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JPRS L/9715

6 May 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 16/81)

FEREYDUN KESHAVARZ:

I ACCUSE THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

OF THE TUDEH PARTY OF IRAN

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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FEREYDUN KESHAVARZ: I ACCUSE THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE TUDEH PARTY OF IRAN

Tehran MAN MOTTAHEM MIKONAM KOMITEH-YE MARKAZI-YE HEZB-E TUDEH-YE IRAN RA in Persian 1978 pp 1-93

[Interview with Dr Fereydun Keshavarz given to Shahrokh Vaziri in December 1977: "I Accuse the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran." Kalq Publications. Passages enclosed in slantlines underlined in the original]

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[Text] Comments

The material you are setting out to read is a dialog between me and Mr Shahrokh Vaziri in Azar 1356 (December 1977) for the completion of his doctoral dissertation which he would be defending at Lausanne University (Switzerland). The dissertation was to be entitled "From Qanat to Oil Pipeline--Petroleum and Power." It was agreed that Mr Vaziri could use any part of our discussion he considered useful for his paper with my consent.

The processing of the dissertation was delayed for various reasons, including some of an academic nature. It explains why the interview, which was held in Azar 1356 (December 1977) is only now being published after more than a year's delay. I must of necessity remind you that the contents of the interview were ineluctibly constrained by the limitation of the questions as formulated. Therefore:

1. Given its limitations and brevity, the interview falls short of satisfying the inquisitiveness of the reader;

2. Concepts have been intermixed in the process of the interview.

Over the year that has transpired since the date of this interview and the delay, which has not been of my doing, our compatriots have embarked on a vehement struggle against the shah's regime which is daily gathering momentum.

The altruism and valor of our people in their fight against the present oppressive, bloodsucking regime and to establish democratic freedoms and political, social, economic and cultural reforms suited to the characteristics of our country and people, have become a source of wonder and adulation by the world. In this revolutionary situation in which the government can only rule by daily massacre, in which the people refuse to put up with this oppressive, despotic and corrupt government any longer and want to bring it to an end, a disciplined and experienced political organization which can command the confidence of the people and of the toiling majority of the Iranian nation in such a way as to assume their leadership in this struggle or at least to participate in the struggle effectively is nonexistent in our country. This is the unpardonable sin of those who have been sitting as expatriates in "socialist countries" for more than 20 years and who "rule" over a handful of party members from a distance, a group of party members who are desperate, malcontents and forced into silent immigration. Thus they are incapable of providing the people of Iran with an organization which can offer a lucid political, social, economic and cultural platform.

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Finally, I deem it necessary to point out to the dear reader again that responsibility for the comments and analyses made in the doctoral dissertation of Mr Vaziri lies squarely at his own door and has nothing to do with me. I am to be held accountable only for the views and statements that are contained in the interview proper. That is all.

/The duplication and dissemination of this interview in the Persian language is free for all./

The translation and printing and publication of this interview is prohibited in other languages and in other countries unless authorized by me. The perpetrator will be sued in accordance with the laws in force.

[Signed:] Dr Fereydun Keshavarz

Azar 1357 (December 1978)

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Foreword

I did not find the opportunity within the context of this study to go into the role played by the Soviet Union in Iran throughout the course of the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry. This was not because I considered the issue inconsequential, but because authentic information and reliable testimony about the role of the Soviet Union in the matter was absolutely unavailable. This was also the case with regard to the activities of the Tudeh Party up to the time it was declared illegal and barred from activity. This was particularly true as regards the policies adopted by some of the leaders of the Tudeh Party of Iran. As will be seen, they deviated from the political line declared by the party.

The following interview enables us to shed light on the details and some obscure points of the role and activity of the Soviet Union and the Tudeh Party of Iran at this stage and, in my opinion, it further serves the purpose of bringing out the role of some intellectuals in the political life of their country--particularly applicable to the developing countries--and shows how the intelligentsia is overwhelmed by events if the intellectuals are sincere, and how their activity comes up against the opposition and intervention of foreign powers and their agents in their political affairs.

Dr Keshavarz, who consented to this interview, is a well-known political personage in Iran today. He is a noted and highly celebrated leader of the Tudeh Party because he was a member of the party Central Committee and the Executive Board.

Born in 1907, Dr Keshavarz completed his study in medicine in Paris. After specializing in pediatrics, he went to Iran. His practice constantly brought him up against the injustice and stark social disparities in Iran. This kindled in him the urge to take political action in order to bring about profound economic, social and political change in Iran. That explains why he joined the Tudeh Party of Iran at its inception. The Tudeh Party of Iran was the only organized party at the time that proclaimed a progressive political policy and declared the imperativeness of deep social changes in the interest of the Iranian nation. He was elected to the parliament (Majles) on the Tudeh Party ticket and later became minister of culture and higher education. After a gunman attempted to assassinate the shah on 15 Bahman 1327 (4 February 1949), he felt compelled to go into hiding. Dr Keshavarz was a professor of children's diseases at universities in Tehran, Moscow, Baghdad and Algiers. He always kept closely aware of the political developments in Iran and the world at large. He knows the political figures and milieu of Iran well. Besides, he is clearly committed to his political leaning. For this reason, I believe that Dr Keshavarz is precisely a master of the political evolution of Iran

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and, in this role, projects himself as a valuable observer of some of the events that have so far defied elucidation. In particular, he agreed to explain many points which have remained not only unknown to the layman but have challenged the wits of the questioning minority and of the specializing few.

It goes without saying that Dr Keshavarz is responsible only for his statements and position, which he defends.

[Signed:] Shahrokh Vaziri

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Interview With Dr Keshavarz

Question: Dr Keshavarz, before entering into the subject of our interview, I would like to ask you to introduce yourself and to talk generally about your political experience and background.

Answer: You should know that, except for part of 1959 and 1960, I have not had anything published in the last 30 years. Part of those 2 years I was a professor of children's diseases in Baghdad and wrote some articles for the Iraqi newspapers, some under my own byline and some without any signature at all. In the period of nearly 30 years that I have been an emigre, nothing has been printed or published under my name apart from those articles I mentioned. Therefore, this is the first time that my views and opinions are to see the light. However, I must remind you that my views and opinions have been aired and defended inside the Tudeh Party of Iran and its Central Committee starting in 1951, that is, 2 years after my emigration to the Soviet Union, and have been circulated among the members of the Tudeh Party of Iran. I have had them put on record in the proceedings of the Central Committee through correspondence (about 59 letters). In these letters I insisted particularly on the necessity of our immediate return to Iran and on extensive and intensive study of the activity of the party in Iran, particularly during the period of its clandestine existence, and on the activity of some Central Committee members that took place secretly and without the party's knowledge.

As an emigre I met many Iranian youths residing in Europe and many party comrades who were all eager to get to the bottom of the reasons for the streak of failures of the party and the National Front which had until then defied them as undefendable. I would speak to them most cordially. After my resignation from the party Central Committee, hundreds of these compatriots of mine heard from me parts of what you are about to hear from me. Yet, although the words were spoken, they are not in print. Only the description of the reception in which I met Baqerov in Baku, which I related to an Iranian student, also in Lausanne, has appeared in his doctoral thesis but without the source having been credited. I therefore feel compelled to speak at length and express thoughts which might perhaps, on the face of it, seem irrelevant to your dissertation. I believe that these thoughts must be aired, but you might decide to forgo inclusion of some of them in your dissertation on my consent.

Before venturing into the substance of the topic, some points command prior attention:

1. My political views are known all my compatriots, who also know that these have not changed over nearly 30 years as an emigre. I was a member of the Tudeh Party

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of Iran, the one which was established in 1320 (1941), about 40 years ago. I was a member of the highest organ of the party leadership. Therefore, I share responsibility for the decisions of these organs, even when I was against their adoption, up to 15 Bahman 1327 (February 1949), that is, the day the shah was shot at and when the party went underground. I hold myself responsible because I left Iran with Secretary General Radmanesh in July 1949 at the behest of the party Executive Board.

2. After extensive study, education and thinking, I have come to deeply believe in scientific socialism. I was among the first 100 members of the party, and if my party membership card was under number 150 it was because the party membership cards were printed and issued with a time lag of a few months due to the party going underground in its infancy. Only a few of those members of the party leadership at the time are still around and, like me, were elected to the party leadership by the First Tehran Conference, later confirmed by the only two congresses of the party. They can be counted on the fingers of one hand.

The first elective gathering of the Tudeh Party of Iran was the First Tehran Conference which met secretly in Tehran in 1942, exactly 1 year after the party's establishment. Party leader Soleyman Mirza had chosen my house for holding the conference, but my house was too much in the public eye. Therefore, the conference was held in the house of my younger brother, Jamshid Keshavarz, on Tir Street, at my suggestion. He, too, had become a party member by then. Less than 90 persons attended the meeting. (The number I remember was 87, not the round figure 120, as recorded by the party leadership.) In this conference I was elected as one of 15 members of what was later called the "Tehran Provincial Committee." This committee was assigned to run the party until the convention of the First Congress of the party. The conference took only one day, a Friday. In the two congresses of the party held to date, I was elected to membership in the Central Committee and the Executive Board.

The shooting at the shah took place on 15 Bahman 1327 (4 February 1949), some 3 years after the defeat of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party and exactly 9 months after the holding of the Tudeh Party Second Congress, which had just survived a clamorous bifurcation. The split came at a juncture when the Tudeh Party of Iran had hardly begun to heal its wounds and put its house in order. A young party only 7 years of age was declared illegal at this time and had to go underground, while it had not even the least experience for clandestine activity. /The third congress of the party has not been convened to this date./ In May 1958, upon my self-exile to Moscow 20 years ago, after our comrade, Khosrow Ruzbeh, had been executed (11 May 1958), I resigned from the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran and wrote: /"I am ashamed of my membership in this Central Committee."/ One of the reasons that forced me to resign and, in fact, the very drop that made my "cup of patience" run over was the insults and accusations that Kambakhsh and Kianuri levelled against Ruzbeh in the corridors during the Fifth Plenum of the party when we received news of the arrest of Comrade Ruzbeh. Kambakhsh accused Comrade Ruzbeh of wanting to appear as a hero (as he put it, Ruzbeh "was playing the hero"). Kianuri said Ruzbeh was weak and in possession of a lot of information that he might divulge. Later on we learned in Moscow that when the group escape from Qasr Prison of 10 members of the party Central Committee was being planned, Kianuri insisted that Ruzbeh should, for the reason alleged earlier (that is, weakness), take the place of our officer comrade, Tafreshian, who was supposed to be among the escapees.

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That was how the plan was implemented. Ruzbeh and nine others were helped to escape, and Tafreshian who had spent so much time in prison was left behind. Today these "leaders," who did not and still do not dare go to Iran and take up activity there despite the suggestions made by other members and by myself, these very "leaders" who were accused by Comrade Ruzbeh--in his famous letter read before nearly 80 party members in the widely attended Fourth Plenum of the party Central Committee in Moscow--/of being cowardly, of deserting their ditches, and of taking refuge in the comfort of foreign countries,/ these same "leaders" plunged into a panegyric of Comrade Ruzbeh just as they have been pouring out eulogies of Dr. Arani for a long time in order to place themselves in the rank of the true torch-bearers of the cause of these two heroes of our party and people and to show themselves as their costrugglers and fighters.

In my letter of resignation addressed to the Central Committee I explained these facts in addition to the other treasons committed by some leaders to our party and people. In the conclusion of my detailed and lengthy letter of resignation (on several pages) I wrote (and I ask you to print): "As I said at the Fifth Plenum, I do not consider my continued membership in the Central Committee to be in the interest of the party any longer. Although in practice I have stayed away from the activity of the Central Committee since the holding of the Fifth Plenum, because some Central Committee comrades do not consider 'staying away from activity' as 'resignation' proper, I hereby resign from this Central Committee, which in my opinion has /been a source of shame and notoriety for the liberation movement of Iran, and no efforts are being made in it to purge the leadership of the party. Much as I take pride in membership in the Tudeh Party of Iran for whose cause the best children of Iran have been martyred, equally do I feel ashamed of membership in the present Central Committee whose members are, in my opinion, mostly competent, but wrongdoers whose wrongs are only a hairbreadth from treason."/

After I had submitted this letter of resignation, a commission representing the Central Committee and comprised of then Secretary General Radmanesh, current Secretary General Iraj Eskandari and Kambakhsh, who was then one of the three party secretaries, called on me at my house in Moscow to "convince" me to withdraw my resignation in a move to avert damage to the party. In the course of the negotiation, Kambakhsh claimed that my resignation would hurt not only the Tudeh Party but also the Soviet Union. (Such arm twisting based on the insinuation of "anti-Soviet attitudes," attempted by Kambakhsh and Kianuri, often worked on party members.) At this point it came to my mind that a "dossier" had been fabricated to frame my brother, Jamshid Keshavarz, who had emigrated to the Soviet Union before me. They had accused him of speaking in unflattering terms about Stalin; they were planning to have him exiled to Siberia. Only last minute intervention by Central Committee member Reza Rusta had headed off this plan. That was why I was persuaded to withdraw my resignation, but I pointed out that the accusations I had levelled against the Central Committee were well founded. Immediately after this meeting I plunged into diligent preparations to make my exit from the Soviet Union. When I was about to leave the Soviet Union, the party Central Committee threatened that I would be expelled from the Central Committee if I left the Soviet Union. I replied that even expulsion from the party at large would not dissuade me from leaving the Soviet Union. Thus, after my resignation, and its withdrawal as a result of the threat from Kambakhsh, I was "expelled" from the Central Committee. In addition, the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran wrote a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union complaining that "Dr Keshavarz considered his membership in the Central Committee

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of the Tudeh Party of Iran of disgrace." It was obvious that this letter was a prelude to blocking my exit from the Soviet Union and, if I insisted on leaving, to have me exiled to Siberia. Otherwise why did the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran write a letter about it to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union?

Let us get back to our main topic. Six months after the shah had been shot at, Radmanesh and I emigrated to Moscow together at the order of the Executive Board. At that time I was, and still am, the only member of the Tudeh Party of Iran who has twice been condemned to death: one count being my membership in the party leadership and the other count in connection with the shooting at the shah, a charge which was attributed to me in a case which is still open. It is necessary to point out here that I did not have the faintest idea of this shooting incident nor any possible connection with it. Neither did the Central Committee nor the Executive Board of the party. Even the secretary general was completely ignorant of the matter.

Some years after this incident, something which I will explain later happened when we learned in Moscow that Kianuri had been in touch with Nasser Fakhrara'i, the would-be assassin, some months before the shooting attempt on the shah. The two counts on which I was condemned to death, to which I referred earlier, indicate that my activity as a member of the party leadership, as a deputy to the National Consultative Assembly (Majles), and as minister of culture and higher education had been effective enough to stir the indignation and spite of the ruling elite of Iran against me. This matter has also been mentioned in my biography inserted in the journal MARDOM (PEOPLE), the organ of the party, which I place at your disposal. Brecht put it aptly in his statement: "Being sentenced to execution is not given as a present; it is earned." So that you may have an indication of how much my activities had irritated the rulers of Iran, it would be sufficient for you to know that the day after the death sentences on some members of the Tudeh Party had been announced, all the newspapers printed a list of the party leaders, which was topped by my name as leader of the Tudeh Party of Iran, printed even above the name of the party secretary general. Such a designation did not exist in the party after Soleyman Mirza.

Ever since I have been an emigre, those party comrades who dissent from the leadership of the party and many of my compatriots with varying political leanings have invited me to their debating sessions for discussion, consultation and debate. They want to know the reasons for the failure of the Tudeh Party and the Nationalist Movement of Iran in the 1350's [21 March 1971-20 March 1972] /But I emphasize again that I have never and in no way been a member of any group or party other than the Tudeh Party of Iran./ My real activity in the Tudeh Party of Iran and in its leadership, like the real activity of a number of other members of the leadership and cadres of the party who emigrated from Iran, was cut off as of 15 Bahman 1327 (1949), i.e., the day the attempt on the shah's life was made. From then on the members of the Executive Board who were either free in Iran because of no death conviction, or were in prison, directed the party. These were Kianuri, Forutan, and Qassemi (who had their special, active faction), on the one hand, and Jodat, Bahrami, 'Alavi, Yazdi and Boqrati, on the other. The latter group was weak in information and theory, and inert and listless in action.

It was only from around 1956 onward that the party Central Committee assumed the leadership of the party again--in exile. That was after some members of the Executive Board, such as Bahrami, Yazdi and 'Alavi, had been arrested again (i.e., after

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their first escape), and after some other members of the Executive Board, such as Boqrati, Qassemi, Jodat, Forutan and Kianuri, had emigrated to Moscow. That was when the party was completely oppressed and smashed, and when most of the members of the party Central Committee and Executive Board gathered in exile in Moscow. But at that time there was no party structure left in Iran. There were a number of people who were loyal to the party but they did not have any substantial organization nor any contact with the leadership in exile.

I repeat that none of the members of the leadership, except me, insisted on returning to Iran for clandestine activity. I continued my insistence from 1950 to 1959, when I left the Soviet Union. However, my suggestions were in vain and went unheeded. Some Central Committee members, especially Kambakhsh, Kianuri, Jodat and Forutan spread the rumor that "Keshavarz wants to leave the Soviet Union for Iran to set up his medical practice in Iran again, to cooperate with the shah's regime and to amass money." After nearly 40 years' membership in the party, during which I have employed all means of struggle within the party, I see that in the party's leadership today all power has actually been centralized in the person of Kianuri, the secretary of the party. Kianuri is an adventurer, like Beria. This leadership is useless because all its members have been in exile abroad since 1956 and have been doing no work in Iran. This leadership "rules" over a few hundred political emigres in East European countries, and this rule has been made possible solely as a result of the aid given to this leadership by the socialist countries and the sister parties. I have witnessed that this adventurous man, whose treason to our party and motherland has been proven, has become the secretary and the dictator of the party after 30 years of efforts and factionalism--for in practice Iraj Eskandari, who despite his old age fancies the title and privileges of the position of secretary general, remains secretary general in name only and is used by Kianuri as a cover for his dictatorship. I tried to change the attitude of the party leadership by struggling inside the party. As I was disappointed throughout, I am now consenting, for the first time, to the publication of my views about the actions of the members of this leadership. SAVAK and our enemies are aware of all the "secrets" and of the shocking crimes of some of the "leaders" of the party, because a number of the leaders and cadres of the party who gave in under torture or duress, as well as some others who returned to Iran and gave themselves up after years of stay in the Soviet Union where they participated in party plenums and conferences, gave SAVAK full reports--as was customary--on all they knew. Only those party members who remained in Iran and only the patriotic organizations in Iran may still be uninformed on these events. These may once again be entrapped by the traitors. Our party and motherland may again be destroyed with tied hands and legs. That is why I am breaking my silence. According to the poet: "Two things blight the brain: to keep silent when one should speak up, and to speak out when one should be tight-lipped."

3. In Iran I have met and talked with almost all Iranian men of politics who played a role in Iran between 1941 and 1949. I will name but a few of these:

Soleyman Mirza was the old, experienced leader of Iran's struggles and was the leader and secretary of the party from its inception to the time of his death in 1942. I came to know him before the outbreak of World War II and came to be very close to him. I cured a boy and girl he had adopted. He referred me to the party and initiated me. During my membership as a deputy during the 14th term of the Majles I was very close to Dr Mosaddeq, too. I had also met Dr Mosaddeq several times before World War II and prior to the establishment of the Tudeh Party of

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Iran. We met when I was making a house call on his grandchildren (at the house of Engineer Mossadeq and of my friend and colleague, Dr Gholamhosseyn Mossadeq). During the term I was a deputy in the Majles, we met and talked now and then at his house or my house.

I met the shah of Iran several times along with Radmanesh and Iraj Eskandari, and once alone (in connection with the construction of a hospital in Bandar Pahlavi on my initiative).

I met and talked with all the prime ministers of Iran, including Razmara, chief of staff of the Iranian Army, who was later assassinated when he was prime minister.

For years I was friends with and close to Pishevari, the leader of the Iranian Azarbayjan Democratic Party, and Mulla Mustafa Barzani, and also the Qazi brothers who led the Kordestan Democratic Party.

Together with Radmanesh I met (in Iran) Benes, the president of Czechoslovakia and Mr Heriot, speaker of France's parliament, who stopped over in Iran on their way to their destinations, during World War II, and we discussed with them the situation in Iran and in the world.

On the foreign score, after residing in the Soviet Union as a political emigre for many years, I was invited to Baghdad as professor of children's diseases in 1959 at the personal instruction of the late Gen 'Abd al-Karim Qasim, Iraq's first president. The party Central Committee opposed my departure from the Soviet Union /and requested of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Unon in a letter that I be denied an exit visa./ In this connection, it became necessary for me to negotiate for an exit visa with the officials of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for several hours. These officials told me that they had a problem because the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party had asked them to prevent me from leaving the Soviet Union. After my departure from the Soviet Union, the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party wrote a letter to all sister parties, informing them that I had been expelled from the Central Committee of the party and that I was barred from contacts. The text of this letter was given to me by the secretary general of the ruling Communist Party of a European country.

I deem it necessary to tell you that the Central Committee does not recognize me even as a simple member of the party (without my having been expelled from the party and without this expulsion or its reason having been printed or announced anywhere). However, I have long since denounced this party "leadership" as illegitimate, and I put it in writing 20 years ago that I considered it a disgrace to be a member of the party--a fact known to all party members.

Years after leaving the Soviet Union I was invited to China for about a month. I talked for more than 2 hours with Zhou Enlai and for several hours with a number of the members of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party led by Deng Xiaoping, who was then secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party and is now the deputy premier of China. The talks were held at a dinner party I had been invited to. Later on I was invited to Albania, where I met Albanian Communist Party Secretary General Enver Hoxha and talked with him for several hours after we had had lunch. (President Enver Hoxha speaks French.) During my stay in Baghdad I met and talked with President General Qasim several times. In one of our meetings, Mulla Mustafa

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Barzani was present, too. In my talks with all the personalities I met I defended our party and the legitimate interests of our nation with utmost candor and sincerity. The principles of scientific socialism have always been my watchword. (Many of my party comrades and compatriots who have met me know that I have long given up the use of the term "Marxism-Leninism" because I have come to the conclusion that "Marxism-Leninism" does not fully define scientific socialism. This position of mine does not mean that the respect I have always had for great men has diminished in any degree. Not at all, for Marx and Lenin were great men and two geniuses in the history of mankind. Pasteur and Koch, too, were great men and prominent scientists who rendered great services to mankind. They were the founders of microbiology and new medicine. However, nobody thought of coining the term "Pasteurism-Kochism" for defining microbiology. Each science was developed and advanced as a result of the efforts and work of hundreds and thousands of persons. Among these scientists, a couple or a handful were stronger and more outstanding and, as it were, geniuses. Imagine what confusion would reign if the names of a number of these scientists were truncated one after another in order to designate each science. Besides, Marx, Engels and Lenin themselves were against this.)

In all my talks with foreign statesmen and heads of governments, including those of the Soviet Union, I made it quite clear, politely but firmly, that I was not a quiet man in the sense that I would succumb to the orders of internal or foreign authorities. In short, that I would not become a lackey, but that my brain and my lifetime experience were my guiding lights, that I would preserve my independence of will. I made it clearly understood, among other things, that despite my severe criticism of and deep disagreement with the policies of the Soviet Union and the countries of the Eastern bloc and of China--God knows what severe criticisms and deep differences of opinion I had with them--I was not the kind of person who would villify this or that person at the behest of others in order to be rewarded with the title of secretary general of this or that party or to gain material concessions. This is something to which those concerned can attest in all honesty.

I am not of the fiber of vituperators and killers. I am a physician and mentally open to discussion and negotiation. When I was in the party I always observed the constitution of the party. Outside the party, I have followed the human code of conduct and expression.

However, later on, in the world we see, in which the declared socialism is not socialism proper, in which internationalism is only a veneer masking narrow-minded nationalistic views and an excuse for prescribing interventionist policies, I came to the conclusion that under the circumstances the national liberation movements of the developing countries should jealously and tenaciously cling to their independence of thought, judgment and action. Help can be accepted, but on the proviso that there be no political, economic or military strings attached, that it not make them dependent followers and not damage the true independence of these movements. The quandary in which Mulla Mustafa Barzani got himself caught by accepting "help" from the shah of Iran had grave consequences for the Kurdish movement--and this should be a lesson to everyone.

Let us return to the subject of our discussion. In Moscow I took the 2-year collegiate course in party politics. Then I completed the 3-year course of the Soviet Social Sciences Academy in Moscow. These two were the most advanced schools of partisan study in the Soviet Union. In addition, I worked as a university professor and pediatrician, first in Tadzhikstan and then in Moscow. After leaving the

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Soviet Union, I was initially employed as a professor of pediatrics in Baghdad before the coup d'etat that resulted in the killing of Gen Abd al-Karim Qasim, the late president of Iraq. After leaving Iraq, I took political asylum in Switzerland, where I was given a "laissez-passer" card. I got permission to travel to Algeria on this card. In Algiers, I served as a ward chief in the city hospital and as a professor at the college of medicine for 15 years, beginning in 1962 when Algeria gained independence. A political refugee passport was given to me in Switzerland only in 1973. You and all those who read these lines and judge them, in order to make sure that your judgment is fair, you should keep in mind that /I joined the party and political activity at the tender age of 24./ That was when I had put a few years of university professorship at the Tehran University behind me. That means that not only did I lack a political background at the time, but I was encumbered with the weight of tradition, incorrect beliefs and information and social habits prevalent in the feudal-capitalistic system of Iran of the time. It was therefore natural that I, like 99 percent of the young and inexperienced members of the party, became only gradually educated, month by month. Year after year I became more experienced and politically more educated. I received my political training in the Tudeh Party of Iran. But the party that educated us did not belong only to a handful of people in the leadership group. It was the party of the hundreds and thousands of workers and intellectuals alongside whom we struggled against the reactionary regime in Iran. It was inside the Tudeh Party of Iran that I learned the true story of mankind and the true history of the society in which I lived. I am a trained member of this very party and I am proud of it. Thus, there is no doubt that I have made big mistakes, too, especially because while I kept up my partisan activity I did not give up my university and medical pursuits (as is reflected in my biography written by the Central Committee) which were useful to the party. If I had then had the political literacy, frame of mind and experience that I have today, I would obviously not have made the mistakes I made. All the same, my partisan and political activity did not harm the party and when I judge myself in the privacy of my own mind, I find myself unashamed of my political record. Some of my past mistakes were: Early on in my activity I thought the United States of America was a country that defended the interests of the smaller nations, including Iran. At that time I personified the U.S.A. in Lincoln and Schuster. The latter was an American economic adviser to Iran who was forced out of Iran under pressure from England and Tsarist Russia, the two countries whose enmity toward our people and country we had learned of while we were in primary school in Rasht. I had also heard the name Baskerville, an American teacher who fought and fell on the side of the Iranian freedom fighters against the despotic Qajar court. At that time I considered Reza Shah a reformer like Attaturk.

I must point out here that some of my judgments today might be open to criticism by some people. Those who know me also know well--and I repeat "know well"--that I have never tried to gather people around myself to form a group or faction, although I daresay from the standpoint of commonsense, education and popularity in Iran I was not less qualified to do so than others who did. Those who know me admit that in debating, if I find the reasoning of my political adversaries more logical and well-founded than mine, I do not insist on my own views. Having pointed this out, I must say that part of what I say is not judgmental but narrative of deeds and events. So, they are not debatable as such. /The events and acts that I describe are true and real./ The reader is free to accept or reject them. On this score I would like to point out once and for all that the verity of what I say is vouched for by my honor and personality. Nearly 45 years of my life as a physician and almost 40 years as a politician vouch for the truth of my statements. Those who know me and the thousands upon thousands of my compatriots who have seen and heard

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me know that when I speak of honor and personality, I do not utter these two words lightly or without forethought. For not only my honor and reputation but also that of my family, which is known to Iranians, is at stake.

There is no doubt that I am apt to be mistaken in my judgments. Who has not made or does not make mistakes? The honorable political man is one who admits his own mistakes and tries to avert repetition, tries to improve himself and to set right the results of his mistakes. These principles apply not only to individuals but also to parties and associations.

5. [sic] Obviously, I have to be held accountable only for what I tell you in this dialogue. What I say and the events I narrate do not invoke any commitment on your part whatsoever, just as the views and conclusions you might express in your thesis will not be my responsibility but yours alone. You know that I have not read your dissertation.

6. Permit me to give a piece of advice, through this dialog, to all those who engage in profound and precise historical research, especially if its events and contents relate to the post-World War II period. Do not believe anybody readily. Begin with me. Study the writings carefully. Investigate them. Know the personalities and doubt all characters. At this stage of Iran's history a lot of false memoirs, testimonies and historical accounts have been written. A host of eulogies and hypocrisy, heaps of accusations and dossiers of fabrications have been generated. In the world of emigres, too, as in today's Iran, there is an abundance of such writings, especially authored by the current leaders of the Tudeh Party of Iran in exile. They have permuted or hidden some facts on the pretext that their revelation would "hurt" the party (whereas, in fact, the revelation of these facts would hurt some of the "leaders").

In this interview with me you shall see that some party leaders distort, cover up or fabricate the facts in order to preserve their position for fear of provocation or sabotage against them on the part of some other leaders, or in order to buy the silence of someone else about their mistakes. This is precisely what happened in the Soviet Union under Stalin, Beria and Baqerov.

I will give you an example: In the party's organ, the journal DONYA (WORLD), published in exile, the memoirs of some leaders were printed in which untruths can sometimes be found. Particularly the writings of Kambakhsh, Kianuri, and Ardashez Avanessian team with lies. The present leadership of the Tudeh Party of Iran in exile is masterful in this kind of work. For instance, Mr Amir Khizi, a member of the Central Committee of the Party, somewhere in his memoirs written for DONYA, has inserted that he hid in his house Heydar 'Amu Oqli, the celebrated fighter of the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1907 and later on a noted leader of the Iranian Communist Party and of the Guilan Revolution of 1919-1920, and when the police arrived to seize Heydar 'Amu Oqli, he helped Heydar 'Amu Oqli to flee through the staircase leading to the roof. For Amir Khizi to have been a friend of Heydar 'Amu Oqli in Tehran at that time, he should have been at lest 25 years of age. That is, he should have been born in 1885. Thus, living as he is, he should be 94 years old. But he celebrated his 70th birthday in Moscow less than 10 years ago. Besides, in the edition of DONYA in the month of Mehr 1353 [23 Sep-22 Oct 1974], it was reported that "Comrade Amir Khizi has this year turned 80." So, according to DONYA, Amir Khizi must have been born in 1894. Again according to DONYA, Amir Khizi owned a private home even before the age of 15, lived by himself, was a revolutionary,

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offered refuge to Heydar 'Amu Oqli, and saved him from the police. This really reminds one of "Stalin's Biography" printed in Moscow. Still, one must say that there is a big difference between Stalin and this "spurious revolutionary." However, behind this cheating about dates, some truth might be hidden, because the older brother of Amir Khizi was a fighter for the Iranian Constitution and a friend of Seyyed Abdolrahim Khalkhali and of Taqizadeh. I knew Khalkhali well because he was a friend of my family and in the latter years of his life a friend and patient of mine. The age of Amir Khizi's brother, who was also an Azarbayjani and a fighter in the Constitutional Revolution, would match that of Heydar 'Amu Oqli. Therefore, it would have been possibly true for Amir Khizi's brother to help Heydar 'Amu Oqli to escape. It could be said that in the case of this biography, Amir Khizi, a member of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran, has put himself in the place of his brother, who must have died in Iran by now. The dead do not speak. The leadership of the Tudeh Party of Iran prints this egregious lie in DONYA because Amir Khizi is one vote in the Central Committee which cannot be dispensed with. (In exile, he has always voted in favor of the Kambakhsh-Kianuri faction and followed their lead.) This reminds me that after the Great October Revolution, at the time of the Gilan Revolution of 1919-1920 and shortly afterward, when I was a child, I met in our house in Rasht nearly all the leaders of the Gilan Revolution, including Ehsanollah Khan, Zareh, Hesabi, Mir-Ja'far Konkuri, Pishevari, the leaders of the Communist Party of Gilan, and others. Later on, I once met Mirza Kuchek Khan Jangali, the legendary crusader of Gilan, and still later, Farrokhi Yazdi, the famous revolutionary poet of Iran who stayed in our house for some time. Would it not be ridiculous and even dishonest of me if one day I were to claim that I was connected with these revolutionaries, while the truth of the matter is that my oldest brother, Karim Keshavarz, who is a writer well known to Iranians, knew them and was close to them in revolutionary activity at that time?

