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West Europe Report

(FOUO 10/82)



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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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THEATER FORCES

ITALY

SOCIALIST JOURNAL COMMENTS ON 'ZERO OPTION,' 'COUPLING'

Rome MONDOPERAIO in Italian Dec 81 pp 16-17

[Article by Francesco Polesella: "Zero Year for Disarmament"; Slantlines denote italics as published.]

[Text] The "zero option" has restated the Western negotiating position in Geneva, placing on the USSR the onus for an effective response in terms of European public opinion. But even bilateral elimination of Euromissiles would not affect Soviet preponderance in conventional weaponry, with the risk of accentuating the importance of the N-bomb.

Negotiations on theater nuclear force reduction in Europe were opened on 30 November in an atmosphere of optimism, which, though tempered by various considerations, would have been impossible to imagine only a few weeks ago.

The Americans, who were suspected by more than one of wanting to sacrifice the appointment in Geneva in order to regain what they felt to be supremacy in terms of a hard-line confrontation with the USSR, have made a spectacular turn-around: Reagan's speech on "zero option" restated the Western negotiating position, and, for the first time in a long while, has shifted onto the USSR the onus for an effective response in terms of European public opinion.

This is an important factor for Europe, and not only because of the political debut of "zero option." Schmidt's Germany--apart from polemics about its "twin tracks" towards negotiations--sees, after Brezhnev's visit, its central position reinforced with respect to any negotiating hypothesis referring to the European continent; it becomes, in this sense, first of all, the "interpreter" of the most important needs of Europe included in the discussion--by means of the necessary tutelage of German interest, because it is more exposed--and of the interests of its other components in an organic and balanced view. The security of Germany, in other words, is proposed in the negotiations as the prime motivation and guarantor of the security of all of Europe.

The peace movement brings about, by means of a more balanced position from the negotiating platform, a new motive for enriching its own position, which should permit it to make a contribution removed from dangerous manipulations to political debate in European public opinion.

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The Hostage Effect

After all, Europe needs successes. The continuation of international hotbeds, such as the aggravation of the Polish question, despite temporary ameliorations, brings close to the Old Continent the hypothesis of a bipolar recomposition of international assets, which would reduce drastically the margin of maneuverability, forcing us still more to delegate the management of crises to the superpowers and adding to the hypothesis of the "militarization of relations" in Europe a much more dangerous reality. In this picture, the search for peace assumes a basic value, and the fact of the negotiations on theater forces must be accepted even before its implications on the level of the renewal of the detente process as an important opening.

The objective of "zero option" acquires, under the European aspect, a central political significance: the measure to which it is carried out will be in the ability of Europe to recuperate its own proposing capability on a general level. The negotiating path is, in any case, complex and assumes variations which are useful to examine.

An essential point of the speech on theater nuclear forces is to obtain arms reduction and at the same time maintain a degree of security which is at least equal for the West. This means two parallel objectives: the raising of the "nuclear threshold" in Europe and the reaffirmation of Euro-American /coupling/, (on the principle, that is, according to which a Soviet attack in Europe should in any case determine a reaction by the entire alliance, and therefore, in the first place, the United States).

The theater missiles--or LRTNF if one prefers--are considered in this light. That is, because they counterbalance the Soviet threat of the SS-20 with a strike-back capability of the United States in Europe, they tend to accentuate the "hostage effect" of American policy with respect to Europe and to reduce the risk of /de-coupling/. The logical consequence of this set-up is obviously that of an increase--and the possibility of spiraling--of nuclear arsenals in Europe: certainly a high price, and one which seems unacceptable to many.

The solution, however, cannot be found in the simple removal of problems or in the wishful denial of data which still exist, such as the imbalance determined by the deployment of the Soviet SS-20s. On the contrary, the quest for peace must pass through a realistic evaluation of existing alternatives, and tend--internally--to maximize the results in the interests of Europe.

The "zero option" could produce, in an extreme hypothesis, contradictory consequences. Total elimination of the Euromissiles by the two sides, which would leave the imbalance of conventional arms unaltered, would not affect the Soviet preponderance in Europe, which, especially in tanks, would seem overwhelming. It would determine the Western need to attribute still more importance--in order to compensate for conventional inferiority--to tactical nuclear weapons, such as the N-bomb, from the "battlefield" and consequently running the risk of lowering the nuclear threshold in Europe and rendering less credible the Euro-American /coupling/. This because--beyond official assurances--the hypothesis of a Soviet conventional attack in Europe, followed by a "tactical" nuclear exchange limited to the European battlefield without involving the superpowers could become credible. Obviously, we are dealing with hypotheses, but deterrence is based on such hypothesis, and they seem, in any case, not to create little worry for European countries, and above all for those such as Italy and Germany which would be chiefly involved.

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The Rebalancing of Conventional Forces

One essential point to such a scenario, then, is the rebalancing of conventional forces. The objective of a European defense policy is or should be this: by adequately strengthening its own conventional response, Europe would be capable of recuperating its own margin of autonomy in the elaboration of the alliance's defensive scenarios, if not otherwise, in the "intermediate step" of deterrence, by committing itself with equal dignity and attributing a different value to the autonomous Anglo-French deterrent. The proposals recently made in the Colombo-Genscher plan for an extension of European political cooperation on security could find fertile territory for thought here and might be immediately operational.

Undoubtedly, given the financial situation of Europe, even more than the political, it seems more than problematical to speak of massive conventional modernization these days. The problem, however, is /not rearmament, it is equilibrium/: Europe can resolve it by aiming decisively at the objective of a substantial reduction of Soviet conventional arms.

This does not mean rejecting the "zero option" or approaching it with reservation; on the contrary, it must remain at the center of a Western political position, through which a careful evaluation of objectives can be achieved.

The Euromissiles are not in themselves "good" or "bad" depending on how and by whom they are deployed. If matters concerning the relationship of forces should not change substantially in Geneva, the solution of deployment--although unpleasant--would be the only solution capable of guaranteeing a sufficient degree of security to Europe, even if Europe witnessed a growing dependence on global American choices in defense matters. A dependence, which anyway would correspond to a reality of facts which are difficult to dispute.

In the present state of relations, a unilateral reduction of Western Euromissiles would not bring about the result of stabilizing Europe and advancing the cause of peace; rather, the contrary would be true. Equilibrium, as we have said, does not in any case always exclusively assume higher levels of nuclear presence. It is compatible with a revision of internal relations in the alliance, in order not to modify the total reactive capability to the Soviet threat.

For Europe, this means a decisive effort for equilibrium of conventional forces, thanks to a greater direct commitment and to negotiations aimed at reducing the weight of Soviet preponderance. It could be in the interest of Europe to link together the same theme of tactical nuclear arms with this high-priority objective: a reduction in tactical nuclear arms which would not alter the overall "on the battlefield" equilibrium would have, above all, the effect of increasing its political-strategic weight, apart from negotiating hypotheses.

