

"THE ARROGANCE OF POWER" —A CLASH OVER U.S. POLICY

STATINTL

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Is the U. S. in danger of abusing its vast power in the world—and, at the same time, overextending itself in global commitments?

That is a basic issue dividing the chairman of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee and the Johnson Administration.

Senator Fulbright criticizes the conduct of

American troops in Vietnam, of American tourists abroad, and the handling of foreign policy.

On these pages is full text of the Senator's address that stirred a controversy, together with sharp rejoinders by President Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and a woman prominent in public affairs, just back from a tour of Vietnam.

Fulbright: "U. S. Is in Danger of Losing Its Perspective"

Full text of an address by Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, delivered at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D. C., May 5, 1966:

America is the most fortunate of nations—fortunate in its rich territory, fortunate in having had a century of relative peace in which to develop that territory, fortunate in its diverse and talented population, fortunate in the institutions devised by the Founding Fathers and in the wisdom of those who have adapted those institutions to a changing world.

For the most part America has made good use of its blessings, especially in its internal life, but also in its foreign relations. Having done so much and succeeded so well, America is now at that historical point at which a great nation is in danger of losing its perspective on what exactly is within the realm of its power and what is beyond it. Other great nations, reaching this critical juncture, have aspired to too much and, by overextension of effort, have declined and then fallen.

I do not think for a moment that America, with its deeply rooted democratic traditions, is likely to embark upon a campaign to dominate the world in the manner of a Hitler or Napoleon. What I do fear is that it may be drifting into commitments which, though generous and benevolent in intent, are so universal as to exceed even America's great capacities.

At the same time, it is my hope—and I repeat it here because it is the major point that I wish to convey in these lectures—that America will escape those fatal temptations of power which have ruined other great nations and will instead do only that good in the world which it can do, both by direct effort and by the force of its own example.

The stakes are high indeed: They include not only America's continued greatness, but nothing less than the survival of the human race in an era when, for the first time in human history, one generation has the power of veto over the survival of the next.

In the seventeenth century, a distinguished Frenchman, Jean de La Bruyère, asked a question that remains one of the profound paradoxes of men and nations. "How," he asked, "does it serve the people and add to their happiness if their ruler extend his empire by annexing the provinces of his enemies? . . . How does it help me or my countrymen

that my country be successful and covered with glory, that my country be powerful and dreaded, if, sad and worried, I live in oppression and poverty?"


The question, phrased somewhat differently, is how and why it happens that the groups into which men organize themselves come to be regarded as ends in themselves, as living organisms with needs and preferences of their own which are separate from and superior to those of the individual, warring, when necessary, the sacrifice of the hopes, the pleasures and the lives of individual men.

It is a paradox of politics that so great a part of our organized efforts as societies is directed toward abstract and mystic goals—toward propagating an ideology, toward enhancing the pride and power and self-esteem of the nation, as if the nation had a "self" and a "soul" apart from the individuals who compose it, and as if the wishes of individual men, for life and happiness and prosperity, were selfish, dishonorable and unworthy of our best creative efforts.

When all is said and done, when the abstractions and subtleties of political science have been exhausted, there remain the most basic unanswered questions about war and peace and why we contest the issues we contest and why we even care about them.

As Aldous Huxley has written: "There may be arguments about the best way of raising wheat in a cold climate or of re-forestation of a denuded mountain. But such arguments never lead to organized slaughter. Organized slaughter is the result of arguments about such questions as the following: Which is the best nation? The best religion? The best political theory? The best form of government? Why are other people so stupid and wicked? Why can't they see how good and intelligent we are? Why do they resist our beneficent efforts to bring them under our control and make them like ourselves?"

Many of the wars fought by man—I am tempted to say most—have been fought over such abstractions. The more I puzzle over the great wars of history, the more I am inclined



Senator Fulbright

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... "Our power to kill has become universal"

to the view that the causes attributed to them—territory, markets, resources, the defense or perpetuation of great principles—were not the root causes at all, but rather explanations or excuses for certain unfathomable drives of human nature.

For lack of a clear and precise understanding of exactly what these motives are, I refer to them as the "arrogance of power"—as a psychological need that nations seem to have to prove that they are bigger, better or stronger than other nations. Implicit in this drive is the assumption that the proof of superiority is force—that when a nation shows that it has the stronger army, it is also proving that it has better people, better institutions, better principles—and, in general, a better civilization.

"Hidden Causes of War"

The evidence for my proposition is the remarkable discrepancy between the apparent and hidden causes of some modern wars and the discrepancy between their causes and ultimate consequences.

The precipitating cause of the Franco-Prussian War, for example, was a dispute over the succession to the Spanish throne, and the ostensible "underlying" cause was French resistance to the unification of Germany.

The war was followed by German unification—which probably could have been achieved without war—but it was also followed by the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, the humiliation of France and the emergence of Germany as the greatest power in Europe, which could not have been achieved without war. The peace treaty, incidentally, said nothing about the Spanish throne, which everyone apparently had forgotten.

One wonders to what extent the Germans were motivated simply by the desire to cut those haughty Frenchmen down to size and have a good excuse to build another monument in Berlin.

The United States went to war in 1898 for the stated purpose of liberating Cuba from Spanish tyranny, but then, after winning the war—a war which Spain had been willing to pay a high price to avoid—the United States brought the liberated Cubans under an American protectorate, and, incidentally, annexed the Philippines, because, according to President McKinley, the Lord told him it was America's duty "to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellowmen for whom Christ also died."

Isn't it interesting that the voice was the voice of God but the words were those of Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, Admiral Mahan, those "imperialists of 1898" who wanted America to have an empire just because a big, powerful country like the United States ought to have an empire?

The spirit of the times was expressed by Albert Beveridge who proclaimed Americans to be "a conquering race." "We must obey our blood and occupy new markets and if necessary new lands," he said, because "in the Almighty's infinite plan . . . debased civilizations and decaying races" must disappear "before the higher civilization of the nobler and more virile types of man."

In 1914, all Europe went to war, ostensibly because the heir to the Austrian throne had been assassinated at Sarajevo but really because that murder became the symbolic focus of the incredibly delicate sensibilities of the great nations of Europe.

The events of the summer of 1914 were a melodrama of abnormal psychology: Austria had to humiliate Serbia in order not to be humiliated herself, but Austria's effort to recover self-esteem was profoundly humiliating to Russia. Rus-

sia was allied to France, who had been feeling generally humiliated since 1871, and Austria, in turn, was allied to Germany, whose pride required her to support Austria no matter how insanely Austria behaved, and who may, in any case, have felt that it would be fun to give the German Army another swing down the Champs Elysées.

For these ennobling reasons, the world was plunged into a war which took tens of millions of lives, precipitated the Russian Revolution and set in motion the events that led to another world war, a war which took tens of millions' more lives and precipitated the worldwide revolutions of which we spoke last week, revolutions whose consequences are beyond the foresight of any of us now alive.

Both the causes and consequences of war may have more to do with pathology than with politics, more to do with irrational pressures of pride and pain than with rational calculations of advantage and profit.