I will describe for you another case of cheating about realities by the present leadership of the Tudeh Party. As the poet says, "This is a long story that cannot be condensed into a short one." Kambakhsh, the secretary of the party, died in exile in Leipzig in 1971. In the eulogies the leader of the party and Iraj Eskandari, the first secretary of the party, performed at his graveside, they called him one of the greatest communists of Iran and a great internationalist. They used words, paper and ink to aggrandize Kambakhsh. In fact, Kambakhsh was one of the obedient followers of the regime of Stalin, Beria, and particularly Baqerov. He did not learn his lesson even after Stalin's death but continued to be obedient. Baqerov was the first secretary of the Communist Party of Soviet Azerbaydzhan and kept his position after he came to Iran from Baku in 1943, that is, 2 years after the party had been formed. And that was when Kambakhsh applied for membership in the party, but his application was rejected by the party Central Committee several times until Aliov, the secretary of the Soviet Embassy who was an Azerbaydzhani and a representative of Baqerov in Iran, forced Kambakhsh's membership on the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party. According to Iraj Eskandari himself and his 53 friends--Dr Arani's disciples--Kambakhsh betrayed Dr Arani and his disciples in the party Central Committee in 1937 even without having been tortured. (Besides, torture at that time was not so "scientific" and unbearable.) He described in writing for Reza Shah's police all the details of the party organization and the names of all the Iranian communists. Kambakhsh himself confessed to this matter at the meeting of the Central Committee and in the extensive Fourth Plenum of the party in Moscow before nearly 80 participants in the plenum who all heard him. Even Iraj

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Eskandari, at a meeting of the Central Committee held in Moscow, called Kambakhsh a traitor, dishonorable and killer of Dr Arani, and dealt a resounding slap in the face. The entire proceeding of this incident has been recorded in the proces-verbal of the Central Committee meeting in Moscow. But, perhaps at Baqerov's order, Kambakhsh's treason has been shrouded throughout the history of our party, despite the fact that Dr Arani himself, in his wholehearted defense in his trial under Reza Shah which cost him his life, described Kambakhsh's treason in detail, but this leadership has consistently obliterated from Dr Arani's defense the part concerning Kambakhsh's treason. Fortunately, a small brochure was printed by the party on the occasion of the 35th anniversary of Dr Arani's death, and the editor forgot to strike out all the parts about Kambakhsh's treason. Some lines of Dr Arani's defense relating to this treason did appear in the brochure. On page 23 part of Dr Arani's statement has been quoted: "On Monday, 20 Ordibehesht 1316 (10 May 1937), the police threatened to execute one of the detainees. Thanks to the existence of a dossier and records on this person at the military tribunal, the threat had its effect on him. He was forced to verify the fantasies and fictions dictated to him by the police, who were the fabricators of the falsehoods. He felt compelled to add his own spurious amplifications to it. The case abounds in falsified facts. On Tuesday, 21 Ordibehesht (11 May), all the arrests were made." Thus Dr Arani clearly says that this person revealed everything and betrayed everybody overnight. As you can guess and all the party cadres know as well, the person in question was none other than Kambakhsh, who had previously been arrested by the police and the army on espionage charges when he was a pilot. This arrest was mentioned in Kambakhsh's biography, which was published by the party after his death. The arrest was mentioned on pages 6 and 7 of the book entitled, "A Glimpse of the Labor and Communist Movement in Iran," which the party leadership published after Kambakhsh's death. I put this book at your disposal. Dr Arani spoke of Kambakhsh's treason at length before the court prior to his execution and said that Kambakhsh wrote a book of several hundred pages by way of a report for the police in one night. Khalil Maleki, one of the 53 detainees, said to the military tribunal in 1960 regarding Kambakhsh" "The details Kambakhsh wrote for the police were so meticulous they were like the report a political party would submit to its congress." This book, this report, was written for the police by Kambakhsh during the length of one night. According to Dr Arani, Kambakhsh had pointed him out as the chief and ideologist of this communist organization. As a reward for this treason, Kambakhsh was convicted to no more than 10 years' imprisonment, whereas Dr Arani, thanks to Kambakhsh calling him the leader of the organization, was killed in prison. (Remember that Stalin's killings also took place in 1937).

There are other relevant matters which are worth mentioning. Not only did Kambakhsh give Dr Arani and the organization away to Reza Shah's police, but he also misrepresented to Arani's friends that it had been Dr Arani who had betrayed them to the police (Dr Arani was in a solitary cell then and nobody had any contact with him). Thus he wanted the dishonor of the treason he had committed to be blamed on Dr Arani, who was in a solitary cell. As a result, Arani's friends would call him a traitor each time they passed by him on the few occasions when they had a recess and a walk in the prison yard. They themselves told us that Dr Arani, who did not know the reason for this kind of behavior on their part, was terribly upset and even wept, with tears coursing down his cheeks. Fortunately, in one of the court sessions, one of the defense attorneys told the prisoners during a recess that it was futile for them to deny the existence of the organization and their membership in it, because one among them had written a full report to the police on this matter. To

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this statement by the defense counsel they replied that they knew that Dr Arani had done that. But the defense counsel, who had seen Kambakhsh's report on file, replied that the author had been Abdolsamad Kambakhsh, not Arani. The members of the group of 53 detainees (Eskandari, Bozorg 'Alavi, Maleki, Tabari and the others) had repeatedly narrated to us the whole story each time they considered Kambakhsh's application for membership in the Tudeh Party in 1942. They said it was in this way that they had accidentally learned of his first treason, namely, reporting to the police, and of his second treason, namely, attributing this treason to Dr Arani. An incident happened in exile in Moscow that was interesting and amusing. In one of the meetings of the Central Committee in Moscow we got word that Mottaqi, a member, a cadre and one of the provincial officials of the party in Tehran, had committed treason and given a number of people away. He had also informed the police and the security organization on his rendezvous with Comrade Ruzbeh and had caused Comrade Ruzbeh to be wounded and captured. At this point Comrade Reza Rusta, member of the Central Committee and secretary of the United Council of Workers, said aloud that Mottaqi, too, would be a secretary of our party. His reference was to Kambakhsh, who had betrayed Dr Arani and the organization and later became a secretary of the party. Kambakhsh was present at the meeting but said nothing. In a book that, as I said earlier, the party leadership posthumously published of Kambakhsh's writings and tried to glorify him, when it comes to discussing the detention of Dr Arani and his routine defense, they steer clear of the part in his defense which they had forgotten to omit from the text used in the brochure published on the occasion of the 35th anniversary of Dr Arani's death. All these instances of deliberate forgetfulness and forgery of facts are perpetrated by the party leadership in a style which is virtually a mirror image of the Stalinist style. In March 1966, Khalil Maleki, a colleague of Dr Arani's (one of the 53), who later branched away from the party--and who apparently knew these kinds of "leaders" better than we did--spoke about Kambakhsh in a tribunal that tried him in Tehran, and said that Kambakhsh had written a full report for the police and revealed all the secrets and given everybody away.

I can cite examples of such falsehoods from the writings of Artashez Avanessian, who is an ambitious person and has really mediocre political understanding. In the early years of the party this man harbored the ambition to become Iran's Stalin. In those years he wrote articles in which the Farsi was corrected by the writers of the party newspapers which were published because of a scarcity of writers. He used the byline "Foolad" (Steel). Those who spoke some Russian knew that Foolad was the translation of the Russian word for steel, from which Stalin derived his middle name, just as Lenin got his name from Lena, a river in Russia. Artashez also chose a Farsi name for himself and tried to have everybody call him Ardeshir, perhaps thinking that it would make it easier for him to become the Stalin of the party. This had nothing to do with me, but this was racism and enmity toward non-Iranian people. My friends know that I have no such tendencies but that, after all, one does not have to resort to such tricks to be active in an internationalist party and to become its chief. In the 1930's, during the time his imprisonment in the reign of Reza Shah, this person became the founder and "leader" of the first faction among the Iranian communists. After release from prison he continued this effort with the hope of becoming the leader of the party. But Avanessian was soon reduced to simply membership in the faction--instead of becoming a leader--because of his political weakness and as a result of the rise of those who followed him but were more "competent" than he. In the National Consultative Assembly (Majles), Avanessian tried to lure me into the faction he, Kambakhsh and Kianuri had set up.

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I brought this matter up in the party faction and in the Central Committee at the time.

If I emphasize this matter and am verbose, it is because the writings of such "political figures" are unfortunately taken as truth and given credibility by some writers and historians. These writers build on forged documents and evidence because of lack of access to real, true ones. Thus they fall into the pitfalls and unknowingly mislead their readers.

7. Some people might say that the revelation of these facts might damage the party. You know well that stating the truth, especially when the truth would help shake up the leadership of a party and sift out the corrupt and the traitors, would never damage the party but on the contrary would help it. Besides, all the facts that I am stating now were stated at the Fourth Extensive Plenum of the Central Committee of the party in Moscow before some 80 people. Radmanesh, Iraj Eskandari (the present party first secretary) and some informed officials of the party and I brought this matter up. Some of those who heard these facts at the plenum and are familiar with the whole story have returned to Iran and told the whole thing to SAVAK. All the same, Radmanesh and Eskandari claimed that the disclosure of these treasons outside the plenum would be inappropriate and harmful to the party. But, after all, SAVAK and our enemies know these facts. It is the party members and the struggling individuals and organizations in our country who are uninformed on these treacheries. Besides, if we surmise for a moment for the sake of argument that this baseless claim is true and that the dirty linen should not be hung outside the party, then it could be asked: why is it that those who know the facts about the treasons and have spoken about them in various plenums remain in the party and promote to the secretarial position these very traitors whose deeds if revealed would hurt the party. In a serious-minded and upright party, is the reward of treason promotion to the rank of secretary? But the truth of the matter is that Eskandari, and after him Radmanesh, came to terms with the Kambakhsh-Kianuri-Forutan-Qassemi faction at the conclusion of the Fourth Plenum in Moscow so that the Executive Board of the Central Committee would equally represent the Eskandari-Radmanesh and the Kambakhsh-Kianuri factions and so that the position of first secretary would remain the province of Radmanesh, whom Eskandari still considered a comrade and protege at the time.

8. After the publication of your doctoral thesis and your interview with me, the propaganda machinery of this leadership--comprised of the newspapers, funds, material, radio time, magazines, etc) supplied to it by the Soviet Union and the "brotherly" parties--is bound to chastise me severely. But I am a lone person and do not even have the financial resource to read or hear all attacks. My request of all parties and persons who are enamored of socialism and the struggle of the oppressed for freedom, of those who struggle in a sincere quest for truth, is that they judge not without rumination and study and that they investigate the accusations I am leveling. (I am even willing to appear before a competent European forum to submit documents and evidence in support of my statements.) My request is that the honorable and conscientious individuals and parties do not forget that the time has not long passed since, with the power of Hitler in Germany and Stalin in the Soviet Union, dossiers were built up and trials were staged of the sincere and honorable strugglers and the devoted communists and patriots which cost them their lives--only to be exonerated posthumously when, after a long lapse, the falsehood of the accusations against them were proven.

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9. Finally, as this is the first time I have in fact addressed the public and revealed some facts after years of silence, and these facts and statements are to be published, I ask that you have the text of my letter of resignation given to the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran in May 1958, that is, 20 years ago, printed at the end of this interview.

I am now ready to answer your questions.

Question: I would like for you to begin by speaking about the shooting attempt on the shah and the political situation of Iran at that time. After the shah was shot at, the government charged the Tudeh Party of Iran with this act and went on to declare the party illegal. However, it has been heard for many years that the party and its leadership as a body did not have a hand in it but that some of the leaders were involved. You are the person who can throw ample light on this matter. I would like to ask you to speak at length on this.

Answer: It is that my belief that the shooting attempt on the shah was directly related to the intense competition over Iran's oil between America and England at that time. The struggle for control of Iran's oil undoubtedly necessitated a struggle to gain power in Iran. Therefore, I believe that the following things are needed for the proper study of this issue:

1. Information on Iran's situation prior to the shooting at the shah on 15 Bahman 1327 (4 February 1949). For this the following things must be known?

a. The balance of political power in Iran at that time;
b. The impact of the power of foreign countries on Iran and their influence in Iran.

2. Who or which power stood to benefit from the assassination of the shah?

3. Barring the assassination of the shah, which person or persons could take the power in his or their hands and in what capacities?

/So, let us begin with a description of Iran's situation before the shooting at the shah./

The occupation of Iran by the Allies (1941) and the removal of Reza Shah from the thrown, or his "abdication" of it, gave the people of Iran, who had become bitter and desperate as a result of the savage oppression of any progressive, nationalistic and freedom-seeking movement in Iran by Reza Shah, the chance to enjoy relative freedom, particularly in the area occupied by the Soviets.

Economically, the war against Hitler prevented the import of adequate consumer goods by Iran and stinted local production. So, not even the day-to-day needs of the population and of the troops of the Allies could be met. This breathed new life into the national bourgeoisie and the petit bourgeoisie. This class resisted the flood of foreign, especially American-made, goods to Iran after the war. It also demanded its role in the government in order to protect its interests because it had by then turned into a political force. To put it in a nutshell, an intense class struggle embroiled Iran after Reza Shah's abdication and before the shooting at the reigning shah. But this struggle did not have its original, classic form

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because the meddling of the foreign powers--England, the Soviet Union and America --had derailed it from its natural and original track. The classes involved in the struggle were the feudalists, who were gradually having their grip loosened, on the one hand, and the foreign-oriented, brokering bourgeoisie that was linked with foreign capital, particularly American, on the other. These two classes shared the power as they did under Reza Shah, with the difference that England had been weakened as a result of World War II, while the upcoming American capitalism, which had emerged stronger and unscathed from the scourge of the war, was gradually replacing England.

It should not be forgotten that by the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, American imperialism wanted to show its power to "discerning people." In Iran, too, the United States showed its power to the Iranian ruling class by Truman's ultimatum to Stalin in 1946 to withdraw his forces from Iran. The young Iranian national bourgeoisie and the petit bourgeoisie of Iran, which had a long revolutionary and anticolonialistic tradition to their credit, were trying to unite and create a political organization that could struggle against feudalism and against the foreign-dominated bourgeoisie.

The Iranian working class did not have a true and long tradition of struggle. Therefore, it lacked organization--a party--with strength and experience, as well as a leadership and cadres that had been forged as a result of long class struggle. The first time the Communist Party of Iran--the progressive party of the working class--could prove itself and be noticed in Iran and the world was during the Gilan Revolution (1919-1920) in the rural and workerless province of Gilan--with the help of the Red Army. The second surge, namely the formation of the Tudey Party of Iran in 1941 and its rapid growth, was also partly indebted to the presence of the Soviet troops in Iran. /In both the first and second attempts, the Iranian nation and its working class were thirsty for an organization which would struggle for liberation from dictatorship to secure political freedoms at the national level./ But, in practice, this freedom was not attained through direct, long and systematic struggle because the dictatorial regime of Reza Shah savagely strangled any embryo opposition. This "freedom" was, if it could be put that way, "given" to the Iranian nation in 1941 as a result of the pressure of forces which were foreign at any rate. The only true, independent communist movement--I mean an original movement whose establishment and development had not been influenced in any way by foreign intervention or as a result of the presence of foreign forces--was the one created by Dr Arani in the 1930's, which was comprised of intellectuals and had only 53 members at the time it was betrayed.

The Iran of 1941 and its working class lacked a revolutionary party with experienced and revolutionary leaders and cadres. This was tragic for the Iranian people, who had been oppressed for 20 years by stringent despotism. Of course, the Iranian peasantry, too, should be mentioned; it had various strata but, in fact, because of the suppression of the limited peasant uprisings of Gilan and Azarbayjan in the 1920's and particularly because of the ruthless suppression of the peasants of Azarbayjan after the defeat of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party in 1946, the Iranian peasants could in no way be termed an organized and effective force in the struggles of 1946 and 1949.

Now, let us talk of the balance of political power in Iran.

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1. Throughout World War II and up to 1949, that is, the time of the shooting attempt on the Shah, the only truly mass, populist party in Iran--one which was truly organized and widely disciplined--was the Tudeh Party of Iran. Its branches and agencies were dispersed all over Iran and had as auxiliaries a very strong youth organization, a women's organization, and a peasants organization. It also led the only nationwide workers union, which had grown tremendously. In addition, as was later made public, an extensive and disciplined military organization was also active alongside the party.

In addition, the Tudeh Party of Iran closely cooperated with the newspapers and publications of the Freedom Front and the United Antidictatorial Front during this period. This strong and great organization grew at a breathtaking speed because the Iranian people and the working class in Iran were thirsty for freedom. Before the shooting at the shah, the Tudeh Party of Iran was run by a 19-member Central Committee, 11 of them making up the Executive Board of the Central Committee which ran the party between the meetings of the Central Committee. The first secretary was among the 11. I will talk about this Central Committee at length.

2. The Royal Court, headed by the shah, had partial control of the executive as well as judicial powers. Partially, because the executive power and particularly the judiciary, had not yet become completely subservient to the shah.

3. The most effective power in Iran at that time for taking serious decisions and action was the Iranian Army. Armies are necessarily disciplined and structured hierarchies based on command. Unfortunately, examples of this type of meddling by the army in implementing "decisive decision and action" abound in developing countries.

Before the shooting at the shah, the Iranian Army and most of its officers, excluding those supporting the Tudeh Party, were at the disposal of Lieutenant General Razmara, the chief of the staff, who pretended to be very loyal and obedient to the shah. This pretense of obedience was carried so far that when I went to see Razmara at the army headerquarters to have a number of demonstrating workers freed by the martial law authorities, he received a phone call from the shah and rose to stand at attention while answering the call and used the term "your slave" repeatedly.

This is a very sketchy picture of the balance of the existing and organized powers in Iran that could more or less affect Iranian politics. I will return to this matter later on. Now we should talk about the power and influence of foreign powers in Iran before the shooting at the shah, that is, after the withdrawal of the last foreign troups from Iran and the defeat of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party. In 1946, when the Soviet troops made their exit from Iran and the Azerbayjan Democratic Party was crushed violently, the Soviet Union no longer had any role in Iran's political scene and it could only count on the friendship of the Tudeh Party of Iran and the supporters of this party, namely, those who aspired to the establishment of a just regime and to move toward socialism. But the political mistakes and faults of the Soviet Union in Iran during the war which were the function of the influence of Baqerov and his Iranian followers helped to smear and ruin the reputation and credibility that the Soviet Union had enjoyed in Iran since the Great October Revolution and since the time of Lenin. It undermined the affection and confidence of the Iranian people for Lenin's Soviet Union and dampened the effect of Soviet policy on Iran's freedom.

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It is obvious that the Soviet request to participate in the exploration of the oil deposits of northern Iran contributed to this setback to Soviet policy regarding Iran's international relations. It permitted America and England to become the uncontested players in the arena of Iran's international relations. With the departure of the Soviet Union from the scene of Iran's international affairs, it became impossible for the Iranians to breathe freely under the sky. There is no opportunity here for me to speak of the things that caused the Soviet Union to request the formation of a joint Iranian-Soviet company to explore and exploit the oilfields of northern Iran, nor about the Soviet goals in Iran after World War II. At that time, veteran British imperialism was still active in Iran after 50 years and still had Iran's neighbor, India, as its colony. Besides, it was firmly entrenched in Iran's domestic and foreign policies. With the help of the British Petroleum Company, Britain was still the strongest foreign power in Iran, but its strength was on the wane while, in contrast, the fresh and upcoming America was rapidly progressing all over the world and replacing Britain.

The fight over Iran's oil in fact began between America and England after the end of World War II. From the beginning of World War II and after the occupation of Iran by the Allied troopes, America quickly permeated the key governmental departments and took over control of the gendarmerie and the army and for a time the Ministry of Finance, among others. On the other hand, it gradually influenced some of the tribal chieftains. Gradually, it enlisted the support of some of the deputies, ministers and political figures by hook or by crook. The situation was such that the foreign-oriented bourgeoisie of Iran was divided into pro-American and pro-British groups. Now permit me to amplify on some of the issues I touched on, particularly on the organization and activity of the Tudeh Party of Iran.

I have no doubt that the Tudeh Party of Iran was the greatest organized political force, the biggest political party in Iran between 1941 and 1949. As I said earlier, the Tudeh Party of Iran was established in 1941 by some of the students and followers of Dr Arani (the group of 53) and some veteran communists who had mostly been released from prison after Reza Shah's ouster. /This party did not have a long history nor a tradition of experience./ It lacked a proper cadre and a trained leadership. Apart from four or five persons, the rest of the founders of the party were mainly lacking in theoretical education and practical experience. But this does not detract in any way from the value of the work they initiated. Unfortunately, two clearly vying groups or factions came into being among some of the founders even before they were released from Reza Shah's prisons. This affected the party, and its effects have lingered on to this day. Even in recent years the strife between these two factions has continued unabated. Radmanesh, the former secretary general of the party, and Iraj Eskandari, the present first secretary of the party, who were the last two survivors of the followers of Dr Arani in the leadership of the party, stood, with their followers, against the faction originally created by Avanessian and later joined by Kambakhsh and Kianuri, and still later by Gholam Yahya Daneshian and his friends. Supported and encouraged by the latter faction, Iraj Eskandari gradually removed his "old comrade," Radmanesh, from the position of secretary general and himself took his place. It can be said with certainty that the factional infighting that was started by the older members of the party in Reza Shah's prison never abated over the years. The old faction plotted to capture the leadership. It will have reached the end of the line after the replacement of Iraj Eskandari as first secretary of the Party by Kianuri, the present secretary of the party and leader of the faction which included Artashez Avanessian and Kambakhsh in the old days. According to information reaching me from East Germany, the fight to effect this change has already begun.

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The existence of two factions in the leadership of the Tudeh Party of Iran has streaked like a red line throughout the 38 years of the Tudeh Party's history and has counted as a major cause of the failure of our party and of the liberation movement of our country. This problem should be studied carefully.

Because of this factionalism and division within the party, some of the veteran and experienced members were left out or driven away from the party. Pishevari can be cited as an example. He was an honorable, experienced, patriotic and devoted communist who was killed in Baku under the Stalin-Beria-Baqerov regime. He was left out of the party thanks to the opposition of Artashez Avanessian, who had a great deal of influence in the beginning of the Tudeh Party's life and was in fact the father of factionalism in the party, the same person who signed his name "Foulad," that is, "Stalin." I will not enumerate here the list of a number of other communists and many others who were mostly among the 53 comrades of Dr Arani but were kept away from the party from the beginning because of Artashez Avanessian and his faction. The existence of some of these pioneers could have been very useful at the inception of the Tudeh Party of Iran.

All the same, I should say that this very primitive leadership of the party, despite all its faults and shortcomings and despite factionalism, tried to avert mistakes and pitfalls so long as it was an overt party and was controlled and assisted by the party members and cadres who were getting more experienced and knowledge as a result of study and struggle.

My election to the leadership committee of the party a year after its institution, merely in 1942, and then to the First Congress--in 1942--and to the Second Congress --in 1948--and to the Central Committee and to the Executive Board of the party shows, first, that the party almost totally lacked experienced cadres in the beginning and, second, it shows how interested the young members and the new arrivals were in political and partisan activity and how enthusiastically they devoted their time and resources to the party and to the Iranian people. As I told you earlier, I joined the party and made my debut on the political scene in 1941 at the age of 24, when I had the least political experience and theoretical knowledge. You may well ask me how it was then that I was elected to the 15-member leadership group of the party in the First Tehran Congress in the very first year of my membership. The answer is that you should look at the list of all 15 persons who were elected to the party's leadership at that conference and at the First Congress. The saying goes: "In the land of the blind, the one-eyed person is king." Alongside me in that leadership group sat the kind of people who, first, hardly possessed enough literacy to read and write and, second, whose experience of political activity was limited to a few months' membership in one or the other party district under the 53 followers of Dr Arani or to a little work with the old Communist Party of Iran. I will name but a few of them for you: Nureldin Almuti, who was reputed to be an honest judge in the judiciary system of the time but lacked theoretical literary and practical experience. He was really below average in comprehension of the national issues. Even to the last day he did not make the least effort to learn at least some theory. Thanks to pressures from Kambakhsh, this man, who was his friend and came from the same city (Qazvin), became the first secretary of the Tudeh Party of Iran for some time. As soon as the Azarbayjan movement was defeated, he began to move gradually away from the party. He later reemerged as minister of justice in Prime Minister 'Ali Amini's cabinet. Please note that the reliability of a person which is to a large extent the function of his education, understanding and perusal of the theoretical issues of scientific socialism should be of high

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importance to a serious-minded party. This man did not know any foreign language and could not read the scientific socialist books and publications not yet translated into Persian. This leadership included two things--E'zazi and Mazhari--who were weaker than even Nureldin Almuti and remained so. I do not intend to pass judgment on them as simple members of the party. But how can such people be included in the leadership of a serious-minded party? I will not extend my talk to assessment of such people as Bahrami and Yazdi, who lacked political literacy and only claimed a background of "cooperation" with the followers of Dr Arani.

Of course, earlier on, there were people in the party such as Soleyman Mirza and some of the intimates and followers of Dr Arami such as Iraj Eskandari and Radmanesh and some old communists such as Artashez Avanessian, Rusta and Boqrati who were more literate and of longer standing than others. But this was only at the inception of the party and in its first couple of years. Soon some of us latecomers and novices in party activism and politics became more mature and literate as a result of study and activity in the party, while some of the oldtimers remained as they were. A representative of such "leaders" was Artashez Avanessian, who sought absolute leadership of the party at its inception. He was dogmatic and of mediocre political acumen. He soon scaled down the leadership ladder because he made no effort to augment his theoretical and scientific knowledge. He had to be content with tagging behind Kambakhsh and Kianuri. (He had studied at the "Kutef," i.e., the Communist University for Middle Eastern Studies in the 1920's). When we represented the party in the 14th term of the Majles, he tried to lure me into what he called the "youth group," that is, the Kambakhsh-Kianuri faction. But I immediately put him in his place and brought the matter up both in the parliamentary faction and in the party Central Committee. Artashez Avanessian never forgot this and never "forgave" me for it. The faction created by Artashez Avanessian was strengthened with Kambakhsh's arrival in Iran in 1943. I told you earlier that Kambakhsh had been forced on the party by Aliov. After Kambakhsh's arrival in Iran a series of actions and events took place in Iran with the help of his brother-in-law, Kianuri, of which the party, the Central Committee, the Executive Board and even the secretary of the party were unaware. These were implemented directly by these two persons with the use of the party machinery and some of the party cadres whom they could depend on. We learned of these events and processes when all the emigre members of the Central Committee gathered in exile in Moscow in the 1950's.

Kambakhsh stayed in Iran and in the party for only 3 years--from 1943 to 1946. He left Iran immediately after the defeat of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party of Iran. He went where he had originally been sent from, namely to Baqerov in Baku. I will list some of those incidents for your information.

1. The assassination of Ahmad Dehqan, the managing editor of TEHRAN MOSSAVAR magazine.

2. The assassination of Mohammad Mas'ud, the managing director of the newspaper MARD-E EMRUZ, who was very popular in Iran for his attacks on the shah's court.

3. The covert formation of the assassination committee with the membership including some members of the party.

4. His involvement, through an intermediary, in the shooting at the shah.

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5. The killing of some of the ordinary members of the party.

6. The murder of Hosam Lankarani, a loyal and devoted member of the party, whose brothers were well known and popular in Iran and in the party. Hosam Lankarani was liquidated at the suggestion of Kianuri and on the approval of the members of the Executive Board living in Tehran on the grounds that he knew many of the secrets of the party!

7. The instigation of the mutiny of the officers in Khorasan who were members of the officers organization. The revolt resulted in the deaths of a number of the best officers of this organization.

8. Causing an explosion on the cruiser Babr.

9. Causing an airplane explosion at Qal'eh Morghi airport.

What is significant is that these adventurist acts were performed by the Kianuri-Kambakhsh gang at a time when the Tudeh Party was an overt organization and even had a parliamentary faction (with eight members) in the Majles.

In sum, Kambakhsh and Kianuri (his brother-in-law) had a secret faction inside the party, or in other words, a "party within the Tudeh Party of Iran" which carried out the roders of Baqerov, the secretary general of the Communist Party of Soviet Azerbaydzhan. It reminds me that in one of the meetings of the Central Committee in Moscow I suggested that Kambakhsh choose between the Tudeh Party of Iran and the Azarbayjan Democratic Party, which was still independent of the Tudeh Party of Iran and was often in conflict with our party. He would have to resign from one because Kambakhsh was both a member of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran and actually the real leader of the Iranian Azarbayjan Democratic Party in Baku. I added that Kambakhsh was active in the Democratic Party on the order of Baqerov, who had not yet been stood before the firing squad. Kambakhsh replied with coolness and self-confidence: "I must consult Comrade Baqerov on this." It was clear to me that this statement was a warning to me to keep silent or I would have to deal with Baqerov. Sometime later I reiterated my suggestion at the Central Committee. In that meeting Kianuri asked for permission to speak. He said: "Comrade Keshavarz is raising a matter which seems to me to be very important and should be cleared up by our comrades. Comrade Keshavarz says that Comrade Kambakhsh has become a member of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party on the instruction of Comrade Baqerov. This brings up another matter, and that is our relationship with our Soviet comrades. This is highly important and therefore I will express my view on it. I believe that if our Soviet comrades call one of us and tell us to /"'do this or that but don't tell your Central Committee comrades,' we should listen and do what we are told."/ This statement has gone on record in the proceedings of the meeting of the Central Committee in Moscow. /The sentences clearly couch a confession by Kianuri of obedience to the Soviet Union and hold a threat to me. Besides, Kianuri was thus putting the foot of the Soviet Union into his actions in the party./

It would be enough for you to read the speeches and writing of the Tudeh Party deputies in the 14th term of the Majles. Then you would see that there was a hidden organization or faction within our party that carried out the order of Stalin, Beria, and Baqerov. On the other hand, 99 percent of the members and cadres of the party and some of the members of the leadership group of the party in Iran were not--I repeat, "were not"--agents and performers of the orders of the Soviet Union and

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were innocent of such charges. They did not at all believe that "if the Soviets beckoned to somebody and told him to do this or that and to keep it a secret from his Central Committee comrades" he should carry out that order. I will cite a few more examples in this context for your information:

On page 131 of Volume 2 of K. Ostovan's book entitled, "Policy of Negative Struggle," part of my speech delivered in the meeting of 19 Mehr 1324 (11 October 1945) has been inserted. On that day a quorum of 81 deputies submitted a bill to the Majles to the effect that the elections to the 15th parliamentary term be deferred until the completion of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran. I will read to you verbatim a part of that speech of mine:

"Messrs Deputies, I do not believe that any honorable Iranian or any Iranian who is proud of calling himself Iranian could accept the presence on the territory of his country of foreign troops, alien troops, even if they are the allies of his country. /As I said last time in the Majles, whoever advocates the stay of foreign troops in Iran I consider a dishonorable and base person./ (shouts of agreement from the deputies) I consider dishonorable and base not only he who finds the presence of foreign troops in Iran necessary but also any person who has any connection with the aliens, covertly or overtly, who receives money from them--as some in this very Majles do--who is their lackey and mercenary. (shouts of agreement from the deputies) There have been some families in this country which have been mercenaries of foreigners for 150 years."