In this scenario, the mutual reduction--or even disappearance: "zero option", in short--of European theater nuclear forces could demonstrate fully its effectiveness as a factor for peace and rationality in the policies of those nations which create, with armaments, conditions ever increasingly intolerable to the free flowering of their own capabilities for civil and humane growth.

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TERRORISM

ITALY

REPENTANT TERRORIST CIANFANELLI DESCRIBES LIFE WITH BR

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 21 Dec 81 pp 63-66

[Article by Antonio Carlucci]

[Text] A repentant terrorist tells us of every step along the fatal road that, over 13 years, led him from the 1968 demonstrations to the most savage acts of the BR.

At 17, in mid-1968, the first strikes, the disorderly rallies, and the throngs of high-school students marching. Then joining and becoming active in the extreme left, amid splits, reunifications, drifting from one group to another. Always the meetings, the mimeograph machines, the pamphlets, the processions. A lot of verbal violence, though some of the people opted to carry a pistol in their pocket or a Molotov cocktail in their book-bag.

At the university he first fell in with the Red Brigades (BR): the first cautious, tentative approaches, the reading of a few "strategic resolutions," passing out pamphlets stamped with the 5-pointed star. After the murder of Aldo Moro came full-fledged membership in the organization, first doing minor errands for the "logistics sector," then into rifle practice, and lastly an assignment to an operational commando group. A lot of "armed propaganda" action, but there was one murder, too: that of Judge Girolamo Tartaglione.

With the Red Brigades, though, there is nothing like an armed mass movement. And so there was another wave of migration toward nearby groups who might be willing to engage in terrorism, but were not prepared to obey the iron rules of an underground organization. In the intervals between the occasional armed attack and numerous armed robberies, the dream of an impossible revolution faded into nothingness. It was no chore to go back to living a normal life. Then one morning in June 1981, the police knocked at the door: once arrested, the prisoner made the decision to tell all about his 13 years of illusion, but mainly years of violence and death.

Massimo Cianfanelli, 30, a non-degree student at the university, told his story to magistrates Ferdinando Imposimato and Rosario Priore. It was 11 days in the telling. In more than 150 pages of transcript,

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Cianfanelli revealed many of the darkest secrets of the Brigades, of the Revolutionary Communist Movement (Valerio Morucci founded it after he pulled out of the BR), of Autonomia's armed groups as well as those of METROPOLI, the magazine published by Franco Piperno and Lanfranco Pace.

"From 1968 to 1970," testifies Cianfanelli, I was present at meetings of the rank-and-file committees at the Cavour lycée. In all the schools they were coordinated by organizations with no permanent structure, and operated only on an ad hoc basis when there were demonstrations and strikes." Massimo Cianfanelli was involved in the same concerns as tens of thousands of students all over Italy: protesting everything about the way the schools were run, demonstrating over Vietnam, impassioned debates over the revolution.

Upon graduation from the lycée he enrolled in engineering school. And in politics, he picked one of the smallest groups: the Revolutionary Communist Nuclei. "We didn't have party cards, but if you count sympathizers there were more than 100 of us." Operating money came from voluntary contributions: "I, as a student, paid 3,000 lire a month, but those with jobs gave more." Leader of the group was Franco Russo, under investigation for his activities at Calabria University. Among the members were Paolo Flores, today a socialist intellectual, and Sergio Petruccioli, brother of UNITA's managing editor, both of whom swiftly set out on different roads.

Two years later, in 1974, the Nuclei merged with another minuscule group known as Long Live Communism. "We did it out of political opportunism," Cianfanelli recalls. "Both organizations were very short on numbers." The new party was baptized Communist Vanguard. Among its leading lights were Fabrizio Panzieri, in prison for the murder of neo-fascist leader Mikis Mantakas; Roberto Martelli, who fled to Portugal during the investigation of the Communist Combat Units; and Marina and Stefano Petrella, brother and sister who wound up in the BR. Other members were not so easily seduced into the armed struggle: Rosa Giolitti and Giusi Mancini, daughters of the former Socialist cabinet ministers, were two who were not.

In 1975, the first pistols. Cianfanelli saw Martelli firing blindly during an attack on an MSI office. "Afterwards," he told the magistrates, "the rumor went around that Martelli and Panzieri had been authorized by the group leadership to carry weapons in protest marches to protect us against attack by the fascists."

Cianfanelli discovered something more than weapons, though. "Inside the organization, you could see a pattern of mafia management taking shape: one small group was in on everything that was going on, and they made the decisions, while the rest of us were left in the dark about the really important things." And that is why he quit Communist Vanguard and joined Workers Vanguard (A.O.).

There he spent 2 years of peace: in A.O. everything was out in the open. This group, though, like the others, was under constant surveillance

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by the BR (as were many others like it) as a promising source of new recruits. What decided the matter for Cianfanelli was his encounter with Emilia Libera, a BR "irregular," meaning she had not yet gone underground. "Why don't you cover your face during demonstrations? You think you're at a concert or something?"

Later on, the woman opened up a little more during a rally: "Did you see what happened?" The police had just shut down the Roman HQ of the Autonomi, on Via dei Volsci. And Cianfanelli replied: "That's serious." But Emilia Libera was thinking of something else. In Turin, there had been an assault on the assistant managing editor of LA STAMPA, Carlo Casalegno. "One for our side!"

From her university classmate's reaction, the Brigade member knew she could press harder. "I knew instinctively that she was in contact with the organization," Cianfanelli told the magistrates. But from her attitude I knew I daren't ask any more questions." That first communication was just the beginning. It wasn't until April 1978, though, at the height of the Moro kidnaping case, that Libera openly acknowledged that she belonged to the Red Brigades.

That was the necessary move to recruit him. Cianfanelli, fascinated by his fellow-student, hesitated very little before accepting his first assignment: passing out hundreds of pamphlets on campus. And at the end of April he joined the campus Brigade. That was the start of the rendezvous typical of the underground life (times and dates set far in advance, meetings invariably staged in student haunts). One after the other, he met the top men in the organization: Bruno Seghetti, Antonio Savasta, Francesco Piccioni, and Valerio Morucci. Even Prospero Gallinari, the head of the column, wanted to meet the new recruit and subject him to a political examination before assigning him to the task of picking out targets on campus.

On his first assignment, though -- drafting a document on the situation on the Rome campus-- Cianfanelli flunked. He failed again when ordered to post his men beneath the house of the professor the BR wanted to hit. After a severe reprimand, he was transferred to another sector: the logistics front. "They said I would be assigned to the antenna sector, that money would be no object, that I was to buy all the specialized publications, and scout the city and pinpoint all antennae on military installations."

The assignments grew more sensitive as the months passed. First, though, Gallinari decided to give Cianfanelli a driving test: How would he handle himself in an unplanned, high-speed escape? In the fall of 1978 came his baptism of fire, at a road-repair site on the Via Flaminia ("We were firing from inside a big pipe, and the noise was so loud I was deaf for 2 days afterwards!"). At last came word from Piccioni, the Rome column's armorer: "Be ready: you'll be the driver on our next operation."