It has been said that buried in the secret soul of every woman is a drum majorette; it might also be said that there is a bit of the missionary in all of our souls. We all like telling people what to do, but unfortunately they usually don't appreciate it. I myself have given my wife some splendid suggestions on household management, but she is so ungrateful for my advice that I have stopped offering it. The phenomenon is explained by the Canadian psychiatrist and former Director-General of the World Health Organization, Brock Chisholm, who writes:

" . . . Man's method of dealing with difficulties in the past has always been to tell everyone else how they should behave. We've all been doing that for centuries.

"It should be clear by now that this no longer does any good. Everybody has by now been told by everybody else how he should behave. The criticism is not effective; it never has been, and it never is going to be. . . ."

Ineffective though it has been, the giving—and enforcement—of all this unsolicited advice has, at least until recently, been compatible with the survival of the human race.

Man is now, however, for the first time, in a situation in which the survival of his species is in jeopardy. Other forms of life have been endangered, and many destroyed, by changes in their natural environment; man is menaced by a change of environment which he himself has wrought by the invention of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

Our power to kill has become universal, creating a radically new situation which, if we are to survive, requires us to adopt some radically new attitudes about the giving and enforcement of advice and, in general, about human and international relations.

"The Danger of Extinction"

The enormity of the danger of extinction of our species is dulled by the frequency with which it is stated, as if a familiar threat of catastrophe were no threat at all. We seem to feel somehow that because the hydrogen bomb has not killed us yet it is never going to kill us.

This is a dangerous assumption because it encourages the retention of traditional attitudes about world politics when our responsibility, in Dr. Chisholm's words, is nothing less than "to re-examine all of the attitudes of our ancestors and to select from those attitudes things which we, on our own authority in these present circumstances, with our knowledge, recognize as still valid in this new kind of world. . . ."

The attitude, above all others, which I feel sure is no longer valid is the arrogance of power, the tendency of great nations to equate power with virtue and major responsibility-

CPYRGHT We have not harmed people because we wished to"

ties with a universal mission. The dilemmas involved are pre-eminently American dilemmas, not because America has weaknesses that others do not have, but because America is powerful as no nation has ever been before and the discrepancy between its power and the power of others appears to be increasing.

I said in a speech in New York last week that I felt confident that America, with its great resources and democratic traditions, with its diverse and creative population, would find the wisdom to match its power. Perhaps I should have been more cautious and expressed only hope instead of confidence, because the wisdom that is required is greater wisdom than any great nation has ever shown before. It must be rooted, as Dr. Chisholm says, in the re-examination of "all of the attitudes of our ancestors."

It is a tall order. Perhaps one can begin to fill it by an attempt to assess some of the effects of America's great power on some of the small countries whom we have tried to help.

Reflecting on his voyages to Polynesia in the late eighteenth century, Captain Cook later wrote: "It would have been better for these people never to have known us."

In a recently published book on European explorations of the South Pacific, Alan Moorehead relates how the Tahitians and the gentle aborigines of Australia were corrupted by the white man's diseases, alcohol, firearms, laws and concepts of morality, by what Moorehead calls "the long downslide into Western civilization."

The first missionaries to Tahiti, says Moorehead, were "determined to re-create the island in the image of lower-middle-class Protestant England. . . . They kept hammering away at the Tahitian way of life until it crumbled before them, and within two decades they had achieved precisely what they set out to do."

It is said that the first missionaries who went to Hawaii went for the purpose of explaining to the Polynesians that it was sinful to work on Sunday, only to discover that in those bountiful islands nobody worked on any day.

"A 'Fatal Impact' on Smaller Nations"

Even when acting with the best of intentions, Americans, like other Western peoples who have carried their civilization abroad, have had something of the same "fatal impact" on smaller nations that European explorers had on the Tahitians and the native Australians.

We have not harmed people because we wished to; on the contrary, more often than not we have wanted to help people and, in some very important respects, we have helped them. Americans have brought medicine and education, manufactures and modern techniques to many places in the world; but they also brought themselves and the condescending attitudes of a people whose very success breeds disdain for other cultures.

Bringing power without understanding, Americans as well as Europeans have had a devastating effect in less advanced areas of the world; without wishing to, without knowing they were doing it, they have shattered traditional societies, disrupted fragile economies, and undermined people's confidence in themselves by the invidious example of their own efficiency. They have done this in many instances simply by being big and strong, by giving good advice, by intruding on people who have not wanted them but could not resist them.

Have you ever noticed how Americans act when they go to foreign countries?

Foreigners frequently comment on the contrast between the behavior of Americans at home and abroad; in our own country, they say, we are hospitable and considerate, but, as soon as we get outside our own borders, something seems to get into us and, wherever we are, we become noisy and demanding and strut around as if we owned the place. The British used to say during the war that the trouble with the Yanks was that they were "overpaid, oversexed and over here."

I recently took a vacation in Mexico and noticed in a small-town airport two groups of students on holiday, both about undergraduate age; one group was Japanese, the other American. The Japanese were neatly dressed and were talking and laughing in a manner that neither annoyed anybody nor particularly called attention to themselves. The Americans, on the other hand, were disporting themselves in a conspicuous and offensive manner, stamping around the waiting room in sloppy clothes, drinking beer and shouting to each other as if no one else were there.

Why Americans Abroad Are "Boorish"

This kind of scene, unfortunately, has become familiar in many parts of the world. I do not wish to exaggerate its significance, but I have the feeling that, just as there was once something special about being a Roman or a Spaniard or an Englishman, there is now something about the consciousness of being an American abroad, something about the consciousness of belonging to the biggest, richest country in the world, that encourages people who are perfectly well behaved at home to become boorish when they are in somebody else's country and to treat the local citizens as if they weren't really there.

One reason why Americans abroad may act as though they "own the place" is that in many places they very nearly do: American companies may dominate large segments of a country's economy; American products are advertised on billboards and displayed in the shop windows; American hotels and snack bars are available to protect American tourists from foreign influence; American soldiers may be stationed in the country and, even if they are not, the population are probably well aware that their very survival depends on the wisdom with which America uses her immense military power.

I think that any American, when he goes abroad, carries an unconscious knowledge of all this power with him, and it affects his behavior just as it once affected the behavior of Greeks and Romans, of Spaniards, Germans and Englishmen, in the brief high noons of their respective ascendancies.

It was the arrogance of their power that led nineteenth-century Englishmen to suppose that if you shouted at a foreigner loud enough in English he was bound to understand you, or that now leads Americans to behave like Mark Twain's "innocents abroad," who reported as follows on their travels in Europe:

"The peoples of those foreign countries are very ignorant. They looked curiously at the costumes that we had brought from the wilds of America. They observed that we talked loudly at table sometimes. . . . In Paris, they just simply opened their eyes and stared when we spoke to them in French! We never did succeed in making these idiots understand their own language."

We all, as Dr. Chisholm explains, enjoy telling people how they should behave, and the bigger and stronger and richer we are, the more we feel suited to the task, the more, indeed, we consider it our duty. Dr. Chisholm relates the story

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of an eminent cleric who had been proselyting the Eskimos and said:

"You know, for years we couldn't do anything with those Eskimos at all; they didn't have any sin. We had to teach them sin for years before we could do anything with them."

