pulling us around." Or, as the Senator from Tennessee recently commented, speaking of our Government's subservience to Mr. Thieu:

> It is as if we had traded resources, our strength for his weakness, so that the organ grinder dances to the monkey's tune.[1]

In pursuit of the phantom of military victory, the Nixon administration invaded Cambodia. Having stated at the time that the sole purpose of the invasion was to break up the Communist sanctuaries, the administration has now shown beyond a doubt that the effect of its policy is a much broader one. Relying as much as possible on its South Vietnamese clients, and perhaps also on Thai and, if possible, Indonesian "advisers," the administration now apparently intends to sustain an indefinite, fullscale military intervention by proxy in Cambodia.

There is abundant evidence of this intent. In his press conference of May 8, the President said that, although the deadline of June 30 for American withdrawal from Cambodia did not apply to South Vietnamese forces. He said further:

> I would expect that the South Vietnamese would come out approximately at the same time that we do, because when we come out our logistical support and air support will come out with them.

[1] CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., April 16, 1970, Senate, p. S5846.

Step by step the administration has hedged, backed off, and now all but repudiated the President's confident prediction of South Vietnamese withdrawal. In a statement at Andrews Air Force Base on May 24, Secretary Rogers indicated unmistakably that the administration expected South Vietnamese forces to remain in Cambodia. Any such operations, Mr. Rogers added, would fall under President Nixon's doctrine that "Asians work together to solve Asian problems." In a television interview on the same day, Mr. Herbert Klein, the President's communications director, contributed further to the backtracking from the President's prediction of May 8. Speaking of further South Vietnamese military operations in Cambodia, Mr. Klein said that he "could not really rule in or rule out the possibility of air support."

On the basis of these and other cryptic comments by administration officials, it is now apparent that the South Vietnamese forces are planning to remain in Cambodia after June 30, contrary to President Nixon's prediction and, in all probability, they will receive American air and logistic support, in direct repudiation of the President's statement of May 8. It is equally clear that the purpose of this proxy military campaign is not merely to eliminate the Communists' border sanctuaries, which the administration already claims to have had great success in accomplishing, but to sustain the feeble Lon Nol military regime in Phnom Penh.

One does not have to rely on cryptic statements by administration officials to ascertain the administration's plan for sustaining the war by proxy in Cambodia. Mr. Ky, as usual, has come through with some blunt and colorful language. In an astonishing insult to President Nixon—unless, of course, he had not heard about the President's press conference of May 8—Mr. Ky said on May 21 that the notion that South Vietnamese troops would withdraw from Cambodia with the Americans was "a silly argument of silly people." Expanding on his own notion of a grand strategy, Mr. Ky also said:

> The Cambodian operation offers us an opportunity to form an anti-Communist front consisting of Cambodia, Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam.

As certain newspapers have commented, the design seems to be one of "Vietnamizing" the Cambodian war.

Mr. Ky may boast that the invasion of Cambodia will bring security to all of Southeast Asia, but the Cambodians themselves do not seem so sure. An official of the Phnom Penh regime commented recently that—

> We now have two invasions being conducted in Cambodia, the North Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese.

For the United States, of course, the continuing involvement of South Vietnamese forces in Cambodia only tightens the hold of the Saigon dictators on American policy. If the ARVN are no more successful in defending the Phnom Penh government than they had been in defending their own, we will soon enough find ourselves summoned to the rescue. Mr. Ky boasts that the South Vietnamese forces "have the capability of mounting military operations independently in Cambodia as well as in Vietnam." If that were so, as it patently is not, there would be no further reason for American military involvement either in Vietnam or Cambodia.

From the narrow viewpoint of the Saigon dictators, getting in over their heads in Cambodia is by no means a "silly argument of silly people." It serves the double purpose of advancing traditional Vietnamese designs on Cambodia and of drawing the United States further into the swamp.

Sometimes we are reminded that Mr. Thieu is boss, and that we ought not to take Mr. Ky's colorful assertions too seriously. Perhaps Ky is no more than an Asian AGNEW but there is every reason to believe that his chief is no less determined than he to keep the Americans mired in the swamp. "You are in it with us," Mr. Thieu recently told an American reporter, with what the reporter described as "a broad grin."

Mr. Thieu even has the temerity to defend the Cambodian invasion in American domestic political terms. A reporter quotes him as saying:

> If Lon Nol and Cambodia stand for the next six months, then I think Mr. Nixon will win the congressional elections this year and be re-elected in 1972, because then the operations will have proven a success.

I am reminded by that passage of the report that Mr. Thieu and his colleagues declined to enter into negotiations in 1968, hoping that the delay in negotiations would further the electoral fortunes of Mr. Nixon. It was also widely reported that one of the local hostesses in town played a part in that little incident.