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The summons came right at the beginning of October. At the meeting, in addition to Gallinari and Piccioni, Cianfanelli found a fourth man: Alvaro Loiacono, a former member of Worker Power (P.O.), Morucci's protege, who had been a fugitive for months and who had been sentenced with Panzieri for the murder of MSI boss Mantakas. He was introduced as an irregular who was picking targets among the "Triple Alliance" (meaning magistrates, carabinieri, and policemen). At that meeting they decided to kill Judge Girolamo Tartaglione. A couple of checks, another round of firing practice, and the commando was ready: in addition to Cianfanelli, it included Loiacono, Adriana Faranda, and "Camillo," a BR member he met only on that one occasion, and whom Cianfanelli has never managed to identify.

It was 10 October 1978. They decided to prepare the ambush at 1430 hours, the time when the judge usually left his office at the Justice Ministry. Cianfanelli, wearing a fake mustache, waited in the car for his accomplices. When the shooting was over he saw them coming on the run, "Camillo and Loiacono quite cool, and the Faranda woman upset." Only next day did he learn the details of the action: "Camillo told how he had gone ahead of Tartaglione onto the landing, had moved in on him, and fired two shots from a Glisenti revolver at point-blank range. Loiacono had a Smith and Wesson and the Skorpion submachinegun to cover the courtyard, but he didn't even have to fire a shot: when the doorman stopped him ("I heard shots!") he replied that he hadn't heard anything. Faranda, with an M12 machinegun and a pistol, was in charge of covering the outside of the building."

With Tartaglione dead, Cianfanelli was tapped for another action: to bushwhack a police car. Morucci devised the plan: a fake phone call to 113, the emergency squad car rushing along Via Nomentana, and falling into the trap. Within a few seconds came a couple of bursts of machinegun fire, shots from a pistol ("The wounding of a policeman was neither planned nor wanted"). Cianfanelli strolled calmly away. "I walked a ways, and then I stole a scooter that was tied to a light-post."

The police had been hit, and now it was the carabinieri's turn. With the same technique they thought they could lure one of their officers into the trap and kill him. That action was a bust. So they switched to another plan out of the guerrilla manual of arms: kidnaping Gen Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa, and setting his car afire.

But during that same period of easy military victories, the climate inside the BR was at blood-heat. "Seven of us left the organization over an ideological and political dispute that had been brewing for a long time," Cianfanelli recalls. He changed camps once more, going along with Mirucci and Faranda, who "kept pressing the need for concentrating on operations closer to home, to the job, to services." The split, which had begun over the Moro kidnaping and killing, was not a painless one. Cianfanelli was ordered by a scowling Gallinari to get back among the ranks and help recover the weapons Morucci had made off with. "Gallinari told me they were bandits who had let themselves

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be manipulated by people like Piperno and Pace." Not even another meeting with the BR (with the seven dropouts present) sufficed to heal the schism.

And that was how the Communist Revolutionary Movement was born, destined to become a ragtag patchwork of neighborhood fringe-groups. Without hideouts, without a structure, and without funds the "movement" limped along until the end of 1979, even losing two of its leaders, Morucci and Faranda, who were arrested in June. In the early months of 1980 the action started up again: a couple of armed robberies and two breakins at gunpoint. Communications were tightened, too, with the Autonomy and Prima Linea [Front Line] groups. Even so, for every new recruit there were more who chose to defect. Cianfanelli began to travel around Italy, from Bergamo to Padua, from Milan to Genoa, to keep his contacts alive. But the pickings were slim. To make up for that, though, he picked up some interesting morsels of information: for instance, that Andrea Morelli and Domenico De Feo, both from Milan, were part of the METROPOLI organization, but their assignment was arms deals in the Middle East. He knew Marco Donat Cattin, met him again in Rome, and heard his suggestion that he join other armed groups (Donat Cattin was one of the leaders of Prima Linea). "At those meetings," Cianfanelli recalls, "the talk was of joint operations. Never of mergers, though, because in Rome the possibilities were limited and besides, the Prima Linea people were ready by then to leave Italy."

The man who set about getting the Communist Revolutionary Movement back on its feet was a free-lance who had just been released from prison (he shared a cell with Morucci). With 50 members in all, the organization devoted itself mainly to armed robbery ("For apartment jobs, the individual cells handled the whole bit, but for banks the leadership made the decisions"). The money was used not only to finance the group, but also to pay salaries (350,000 per month) and help individual terrorists to open high-fi stores, import-export companies, and alternative restaurants.

Some of the money also went to pay for vacations in the summer of 1980. With the fall came more bank robberies. Then, on 13 November, they ended with the killing of two terrorists (Claudio Pallone and Arnaldo Genoino) in a shoot-out with the carabinieri.

His political illusions in tatters, and the stakes in the game already too high, Cianfanelli decided it was time to go home. Just as he had wandered into terrorism, he was free to walk out of it without so much as a by-your-leave, taking advantage of a period when the major units were breaking up. Nor did he lose all contact: some of his erstwhile comrades met him again, some by chance, at a casual party (at the home of an unwitting newsmen, for one), or in the halls of the university.

The police got to him almost by chance, while they were investigating a neofascist group that had had indirect contacts with red terrorists (their weapons came from the same source and at times their targets

were very similar). For several days he held out and refused to talk. Then he began: "Some time ago I made up my mind to pull out. Now I'll tell you where my political odessey took me."

In Naples, a War of Words

The Naples BR column and the BR prison front to the BR executive: "Your style ranges all the way from insolence to arrogance."

BR executive to the Neapolitan column and the prison front: "With your stupid attitude you are a serious handicap to the organization."

During May and June 1981 -- at the height of the public furor over the kidnappings of Ciro Cirillo, Remo Sandrucci, Giuseppe Taliercio, and Robert Peci -- a furious dispute broke out within the ranks of the BR. Charges and counter-charges, threats and expulsions, and insults unheard-of between BR brethren, even during the stormy months in 1980 when Milan's "Walter Alasia" column decided to go its own way.

The events that triggered the May-June row were the Cirillo and Taliercio killings. The executive opened hostilities (that was the BR's eight-man summit, according to Patrizio Peci's confession). In four typewritten pages dated "May 1981," smuggled into the maximum security prison at Palma, the Neapolitan column found itself charged with "questionable judgment in the Cirillo action." "You have endangered a tremendous opportunity," wrote the executive, "having to do with a series of follow-up targets involving the government." And it went on: "Just to shut people up, you are fighting political battles in the name of action" (a reference to the wounding of two Naples city councilmen; Ed.). And it wound up: "We called a meeting of the strategic leadership to talk about this, and you didn't even bother to show up."

The Neapolitan column and the prison front fired off a 16-page counter-blast. It centered on two major charges: the executive was sticking its nose into every issue; and it had stripped the strategic leadership, which includes all column-chiefs, of its proper role as "a forum for political discussion of divergences." ("We did not come to the meeting because you wanted to turn it into a disciplinary hearing!").