I am reminded of the three Boy Scouts who reported to their scoutmaster that as their good deed for the day they had helped an old lady cross the street. "That's fine," said the scoutmaster, "but why did it take three of you?" "Well," they explained, "she didn't want to go."

The good deed above all others that Americans feel qualified to perform is the teaching of democracy and the dignity of man. Let us consider the results of some American good deeds in various parts of the world.

Over the years since President Monroe proclaimed his doctrine, Latin Americans have had the advantages of United States tutelage in fiscal responsibility, in collective security and in the techniques of democracy. If they have fallen short in any of these fields, the thought presents itself that the fault may lie as much with the teacher as with the pupils.

When President Theodore Roosevelt announced his "corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine in 1905, he solemnly declared that he regarded the future interventions thus sanctified as a "burden" and a "responsibility" and an obligation to "international equity."

Not once, so far as I know, has the United States regarded itself as intervening in a Latin-American country for selfish or unworthy motives—a view not necessarily shared by the beneficiaries. Whatever reassurance the purity of our motives may give must be shaken a little by the thought that probably no country in all human history has ever intervened in another except for what it regarded as excellent motives.

"The wicked are wicked, no doubt," wrote Thackeray, "and they go astray and they fall, and they come by their deserts; but who can tell the mischief which the very virtuous do?"

"Tutelage by U. S. Marines"

For all our noble intentions, the countries which have had most of the tutelage in democracy by United States Marines are not particularly democratic. These include Haiti, which is under a brutal and superstitious dictatorship, the Dominican Republic, which is in turmoil, and Cuba, which, as no one needs to be reminded, has replaced its traditional right-wing dictatorships with a Communist dictatorship.

Maybe, in the light of this extraordinary record of accomplishment, it is time for us to reconsider our teaching methods. Maybe we are not really cut out for the job of spreading the gospel of democracy. Maybe it would profit us to concentrate on our own democracy instead of trying to inflict our particular version of it on all those ungrateful Latin Americans who stubbornly oppose their North American benefactors instead of the "real" enemies whom we have so graciously chosen for them.

And maybe—just maybe—if we left our neighbors to make their own judgments and their own mistakes, and confined our assistance to matters of economics and technology instead of philosophy, maybe then they would begin to find the democracy and the dignity that have largely eluded them and we, in turn, might begin to find the love and gratitude that we seem to crave.

Korea is another example. We went to war in 1950 to defend South Korea against the Russian-inspired aggression of North Korea. I think that intervention in that war was justified and necessary. We were defending a country that clearly

wanted to be defended: Its army was willing to fight and fought well, and its Government, though dictatorial, was a patriotic Government which commanded the support of the people.

Throughout the war, however, the United States emphasized as one of its war aims the survival of the Republic of Korea as a "free society," something which it was not then or for a long time after the war.

We lost 33,629 American lives in the war and have since spent \$5,610,000,000 on direct military and economic aid and a great deal more on indirect aid to South Korea. The country, nonetheless, remained until recently in a condition of virtual economic stagnation and political instability.

These facts are regrettable, but the truly surprising fact is that, having fought a war for three years to defend the freedom of South Korea, most Americans are probably ignorant of, and almost certainly uninterested in, the current state of the ward for whom they sacrificed so much.

We are now engaged in a war to "defend freedom" in South Vietnam. Unlike the Republic of Korea, South Vietnam has an Army which is without notable success and a weak, dictatorial Government which does not command the loyalty of the South Vietnamese people.

The official war aims of the United States Government, as I understand them, are to defeat what is regarded as North Vietnamese aggression, to demonstrate the futility of what the Communists call "wars of national liberation," and to create conditions under which the South Vietnamese people will be able freely to determine their own future.

I have not the slightest doubt of the sincerity of the President and the Vice President and the Secretaries of State and Defense in propounding these aims. What I do doubt—and doubt very much—is the ability of the United States to achieve these aims by the means being used.

I do not question the power of our weapons and the efficiency of our logistics; I cannot say these things delight me as they seem to delight some of our officials, but they are certainly impressive. What I do question is the ability of the United States, or France or any other Western nation, to go into a small, alien, undeveloped Asian nation and create stability where there is chaos, the will to fight where there is defeatism, democracy where there is no tradition of it and honest government where corruption is almost a way of life.

Our handicap is well expressed in the pungent Chinese proverb: "In shallow waters, dragons become the sport of shrimps."

Early last month demonstrators in Saigon burned American Jeeps, tried to assault American soldiers, and marched through the streets shouting, "Down with the American imperialists," while one of the Buddhist leaders made a speech equating the United States with the Communists as a threat to South Vietnamese independence.

"Why Are Foreigners Ungrateful?"

Most Americans are understandably shocked and angered to encounter such hostility from people who by now would be under the rule of the Viet Cong but for the sacrifice of American lives and money. Why, we may ask, are they so shockingly ungrateful? Surely they must know that their very right to parade and protest and demonstrate depends on the Americans who are defending them.

The answer, I think, is that "fatal impact" of the rich and strong on the poor and weak. Dependent on it though the Vietnamese are, our very strength is a reproach to their weakness, our wealth a mockery of their poverty, our success a

CPYRGHT "We are trying to remake Vietnamese society"

reminder of their failures. What they resent is the disruptive effect of our strong culture upon their fragile one, an effect which we can no more avoid than a man can help being bigger than a child.

What they fear, I think rightly, is that traditional Vietnamese society cannot survive the American economic and cultural impact.

"Saigon: an American Brothel"

Both literally and figuratively, Saigon has become an American brothel.

A "New York Times" correspondent reports that many Vietnamese find it necessary to put their wives or daughters to work as bar girls or to peddle them to American soldiers as mistresses; that it is not unusual to hear a report that a Vietnamese soldier has committed suicide out of shame because his wife has been working as a bar girl; that Vietnamese have trouble getting taxicabs because drivers will not stop for them, preferring to pick up American soldiers who will pay outrageous fares without complaint; that, as a result of the American influx, bar girls, prostitutes, pimps, bar owners and taxi drivers have risen to the higher levels of the economic pyramid; that middle-class Vietnamese families have difficulty renting homes because Americans have driven up the rent beyond their reach, and some Vietnamese families have actually been evicted from houses and apartments by landlords who prefer to rent to the affluent Americans; that Vietnamese civil servants, junior Army officers and enlisted men are unable to support their families because of the inflation generated by American spending and the purchasing power of the GIs.

The Secretary of Defense recently reported with pride that his Department is providing 9.2 pounds of goods a day for each GI for sale in the PX's; what the Secretary neglected to point out was that these vast quantities of consumer goods are the major source of supply for the thriving Vietnamese black market.

It is reported that 30,000 cans of hair spray were sent to Vietnam in March of 1966. Since it is unlikely that the American fighting men are major consumers of hair spray, it seems reasonable to suppose that this item has found its way to the black market.