Deputy Speaker of the Majles: "Dr, please do not digress."

Dr Keshavarz: "Mr Malek Madani, if the majority in the Majles permits, I will speak against this bill. Otherwise I will quit this Majles...."

Deputy Speaker: "Please continue your speech, but do not digress from the subject of the bill...."

Several times the members of the majority and at this point the deputy speaker of the Majles tried to prevent my speech, until I said: "Despite all your clamor and ado in this Majles, I will stand here and speak out whatever I believe serves the national interest even if an attempt may be made on my life upon my leaving this place." The majority deputies finally quited down and I continued my speech thus: "...After pointing out that an honorable Iranian--and I consider myself one such honorable Iranian--will not permit foreign troops, even those of our allies, to remain in Iran, permit me to speak a little about our relations with the Allies." Here again I was heckled, but after some more exchanges calm was restored and I managed to continue: "...I say these things in order to make it clear to those unbiased deputies that not all connection with or fondness for a foreign government can be termed unpatriotic.... Therefore, if some person, some deputy, finds it in the interest of his nation to support a friendly policy from among the various foreign policies toward his country, he cannot be called unpatriotic. (deputies: That is right!) The person who calls him a foreign mercenary is himself dishonorable."

Hashemi: "There are limits to this."

Dr Keshavarz: "There certainly are limits, Mr Hashemi. The limits are that friendship toward a foreign government should be within the framework of the interest of the Iranian nation and the integrity of our country. I mean this friendship should

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go only so far as to insure that Iran belongs to the Iranians and that its integrity and the interest of the Iranian nation are preserved. (deputies: That is correct!) May I add that the person who advocates this friendship does not get any money or position for his advocacy. (deputies: That is correct!) /Mr Hashemi, a patriot is one who limits his friendship with foreigners to the interests, independence and integrity of Iran...."/

The majority deputies finally interrupted my speech in which I was recalling some facts about the agreement of 1919, Seyyed Ziaeddin, the coup d'etat of the third of Esfand of the army commander [reference to Reza Khan before he became the shah]. The deputy speaker of the Majles put a motion to vote to deny my the right of speech in that session. The majority voted for this law-breaking motion and deprived me of the right to speak. I was not the only person in the Tudeh Party of Iran who had this view of relations with foreigners. I dare say the majority of the party's deputies in the Majles and the near total majority of all the party cadres and members shared the same view, but some other members of the leadership and party deputies in the Majles, such as Kambakhsh, Avanessian and Kianuri, held a diametrically opposite view. For instance, at that very time and on the very subject of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran, Kianuri wrote in an article in the newspaper MARDOM which was aimed at intellectuals: "...The matter of the withdrawal of the Allied forces from Iran is a very sensitive and important problem of our country and it is not at all advisable to judge it with childish emotions.... Just as military needs during the war required that the enemy not get a foothold on the borders of the great powers, this principle remains equally valid today when political war has replaced military war. /Before the British and Soviet armies leave Iran the two governments want to make sure that no base will be created in Iran against them...." The prerequisite for the departure of foreign troops is that they should make sure that their legitimate interests in Iran are protected...."/ The war was over. As you can see, no further explanation is needed about these two contradictory views. Kanuri's article has been printed on pages 228 through 230 of Jami's book entitled "The Past Is the Guiding Light for the Future," and I put it at your disposal. The other example occurred at the end of spring 1945 when Kambakhsh, who spoke very little in the Majles, asked for permission to speak. He said something like this: "If the government and some parliamentary factions would like to shift the struggle out of the newspapers and out of the Majles and other forums and turn it into a different kind of struggle, we accept the challenge." We deputies of the Tudeh Party did not understand in those days why Kambakhsh gave the government and the Majles such an "ultimatum" and spoke in that manner. The party had not decided to throw a challenge to the government and the Majles, so to speak, and to declare war on them. We had an overt party and eight-member parliamentary faction. This was better than fighting and going underground anyway. A couple of months later the revolt of the officers took place in Khorasan under the supervision of Kambakhsh which had definitely been planned at the order of Baqerov in Iran. The Central Committee had no clue to it. Later on, in Moscow, Kambakhsh tried but failed to attribute this incident to Iraj Eskandari. This was in fact a provocation which cost the lives of seven of the best officers of the party military organization in Gorgan. As you see, the mistakes and treasons of an active faction in the party leadership, a faction which carried out the orders of foreign authorities, on the one hand, and the lethargy, carelessness, connivance and opportunism of a number of other leaders, on the other, resulted in the actual existence of two parties, two leaderships, two policies in the Tudeh Party of Iran when it was an overt party in Iran. The Tudeh Party of Iran was like a strong and healthy body commanded by a tiny, sick

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and confused brain. If the party had not been afflicted by such treason, factionalism and division, its body would have functioned better, its leadership would have analyzed the issues better and worked more efficiently.

Now, of course you have the right to tell me: "Dr Keshavarz, you went overboard with friendship toward the Soviet Union, and that at the time of Stalin, Beria and Baqerov...." Your criticism of me is no doubt well directed. But it should not be forgotten that I and those like me--that is, 98 percent of the members of the party--were novices and inexperienced in political and partisan work. I walked from my medical practice desk to the party in 1941 without the slightest partisan knowledge and experience or record of political struggles. You would only have to look at my biography published by the party Central Committee in the newspaper MARDOM for intellectuals. It reads: "...Dr Keshavarz is a distinctive example of the Iranian youths and intellectuals who have stepped into the circle of politics, partisanship and social affairs only thanks to our great mass movement. In his speech which took 3 and 1/2 hours to deliver at the time of the Hakimi premiership, he made the following judgment on the 20-year-old ruling elite: '...What has been given the Iranian nation can be summed up in three words: poverty, ignorance and fear. This is what the ruling class of Iran has deposited for the Iranian nation.'" The biography continues: "Such a person not only had nothing to do with politics during the past 20 years but admits that he understood nothing of politics... It was only the movement engendered by our party in Iran that saved him and thousands of youths and intellectuals like him from the dark and murky world and promoted them to the highest ranks and even to membership in the Central Committee in the unified rank of our organization as a result of their own perseverance and diligence.... His father, who as a constitutionalist in the beginning of the constitutional movement... died in the compound of the Majles when Dr Keshavarz was only 2 years old.... It was only his study in the branch of pediatrics that permitted him from the beginning to manage his life by setting up his practice. His specialty in this field soon improved his fortunes, and he was appointed head of the first children's hospital of Iran, of which he himself was the founder.... His lack of knowledge of politics and distance from all such goings-on gave him a chance to complete his education in his field of specialty and he even wrote in his memoirs: "When my fame took me to the sickbed of the youngest son of the former shah (Hamid Reza, who was 7 years old then) on a house call, I cured him of his diphtheria. Later I joined the party as a simple member.'" The article goes on: "His membership card was numbered 150. After this, Dr Keshavarz who was a rare member of the middle and lower classes of the society to go to the university and to go to Europe, thought above all of saving the classes from among which he had risen. He became an active member of the party.... He was never among the 53 and was not imprisoned before 20 Shahrivar [11 September], but now he is not only minister of education of our country, he is also a member of the Central Committee and the Politburo of our progressive party.... In the beginning of the work of the party, things were not easy. Very often the meager rent of the party's club would be deferred for months. The landlord would be angry. Many times the cost of the paper for the party's newspaper had to be borne by the personal resources of the members of the Central Committee. Dr Keshavarz gave a lot of valuable aid to the running of our party in those times. Our comrades will not forget that he would come to the party at night after 5 hours of practicing medicine and sometimes pour out the contents of his pockets on the desk in the Central Committee and give all he had earned.... Since the First Tehran Provincial Conference that elected from among its ranks the members of the Provincial Committee and of the Central Committee, Dr Keshavarz has been a member of the Central

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Committee of our party. He was elected as deputy to the 14th term of the Majles from Bandar Pahlavi and during the 14th term of the Majles was the ablest opponent of the disgraceful deputies of the majority. His power of speech and above all his commendable coolness in the face of the vexing ruses of the corrupt parliamentary majority was the most remarkable of his attributes. His famous speech against the second Sa'id cabinet, his speech in the first Hakimi cabinet which lasted 3 and 1/2 hours in one session, were among the most notable speeches in that term.[1] He astounded everybody when he managed to reach the podium of the Majles despite his injured head and hands[2] to speak against the Sadrol'ashraf cabinet. Doubtless he had a key part in disgracing the shameful policy of the majority in the 14th term of the Majles. During the Sadr government, the attention of our opponents was focused mostly on him. They threw a grenade into his house, and even though as a Majles deputy he was entitled to immunity from any intrusion, he was insulted and beaten with bayonets and rifle butts. Dr Keshavarz is a long-winded, clever, witty, adroit and attractive speaker. In all his interviews with foreign journalists and in all his statements about our party, he has never allowed the interviewer to drag from his mouth anything to the disadvantage of our party. He has always convinced the other party with complete cleverness and alertness. The best weapon our party wields against its opponents and the most effective tool we have to destroy the majority in the 14th term of the Majles is his ability not to succumb to sentiment or compassion and not even to get worked up in debates and wrangles...."

I apologize for reading you these lines the party wrote about me. I was not the only young newcomer to the party and to politics to act with so much self-sacrifice and diligence. The history of the Tudeh Party of Iran and of our country clearly shows that many of our comrades stood up to the enemy to the point of death and defended their views and the interests of the majority of the Iranian people. They revealed no secrets under duress and gave away no one while in captivity. In contemporary Iran, no other party has had so many self-sacrificing men nor given so many martyrs. I just meant to show, by borrowing the words of the Central Committee itself, with what liveliness, enthusiasm and self-sacrifice 90 percent of the members and cadres of the party who, like me, had gone into party politics for the first time, served the party and through it the Iranian nation. Permit me to add that in the same early years, in addition to the financial assistance I gave the party, as admitted by the Central Committee in its writings, for some time I voluntarily sustained the livelihood of two of our Central Committee comrades who devoted all their time to partisan work. I am divulging this for the first time in my 43 years of partisan activity. Everybody knows that I had no inheritance or family fortune. My father was a revolutionary at the time of the Constitutional Revolution and a deputy of the National Consultative Assembly (Majles) from Bandar Abbas and Rasht. He died inside the Majles in its second legislative term when I was only 2 years old. My childhood

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1. These speeches had not been prepared in advance. Dr Keshavarz would only jot down the highlights of the issues he wanted to raise. (Shahrokh Vaziri)

2. When he was a Majles deputy a group of soldiers, at the order of the government and led by a Major Zarrin-Na'l, encircled him on Ferdowsi Avenue near the party's club and beat him up for a while with bayonets and rifle butts. They injured him and broke his hands and head until he passed out. Only a number of women workers grappled with the soldiers and saved him. (Shahrokh Vaziri)

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was filled with hardship. The help I gave to the party was the fruit of my daily medical work. I will now give a direct answer to your question regarding my friendship toward the Soviet Union.

Dr Mosaddeq, the national hero of Iran, the champion of nationalization of the Iranian oil industry, who had over 40 years of experience in political struggle, had this to say about the Soviet Union when he spoke at the 14th term of the Majles: /"As I have observed in the past, I have no doubt that if the Soviet Union bowed out of the Iranian political scene, it would be difficult for us to breathe even in the open air."/ He also said: "...If it were not for the policy of the Soviet Union, if it were not for the Iranian-Soviet pact of 1920, and if the Soviet Union had not done what it did, I swear that the Vosughoddoleh agreement would not have been abrogated...." (The reference is to the agreement imposed on Iran in 1919 by the British with the help of their mercenaries, Vosughoddoleh, the chief minister, and Nosratoddoleh Firuz, the foreign minister, which would reduce Iran to an actual colony of Britain.) Even an unpatriotic politician and British mercenary like Seyyed Ziaeddin, who was a staunch supporter of the 1919 agreement, was full of praise for the Soviet Union whenever he talked about that country. (I will quote for your information his words to Prince Mozaffar Firuz, son of Nosratoddoleh Firuz and an advocate of the agreement, during whose term of office as foreign minister in Vosughoddoleh's cabinet the agreement was signed and imposed on Iran. When Mozaffar Firuz went to Palestine he brought Seyyed to Iran from Palestine with a lot of pomp so that Seyyed could resume his servitude toward Britain. In a talk with Mozaffar Firuz,[3] published in the newspaper EQDAM, issue No 166, 8 Bahman 1321 (28 January 1943), Seyyed Ziaeddin said:

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3. Mozaffar Firuz first went to Palestine and brought Seyyed Zia to Iran and established the newspaper RA'D-E EMRU. (Seyyed Ziaeddin's newspaper at the time of the adoption of the 1919 agreement was called RA'D and was overflowing with adulation for the 1919 agreement and defense of the interests of the British.) In RA'D-E EMRU, Mozaffar Firuz showered the Tudeh Party of Iran and even Dr Mosaddeq with invectives and attacks which are on file. After Seyyed Zia's defeat, in which Dr Mossadeq and our party played a role, Mozaffar Firuz landed on Qavam's side and, except for the short period during which the Azarbayjan Democratic Party was extant, these two denounced our party. All the party members, intellectuals and people of Iran remember these processes. But today, this same Mozaffar Firuz "cooperates" with the party's leadership along with Kianuri, who is the husband of his aunt and the secretary and omnipotent figure in the Tudeh Party of Iran in exile.

This man reminds me of the cooperation of this leadership of the party with Major General Bakhtiar, the notorious executioner. Everybody knows that Bakhtiar was the founder and chief of SAVAK and fiercely suppressed our party. He had the best, the most honest and the most honorable of the Iranian officers imprisoned and shot. He subdued into cooperation group after group of our party cadres and members through inhumane and unbearable torture. Our martyred and heroic comrade, Ruzbeh, wrote to the Fourth Executive Plenum of the Central Committee about these tortures, but this leadership does not want to or cannot print it because Comrade Ruzbeh's letter condemns them as dishonorable. He described the torture in these words: "...This torture is too much for the stamina of a human being to sustain...." At this juncture I recall that the Italian author Oriana Fallaci wrote in her book entitled, "Life, War, and Nothing Else": "...If you could understand that a human being cannot withstand the corporal punishment of today, then you would realize why I confessed.

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"...Lenin and the key figures of the Russian revolution were not Iranians as far as language, political opinion, characteristics and habits are concerned, but what they gave Iran and what they did for Iran, no Iranian king, or political leader, no Iranian minister, Majles deputy, or writer has done for Iran throughout Iran's history.... When Lenin was in Petrograd I was there, too. Lenin said: 'I will annul the capitulation treaty with Iran.' And I had faith in them.... I was confident that Lenin and the leaders of the Russian revolution would make good their promises..." On another occasion, Seyyed Zia told the Majles in the presence of Dr Mosaddeq: "...Gentlemen, the pride in the signing of the Iranian Soviet agreement is mine...." As you see, the former was the statement by Dr Mosaddeq, the old honest statesman, and the latter was the statement by Seyyed Zia, the old mercenary politician in the employ of Britain. But we were school children at the time of the signing of that agreement. Under Reza Shah's dictatorship we were initially students at the Darolfonoon higher school and then we were sent to Europe by the government for higher education. Under those circumstances how could we novices have anything except veneration for the land of Lenin and of the Great October Revolution? Even today I find Dr Mosaddeq's statement about the Soviet Union valid.

Briefly speaking, the majority of Iranian communists and followers of Dr Arani--the second generation of Iranian communists--who began their activity with the Tudeh Party of Iran, and most of the communists who were of the first generation of communists in Iran and were killed in exile by Stalin or remained in Iran in Reza Shah's prison or under banishment, were all upright men, devoted and patriotic, and their fondness for the Soviet Union was based of their beliefs, patriotism and humanism. They were firmly convinced that they were thus protecting Iran's interests.

Briefly speaking, to appraise the status and power of the Tudeh Party of Iran in the months preceding the shooting at the shah, it must be said that the Tudeh Party of Iran did not have the power to take over the government after the possible death of the shah because the Azarbayjan Democratic Party had already been crushed, the Tudeh Party itself had suffered from schism and, besides, the Government of Iran and the reactionary forces were severely crushing the structure of the Tudeh Party after the defeat of Azarbayjan.

From a possible assassination of the shah, only Razmara, who had the control of the army in his hands, stood to benefit.

Question: A great deal has been written about the Azarbayjan Democratic Party. What was the nature of the relationship of the Tudeh Party of Iran with the events of Azarbayjan? What were the ties between these two parties?

[Footnote continued from previous page]

Know, too, that a human being would confess under mental torture because he cannot sustain that, either.... Sometimes one's soul weeps just like one's body does...." Our comrade, Ruzbeh, had expressed the same views in his letter years before. When Bakhtiar, the executioner, fell out with the shah for personal reasons and started his activity in Baghdad, the leadership in exile began to cooperate with Bakhtiar. I remember that I wrote to some of my friends in exile at that time that even if Bakhtiar managed to push the shah out, he himself would be in a position of strength because the army would be at his disposal. What does the party stand to gain from this? Those comrades are still living.

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Answer: The Azerbayjan Democratic Party was established during the premiership of Sadrol'ashraf. Sadr was an intensely reactionary man and he severely suppressed our partisan organizations in Tehran and in the provinces. In his youth, Sadr had been a religious judge and had a hand in sentencing to death and in killing a number of constitutional revolutionaries such as Malekolmotekallemin, Sur Esrafil, and Yahya Mirza (Iraj Eskandari's father) in the Baghe Shah. These sentences given to the leaders of Iran's constitutional movement at that time were on the order of one of the biggest mojtaheds (religious jurisprudents) of the time, the notorious and influential reactionary of the Qajar court. This reactionary mojtahed was Sheykh Fazlollah Nuri, a Muslim religious leader and the grandfather of Kianuri, the current secretary of the Tudeh Party of Iran in exile. After the victory of the freedom fighters and the establishment of the constitutional government in Iran, Sheykh Fazlollah Nuri was tried, sentenced to death and put to death by hanging. The number of people who were sentenced to death at that time was really very small and was limited to the most bloodthirsty of them. The story of the event can be read in the book about the Iranian Constitutional Revolution by the famous Orientalist, Edward Browne, and the books entitled "The Iranian Constitutional Revolution" and "Eighteen Years in Azarbayjan's History" by the late famous Iranian historian Kasravi. The study of this story puts one to thinking, because Sheykh Mehdi Nuri, the son of Sheykh Fazlollah and the father of Kianuri, performed some acts at the side of the gallows on the day of his father's hanging that were most shocking as far as human compassion is concerned. At the gallows he helped his father's hangman to kill him. He was later found dead on a Tehran street one night and his killer was never found. I was talking about Sadr, who atrociously suppressed the partisans and all the democratic organizations of Iran so that he would pave the way for the Reza Shah dictatorship and for consolidating the status of the British Oil Company in the south. I will spare you the details of these.

The day before the announcement of the establishment of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party, the Tudeh Party Central Committee had a meeting in my house. The reason for holding the meeting in my house was that the party's club had been occupied by soldiers under the martial law announced in Tehran, but I enjoyed parliamentary immunity in my house. At about 1800, Asghar, my driver, called me and said: "A man who calls himself Padegan has come from Tabriz and says he has urgent business with you." Padegan was the secretary of the party's provincial organization in Azarbayjan. I went out of the room and Padegan said: "I have just arrived from Tabriz with a very urgent message for the Central Committee but I do not know where to find our comrades." I replied: "It so happens that a Central Committee meeting is taking place in my house right now and everybody is here." I took him into the room. He said to everybody: "I have just arrived from Tabriz and I must return immediately. I have come to inform you that as of tomorrow our entire organization in Azarbayjan will be separate from the Tudeh Party of Iran and will, with the agreement of the Soviet comrades, join the Azarbayjan Democratic Party, whose establishment is to be announced tomorrow.

You can imagine what a shock this was to all of us and how we felt. We wanted to enter into negotiation and discussion with Padegan but he got up after a few minutes and said: "I have not been sent here empowered to hold talks. I have only come to give you the news." He said goodby and left so that he could be in Tabriz the following morning in time for the announcement of the establishment of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party. There was a long discussion among us about this. We finally decided to write a letter to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to convince them that what they were doing would hurt both the Tudeh Party of Iran and the Soviet Union. Out of the 15 members of the Central Committee not one agreed with what we

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wanted to do, or did not dare to speak up his agreement. Later on, in exile in Moscow, where many of the secrets of some of the leaders were exposed and we found out about all that Kambakhsh had been doing during his 3-year stay in Iran and in the party, I was sure that Kambakhsh had been informed by Baqerov's agents in Tehran about all the processes in Azarbayjan (such as the Khorasan uprising) before the establishment of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party and had perhaps taken a hand in the preparation thereof, particularly because immediately after the defeat of Azarbayjan, whereas we were all living in a state of semi-hiding, Kambakhsh left Iran for the Soviet Union and informed the Central Committee in a hurry that he had turned over all his partisan responsibilities to Kianuri, who, in Kambakhsh's words, was the only person who was knowledgeable about all the matters at hand.

At any rate, the letter of protest was written to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and I remember well that Iraj Eskandari was assigned to write the letter in question. After it had been read out and approved by the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party, it was sent, but no answer was ever received.

The rest of the events of Azarbayjan and the establishment of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party are public information. The day after the establishment of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party had been announced, the Tudeh Party of Iran in Azarbayjan joined the Azarbayjan Democratic Party. If I am not mistaken, Boqrati, a member of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran, gave a speech during the ceremony celebrating the inauguration of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party in Tabriz without the permission of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party.

There is no doubt that over those 20 years the people of Azarbayjan had been oppressed under the oppressive, cruel and degrading rule of Reza Shah even more than the other parts of the country. All the prerequisites for a revolution or uprising had permeated all the people of Iran. But the police, gendarmerie and army of Reza Shah and the presently reigning shah cruelly crushed all dissidence and recalcitrance of the Iranian people. However, the presence of the Red Army in Azarbayjan and its agreement to help the uprising of the people of Azarbayjan prevented the police and gendarmerie, and particularly the army, from snuffing out the discontented and rioting people with bullets and bloodshed.

The Tudeh Party of Iran gradually lent its support to the legitimate demands of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party. The Iran Party, too, which was comprised of a number of intellectuals and patriots--and later, a number of the close and loyal colleagues of Dr Mosaddeq--supported the legitimate demands of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party. A large number of the newspapers, intellectuals with influence in politics, and deputies of the National Consultative Assembly (Majles), recognized the legitimacy of the demands of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party and gave it their support. The Iranian newspapers of the time, even the reactionary ones, bore witness to this claim and their pages were full of support for the rights of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party and for the necessity of extending its proposed reforms to all parts of the country.

The Azarbayjan Democratic Party created enthusiasm and joy in the Iranian people, in Iranian freedomlovers and in the opponents of the despotic regime. But it should have kept clear of Soviet Azarbayjan and of the suspicion of secession from Iran. It should have said and did much more to show that the Azarbayjan movement was part

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of the freedom movement of all the people of Iran and that Azarbayjan would always remain part and parcel of a unified independent and free Iran. The statements and writings of the deputies of the Tudeh Party in the National Consultative Assembly (Majles) prove that 90 percent of us thought no differently. By keeping the differences of the time in mind, the Azarbayjan Democratic Party should have trodden the path that the likes of Sattar Khan and Khiabani trod. It should have daily emphasized the fundamental principle that Azarbayjan was an integral part of Iran. If these conditions had been observed, particularly if the Soviet Union, the powerful great northern neighbor of Iran, had not demanded access to the oil resources of northern Iran, if the Soviet Union had declared, instead, that it wanted an independent, democratic and free Iran as a neighbor, free from fear of foreign intervention; if the Soviet Union had made clear that it did not covet Iranian Azarbayjan and the Iranian oil; if it had offered to help Iran unconditionally to tap its resources (the kind of help it later gave the shah but not the people of Iran, help which is still continuing), Iran's situation definitely would not have been what it is today.

The Soviets finally stranded the Iranian Azarbayjan movement. Consequently, 16,000 people of Azarbayjan were killed by the Iranian Army. Part of the leadership of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party immigrated to the Soviet Union (Baku). The rest had to give themselves up or face imprisonment, torture and execution. This should serve all liberation movements of the world, all parties, patriots and humanists as a lesson "not to descend into a well with the rope of the others."

Allow me to narrate an incident for you at this point. This incident shows, on the one hand, the view and attitude of the Soviet leaders toward Iranian Azarbayjan and the leaders of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party and, on the other, throws light on the character of some of the leaders of the Iranian Azarbayjan Democratic Party, especially Pishevari.

At his dinner reception in Baku given in honor of Pishevari and the chiefs and officers of the army of the Iranian Azarbayjan Democratic Party, Baqerov, the secretary general of the Soviet Azerbaydzhan Communist Party, said: "The biggest mistake of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party which brought it defeat was that it did not adequately stress the need for the unification of the Soviet and Iranian Azarbayjans." A few of the Iranian officers who had joined the Azarbayjan Democratic Party and were attending the reception told me that as the next immediate leader of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party, Pishevari said in his dinner speech in response to Baqerov: "Contrary to Comrade Baqerov's opinion, I believe that our biggest single mistake and cause of the defeat of our movement was that we did not emphasize enough the indisputable unity of Iranian Azarbayjan with the rest of Iran. We should have stressed our solidarity with Iran and the Iranian people; we should have stressed the inseparability of Iranian Azarbayjan from Iran." Those like me who have known Pishevari appreciate that his integrity and courage were such that he would fear no one when he wanted to tell the truth and express his opinions. Baqerov was furious and he said to Pishevari in Turkish, "Ottorkishi," meaning "sit down little man." It was his way of belittling Pishevari. Pishevari was a liberal. What was exchanged after this may be known some day. What is certain is that after that moment, Pishevari became an object of hatred to Baqerov and his agent. Soon afterward the car in which Pishevari was riding was involved in an "accident" with a truck. He was sitting in the front seat next to the driver while Gholam Yahya was in the back seat. Pishevari was injured and hospitalized. Those who visited him at the hospital said he was not in danger. But Pishevari "died" in the hospital overnight. Some time

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after Stalin's death, Baqerov was publicly tried and condemned to death. Reportedly he confessed that between the 1920's and the time of Stalin's death (1952) he had killed about 25,000 people. Pishevari was one of those who had been killed by Baqerov. Gholam Yahya (Daneshian), one of Baqerov's lackeys, replaced Pishevari as the leader of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party after Pishevari's "death." Later on, after years of opposition to the Tudeh Party of Iran, the Azarbayjan Democratic Party was ostensibly merged with the Tudeh Party, and Gholam Yahya became a member of the highest echelon of leadership in the Tudeh Party, namely its Executive Board.

Those who knew Pishevari recognized that he was an honest, humble, and liberal person, devoted to the cause of the liberation of Iranian toilers. He spent all his life in revolutionary activity, prison or exile. Pishevari was a friend of the Soviet Union, not a lackey of that government like Gholam Yahya was. I cherish his memory with deep veneration.

Question: How and why was Pishevari elected to the leadership of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party?

Answer: Pishevari was a devoted revolutionary. He had taken an effective part in the Guilan Revolution of 1919-1920. After the Guilan Revolution he spent 20 years in prison and under banishment. He was freed in 1941 upon the arrival of the Allied troops. He was barred from joining the Tudeh Party of Iran on account of Artashez Avanessian's opposition to him. Artashez Avanessian was an ambitious, egotistical man and could not bear to see that there were others better and wiser than himself. That explains why he detested Pishevari.

Left out of the Tudeh Party of Iran, Pishevari did not remain idle. He started publishing the newspaper AZHIR just as he published the newspaper HAQIQAT at the beginning of the rise of the commander of the army (Reza Shah) which was then the most widely circulated newspaper in Tehran. My brother, Karim Keshavarz, who had been a close friend and colleague of Pishevari's since the years of the Gilan Revolution, cooperated with him in AZHIR newspaper too. His byline was occasionally given as "Karim Rashti." Pishevari was elected to the fourteenth term of the Majles from Tabriz, but the reactionary majority of the deputies rejected his credentials. I must elucidate a fact at this point. Some people have written that Iraj Eskandari voted against Pisheviri's credentials. The fact is that Iraj Eskandari voted in favor of Pishevari's credentials like the rest of us did. It was Avanessian who did not vote in favor of him due to the animosity toward Pishevari he had harbored since prison days. Dr Mosaddeq deplored this decision of the majority in the Majles.

Pishevari was an Azarbayjani and with his long record of struggle, he was the best choice for leading the Azarbayjan Democratic Party. There was nobody more experienced and of longer standing than he. With few exceptions, the members of the leadership of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party were puny persons, politically emaciated. Others like Dr Javid and Shabastari were unbelieving and unprincipled.

Question: How would you justify the confusion and pandemonium which seized the Azarbayjan Democratic Party in its last days?

Answer: There were more than just a couple of reasons. Here are two of the reasons:

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Question: How would you justify the confusion and pandemonium which seized the Azarbayjan Democratic Party in its last days?

Answer: There were more than just a couple of reasons. Here are two of the reasons:

1. Roosevelt, who had maintained friendly relations with the Soviet Union and with Stalin, had just died and his successor, Truman, issued his famous ultimatum to the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces from Iran. Truman threatened the people of the world and the Soviet Union with the American atomic bomb, something the Soviet Union lacked.

2. On the other hand, the Soviet Union had been "assured" by Qavam that the oil deposits of Iran would be exploited by an Iranian-Soviet joint venture. Therefore, there was no need to keep the Soviet troops in Iran. Stalin ordered the departure of the Soviet troops from Iran. This shows that Stalin wanted oil, not a free and democratic Iran. It is clear that this decision created a lot of anxiety and then a panic in the Azarbayjan Democratic Party. Some of the members and leaders of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party emigrated to the Soviet Union. Some others were killed on the streets and in their homes by the army that had arrived from Tehran and by the mercenary hooligans hired by the government. And a number of party members preferred to stick to their guns and fight it out. They fought to the last man and became martyrs. Many of them did not ever get the chance to talk to their friends.

The stark truth is that the people of Iran, and in particular the oppressed people of Azarbayjan, were victimized by a wrong and, at any rate, unsocialistic policy of Stalin's regime. I will not enter into a discussion at this point of the provocation by the United States of America and England in the south of Iran, among the tribes and in Khuzestan. Unbiased experts on Iran's politics know these facts. To sum it up:

1. The "mistakes" of the Soviet Union and of the Iranian Communist Party in 1919-1920 with respect to the Guilan Revolution and to Mirza Kuchek Khan Jangali, the decent, valiant but noncommunist revolutionary, resulted in the defeat of the Iranian liberation movement. Mirza Kuchek Khan was forsaken and killed. Those revolutionary leaders who emigrated to the Soviet Union were killed in the Stalinist "purge" of the 1920's.

2. Considering the locality and other differences, the "mistakes" of the Soviet Union, the Azarbayjan Democratic Party and of the Tudeh Party, and the treason of some of the leaders of these two parties who constantly placed the machinery of their parties at the disposal of Baqerov and Stalin, resulted in the defeat of the Iranian liberation movement in 1946 and in the death in Baku of the revolutionary leader of the people of Azarbayjan, Pishevari. It also resulted in the imprisonment, torture and execution of a large number of the members, officials and officers of these two parties. Far be it from me to want to try to detract even one iota from the valor, sacrifices and services of the communist revolutionaries or the Tudeh Party and the Azarbayjan Democratic Party. Most of the members and leaders of these organizations were honest and devoted persons. Thousands of them gave their lives in the cause of their belief and or were sent to jail or exile. Or they were killed by the regime of Stalin and Baqerov. /But these martyrs should not be used as an excuse to cover up the treason, faults and mistakes of the parties, and particularly of their leaders.