Most significant, though, the resolution dated "June 81" contains the charge that the whole Taliercio business was wrong from start to finish. There is no complaint about the murder of the company director: the fault was in not persuading him to "cooperate," and in failing to make even one recruit in the company plant. "The lack of ambition was the clue to the operation's most egregious shortcomings."

There is no clue in either of the documents as to whether or not the breach has been healed. One carabinieri officer, though, has some hope: "Maybe something has happened at last that we have been waiting for a long time. Maybe some of the BR brethren are dropping out of the organization because they are fed up with the power struggles among the column leaders."

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ENERGY ECONOMICS

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

NEW METHOD FOR UTILIZING WASTE HEAT DEVELOPED

Hamburg CAPITAL in German No 1, 1982 p 129

[Article by Karl-Heinz Seyfried: "How Industrial Waste Heat Can be Utilized." Industry Wastes Large Quantities Of Heat Each Day That Are Contained in Air and Water. This Could Be Used To Heat Many Homes. A New Process May Put An End To This Waste--Cold Conductors.]

[Text] The waste is without parallel: from joint sewage treatment plants of the city of Ludwigshafen and the BASF chemical plant enough energy flows unused into the Rhine to heat a city of 80,000 inhabitants. A similar and equally depressing balance could be drawn up for all areas of industrial concentration in the Federal Republic.

Until now no one knew exactly what to do with the discharge and cooling water from factories, electrical generating plants and sewage treatment plants since this water attains a temperature of at best around 40°C. In order to feed a regional heating network, much higher temperatures are needed: at least 80°C or better even, 180°C. Superheating the water, most experts agreed, would be uneconomical.

The study group Planning-Energy-Architecture (Plenar) seems finally to have found one way to end the wastage. Highly respected city planners, engineers and the Rhenish-Westphalian Electrical Works in Essen have joined forces to develop, under a contract with the Federal Ministry of Research, a new type of regional heating system for the area on the left bank of the Rhine between Speyer and Worms. The specialists were not at a loss. The way to attack the problem was not to be found in the conventional delivery of extremely hot water under high pressure to customers, but instead lukewarm waste water.

Heat pumps would superheat the heating water at the point of use. Such pumps operate on the same principle as that of a refrigerator: like the latter it also withdraws heat from its interior and transfers it by way of condenser coils at its rear into the air of the kitchen. The heat pumps can thereby generate at least 3.2 times the heat as its requirement for operating energy--electrical current, gas or heating oil. The remainder comes from the waste water.

To be sure, heat pumps can also absorb energy not just from waste water, but also from their immediate environment--for example from the air, the ground or subsurface water. Yet the initial temperature from these sources is lower in winter than is the case with waste water, which brings about higher installation and energy costs.

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For example, a heat pump using air delivers only 2.2 times as much energy as is invested in electrical current. The construction of waste water pipe lines is justified, if for no other reason, by the fact that they are inexpensive compared with the pipes required for high-temperature regional heating systems. One kilometer of insulated regional heating pipeline, laid underground, costs more than DM 10 million. Using the simpler cement pipes for "cool regional heating," the costs are reduced to DM 2 million.

Because the lukewarm water does not reduce substantially in temperature during transport, as Plenar associate Andreas Krebs of the Frankfurt Office for City Planning explained, even relatively long distances between the source of the waste heat and the ultimate consumer can be dealt with economically. This will allow the discharge heat from large power plants which are generally located at some distance from population concentration centers, to be used for heating purposes in the cities. One block of the Biblis nuclear power plants could heat all of the more densely settled regions along the left bank of the Rhine between Worms and Speyer using pipeline approximately 45 km long. The second block of the atomic pile could similarly serve the Frankfurt area.

The Plenar Plan has one hitch however. Such a regional network would only be economical if all dwellings were hooked in to the regional heating net. But this assumes legal compulsion to do so. In the light of this difficulty Plenar proposes to serve only districts with short distances between the waste heat source and the consumers, using the proposed system. Traditional heating systems could serve as an emergency reserve and be maintained for periods of peak need.

Even at this moment the proponents of waste heat are certain of one thing: their solution would not only spare the environment and reserves of energy, but also the pocketbooks of consumers who are increasingly plagued by price increases.

Comparison of Gas Heating With Waste Heat

The 20° to 28° C discharge water of the large-scale sewage treatment plant at Ludwigshafen can, by using 4 gas-driven heat pumps coupled with gas boilers for peak production, heat the 300 private homes and 850 apartment dwellings of a new housing development some 4.5 km distant from the plant. Investment costs: DM 8 million. The municipal utility authorities plan gas boilers for the individual houses which will entail hookup costs of some DM 4 million for homeowners. Nonetheless the balance comes out in favor of waste heat use:

<u>Annual Heating Costs For The Entire Development</u>	<u>Gas Heat</u>	<u>Waste Heat</u>
	in DM 1,000	
Energy *	1,716	838
Interest (10 percent) and Depreciation	430	960
Maintenance	<u>160</u>	<u>190</u>
Total Costs	2,306	1,988

*DM 0.66 per cubic meter for gas heating, DM 0.57 for waste heat system.

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ITALY

COLDIRETTI'S LOBIANCO ATTACKS FINANCIAL LAW

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 21 Dec 81 pp 210-215

[Interview with Arcangelo Lobianco, Naples deputy, president of the independent farmers association (Coldiretti) by Tino Oldani: "Look Out For the Farmers!"]

[Text] Farm organization president points the finger at Prime Minister Spadolini: he raises taxes and then kicks out even the basic financial aid.

"The budget bill as passed by the senate is a punitive measure aimed at those who till the soil. If it is not improved in the Chamber, members with ties to our organization will vote against it." Arcangelo Lobianco, 52, Christian Democrat deputy from Naples who has headed the independent farmers' federation for a year now, has decided to take the field against Giovanni Spadolini's government. His is going to be a tough, frontal attack that may well imperil the first [postwar] government coalition that does not include the DC: in the Chamber, DC deputies with IOUs out to the independent farmers number 35, more than the PRI's 15 and the PLI's 9 put together, and a force bigger than even Pietro Longo's Social Democrat (PSDI) contingent of 21 deputies.

A man to watch these days, one who heads an imposing organization which his predecessor, Paolo Bonomi, used for 35 years as a pool for DC votes (1.2 million member families, 11,000 sections, and 20,000 of its candidates elected to local and national office), Lobianco has devoted the first year of his presidency to breaking down the walls the Coldiretti had built around themselves through their all-or-nothing stance. "Now," he says, "the hard part begins: our political and cultural renewal." His first move -- to the general astonishment -- was his swift back-off from the DC: at the Christian Democrats' November gathering at Rome's EUR, Coldiretti registered among the "non-party" (outsider) groups, along with intellectuals like Pietro Scoppola, Luigi Pedrazzi, and Achille Ardigò. Lobianco talked to PANORAMA about his next moves.

Question: What is it about the budget bill that the Coldiretti doesn't like?