One Vietnamese explained to the "New York Times" reporter whom I mentioned that "any time legions of prosperous white men descend on a rudimentary Asian society, you are bound to have trouble." Another said: "We Vietnamese are somewhat xenophobe. We don't like foreigners, any kind of foreigners, so that you shouldn't be surprised that we don't like you."

Sincere though it is, the American effort to build the foundations of freedom in South Vietnam may thus have an effect quite different from the one intended.

"All this struggling and striving to make the world better is a great mistake," said Bernard Shaw, "not because it isn't a good thing to improve the world if you know how to do it, but because striving and struggling is the worst way you could set about doing anything."

One wonders as well how much our commitment to Vietnamese freedom is also a commitment to American pride. The two, I think, have become part of the same package.

When we talk about the freedom of South Vietnam, we may be thinking about how disagreeable it would be to accept a solution short of victory; we may be thinking about how our pride would be injured if we settled for less than we set out to achieve; we may be thinking about our reputa-

tion as a great power, as though a compromise settlement would shame us before the world, marking us as a second-rate people with flagging courage and determination.

Such fears are as nonsensical as their opposite, which is the presumption of a universal mission. They are simply unworthy of the richest, most powerful, most productive and best-educated people in the world.

One can understand an uncompromising attitude on the part of such countries as China or France; both have been stricken low in this century, and arrogance may be helpful to them in recovering their pride.

It is much less comprehensible on the part of the United States, a nation whose modern history has been an almost uninterrupted chronicle of success, a nation which by now should be so sure of its own power as to be capable of magnanimity, a nation which by now should be able to act on the proposition, as expressed by George Kennan, that "there is more respect to be won in the opinion of the world by a resolute and courageous liquidation of unsound positions than in the most stubborn pursuit of extravagant or unpromising objectives."

"The Wrong Kind of Power"

The cause of our difficulties in Southeast Asia is not a deficiency of power, but an excess of the wrong kind of power, which results in a feeling of impotence when it fails to achieve its desired ends.

We are still acting like Boy Scouts dragging reluctant old ladies across streets they do not want to cross. We are trying to remake Vietnamese society, a task which certainly cannot be accomplished by force and which probably cannot be accomplished by any means available to outsiders. The objective may be desirable, but it is not feasible.

There is wisdom, if also malice, in Prince Sihanouk's comparison of American and Chinese aid. "You will note the difference in the ways of giving," he writes. "On one side, we are being humiliated, we are given a lecture, we are required to give something in return. On the other side, not only is our dignity as poor people being preserved, but our self-esteem is being flattered—and human beings have their weaknesses, and it would be futile to try to eradicate [them]."

Or, as Shaw said: "Religion is a great force—the only real motive force in the world; but what you fellows don't understand is that you must get at a man through his own religion and not through yours."

The idea of being responsible for the whole world seems to be flattering to Americans, and I am afraid it is turning our heads, just as the sense of global responsibility turned the heads of ancient Romans and nineteenth-century British.

A prominent American is credited with having said recently that the United States was the "engine of mankind" and the rest of the world was "the train."

A British political writer wrote last summer what he called "A Cheer for American Imperialism." An empire, he said, "has no justification except its own existence." It must never contract; it "wastes treasure and life"; its commitments "are without rhyme or reason." Nonetheless, according to the author, the "American empire" is uniquely benevolent, devoted as it is to individual liberty and the rule of law, and having performed such services as getting the author released from a Yugoslav jail simply by his threatening to involve the American consul, a service which he describes as "sublime."

What romantic nonsense this is. And what dangerous non-

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... "The human race is demanding dignity and independence"

sense in this age of nuclear weapons. The idea of an "American empire" might be dismissed as the arrant imagining of a British Gunga Din, except for the fact that it surely strikes a responsive chord in at least a corner of the usually sensible and humane American mind. It calls to mind the slogans of the past about the shot fired at Concord being heard round the world, about "manifest destiny" and "making the world safe for democracy" and the demand for "unconditional surrender" in World War II. It calls to mind President McKinley taking counsel with the Supreme Being about his duty to the benighted Filipinos.

The "Blessings-of-Civilization Trust," as Mark Twain called it, may have been a "daisy" in its day, uplifting for the soul and good for business besides, but its day is past.

It is past because the great majority of the human race are demanding dignity and independence, not the honor of a supine role in an American empire.

It is past because whatever claim America may make for the universal domain of its ideas and values is countered by the Communist counterclaim, armed like our own with nuclear weapons.

And, most of all, it is past because it never should have begun, because we are not the "engine of mankind," but only one of its more successful and fortunate branches, endowed by our Creator with about the same capacity for good and evil, no more or less, than the rest of humanity.

An excessive preoccupation with foreign relations over a long period of time is a problem of great importance, because it diverts a nation from the sources of its strength, which are in its domestic life.

A nation immersed in foreign affairs is expending its capital, human as well as material; sooner or later that capital must be renewed by some diversion of creative energies from foreign to domestic pursuits.

I would doubt that any nation has achieved a durable greatness by conducting a "strong" foreign policy, but many have been ruined by expending their energies on foreign adventures while allowing their domestic bases to deteriorate.

The United States emerged as a world power in the twentieth century not because of what it had done in foreign relations, but because it had spent the nineteenth century developing the North American continent; by contrast, the Austrian and Turkish empires collapsed in the twentieth century in large part because they had for so long neglected their internal development and organization.

"Excessive Involvement Abroad"

If America has a service to perform in the world—and I believe it has—it is in large part the service of its own example.

In our excessive involvement in the affairs of other countries, we are not only living off our assets and denying our own people the proper enjoyment of their resources; we are also denying the world the example of a free society enjoying its freedom to the fullest. This is regrettable indeed for a nation that aspires to teach democracy to other nations, because, as Burke said, "Example is the school of mankind, and they will learn at no other."

There is, of course, nothing new about the inversion of values which leads nations to squander their resources on fruitless and extravagant foreign undertakings. What is new is the power of man to destroy his species, which has made the struggles of international politics dangerous as they have never been before and confronted us, as Dr. Chisholm says, with the need to re-examine the attitudes of our ancestors so as to discard those that have ceased to be valid.

Somehow, therefore, if we are to save ourselves, we must find in ourselves the judgment and the will to change the nature of international politics in order to make it at once less dangerous to mankind and more beneficial to individual men.

"Source of War: Human Nature"

Without deceiving ourselves as to the difficulty of the task, we must try to develop a new capacity for creative political action. We must recognize, first of all, that the ultimate source of war and peace lies in human nature, that the study of politics, therefore, is the study of man, and that if politics is ever to acquire a new character, the change will not be wrought in computers but through a better understanding of the needs and fears of the human individual.

It is a curious thing that, in an era when interdisciplinary studies are favored in the universities, little, so far as I know, has been done to apply the insights of individual and social psychology to the study of international relations.

It would be interesting—to raise one of many possible questions—to see what could be learned about the psychological roots of ideology: To what extent are ideological beliefs the result of a valid and disinterested intellectual process and to what extent are they instilled in us by conditioning and inheritance? Or, to put the question another way: Why exactly is it that most young Russians grow up believing in Communism and most young Americans grow up believing in democracy, or, for that matter, what accounts for the coincidence that most Arabs believe in Islam and most Spaniards in Catholicism?