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There is no opportunity at this point for me to describe in detail the most useful and fruitful efforts and activity of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party during its brief, 1-year existence, or the mistakes it made. However, it was fairly clear at that time, too, that the experience of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party pointed to one thing: with the situation prevailing throughout the socialist front, it was not clear who or which party was communist and who or which was not. On the other hand we see that internationalism, too, was abused. No liberation movement, no revolutionary process should count on foreign assistance, even if the aiding regime is called socialist. For such aid may cost the independence and freedom of the movement. Therefore, it should always stand on its own feet and struggle with indigenous means.

Question: What was the position and situation of the Tudeh Party of Iran after the defeat of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party?

Answer: As I said earlier, the establishment of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party was unexpected to us. We were faced with a fait accompli. The defeat of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party was equally unexpected to us. We were again faced with a foregone conclusion. Our party had nothing to do with and no information about the establishment or the retrenchment of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party.

The mistake of the Tudeh Party of Iran and of its leadership--and that includes all of us--was that instead of criticizing the mistakes of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party and thus proving to the Iranian people our party's independence, we supported the Azarbayjan Democratic Party unconditionally. But given the situation prevailing in the leadership of the Tudeh Party of Iran, the struggle raging inside the leadership group, /the existence of a faction inside the party leadership acting on the instruction of foreigners,/ and given the youth and inexperience of the party, which was only 5 years old then (1941-1946), it would be out of place to expect it to function correctly. /Unconditional support of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party and of the Soviet Union cost our party and the people most dearly./ The unfounded accusations and the villifications that the present party leadership in exile levels against me in punishment for my candidness will solve nothing for them, nor for the party, nor for the oppressed people of Iran who have been the underdog in their struggles against a bloodsucking dictatorship for 25 years.

/The leadership of the Tudeh Party of Iran should change, and the party should sincerely admit to its mistakes. This is the only correct way and the only means of winning the confidence of the majority of the Iranian people. And this must be done inside Iran. Otherwise this leadership can be imposed on the people only by means of the bayonets of a foreign army or by means of foreign money. That is what the Americans have been doing for the shah of Iran.

It must be said that if the excuse of the shooting at the shah had not been used to disband and crush the Tudeh Party of Iran, the Americans and the British and their mercenary regime in Iran would have made up another pretext for suppressing the party. Remember La Fontaine's story "The Wolf and the Lamb"? But in this case, the judgment of the people of Iran and of history would be recorded to the benefit of the leadership of the party. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the party of Lenin and of the Great October Revolution, which gave rise to the first government of workers and peasants, made a valuable contribution to the independence of Iran in the dark years of our history, and the Soviet Union shouldered the heaviest burden of the

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struggle in the war against the fascism of Hitlerite Germany and Italy and their accomplices, making millions of sacrifices to become in fact the key element in the defeat of fascism. There is no doubt that these facts effectively won confidence in the Soviet Union among the majority of the members, cadres and leaders of the Tudeh Party of Iran. The youth and inexperience of the party and the bifactionalism within the leadership were added factors which led to the mistakes of the Tudeh Party of Iran. Add to all these the existence of two unscrupulous mercenaries of Baqerov (i.e., Kambakhsh and his brother-in-law Kianuri) who had penetrated into the party, taken a grip on the sensitive affairs and acted according to the wishes of their masters, and it will become clear why the Tudeh Party of Iran was defeated.

Question: What was the reaction of the hundreds of party units in Iran when they learned that Kambakhsh was an agent of Baqerov and of the Soviet Union?

Answer: The units in Iran did not know about these issues. When the party leadership gave in to Aliov's wish about Kambakhsh's membership in the party, it kept it a secret from the members of the units. Some people like me learned of many of the crimes and secret doings of this group in the party only when we were in exile and only after some of our party comrades ceased to be tongue-tied and started to report and confess.

I must say that these issues seemed to us newcomers to be just a competition within the party. We did not know these "leaders" well and were very inexpert in party politics.

As long as Stalin was alive, telling the truth was highly hazardous. My brother, Jamshid, and later I became objects of attack by Kambakhsh and Kianuri on this score, so much so that in one of last sessions of the Central Committee plenum which I attended (in 1958), I clearly told the meeting that I did not dare drink coffee in the Central Committee because I feared the Kambakhsh-Kianuri band would send me to the flock of Hessam Lankarani, Zakharian and others. Despite all these difficulties, a great many units and emigre officers wrote to the party Central Committee letters of protest and complaint, including some from Baku, about their deplorable situation and about the doings of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party, whose true administrators were Baqerov-appointed Kambakhsh and Gholam Yahya Daneshian (the leader of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party), who were both devoted servants of Baqerov. These letters are on file and have been reflected in the proceedings.

Before the Fourth Plenum, particularly in the last days of this extensive plenum in Moscow (June-July 1957), which lasted 3 weeks and was attended by 80 participants (15 from the Central Committee and 59 from among the cadres), the party was divided in almost two equal groups with a difference of a few votes. The simple majority intended to expel from the party the culprits and perpetrators of the past mistakes (especially Kambakhsh and Kianuri). At this point it was learned that the Soviets, who were putting on record all the proceedings of the plenum and had a representative in the plenum as a "guest from a brotherly party", were against the division of the party into two groups. At this point, Iraj Eskandari came in the middle and began a conciliation effort. Iraj Eskandari had fallen out with Kambakhsh and Kianuri and had severely attacked them, calling them traitors, saboteurs, and killers of Arani. But in the plenum recess, before the eyes of the 80 participants in the meeting which was being held in a garden, he took the hand of Maryam Firuz, Kianuri's wife, and said: "Dear cousin, let us go and have a little chat." You see, they

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are prince and princess, but Iraj Eskandari's father, Yahya Mirza, was a constitutionalist who was sentenced to death for his ideology and was killed during the reign of Mohammad 'Ali Shah of the Qajar dynasty, whereas Maryam Firuz's father was Prince Farmanfarma Firuz, who opposed the constitutionalists and the liberals. His crimes and those of his children have been recorded in Abolqasem Qasemi's book entitled "Iranian Oligarchy or Ruling Families" under the chapter on the family of Firuz Farmanfarmaian. All the participants in that day's meeting of the plenum remember this "unexpected" scene, and this glib talk with "dear cousin" in Moscow was a standing joke among the cadres for a long time. Thus peace was restored within the leadership. Radmanesh, the party secretary general, who was always an irresolute man, adhered to Iraj Eskandari's formula, which was the worst solution. Thus, the Executive Board which was elected equally represented the two sides, while the office of the secretary general remained the tutelage of Radmanesh, who had been opposed to the Kambakhsh-Kianuri faction until that day. Some cadres, including myself, strongly opposed this peacemaking formula, but we found ourselves in the minority. Similar incidents had apparently preceded in the case of the Greek and Spanish Communist Parties in exile in the Soviet Union. In their cases, fighting had broken out and a number of people had been injured. In that plenum, the new Executive Board promised to discourage division and factionalism and to try to make for cooperation. All the crimes, treasons, factionalisms and killings that had driven a nation into the bondage of America were committed to oblivion. The perpetrators of these treasons stayed in their positions. This was a great victory for the Kambakhsh-Kianuri faction, which had been eased through with the direct help of the "host."

At the next (fifth) plenum, the two sides in the Executive Board complained that their differences had not gone away and that they were still bickering. They wanted a solution. So they were nudged toward reconciliation again and the Central Committee ordered them to make peace. They did make peace again. Sometime later, Iraj Eskandari who was the go-between in this peacemaking process, got his reward. With the help of Gholam Yahya and the Kambakhsh-Kianuri gang, he removed his old friend, Radmanesh, from the office of secretary general and replaced him. Thus Iraj Eskandari, who was the only survivor in the plenum leadership from among the friends of Dr Arani, had to obey the orders of a faction which was headed by Kianuri and was acting on the order of some of the leaders of the Soviet Azerbaydzhan Democratic Party supported by some of the members of the Iranian Azarbayjan Democratic Party who had joined the leadership group of the Tudeh Party of Iran.

The Iranian members, officers and cadres of the Tudeh Party of Iran knew Gholam Yahya well and were informed about his crimes, but they did not dare to speak up because of their situation in exile where they were. Gholam Yahya, who has reportedly became paralyzed recently, is still the chief of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party and a member of the Executive Board of the Tudeh Party of Iran. He is illiterate, bloodsucking and corrupt. He abetted the preparation of the means of the murder of Pishevari. He was a lackey of Baqerov, the secretary of the Soviet Azerbaydzhan Communist Party, who was tried and executed after the death of his friend, Stalin.

As a result of the pressure brought to bear upon it by the Soviet Azerbaydzhan Communist Party, the Iranian Azarbayjan Democratic Party in exile (in Baku), after years of wrangling and opposition to the leadership of the Tudeh Party of Iran domiciled in Moscow, joined the Tudeh Party of Iran with the ostensible title of "Provincial Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran" in Azarbayjan, but it preserved its structure,

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its Central Committee, its name, and its secretary general (or chairman), namely Gholam Yahya. Thus a number of the members of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party, including Gholam Yahya himself, found admission into the leadership of the Tudeh Party. All the party members in exile know that it was only I--I repeat "only /I"/--in the Central Committee of the party in Moscow who was against these ostentations and tricks about the merger of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party into the Tudeh Party without first disbanding the Azarbayjan Democratic Party. I used to say that that kind of leadership in the Tudeh Party of Iran deserved no better "provincial committee" than that. Another trick of the kind that was played in the leadership of the party in exile some years ago, of which everybody is aware, is that 20 persons were recently appointed or "coopted" into the party Central Committee, despite the fact that no more than 10 members remained from the original members of the Central Committee elected in the congress held in exile in East Berlin, whereas the rest of the people attending it are advisers without the right of vote. Stranger than that was the fact that the Executive Board had brought these 20 persons to Leipzig from various cities in the socialist countries before the approval of their appointment to the Central Committee. They were waiting in a room for the "Central Committee" to vote for their "acceptance" so that they could participate in the Central Committee. And that was done. This is reminiscent of the meetings of the Central Committee and of the congresses of some parties where not even one person could be found who could express the slightest doubt or criticism of the tens of resolutions that were passed in their meetings "unanimously." We saw the result of such "unanimity" under Stalin. How different were such unanimous decisions from the meetings of the Soviet Communist Party under Lenin, in which everything was thrashed out in debates of the pros and cons of issues by the majority and the minority and everything was reflected in the press for the people and the party members to judge. But nowadays, people are removed from the leadership of parties--such as Khrushchev, Liu Zhaotsi, Lin Biao, "the gang of four" and others--without any trial, without their charges and defense being known to the people. All those who have spent their lives in exile in socialist countries know that the leaderships of "brotherly parties" in those countries have full control over the employment, wages, place of residence, in short over the livelihood, so to speak, of the cadres and members and the families of the emigres, and the measure of their attitude toward these people is the same measure used by the secretary general and the leaderships of their respective parties toward them. Therefore, these cadres and members in exile still cannot say what is on their minds. I was not an ordinary, unknown official, and the Soviets knew what my living conditions were in Iran. But even I and my wife were accused by Kambakhsh, at a party Central Committee meeting in Moscow, of seemingly having replaced our personal used sheets with new government ones. What a cheap world! Kambakhsh told the Central Committee meeting that a Russian "commandant" of the Soviet Academy of Social Sciences where I studied at that time had informed him that we had given a few old sheets to them instead of new ones. It seems that the functionaries of the Beria and Baq rov regime were engaged in helping their Iranian operative to silence me by fabricating a false dossier on me, an art of which they were masters. The exact nature of this procedure has been registered in the minutes of the party Central Committee meeting. This type of framing was practiced not only during the Stalin-Beria-Baqerov regime against many of the opposition in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, but also against many Iranians in the thirties, which led to their execution. Even during this period of our exile, two officer comrades suffered the same calamity. One was Mohseni, who committed suicide, and the second was A. Qobadi, who asked to be surrendered to the Iranian Army although he knew he would be killed. He was handed over to the Iranian Army by the Soviets at the frontier in Khorasan and was executed

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by a firing squad of the Iranian Army. In view of all this, can it be said that the present Soviet leaders are unaware of the crimes committed by the present leaders of the Tudeh Party? Do the Soviet leaders not realize that they are gradually losing the remnant of the valuable asset of good reputation and prize which Lenin and his comrades won for the first country of workers and peasants, to which Stalin dealt a severe blow? From that date I decided that I should send my wife and two children to France. (My wife had a doctorate degree from the law college of France; she was the first Iranian woman to obtain this degree in France and the license to practice law in Iran.) I sought to make preparations to leave the Soviet Union, which had become an arena for their activity to frame others, so that I might be able to do something for our party and country in the process. My wife and two children left for Paris. The Tudeh Party Central Committee in Moscow had for years opposed my departure from the Soviet Union for Iran (for covert operations) or to other countries (for overt activities). No one was prepared to leave the Soviet Union. I wrote a letter and pointed out that I had no intention of cooperating with the shah's regime as had been rumored by some members of the leadership outside the meetings. These rumors had it that after sending my family to Paris I planned to return to Iran to make peace and cooperate with the regime in Iran. To disprove these allegations I stated that I would leave behind my eldest son, Farhad, with his own consent, as a hostage with the Central Committee so that it would be proved to them that I had no intention of treason to the party nor to the people but that I only intended to serve my people after reaching Iraq.

During my stay in Iraq I began broadcasting to Iran three nights a week via Baghdad radio, while working at the hospital. My party comrades and the people of Iran have heard my statements. The Central Committee in Moscow was reprimanded by the cadres and was embarrassed. The letters of encouragement from the cadres in exile are still in my possession. But a letter from the Central Committee in Moscow informed me that I should desist from any political activity in Iraq. That accusation by Kambakhsh together with the letter I wrote to the party leadership regarding the keeping of my son hostage in Moscow are available in the minutes of the Central Committee meeting and also in the dossiers.

Most probably the accusation regarding the "bedsheets" reached the attention of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. I and my family were not unknown in Iran. They knew who I was before I joined the Tudeh Party of Iran. They undoubtedly knew that Dr Mosaddeq and I were the only deputies of the National Consultative Assembly (Majles) who refrained from accepting our salaries from the very beginning. Dr Mosaddeq did not accept his salary and contributed it to the university library. And I wrote to the National Assembly (Majles) to ask them to pay my salary each month to the hospital in Bandar Pahlavi, from which city I had been elected deputy just as my father had been elected from the same city some 40 years before me. The hospital was constructed in this city during my term as deputy and as a result of my constant efforts. In addition, during my term as minister I used to send my salary for the same hospital. Fortunately, the book entitled "Negative Campaign Policy," Volume II, by K. Steven mentions on page 191 that Dr Mosaddeq did not accept his salary and on page 392 it mentions my refusal to accept a salary.

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The Soviets undoubtedly prevented this dossier fabrication by Kambakhsh. In short, when I saw to what degree of ignominy some of the "comrades" had sunk, when I realized that they planned to "silence" me through every possible means, I decided to leave the Soviet Union. This kind of framing and accusation was concocted against a number of honorable Iranian officers in exile, too. I am astonished how some individuals devoid of the most basic human characteristics profess that they are communists, whereas they should be free of all forms of jealousy and opportunism and should be in the service of the public. They should be forgiving and decent. As it is said, one should become a Salman before one can become a Muslim. One must first be a human being before having pretensions to being a communist. You may tell me that there are few real Muslims in the world. Or that there are few real communists. In this event you are right. It must be known that both real Muslims and real communists should be respected. How can one hide the truth or distort it, cheat or lie to his party and the people of his country, and be at peace with himself and not be ashamed of his conscience in his solitude? Such a person cannot be either true Muslim or a true communist. I prefer noncommunist Dr Mosaddeq to communist Stalin a thousand times. I even apologize for using Mosaddeq's name in the same sentence with Stalin's name. All members of the party know that Kambakhsh was an unconditional and unprincipled lackey of the Stalin regime. During the night he was caught, he confessed and betrayed Dr Arani and everyone and everything else for fear of his life without even having been tortured. Is it not possible that Kianuri, brother-in-law of Kambakhsh and his righthand man in the party, who was also responsible for the establishments of the party and of the officers organization, confessed to everything and pledged to cooperate, thus becoming the lackey of another overlord after he was caught following the assassination attempt against the shah in a bid to save his own life? In view of his position and power within the party was it not to the benefit of his second master that he remain in the party and serve the regime in tight and critical times? (For example, during the 28 Mordad coup d'etat against Mosaddeq?) This is a theory that has long troubled me. And just as I stated in the Central Committee in Moscow, I do not have any evidence to prove my allegations for the time being. But remember Dr Arani's statements in his defense in the Mokhtari court regarding Kamakhsh. He stated that "among a group of persons arrested, one individual was threatened by the police with execution, and this threat worked because of the existence of a dossier and a record..." We know that Dr Kianuri had contacts for several months with Nasser Fakhrara'i who shot at the shah. What threat could be more effective to make a person subservient to the regime than the charge that he had cooperated with the would-be assassin of the shah? Remember that the police and the intelligence apparatus of the Iranian Government was hundreds of times better equipped, "smarter" and better informed in 1949 than at the time of Reza Shah in 1939.

If I raise this issue today it is because a fatal danger threatens the freedom movement of our countrymen. A Tudeh Party led by Kianuri and his agents will surrender the Iranian people and toilers tied and bound to the enemies of the country as it did in 1949 and 1953. This will defeat the liberation movement of the Iranian masses. (In both events Kianuri was really responsible for the failures.)

Question: Was there an assassination committee in the Tudeh Party? Is it possible for you to elaborate?

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Answer: Yes, such a committee did exist. We became aware of such a committee during our exile in Moscow during the fourth plenary session of the party in 1957. During this session about 80 people were present, and it must be said that it was only in exile that the cadres became aware of some of the secrets and mustered the courage to speak and to stop being tongue-tied. It was learned in exile that the committee was organized by Kianuri and Kambakhsh utilizing the facilities of the party and the assistance of certain party members in a manner hidden from the party, the Central Committee, the Executive Board, and even from the party secretary general. The individuals coopted for this task believed that they were carrying out the orders of the party, since these two persons were responsible for the establishment of the party and of the officers' organization. Let us not forget that Comrade Ruzbeh said during his trial that "whatever I did was on the instructions of the higher party officials." We heard in Moscow that Kambakhsh and Kianuri would instruct certain naive members and tell them that "this course of action concerns friends and should remain secret." The reference to "friends" was the Soviets. These individuals would not divulge secrets because of the faith they had in the Soviet Union. After Kambakhsh's departure from Iran in 1946, Kianuri took over the committee. I will give you an example of the work of the assassination committee, of which I learned while in Moscow. One was the assassination of Ahmad Dehqan, editor and publisher of TEHRAN MOSSAVAR and deputy of the Majles in May 1950. It is true that Ahmad Dehqan was a reactionary who was anti-Tudeh, anti-Soviet and a corrupt person. But there were hundreds more reactionaries like him in Iran, probably more important, higher in position and more effective than him. How could a serious-minded party, with some record of parliamentary activity and with eight deputies in the Majles, actively paving the way for overt activity in 1950 (which would have materialized during the premiership of Dr Mosaddeq if there had not been so many treasons in the party), take upon itself to assassinate an insignificant--or even a significant--adversary of the party? What benefit did it have at that time? What could have been gained by this act anyway?

My aversion to Kambakhsh and Kianuri was because while they were Stalin's agents they importuned their way into the party, rose to high positions in the party and continued their operations even after the crimes of the Stalinist regime had been exposed. They landed the Tudeh Party in disrepute even though the majority of its members were upright, humane and devoted to their ideology.

The criticism I had of the party leadership in exile, and still have, is that this leadership opted for silence (perhaps under pressure from Soviet officials) even though it was informed of the misdeeds of these two characters. Thus they preserved their positions in the party, whereas it was necessary to reveal the facts for the knowledge of the party and the Iranian people; it was necessary to expose their treasons committed in secret and without the knowledge of the party; it was necessary to have real and full self-criticism by them and to act according to the requirements of the truth.

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My criticism of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is not that it has spies in Iran. All great powers have spies in Iran. We were not in power so we could not prevent this. My criticism is that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union imposed on a "fraternal party" its own agent and spy, thus taking undue advantage of the faith we and all Iranian patriots had in Lenin's party and country, the party and country that made an invaluable contribution to the independence of our country in the dark and difficult years of Iran's history. It betrayed the internationalism in which we, the majority of party members, sincerely believed. It supported its agent and spy in various ways so that he would rise to the highest position in the party and would gradually turn the Tudeh Party of Iran into a political apophysis of the Soviet Union in Iran. Just as the Iranian Azarbayjan Democratic Party, that is, the outgrowth of the Soviet Azerbaydzhan Communist Party, promoted Kianuri to the position of the secretary of the Tudeh Party today and will further promote him to the rank of secretary general of the Tudeh Party of Iran tomorrow. Unfortunately, it must be said that the Soviet and Chinese parties spurned proletarian internationalism, in contrast to their attitudes in the 1920's and 1950's, respectively. Unlike those years, they now have use for lackeys and henchmen.

You or some of your readers might say that I am gambling with my life by revealing these facts about the Soviet Union, China and the current leadership of the Tudeh Party of Iran. One life is negligible in comparison with the lives of the people who are crushed under the bootheels of dictatorship in a country where girls and boys daily sacrifice their lives in an unequal fight to light the torch of liberty.

Anyway, I have digressed too far from the topic. There is a Persian proverb which says "Talk brings on talk" or "One word leads to another." I was talking about the murder of Ahmad Dehqan. One evening in Moscow I was at home with my son Farhad. For some months I had put up an officer friend of mine with his wife and little daughter because my wife and children had gone to Paris. That family could not find a room in which to stay in Moscow. Later on I found out that this comrade and his wife were unquestioning followers of Kambakhsh and Kianuri and Maryam Firuz. They had brought them to Moscow and promised them a room. Housing was a vital problem to the exiles in the Soviet Union. That night, the officer comrade and another emigre, Major Shafa'i, had joined me at supper. He is now a professor at Baku University. It was about 1900 when the doorbell rang. It was Iranian police First Lieutenant Qobadi, another comrade officer of ours. He claimed that he had missed us and come to see us. We sat down to dinner. At the dinner table and after dinner Qobadi complained of the leadership of the party, particularly of Kambakhsh and Kianuri. He explained to us some of his activities in Iran for the party, including how he and another police officer comrade, Akhgar, had arranged for the escape of 10 leaders of the party from Qasr prison. He also said he used to drive in a police jeep--while he was wearing a police uniform--Maryam Firuz (Kianuri's wife) and Forutan (Kianuri's factional comrade) to Vanak so that these two could exchange the information and instructions of the Central Committee. He said everybody knew that if he were caught in the act his punishment would be execution. At this point he could not help crying. He said: "What I saw of them in Iran and what I learned about their crimes in exile in the Soviet Union gradually turned me into an alcoholic in an effort to forget these things. I saw that they did nothing for the people of Iran while they were in Moscow, and that they were unwilling to return to Iran and engage in covert activity, whereas I was ready to give my life for these persons. /I have become so indignant and disappointed that I plan to request repatriation to Iran where I will have myself executed upon arrival so that I can regain my honor and dignity and join

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my executed comrades." This is precisely what Qobadi did. At his own request, Qobadi was turned over to the Iranian Army on the Khorasan border by the Tudeh Party leadership and the Soviets. He was immediately put before a firing squad on the spot./

Qobadi continued: "When Hassan Ja'fari, member of the Tudeh Party of Iran, assassinated Ahmad Dehqan, the manager of Tehran Mossavar, he was taken to Qasr prison in Khordad 1329 (22 May- 21 June 1950). The following day Kianuri called me to his hideout and instructed me to talk to Ja'fari and tell him that the party was preparing a plan for his escape and that he should not be frightened and should not make any reference to the Tudeh Party."

It must be said that Ja'fari's defense counsel defended Ja'fari as someone who had killed Ahmad Dehqan for personal and not for political reasons. On the other hand, Kianuri managed through friendly contacts to get a party comrade into the court as the intern of the counsel. His mission was to hearten Ja'fari so that he would not speak up about the party. This person is still living and he himself narrated this story to me. Qobadi said Ja'fari was impressed by the fact that even police officers were among the members of the Tudeh Party on the sly and that they were planning his escape. He therefore did not drag the party or Kianuri into his court hearings. Qobadi says that in order to draw a red herring before the eyes of the other officers and his superiors, "I told them I had made friends with Ja'fari just to learn this case inside out." Finally, Qobadi told Ja'fari one day on Kianuri's instruction: "The plan for your escape has been completed. The day they take you to Sepah Square for hanging a large number of the party will be milling in the crowd as spectators. Just as they prepare to execute you, the party members will save you from the police and the military and help you escape to a safe hideout." Qobadi told us that Ja'fari, who had believed him, went to the gallows with ease of mind, "but when they made to put the noose round his neck he was perturbed and cast a surprised look at me. I had gone there to hearten him. But it was too late." Qobadi said that he has often awakened startled as a result of seeing in his dreams Ja'fari's face with his look of disbelief at the gallows. This memory, Qobadi said, deprived him of the desire to eat and of the ability to sleep and drove him to alcoholism in an effort to forget and to blunt his thinking. Qobadi turned to me and said: "As a doctor you can understand why I am in the shape I am in."

Such persons cannot be termed party leaders. They are criminals who have to be tried in ordinary courts on charges of homicide. I will not press the point about the damage such leaders have inflicted on the Tudeh Party of Iran. like Stalin, Beria and Baqerov inflicted on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

This killing was an example of the doings of Kianuri. All those who were in my house that night and heard our officer comrade Qobadi are living, but do they have the courage to speak the truth?

Such leaders have committed tens of similar instances of such crimes without the knowledge of the Tudeh Party of Iran, the Central Committee, the Executive Board or even the secretary general.

Radmanesh, the former party secretary general, and Iraj Eskandari, the present party secretary general, spoke about these crimes to the Fourth Extensive Plenum of the Central Committee which was attended by 80 persons. But they dreaded the "consequences" of divulging such facts to the general membership of the party and to the

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public. Their opportunism and inertia in calling for "solutions with no side effects," their cronyism and factionalism and the faults which related to them as well, forced them into conciliation and cooperation with their adversaries. It must be said that the fear of the secret police of Stalin, Beria and Baqerov also weighed on them. Such agencies usually survive the dictators. It is still extant and its impact is sometimes heard of. All these factors caused two groups that were blood enemies to make peace and equally constitute an Executive Board--representing the two groups on an even basis. Their distance from and inactiveness at home base facilitated this compromise.

The truth of the assassination of Ahmad Dehqan was kept a secret from the party for a long time, and a simple young man devoted to the party was victimized by the caprice and adventurism of one of the leaders of the party. After all, how can a party whose leadership commits acts which if revealed would cause tremendous detriment to the party countenance the rise to the position of party secretary of the very persons who have inflicted such damage on the party?

I remember that I narrated at the Fourth Plenum all the things that Kambakhsh, and particularly Kianuri, had done in Iran in the covert as well as overt periods of the party's activity. I narrated them when the theses prepared for the plenum were to be read beforehand by the Central Committee so that they would, in fact, be vetted and censored. Among other things, I told the plenum about the murder of Mohammad Mas'ud and Ahmad Dehqan, of Kianuri's involvement in the shooting at the shah, etc. In the middle of my statement, Forutan, who had from his early admission to the party been a follower of Kambakhsh and Kianuri, and according to whose description at the plenum his friendship with Kianuri and Maryam knew no bounds, shouted: "Comrades, it would be treason to leak such matters out of the plenum because the people of Iran liked Mohammad Masud." Upon hearing these words I yelled back at him: "Isn't committing his murder at the instruction of your pal, Kianuri, treason? But those who condemn the crime which you dare not even uncover are taken by you to be traitors, aren't they?" Forutan, who had not yet quit the leadership of the Tudeh Party of Iran and the wing of the vassals of the Soviet Union and had not yet fled East Berlin to become a minion of China, shut up.

Permit me to inject a parenthetical statement at this juncture and reveal another issue which is being distorted and cheated on by the present leaders to protect the party's prestige." The process of this cheating has already been put in motion. I apologize in advance for the prolixity of the matter. I believe it would be useful for Iranian youths to learn the details of some of the issues and problems in Iran's history. It must be made known that some family relationships and kinships left an impact on Iran's political history. The people of Iran know full well the family of Farmanfarma Firuz, the notorious feudal lord who lived until World War II. Abolfazl Qasemi has written a book on this family and described its treasons. I put at your disposal this book and the file I have on this family.

Prince Abdolhosseyn Mirza, bettern known as Farmanfarma Firuz, the big, wealthy Iranian feudal lord, closely cooperated with five shahs, the last of whom was Reza Shah. In the reign of Reza Shah he made his son, Nosratoddowleh Firuz, his successor. He became known as Reza Shah's righthand and at the time, but was later killed in prison on Reza Shah's order. Farmanfarma was the uncle and cousin of the last of the Qajar kings. He and his fathers had been among the greatest feudal chiefs of Iran. The extent of their lands was estimated to be twice the area of Belgium.

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Farmanfarma had amassed this wealth by killing and plundering the people. Farmanfarma, who has been pictured as a truly conservative, bloodsucking and despotic person in Iran's history, had tens of wives and concubines, a practice which prevailed among the feudal lords and princes of Iran before World War I. He had a host of children. I remember well that when I studied in the old Darolfonoon higher school and lived in a little house in Tehran--the site of which was later used as Reza Shah's garage in the royal courtyard--I would see an old man who would each day shepherd to school a "herd" of no fewer than 15 or 20 little boys and girls. He wielded a stick and virtually rounded up the children on the sidewalk opposite our house, very much like a shepherd rounding up his sheep. They said those were the children of Farmanfarma. It must be said that Farmanfarma was very particular about the education of his children. It was then that Vosughoddowleh Firuz, Farmanfarma's eldest son, was the foreign minister of Iran and signed the ominous treaty of 1919. A confidential report to the British Foreign Office by the British ambassador in Iran says: "Sykes is a competent young officer. He has managed to bring to our fold and to the defense of our interests Prince Farmanfarma, who is one of the leading statesmen in Iran." The said young Sykes later became the British ambassador in Tehran, "Sir Percy Sykes."

Two of the sons and one of the daughters of this feudal prince also have a special place in Iran's history for their notoriety:

1. Mohammad Vali Mirza Farmanfarmaian, who was a big feudal lord like his father, befriended the Democratic Party of Azarbayjan at the time of the Azarbayjan movement. This saved his expansive estates from being redistributed under the land redistribution law. Like his father at the turn of the 20th century, he accommodated each and every regime. His sons, the Farmanfarmaians, are now among the wealthiest people in Iran because they are partners with the brothers and sisters of the present shah in every deal and in every construction project they get. The intellectuals and the people of Tehran are very well aware of the details of the under-the-table deals made by the Farmanfarmaians. It suffices to say that according to reliable information from the daughter of Prince Farmanfarma, the sister and aunt of the Farmanfarmaians and of Nosratoddowleh Firuz and of his son, Mozaffar Firuz, that is, Maryam Firuz--whose second husband is Kianuri, the present secretary of the Tudeh Party of Iran--was constantly in touch with and met with the Farmanfarmaians both inside and outside Iran and both when the party was overt and when it was underground. Therefore, either the Farmanfarmaians, that is, the partners of the shah and his brothers, became "red princes and princesses" like their aunt, Maryam Firuz (Kianuri), or one would have to take it that Kianuri has become connected with the lords of this dynasty through Maryam Firuz. One is really confounded by such connections.