Besides Thieu and Ky, the only people who appear to be delighted by the American invasion of Cambodia are the Chinese. Assuming that the Chinese wish to expel American military power from Asia, to curb Soviet influence and expand their own, they cannot fail to take pleasure in seeing the Americans blunder into a new hopeless military adventure. From the Chinese point of view, the extension of the war into Cambodia serves to drain American resources and isolate the United States internationally, while giving the Chinese an opportunity to displace Soviet influence with the Indochinese Communists by demonstrating their own more militant support. In addition, the "protracted war" to which the Vietnamese Communists are now settling down can only serve, from China's standpoint, to bring a dependent and exhausted North Vietnam even further under Chinese influence. In a strikingly candid comment to an American some time ago, a North Vietnamese official said:

> You think you are blocking China by fighting us, but in fact, you are destroying a barrier to Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia if you destroy us.[2]

[2] Quoted by Stanley Karnow in "Nixon's Expansion of the War Seems to Delight Chinese," Washington Post, May 11, 1970, p. A23.

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Anticipating protracted warfare, China appears to have pledged full backing to the Communist forces in all three Indochinese countries. The Chinese indicated long ago that they welcome American involvement in Asian wars of attrition. It is worth recalling a significant editorial which appeared in the People Daily of Peking on August 30, 1966:

"To be quite frank," the editorial stated, "if United States imperialism kept its forces in Europe and America, the Asian people would have no way of wiping them out. Now, as it is so obliging as to deliver its goods to the customer's door, the Asian people cannot but express welcome. The more forces United States imperialism throws into Asia, the more will it be bogged down there and the deeper will be the grave it digs for itself.

". . . The tying down of large numbers of United States troops by the Asian people creates a favorable condition for the further growth of the anti-United States struggle of the people in other parts of the world. With all the people rising to attack it, one hitting at its head and the other at its feet, United States imperialism can be nibbled up bit by bit."

We are being "nibbled up bit by bit," not only in Indochina but, far more seriously, by the repercussions of the Indochina war within our own country. It is most urgent, therefore, that we change our course and seek a political settlement based on the two general principles which the North Vietnamese have repeatedly indicated will motivate them to engage in serious bargaining. These two principles are, first, the establishment of a transitional coalition government for what would become an independent, neutralist South Vietnam; and second, a commitment to a definite schedule for the ultimate total withdrawal of American forces.

The major single obstacle to serious negotiations on these bases is the disastrous notion that there is a connection between our own national interests and the survival and power of the Saigon military dictatorship. We do not have to impose anything on Mr. Thieu and Mr. Ky or on anybody else in order to open the way to negotiations. We have only to put them on notice that they are at liberty either to join us in negotiating a compromise peace or to make some arrangement of their own. Should they prefer to continue the war, that would be their privilege, and they have an army of over a million men of which to do it. All that I would take away from the Thieu-Ky regime is their veto on American policy.

Perhaps the really difficult thing for Americans is not in recognizing what needs to be done but in recognizing the disastrous consequences of what has already been done. The nature of this dilemma was summed up eloquently by Rabbi Irving Greenberg in a statement before the Committee on Foreign Relations on the moral impact of the war:

Shall we now go to the parents of the 40,000 (American dead) and say: we have erred and your children have died in vain? Shall all this patriotism and sacrifice mean nothing? I realize the full force of this dilemma. But the only corresponding answer must be: Shall we condemn another 10,000 Americans and another 50,000 Vietnamese to death rather than not admit?

But inability to accept the tragic, the ironic, the possibility of mistake and failure is to be less than fully human. Perhaps this is our national problem.

Looking beyond this war which has so drained our substance and spirit, things need not look so bleak for America after all. Drawing a parallel between American feelings about Vietnam and British anxieties over the revolt of the American colonies two centuries ago, an English military analyst, Correlli Barnett, points out that the British leaders of that day suffered feelings of failure and frustration no less acute than those of our own leaders today. But, Mr. Barnett writes:

Once the American war was liquidated, Britain's mood changed with astonishing speed. National hope and self-confidence were reborn. Instead of the decay and distintegration to which men had looked forward, Britain's greatest wealth, greatest power and greatest influence in the world were yet to come.

With some commonsense and moral courage, the same might be arranged for America.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article which was printed in the New Republic of May 23, 1970, entitled "Chairman Mao's Breakthrough."

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CHAIRMAN MAO'S BREAKTHROUGH

(By Robert H. Yoakum)

My Chinese acquaintance was impeccably dressed and spoke almost perfect English. I asked what kind of work he did.

"My work is traveling for the People's Republic of China," answered Mr. Hee. Then he added with a mischevious grin, "To see how things are going."

"And how *are* things going?"

"Very, very well. Your government's invasion of Cambodia was exactly on schedule."

"What schedule?" I asked.

"*Our* schedule," said Mr. Hee.

"I don't understand," I said, feeling irritated and embarrassed.