What, in short, is the real source of ideological beliefs and what value do they have as concepts of reality, much less as principles for which men should be willing to fight and die?

I recently had the privilege of a luncheon with the distinguished Johns Hopkins psychiatrist, Dr. Jerome Frank, and he explained to me some psychiatric principles which may be pertinent to a better understanding of international relations. He pointed out, for example, that an ideology gives us an identity beyond our own trivial and transitory lives on earth and also serves the purpose of "organizing the world" for us, giving us a picture, though not necessarily an accurate picture, of reality.

A person's world view, or ideology, says Dr. Frank, filters the signals that come to him, giving meaning and pattern to otherwise odd bits of information. Thus, for example, when a Chinese and an American put radically different interpretations on the Vietnamese war, it is not necessarily because one or the other has chosen to propound a wicked lie, but rather because each has filtered information from the real world through his ideological world view, selecting the parts that fit, rejecting the parts that do not, and coming out with two radically different interpretations of the same events.

There is a "strain toward consistency" which leads a country, once it has decided that another country is good or bad, peaceful or aggressive, to interpret every bit of information to fit that preconception, so much so that even a genuine concession offered by one is likely to be viewed by the other as a trick to gain some illicit advantage.

A possible manifestation of this tendency is the North Vietnamese view of American proposals to negotiate peace as fraudulent plots. Having been betrayed after previous negotiations—by the French in 1946 and by Ngo Dinh Diem in 1955 when, with American complicity, he refused to allow the elections called for in the Geneva Accords to take place—the Hanoi Government may now feel that American offers

CPYRGT "Before China can accept friendship, she must recover pride"

to negotiate peace, which we believe to be genuine, are in reality plots to trick them into yielding through diplomacy what we have been unable to make them yield by force.

Another interesting point is the shaping of behavior by expectations, or what is called the self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus, for example, China, fearing the United States but lacking power, threatens and blusters, confirming the United States in its fears of China and causing it to arm against her, which, in turn, heightens Chinese fears of the United States.

Prof. Gordon Allport of Harvard made the point some years ago that "... while most people deplore war, they nonetheless expect it to continue. And what people expect determines their behavior. . . . The indispensable condition of war," wrote Professor Allport, "is that people must expect war and must prepare for war, before, under war-minded leadership, they make war. It is in this sense that 'wars begin in the minds of men.'"

"China—a Menacing Abstraction"

Another striking psychological phenomenon is the tendency of antagonists to dehumanize each other.

To most Americans, China is a strange, distant and dangerous nation, not a society made up of 700 million individual human beings, but a kind of menacing abstraction. When Chinese soldiers are described, for example, as "hordes of Chinese coolies," it is clear that they are being thought of not as people but as something terrifying and abstract, or as something inanimate like the flow of lava from a volcano.

Both China and America seem to think of each other as abstractions: To the Chinese, we are not a society of individual people, but the embodiment of an evil idea, the idea of "imperialist capitalism"; and, to most of us, China represents not people, but an evil and frightening idea, the idea of "aggressive Communism."

Obviously, this dehumanizing tendency helps to explain the savagery of war.

Man's capacity for decent behavior seems to vary directly with his perception of others as individual humans with human motives and feelings, whereas his capacity for barbarous behavior seems to increase with his perception of an adversary in abstract terms.

This is the only explanation I can think of for the fact that the very same good and decent citizens who would never fail to feed a hungry child or comfort a sick friend or drop a coin in the church collection basket celebrate the number of Viet Cong killed in a particular week or battle and can now contemplate with equanimity, or indeed even advocate, the use of nuclear weapons against the "hordes of Chinese coolies."

I feel sure that this apparent insensitivity to the incineration of thousands of millions of our fellow human beings is not the result of feelings of savage inhumanity toward foreigners; it is the result of not thinking of them as humans at all, but rather as the embodiment of doctrines that we consider evil.

Dr. Chisholm suggests: "What we the people of the world need, perhaps most, is to exercise our imaginations, to develop our ability to look at things from outside our accidental area of being." Most of us, he says, "have never taken out our imaginations for any kind of run in all our lives," but rather have kept them tightly locked up within the limits of our own national perspective.

The obvious value of liberating the imagination is that it might enable us to acquire some understanding of the view of the world held by people whose past experience and present situations are radically different from our own.

It might enable us to understand, for example, what it feels like to be hungry—not hungry in the way that a middle-class American feels after a golf game or a fast tennis match, but hungry as an Asian might be hungry, with a hunger that has never been satisfied, with one's children having stunted limbs and swollen bellies, with a desire to change things that has little regard for due process of the law because the desire for change has an urgency and desperation about it that few Americans have ever experienced.

Could we but liberate our imagination in this way, we might be able to see why so many people in the world are making revolutions; we might even be able to see why some of them are Communists.

Having suggested, as best an amateur can, some of the psychological principles that might be pertinent to international relations, I now venture to suggest some applications.

Paranoid fears, says Dr. Frank, are not entirely false fears; certainly, China's fear of American hostility, though distorted and exaggerated, is not pure invention.

In dealing with paranoid individuals, Dr. Frank suggests, it is generally desirable to listen respectfully without agreeing but also without trying to break down or attack the patient's system of beliefs. It is also important not to get overly friendly lest the patient interpret effusive overtures as a hostile plot.

Dr. Frank also suggests that the paranoid patient is certain to rebuff overtures of friendship many times before beginning to respond.

"Reduce Expressions of Hostility"

Applying these principles to China, perhaps the best thing we can do for the time being is to reduce expressions of hostility, put forth only such limited proposals for friendship as might be credible, and otherwise leave her strictly alone.

In the wake of the historical trauma, China's fear and hatred of the West is probably still too deep, and likely to remain so for some time to come, to permit of positive cooperation, or, indeed, of anything beyond what we might call mutually respectful relations from a distance.

Before China can accept the hand of Western friendship, she must first recover pride. She must recover that sense of herself as a great civilization which was so badly battered in the nineteenth century and, with it, the strength to open her door to the outside world.

Having been all but destroyed as a nation by the forced intrusions of the West, China must first know that she has the strength to reject unwanted foreign influences before she can be expected to seek or accept friendly foreign associations.

Or, to make the same point from the side of the United States, before we can extend the hand of friendship to China with any expectation of its being accepted, we must first persuade her that we respect her right to take what we offer or leave it as she thinks best.

There is no better way to convey this message to China than by leaving her alone.

If we can give our imaginations a "good run," as Dr. Chisholm recommends, we are likely to learn that the "way of life" which we so eagerly commend to the world has little pertinent either to China's past experience or to her future needs.

China, Dr. Fairbank [of Harvard] tells us, is a society in which the concept of "individualism" which we cherish is held in low esteem because it connotes a chaotic selfishness,

CPYRGHT. "Let us meet these difficulties like wise and sensible men"

the opposite of the commitment to the collective good which is highly valued by the Chinese.