2. The eldest son of the Farmanfarma was Prince Nosratoddowleh Firuz, father of Prince Mozaffar Firuz. He is even more "notorious" in Iran's history than his brother. Therefore, I will spare you the details about him. The history of Iran and the declassified documents of the British Foreign Office are replete with accounts of Nosratoddowleh's treasons. For instance, Document No 648 of the British Foreign Office reads: "...Vosuqoddowleh, Nosratoddowleh Firuz and Saremoddowleh, whom our ambassador tried to introduce into the Iranian cabinet in 1921, constitute a 'Triangle of Corruption'...." The trio had received a huge sum (130,000 pounds) from the British Government to sign the 1919 agreement and have it ratified by the National Consultative Assembly (Majles). When the agreement fell short of being ratified by the Majles and from being signed into law by Ahmad Shah, the trio refused to return to the British their prepaid bribes. The 1919 agreement would have turned Iran into a British colony.

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Nosratoddowleh Firuz, the foreign minister of the "Agreement Cabinet" and Seyyed Ziaeddin were the two persons who defended the contract in the newspapers (see Seyyed Zia's RA'D newspaper, the issues of the year 1919, and TRIBUNE DE GENEVE, the issues of the year 1919).

As a reward for his efforts to conclude the agreement, Nosratoddowleh was one of the three persons marked by the British to rule Iran. The other person was Reza Khan Mirpanj who later staged a coup d'etat and became the commander of the army and then the shah--calling himself Reza Shah. Nosratoddowleh, who had hurriedly set off for Iran from England, was delayed in his journey via Kermanshah because of heavy snow that had cut off road communications. By the time he arrived in Tehran, the other nominee of the British had been selected by Britain's General Ironside--thus Reza Shah had effected his coup d'etat. After the coup d'etat, Nosratoddowleh became Reza Shah's righthand and his minister and adviser. But since he was a dangerous rival whom the British might some day prefer to Reza Shah, he was imprisoned and later killed after Reza Shah had established himself and consolidated his position.

3. Prince Mozaffar Firuz was the son of the "notorious" Nosratoddowleh. Like his father, he had been brought up and educated in England and played parts similar to those played by his father in Iran's history. When the Allied forces occupied Iran, he thought of collusion. He went to Palestine and brought to Iran with great fanfare his father's old friend and colleague, Seyyed Zia. He set up the newspaper RA'D-E EMRUZ and began a propaganda campaign in favor of Seyyed Zia, who had been set up by the British to assume the position of prime minister in Iran. All the issues of RA'D-E EMRUZ are replete with attacks and vindictive statements on the Tudeh Party of Iran and with occasional attacks on Dr Mosaddeq. But once again the British role was a failure. Dr Mosaddeq, the top-ranking deputy from Tehran, the minority in the Majles, the Tudeh Party faction in the Majles, the people of Iran and the liberal press of the time exposed Seyyed Zia and his "errand boy," namely Mozaffar Firuz, to the people of Iran. A year or two later the "gentlemen" went out of business.

Mozaffar Firuz surfaced again after some time. This time he appeared on the political scene as the righthand of Qavam Saltaneh--as his foreign minister. He still harbored his visceral hatred for the Tudeh Party of Iran and his aversion to Dr Mosaddeq. (Only in the 1-year period of the existence of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party did Mozaffar Firuz cease his antagonism toward and vituperation of the Tudeh Party of Iran.) After the fall of Qavam's government, Mozaffar Firuz was appointed Iran's ambassador to Moscow as a precautionary move. But he was later removed from his ambassadorial position and went to Paris. It was in Paris that he gradually began to cooperate with the present leadership of the Tudeh Party of Iran through his aunt, Maryam Firuz, and through his aunt's husband, Kianuri, the present secretary of the party.

Like his uncle, Farmanfarmaian, who had been nominated by the Tudeh Party of Iran as a Majles deputy during Mosaddeq's government, Mozaffar Firuz, too, gradually won the confidence of the party. For instance, Iran's delegation (read: "The delegation of the Tudeh Party leadership in exile") to the Helsinki conference on 23 September 1976 was comprised of:

A. "Prince Mozaffar Firuz, the sincere deputy premier and foreign minister of Iran";

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B. Maryam Firuz, member of the women's movement.

It was also comprised of two other persons. One was a journalist known in Iran and to the party by the name of Davud Nuri. The other was a former higher school teacher from Tehran with the title of "Professor" Qodduh. As you see, the present leadership of the Tudeh Party of Iran is determined to absolve the Firuz family of its past ignominy and foist it off as clean. Why should it not do so? Is the present secretary and virtual factotum of the present leadership of the party--whose leaders are all in exile in East Germany--not one of the same family?

On page 22 of the journal DONYA--which, by a quirk of fate, was founded by Dr Arani, the martyr who was imprisoned and killed by Reza Shah, the appointee of the British while himself the master of the Firuz dynasty--there is an article in its issue of 7 Mehr 1356 (29 September 1977) signed with the pseudonym "Kamran", which reads in part as follows: "...and there were young men like Nosratoddowleh, Dashti, Dabir A'zam, Teymurtash, Davar and others /who perhaps saw Iran's sublimation in the growth of his power/ (meaning that of Reza Shah--Keshavarz)...." Further on, the article says: "...These gentlemen deliberately forgot that whatever has been done in the exalted name of his majesty... are either plans that have been under consideration since the Nasserite era, particularly since the Constitutional Revolution, or they are the reforms inculcated on the noble being of his majesty by such /intellectuals/ as Teymurtash, Nosratoddowleh Firuz, Davar and by the forerunners and pioneers who were not in the government...." As you can see, this article in Arani's DONYA terms Nosratoddowleh Firuz, the notorious hireling of Britain, as a "young intellectual" who apparently /wanted Iran's sublimation./ (Perhaps that was why he and his like had received a reward of 130,000 pounds from Britain beforehand!) Or, the article says, Nosratoddowleh wanted to introduce reforms in Iran because he was an intellectual and among the Iranian pioneers and vanguards. (Probably he spent his share of the 130,000 pounds on Iran's improvement!) Take note of the degree of shamelessness, audacity and adulteration in Iran's history.

As it was not really possible to put down Nosratoddowleh Firuz's name alone in this article--since he was extremely notorious in Iran and it was not possible to exonerate him as his red sister, Maryam Firuz--they made a point of mentioning his name along with a few other names such as those of Dabir A'azam, Dashti and others who had all been known as Britain's minions. These gentlemen were not even ashamed of mentioning the names of Soleyman Mirza and Dr Mosaddeq along with that of Tadayon, the thief. Please note the article on page 24, which reads: "...One day the commander in chief [Reza Khan] was having a friendly chat with well-known parties and persons such as Soleyman, Mohsen Eskandari, Mosaddeq Saltaneh and Tadayon and, as we said, he was /effecting some reforms with the assistance of some 'intellectuals'/..." (No doubt here, too, the reference to "intellectuals" was to Nosratoddowleh--Keshavarz.) /If Dr Arani, the founder of DONYA, Soleyman Mirza and Dr Mosaddeq could hear these words they would tremble in their graves./ After all, everybody in Iran knows that Tadayon, the close colleague of the commander in chief (later to become Reza Shah) and later on a colleague of the present shah, was corrupt and thieving to the marrow. In the 14th term of the Majles, with the help of our parliamentary faction and of the minority group in the Majles, Dr Mosaddeq exposed the cases of Tadayon's thefts during World War II when he amassed huge wealth by taking part of the basic livelihood of the famine-stricken people of Iran. Can it be that Iraj Eskandari, the present secretary of the Tudeh Party of Iran, has forgotten these facts? Or perhaps the divulgence of this cheating is equally "to the detriment of the party?"

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4. Princess Maryam Firuz, daughter of Farmanfarma, sister of Nosratoddowleh Firuz, and aunt of Mozaffar Firuz, contrary to what was recently reported in FRENCHWOMEN magazine, after admission into the Tudeh Party upon marrying Kianuri, she had a comfortable life and education like the other children of Farmanfarma.

In the reign of Reza Shah, Maryam Firuz was married to Major-General Esfandiari, son of Haj Mohtasham-Saltaneh Esfandiari. Her father-in-law was the life-long speaker of the National Consultative Assembly (Majles) under Reza Shah. The people of Tehran, including me, often saw this princess riding on horseback with her husband and some foreign--French and British--officers on the old Pahlavi dirt road. I knew this couple well because I was the physician caring for their two daughters. One of them was under my care for a month for acute diphtheria. When Iran was occupied by the Allied forces in 1941, Maryam Firuz, who had divorced her first husband, would throw a "Friday Party" every week in her garden in Shemiran to which a number of the young people of those days were invited for a swim-lunch. On the 3-week journey we had to Tashkent during World War II to attend the festivities of the universities of Soviet Central Asia--along with Dr 'Ali Akbar Siasi, then chancellor of Tehran University, and Sadeq Hedayat--when we sometimes chatted in the villa where we stayed, Sadeq Hedayat would tell stories about these "Friday Parties" which he had attended along with Forutan, Ahmad Qassemi, Kianuri, Nushin and some other young people of the time. Incidentally, they were all members and supporters of the Tudeh Party of Iran. He said that Maryam Firuz, after wavering between Qassemi and Kianuri, who had both sought her hand, finally chose Kianuri. Frankly, I suspect that the British and their Intelligence Service definitely knew of Kambakhsh's communist activity in the 1930's, of his having been imprisoned twice and of his connection with the Soviets. The brother-in-law of such a person could certainly be very useful to the British. Those who have reached my age and have, as it were, been bitten by the snake, are very shy of black as well as white thread. Such persons remember that Teymurtash, the powerful court minister in the early years of Reza Shah's reign, was siding with the Soviets in the talks about oil. The British found this out and informed Reza Shah. He threw Teymurtash into prison and had him killed there. With all the things that have been done by the CIA, the Intelligence Service, and the KGB since World War II, and what with all the things done by Kianuri to the detriment of the Iranian nation and to the benefit of the foreigners--which put the Tudeh Party of Iran, the only party of the Iranian workers and toilers, in disrepute--it is only natural that such suspicion occurs to my mind. At any rate, further delving into this matter is necessary and greater care must be taken particularly because Maryam Firuz, the offspring of the family of "treason," whose admission to the Central Committee was rejected even in Tehran for many years, was finally admitted to the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran in East Berlin at the order of her husband.

If I have spoken at length about these two families, namely that of Sheykh Fazlollah Nuri, his son Sheykh Mehdi, and his grandson Kianuri, and that of Nosratoddowleh, his daughter Maryam Firuz, and his grandson Mozaffar Firuz, it is because these two families now virtually control the entire organization of the party in exile with the witting or unwitting assistance of "brotherly parties."

I apologize for the digression. What can I do? I have many sad recollections of these crooked "comrades." The mention of the article in the party organ DONYA absolving the scandals of Nosratoddowleh Firuz reminded me of another letter which I cannot fail to mention.

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I had just arrived in Geneva from Baghdad. I was walking along the lake one afternoon when I ran into one of the Mas'udi brothers, the one who was the editor of JOURNALE DE TEHERAN. He was coming from the opposite direction with a man I did not know. We came face to face. Mas'udi, who knew me well in Iran, greeted me. I returned his greeting. He told the other person, whom he called "Mr Zolfaqari," how I had cured the child of his brother, 'Abbas Mus'udi, of typhoid fever. I had never met Mr Zolfaqari, but I was informed of the crimes his family had committed in Zanjan. Mas'udi said to me: "Everybody in Iran is sorry that you left Iran. Many families have thus lost the physician for their children." I replied: "As long as the shah and a handful of criminals and thieves rule Iran, there is no place for me in that country." Then I said goodby and left them immediately. Some time later, a friend of mine who happened to stop over in Geneva brought me a copy of TEHRAN MOSSAVAR magazine, in which I read that Zolfaqari had said in Tehran that I had gone to his hotel and kowtowed to him and asked him sobbingly to beg the shah to pardon me. There was some more nonsense of the same vein in the item, which is not worthwhile denying at this time. But at that time I got very angry and sent a registered letter to the party--and kept its registration slip like those of all the letters I sent to the party leadership by registered mail--describing the entire story of my chance encounter with Mas'udi and Zolfaqari and explaining the article in TEHRAN MOSSAVAR magazine, a copy of which had fortunately reached me. I attached a complete denial to that letter, and since I knew the "leadership," I added at the end of the denial that not only my prestige but also that of the Tudeh Party of Iran was at stake. What would our party comrades and the people of Iran who knew me and who knew about my activity in the Tudeh Party of Iran say? I wrote them that I was authorizing them through that letter to make any changes in my letter of denial they wished but that they should not let the shameless slander by the shah's propaganda machinery go unanswered. This letter was unanswered like the rest of the at least 50 letters I had written the Central Committee from abroad or while in Moscow. I was very perturbed. A friend in Geneva who saw how I felt said he would retaliate for this "unmanliness" of theirs. He wrote an article for the WORKERS VOICE, organ of the communist party of Switzerland, the Labor Party, entitled "Despite the Shah's Lies the Iranian Nation Will Not Surrender." Signed under the pseudonym "Siamak," the article appeared in Issue No 32 of the newspaper on 9 February 1961. In it he wrote about the article in TEHRAN MOSSAVAR and about the fact that I had no means of informing the Iranian nation of my denial. Some years later when I was employed in Algeria as a professor of pediatrics, I was teaching the students of the School of Medicine, Nursing and Midwifery at the bedside of a patient one day when I was informed that a man named Iraj wanted to see me. I could not tell who it was so I said he should be directed into the room for me to see. It was Iraj Eskandari who entered the room. After the lesson was over I learned that Amir Khosrovi (Babak) was also with him, staying at the hotel. Despite the bad things this "leadership" had done to me I invited them to my house and entertained them for a few days. One day while we were chatting, Iraj Eskandari asked me why I did not make a trip to East Berlin. I narrated some of the past events, of which Babak had no idea. I also mentioned my latest letter to them denying the article in TEHRAN MOSSAVAR. Amir Khosrovi, who did not know about this, was very upset and asked Iraj Eskandari if I was telling the truth. He answered in the affirmative, and said that the letter had arrived and been read by the secretarial board (Radmanesh, Eskandari and Kambakhsh). He said to Babak: "You know that the Kambakhsh gang is against Keshavarz. They therefore vetoed the publication of his letter in the party newspaper. I remember well that Babak said angrily: "But this is disgraceful, treason." Eskandari replied: "What can be done?" Today, Babak, who is a member of the Central Committee, lives in Western Europe and therefore is not forced to keep silent.

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Does he have the courage to testify to this? Or does he fear that he may be removed from the Central Committee for telling the truth?

My parenthetical "sentence" has become too long. As I said, you do not have to include all these matters in your doctoral thesis. Choose, with my approval, the parts that you want. As you see, the treasons have not been exposed or punished. These have encouraged Kianuri and his wife, Maryam Firuz, to distort and adulterate the history of the party and of the political struggles of the Iranian people. As a great number of the Iranian youths do not know the details of the Iranian political struggles, they gradually exonerate the notorious traitors such as Nosratoddowleh Firuz, Tadayon and even Dashti. But, on the other hand, when I send them a letter of denial trying to protect my honor and that of the party from slander by the reactionary regime of Iran against me, who had at any rate been known to the Iranian people as one of the leaders of the Tudeh Party of Iran, they turned it down. The refusal was aimed at smearing the reputation of a person whose sin was to uncover the truth in the party.

At any rate, the assassination committee killed many people in Tehran under the direction and at the order of Kianuri. As is customary, the doers were changed but the commanders remained constant. And of these matters we learned only when we were in exile in Moscow and only when some of the other cadres threw their fear to the wind and started unburdening themselves.

In a meeting of the party Central Committee in Moscow, Kianuri had to confess that such a cell existed in the party. Testimonies to that effect were undeniable. He said that this cell had been imposed on him in 1946 when Kambakhsh left for Baku. He said that Kambakhsh had told him /to keep the cell going until he sent word to him from Baku./

If this were an ordinary cell, then Kambakhsh would not have the right to interfere with it or give instructions about it, and that from Baku. If the committee had an ordinary function, then the function would have to be determined by the party. As it was learned in Moscow, the committee did not have an ordinary function and was in fact connected with Kambakhsh personally. It was the very assassination committee that Kambakhsh had to direct from Baku.

Question: Please tell me about the murder of Hosam Lankarani. They say the Tudeh Party of Iran murdered him.

Answer: Hosam Lankarani was killed at the suggestion of Kianuri and upon approval of the Executive Board of Tehran. The guilt they thought of ascribing to him was that he knew too many secrets. All the members of the party in Tehran knew then and know now that Hosam was one of the most devoted and hard-working officials of the party. Therefore, he knew of many things. Is death the reward of a person who is too devoted and works too hard? He had not contacted the police to deserve such treatment from the party. What should one call the killers of such a person? And what should one do with them? Is it not a disgrace to keep such persons in the party and to promote them to the rank of secretary?

Question: It is widely believed that Mohammad Mas'ud, too, was killed by this same assassination committee. Is this true?

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Answer: The issue of the murder of Mohammad Mas'ud was brought up at the meeting of the Central Committee in Moscow first by me and then by Iraj Eskandari. At the Fourth Extensive Plenum it was only I--I repeat, only /I/--who brought this matter up and bore the brunt of the spite and enemity of Kianuri and his brother-in-law, Kambakhsh. A few other members of the leadership spoke of this matter in shrouded terms, but they did not follow the matter up for fear of having their relationship severed with Kambakhsh and Kianuri; they wanted to keep their options for reconciliation open.

Mohammad Mas'ud, the manager of the newspaper MARD-E EMRU, was killed on the night of 22 Bahman 1326 1947 [sic--should be 11 Feb 1948], at a time when the party was operating freely and openly. It was being relieved gradually of the severe pressures brought on it by the defeat of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party. Altogether there were eight people in the know: There were five persons at the time of the murder--Khosrow Ruzbeh, Hosam Lankarani, Homayun 'Abbasi (who later gave in under torture), and a cadet of the officers college--a sixth was a woman, another was Kianuri, and I do not know who the eighth person was. All these persons were close collaborators of Kianuri. All the party members knew this. Only 'Abbasi was directly involved in killing Mohammad Mas'ud. The others were there just to "help," if necessary. The Central Committee and the Executive Board of the party were totally unaware of these killings and of the shooting at the shah. Our comrade, Ruzbeh, told the military tribunal many times that whatever he had done had been at the order of his superiors in the party. Our comrade was telling the truth, and a reading of his defense corroborates this. He was telling the truth because this committee, too, had been set up at Kianuri's order. The revelation of the murder of Mohammad Mas'ud caused Kianuri and Kambakhsh to try to minimize the significance of the sacrifices of Ruzbeh--before his execution--abroad, and even in plenums, for some time. Kambakhsh said: /"Khosrow's biggest weakness is that he wants to play hero and to aggrandize himself./ Obviously Kambakhsh was jealous. He knew that with his record of confessions to Mokhtari's police he could never claim heroism. He definitely feared that the history of party and of the political struggles of Iran would sooner or later judge him as he was.

Kianuri said: "Ruzbeh is weak and as he knows many secrets, he might confess." Or he would say: "During this period Ruzbeh would not listen to us." In fact, Kianuri was trying to exonerate himself by accusing Comrade Ruzbeh. He knew that Ruzbeh would not be in a position to answer him any more. At any rate, Ruzbeh repeatedly told the tribunal: /"Whatever I have done has been with the agreement of the higher officials of the party. I have never done anything contrary to instructions, nor on my own volition, nor arbitrarily."/

What Ruzbeh said was quite true. As we found out in Moscow, Kianuri's arbitrary activities in the party were not limited to a couple of instances. The "superiors" of Ruzbeh were Kambakhsh and Kianuri. The present leadership and Kianuri must tell whether Comrade Ruzbeh was telling the truth or a lie. If he was telling the truth--which he was--then how could a responsible official of the party who gives the order to five persons to murder Mohammad Mas'ud be selected as the secretary of the party? Read Ruzbeh's defense--a defense which exudes candidness, lucidity and self-sacrifice. Then you will know how Kambakhsh and Kianuri are lying to save themselves.

A five-page brochure published by the party after Comrade Ruzbeh's arrest, entitled "A Few Explanations About the Statements of the Military Prosecutor," denied that the Central Committee had directed the murder attributed to the party by the military

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prosecutor. The denial was completely bona fide because in 1326 (March 1947-March 1948) when the party was overt, neither the Central Committee nor the Executive Board was aware of such doings. Kianuri was acting on his own without the knowledge of the party, whereas the performers of these acts, who knew what risks they were running, thought they were carrying out the instruction of the party. Today everybody knows--and the newspapers wrote about it at the time--that the police and the army arrested some of the people involved in Mohammad Mas'ud's murder. But they were released after a time. After the secrets of the murder of Mohammad Mas'ud were revealed in Moscow, we asked ourselves why these five persons were released. Was the general staff--meaning Razmara--not influential in this release? We should remember that Kianuri, who had been involved in the shooting at the shah, had twice been in contact with Razmara, namely the true organizer of this incident. If one of the detainees had confessed (as we saw hundreds of people confess, whether tortured or not), what would become of the party that had killed Mohammad Mas'ud, a journalist who was loved by the people? It was not possible then to convince the people that this had been done by Kianuri, who had taken undue advantage of the members of the party absolutely without the knowledge of the party Executive Board.

People would snatch from one another's hands the issues of Mohammad Mas'ud's newspaper MARD-E EMRUZ. A few hours after it appeared, its price would be more than 10 times higher. After all, Mohammad Mas'ud had attacked the shah, the royal family, and in particular, Ashraf, with amazing courage. What did the party stand to gain from his murder? This would have only served the interests of the Imperial Court. What were Kianuri's connections that led him to do this? He often used to say: "I played a trick." Perhaps here, too, he wanted to play a trick by killing Mohammad Mus'ud and lay the blame at the shah's door so that the people would hate him more. But again this would have benefited Razmara, who was planning to take power into his own hands and kill the shah. How was it possible to play in such a way with the fate of a party in which thousands of Iranian intellectuals and toilers were working sincerely at that time? How was it that the leadership of the party in exile came to connive at all the adventurisms of Kambakhsh and Kianuri, who should, in the case of the latter, be called "a man with a thousand faces"? Connived so that he could rise to the position of secretary of the party? So that he could gain control of the party because Iraj Eskandari, the party secretary general, was a mere facade--something known to all the party officials in exile? Is this silence also at the order of the "brotherly party"? Anyway, the aforementioned brochure published by the Central Committee rightly denied the Central Committee's involvement in the murder of Mohammad Mas'ud. The brochure is very interesting and all the cadres of the party should read it. As I had foreseen in my letter of resignation from membership in the Central Committee without knowledge of the trial and the defense by Comrade Ruzbeh, the "confessions" of Comrade Ruzbeh can be explained by the fact that he thought the party was unaware of the criminal acts some of the leaders had committed. He did not know that some of the cadres who took Kianuri's orders to be those of the party realized their mistake in Moscow and reported everything they knew.

The five-page brochure of the Central Committee says: "...Even if we assume the military prosecutor's allegations to be true that a group of so-called 'extremist, hardliner and emotional' people who call the Tudeh Party of Iran conservative and its leaders cowardly and inept in taking radical and severe decisions have themselves committed the murder of Mohammad Mas'ud, then there remains no grounds to level the same accusation against the Tudeh Party of Iran...." As you observe, these gentlemen have left an escape route open for a rainy day so that they may,

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if necessary, turn the point of guilt toward Comrade Ruzbeh and acquit Kianuri, the higher official of the party and organizer of this scheme. It is true that the case filed by the Intelligence Department after the murder of Mohammad Mas'ud and the arrest of a number of party members is corroborated by the statements of Comrade Ruzbeh before the military tribunal. The link was also pointed out by the military prosecutor. After all, it is evident that a murder took place, a certain number of people were the perpetrators of it, some of whom have been arrested, and the murder was committed at the order of a member of the party leadership without the knowledge of the Central Committee. After all, if a reactionary and dishonest official tells us the truth for once, and if we are sure that he is telling the truth and, more importantly, this true information causes a purge of the traitors from the party, we should not say that since the teller is reactionary and opposed to us his truth is necessarily a falsehood. If the reactionaries say it is day now, we should not refute them and say it is night simply because we are against them. Azemudeh was a dirty criminal, and many false dossiers have been fabricated in the military tribunal which have entailed the execution of the best children of our country. But if a man like Ruzbeh made some statements in the court which corroborate other evidence, and the military prosecutor published his true statements to use them to the interests of the regime, his statements must not be denied, especially where Comrade Ruzbeh says in his own defense: /"I was arrested at a time when there were no more hidden secrets. The likes of Bahrami, Qoreishi, and particularly 'Abbasi, had said it all. Even the facts known only by two persons, for instance by myself and by 'Abbasi, had been divulged. The volume of the government's information was 10 times that of mine. If I wanted to answer in the negative to any question as in the first investigation sessions, not only would the investigators have missed nothing, but I would not be alive today and would have been seemingly 'released' from prison like Kuchek Shushtari and Vartan were."/[4]

The difference between that kind of freedom and execution by firing squad would be that /neither would such things be said nor would any prestige be at stake..../ "To die in combat is better than escaping in an unmanly way." This last poem was quoted to the leadership of the party by Ruzbeh, just as he wrote it to the executive plenum in his famous letter in which he accused the leadership of vacating the fighting ditch and of taking it easy abroad instead. That is why this letter is not printed, and if it is printed some day its "harmful" parts will he expunged like part of Dr Arani's defense.

Please note that I did not extract the aforementioned statement by Ruzbeh out of the file of the military prosecutor's office. Those lines were quoted from the publications of the Tudeh Party of Iran in 1340 (1961). As the proverb goes, "Liars should have a good memory." Those gentlemen have forgotten even their own publications, and as they are liars they have a poor memory and make mistakes in relating the events. Only the truth remains unalterable. But these men are frightened of the truth just as the jinn are frightened by the mention of the name of God. Ruzbeh told the truth so that it could be recorded in history and some day be revealed. He was defending the party, which was unaware of these goings-on; he was not protecting the "higher officials" of the party. The present party leadership that is covering up for the numerous crimes of Kianuri, those who keep silent about such sabotage through fear

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4. These two self-sacrificing members did not reveal any information under torture until they died. But the government announced that they had been released.

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or because of their involvement or their obedience to the orders of foreign authorities, will be answerable to the members of the party and to the people of Iran tomorrow. How will they answer? Kianuri, who called Ruzbeh weak before Ruzbeh was arrested by the police, has not ever had even a needle piercing his hand, has he? See Ruzbeh's honor, honesty and decency when he writes in his famous letter to the Fourth Extensive Plenum: "The physical torture given the prisoners is so unbearable to a human being that I always carry two loaded pistols with me so that if I am spotted I can shoot my way out or get killed in the process." That is what he did, but the doctors kept him alive. Those who termed Ruzbeh "pseudoheroic" and "weak" forget the real weakness, which was Kambakhsh's who, to quote Dr Arani about him, after being arrested wrote a whole book of reports for the police without even having been tortured. Aren't those in the present leadership who know this fact ashamed of the encomium they showered on Kambakhsh after his death? Don't they know that simple individuals like Shushtari and Salakhian died under torture described by Comrade Ruzbeh as too much for any human being to withstand, but they did not even part their lips to whisper any information, something which was emulated by hundreds of other members of the party? In what other serious party in the world would you find the like of such a phenomena that the numerous and known crimes of a person or persons are not connived at and unpunished but their perpetrators are promoted to the rank of secretary of the party? What right do some leaders of a "fraternal party" have to impose such secretaries on a smaller and weaker party in exile in their country? Is this the meaning of proletarian internationalism? I must also speak further in order to complete the information on the murder of Zakharian. He was an Armenian intellectual, an old member of the party, a truly literate man, gifted and devoted to the cause of the party. A couple of days before he was scheduled to leave for Moscow he mysteriously disappeared and was later found dead. Zakharian was among the intellectuals who firmly believed that the party should support Dr Mosaddeq and the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry. They loudly defended their view before the party Executive Board. Differences in the Executive Board in Iran had led to personal vendettas and even scuffles which had hampered operations and confused and divided the cadres. One such dispute concerned the manner of dealing with Dr Mosaddeq. As I said earlier, from February 1949 (the time of the shooting at the shah) onward, some members of the party leadership left Iran one after the other and gathered in Moscow. They did not have any contact with the party leadership back in Iran. The party Executive Board in Iran was comprised of: Jodat, Boqrati, 'Alavi, Bahrami, Yazdi, Kianuri, Qassemi and Forutan. In order for you to know how poorly informed the members of the Central Committee in Moscow were kept about the situation in Iran, it would be sufficient to tell you that until about 3 years after the death of Stalin we did not have access even to the ordinary Iranian newspapers such as KEYHAN and ETTELA'AT, which were to be found on newsstands in all major cities of the world, as in Tehran itself. Our frequent requests to receive them were unanswered. After Stalin's death and after a lot of talking by Radmanesh, Tabari and me, who were studying at the Soviet Academy of Social Sciences, we finally managed to gain access to those two newspapers. The arrangement was that the three of us would gather in a room at the academy every 10 days and would receive the newspapers bundled together. They were at least a month old. They shut us in in that room, perhaps to make sure that nobody but us would read those papers. We would return the newspapers after reading them. We had been advised not to take notes of the newspapers! After all, why should the emigres of a political party be prohibited from reading the overt newspapers of their own country? But things were not the same everywhere. Kambakhsh could get anything he wanted in Baku. He was in touch with Kianuri in Iran through Baqerov's agents. (Remember he had told Kianuri to await instructions from him from Baku about deciding on the fate of that unit.)

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Let us revert to the case of Zakharian, who had been assigned by the majority of members on the Executive Board to go to Moscow and inform the members of the Central Committee residing abroad about the situation of the Executive Board in Tehran and about the difference in its leadership which had paralyzed the party. Kianuri and his close friends were vehemently against Dr Mosaddeq. Moreover, he believed that Zakharian would report onesidedly in favor of the group opposing him. He tried hard to prevent Zakharian's trip to Moscow. He went as far as taking recourse to Soviet officials in Iran to urge them to prevent Zakharian from going to Moscow.

It is recorded in the minutes of the meetings of the Central Committee in Moscow that the Soviets had informed Radmanesh that Kianuri opposed Zakharian's journey and said that his report would be partial to the group opposing him. Therefore, he said that Zakharian should not visit Moscow and if he did he should be accompanied by a member of Kianuri's group so that he would tell his side of the story. /Such messages were rarely conveyed by the Soviets. But Kianuri's unremitting insistence must have forced the Soviets to pass on his message. At any rate, Zakharian disappeared a couple of days before his scheduled departure. After a while it was rumored that he had been killed. Later on they found his body in a well at one of the covert houses of the party. (It was the house in which 50,000 grenades made under Kianuri's supervision were found. I remember that Radmanesh told the 80 participants in the Fourth Plenum about the mistakes of Kambakhsh and Kianuri: "These gentlemen made 50,000 grenades to be turned over to the Iranian Army.") Thus, Zakharian's death was glossed over and it was never investigated. After I had narrated to the Central Committee in Moscow the account of the incident in the detail I have given here, and also after I had expressed my views at the extensive plenum, Kianuri consistently claimed that Zakharian had been arrested, killed and dumped into the well of the party's house by the regime. The question is: Why was he killed just before his scheduled departure for Moscow to submit the report to which Kianuri had objections and had even resorted to the Soviets to prevent? Besides, party cadres like Zakharian were not a commodity like grenades belonging to the party. Even if they had been arrested and killed secretly by the regime and put to death under torture, our comrades in prison would always find out about their arrest, torture and death (just as in the case of the arrest, torture and murder of our comrades, Shushtari and Salakhian), whereas nobody even found any trace of Zakharian in the prisons. There were many other intellectuals like him who were arrested but not killed. The suspicion is strong, at any rate, that Kianuri ordered the committee under his supervision or a couple of his close followers to kill Zakharian, or that he was cooperating with the regime and informed them to arrest him to that he would be rid of this "troublemaker". Remember Malinovskiy, the member of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party and its representative in the Russian parliament? According to Lenin, he served the party, on the one hand, and betrayed the party members and officials to the police, on the other. I tell the party and the people of Iran with confidence that Kianuri is an overambitious man, and hence very ruthless, one who would sacrifice anybody and anything just to satisfy his purpose and ambition, for which he would have no scruples even when it came to killing people.