Answer: A lot of things. But there are two provisions that threaten more than any others to snag the farm sector in a punitive bite: first,

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it calls for very large hikes in our social security and health costs, and then, with one stroke of the pen, it takes away basic government financial support for agricultural investments. I am referring to the 700 billion lire in the "4-leaf clover" bill already appropriated for 1981 and now deferred to 1982; the same fate was meted out to the additional 300 billion lire in financing already promised, and then they take another 500 billion lire out of the 1982 appropriation and add them to the funding for the current fiscal year. If these measures are not changed, the farm worker's income, which is already less than 55 percent of the average income of all other workers, will be pared to even meaner levels next year. And 1982 already looks like a horrible year, following on this year's 2-percent drop in farm production.

Question: You're not going to claim that the increase in social security taxes is unjustified: the Coldiretti have been pilloried precisely because, by drawing pensions far out of proportion to what they have paid in, they are sinking the Social Security Fund (INPS).

Answer: The Coldiretti have never opposed a gradual increase in Social Security taxes, so long as it was accompanied by an improvement in farm pensions, which are far below those of other workers. We are squarely opposed, though, to the indiscriminate increase in per capita contributions: you can't ask every farm to come up with the same amount, because a 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ -hectare farm planted to vineyards pays a minimal sum by comparison with the 10 hectare spread planted to profitable cash crops. It would be fairer to spread Social Security costs proportionally, according to the amount each farm can pay, and to adjust pensions to match.

Question: What will happen if your demands are not met?

Answer: That's obvious: those deputies in the Chamber who are with us will vote against the budget bill. And it would be wise not to forget that, in addition to the 35 deputies who come straight out of the current middle executive levels of Coldiretti's national and local offices, we can also count on other deputies elected with the votes of our organization.

Question: Just how many are there -- senators and deputies together -- who have close ties to Coldiretti?

Answer: When we all get together to talk over something really important, there are no less than 60 of us. Like it or not, we represent almost 4 million votes.

Question: What you're telling me has all the earmarks of a DC torpedo with Spadolini's name on it.

Answer: Torpedos always arrive unannounced, sometimes even from behind. But we have told Spadolini personally about what we want, at least three different times. Our latest meeting with him, unfortunately a disappointing one, was held no later than 1 December.

Question: Probably with a government headed by a Christian Democrat your attitude would be a little more malleable.

Answer: I rule that out absolutely. Last year, on this same issue of the budget bill, I took on Arnaldo Forlani, who at the time was prime minister. And I locked horns with Treasury Minister Nino Andreatte, too, even though he is a Christian Democrat too, citing the same criticism as I had the year before: the farmers are no longer willing to submit to punitive [tax] measures, nor yet to indiscriminate cuts in the funds for productive investments.

Our spending on agriculture is already the lowest in Europe: for every lira granted in Italy, they spend 3.3 in Germany, 4.6 in France, and 4 in England. So let the Christian Democratic ministers not toy with illusions: Coldiretti intends to become increasingly a union that will stand up for the rights of its members, wholly independent of the DC.

Question: How are your relations with the other unions?

Answer: For years we haven't spoken a word to each other. Now, though, we have a constructive dialogue under way. A lot of our moves are determined in conference with the Confcoltivatori, which is close to the PCI and PSI. After I sat down to lunch with Lama, Carniti, and Benvenuto we also established relations with the national unions. Right now at the National Economic and Labor Council (CNEL) there are three joint working groups on which Coldiretti sits along with the CGIL, CISL, and UIL, set up to investigate three areas: the 3-year plan, revision of the EEC's farm policy, and social security.

Question: What did you say to Lama, Carniti, and Benvenuto when you met them for the first time?

Answer: I explained that agriculture will no longer stand for being the rear wheel on the cart. At a demonstration we staged in Piazza San Giovanni in Rome, there was one poster that read: "HEY! CGIL! Cisl! UIL! Stop a minute! Wait for us!" Today there is a gulf of misunderstanding between the farm world and that of industry: the factory worker and the office worker are completely ignorant about the men and women who work in the fields, while the farmer looks on the people who work in factories or offices as privileged classes. The disparity between the two sectors is enormous.

Question: For example?

Answer: An independent farmer often works land that is not his own, under conditions not all that different from those of a factory worker. Yet if a farmer's wife who works on the family farm has a baby, in place of the 6 months leave that other working women get, she gets only a 50,000-lire check from the government, or just about what the EEC pays farmers for the birth of a calf. Yes, the list of privileges the farmers envy workers in industry is a long one.

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Question: Have you also made some changes in Coldiretti's relations with the left-wing parties?

Answer: The facts are there to show that we have: on practical issues, like farm agreements, our positions and those of the PCI coincide. Why? Because both of us represent real forces in our society. And we behave responsibly. Maybe this is why we can't seem to get along with the social democrats.

Question: Could you clarify that a little?

Answer: It would be a very easy thing to ride the anger coming out of the country for political gain. And we refuse to do that. We cannot, however, hide our deep concern when we see behind the grape revolution in Barletta or behind what are tantamount to subversive incidents in Tuscany and Tarantino, not only the fascists (MSI) fanning the flames, but a party that is actually part of the government, like the Social Democrats. Our opting for a place in the ranks of organized labor is also motivated by our determination to defeat this ridiculous line of empty -- not to say Poujadist -- protest for protest's sake.

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ECONOMIC

ITALY

RIVALRY BETWEEN AERITALIA, AUGUSTA IN AIR SECTOR

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 21 Dec 81 pp 215-219

[Article by Giuseppe Oldani]

[Text] The battle between Aeritalia and Augusta goes on, no holds barred. And even though their feud spoils international agreements that would mean billions to Italy, the ministers act as though nothing were happening.

There is one sector of Italian industry that derives practically its entire living from government: money for financing, money from the sinking fund to bail it out of rough going, money for support of its foreign marketing, and money from purchase contracts. And yet, despite this unique feature, it is the sector where you find the least concern with resource planning, with investment coordination, or with joint projects. On the contrary: international experts look on the Italian aviation industry as a savage jungle where, in spite of the ministers on the Interministerial Economic Planning Committee (CIPE), it's every man for himself -- not just private against state-owned industry, but IRI-controlled state-run industry against EFIM-controlled state-run industry.

To read it, one would think that the plan CIPE laid down for the aviation sector should have restored some semblance of order there. But instead the struggles of the hostile interests have clearly been so violent as to force the architects of the plan to confine themselves to generalities, sound enough at the strategic level, but nothing spelled out to bring the warring corporations back into line. So the plan says that the corporations must cooperate, assigning priority to joint ventures in Europe wherever possible, falling back on the Americans for bigger and more costly aircraft, but says nothing about the specific cases of companies which are already flouting those guidelines.

The chaos became too noisy for comfort with the personally embittered struggle between the heads of the two state-controlled companies in the sector: in one corner you have Pietro Fascione, vice president of EFIM's Augusta; and in the other Renato Bonifacio, president of the IRI-Finmeccanica subsidiary, Aeritalia. The former reportedly has

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socialist leanings, the latter proudly wears the Christian Democrat brand.