"Well," said Mr. Hee, "several years ago our great leader, Chairman Mao, made a major psychological-geopolitical breakthrough. He learned that Americans fear, above all other things, losing face. This discovery by itself would not show that Chairman Mao is a genius; it was the application he made of it.

" 'What we shall do,' said Chairman Mao, 'is to use this American fear of losing face to suck them deeper and deeper into a psychological-economic-political-military struggle that they cannot win. We shall help them to bleed themselves to death. And we shall do this without employing one Chinese soldier.'

"This new policy was tested in a few small incidents," Mr. Hee continued, "the way your capitalists test products in local markets before selling them nationally. It worked perfectly. Then we launched the full program in Vietnam. From that point on you have been moving on our schedule.

"Our Chairman then further refined this plan. He called it the Self-Perpetuating Principle of Self-Destructive Face-Saving. It means that you make your enemy lose face in such a way that he thinks he is keeping it *while everyone else is watching him lose it*. He undermines his own prestige, and publicly humiliates himself—all the while talking loudly about how he will not be humiliated. It is the ultimate form of humiliation. And the enemy himself sustains the processes of his own unwitting suicide."

I shuddered.

"For example," Mr. Hee continued, "if the invasion of Cambodia it was necessary for President Nixon to say. . . ." Mr. Hee pulled a newspaper clipping from his pocket ". . . 'I would rather be a one-term President than be a two-term President at the cost of seeing America become a second-rate power, and see this nation accept its first defeat in its proud 190-year history.'

"You understand?" asked Mr. Hee. "We tell the rest of the world that you are fighting in Asia, killing tens of thousands of Asians, because you are powermad and terrified of defeat at the hands of the ordinary people. You say you are fighting in Asia to help the Asians. But who do they believe when they read that your President has said he fears *American* defeat, and *America* becoming a second-rate power? The Asians see that you are mainly afraid of losing *your* face, not of their losing *their* heads. You do not see this. So you unwittingly hasten your own doom.

"Another example of how you lose face while you are keeping it: Your President says one day that he will withdraw 150,000 troops. Then ten days later he says it is necessary to invade Cambodia in order to protect American troops. If they are in such great danger now, how could he earlier have promised to weaken them by greatly reducing their numbers? That is precisely the kind of public announcement that is anticipated in the Self-Perpetuating Principle of Self-Destructive Face-Saving.

"Look at the results wrought by the application of Chairman Mao's Principle:

"First, your military men have been discredited. The more mistakes they make, the more ridiculous they look. The more ridiculous they look, the more face they lose. The more face they lose, the more they extend themselves. And the more they extend themselves, the more mistakes they make.

"Second, ten years ago there were almost no Communists in America. Now there are Communists in every slum and on every campus.

"Third, you have spent more than $100 billion on the Vietnam war, or the equivalent of about $3500 for each Vietnamese—an amount on which one could retire in that country. But instead of buying peasant prosperity, which could have ruined us, you have used the money on war and killing and face-saving, leaving yourself a legacy of hatred on which we will flourish.

"Fourth, you have not made South Vietnam into a showplace of capitalist glories, but rather into a showplace of continued poverty, disease, prostitution, and massive corruption.

"Fifth, your economy is beginning to come apart under the pressure of maintaining face everywhere, just as we thought it would.

"Sixth, your society is also coming apart because there are some Americans who do not care about saving face. The black faces, especially, do not care about saving white faces."

"But," I protested, "what if the people who want to save the country prevail over those who want to save face? Wouldn't your whole plan go down the drain?"

"Yes, it would," Mr. Hee admitted, "and we were concerned when President Johnson left Washington. No one worried more about saving face than he. But we need not have worried. The three most admired men in your nation, according to the Gallup Poll—President Nixon, Billy Graham, and Vice President Agnew—are all greatly afraid of losing face. We have nothing to fear."

Mr. Hee giggled, as though remembering something funny. "You know," he said, "until Chairman Mao made the breakthrough we had much trouble understanding you Occidentals. You look alike, you sound alike, and you hold your life very cheaply. Even on the streets you attack one another, and your television each night dramatizes

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hundreds of horrible, violent, senseless deaths. You even let children watch. We had no idea how to deal with you.

"Now, after Chairman Mao's discovery, we still don't understand you very well, but we do know how to deal with you."

"Can you tell me what is planned for our future?" I asked.

"The future, . . ." Mr. Hee smiled scrutably; I could see that much had been planned for us. "Well, we shall wait until you are as mired in Cambodia as you are in Vietnam. Then Laos. Then Burma, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq. . . ."

"Wait!" I almost shouted. "You're taking us right into the Middle East. That might mean war with Russia as well!"

"Ah, so?" said Mr. Hee.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the application of those thoughts to the pending business, particularly the Church-Cooper amendment, only emphasizes the effect upon the relative power and influence of the United States, of China, and of Russia. The effect on that relative power, it seems to me, is so persuasive that anything this body can do to hasten the solution of the war in South Vietnam rather would be greatly in the national interest.