Question: Would you now please talk about the participation of the Tudeh Party of Iran in Qavam's cabinet. Why and how did the party take part in Qavam's cabinet?

Answer: You know that after World War II the Italian and French Communist Parties participated in the cabinets of their countries. Of course, those two parties had

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a background of tens of years of struggle and long political experience. Therefore, they had many trained cadres and tens of thousands of active members. Iran and the Tudeh Party of Iran lacked such a tradition. The party was only 5 years old when it joined Qavam's cabinet in 1946. It had neither a proper leadership nor an experienced cadre. I must reiterate here that I have profound respect for the communists of my country, the struggle against British imperialism and the corrupt Qajar regime and their agents in very difficult circumstances and without any experience in 1920. Many of these patriots gave their lives in the cause of their ideology or were killed in exile by Stalin's regime. The Communist party of Iran had to start from scratch three times because each time the foreign and internal enemies massacred the members of the party most ruthlessly. It is undeniable that the Iran communists, like those of all countries, particularly in the colonialized countries, are among the most decent, most honorable and most devoted strugglers of their country. In comparison with other parties and other countries, the Iranian communists have paid a heavier toll to the reactionary, corrupt, mercenary and dictatorial governments but have not succumbed to them. You could exclude from this general category the period of Stalin, Beria, Baqerov and the like, and their followers in the leadership of the socialist countries. In my view, they cannot be called communists. They have besmirched the name communism. This phenomenon will pass and a new leaf in the history of mankind will gradually turn. It will be proved that communists are the best defenders of the interests of the majority of their countries and of all the toilers of the world.

The participation of the Tudeh Party of Iran in Qavam's government, like its establishment, was attempted without a strong basis. In fact--I believe this must be said--the presence of the Red Army in Iran and the establishment of the Azarbayjan Democratic Party were the fundamental factors of the Tudeh Party's participation in Qavam's coalition government, not the power or the 5-year background of the party. Barring those two factors, British imperialism and the shah would not have permitted the party to participate in the government so soon.

The truth of the matter was that Qavam had promised that the exploitation of the oil deposits in northern Iran would be turned over to a joint Iranian-Soviet company. In order to make a show of his "goodwill" toward Stalin and toward the Soviet Union, he invited the Tudeh Party and its partner, the Iran Party--a party of intellectual patriots--to join the government.

During the war, too, Scheili had asked the Tudeh Party of Iran to join the cabinet, but the party had rejected the offer. Qavam, too, once before--prior to the Azarbayjan incident--had called on the Tudeh Party to join the cabinet, but the party had turned that offer down, too, after a debate inside the party. Soleyman Mirza, who knew Qavam only too well, had admonished the party not to accept his offer. But the last time the offer was made and taken up, it was not discussed in the Central Committee or in the Executive Board of the party. As far as I was concerned, I learned of the negotiations, which had seemingly taken place secretly, the day Iraj Eskandari, Yazdi and Sheykh Hosam Lankarani came to my house near sunset. Yazdi and Lankarani stayed in the car on the street while Eskandari came into my house and said: "We are conducting negotiations with Qavam regarding participation in the government I have come to take you." I replied that I did not know Qavam. I refused to go to Qavam's house. I do not know if Eskandari has retained enough conscience to verify this fact today. Mr Lankarani's still living in Iran and can testify to this. At any rate, Iraj Eskandari did not insist; he left. Sometime later, Radmanesh, the

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secretary of the party, told me that I would have to participate in the cabinet on behalf of the party. Apparently I had been nominated to be minister of culture and higher education. His words weighed more with me. At that time I was still little educated in theory. I received serious political and theoretical education only later, in the Soviet Union.

That was why I had a great deal of faith in the competence of the veterans in the leadership, particularly in Iraj Eskandari and Radmanesh, who I believe were undoubtedly politically more knowledgable and more literate in theoretical studies than the others. What I am about to tell you shows well how much interest, enthuiasm and devotion I and the like of me had at the time toward the party and the former detainees, such as Radmanesh and Eskandari. After all, it was said that Radmanesh had been active in the youth organization of the Communist Party of Iran during the Iranian Revolution and that Iraj had been among the 53 detainees who had been friends and coworkers of Dr Arani. Both had just been released from Reza Shah's prison. By the side of them, a person like me, who knew and had done nothing but medicine and medical work, did not count at all at the time of the establishment of the party and in its early years of activity. It was on a day of demonstration against the Sa'id government. We were leading a throng of about 150,000 workers and intellectuals into Eslambol (Naderi) Avenue. We reached the Palace cinema. A group of the military blocked our way. At the command of their commander they knelt in a combatready position and prepared their machineguns for firing. The commanding officers warned us that if we went another step forward he would order them to fire. The back rows of the crowd, who did not know what was going on, pushed us forward. Radmanesh was by my side. At this time I spontaneously pushed Radmanesh behind me and told him to move back because as the secretary general of the party he had to stay alive. Believe me I was not a personal friend of Radmanesh nor of Iraj Eskandari. My friendship with them was that of copartisans. I had not known Iraj Eskandari at all before the establishment of the party. I had seen Radmanesh only at the Darolfonoon higher school. My acquaintance with them came about in the party. On that day, the intervention of an officer who was apparently a member of the (party's) officers organization saved all of us from death, because he ordered the soldiers to rise and step aside.

Let us return to our discussion about our participation in Qavam's cabinet. The participation in the government had not been previously discussed in the Central Committee. /It must be admitted that in the conditions of the party and of the country at that time, if this matter has been broached it would have been approved./ Even Kianuri and Qasemi, who later opposed this move, had praised the participation in the cabinet and lauded Qavam Saltaneh in the party newspapers. This was the sort of thing that I and many other members of the leadership group would never do. /I met Qavam for the first time when he presented the cabinet ministers to the shah./ Something interesting happened that day, which must be remembered by all the ministers. I reported it to the Central Committee the same evening.

Later in the afternoon of that day I went to Khosravani's summer mansion in Shemiran, where Qavam was residing in the summer. My friend, Allahyar Saleh, of the Iran Party, was with me. The other ministers had arrived before us. Mozaffar Firuz, who played the role of factotum for Qavam, came to the garden where the ministers were gathered and announced that "his exalted excellency" was getting dressed. (Qavam was ill and Dr Eqbal gave him several shots each day.) The ministers were urged to be prepared as they would be taken to an audience with the shah in order

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to be presented to him. He then said the ministers would be presented in the following order: He named the ministers and their respective ministries until he came to my name: Dr Keshavarz, the minister of post and telegraph. I told him I was surprised and said I thought there might be a mistake because the party had told me I would be minister of culture and higher education. He replied: "We and the party have earmarked the Ministry of Post and Telegraph for you." A few words were exchanged between us. Finally I was enraged and said that I was a professor at the School of Medicine and one of the 12 members of the Higher Council of Education. The Ministry of Culture, I said, was relevant to my work and information whereas the position of minister of post and telegraph had nothing to do with my university professorship and with my work. Therefore, I said, I would not accept the position. I was preparing to go back to town when Mozaffar Firuz said: "Please wait so that I may have a word with his exalted excellency." He went inside the building and returned and said: "His exalted excellency says the Tudeh Party of Iran has chosen the Ministry of Post and Telegraph for you." I declined again and prepared to leave the garden. Mozaffar Firuz went in and came out several times in an effort to persuade me to accept the position of minister of post and telegraph. The last time, Akbar Khan, the valet of Qavam, came instead of him and said: "Dr Keshavarz, please pick up the phone; the Soviet ambassador wants to talk to you." (The telephone was in the arbor.) The ministers gathered around me as I picked up the receiver. A voice said in Farsi: "Dr Keshavarz, greetings, I am Ashurov, the clerk of the Soviet Embassy. His Excellency Ambassador Sadchukov is here and I am translating his words for you. His excellency asks you to accept the position of minister of post and telegraph because Mr Qavam Saltaneh is in a hurry to present the ministers to his majesty. The ambassador says that the acceptance of this position is to the benefit of your party and in the interest of Iran and the Soviet Union." I knew Sadchukov because I was his children's doctor as well as for the children of almost all the embassies in Tehran, including the French, Belgian, Iraqi, and American embassies, and even the children of the first secretary of the British Embassy whose name was Price--if I am not mistaken--and whose 1-year-old son was severely ill. My talk with Sadchukov was very matter-of-fact each time I made a house call to see his children. Ashurov's words angered me and I shouted: "Ask Mr Sadchukov since when the ambassador of a foreign country has been entitled to interfere in the affairs of our country and our party. I am a member of the Tudeh Party of Iran and am carrying out the party's orders. I do not permit anyone else to decide what I should do." With those words I hung up on him. Sepahbodi, the foreign minister-designate, walked up to me immediately, kissed me and said: "Dr Keshavarz, I am grateful to you. You have made all of us proud." He then turned to Major General Ahmadi, the war minister-designate, who was a very reactionary man, and said to him: "Last night when all of us ministers were gathered you expressed dissapointment at the fact that the Tudeh Party was also represented in the cabinet as they were Soviet agents. I told you that people such as Dr Keshavarz, Iraj Eskandari, Shahab Ferdows, and Dr Radmanesh and many other educated young people like them were patriotic and honorable persons and that they did not deserve such accusations. I am glad that I have been proved right so soon." All the ministers and even Sepahbodi and my friend Allahyar Saleh kissed me. Some of those ministers are still living and have not forgotten that incident. Qavam must have telephoned and complained to Sadchukov about my refusal of the ministerial position. But my response to the Soviet ambassador forced Qavam to back down. Two or three minutes later Mozaffar Firuz came to the garden and said: "Dr Keshavarz will be presented as the minister of culture and higher education, and Dr Eqbal (who had originally been slated for minister of culture) will be presented as the minister of post and telegraph." It is interesting

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that Qavam did not even consider it necessary to ask Dr Eqbal's opinion before changing his ministry! He knew Dr Eqbal to be a slave to power and only wanting to become some minister. Thus the "unexpected incident" was averted.

The work of each of the ministers of that cabinet will one day be judged impartially and correctly by the people of Iran and by history. What I can say about it here and now is that I am proud--not ashamed--of the work I did during my incumbency in that position.

At this point I remember another matter. The party Central Committee, under pressure from Kambakhsh and Kianuri and "other youths" at that time--insisted that I appoint Khalil Maleki, a higher school teacher in Tehran and the leader of the "party youth" at the time, as my deputy at the Ministry of Culture. At that time they did not call him names and they were the ones who even insisted on his joining the party. It was only on the day before his branching off from the party that these youths parted from him. Until the night before the bifurcation they were supposed to leave the party along with him.

This is what Maleki himself confirmed at his trial. But I had no amity or enmity toward Khalil Maleki, although my views differed from those of the others who insisted that he become a deputy minister. I maintained that the people should feel that the Tudeh Party's participation in the government did not give the impression that the Tudeh officials would be monopolizing everything and every position. We should be ready to strike a bona fide cooperation with all democratic, upright and patriotic parties and personalities in public affairs. That was why I chose Dr Shayegan as my deputy, against their persuasion. I had no friendship or personal relationship with him, but I knew that he was a university professor and a decent and patriotic person. Later on Dr Shayegan became one of the close and loyal colleagues of Dr Mosaddeq and remained loyal to him to the last day, which made me even more satisfied with my choice. I appointed Maleki as director general in the Ministry of Culture. However, his friends never forgave me for not having appointed him deputy minister.

Question: Why had the Tudeh Party of Iran agreed to fill the position of minister of post and telegraph?

Answer: As I told you, I was never involved in any way in the negotiations with Qavam. These negotiations were not discussed in the Central Committee and the Executive Board, on both of which I was a member. But in Moscow I heard from Iraj Eskandari that the talks with Qavam had reached the conclusion that the Tudeh Party of Iran should be allocated the Ministry of Industry (Eskandari), the Ministry of Health (Yazdi) and Ministry of Post and Telegraph for which Kambakhsh had been nominated, while the Ministry of Justice would go to the Iran Party (Allahyar Saleh). Iraj Eskandari said Qavam had not agreed to Kambakhsh's proposed appointment under any circumstances. It must be said that Qavam was very much an ordinary person as far as common sense and education were concerned, and, in my view, he was very arrogant, despotic and self-satisfied.

Qavam said that Kambakhsh was unknown to the public and to him. Therefore, he could not admit him into the cabinet. It was on account of this opposition on Qavam's part that I was nominated in his place for membership in the cabinet. I repeat that I did not know Qavam and had never seen him before. I met him and heard him for the

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first time when he presented us to the shah. Why had the Post and Telegraph Ministry been earmarked for Kambakhsh? My guess is that this ministry would have been most useful to Kambakhsh as a henchman of Stalin, Beria and Baqerov.

I must remind you that Qavam had assured Stalin about an oil deal in the north. He had recognized the Azarbayjan Democratic Party and had connected Azarbayjan with Tehran. He had given provisional concessions to Azarbayjan. He had stopped the vehement and violent repression of the democratic organizations, particularly the Tudeh Party of Iran, which prevailed all over Iran. He had some conspicuous agents of Britain arrested. Perhaps he did all these things just in order to assure Stalin that he would concede the oil deposits in the north of Iran to the Iranian-Soviet company. The invitation to the Tudeh Party of Iran to participate in the government was part of this plan of his. Perhaps he wanted to deceive Stalin with these moves. It should not be forgotten that Qavam was a reactionary, egotistic and ambitious man. He always had a close relationship with the Americans. At the same time, he was always an enemy of the Pahlavi dynasty at the bottom of his heart. I have many evidences to prove this allegation, but I do not wish to prolong this discussion.

Question: As regards the exit of the Tudeh Party's ministers from the cabinet, was it Qavam who dumped them?

Answer: Everybody knows that Qavam and Mozaffar Firuz, after establishing the Iranian Democrat Party, started to repress our organization so that they could later crush the Azarbayjan Democratic Party. The Tudeh Party's ministers strongly protested against this move by Qavam. I remember well that a few days before resigning our positions in Qavam's cabinet, we three ministers of the Tudeh Party discussed this matter with one of his closest ministers after a ministerial meeting. He said that the repression of the Tudeh Party was not an initiative of Qavam's but that it was the shah who ordered the repression. We replied that the shah did not have the right to interfere in the running of the country and that Qavam was in charge. The minister said: "I will tell you a secret and I ask you not to share it with anyone else. I was with Razmara this morning and discussed the chaotic situation in the country with him. I suggested to him that we should stage a coup d'etat and take the power of the government into our own hands and make Qavam president and prime minister and strongman of Iran. Razmara replied that it would be a very easy job to pull off in no more than 2 hours, without anything being upset. However, the proviso would be for Qavam to give the order to carry it out. I conveyed Razmara's message to Qavam, and the old man said that it was still too soon and that we should wait a while longer." (I believe this minister was telling me the truth because he had strong and serious family reasons for his aversion to the Pahlavi dynasty.)

This is what that minister said. I later read the same story coupled with some false quotes from Iraj Eskandari in Abolfazl Qasemi's book "Oligarchy" (pp 115-116). Any sensible and impartial man can tell that the story is too elaborate, which normally indicates that either the narrator or the writer has injected his own ideas into it.

I would like to remind impartial writers and historians that they should not "take any coin as pure metal" or take things at face value. They should consider the writer, the evidence and the users of such views, notes and memoirs. For instance, some of the material on the two pages of the above-mentioned book has, as far as I know, been lifted from the book by the notorious General Arfa'.

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At any rate, a few days later we informed Qavam that we would not attend our ministries as of the following day and that we would resign because of the situation engendered by him. Qavam went to the shah and submitted his resignation the same morning. Obviously there were no Tudeh Party ministers in the next cabinet. What I have told you is factual truth. If we had remained in the cabinet, Qavam would definitely have submitted the cabinet's resignation to the shah before our individual resignations and would thus have gotten rid of "our pestilence."

I could tell you a great deal about the toadyism and apple-polishing of many of the ministers, but there is no place in your dissertation for such material. I will also spare you the subsequent incidents. Briefly speaking, after our resignation the party was crushed and the decimation of the people of Azarbayjan began at the order of the government. All democratic organizations, and above all the Tudeh Party of Iran, were attacked, the clubs were sacked, and the members and cadres were arrested and exiled. However, the opposition front and those who advocated democracy and antidictatorship did not remain idle. Despite factionalism and intense internal differences, the Tudeh Party of Iran tended to make good the damages inflicted on it. As the party was on a legal footing it used all the aspects of overtness to its advantage and formed anew the antidictatorship front. In order to "solve" the oil issue, England, America and the Royal Court were fishing for excuses to mete out to the Tudeh Party of Iran what they had already dealt out to the people of Azarbayjan. They wanted to ban the overt activity of the Tudeh Party. Everybody remembers those months. The newspapers of Iran wrote about these incidents extensively in those days. I myself wrote an article in the newspaper RAHBAR about this matter which was in the form of a reply to a Tehran newspaper. After the defeat of Azarbayjan, intense wrangling broke out between England and America over Iran's oil wealth. Their agents in Iran did not even stop short of killing each other. In the face of the conspiracy engineered against Iran's freedom and interests, the Tudeh Party of Iran was the only organized power and strong body that loomed like a major obstacle in the way of implementation of the sinister designs of America, England and the Royal Court and that cooperated with the other democratic forces and patriotic and freedom-loving personalities. All this despite its political inexperience, factionalism in leadership, and despite the fact that a party had been created within our party by Baqerov's agents which acted without the knowledge of the Central Committee.

There is a consensus among all Iranian patriots that despite all its faults and mistakes in that eventful era of the struggle of the Iranian people against imperialism and its agents, the overt Tudeh Party of Iran was a significant force. That explains why it was the chief target of the antipatriotic forces in the postwar years. At such a critical point to our country and to our party, Kianuri, the organizational chief of the party and of the officers organization, which was so confidential that some of us did not even know of its existence, was in touch with Nasser Fakhrara'i through a party member in order to arrange for Nasser Fakhrara'i to shoot the shah on Friday, 4 February 1949. Thus the excuse that America, England, and the Royal Court needed for declaring the Tudeh Party of Iran illegal was thrown into their laps.

Question: Incidentally, I intended to ask you to speak about the shooting at the shah at great length and to express your view on it.

Answer: The shooting at the shah took place on the afternoon of 15 Bahman 1327 (4 February 1949) in the yard of the University (of Tehran). When Qassemi, the friend and factional ally of Kianuri, came to Moscow at the same time as Boqrati, an adversary of Kianuri and Qassemi and a friend of Radmanesh and Iraj Eskandari, we

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heard that Kianuri had been involved in the shooting at the shah. When they described to us how Kianuri had been in touch with Nasser Fakhrara'i for several months through Arkani, a staggering chain of events appeared before us, events that had formerly escaped our notice. Those seemingly insignificant events were now relevant and meaningful in connection with Kianuri's involvement in the shooting.

All the things I have narrated for you are contained in the minutes of the meetings of the party Central Committee in Moscow and should still be on record, unless they have been deleted or stolen. (Because once one of the books of party minutes which was kept in a house used only by members of the Central Committee was lost. I needed that volume to quote a statement by one of our comrades at that time. I said: "Comrades, one of us members of the Central Committee seated here has stolen the minutes book." Everyone searched for it, but no trace was found. My insistence was to no avail. It was evident that somebody had stolen it to get it out of the way.)

I shall describe for you some of the events relevant to the shooting at the shah to which I alluded earlier:

1. About 4 months before the shooting at the shah, Kianuri suggested to the Central Committee meeting that the party place adequate money at the disposal of the general organization of the party (namely, himself) so that he could get a house, a printing shop, paid employees, a car and other necessities, because in his words the party would soon have to go underground. He suggested that whoever had a house should sell it and give the money to the party. It should be noted that all the information supplied to the party by the officers organization went through Kianuri, because he was in charge of it. When Qassemi and Boqrati told us in Moscow that Kianuri had been involved in the shooting at the shah, we realized the motive behind his suggestion that day.

2. The anniversary of Arani's death is 14 Bahman [3 February], not 15 Bahman [4 February]. On that day, usually a large number of people gathered at Emamzadeh Abdollah (cemetery). But a few days before this anniversary in the year 1327 (1949), that is, the year of the shooting at the shah, Kianuri suggested to the Central Committee to redesignate 15 Bahman [4 February] as the anniversary of Arani's death so that it would fall on a Friday. His excuse was that a larger number of people would then attend the anniversary. It was the first time since the party's establishment in 1320 [21 March 1941-20 March 1942] that such a change had been made in the anniversary. What with the things Qassemi and Boqrati told us, it became clear to us that Kianuri proposed this change to the Central Committee with the knowledge that the shah would be shot at on Friday.

3. Halfway through the anniversary meeting in Emamzadeh Abdollah, which was only a few kilometers from Tehran, Kianuri went to Tehran without our knowledge. After he returned we realized where he had gone. And when we asked him why he had gone to the city, he replied: "I went to get my photographic equipment in order to take pictures here." Everyone seemed to be satisfied with this reply even though some of the party members had already taken numerous pictures and, besides, some professional photographers were there to take pictures for a price. Through Qassemi and Boqrati in Moscow, we learned that Kianuri had gone to the city at that time to see Arkani near the university to make sure that Nasser Fakhrara'i had managed to get into the university.

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4. When Arani's anniversary ceremony was over, Kianuri insistently suggested to the Executive Board at Emamzadeh Abdollah that the gathering--totalling about 10,000 people--return to the city on foot. Everybody opposed the idea on the grounds that it would give the police the opportunity to call it a provocation and shoot at the crowd, killing a large number of people. For that reason we broke up and returned to Tehran by trucks and automobiles. In Moscow, after hearing Qassemi's and Boqrati's report, we realized that the suggestion to walk had been made by Kianuri in connection with the shooting at the shah. He perhaps wanted to make a show of the party's strength after the killing of the shah. It must be said that if Kianuri was the kind of person who would play both sides (act as double agent) and was connected with Razmara, then in that case, with the killing of the shah and our march on the city, Razmara could arrest the party leadership and perhaps have a number of the members and cadres of the party killed by shooting at the crowd. With the background that many in the party leadership knew of Kianuri, it was also possible to surmise that Kianuri wanted thus to get rid of a number of us who were at any rate better known to the people of Iran and among the party members and had greater political mileage than him. Was it not the same thing that his masters, that is, Stalin, Beria and Baqerov did to their "comrades"?

At any rate, we all returned to Tehran by the same means we had used to go to Emamzadeh Abdollah. Once back in Tehran we merged into the population and each went to our own homes.

Everything I have said above and all the things I will describe hereunder have been recorded in the minutes of the meetings of the party Central Committee in Moscow in much greater detail and have been discussed in numerous meetings of the Central Committee. Neither the party leadership nor its secretary general knew anything about Kianuri's involvement in the shooting at the shah before Qassemi and Boqarti came to Moscow.

Briefly speaking, we returned to Tehran from Emamzadeh Abdollah late in the afternoon of 15 Bahman 1327 [4 February 1949]. I remember well that Radmanesh, Tabari, I and another party comrade rode to the city in my chauffeur-driven automobile. When we reached home, Rostam, my son, ran to us and said: "Father there has been a shooting attempt on the shah at the university. They put him in a car and took him away from the university. We were watching everything from the terrace of our house." Let me say in passing that this son of mine died of typhoid fever at the age of 18 when I was in exile. Many of the doctors did not dare go to my house to treat him because my house had long been under siege and surveillance by the police and the military. Very often they awakened my wife and children in the middle of the night and sent them into the yard in the cold of winter so that they could search the house "freely." After hearing the news, I set out for the party's club on Ferdowsi Avenue immediately. From afar I could see that the party's club had been occupied and soldiers were busy carrying the party books and papers to their trucks. I went immediately to Radmanesh's house. He had not heard about the incident at all because after I had dropped him off in front of Reza Nur Hospital on Naderi Avenue, he had taken his wife and one-week-old newborn baby home and stayed at home. Together we found Tabari, and more than half of the members of the Executive Board were in the house of 'Alavi --who was later executed by firing squad--where we held a meeting. The unmistabke evidence that the party Central Committee and leadership had had no idea of the shooting at the shah and of Kianuri's involvement in it was that Jodat, Boqrati, Nushin, and 'Alavi were arrested at home and Yazdi and Qassemi were arrested at their work places when they reported to work the following morning. Radmanesh, too,

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was at home, and when the soldiers knocked on his door and he realized that he was to be taken, he jumped from the window onto the roof of the neighboring house. He jumped roof to roof as far as a natural ice-making yard near his house on Doshan-Tappeh Street. From there he went to a party comrade's house and took refuge there.

Is it acceptable and logical that the members of the leadership of a party plan to assassinate the shah and then sleep on it with ease of mind at home and go to work the following morning only to be arrested? At any rate, Kianuri, too, was incidentally arrested the same night. Apparently the police called at his house once but he was not in. (That night the police and the secret police called at the home of each of us.) After the police had left his house he decided to leave the meeting place and go home. Some of the comrades forbade him to do so, calling it recklessness. But he said he had something imperative to do and that he had to take some party documents from home. He added that once a place was bombed it would not be bombed again the same day. But a member of the party, Eskandar Sarabi, who had returned from emigration to the Soviet Union in the 1930's, was lurking near his house. When the Soviet Army was in the north of Iran he had run arms and caused a lot of trouble in Semnan, but it was found out later that he was in league with the police as well. As soon as Kianuri entered the house he tipped off the police and Kianuri was arrested. This story has been told by Kianuri and his friends many times.

But I had been staying for some evenings at my sister's house. Her husband, 'Ali Akbar Nahavandi was a quiet and honorable person (contrary to his youngest son Hushang Nahavandi, who was an active follower of Dr Mosaddeq when he was a student in Paris but after Mosaddeq's arrest he joined his adversaries and the court; university students are aware of the criminal, dirty and disgusting acts of this renegade). 'Ali Akbar Nahavandi had a heart ailment and his condition required a physician to be present at his bedside constantly, if possible.

In the meeting held at 'Alavi's house some of the participants said the government had definitely ascribed the shooting to the party and therefore occupied the party's club. They would definitely arrest the leaders. I was one of those who was of this opinion. When we said this, Radmanesh, with his northern accent, said: "Sir, this cannot be stuck on us even with a thousand kilos of glue." Some of those who heard these words are still alive. I insisted that the members of the Executive Board should not sleep in their own houses for some nights. On my insistence, Tabari refrained from going home. I remember that he went to his sister's house and escaped detention.

I forgot to tell you that Kianuri did not utter a word at that meeting. After Qassemi, Boqrati and Kianuri arrived in Moscow, the issue of the shooting at the shah was brought up again at the meeting of the Central Committee in the presence of Kianuri. Almost everybody accused him of arbitrariness, individualism and sabotage and held him responsible for the party being declared illegal--which resulted in the arrest and death of a large number of party members and in the disintegration of the party. The only reply Kianuri gave was: "I told you about it." He was telling a lie again. But if we assume for one moment that he was telling the truth and that the Executive Board or at least the secretary of the party had been informed about the shooting at the shah and had been involved in it and therefore knew that Kianuri had a hand in it, then how would you explain the fact that Kianuri kept completely silent in the meeting at 'Alavi's house and spoke not a word when some of us said that something terrible had happened which would be attributed to us, that the party would

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be crushed and we would be arrested, regarding which Radmanesh remarked that the accusation would not stick even with a thousand kilos of glue? If the Executive Board had been informed of his involvement in the shooting, in response to the above-mentioned statements he should have said: "Comrades, what has come over you? I told you about it and you approved of my participation in this. Why are you backing out now? Why are you feigning ignorance? If I am arrested tomorrow and if it is proved that I have been involved in this, at least do not deny your knowledge of this matter.

Apart from this, as I said, those who had approved the order to shoot the shah would not have slept in their own homes and in particular would not have gone to work the following morning to be arrested after the shooting at the shah--whether or not he was killed.

At any rate, the police called at my house, too, but I was at the bedside of a patient that night. My wife phoned me and told me not to come home the next day. So, I did not go home. I remember something funny: I phoned the home of Colonel Saffari, the chief of police, whose children were my patients. His wife said he was taking a bath. She called him and he hurried to the phone. I told him everybody knew that our party was against terrorism and that he knew well "that we had nothing to do with this adventure. Why did you occupy the party's club?" He said he had orders to do this. Besides, "these things were done by the army. Everything will be all right. Please tell me where you are so that we can meet and settle the matter." It was obvious that he wanted to arrest me, too. I answered him with a laugh and said: "I am not far away from you. In fact, I am only 500 meters away from you." (My sister's house on Saba Street was only a short distance from Saffari's house.) But, I added: "I have no time for you." I hung up on him and immediately drove to the house of a worker comrade who was a friend of mine. It was 16 Bahman 1327 [5 February 1949]. My life in hiding had started.

From then until I emigrated with Radmanesh a few months later I took part in the meeting of the party leaders who had not been arrested only once. The meeting was held for the purpose of putting the covert affairs of the party in order. From among the members of the Executive Board only four persons--Radmanesh, Tabari, Forutan and I--had remained at large. This group and some of the responsible officials of Tehran zone held the meeting. Two or three months later Tabari was sent to Moscow. At that meeting, Radmanesh told me that since I was very well known in Tehran and had facial marks (smallpox pockmarks), it would be unwise for me to leave my hideout in order to take part in meetings. He said that the danger of my getting caught was greater than that of the others. He added that I would be notified if a major development took place. Four months after the shooting at the shah, Radmanesh informed me that it had been decided--a decision also approved by our comrades in prison--that he and I should temporarily leave Tehran and go to Moscow, and that we should return to Tehran only when the groundwork for covert operations was ready. I have no information about these decisions other than what Radmanesh told me. I was in hiding in the homes of friends and party comrades. I was never a financial imposition on my friends or on the party. For a while I was even hidden in the home of a high-ranking and wealthy army officer whose child's life I had saved. The first clandestine printing house was bought with money my wife paid on my instruction. Radmanesh and I left Iran together in the first half of July 1949. Thus began the migration that has lasted nearly 30 years now--a migration accompanied by spiritual hardship for me as was the case with thousands of my cothinkers and fellow strugglers.

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I spent 10 years in the Soviet Union; later I stayed in Baghdad and after that in Geneva; and I resided in Algiers for 15 years. As I said earlier, Qassemi and Boqrati came to Moscow to take part in the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It was they who said what I am going to relate next. I repeat that all that I say here on my own and quoting them is on record in the minutes of the meetings of the Central Committee in Moscow.

They said that after spending some time in a Tehran prison, the two of them were transferred to a prison in Shiraz where they met Arkani. According to the version given us in Moscow, Arkani was a student member of the party who had known Nasser Fakhrara'i since childhood. The first thing they asked Arkani was: "Why did you get the party linked with the incident of the shooting at the shah? Why did you not inform the party even though you had known for months of the plan to have Nasser Fakhrara'i shoot the shah? Can't you see the state into which the party has been precipitated?" Qassemi said that Arkani was "surprised at our statements." He said that months before the shah was shot at he had been keeping Kianuri, the chief of the organizational affairs of the party and the speaker of their zone of activity, informed about the statements of Nasser Fakhrara'i.

It is necessary to say here that some months before the shooting at the shah, Kianuri told the Central Committee that the university activity zones had asked to be permitted to hold their meetings at Dr Keshavarz' house because his house was located opposite the university and the weather was cold and the streets muddy when they left the university. Obviously I accepted this suggestion and a few zonal meetings by the university students were held in the various rooms of my house. Apparently the second reason for my being sentenced to execution on charges of complicity in the shooting at the shah was this very fact of holding such meetings in my house which had taken place pursuant to Kianuri's suggestion to the Central Committee.