State Participations Minister Gianni De Michelis has already let it be known that he intends to settle the issue by merging the two companies or by putting both of them under the wings of a special financial corporation for the aviation sector. He had nothing to say, however, about the fate of the two men, who are battling tooth and claw for the most impregnable power base.

There have been episodes that border on the silly. There is a story making the rounds in Milanese industrial circles, for one: "Since Augusta owns a little foundry at Benevento, Bonifacio is moving heaven and earth to get one of his own, and is scattering bids right and left for a comparable share."

On his part, Fascione is bulling ahead in some very ambitious plans. Rumor has it that Bonifacio's Aeritalia might be interested in buying Aermacchi, a Varese company still in private hands, whose prosperity is based on the MB 339, a training craft that has been adopted by several countries. And so, not to let the grass grow under foot, the Augusta subsidiary, SIAI, has another trainer on its drawing boards, to be known as the S 211, and of course is asking IMI for the money to finance it, despite the fact that the Defense Ministry has turned it down on the grounds that it is "of no interest."

Yet another episode: the German and Italian military have called for proposals on an anti-tank helicopter and, by some happy chance, the German requirements are almost line-for-line identical with the Italian. There was talk of collaboration which would involve Augusta on the Italian side and Germany's MBB on the other. Augusta turned that idea down, and plans instead to do the whole thing on its own, designing a model -- its A-129 -- based on the civilian A-109 and equipped with an engine manufactured by Piaggio under a Rolls Royce licence. The upshot is that the Germans are going ahead on their own, with MBB doing the helicopter's airframe and Motoren Turbinen Union (MTU) doing the engine, and voluntarily offering to work with FIAT Aviation in Italy and Turbomeca in France.

The large-scale maneuvering for slices of the aviation pie is not confined to on-again, off-again international agreements. There is worse to come: right here at home there is guerrilla warfare going on for control of this or that company. Aeritalia has already laid covetous hands on Partenavia. Now Fascione's Augusta is negotiating a takeover of Breda Nardi, a little company making helicopters under licence from Hughes, a tiny outfit which is 40 percent owned by the Nardi family and 45 percent held by INSUD, a holding company in which most of the stock is held by EFIM, of which Augusta was a subsidiary.

Apparently Fascione is asking for a financial dowry package of 20 billion lire to take over Breda Nardi, but, above and beyond all this, there has already been a little "thriller" at the ministerial level. Looking Gianni De Michelis straight in the eye, Fascione declared that

that should Breda Nardi come into Augusta's hands there would be considerable economies of scale, and it could go on building Hughes helicopters undisturbed. Emanuele Nardi and the old private owners, however, showed the minister a letter from Hughes informing them that the Hughes licence to build would be revoked should Augusta take over the company. Who will win? While we wait to find out, it is certain that Breda Nardi, which the military selected to receive a large order, will die by drowning in a rising tide of debt.

"If this is the way we straighten out the aviation sector," say many experts, "then it is clear that the Italian taxpayer will be made to pay dearly for the lack of production and marketing coordination. In aviation, the fact is that every new takeover battle simply makes the long-standing maladies worse."

Those long-standing maladies, though, were made more acute precisely by an excess of parochial chauvinism. The latest instance is still merely a rumor: right now, there is a world-wide boom in commuter aircraft -- planes carrying 30 or so passengers designed to serve the less heavily traveled routes which have been abandoned by the major airlines. One of them is the ATR-42, which is a Franco-Italian product (Aeritalia on our side, Aerospatiale in France). Despite this presence, the story goes that Siai -- an Augusta subsidiary -- is intent on designing another similar model, a commuter aircraft which reportedly already has a name: Kangaroo.

Is this rumor true? Or is it fair to suspect mischief here? Will the battle between Aeritalia and Augusta really go to such extremes and damn the consequences? And when it's all over, who is going to pay for this mess? The only sure answer would seem to answer another question: who is not going to foot the bill? Old Count Corrado Augusta, that's who. Until a year ago, Corrado Augusta owned 50 percent of Augusta. Now he has decided not to subscribe to the planned capital increase, and has let his share drop to 20 percent. "Now," they say, "he is negotiating to sell another big chunk of his holdings, maybe a bloc of 10 percent, maybe 20 percent. Then he will leave Italy and head for the United States, for Houston, where he plans to go into the banking business. What it all boils down to is that he has no intention of paying other people's bills.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

LABOR UNIONS PROTEST NEW LAW ON ARBITRATION BOARDS

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 14 Jan 82 p 78

[Article by Francoise Chirot: "Arbitration Boards: More Change"]

[Text] The bill to reform the boards had won virtually unanimous support. But then the Council of State put in its 2 cents' worth.

After the lapse of 3 years, President Francois Mitterrand has disavowed Socialist Party Secretary Francois Mitterrand. The 6 January cabinet meeting deleted the article in the arbitration board reform bill that gave the national labor unions (CGT, CFDT, CFTC, FO, and CGC) a monopoly on nominating candidates for seats on those boards. True, the government had been intensely lobbied by the Council of State to do just that. The fact remains that, in 1978, the Socialist Party had cited this reason for its refusal to approve the reform bill sponsored by Raymond Barre's government.

"Wholly unacceptable," say the unions, which plan to ask parliament to attach some amendments.

Bad news for Labor Minister Jean Auroux. Helped with a pinch of workers' rights and a couple of provisions drafted by the Democratic Confederation of Labor (CFDT) to settle operational problems, his bill for reform of the arbitration boards was expected to sail through with virtually unanimous support. Even the employers approved of it, on the whole. What, exactly, was Auroux trying to do? Merely to put the finishing touches on board reform proposals begun by one of his predecessors, Robert Boulin, in 1978. These boards, created by Napoleon, are the venue for employers and wage-earners in the private sector to meet as equals and resolve disputes stemming from union labor contracts: wrongful dismissals, discrimination, overtime pay, compliance with contract provisions--100,000 cases a year in all. Union workers are fully aware of the salutary nature of the boards' activity: 63 percent of all those eligible to vote made the trek to their city halls to elect 13,572 board councilmen in December 1971.

The Barre government's bill called for elections to replace half the board members every 3 years. Before the truth ever dawned on him that doing so would, in effect, give the edge, in the long run, to the biggest of the labor unions, the CGT, Jean Auroux made a few changes in the system. From now on, all board members will be elected at the same time and will serve a 5-year term. The same

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system will apply nationwide. That means no more special by-law for Alsace and Moselle, where the "echevin" [alderman] system still applies. An echevin must, by law, chair all tribunal sessions there; the rub is that there is no such worthy in communes with less than 200,000 population. "Half the wage-earners," explains the CGT, "were thereby disfranchised."

Furthermore, the new bill improves the board members' job security. Similarly, the system of compensating them for days spent on board duty will be more efficient: they will draw their regular wages from their employers, who must then apply to the government for reimbursement. "High time, too," say the labor organizations. "Some of our people have lost thousands of francs by serving on the boards."