So I do hope the Senate will be able to proceed to a vote on the Cooper-Church amendment at the earliest opportunity.

The amendment offered by the Senator from Kansas—and, of course, he has every right to offer that or any other amendment to the bill—is quite obviously designed to destroy the effectiveness of the Church-Cooper amendment. It is designed so that, if adopted, it would be the equivalent of rejection of the Church-Cooper amendment. So I hope at the proper time it will be rejected or tabled, as I would expect to propose, if it seems appropriate next Wednesday when this matter comes up for a vote.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, is it in order to put this material in the RECORD?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, at what time will the Pastore germaneness rule become inoperative today?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. At 1 minute to 2.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, if I may ask a parliamentary inquiry, some of the material I have relates directly to my discussion. I consider it to be persuasive and relevant to the merits of the Cooper-Church amendment. These certainly are not unrelated to the war and to the effect of that war upon our domestic economy. I did not wish to intervene, in view of the anxiety of so many Senators to discuss this matter, but both the letters and the insertions that I wish to offer—except for one item, as to which I will certainly defer, which I mentioned a moment ago, and which has to do with nutrition in certain counties in Arkansas—are relevant to the war in Indochina.

May I make a parliamentary inquiry? Where do we draw the line as to when a matter is or is not relevant?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. May the Chair state to the Senator from Arkansas that if the Senator believes the material is relevant, the Chair will consider that that is accurate and the Chair will entertain a unanimous-consent request.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield for just a moment, I am going to say the same thing the Chair has stated, that if, in the opinion of the Senator from Arkansas, the subject matter which he wishes to discuss is relevant and germane, certainly the Senator from West Virginia is not going to question the judgment of the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Let me say to the Senator from West Virginia that I have a letter which I received this morning from a constituent that comments on events in this country which I believe are directly related to the war in Vietnam.

I think anything that throws light upon the effect of that war on the situation in our country is relevant to the Church-Cooper amendment, because the Church-Cooper amendment, if it has any purpose at all—and I think it has—is to bring this war to an end at the earliest possible date in order to prevent the disintegration of our society here in the United States. So in that respect I think it is relevant.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. The Senator from West Virginia would raise no objection.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, I recently received a letter, which disturbs me very much, from an instructor in a high school in my State. This sentiment for the extreme repression of students is an eloquent indication of how far some of our people have gone in departing from the constitutional democratic system for which this country has stood throughout its history. This letter indicates how the same sentiment that mutilated Germany, and has mutilated Greece and other countries in this century, is developing within our own society. It should be a warning that we must change our priorities and begin to deal with the problems which afflict our own people.

I ask unanimous consent that the letter be inserted in the RECORD as part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MAY 12, 1970.

Hon. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I am a high-school industrial arts printing instructor with four years of U.S. Air Force training, five years of college (B.S. and M.T. degrees), and nine years as printing instructor at Northside High School, Fort Smith.

I am becoming more and more concerned about the destroying of public property and total disregard for law and policemen. The Kent State University shooting of four students is exactly what is needed in this country. Some idiots started to riot in Mexico and the police shot to death thirty-two of them. That put an end to the riots.

When (if ever) will the lawmakers wake up and quit coddling the criminals and put some teeth in the laws? The true American people are VERY tired of paying high taxes to support the government officials who sit and pass laws such as the gun and ammunition laws which hinder the law-abiding citizens, and on the other hand, they turn the criminals loose. Also of concern are the riots where tax-paid property is destroyed and the government does nothing.

The men who fired the shots which took the lives of four Kent students should receive a medal. They were trained to protect themselves and government property, and they did just that. Let's punish the criminals (anyone who riots is a criminal) or close the tax-paid institutions and quit PLAYING school.

When I was in military service and college, the policemen were respected. WHEN will the lawmakers and the VERY criminal-coddling Supreme Court take the handcuffs off the police and put them where they belong? Why are the lawmakers and courts MORE concerned about the rights of the criminals but disregard the rights of the murdered, the raped, the robbed, the burned out, and the widows and children?

Sir, as you can see by this letter, I am thoroughly disgusted with the high taxes to support a government that condones the criminal's acts, finances him and the rioters with welfare checks, and sits back and points a finger of blame at the police or military who try to protect the peaceful people and government property.

When, when, will the government be for the law-abiding, peaceful, tax-paying citizens? The United States—is it?

Respectfully yours,

_____.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I did not intend to read it all, but in view of the exchange and the possibility that it is not relevant to what is going on resulting from the war, I will read only two paragraphs.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, the Senator from West Virginia is listening with great interest.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I want to read two paragraphs.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, the Senator from West Virginia would urge that the Senator read the entire letter.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Well, it is too long. It relates to a point I have been making. This letter is from an instructor who has had 5 years in college. He wrote:

I am a high-school industrial arts printing instructor with four years of U.S. Air Force training, five years of college (B.S. and M.T. degrees), and nine years as a printing instructor at Northside High School, Fort Smith.