Similarly, the very word for "freedom" (*tzu-yu*) is said to connote a lack of discipline, even license, the very opposite of the Chinese ideal of disciplined co-operation.

Even such basic Western ideas as "loyal opposition" and "self-determination," Professor Fairbank points out, are alien to the Chinese.

The cultural gap is further illustrated by the difference in attitudes toward philanthropy: To Americans, it is a Christian virtue; to the Chinese, it is, unless reciprocal, insulting and degrading—something that we might keep in mind if relations ever thaw enough to make conceivable American economic aid or, more plausibly, disaster relief in the event of some natural calamity such as flood or famine.

In the light of these profound cultural differences, shall we, in Mark Twain's words, "go on conferring our civilization upon the peoples that sit in darkness, or shall we give those poor things a rest?"

"Seating Red China in U. N."

There are, I think, some limited positive steps which the United States might take toward improved relations with China. It would do the United States no harm in the short run, and perhaps considerable good in the long run, to end our opposition to the seating of Communist China in the United Nations, and, depending on events, to follow that up with some positive suggestions for more normal relations.

The United States has already proposed visits by scholars and newspapermen between China and the United States and, although these proposals have been rejected by the Chinese, it might be well, though not too often and not too eagerly, to remind them of the offer from time to time.

In proposing these and other initiatives to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as major components in a policy of "containment without isolation," Prof. Doak Barnett made the point that "In taking these steps, we will have to do so in full recognition of the fact that Peking's initial reaction is almost certain to be negative and hostile and that any changes in our posture will create some new problems. But we should take them, nevertheless, because initiatives on our part are clearly required if we are to work, however slowly, toward the long-term goal of a more stable, less explosive situation in Asia and to explore the possibilities of trying to moderate Peking's policies."

The point of such a new approach to China, writes Professor Fairbank, is psychological:

"Peking is, to say the least, maladjusted, rebellious against the whole outer world. Russia as well as America. We are Peking's principal enemy, because we happen now to be the biggest outside power trying to foster world stability.

"But do we have to play Mao's game? Must we carry the whole burden of resisting Peking's pretensions? Why not let others in on the job?"

"A Communist China seated in the U. N.," Fairbank continues, "could no longer pose as a martyr excluded by 'American imperialism.' She would have to face the self-interest of other countries, and learn to act as a full member of international society for the first time in history. This is the only way for China to grow up and eventually accept restraints on her revolutionary ardor."

The most difficult and dangerous of issues between the United States and China is the confrontation of their power in Southeast Asia, an issue which, because of its explosive possibilities, cannot be consigned to the healing effects of

time. I have suggested in recent statements how I think this issue might be resolved by an agreement for the neutralization of Vietnam under the guarantee of the great powers, and I will not repeat the specifications of my proposal tonight.

Should it be possible to end the Vietnamese war on the basis of an agreement for the neutralization of Southeast Asia, it would then be possible to concentrate, with real hope of success, on the long, difficult task of introducing some trust into relations between China and the West, of repairing history's ravages and bringing the great Chinese nation into its proper role as a respected member of the international community.

In time, it might even be possible for the Chinese and Taiwanese on their own to work out some arrangement for Taiwan that would not do too much damage either to the concept of self-determination or to the Chinese concept of China's cultural indivisibility—perhaps some sort of an arrangement for Taiwanese self-government under nominal Chinese suzerainty. But that would be for them to decide.

All this is not, as has been suggested, a matter of "being kind to China." It is a matter of altering that fatal expectancy which is leading two great nations toward a tragic and unnecessary war.

If it involves "being kind to China," those who are repelled by that thought may take some small comfort in the fact that it also involves "being kind to America."

On Nov. 14, 1860, Alexander Hamilton Stephens, who subsequently became Vice President of the Southern Confederacy, delivered an address to the Georgia legislature, in which he appealed to his colleagues to delay the secession of Georgia from the Union: "It may be," he said, "that out of it we may become greater and more prosperous, but I am candid and sincere in telling you that I fear if we yield to passion and without sufficient cause shall take that step, that instead of becoming greater or more peaceful, prosperous and happy—instead of becoming gods, we will become demons, and at no distant day commence cutting one another's throats. This is my apprehension. Let us, therefore, whatever we do, meet these difficulties, great as they are, like wise and sensible men, and consider them in the light of all the consequences which may attend our action."

What a tragedy it is that the South did not accept Stephens' advice in 1860. What a blessing it would be if, faced with the danger of a war with China, we did accept it today.

"Humility to Match Our Pride"

In its relations with China, as indeed in its relations with all of the revolutionary or potentially revolutionary societies of the world, America has an opportunity to perform services of which no great nation has ever before been capable. To do so, we must acquire wisdom to match our power and humility to match our pride.

Perhaps the single word above all others that expresses America's need is "empathy," which Webster defines as the "imaginative projection of one's own consciousness into another being."

There are many respects in which America, if it can bring itself to act with the magnanimity and the empathy appropriate to its size and power, can be an intelligent example to the world.

We have the opportunity to set an example of generous understanding in our relations with China, of practical co-operation for peace in our relations with Russia, of reliable and respectful partnership in our relations with Western Europe, of material helpfulness without moral presumption in

our relations with the developing nations, of abstention from the temptations of hegemony in our relations with Latin America, and of the all-around advantages of minding one's own business in our relations with everybody.

Most of all, we have the opportunity to serve as an example of democracy to the world by the way in which we run our own society. America, in the words of John Quincy Adams,

should be "the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all" but "the champion and vindicator only of her own."

If we can bring ourselves so to act, we will have overcome the dangers of the arrogance of power. It will involve, no doubt, the loss of certain glories, but that seems a price worth paying for the probable rewards, which are the happiness of America and the peace of the world.

The President's Reply to Senator Fulbright

Without using Mr. Fulbright's name, President Johnson replied to the Senator's criticisms in a speech at Princeton University on May 10. Excerpts from the President's address:

Abroad we can best measure America's involvement, whatever our successes and failures, by a simple proposition: Not one single country where we have helped mount a major effort to resist aggression—from France to Greece to Korea to Vietnam—today has a government servile to outside interests.

There is a reason for this which I believe goes to the very heart of our society: The exercise of power in this century has meant for the United States not arrogance, but agony. We have used our power not willingly and recklessly, but reluctantly and with restraint.

Unlike nations in the past with vast power at their disposal, the United States has not sought to crush the autonomy of her neighbors. We have not been driven by blind militarism down courses of devastating aggression. Nor have we followed the ancient and conceited philosophy of the "noble lie" that some men are by nature meant to be slaves to others.

* * *

Surely it is not a paranoid vision of America's place in the world to recognize that freedom is still indivisible—still has

adversaries whose challenge must be answered.

Today, of course, that challenge is sternest in Southeast Asia. Yet there, as elsewhere, our great power is tempered by great restraint. What nation has announced such limited objectives or such willingness to remove its military presence once those objectives are achieved?

What nation has spent the lives of its sons and vast sums of its fortune to provide the people of a small, striving nation the chance to elect a course we might not ourselves choose?