Under a decree issued on 11 December 1981, Jean Auroux had already satisfied one of labor's demands in relation to their councilmen's training. The unions had been protesting a decree handed down by former Justice Minister Alain Peyrefitte, assigning responsibility for their training to the appeals courts. From now on, provided agreement is reached with the Labor Ministry, the unions will have the money to pay for that training.

With that out of the way, though, Auroux found his hands tied by a ruling from the Supreme Court of Appeals, and he could not solve the problem of the foremen and supervisor section. Despite protests from the CGC and the CGT, foremen and supervisors will still be barred from the arbitration boards. They will have to register in one of the four other sections: industry, commerce and commercial services, agriculture, or miscellaneous activities.

That still leaves the problem that cannot be settled by law: operational problems. These arise out of a shortage of staff and office space. In Orleans, for instance, the arbitration board sits in the circuit court chamber. It is no easy matter to try a murder case and a plea of wrongful dismissal at the same time.... In Paris, where there is a backlog of 22,000 cases, the number of councilmen could handle as many as 50 cases a day but, because of a shortage of office space, only 32 are actually heard. In all the big cities, staffing is inadequate. There is sometimes a wait of as long as a month for a typed transcript of a ruling. Only one thing can set this state of affairs to rights: more money.

For 1982, the Justice Ministry, which is in charge of arbitration board operations, has asked for 68 million francs more than last year. But will that be enough? Elections are slated for the end of the year, and that will cost more money. "There really wasn't any rush," says the CGT: it would have preferred elections to the boards of directors of the Social Security Funds.

To put it briefly, elections to the arbitration boards require a great deal of organization, planning, and propaganda effort on the part of the unions--efforts concomitant with the stakes involved. These elections are, after all, the litmus test of their standing among the workers they are assumed to represent.

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POLITICAL

ITALY

DEMOSKOPEA SURVEY ON SPADOLINI, PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 21 Dec 81 pp 49-54

[Article by Chiara Valentini: "How Do You Like the Lay Government?"]

[Text] Italians have a deep desire for change: they are glad there is no longer a Christian Democrat running the government, they don't put much stock in the DC or PCI, and they would like the president to have more power. Oh, yes: and they would like to be able to elect their mayors directly.

Should Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini fall some time within the next few months, as seems increasingly likely, Italians would be angry and disappointed, and would lose what little faith they were beginning to have in politics. These are the conclusions that emerge from the latest Monitor poll, the quarterly survey the Demoskopea organization conducts for PANORAMA, on a sample of 2,000 representatives of the Italian population.

This time, the Monitor shows that a lot has changed in the 7 months we have had a man from a lay party running the government. First of all, the attitude toward those who govern us. There is one basic question that is asked in each of these surveys (see table) as to opinions of the performance of the government in office. For the past year that question had evoked extremely negative responses, expressed in a truly disastrous rating index: minus 23 for the last Cossiga government, and minus 21 for the Forlani government.

With Spadolini, the picture has suddenly reversed, and all of a sudden the approval rating has jumped to plus 15. Why? First of all because the new prime minister is not a Christian Democrat. To the question: "Was it good or bad for the country that a non-DC prime minister has been appointed for the first time in 30 years?" 46.7 percent replied "A good thing," and only 8.4 percent "A bad thing." That is an astounding figure, when you stop and think that there is another 44.9 percent out there who will duck the issue with a "Don't know."

"What this means in other words," says sociologist Giampaolo Fabris, president of Demoskopea, "is that the overwhelming majority of those

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who take an active interest in politics is pleased with this changing of the guard." Among those pleased is the Christian Democratic rank and file ("A good thing" for 39 percent of DC voters, who went on to reply in the identical proportion, that it was "A good thing" that the man appointed was Giovanni Spadolini).

Even when you ask people in practical terms about the way Prime Minister Spadolini has done his job these past months, the attitude does not change much (see table). For 40.9 percent, the prime minister is doing "pretty well," while only 13.9 percent judge his record as "pretty bad." If we now look into these answers, and break them down according to age, social class, and where they come from, we find that Spadolini's popularity is highest among the educated and affluent citizens of the big cities in the Center-North (61 percent of those with some secondary education are for him, but only 36 percent of those with only a grade-school education. Forty-five percent of the North likes him, as against 36 percent of the South; 75 percent of executives and businessmen do, too, but only 44 percent of workers fancy him).

As for political preferences, Spadolini, curiously enough, finds almost the same approval rating among Christian Democrats (47 percent), and communists (46 percent), but rates still higher with the center parties: 63 percent among socialists, 64 percent among social democrats, and 78 percent among liberals.

From this particular count we see one of the aspects emerging most clearly from the survey: there seems to be a gathering consensus around the first lay-party prime minister in 30 years, and it seems to be softening the DC-PCI polarization.

To the question asked in every survey, whether it would be better to have the Christian Democrats or the communists in the government, the mean index for those who prefer one or the other drops for the first time among both groups. (See table.) If you look then at the political preferences of respondents, the most striking fact is that a very large slice of the socialist rank-and-file -- no less than 53.7 percent -- wants the PCI in the opposition. "There is proof of how far we are in Italy from achieving unity on the left," says Stefano Rodotà, an independent leftist member of the Chamber of Deputies.

An attitude of moderation and pragmatism, impatient with the subtleties of high politics, also emerges from a list of questions about institutional reforms. At first reading this might look as though people were longing for authority, for instance when they answer the question about increased powers for the president: 31.9 percent say they favor it, and of those 56.8 percent of Christian Democrats, 52.6 percent of communists -- thus bolting their parties' stance -- and a stunning 62.3 percent of the socialists. While the exclusionary clause recently proposed by Bettino Craxi, the rule that says no party that fails to garner 5 percent of the popular vote could sit in Parliament in its own right, finds favor with 50.9 percent (51.9 percent are actually registered communist voters, despite the fact that the PCI inveighed bitterly against the idea).

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It would be over-simplifying, though, to read these responses as merely indicative of voter backlash or of the "plague on both your houses" stance. For one thing, only 35 percent of respondents answered "Yes" when asked: "Would you like to see more power vested in the prime minister?" At the same time, almost twice as many, 61.9 percent, would like direct elections for mayors. "We have by now a very strong personalization of office, a confidence in personal power, personal government, that seeks increasingly to detach itself from the parties, as in the case of mayors," observes Rodotà.

Impatience with over-complicated political alchemy, expressed in approval of the 5-percent clause, does not mean a willingness to suspend democratic law. A kind of catch question slipped in precisely to see if this was indeed the attitude, asked opinion as to a majority premium for the party that polled most votes: only 19.6 percent of respondents said they thought it would be all right.