I am becoming more and more concerned about the destroying of public property and total disregard for law and policemen. The Kent State University shooting of four students is exactly what is needed in this country. Some idiots started to riot in Mexico and the police shot to death 32 of them. That put an end to the riots . . .

The men who fired the shots which took the lives of four Kent students should receive a medal. They were trained to protect themselves and gorvernment property, and they did just that. Let's punish the criminals (anyone who riots is a criminal) or close the tax-paid institutions and quit playing school.

Mr. President, to me that is a very disturbing sentiment, especially since it arises from a man with the kind of education which he indicates he has had.

Mr. President, in a little different vein, but within the same area, of the tens of thousands of communications I have received in the past few weeks, many have been impressive and moving.

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I would like to call attention to several of these letters which I believe have a particular point to make. The first is from a lady in Dover, Ark., who relates how this "senseless war" has touched her family's life. She writes:

Please give our young people the chance to live, to seek their own way of life free to love and have faith in our country and our fellow man.

I am sure that if this war was necessary, if our country was in danger, the majority of our young people would go forth and do what was right to defend our country. But we are not in danger.

Mr. President, I think that Mrs. E. R. Edwards, the author of that letter, has expressed herself better than many of those of us who have spoken or written thousands of words on the subject.

I would also call the Senate's attention to two letters from Arkansas students. One, Collins Hemingway, a student at the University of Arkansas, reflects the views of many of the students from whom I have heard. Another, Jim Zine, a theology student, expresses his concern about the expanding violence in our society.

I would like to take note of two further letters which I think deserve notice. One is a letter to me from the Conference of Major Superiors of Jesuits expressing "deep concern over the moral implications of the war in Indochina." The other is a copy of an open letter to President Nixon which was sent to me by the student body leaders of Graceland College, Lamoni, Iowa. I think it makes a number of excellent points.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that these five letters be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DOVER, ARK., *May 15, 1970.*

DEAR MR. FULBRIGHT: You will probably never see this letter as it will likely be opened by someone other than yourself. Still I feel it in my heart to write you.

Yesterday my daughter received a letter from her husband who is in Vietnam telling of the death of his dearest friend. He, like my son-in-law, is a motion picture photographer. His plane was shot down over Cambodia. The hurt in my daughter's eyes was unbelievable. The idea that this friend had died in something as senseless as this war is something hard to live with. To think of all the suffering and agony the young people are going through is unbelievable. No wonder there is so much unrest in our young, our leaders of tomorrow. Please urge our leaders of our country to stand up and be the leaders we can be proud of and the men you are capable of being. Any man can hide behind some one else's mistakes but it takes a real man to say "I was wrong." Please give our young people the chance to live, to seek their own way of life free to love and have faith in our country and our fellow man.

I am sure that if this war was necessary, if our country was in danger, the majority of our young people would go forth and do what was right to defend our country. But we are not in danger.

So it is my prayer that this war will end soon and our young boys can come home and go about their lives, have their children and believe that life can be beautiful.

Yours truly,

MRS. E. R. EDWARDS.

FAYETTEVILLE, ARK., *May 8, 1970.*

Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: Since I have always been criticized by my liberal friends as being too conservative and by my conservative friends as being the opposite, I have always figured I was somewhere in the middle. Recent events, however, have begun to push me—toward the left, if I am to believe definitions of the news media.

President Nixon's actions leave me only one recourse: to fully and completely oppose him in the expansion of the war in Southeast Asia. (I had hoped this country could survive his wave of mediocrity, but I am now willing to admit I am mistaken.) Put on your list one more supporter of your actions. Though I will miss this fall's elections due to age restrictions, you may be assured that Mr. Nixon will have one more vote on the other side in 1972. And for you, in 1974, a vote to the positive.

As a moderate (until now) at the University of Arkansas, I feel it my duty to warn you that the Cambodian campaign and the Kent State Massacre have created on this campus unimaginable frustrations. I am afraid it might ultimately lead to violence as will all unalleviated frustration. You must impress on your colleagues that if and when this happens, it will not be the result of agitators, but of a raging feeling of helplessness at going through the peaceful channels again and again with no results. If there is an agitator, it is President Nixon, who insists on ignoring the people.

I might further ask you to consider legislation that would forbid any militia-type force as the National Guard from being used in situations like that at Kent State. Whenever untrained (for that is the only way to describe week-end soldiers) troops are used, you can count on at least one killing through panic. Trained regulars perhaps would have been better prepared and prevented this tragedy.

Sincerely,

COLLINS HEMINGWAY.