Arkani told Qassemi and Boqrati that when he informed Kianuri of Fakhrara'i's intention, Kianuri told him not to share the information with anybody else but to wait until he called him. A week later Kianuri told Arkani to keep in touch with Fakhrara'i and that if any assistance was needed, Kianuri would arrange it.

Arkani told Qassemi and Boqrati that Fakhrara'i had followed the shah once to Esfahan, once to Tabriz, and apparently once to the Jalalieh area where a parade was taking place. However, he had not managed to attempt to shoot the shah. Arkani had filled Kanuri in on these moves each time. Once Kianuri had told Arkani that Fakhrara'i was a coward and would not do anything after all. Meanwhile Fakhrara'i had apprently received 450 tumans to buy weapons. Arkani told Qassemi and Boqrati that in the long run he accompanied Nasser Fakhrara'i as far as the entrance to the university on 15 Bahman [4 February] and then met with Kianuri (who had taken time off to return to Tehran from Emamzadeh Abdollah) at a rendezvous point near the university where Arkani informed him that Nasser Fakhrara'i had entered the university. What I narrate for you in this interview is so strange that one gets the impression that Machiavelli, Rokamvel [sic] and James Bond were all incarnated in the person of this man, Kianuri. He would continue his crimes by means of falsehoods, trickery and intimidation of some of the cadres and leaders of the party and by killing a number of witnesses and adversaries or by getting them caught. The surrender and betrayal of some members of the party leadership, although extracted by torture, helped Kianuri's purpose because nobody would believe their truthful statements.

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Qassemi and Boqrati said that as soon as it was known in Tehran prison that Arkani, too, had been arrested, Kianuri was agitated and perturbed and repeatedly asked what would be the punishment of people who had participated in a conspiracy to kill the shah. Qassemi (who held a Bachelor of Arts in law) said: "We did not know of Kianuri's involvement in the plot. We therefore asked ourselves why he was asking us about this." The rest of the members of the Executive Board who were in prison with Kianuri and later came to Moscow verified this matter. In Moscow, Nushin, Qassemi, Boqrati, Jodat and others told us that Kianuri had secretly arranged for his solitary escape from the prison through Hosam Lankarani, Maryam Firuz and Forutan and by using party cadres and means, while another plan was afoot for the collective escape of all the detained leaders of the party. You know that this collective escape of the 10 leaders took place with the help of two police officers who were members of the party's officers organization. It created a great deal of clamor. The plot for Kianuri's lone escape from prison was uncovered the day before it was to be implemented. It so happened that the day Hosam Lankarani, who was the linkman, went to the prison he did not find Kianuri at hand. So, he told another member of the Executive Board--presumably Nushin--to tell Kianuri that everything was ready for his escape the following day. Hosam Lankarani thought the escape plan had been approved by the detained comrades. The news quickly got around to all the members of the Executive Board in prison and was discussed by them. They prevented Kianuri from escaping and remonstrated with him for acting independently. After we learned about this from Boqrati and Qassemi in Moscow, Kianuri, too, came to Moscow. All the members of the Central Committee and even his factional friends, namely Qassemi and Forutan, chastised him severely. His arbitrary acts, egotism and mistakes were again discussed to his involvement in the shooting at the shah but claimed that he had told us beforehand. The members of the Central Committee became angry and called it a strange lie. They said he had never brought the matter up in the Central Committee. Raanesh, the secretary of the party, asked everybody to express their views on Kianuri's allegation one by one and confirm whether or not this matter had ever been mentioned in the Central Committee. Six or seven persons said, one after the other, that this was a lie and that the question of shooting the shah had never been broached to nor approved by the Central Committee or by the Executive Board. Besides, what would our party gain by killing the shah? He would have been replaced by somebody else of his ilk. The members of the Central Committee were telling the truth: no such matter had ever been brought up at the Central Committee to be approved or rejected. I was the only one who remembered what I will tell you now. I repeat: nobody but me reminded of this. In the debate in the Central Committee I thought it would be unconscionable if I did not bring up the matter which I remembered. This is what I said at the meeting:

On a summer day in 1327 [1948] the Executive Board held a meeting in Kianuri's house. After the meeting, a couple of the members who were in a hurry left while the others took their time in preparing to leave in groups of two, three or four. While we were chatting, Kianuri said: "Comrades, Maryam has made ice cream for you. Stay and have some." We started having ice cream while we were up and ready for departure. While we were chatting, Kianuri said: "By the way, what would happen if the shah were killed?" There were a couple of comments. One said there would be no difference. Another questioned whether it would serve any purpose because somebody else would take his place. I remember well that Tabari said terrorism was in conflict with the ideological principles of our party and that Marxism-Leninism was averse to terrorism. After we had eaten some ice cream, we all parted, paying no particular attention to Kianuri's words, which seemed commonplace.

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When I related this matter at the Central Committee in Moscow, some of the members of the Central Committee also recalled more or less the same words. It became clear that Kianuri had said that at that time with a devious purpose. Many of the party cadres have come to know Kianuri as a scheming, deceitful and tricky person. He often said--and I gather he still boasts about it--that he "played a trick." To cut a long story short, this meeting of the Central Committee was adjourned until the following week. But at the next session, other subjects were brought up and the case of the shooting at the shah and Kianuri's involvement in it were dropped from the agenda. Did the Soviets, who definitely kept themselves informed about our talks, give instructions to protect Kianuri? This is something that only Radmanesh can answer. Or perhaps behind-the-scenes negotiations, threats and deals had taken place between the gang of Kambakhsh, Kianuri, Forutan and Qassemi, who always trailed behind them some intellectually weak persons of political mediocrity such as Amir Khizi and Hakimi. My insistence and efforts in the following sessions of the Central Committee and in the Fourth Extensive Plenum to have a thorough investigation carried out and a conclusion reached about this were in vain. Equally ineffective were the insistence on my part and on the part of some other cadres of the party on each of us going to Iran for clandestine work. The only outcome of this was that I came increasingly under unfair attacks by the Kambakhsh-Kianuri faction (such as the slander that I had changed my old bedsheets for new ones belonging to the Soviet Government). As I knew too much by then, I started to fear for my life. Another point was related to us by each of the members of the Tehran Executive Board who came to Moscow one after the other. That, too, is on record in the minutes of the Central Committee. They said that Kianuri was taken out of the prison two or three times by two military persons and then returned to prison after some hours. (It was planned for Kianuri to escape on one of these trips.) It has been asked: "Where did Kianuri go? Who did he meet? How was it that a dangerous member of the Tudeh Party who had been sentenced to imprisonment or death was taken out of prison by two policemen or soldiers and stayed out for hours each time? Was his escape not planned with the agreement of the government officials who perhaps wanted him to become the head of the party while the others stayed in prison? Or did they want to use his involvement in the shooting at the shah to force him to confess and to plead like his brother-in-law Kambakhsh?"

When the members of the Executive Board asked Kianuri where he had been taken he replied that he had been taken out to elaborate the plan for the building of a palace for the Ministry of Finance or for Ashraf Pahlavi. (I have heard both versions.) After this inquiry by the members of the Executive Board, Behbudi, a staff member of the Ministry of Imperial Court and a confidante of Reza Shah and of the reigning shah, came to the prison one day and, in front of everyone, paid a fee of 16,000 tumans to Kianuri. Behbudi's visit would normally have indicated that Kianuri was building the palace for Ashraf.

Were the plan and the construction work for real? Was the payment in front of everybody a stage shop? How was it that the Royal Court was paying a fee of 16,000 tumans to a member of the Tudeh Party who was to be incarcerated for 10 years while the party of which he was a leader had been accused of attempting to kill the shah? Everything I have described here has been put on record in the minutes of the Central Committee, and Kianuri himself has confessed to them. If anybody looks into these issues and into other faults and crimes of Kianuri he will confirm that the broaching of these and many other questions is not out of place and should be investigated. Perhaps someday history will answer these questions and the confidential files of the regime will be revealed. At any rate, when I made house calls on the shah's youngest brother (Hamid Reza) every day for almost 2 months in the thirties and saved him from a severe

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and dangerous diphtherial paralysis which the court physicians had failed to diagnose, for which service I was not paid even one shahi [penny] although I was not a prisoner or a convict at the time, while 16,000 tumans was paid to a convicted, imprisoned Tudeh Party member as the outstanding fee for building a palace! It is particularly relevant when one remembers that the same Behbudi was connected with Kianuri during Mosaddeq's era. For Kianuri said in the meeting of the Central Committee in Moscow --and this, too, was recorded in the minutes--that this same Behbudi was connected with the Anticolonialism Association on behalf of the association to which Kianuri had officially been assigned by the party. The association was charged with the duty of preparing for overthrow of Mosaddeq. One of these two persons was Fada'i 'Alavi who was in touch with Behbudi at Kianuri's order. These were the details and descriptions of some of the proceedings related to the incident of the shooting at the shah which are recorded in the minutes of the party meetings and of which the members of the party leadership and some of the cadres are informed.

I wonder if someday the consciences of the members of this leadership in exile will be awakened as a result of the damage Kianuri has inflicted on the party and on the people of Iran, and if they were to purge the party I would be surprised because some of the members of the Azarbayjan Communist Party are behind Kianuri and Gholam Yahya and the Azarbayjan Communist Party is part of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The members of the party leadership have been residing in the Soviet Union and the socialist countries for more than 20 years and do not set foot on Iranian soil, and they protect one another. Although they know--and have frequently said--that Kianuri is an ambitious, adventurous, individualistic and unprincipled person whose hands have been stained with the blood of a number of party members, they keep quiet or are afraid to speak up. Briefly speaking, it seems that the shooting at the shah was masterminded by Razmara, who had the army entirely in his hands. Contrary to the customary protocol, Razmara had absented himself from the ceremony at the university on the pretext that the demonstrations of members of the Tudeh Party at Emamzadeh Abdollah required caution and alertness by himself and the army. Nasser Fakhrara'i fired five shots at the shah, who was slightly injured. Then Nasser flung his weapon at the shah and did not defend himself. At this moment a high-ranking officer, Colonel Daftari according to some people or Colonel Saffari according to others, drew his revolver and shot Fakhrara'i at close quarters. Fakhrara'i, too, was one of those who "knew too much" and had to be "silenced." The Tudeh Party of Iran was immediately declared illegal and a brutal repression of it began. Please note that even Gerard Villier, author of the book entitled "The Effortless Rise of Mohammad Reza Shah," writes the following, brutal and ponderable line on pp 166-169: "...It must be noted that there was a disqueting coincidence and simultaneity between the act of Fakhrara'i and the accidental change of the meeting of the Tudeh Party..." He did not know that the change of the day was not accidental, just as none of us knew it, either. He did not know that it was not the Tudeh Party of Iran that had organized the shooting at the shah, but an adventurous man who had risen to a high level in the party who had organized the shooting at the shah. He did not know that this individual had deliberately led the Tudeh Party to disbandment, perhaps at the order of Razmara and his foreign masters so that the "oil problem" would be solved easily. Perhaps as a result of the confession of Arkani who had been arrested quickly (an arrest unexpected by Kianuri) and the uncovering of Kianuri's role in the shooting at the shah, Kianuri had also succumbed for fear of his life and consented to cooperate with the Royal Court and its masters. That being assumed, then the taking of Kianuri out of the prison and his meeting with Ashraf--who was and still is an active politician of the court--and his connection with Behbudi and the payment of the 16,000 tumans as a coverup become self-explanatory.

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Now I will read to you part of the first clandestine issue of the newspaper MARDOM, which appeared sometime after the shooting at the shah:

"...Who does not know of the disgraceful and Iran-destroying intentions of those flunkies of the pound sterling and the dollar? Who does not know that the destruction of the party was considered necessary in order to solve the problems related to oil, to the Shahi Bank, to the 7 year plan for changing the constitution, the formation of the Senate, the bylaws of the election of the National Consultative Assembly [Majles] and the internal bylaws of the Majles, the clampdown on the already restricted freedom of the press, the reconversion of the distributed lands, and a series of other shameless acts performed with clumsy haste, one after the other, after the incident of 15 Bahman 1327 [4 February 1949]? How well this writer, who certainly had no idea that the destruction of the Tudeh Party of Iran was done by one of the members of the party leadership, wrote."

The above lines are not mine. Look into them carefully. These words were written by party cadres in the first issue of the party's organ after the shooting at the shah. From this it can also be deduced that any time Kianuri and his group were away from the process of the party work, the party cadres saw things better and performed better. After all, who other than Kianuri gave an excuse to imperialism, the shah and Iran's reactionaries to wreak the needed destruction of the Tudeh Party of Iran by attempting to assassinate the shah? /All those who are informed about these goings-on but sit on the leadership board of the party in exile should one day address themselves to this question--even posthumously and even if their answer is given to history: "What sort of, in their own words, individualists, ambitious and adventurous person who inflicted such damage on the party and on the liberation movement of Iran rose to the position of secretary of the party?"/

Which authority, person or deals made them keep quiet when I proposed the expulsion of Kianuri from the Central Committee in the fifties on charges of repeated treason on his part and asked them to draw conclusions from the allegations and statements they themselves had found were founded? Kianuri's involvement in the shooting at the shah gave the enemy the opportunity to savagely crush the largest and most disciplined organization of the masses, the workers and toilers, the only one in Iran.

The people of Iran were temporarily disarmed. The obstacle was removed and an intense quarrel ensued between America and Britain over Iran's oil. Fortunately, an objective, patriotic man, a veteran struggler who was well aware of the secrets of the policy of the foreigners in Iran was wisely preparing the plan for the struggle in the cause of the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry. This man was Dr Mosaddeq, who rightly became the national hero of Iran. By playing on the conflicts existing between the Americans and the British in Iran, he took the lead in the struggle of the Iranian people and nationalized Iran's oil industry. I bow my head in reverence to the memory of the man who was not a member of the Tudeh Party of Iran but who did what the Tudeh Party should have done and should have supported.

Question: There are some shady areas in the relationship between the Tudeh Party of Iran and Dr Mosaddeq during the period of struggle against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and in the immobility of the Tudeh Party of Iran at the time of the coup d'etat of 28 Mordad 1332 [19 August 1953] staged against Dr Mosaddeq. Could you discuss this?

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Answer: Yes, but I will not go into details on the well-known issues. First, I must say that there were two totally different phases in the history of the struggle of the Tudeh Party of Iran which have to be dealt with entirely separately.

1. The overt phase of the activities of the Tudeh Party of Iran from Shahrivar 1320 [23 August - 22 September 1941] to 15 Bahman 1327 [4 February 1949].

2. The covert activity phase of the party from 15 Bahman 1327 [4 February 1949], when it was declared illegal, to the midfifties, i.e., when the group-by-group surrender of the cadres and members of the party began and nothing remained of the party in Iran and all the members of the Central Committee who had not been caught gathered in Moscow.

In the covert phase of the party's activity, factionalism reached a new high in the party. In one wing there were Kianuri, Qassemi, Forutan and their followers who were more educated, more active and at the same time were opposed to the idea of support for the Iranian oil industry nationalization movement of Dr Mosaddeq. The other wing in the Executive Board was comprised of Boqrati, Jodat, 'Alavi, Yazdi and Bahrami who were by far less educated in theory and far behind the former wing from the standpoint of activity. During the entire period of its overt activity, in and out of parliament, it supported Dr Mosaddeq and cooperated with him. Only at the time the issue of the northern oil came up, did a chasm come about between the Tudeh Party of Iran and Dr Mosaddeq and his supporters. This separation worked to the disadvantage of the Tudeh Party of Iran. But, at any rate, the issue of the northern oil was resolved to Dr Mosaddeq's satisfaction until the Azarbayjan Democratic Party was created. All those who witnessed the political struggles in Iran at that time knew that there was intense cooperation between the party and Dr Mosaddeq. Besides, the minutes of the sessions of the 14th term of the Majles clearly show this fact. As far as the oil problem was concerned, too, the majority of the Majles deputies and Dr Mosaddeq were of the opinion that the act prohibiting negotiations on oil with foreign governments while foreign troops were in Iran should be ratified. They insisted that approval of the act should have top priority in one sitting of the Majles Radmanesh, Iraj Eskandari, I and a couple of other deputies from Tudeh Party were in favor of this law, while Kambakhsh and Artashez Avanessian were strongly opposed to it. They believed that the law was aimed against the Soviet Union. With the kind of majority that dominated the 14th term of the Majles, no act permitting Soviet participation in the exploitation of the northern oil would be passed at any rate. Qavam approached the Soviet Union and approved of conceding the northern oil to a joint Iranian-Soviet company at a time when the Soviet troops were in Iran and the Azerbayjan Democratic Party was in control of the northern province. A reading of the speeches made at the Majles that day by Radmanesh, Iraj Eskandari and me would show that we and our party were completely for Dr Mosaddeq's position. Some impartial and truth-seeking writers testified to this fact and even wondered how it was that we did not vote in favor of the act despite the speeches we made in favor of Dr Mosaddeq's views. They did not know that there was no consensus on this in the Tudeh Party faction in the Majles. We needed a few minutes to discuss the matter so that the pros and cons could be discussed and so that we could arrive at a factional consensus. Unfortunately, my motion and request on behalf of the faction was rejected by Dr Mosaddeq and the Majles majority. My speech in the Majles on that day asked for and praised Dr Mosaddeq's patriotism, in which I really believed and still do. And Dr Mosaddeq knew this. I remember well that I addressed him and said: "Dr Mosaddeq, in the field of politics I am your junior brother. At the

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moment I cannot vote against or for this act." I suggested that a few minutes' recess be announced so that our faction could make a decision. Unfortunately, in the tense atmosphere of the Majles on that day the motion for recess was turned down. Consequently, because of the secrets of the two persons who considered the act anti-Soviet and pro-British on the one hand, and because of the profound respect for and belief in Lenin's country--which one should not be afraid of speaking up about--shared by the majority of deputies from the Tudeh Party, on the other, we voted against the act. /My conscience dictates that I say, too, that our parliamentary faction believed that Soviet participation in the extraction of oil in the north would separate greater democracy and freedom in Iran and reduce the influence of the British Petroleum Company in Iran./

As I said earlier, Radmanesh and I went to Moscow together a few months after the shooting at the shah. Iraj Eskandari was in Paris then and never returned to Iran. The three of us knew Dr Mosaddeq better than the others. We had worked with him and always supported him. On the other hand, up to the time that we left Iran, the Kambakhsh-Kianuri group that acted secretly within the party could not have the least impact on the general policy of the party outside (not in the internal structure of the party) or on its relationship with democratic organizations, the press or political personalities. Was the decision of the Executive Board, in a meeting at which I was not present, that Radmanesh and I should leave Iran together--a decision about which I was notified by Radmanesh--meant to clear the deck for the Kambakhsh-Kianuri group? There are many such problems in the Tudeh Party of Iran which are known only to Radmanesh. If he conjures up the courage to commit to paper everything he knows in all honesty, then he will have rendered a great service to the party, its members and the people of Iran in the twilight of his life. He would relieve his conscience of the anguish he must be suffering.

At any rate, the political war between England and America over Iran's oil was raging and in the last months preceding the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry some famous Iranian dignitaries were killed or wounded (such as Hazhir, the Iman Jom'eh [Friday prayer Imam] and Razmara (during his premiership). It should not be forgotten that the shah's assassination at that time would have been directly to the benefit of Razmara, who had the army in his hands and was therefore, the "strongman" of Iran. The assassination of the shah at that time would have served the Americans, too, because the shah was still a serious defender of the interests of the British and of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The evidence to this allegation is Golsh'ian's report on the meeting of the cabinet on the oil problem and the negotiations with the oil company, in response to which report the shah ordered that the talks with the oil company be followed up in any event.

After a series of events which are known to the public, Dr Mosaddeq managed to have the Act of Nationalization of the Iranian Oil Industry ratified by a Majles in which at least 75 percent of the deputies were reactionary and connected with the British Petroleum Company in one way or another.

It should be said at this point that the American Embassy had, in those days, coaxed, bullied and "counselled" a number of the Majles deputies in the British pay into approval of the nationalization act. These people are still living witnesses to this fact. The Americans thought they would be accommodated by Dr Mosaddeq after the ratification of the act. Their mistake was that they had underrated this patriot,

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this veteran old struggler against foreign interference in Iran's internal affairs. They did not know that he thought of nothing but Iran's interests.

Dr Mosaddeq's resoluteness and uncompromising attitude against the Americans brought about the overthrow of his government on 28 Mordad 1332 [19 August 1953], a few months after Stalin's death. It must be said that the Soviet Government did nothing to support Dr Mosaddeq. On the contrary, it worked against him as if it wanted to wreak vengeance on him. It suffices to say that although Dr Mosaddeq's government had become impoverished, Iran's gold deposited in the bank in Moscow was not returned to it, but after Stalin's death and Mosaddeq's overthrow it was returned to Zahedi, the agent of the coup d'etat and the mercenary of the United States of America.

Under Mosaddeq, those members of the party Executive Board who were in Iran split into two opposing groups after 10 of the party's leaders escaped prison collectively. One group was comprised of Jodat, Boqrati, Yazdi, Bahrami and 'Alavi. The other group was comprised of Kianuri, Qassemi and Forutan. These groups were not opposed to each other on theoretical or current political issues. The split stemmed from their desire to take full control of the leadership of the party. Other substantive and legitimate differences were unfortunately less important.

The former group was comprised of the sort of people who were very weak in theoretical and political knowledge and very slack and sloppy in work and activity. Therefore, it was ready to accommodate the latter. The latter group, which included Maryam Firuz (Kianuri's wife), A'zam Sorush (whose second husband was Ahmad Qassemi) and Qoreyshi, the secretary of the Tehran provincial organization of the party, was more active and clever. They usually carried under their arms one or more books by Lenin so that they could convince others to accept their views, particularly those in opposition to Mosaddeq's government, with the help of quotations from Lenin. According to the information reaching us in Moscow, the first group was more in favor of supporting Dr Mosaddeq. But none of them could write even a brief article or statement. This was even written to our advisory meeting--namely the meeting of the members of the Central Committee that gathered in Moscow. They were influenced mostly by the writers and intellectuals of the party, such as Tamaddon, Noruzi and Zakharian, who were staunch advocates of the party's support for Dr Mosaddeq and used their information, opinions and pens. It is possible that the arguments of these three persons had convinced the former group of the necessity of supporting Dr Mosaddeq. The latter group was against Dr Mosaddeq, so much so that it decided to expel Tamaddon from the party for his stubborn insistence on the necessity of supporting Dr Mosaddeq. Quassemi was a good writer and altogether a lot better than the other members of his group. But he was very ambitious and particularly wanted to be considered a charismatic character. He sometimes had harsh disputes with Kianuri. But their differences were the product of their ambition, and therefore not enduring. The latter group used the covertness of the party to do away with the modicum of democracy which could undoubtedly survive even in conditions of covertness. This alienated the cadres who would not succumb to their views and excluded them from responsible positions. Under the influence of the Kianuri faction, the party's leadership in Iran was constantly at daggers with Dr Mosaddeq, sometimes vehemently and sometimes less so. For instance, I remember that the newspaper CHELENGAR--the famous comic organ of the party published under the supervision of the talented Gilani poet, Afrashteh--had, under the influence of the leadership, printed a caricature showing Dr Mosaddeq clad in feminine clothes dancing to the tune of an American orchestra led by Harriman.

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Following the lead of Kianuri and Qassemi, the party's paper at that time profusely villified Dr Mosaddeq and his foreign minister, Dr Fatemi, who had taken refuge with our party but was arrested and later shot by a firing squad. Our newspapers called Dr Fatemi "the base and original spy of imperialism." Kianuri told the Central Committee in Moscow that he had been in touch with the Royal Court through the same Behbudi, who had visited him in the prison, for the overthrow of Dr Mosaddeq's government. He said in the Central Committee that through the members of the Anti-colonialism Association, he had been in touch with Kashani, Baqa'i and Jamal Emami who were among the staunch opponents of Dr Mosaddeq, and that he had even written an article in the party's newspaper in support of Seyyed Ziaeldin. During Mosaddeq's rule, there was sheer anarchy in the leadership of our party, with everyone pulling the party in a different direction. But Kianuri's faction was more active and stronger, hence more effective. Antagonism to Dr Mosaddeq was so strong at that time that according to an officer comrade who was the commander of the guard at the radio station --who had told another officer who later told us in exile in Moscow about it--when Zahedi and a few others went to seize the radio station "my first reaction was to mow them down by machinegun, but then I thought that since the party was against Mosaddeq it was perhaps in favor of the coup d'etat, especially because I had not been given any instructions to the contrary." The party's organization worked like a clock until the night before the coup d'etat, and it is not know which authority ordered the party to cease contact with everybody that night. A huge officers organization was at the party's disposal, and Zahedi's personal guards as well as those of the radio station were all members of the officers organization. But the leadership paralyzed everybody. There are many interesting facts and details which I cannot recall but which should be on record in the minutes of the Central Committee or on file at the party, if they have not been destroyed.

Concerning the 25 Mordad [16 August] coup d'etat, that is, the first coup, Kianuri told the Central Committee that he phoned Dr Mosaddeq and informed him of the planned coup d'etat. That the officers organization should basically have known of the planned coup d'etat was beyond doubt, but who can say for sure whether Kianuri, with his deep enmity toward Dr Mosaddeq, suddenly turned softhearted and informed Mosaddeq about the coup. Besides, Dr Mosaddeq had the army staff under his control, and it was learned on the day he was arrested that there were many patriotic officers supporting him. Therefore, it is possible that he had learned about the coup plan from other sources. Besides, I must remind you that Dr Mosaddeq did not trust the leadership of the Tudeh Party of Iran, and rightly so. At the time of the nationalization of the oil industry, Dr Mosaddeq said that the leadership of the Tudeh Party of Iran was partly pro-Soviet and partly pro-British. Besides, all those who worked closely with Kianuri and knew him well say that he told many lies and each time would call it "playing a trick." He has long played tricks in the history of the party, in its covert period, misrepresenting facts totally, often showing himself and the party leadership at the time of Mosaddeq's rule through his articles in DONYA to be in favor of Dr Mosaddeq. He claimed in his writings of having done this and that. The aim of these articles is to adulterate history--as was done in Stalin's era--and to exonerate himself, particularly because some of the people who could have borne witness to the past problems of the party had been liquidated.

Our comrade, Khosrow Ruzbeh, wrote in his famous letter: "I must survive so that the demoralization of the cadres and members of the party will be prevented. The demoralization referred to by Comrade Ruzbeh was a product of the treacheries, homicides, and streak of unjustified defeats. It is no wonder that the Iranian newspapers, which, as everyone knows, are under the control of SAVAK, sometimes praise Kianuri in the context of their writing about the party. I have seen such praises in TEHRAN MOSSAVAR magazine.

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Another point that comes to mind relates to the second coup d'etat, namely the coup of 28 Mordad [19 August]. The Executive Board had held a meeting in the morning of that day. Word came that some knifers and prostitutes had taken to the streets and were shouting slogans such as "Long Live the Shah!" and "Death to Mosaddeq!" Having already experienced the abortive coup d'etat of 25 Mordad [16 August], which was killed in embryo by the officers loyal to Dr Mosaddeq and by the army staff, the party Executive Board was quick to sense that a second coup d'etat had begun. 'Ali 'Olavi suggested that a general strike of Tehran factory workers be ordered so that the workers would go into the streets (which was feasible within 2 hours). At the beginning of the coup d'etat, even its executors were not optimistic about its success. It is recorded in the minutes of the meeting--and this has been admitted by Kianuri himself--that he and only he opposed this proposal. As he saw that everybody else was for the idea, he rationalized that "this would be to the detriment of Mosaddeq." Kianuri, who had seemingly become a proponent of Mosaddeq(!), insisted that this should not be attempted without Dr Mosaddeq's permission(!). The members of the Executive Board argued that the workers and party members would pour into the streets shouting "Long Live Mosaddeq!", which would not be to the detriment of Mosaddeq. When Kianuri despaired of preventing the strike, he suggested that he would go and telephone Dr Mosaddeq to find out his views on this. He went and returned after about an hour and said that Dr Mosaddeq had said that he was completely in command of the whole situation and that we should do nothing at all. Time was gradually running out and the general strike was ruled out and Kianuri, who was the head of the officers organization, did not think of using this organization! Some 50 officer members of the organization could have drawn their revolvers and shouted the slogan "Long Live Mosaddeq!", not "Long Live the Tudeh Party of Iran," and by doing so they could have upset the situation entirely. But the cadres gradually brought in disheartening news. It was public knowledge that after the coup d'etat of 25 Mordad (16 August) the party had become nearly covert. Despite the request of the cadres, nothing was done, but Kianuri again suggested that he should go and telephone Dr Mosaddeq again. He left--God knows where he went because he was alone--and some more time elapsed. When he returned he said that Dr Mosaddeq had said that it was a foregone conclusion and that he could not do anything himself but if we could do anything we were free to do so. But valuable time had been lost. The clock could not be turned back on the 3 hours that had elapsed. It was a point of time that could have drastically affected the fate of the nation. With the help of the 18 million dollars the CIA had placed at his disposal to carry out the coup d'etat, Zahedi went into action and the officers who were waiting to see how the scales would turn joined him one by one. The radio station was occupied while the officer of the guards there was a member of our officers organization. When the radio resumed its broadcast to the entire nation with the words "Long Live the Shah!" and "Death to Mosaddeq!", the fate has been sealed. At a very critical moment in Iran's history, Kianuri, who had taken the reins of the party in his hands by taking undue advantage of an opportunity in the party and had intimidated the Iran-based party Executive Board as shown by the documents existing in Moscow, stabbed the nation in the back and served imperialism and the Imperial Court handsomely. He had served imperialism once before by having Mohammad Mas'ud murdered. His involvement in the shooting at the shah and the resulting declaration of the party's illegality was also a valuable service to colonialism. What more could the CIA and the British Intelligence Service have done in Iran by themselves? Despite all this, Kianuri was elected secretary of the Tudeh Party of Iran in exile and imposed his views on the others.

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When will Kianuri present his next masterpiece? When again, for the nth time, will Kianuri manage to lead to defeat the party which, despite all that its enemies might say and despite the treasons and political mistakes, has given hundreds of martyrs and has had thousands of its members imprisoned in the cause of Iran's freedom and independence? /The Tudeh Party of Iran must be dissociated from the leadership esconced in exile./ The young self-sacrificing youths of Iran are marching on the right path, on the path of the freedom and independence of Iran and of humanity, but this leadership ensconced in exile acts to defame the party of martyrs.

Who witnessed Kianuri's telephone call to Dr Mosaddeq? He went alone. Who can prove that he did not call or meet his masters to inform them that he was trying to prevent the party from acting in support of Dr Mosaddeq? Besides, the telephone line to Dr Mosaddeq's house had been disconnected! What was the use of phoning anyway? Why did an officers organization with nearly 600 members--when the Iranian Army had fewer than 15,000 officers--not make a move in favor of Mosaddeq but instead wait to be turned over to the regime and to imperialism with hands and feet tied after the best children of Iran were put before the firing squad? The party leadership in exile never wanted to consider this matter seriously. It always connived and skimmed over the matter lightly. How can these acts of throwing Iran to the wind be investigated now that the responsible officers of the officers organization and the officials of the party have been shot and nobody has survived to throw light on these issues? Of course, the testimony and confessions of 'Abbasi, an officer expelled from the army long ago and the closest colleague of Khosrow Ruzbeh, are a matter of record in the officers organization, but how can they be used as evidence? He gave the officers organization away under torture. The torture to which Ruzbeh referred in his famous letter was beyond the tolerance of an ordinary human being. Speaking of officers, part of the report submitted to the Central Committee by Nasser Saremi after his entry into the Soviet Union comes to mind. Nasser Saremi was one of the officials closest to Kianuri and often acted as his chauffeur and bodyguard.