The aims for which we struggle are aims which, in the ordinary course of affairs, men of the intellectual world applaud and serve: the principle of choice over coercion, the defense of the weak against the strong and aggressive, the right of a young and frail nation to develop free from the interference of her neighbors, the ability of a people—however inexperienced, however different, however diverse—to fashion a society consistent with their own traditions and values and aspirations.



President Johnson

Rusk: "Power Has Not Corrupted American People"

Secretary of State Dean Rusk was asked about the Fulbright speech when he appeared on an ABC radio and TV program, "Issues and Answers," on May 8, 1966. Following excerpts are from his comments:

Secretary Rusk: One always has to be careful about the abuse of power. Lord Acton [English historian] once said that power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. But I think it is a matter of the greatest historical importance that the almost unbelievable power of the United States since 1945 has not corrupted the American people. That power has been used to support the simple and decent purposes of the American people in world affairs.

Now let's look at the record since 1945 onward: We demobilized almost totally after World War II, to a point where, in 1946, we did not have a single division ready for combat or a single air group ready for combat.

We tried to eliminate nuclear weapons from the arsenals of the world by giving them up for ourselves under the Baruch proposals [a U. S. plan, developed by Bernard Baruch, for the international control of atomic energy, presented to the U. N. in 1946].

We reduced our defense budgets to something like 10 billion dollars in 1947.

We took the leadership in insisting upon a peaceful reconciliation with our enemies, Germany and Japan.

We spent over a hundred billion dollars not only binding up the wounds of war, but trying to help other countries get on with their economic and social development.

We put some 14 billion dollars in food assistance to other countries.


When crises have come up, upon occasion we have to act with firmness, but we have also acted with great prudence.

We flew an airlift into West Berlin to help those people survive while we explored the possibilities of peaceful settlement rather than engaging our troops in combat.

In Korea we took enormous casualties to try to defend the ability of the South Koreans to live at peace without unleashing the Pandora's box of nuclear war.

When the Cuban missile crisis came up, President Kennedy took extraordinary effort to leave the door open to a peaceful settlement of that great crisis.

We waited four years, through increased infiltration from



Secretary Rusk

North Vietnam into South Vietnam, before we struck at North Vietnam.

Now there may have been mistakes along this period, but they are not mistakes of arrogance.

The United States has committed itself to trying to build a decent world order. Why? Because the tens of millions of casualties in World War II, and the prospect of hundreds of millions of casualties in World War III make it a compelling necessity that we organize a peace, that we not leave these things just to hopes for peace, or we not leave them to the ideas of the 1930s, that if you are not too rude to the aggressor, maybe he will be satisfied and leave you alone.

We have got to organize a peace. That is what the United States has been all about in this postwar period. And we don't go around looking for business in these matters.

There have been dozens and dozens of crises in which we have not taken part. We are not the gendarmes of the universe. But it has been necessary upon occasion for us to move to defend the possibility of an organized peace, particularly where we have specific commitments through alliances.

Now this is not arrogance. The attitude of the American people in this postwar period has not been one of arrogance despite the unbelievable character of the power which is available. But this power must not be used by ourselves, the Russians or others, because the survival of the human race depends upon it.

These problems should be approached on one's knees.

These problems make pygmies of us all, and unless we approach them with humility we will never solve them.

Senator Fulbright's charge that American troops are making a brothel of South Vietnam came into the discussion.

Secretary Rusk: I must say I was disturbed by the characterization of a city of 2.5 million people, a proud and sensitive people, as an American brothel. It just isn't true, as a matter of fact.

We all know that the world's oldest profession is present in every big city throughout the world, and the world's oldest profession is supported by men, and has been since the beginning of time, whether in uniform or in civilian clothes.

But what also disturbs me is that this reflects unfairly and inaccurately upon what our men are doing out there.

The overwhelming majority of our men are fighting, standing guard, patrolling, carrying rice to people who are hungry, running aid stations for those who are sick, teaching classes, building schools and doing the things that are necessary to help the South Vietnamese people get on with the job.

Now the characterization of a city of 2.5 million people as a brothel, and the implication that this is preoccupying the attention of our soldiers out there, I think, is not very helpful under present circumstances.

The questioning turned to Senator Robert Kennedy's argument that a policy of no sanctuary for Communist planes which might attack from bases in Red China could cause real trouble.

Secretary Rusk: Any decisions on that subject would be, of course, made by the President in the light of all the circumstances at the time. I think that we would not be building a peace if we should somehow establish the principle in international law that nations can conduct military operations against their neighbors, and be themselves safe under a sanctuary of some sort. This would greatly distort the possibilities of organizing a decent peace. But the source of a danger, if that issue should arise, would be from those

who would inject themselves into a conflict which we are trying to settle.

I would be in Geneva tomorrow afternoon if there was anybody there to talk with me about peace in Southeast Asia.

For five years we have gone to the ends of the earth to talk about peace in Southeast Asia.

We went to the Laos Conference in Geneva. We accepted the Soviet nominee as the Prime Minister of Laos. We accepted the idea—produced by the Laotians themselves—that they should have a coalition Government. We signed that agreement. So did Peiping and so did Hanoi. But from the very day of the signature, Hanoi refused to withdraw its troops from Laos, refused to cease sending its troops through Laos into South Vietnam.

Now, the question is, who is interested in peace, and who is insisting upon taking over somebody else by force?

A lot of these things ought to be sorted out on the basis of those very simple things. It isn't necessary to confuse these with a great deal of speculation and all sorts of philosophy and all sorts of ambiguity and murkiness. At the heart of the matter is, how are we going to organize peace and who is prepared to join in doing that, and who is determined to gobble up their neighbors by force?

Mrs. Lord: "Fulbright Should See Good Work of Our GI's"

Senator Fulbright's speech prompted the following statement from Mrs. Oswald B. Lord, who has served in United Nations posts and on presidential commissions, and who has just returned from a tour, sponsored by the U. S. State Department, of South Vietnam and other countries.

I wish Senator Fulbright could go to Vietnam to see for himself the good work so many of our young men there are doing in their off-duty hours.

When people back here talk about Saigon, they talk about the bar girls. You don't hear about all the time our young men are spending to build and operate day schools, care centers, orphanages, other things for the people.

A leprosy village is being built on an island about 5 miles from Saigon. A French woman started it. The men in an American Army unit learned about it and pitched in. They are building a bridge and a road to give access to the island.

There is an orphanage in Saigon, started by the Vietnamese Women's Association. The children are either war orphans or refugees from the North. GI's off duty are building new classrooms so the children won't have to eat, sleep and go to school in the same room.

Near Da Nang, a new settlement is being built for refugees who fled from the Viet Cong. I saw GI's working there, playing with the kids, helping older people learn new trades and new methods of farming.

These are just a few examples. I want to bring the positive to the attention of people. I am anxious that the mothers and wives of this country realize how much good these boys are doing out there.