LITTLE ROCK, ARK., *May 7, 1970.*

DEAR MR. FULBRIGHT: I am a student of Eden Theological Seminary in Webster Groves, Mo. We at Eden, acting in the principles of humane Christian concern, struck from classes. By observing a disruption of normal daily activity, it was our hope to stimulate a widespread public consideration and reaction to serious social and political issues which have surfaced in the past week. I feel to conduct routine and normal daily business in light of these recent events is to condone and encourage further an atmosphere of expanding violence that currently pervades our society. I believe that the time has now arrived when violence in any of its manifestations can no longer be tolerated as a rational form of human thought or behavior. Furthermore I have dedicated myself to continue to protest and resist against incipient violence, in all forms of levels of social and political life. I would also like to take this time to thank you and support you on your stand against all forms of political and social violence. I am behind you and wanted to let you know you are appreciated. Please continue to give us hope. A concerned Christian in a troubled world,

JIM ZINE.

CONFERENCE OF MAJOR SUPERIORS OF JESUITS,
Washington, D.C., May 20, 1970.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
U.S. Senate, New Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: We write to you as a corporate body of Major Superiors of the Society of Jesus, as leaders of the Jesuits who work throughout the United States. Meeting in Tampa for our semiannual review of our ministries, we take this occasion to bring to your attention our concern over moral issues afflicting the conscience of every citizen of this nation.

We speak to you out of our deep appreciation of the dignity of all human life and of the brotherhood of all mankind. We can no longer be silent in the face of an issue which encourages and fosters hostile divisions between man and man, at home and abroad. The tenents of our Christian faith cry out for peace among all men.

We wish to express to you our deep concern over the moral implications of the war in Indochina. We must ask whether the results, which are sought in good conscience by those who support the war, are any longer proportionate to the evil involved. Our concern is further heightened by the clouded origin of American involvement in this war and by the questionable morality of the recent escalation of the war by the invasion of Cambodia and the resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam. In addition, we deplore any attempt to motivate the American people to accept this escalation on the basis of our never having lost a war.

Over and above the moral ambiguity of the war itself we have a further concern over the effects of the Indochina war in our own country, namely, violence in our streets, unrest on our campuses, and the problem of the military draft.

Moved by these considerations and by our profession as ministers of religion, we call for immediate action from every member of the Senate of the United States:

1) We urge that you take steps to end this war without delay.

2) We urge that the national budget be channeled into peaceful directions by cutting back military appropriations.

3) We urge you to modify Selective Service regulations (the draft) to allow selective conscientious objection, as recently espoused by the United States Catholic Conference.

4) We urge that you take these positive actions to heal the alienation of our youth from this country.

We earnestly address these requests to the Senate of the United States, as American citizens and ministers of religion, grievously distressed over the present moral stance of our beloved country.

Most sincerely yours,

JOHN V. O'CONNOR, S.J.,
Executive Secretary.

GRACELAND COLLEGE,
Lamoni, Iowa, May 12, 1970.

President RICHARD M. NIXON,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

MR. PRESIDENT: We who have the responsibilities for the leadership of Graceland College and its student body believe that we must express to you the feelings of faculty and students on this campus over the conduct of the war in Indochina. The events of the past two weeks, primarily your decision to take military action in Cambodia and the reactions on so many college campuses across America, have prompted a deep concern on this southern Iowa campus for the effects the war is having in those tragic countries in Southeast Asia and across this great nation of ours. It is our joint judgment that large numbers of thoughtful young men and women on our campus, deeply devoted to their country and its rich heritage of freedom, see in the blighting effects of this protracted military engagement a threat to the lives of its young men, a waste of resources vitally needed to meet America's own problems of poverty, racism, pollution, crime and other such forces diminishing the quality of life in our country, but most of all a threat to cherished free-

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doms as polarization becomes extreme among us.

On our campus there is disillusionment because so little, if any, progress has been made in bringing an end to our tragic involvement in Southeast Asia. We do not understand the failure of your administration to appoint a successor to Ambassador Lodge to represent us at the Paris peace talks, your failure to give vigorous support to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, your seeming indifference to the United Nations. We see no imaginative program coming out of your administration to bridge the widening gulf between the races. We are dismayed that in a time of bitterness and polarization, your Vice President travels the country setting people against each other and engaging in inflammatory and irresponsible rhetoric.

But we are confident that the faculty and students at Graceland have not given up. They want to work with you to cleanse our country of violence, to ease the burdens of poverty, to establish liberty for all our peoples, to safeguard the environment for our children, to restore American prestige among the nations.

We see these tasks, so urgent upon the national agenda, all subverted by our military involvement in Vietnam and now Cambodia. We ask you to listen to our young people and others throughout this nation. We ask you to mobilize the best insights available in the nation today to bring an early end to the military engagement in Indochina and to direct the energies of the youth of this nation to its restoration.

Yours respectfully,

WILLIAM T. HIGDON,
President.