Nasser Saremi writes: "The party was underground. One day I came across an officer comrade , Colonel Parman. He said it was a good thing he saw me because he wanted to inform us that they had started arresting our comrades in the officers organization that morning. He said that he and four others had stayed away from their posts. He asked me to ask the Executive Board what they were supposed to do. He said that they had nowhere to hide and he asked that the party hide them.

I remember the names of two of the officers Saremi said he had met. The group included Colonel Entezami, Colonel Qassemlu and two majors. Saremi said he could see Kianuri--who was also in charge of the officers organization--more easily and quickly than others could. He said he told Kianuri about it and Kianuri told him: "Do you know what responsibility you have undertaken? Don't do a thing about it and don't show up at the rendezvous either." Nasser Saremi said he told Kianuri: "If you agree, I will personally hide them." But Kianuri became angry and told him: "You have no right to do this." Saremi then pleaded: "But each of these people have done a thousand things for the party. If they are caught each of them will be condemned to death." Saremi added: "Then I will go and tell them that I cannot help them." But Kianuri told him: "That is not necessary at all. In fact, the greater the number of the officers arrested, the better. They had better go to their posts because the larger the number of detainees, the less they can do to harm them." This is Saremi's report and it is on record in detail in the minutes of the Central Committee.

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Nasser Saremi was an intimate and protege of Kianuri and he lived in exile in Eastern European countries for 10 years. As he was trusted by Kianuri he was permitted to travel to the West, too. It was on one of these trips that he headed for Iran and gave himself up. Apparently he now lives in Mozandaran Province. The arrest of these five comrades of the officers organization was the direct fault of Kianuri. If I am not mistaken, Major 'Atarod and Dr Vazirian from among our five detained comrades were executed.

I have described for you some of the points and details of the work of the party leadership group in its covert period of operation. With a young and inexperienced party having a divided leadership and some leaders who were happy at the detention, surrender and death of their opponents (this point I have aired in the Central Committee and committed to paper, which is on file among the party documents), having the kind of leaders who thought not of Iran and of their compatriots but of settling personal scores, and above all, having two obedient and subservient agents of a foreign country, the result could not have been any better than it was. What has come out of all this is that thousands of the cadres and members resigned their party membership group by group and--apparently at the instruction of the Executive Board in Tehran or of Kianuri himself--they signed "resentment letters." A large number of them were thrown in jail or sent into exile or emigrated from the country. What remained of a party which was right, in its covert period, the guiding light of the Middle East, was a leadership ensconced in emigration.

Under these circumstances, how would it be possible that an officers organization comprised of 600 of the most decent Iranian officers, whose decency and uprightness were admitted even by the enemy, would not be uncovered? How would it be possible that some of these officers, the like of whom will not spring up in Iran again for a long time to come, would not be executed by a firing squad? Note that at times critical to the party and to the people of Iran, including the time when Dr Mosaddeq needed the help and solidarity of the Iranian people, the party was paralyzed, a general strike was prevented, and the Iranian people were turned over to internal and foreign enemies with hands and feet tied.

I will now tell you about the part played by Razmara in the shooting at the shah. We know that before Bahman 1327 [February 1949], Britain made every effort to preserve its interests in Iran particularly in the southern oil company. This company had for years wooed and put on its payroll a number of political figures in Iran and had arranged for Reza Shah to ascend the throne. On the other hand, we should take note of the reputation of Britain's power in Iran, which had a most significant psychological impact. I remember my politically innocent mother saying: "If the cat jumps on the neighbor's wall, be sure it did so at the behest of the British." The fact that Reza Shah was seated on the throne by the British and, according to British Foreign Minister Eden, was made to abdicate and leave Iran by the British, helped to aggrandize the image of the power of the British. I believe it was mostly for this reason that the shah of Iran earnestly defended the interest of Britain and of the southern oil company until the nationalization of the oil industry and even up to the coup d'etat of 28 Mordad 1332 [19 August 1953] when the CIA returned him to Iran and put him back on the throne. It is my belief that years before the shooting at the shah, Razmara, who had gradually gained control of the army, had been planning a coup d'etat with adroitness and precision. He wanted to do the same thing with the Pahlavi dynasty that Reza Khan, the commander of the army, had done to end the Qajar dynasty in 1299 [21 Mar 1920 - 20 Mar 1921]. However, the temporal and physical

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setting of Razmara's plan was different. That was why the Royal Court ordered Razmara killed. Two rival agents, each affiliated with a foreign power, were wary of each other. It is a well-known saying that two kings cannot rule the same kingdom. Remember that after the 1920's, Reza Khan, the commander of the army, owed his gradual rise to monarchy to the British. He gradually eliminated the other agents of Britain who were his rivals in Iran (such as Sheykh Khazal, Nosratoddoleh Firuz, and ...). Razmara was generally known as a British agent, and no doubt the British were bereaved by his loss. The sadness of the tone of the British press at the time bears witness to this fact. The attitude adopted toward the oil issue by Razmara during his premiership also confirmed this. It must be noted that the day after his death, PRAVDA, the organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, devoted its editorial to this subject. As far as I remember, nothing of the sort had been done in the case of any prime minister before. Perhaps this appreciation of Razmara was because he had forced the Voice of America radio to shut down, had expanded diplomatic and trade relations between the Soviet Union and Iran, and had moved close to the Soviets.

It is also possible that Razmara played the idea of closeness to Britain and the Soviet Union as a trump to keep the United States of America out of the arena of Iranian politics. Yet another assumption which deserves to be delved into by historians, in my opinion, is that Razmara, a clever, educated and hard-working officer, was a nationalist and wanted initially to remove America's hand from Iran by dethroning the shah with Soviet and British support and then show his real, nationalist face after establishing his position to a reasonable extent. In my view, all these assumptions must be considered in order that the history of Iran's political struggle prior to nationalization of the oil industry may be elucidated. What is now beyond a shadow of a doubt is that the murder of Razmara turned out to be beneficial to the shah, because Razmara was a strong and dangerous rival to the shah. This murder was also beneficial to America, because although Razmara appeared to be pro-British or nationalist, he was not pro-American at any rate. But if the shah had been killed, it would have been to Razmara's benefit because he had the army in his hands and could become Iran's president and carry out the plan he had in mind. After all, the Americans would not be unhappy at the shah's death at that time because the shah was still a defender of the interests of the British (see the oil negotiations and the report of Finance Minister Golsha'ian). /The party to this situation that did not stand to gain anything from the killing of the shah was the Tudeh Party of Iran, which would be repressed in any event./

Question: At the close of this interview, would you like to add any comments by way of drawing a conclusion?

Answer: Yes, thank you. My conclusion can be summed up in a few points, as follows:

1. With the cogent and lucid evidence gathered gradually since 1949 it has been proved that the Tudeh Party of Iran and its leadership did not have the slightest hand in the shooting at the shah, and the allegation of party involvement in the shooting at the shah was fabricated in order to crush the party and thus pave the way for dictatorship and for the solution of the oil problem.

2. I believe that the party's noninvolvement in the shooting at the shah and the involvement of the organizational supervisor of the party without the party's knowledge is of extreme importance to those who want to write about or judge the history of the party and of Iran impartially, because 15 Bahman 1327 [4 February 1949] was a watershed in the history of the Tudeh Party of Iran and of the Iranian nation's

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anti-imperialist struggle. It divides the history of the party into two distinct eras. As you can see, some of the members of the leadership group in exile, particularly Kambakhsh, try in their writing, to assign different divisions to the era of the struggles of the Tudeh Party of Iran in an effort to play down the importance of the shooting at the shah and the arbitrary behavior of Kianuri which resulted in the illegalization of the party.

In both stages of its history, the party must one day investigate the collective operations and decisions of the leadership and the activities of some of the leaders kept secret from the party. I am of the opinion--and I have time and again expressed this belief in the meetings of the Central Committee--that Kambakhsh, and particularly Kianuri, secretly carried out sabotage work inside the party, which is only a hairbreadth removed from out-and-out treason. For instance, after betraying Dr 'Arani and the network of 53, Kambakhsh told the simple members of the party that he did this so that Siamak and some of the officers he knew at that time would not be betrayed. This party leader should be asked if he "would have to betray Siamak and the others in the first place." Did Salakhian and Shushtari, two ordinary members of the party, not resist to the point of death and refuse to betray anybody? As regards Kianuri, it must be said that this man committed many arbitrary acts and mistakes from the time he became the organizational chief of the party up to 1332 [21 Mar 1953 - 20 Mar 1954], and afterward, until the time the officers organization was uncovered, and these arbitrary acts and mistakes constituted great treason to the Iranian nation. (Some of these acts and mistakes that have been discovered have been mentioned in this interview.)

In the overt period of the party's activity the leadership was not free from guilt, either. But in this period the blame for the mistakes and wrong decisions lies at the door of the entire leadership group, because the decisions were made collectively. Those responsible for these wrong decisions during the overt period of the party's activity must also be sought out and, if necessary, punished. If the mistake is not big, the one who committed the mistake should sincerely carry out self-criticism and thus show that the old ways have been abandoned. As far as Kianuri is concerned, however, it must be said that his repentance is as sincere and acceptable as that of the wolf, because he is simply incorrigible.

For all the collective decisions made by the leadership between 1941 and 1949, whether or not I voted in favor of some of those decisions, I consider myself responsible and accountable and I am ready to accept the consequences ordained by the people and by the party.

Only if the past situation of the party is investigated and analyzed thoroughly and all the mistakes, arbitrary actions and treasons revealed will the party regain the confidence of the toiling masses and the intellectuals of Iran.

In the history of the struggle of nations and parties there are many examples of some of the leaders of a party moving away from the policy, program and constitution of the party in a given period and doing certain things either intentionally or unwittingly that were no different than treason to the fate of a nation.

To the millions of toiling workers, peasants and intellectuals who have for years been caught in the clasp of despotism and dictatorship, who have made many sacrifices and been condemned to defeat, hardship in life, mental strangulation, torture and death by the firing squads, it does not make any difference whether all this misery

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was the product of mistakes or the result of deliberate treason. Such knowledge does not remedy anything.

Another example extant in such parties is the kind of person who gradually takes all the power into his hands, subjugates the party leadership to his will and represses the opponents of the dictator. An outstanding example of such a person is Stalin, who put the Communist Party of the Soviet Union--Lenin's party--in such a state as we see today.

There is no doubt that due to the youth and inexperience of the Tudeh Party of Iran, some mercenary and treacherous elements infiltrated the party from the outset. They received their instructions not from the collective and common leadership but from foreign sources in secret. Or they put their wrong ideas into effect by using the leadership machinery.

The bulk of the Tudeh Party of Iran and the near-total majority of the cadres and members of the party were and still are decent, sincere and devoted persons. Even in the present leadership in exile, numbering about 40 persons, there are decent and devoted people who have to remain silent for fear of losing their housing, means and livelihood. But the majority of the members of the current Executive Board and of the Central Committee in exile have been traitors to the Tudeh Party of Iran and to the Iranian nation and are like antibodies in the party's body that must be repelled.

/How can the present party leadership in exile, whose living costs are paid by a foreign government, act independently of their masters in international as well as Iran's domestic politics?/ If anybody dares so much as disagree, he is ousted. He would be left hungry on the streets and would be driven to suicide, as has happened to some of our comrades.

3. All the points I have raised in this interview about the party leadership and certain members of it are on record in detail in the party files and are supported by documents. I spoke about them at the meetings of the Central Committee and at the Fourth Extensive Plenum of the Central Committee in Moscow in 1957 in the presence of about 80 party officials and members, but the compromise between the two factions in the leadership group made the statements inconclusive.

4. Socialism, scientific socialism, is the system that insures a bright future for mankind. I have no doubt at all about this, just as I have no doubt that the principles of scientific socialism are correct and must some day be established in the world. Unfortunately, our generation and perhaps even our children will not witness the complete prevalence of socialism.

/What is important in Iran today and must be addressed and sincerely implemented is not a socialist program but the unity of all the democratic, liberal and anticolonialist forces. Such unity is bound to bring about a free Iran with a republican regime/ under which all the principles of democracy, freedom of opinion, religion and association are fully observed, and any foreign intervention in Iran's affairs are prevented. All the healthy forces of Iran, consisting mainly of the workers, farmers and intellectuals, must participate in this drive. The Iranian intellectuals have an important part and a momentous duty to facilitate the cooperation and unity of the various democratic and anticolonialist organizations. Such unity and cooperation can persist for years in the present Iranian and world situation only if it is

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based on patriotic, wise, chaste and undemanding factors, and only if it aims first and foremost at the interests of the near-total majority of the Iranian people, and only if the fate of the Iranian people is put in the hands of true representatives of the people, elected in a completely free and democratic election, under circumstances in which everybody respects and accepts the votes of the people, irrespective of which way they are cast.

/This commonweal would exclude only those groups, parties and persons who have cooperated with the shah not to secure their daily livelihood but for the purpose of getting rich and plundering, embezzling and stealing. The parties, groups and persons whose obsequiousness to a foreign power--no matter which one--is ascertained, must be excluded./

5. The fighting and bickering that goes on among the opponents of the present regime of Iran both inside and outside Iran damages the anticolonialist and antidictatorial movement and works against their unity.

The quarrel over Stalin, Mao Zedong, Trotskiy and others should be left to the concerned nations or to those who have the time for it, namely, the people of the industrialized countries. For the Iranians whose home, that is their country, is burning in the fire of injustice and dictatorship, such debates are a luxury and superfluous. What should have priority in Iran is the struggle for democracy and freedom of thought, of belief, and of religion, the campaign against despotism, oppression, bribery, coercion, and unpatriotism. If this campaign gets off to a good and sincere start, it will still take years to bear fruit. A large number of my friends and compatriots know that I have put this view forward for years among the groups in exile. The struggling Iranian men and women have more important and imperative things to do than internecine fighting, division into small groups with a handful of members, and fighting against one another. They should unite and concentrate on a single line of action, or at least cooperate on it. Iranians who live abroad for any reason--whether emigration, study, or residence--have a very important duty in this regard.

6. /The people of Iran will, at any rate, overthrow the present regime in Iran sooner or later./ This is another matter about which I have no doubt. Everyday we should do something that will bring that day closer, so that the anguish and torment besetting the Iranian people will come to an end. This regime and the Pahlavi dynasty have brought the Iranian nation nothing but loss, damage, injustice, torment, and execution. It promises no better in the future, either. As the poet said, "the infested crop yields no harvest." The Pahlavi regime is blighted; it is contaminated by the blight of injustice, cruelty, thievery, bribery and allegiance to foreigners.

Fifty years ago this family had nothing but a house on Sepah Avenue in Tehran. It belonged to Reza Khan Mir-Panj. Today it is the wealthiest family in the world. This means that it has plundered billions of dollars of the wealth of our dear country and the fruit of the labor of the hard-working people of Iran. The dues of the Imperial Court and the salary of the shah have been fixed by Iranian law and it is easy to calculate how much salary the shah has received and how much money he has spent. But they are so insolent that they pass a law on declaring the sources of individual income. Of course, they could not implement the law because everybody asked the Pahlavi family where it had got its wealth. How well the poet put it when he said:

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During the Pahlavi reign,
The lives of all thieves are naught,
They catch everybody else in town,
The thief who is never caught is king.

7. Permit me to speak about one more matter which pains me and which seems to me to be important. By speaking out on this matter I believe I will be the spokesman for the feelings and thinking of all convicts, political prisoners, all the Iranian emigres and their families. I myself have been sentenced to death twice. Often, amnesty is requested abroad and in Iran for political prisoners. The request is sometimes mentioned in the writings of the leaders of the Tudeh Party of Iran. General amnesty in Iran, which has turned into a big prison, is nothing but a ruse any more. Amnesty proper is granted to somebody who has committed a felony, whereas all the trials in person and in absentia, and the resulting political convictions and the charges are falsified in Iran. If a person has not committed any crime but is convicted and punished, he must be reinstated and at least be apologized to. /I personally am loath to accept such "amnesty." If I accepted the "amnesty" of the present regime of Iran I would be writing off 40 years of my political career, of which I am rightly proud. That would be the betrayal of my ideal. It would be treason to my nation./

My friends would testify to the fact, which I have duly written to the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran, that the regime frequently invited me to Iran via different media, but I replied that I would not let myself fall into the mud hole in the latter years of my life. Therefore, as far as "amnesty" is concerned, there are only two ways in my view:

Either the regime of Iran would reinstate the person about whom it has fabricated dossiers or who has been convicted because of his struggle against this criminal regime (which presupposes that the regime in Iran would change). Or the present regime of the shah would agree to retrials under normal conditions. In the latter case, as far as I am concerned, I solemnly declare that I am ready to return to Iran to go on trial openly provided that the shah's regime guarantees my physical and judicial security with one of the official international authorities (for instance, the International Society for Protection of Human Rights). Failing that, I would be willing to go on trial in a court of justice in France or Italy for chages I have made against the regime. The Iranian regime, the government and the shah, may send their representatives or attorneys to either of these countries they choose. I will act as my own chief attorney and defense counsel and as the attorney and counsel in absentia of the thousands of my compatriots who, because of their struggle in the cause of Iran's liberation, have been convicted by the regime under various pretexts. /I hereby declare and pledge solemnly to accept beforehand any verdict issued by the court./

8. Finally, I thank you, Mr Vaziri, for having acted as a medium for me to tell my compatriots and the members of the Tudeh Party of Iran things which have been weighing heavily on my conscience for such a long time. I hope you and your readers will forgive me for the faults and shortcomings of my interview.

What I have told you will, I believe, help to elucidate the history of our country and our party. By history I mean the genuine and true history, not an adulterated and falsified history which is written now and rewritten later, not a history which

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is written at the will of leaders or of a particular dictator and is later changed when he is out of power or dead. The history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union written at the time of Stalin was revised after his death, which bears witness to this fact. What has been written about the Pahlavi dynasty during the past 50 years, too, is false and after the fall of this regime the truth will be written as it happened. For the past 30 years that I have been an emigre my thoughts have been with my country, Iran, and with its toilers, particularly the youths who are struggling against this regime--some of whom will not stop short of sacrificing their lives, who keep the torch of struggle against imperialism, the shah and their lackeys aflame with their blood. These devoted, chaste, sacrificing youths were not among us in the period of struggle about which I have been speaking in this interview. Therefore, they are not familiar with the experience of that era. I hope that what I have said here by way of showing the true face of the leadership in exile and the method of its work will be useful to these youths.

[Signed] Dr Fereydun Keshavarz

Geneva, December 1977 (Azar 1356)

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Resignation of Dr Keshavarz from the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran, dated 14 May 1958

Yesterday Tehran radio and foreign broadcasts reported that Comrade Khosrow Ruzbeh was executed in Tehran on 11 May 1958. The Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee that met in February-March 1958 deemed it necessary to ask its sister parties to take serious measures to save Comrade Ruzbeh. In the letter drafted by the Executive Board, reference to Comrade Khosrow Ruzbeh's membership in the Central Committee was deliberately omitted. It was suggested in the plenum that his position be listed next to his name, but the motion was overruled by a near-total majority of those present in the plenum. (Those for it were Keshavarz and Azarnur and the lone abstainer was Amir Khosrovi). The "excuse" given at the plenum was that mention of his membership in the Central Committee would discourage the noncommunist press and circles from helping to save him. I was the only person to speak up against this motion in the plenum. I reminded them that Comrade Ruzbeh was noted in the world as a prominent leader of the party, and some foreign newspapers, including some British and American papers, had even called him Iran's "Lenin." Therefore, the omission of his title was only an excuse in order to obscure the title that had rightly been given him. (Yesterday, the United Press news agency reported from Tehran: "Khosrow Ruzbeh, the well-known communist, called Iran's Lenin by the people, faced the firing squad.") This fact was attested to in the lobbies of the plenum by the comrades of the Central Committee even during the plenum. These comrades were of the opinion that "because of the damage that Comrade Ruzbeh caused to the party by his confession, he then became defiant and tried to be a hero for his own benefit, while he hurt the party." If these comrades had the courage not to deny these views now and not to change their positions to their own advantage as usual, it would be known that they not only regretted having given Comrade Ruzbeh the title of "member of the Central Committee" but would call this act of Comrade Ruzbeh's by other names if they found the opportunity to do so. Now our brave Comrade Ruzbeh has been executed, while his name was struck off the list of members of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran in the letters written to sister parties. Thus his name was not reflected in the world press and therefore nobody learned that he was a member of the party Central Committee who resisted with valor, did not succumb to the enemy and chose to be executed. /Chances are that when he was executed he had no idea that he had been elected a member of the Central Committee of the party./ At any rate, another problem which was laid bare by the members of the party Central Committee and was discussed even during the recess at the Fifth Plenum in the lobby and was later taken up by the cadres was the evaluation of the Comrade Ruzbeh's activity in the party. I now propose that:

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1. The party officially declare its views about the activity of Comrade Ruzbeh so that the "confessions" of Comrade Ruzbeh may not be hidden among the issues that the Central Committee has not yet commented on, and so that the prestige of our courageous comrade is not blemished.

As I have said before, I believe that Comrade Ruzbeh was determined to resist the enemy in prison after he had been betrayed and arrested. Therefore, he was sure that he would be executed. He saw that some of the issues he thought should be made known to the entire party (for he considered the party leadership incompetent and some of its members traitors) could only /be brought to the attention of the party/ by his confirming the confessions of the others who had already divulged everything (for instance, chances were that the confessions of 'Abbasi, who had committed treason, might not be accepted as genuine by the party). He most probably thought that his denial of the confessions of 'Abbasi and others would confuse the party and help the culprits to get away with their crimes. /He did not know that the party had found out about many of the past issues thanks to the confessions of other comrades in exile./ In my opinion, the "confessions" of Comrade Ruzbeh whose courage and heroism in the face of the enemy were admitted even by the enemies of our party, should be studied in the light of the party's situation and of the treasons, faults and crimes committed within the leadership of the party, completely discrediting it. Ignoring and covering up the real truth and instead blaming those who reveal the treasons (as the Central Committee did at the Fourth Plenum) is neither fair nor proper for a party, nor does it absolve the party of the accusations against it.[1]

2. The Central Committee accepts its mistake and criticizes itself for failing to mention in its letter to the brother parties the fact that Comrade Ruzbeh was a member of the Central Committee. /After the murder of Comrade Hosam Lankarani (in whose death all the members of the Tehran Executive Board were incriminated and should be investigated) and after the execution of Comrade Ruzbeh who, in my view, was another courageous comrade in our party who was victimized by the situation that came about for the party after the shooting at the shah, two effective comrades of our party who were directly and sufficiently informed of many of the secrets and crimes of the Kambakhsh-Kianuri gang were silenced. They might have revealed the secrets of this gang and exposed it after making sure that the instructions of these two persons were not always the instructions of the Central Committee. Now the party cannot inquire of these two comrades about the process of the murder of Mohammad Mas'ud and other crimes committed in the party. No longer can our party investigate with Comrade Ruzbeh's help the process, and particularly the causes, of the murder of Comrade Hosam Lankarani, who was one of the most sincere members of the party and who had worked under the direct supervision of Kambakhsh and Kianuri for several years, that is, from the early years of the party's establishment until the time of his death. He (Ruzbeh) had recently been looking in, so to speak, to investigate and find out what had happened to him (Lankarani) to make him addicted to morphine and cocaine!/ The party will never be able to hear from Ruzbeh's own mouth the details of the reasons for Comrade Ruzbeh calling Comrade Qassemi a traitor to the party at the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee, calling him a thief of the chastity of somebody's wife, and suggesting to the plenum that he be expelled from the party.

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1. The reader must note that before he was executed, Comrade Ruzbeh was accused by two or three persons in the Central Committee so that he had to be "defended."

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The death of these two persons has undoubtedly been to the detriment of the party and to the benefit of the traitors who used the party for terrorist, adventurist and sabotage purposes without the knowledge of the Central Committee. (It is noteworthy that Kambakhsh and some other members of the Central Committee said that "Hosam knew too much about party secrets and his existence became a source of danger.") I think that the truth of the matter is that Comrade Hosam Lankarani had become a source of danger to this gang because he had learned many of the gang's secrets and found out about their reasons and crimes and witnessed the moral decadence of some of the women who were the real managers of these "leaders." There was the danger that he might divulge certain facts. This likelihood cost him his life. Those who considered it necessary to have Hosam Lankarani killed used the credulous members of the Tehran Executive Board as a tool to implement their ominous plan and got a round of "votes" from the party members for their purpose. Thus they vehemently and unanimously defended the necessity of Comrade Hosam Lankarani's death. There is no doubt that this matter will be covered up.

/I have no doubt that these traitors will eliminate me, too, if they can, because I am bold in my struggle against them./

Comrades, basically the misfortune of our party is not that we have committed grievous mistakes. The party has been defeated abjectly and certain things have been committed in it that are only a hairbreadth from treason, because mistakes can be corrected by criticism or self-criticism and a sincere admission of one's mistake. Culprits and traitors can be punished, for instance, by expelling them from the leadership group or from the party and by exposing them to the people of Iran. Thus the confidence of the party members will stop wavering. In this way the confidence of the masses can be regained. Basically, the misfortune of our party is that in the covert and exile situation of the party, the party leaders who are supposed to find a radical remedy for this situation lack the courage and the guts to see the stark facts and remedy the problem for reasons that are clear to all, about which I spoke at the Fourth and Fifth Plenums. I mean that the strong nucleus that must be created for reformation and for leadership is nonexistent, and the efforts made for this purpose have been futile. Narrow-minded interests, factionalism and cronyism in the leadership group and the love of high positions have prevented the party from being reformed. The party masses are not ready, either, to roll up their sleeves and uncover the truth and purge the party of the traitors, to create a healthy atmosphere in which to breathe. /The result is that the persons who considered--and still do--one another traitors, infamous, and criminal have compromised and are "bossing" the party. That is why this collection of leaders is confused, does nothing to promote the movement of the Iranian workers and for the growth of the liberation movement of our country; lacks true prestige inside the party and among the people of Iran; publishes a newspaper with the help of money and means provided for it by the brotherly parties but the newspaper does not reach the Iranian workers; it broadcasts from a radio station which is not heard by the Iranian workers, and only "bosses" over a handful of desperate cadres in exile./

Some of the comrades in the Central Committee and the Executive Board know and agree that there is but one way to save the party: That is, by self-criticism and sincere criticism of the past activities of the party and the leadership. The saboteurs should be pointed out to the party and the people and they must be expelled from the party. Hence, the confidence of the toilers and the working class of Iran in the party will be restored again. But these comrades do not have the bravery and courage

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to do such things. They are preoccupied with protecting their "pals" whom they have abetted in some wrongdoings. This is another sin of theirs that will be condemned by the party in the future.

Several years have passed since the defeat of the party and of the liberation movement of Iran, but the leadership of the party is sitting put in the convenience of exile and covertness of the party. During this period the party has done nothing but produce a few pages of general criticism and admission of "party mistakes." Apart from these, the leadership is saying nothing concrete to the party nor to the people of Iran. /It does not say who were responsible for the thefts, homicides, the shooting incident on 15 Bahman [4 February], the murder of Mohammad Mas'ud, the explosion of Babr warship, the constant incitement of the people against Dr Mosaddeq, and putting wind in the sail of the enemy and of the Imperial Court, etc., etc., Was the entire leadership responsible? Or only certain persons deserved the blame?/

They do not say how the perpetrators of these wrongs, each of whom has committed treason against the liberation movement of our country and our party, were punished so that the party and the people would be sure that their behavior would not be repeated. /One does not leave socialist countries and prevent others who wish to go there and so something./ To avoid verbosity, I will refrain from speaking about the activity of the comrades in the German Democratic Republic. I believe the comrades have caught the "intellectual disease" in that they publish a newspaper in exile for nonexistent readers, broadcast radio programs for non-existent listeners, without paying attention to the fact that 99 percent of Iranian toilers do not own a radio set and do not listen to the radio.[2] Or they issue communiques on May Day, without a trace of information about the Tudeh Party of Iran or the Central United Council of Workers. Was there no one in the Executive Board who could point out that a communique which they had signed in the form in which it appeared, was the instrument for the liquidation of the party and Central United Council of Workers? The communique addressed the "workers' movement" but did not mention the Tudeh Party of Iran and the Central United Council of Workers. It read: "Any group which is formed in the name of the workers must be used for the protection of the rights of the Iranian workers and toilers." At another point it says: "Struggle against Colonialism and work for the cause of securing peace for the rest of the people of Iran." The communique addressed the workers in general (not the party comrades) but did not mention a word about the existence of the party and the United Council, their current activities or at least, their future activities.

/It seems that the Iranian workers must conclude from this communique that nothing but an emigre leadership remains from our party and from the United Council, and that the leadership is as cowardly as the pilfering cat who runs away as soon as the stick is as much as picked up. The leadership does not dare mention the party and the United Council and their activities in the communiques./

I have so far been of the opinion that the majority in the Central Committee struggled against the Kambakhsh-Kianuri gang. Although I have found serious faults with the comrades opposing this gang, I have always considered the opponents of the Kambakhsh-

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2. Each time a socialist country establishes a lucrative economic arrangement with Iran, it silences the voice of the Tudeh Party radio of Iran. More than a year ago, Bulgaria shut down the Peyk-e Iran Radio--which was at the disposal of the Tudeh Party of Iran--because a profitable economic deal had been struck with Iran. (F.K.)

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Kianuri gang in the Central Committee to possess higher human and political dignity than their foes. I still hold the same opinion, but I have now come to the conclusion that the same serious shortcomings and mistakes of some of them, and their tendency to defend the improprieties, faults, political weaknesses of their immediate friends and their tendency to preserve their position and to protect their friends in the leadership of the party has caused these comrades to strike a temporary compromise with their adversaries--namely the Kambakhsh-Kianuri gang--so that they can join forces to save their shaky positions. I believe that comrades Radmanesh and Iraj Eskandari are now in that position. The approval given the Executive Board at the Fifth Plenum by the participants minus two votes, is a clear indication of this accommodation.

Comrades! As I said in the Fifth Plenum, I do not consider my membership in this Central Committee in the interest of the party. Although I have ceased working in the Central Committee, since the holding of the Fifth Plenum, some comrades in the Central Committee say, this is not the same as resigning. /Therefore, I hereby officially resign from the membership of the Central Committee. In my opinion the Central Committee is a source of disgrace and ignominy to the liberation movement of Iran and no effort is made to purge the leadership. As much as I take pride in membership in the Tudeh Party of Iran in whose cause the best offsprings of Iran have been martyred, I feel just as ashamed of being a member of the present Central Committee. The majority of its members are, in my opinion, incompetent or have perpetrated improprieties which are short of treason by only a hairbreadth./

The improprieties of the Central Committee or of some of its members have brought the sacrifices of a heroic nation such as the Iranian nation to naught, so much so that the traitorous Shah is today writing off, with the help of a number of Imperialist agents, all the successes which the Iranian nation had gained with its blood since the beginning of the constitutional movement, the successes in which our proud party has had a remarkable part.

I request that my resignation from the Central Committee be announced to all the party divisions. It goes without saying that I will continue to be a member of the party and will keep up my struggle for the purging of this leadership within the framework of the party's principles.

Moscow--14 May 1958

Dr Fereydun Keshavarz

[P.S.]

Since March 1958 I have written you two letters requesting approval of my plan to travel to and take up residence in Prague. But you have not answered my letters yet. Given your earlier disapproval of my going to Syria or Egypt, I do not think that your positive or negative decision and its notification to me would be a difficult matter. Your problem is that in such cases you make your decision neither in the interest of the party nor within its terms of reference. You have your personal grudges influencing your judgement and you find it difficult to announce your unreasonable decisions to the person concerned. Perhaps that is why you do not respond to my letters. At any rate, I seriously request a decision regarding my proposed travel to Prague, at least.

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