Mrs. Lord

CP RESPONSIBLE AND IRRESPONSIBLE CRITICISM OF FOREIGN POLICY

(Continued from the back of this page)

should it surrender? The Arkansas Senator implies that there is something honorable about capitulation and something dishonorable about asserting a nation's right to defend its territory or to assist in the defense of helpless peoples who request us to come to their aid.

Another criticism voiced by the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is that Americans misbehave when they go abroad, and appear to be "boorish when they are in somebody else's country." But are there not many more Americans who are courteous and respectful and who have made enduring friendships while traveling around the world? Mr. Fulbright makes another blanket indictment when he says:

"Both literally and figuratively, Saigon has become an American brothel."

Secretary of State Rusk rebutted this charge by pointing out that there are brothels all over the world, but that they do not typify the behavior of the entire population of any big city.

The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee criticizes the mission of American forces in Vietnam, even though their help was formally requested by the government there. He doesn't see anything wrong with an uncompromising attitude toward peace by Red China or North Vietnam but thinks the United States ought to compromise anyhow. He adds:

"Having been all but destroyed as a nation by the forced intrusions of the West, China must first know that she has the strength to reject unwanted foreign influences before she can be expected to seek or accept friendly foreign associations. . . .

"There is no better way to convey this message to China than by leaving her alone."

But what shall be said of a government on mainland China that interferes with the independence of other nations in Southeast Asia and fights South Vietnamese as well as American soldiers?

Notwithstanding such unmoral conduct, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee favors the seating of Communist China in the United Nations. He does not answer Secretary Rusk, who asks:

"What do you do about Formosa? . . . It has a population equal to more than half of the members of the U. N.; it was a charter member of the U. N. Peiping has made it very clear, not only that the Republic of China must be expelled, but that the U. N. must apologize and reorganize and do all sorts of other things."

Abstract advice by Mr. Fulbright, such as "to set an example of generous understanding in our relations with China," does not tell us what good it will do to ignore the behavior of the Red Chinese and their ag-

gressive policies in Korea and elsewhere, when there is still no sign of any change in policy in Peiping.

The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee says that, if America "can bring itself to act with the magnanimity and the empathy appropriate to its size and power," it can be "an intelligent example to the world." He adds:

"If we can bring ourselves so to act, we will have overcome the dangers of the arrogance of power. It will involve, no doubt, the loss of certain glories, but that seems a price worth paying for the probable rewards, which are the happiness of America and the peace of the world."

But suppose this involves the loss of the prestige of the United States on every continent and leads to insurrections and depredations which threaten the lives and property not only of Americans but of other foreign nationals? What would become of the West German people, for instance, if we withdrew from Europe and thus gave the Communists a free rein to take over the new German Republic?

The issue presented is whether or not we should surrender and forsake our responsibilities, desert our own allies and appease the enemy. Did appeasement ever pay before? Was not appeasement in 1938 the direct cause of World War II in 1939?

Mr. Fulbright may have conscientiously tried to be provocative and get attention in an earnest search for alternative policies. But he paints an image of his own country as irresolute in the middle of a war and as reaching out desperately for peace at any price.


As President Johnson said in his speech at the dedication of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University a few days ago, the American record speaks for itself. He declared:

"The exercise of power in this century has meant for all of us in the United States not arrogance, but agony. We have used our power not willingly and recklessly ever, but always reluctantly and with restraint.

"Unlike nations in the past with vast power at their disposal, the United States of America has never sought to crush the autonomy of her neighbors. We have not been driven by blind militarism down courses of devastating aggression. . . .

"As I look upon America this morning from this platform of one of her greatest universities, I see instead a nation whose might is not her master but her servant."

The United States Senate should adopt a resolution affirming the above quotation and directing that it be proclaimed as the true voice of America. [END]



RESPONSIBLE AND IRRESPONSIBLE CRITICISM OF FOREIGN POLICY

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BY DAVID LAWRENCE

THERE ARE TWO KINDS of criticism of public policy. Responsible criticism presents facts and, after fair analysis, offers constructive alternatives. Irresponsible criticism ignores certain facts germane to a controversy, misconstrues basic motives, and sometimes argues that the best way to deal with trouble is to run away from it.

Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, Democrat, has just delivered a series of lectures before college audiences denouncing the foreign policy of the United States during the last 70 years. He downgrades his own Government as bumptious and domineering. He accuses it of brandishing military force and displaying throughout the world an "arrogance of power."

As Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Fulbright has a responsibility—not only to the people of his own country but to other peoples as well—to be objective. Because the legislative branch of our Government is considered co-ordinate with the executive, the rest of the world takes seriously the speeches and proposals of a Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. Fulbright was a Rhodes scholar at Oxford for three years, and observed that the parliamentary system in England places responsibility on the party in power. Leaders within that same party who dissent on a major policy must resign or perhaps join an opposition party. The issue can then be decided by the people in a national election.

Every Senator has the right of dissent, but no Senator should be permitted to represent his party as chairman of an important committee if he is in fundamental disagreement with the policies of an Administration controlled by his own party.

The present Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee continues to advocate proposals that are diametrically opposite to those of the Administration in power. Even in the midst of the war in Vietnam, in which 250,000 Americans in the armed services are engaged, the Senator not only assails his own Government but scoffs at policies of the United States for more than a half-century, questions its motives, and minimizes its altruistic endeavors.

Mr. Fulbright begins his tirade with the charge that our war against Spain in 1898 was imperialistic. He omits reference to the action of the Spaniards in blowing up the battleship *Maine* in Havana harbor,

killing 286 Americans. He disregards the effect upon the American people of the atrocities committed in Cuba by the oppressors.

The Senator bemoans the fact that the liberated Cubans were ruled for many years under an American protectorate. He disregards the help we gave them in developing their resources.

We did the same thing in the Philippines. Yet Mr. Fulbright cynically condemns President McKinley for saying it was America's duty "to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize" the people of the Islands and "by God's grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellowmen for whom Christ also died."

We have intervened for a time in many countries in Latin America to restore order, and have always withdrawn when a stable government could be established.

Mr. Fulbright, moreover, in a welter of words about the conflicting ambitions of European nations in the major wars, ignores the reasons for our participation in World War I nearly three years after it began. He doesn't mention that it was the interference with American merchant shipping which caused Congress in 1917 to declare a state of war. Several vessels—including the unarmed British steamer *Lusitania*—had been sunk by German torpedoes with the loss of many American lives. We tried in vain for two years to get assurances that our ships would not be attacked.

Was or was not the "freedom of the seas," a vital principle of international law, worth fighting for? Was President Woodrow Wilson wrong when he said we must do our part to "make the world safe for democracy" and to get rid of autocratic governments?

The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, however, characterizes all this as not for "the defense or perpetuation of great principles" but rather as "explanations or excuses for certain unfathomable drives of human nature." He seems to think that what we did in World War I and World War II was an example of "arrogance of power, the tendency of great nations to equate power with virtue and major responsibilities with a universal mission."

Mr. Fulbright also appears indifferent to the fact that the United States certainly could not keep out of World War II after the Japanese bombed American territory at Pearl Harbor in 1941.

Should a nation defend itself when attacked, or

(Continued on preceding page)