DAN F. GRAYBILL,
Student Body President.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Again, Mr. President, I think these underline the point and the persuasiveness of the need for the Church-Cooper amendment to the pending legislation. Of course, there are some with a different view; I would not pretend it is a unanimous belief, by any means; but, in my view, from my own experience, the great majority of the people of this country would like to see this war brought to a close. I think they are persuaded, as I am, that adoption by a substantial majority of the Church-Cooper amendment would contribute to that purpose.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I am about to propound the same unanimous-consent agreement that was suggested earlier, and which will fit in now, as it did then, with the question raised by the distinguished Senator from Arkansas, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

I send to the desk a unanimous-consent request and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read the proposed unanimous-consent agreement.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

Ordered, That the Senate proceed to vote at 11:30 a.m., Wednesday, June 3, 1970, on the pending amendment (No. 662) by the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Dole) to H.R. 15628, an Act to amend the Foreign Military Sales Act. Should a motion to table be made, the vote on that would occur on 11:30.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR CONSIDERATION OF AMENDMENT TO BE OFFERED BY SENATOR BYRD OF WEST VIRGINIA

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the pending amendment is disposed of, an amendment to be offered by the distinguished Senator from West Virginia (Mr. BYRD), which will be printed in the RECORD today, be in order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL MONDAY, JUNE 1, 1970, AT 11:30 O'CLOCK A.M.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until the hour of 11:30 a.m. Monday morning next.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR SMITH OF MAINE ON MONDAY NEXT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of the prayer by the Chaplain, the distinguished senior Senator from Maine (Mrs. SMITH) be recognized for not to exceed 30 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS ON MONDAY NEXT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on Monday at the conclusion of the remarks by the distinguished Senator from Maine there be a morning hour for the transaction of routine morning business, with a limitation of 3 minutes on statements made therein.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AMENDMENT NO. 664

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment, and ask that it be stated by the clerk and that it be printed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 4, line 25, after "Cambodia" insert "(a)".

On page 5, between lines 18 and 19, insert the following: "(b) Nothing in subsection (a) shall preclude the President from taking such action as may be necessary to protect the lives of United States forces in South Vietnam or to hasten the withdrawal of United States forces from South Vietnam."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be received and printed, and will lie on the table.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, the amendment which I have submitted today and which will be printed is the amendment which I intend to call up immediately following the vote on Wednesday next on the pending amendment authored by the Senator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE).

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT—ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT FROM CLOSE OF BUSINESS ON MONDAY UNTIL 12 NOON ON TUESDAY AND FROM CLOSE OF BUSINESS ON TUESDAY UNTIL 10 A.M. ON WEDNESDAY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, in view of developments which have occurred, to amend the unanimous-consent agreement to provide that when the Senate completes its business on Monday next, it stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock noon on Tuesday.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. And that at the conclusion of business on Tuedsay, the Senate stand in adjournment until 10 o'clock Wednesday morning next.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of the prayer on Wednesday morning next, and the reading of the Journal, the time be equally divided, between 10 o'clock and 11:30 a.m., between the sponsor of the amendment, the Senator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE) and the Senator from Montana, or any Senator he may designate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. On the question of the division of time on Wednesday morning next, I ask unanimous consent that the request already agreed to be modified as follows: That the time be equally divided between the majority and minority leaders, or any Senators they may designate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time to begin after the reading of the Journal on Wednesday?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The unanimous-consent agreement was subsequently reduced to writing, as follows:

Ordered, That the Senate proceed to vote at 11:30 a.m. Wednesday, June 3, 1970, on the pending amendment (No. 662) by the Senator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE) to H.R. 15628, an act to amend the Foreign Military Sales Act, with the time after the reading of the Journal to be equally divided and controlled by the majority and minority leaders, or whomever they designate. Should a motion to table be made, the vote on that would occur at 11:30 a.m. on said date.

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THE CALENDAR

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, if there are no further speeches by Senators on the unfinished business, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar Order Nos. 911 and 912, which have been cleared with the minority.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

GODDARD ROCKET AND SPACE MUSEUM, ROSWELL, N. MEX.

The resolution (S. Res. 406) to print as a Senate document materials relating to Senate Concurrent Resolution 49 was considered and agreed to, as follows:

Resolved, That there be printed with illustrations as a Senate document, in such style as may be directed by the Joint Committee on Printing, a compilation of materials relating to S. Con. Res. 49, providing congressional recognition to the Goddard Rocket and Space Museum, Roswell, New Mexico, together with certain tributes to Dr. Robert H. Goddard, American rocket pioneer; and that there be printed for the use of the Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee seven thousand additional copies of such document.

The title was amended so as to read: "Authorizing the printing of a compilation of materials relating to congressional recognition of the Goddard Rocket and Space Museum (S. Con. Res. 49) as a Senate document".

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from the report (No. 91-903), explaining the purposes of the measure.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

The Committee on Rules and Administration, to which was referred the resolution (S. Res. 406) to print as a Senate document materials relating to S. Con. Res. 49 (congressional recognition of Goddard Rocket and Space Museum), having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the resolution as amended be agreed to.

The Committee on Rules and Administration has amended the title so as to clarify the nature of the materials to be printed.

Senate Resolution 406 as amended would provide (1) that there be printed with illustrations as a Senate document, in such style as may be directed by the Joint Committee on Printing, a compilation of materials relating to Senate Concurrent Resolution 49 (providing congressional recognition to the Goddard Rocket and Space Museum, Roswell, N. Mex.), together with certain tributes to Dr. Robert H. Goddard, American rocket pioneer; and (2) that there be printed 7,000 additional copies of such document for the use of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences.

The printing-cost estimate, supplied by the Public Printer, is as follows:

Printing-cost estimate

To print as a document (1,500 copies)	$2,619.13
7,000 additional copies, at $177.84 per thousand	1,244.88
Total estimated cost, S. Res. 406	3,864.01

SELECT COMMITTEE ON CRIME

The Senate proceeded to consider the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 580) authorizing certain printing for the Select Committee on Crime which had been reported from the Committee on Rules and Administration with an amendment, at the beginning of line 4, to strike out "ten" and insert "twenty-five".

The amendment was agreed to.

The concurrent resolution, as amended, was agreed to.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from the report (No. 91-909), explaining the purposes of the measure.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

The Committee on Rules and Administration, to which was referred the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 580) authorizing certain printing for the Select Committee on Crime, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the concurrent resolution as amended be agreed to.

House Concurrent Resolution 580 as referred would authorize the printing for the use of the House Select Committee on Crime of 10,000 additional copies of House Report 91-978, entitled "Marihuana".

The Committee on Rules and Administration has amended House Concurrent Resolution 580 by increasing the number of copies to be printed from 10,000 to 25,000. This action was taken by the Committee at the request of Congressman John Dent, chairman of the Subcommittee on Printing of the House Administration Committee, and Congressman Claude Pepper, chairman of the House Select Committee on Crime, and in order to meet unusual demands for the report from Members of the House of Representatives.

The printing-cost estimate of H. Con. Res. 580 as amended is as follows:

Printing-cost estimate

Back to press, first 1,000 copies	$696.84
24,000 additional copies, at $124.94 per thousand	2,998.56
Total estimated cost, H. Con. Res. 580 as amended	3,695.40

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the unfinished business be temporarily laid aside.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RESULTS OF THE CAMBODIAN SANCTUARY OPERATION

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I submit for the information of the Senate the results of the Cambodian sanctuary operation as of 8 a.m., May 28, 1970, and ask unanimous consent that the summary be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the summary was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Total operations	Number	24-hour change
Individual weapons	11,976	+131
Crew-served weapons	2,100	+69
Bunkers/structures destroyed	7,101	+115
Machinegun rounds	3,176,512	+90,808
Rifle rounds	5,822,903	+103,185
Total small arms ammunition (machinegun and rifle rounds)	8,999,415	+193,973
Grenades	20,973	+4,183
Mines	3,204	+102
Satchel charge	500	(1)
Miscellaneous explosives (pounds)	72,000	(1)
Antiaircraft rounds	134,299	(1)
Mortar rounds	31,470	+1,933
Large rocket rounds	1,097	(1)
Smaller rocket rounds	17,952	+1,845
Recoilless rifle rounds	20,395	−105
Rice (pounds)	9,790,000	+2,340,000
Man-months	215,380	+5,148
Vehicles	317	+7
Boats	40	(1)
Generators	36	(1)
Radios	180	(1)
Medical supplies (pounds)	36,000	(1)
Enemy KIA	8,128	−43
POWs (includes detainees)	1,797	+20

[1] Unchanged.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

CORRECTION OF THE RECORD

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, at the request of the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE), I have been asked to state that on page S7402 of the RECORD appears an error listing the senior Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS) as a cosponsor of Senate Resolution 405.

On behalf of the Senator from Maine, I ask unanimous consent that this error be corrected by deleting the name of Mr. STEVENS from this list of additional cosponsors and adding the name of the junior Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AMENDMENT TO STRIKE ALL FUNDS FOR THE SST FROM TRANSPORTATION APPROPRIATIONS

AMENDMENT NO. 665

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I submit an amendment to the Department of Transportation appropriations bill, H.R. 17755, which would strike all funds for SST development for the coming fiscal year. I ask that it be printed and referred to the Committee on Appropriations.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GRAVEL). The amendment will be received and printed, and by unanimous consent will be referred to the Committee on Appropriations.

The amendment is as follows:

AMENDMENT NO. 665

On page 2, line 20, strike all language beginning with the words "Civil Supersonic Aircraft Development" through the end of line 2 on page 3.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, yesterday the House of Representatives passed H.R. 17755, appropriating funds for DOT for fiscal 1971. The line item for development of the SST is $290 million. The effort in the House to strike the SST from the bill was led by Representative SID YATES of Illinois, who did an outstanding job of marshaling arguments against this program. Although his effort failed narrowly yesterday, I think it

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