Far more out of touch with the real issues and influenced almost solely by rumor and long-standing convictions, though, was the Italian thinking that emerged in connection with the biggest and by all odds the most arcane scandal of recent years: the case of Masonic Lodge P2. Asked to say which party, in their view, was most deeply involved in the matter of the secret lodge, 36.8 percent pointed to the DC, 6.8 percent to the PSI, and a paltry 2.6 percent to the PSDI run by Pietro Longo, the only party secretary named in Licio Gelli's lists. A very high percentage, 49.9, subsequently admitted that they "did not know," that they couldn't make heads or tails of it, that they couldn't get any clear idea of that colossal intrigue. "The slight amount of blame attaching to the socialists and social democrats is disconcerting, and it goes to show that in these cases people reason only on a presumption of guilt: when there is a scandal, people in general tend to believe that nobody could be responsible but the Christian Democrats," remarks Gigi Melega, a radical MP, who has long been engaged in his own battle with the socialist whip in the Chamber, Silvano Labriola, one of the men on Gelli's list.

Though Italians may be at sea when it comes to the freemason scandal, they know exactly where they stand on the matters that most concern the average Italian in everyday life. Comparing the findings with those of past months, we see a sharp rise in interest in such matters as drug abuse and health, housing and inflation, while there is less concern with crime, particularly terrorism.

Zanone: "Budget Bills Are Fatal to Governments"

Valerio Zanone, Liberal Party secretary and a major proponent of the lay-cum-moderate alternative, had this to say when PANORAMA asked him just what it is that makes the lay parties and Giovanni Spadolini so popular:

Question: This survey shows us that the one-on-one war between the Christian Democrats and the Communists, along with their two-party monopoly on politics, is running out of steam. It also shows us that

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people are beginning to show favorable interest in the lay parties in the center, and in third forces. What are the reasons for this?

Answer: It is a trend that started in 1979 and which is going to grow. I think we are just now beginning to get the first signals, but they are enough to deliver the message that the de facto two-party system, which reached its peak in 1976, is already dead.

Question: Why?

Answer: Up until 1976 the DC and the PCI fed on one another. Anger at the Christian Democrats would show up in big protest votes for the Communists, and those big votes would scare people into voting DC next time around. And then if either of the parties showed a drop at the polls, the extremists moved in to exploit it -- the MSI on the right and the extreme left. Now that cycle has ended, too. Right now, but even more so in the future, the crisis in bipolarism, in ideologies, in extremism of every stripe will work to the advantage of the lay parties and the liberal-socialists. People want practicality, a pragmatic approach. And we are offering it to them.

Question: Why do you think Giovanni Spadolini and his government rate so highly with the average Italian?

Answer: They like Spadolini first of all because he is the personification of a very specific myth, as is Sandro Pertini, for that matter. People see Pertini as the good-hearted, curmudgeonly grandfather, and they perceive Spadolini as the brilliant uncle, the one who always brought home "A" grades and took honors at the university, the one who won all the competitions and all the prizes. As for his government, part of its charm is its new faces, which earn it far more confidence among the voters than the ones that went before it.

Question: You Liberals, though, even though you are part of this coalition, don't seem to be overly smitten with our first lay-party premier.

Answer: We are simply supporters, not fans. But because of something in our nature, we have never allowed brawling, unseemly quarreling, or the laying of sneaky snares for the unwary. Of course it is easier, in words, to get along with a lay-party prime minister. But when we actually get down to business, there is no guarantee that there will be any great difference from what we have had in the past.

Question: Do you believe, as a lot of people in politics now do, that this government is doomed to fall within the next few months?

Answer: I should suggest that you look at the coincidence we have always had, in the past, between the introduction of the budget bill and the fall of the government. And it is certainly highly unlikely that the Spadolini government will escape that coincidence, since the kingpin of its policy is right there in the budget bill. That bill is, in some ways, like the amaryllis blossom. The plant pours every bit of its

juices and every ounce of its strength into getting that flower to bloom. Once the bud opens, the plant dies.

Question: And when the plant dies -- to stick to your metaphor -- will you Liberals insist on another lay-party prime minister?

Answer: I don't get the feeling that the Christian Democrats will be very enthusiastic about letting a lay-party man into the top spot again. But that isn't the basic issue. It is far more important that we manage to hammer out real cohesion among the other four parties in government, that we take these faction-ridden, ramshackle, unruly lay parties and somehow make them the true soul of the new coalition.

TABLE 1. Almost a Crush on Spadolini

Last June the president, for the first time in 30 years, chose a politician who was not a Christian Democrat to be prime minister. In your view, was that decision, on the whole, good or bad for the country?

	Total	Men	Women
A good thing	46.7	57.0	37.1
A bad thing	8.4	8.9	7.9
Don't know	44.9	34.1	55.0

What about the decision to name Spadolini to the post? Was that, on the whole, a good thing or a bad thing?

A good thing.....	38.7	47.2	30.7
A bad thing	9.2	10.2	8.3
Don't know	52.1	42.6	61.0

How would you rate Spadolini's performance as head of the government?

Geographical Area of Residence

	Total	Northwest	Northeast	Center	South*
Very good.....	3.6	2.1	4.7	5.3	3.3
Pretty good	40.9	44.7	49.2	40.7	32.6
Pretty poor	13.9	17.4	8.9	11.6	15.2
Very bad	2.5	1.1	0.1	3.1	5.0
Don't know	39.0	34.7	37.1	39.3	43.9

* South includes the islands.

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TABLE 2. Get the Big Parties Out of the Government

In the national interest, do you believe it would be better for the Christian Democrats to be in the government or in the opposition?

	Oct 79	Feb 80	Jul 80	Oct-Nov 1980	Feb 81	Jul 81	Oct 81
In the government	49.3	50.2	45.5	51.4	48.2	49.4	41.0
In the opposition	20.4	23.2	26.5	20.9	24.6	30.3	29.3
Don't know	30.4	26.6	28.0	27.7	27.2	25.2	29.7

What about the Communists?							
In the government	26.2	28.7	29.7	25.4	28.1	29.9	23.8
In the opposition	38.7	40.1	39.8	43.5	41.2	42.4	44.6
Don't know	35.2	31.2	30.5	31.2	30.7	27.7	31.6

TABLE 3. Andreotti Was So Nice, Though...

Among the heads of government listed below, which would you say were the most ... ?

	Andreotti	Cossiga	Forlani	Spadolini	Fanfani	Colombo	Rumor	None of the above	Don't know
Honest.....	7.1	4.8	4.8	17.9	3.0	6.1	0.9	24.1	31.2
Qualified and capable.....	20.0	4.3	3.9	14.3	6.1	6.4	0.2	9.4	34.9
Nicest.....	12.1	5.8	5.9	13.4	4.1	8.5	0.8	19.7	29.9
Learned.....	17.6	2.8	2.6	13.8	8.8	6.6	1.3	6.0	39.9
Energetic.....	9.9	5.0	4.2	21.1	6.1	6.7	1.1	9.1	36.2
Basically well-meaning....	6.0	5.4	4.5	27.1	2.7	4.8	1.0	14.1	34.3
Typical.....	12.1	4.9	5.8	9.8	6.1	12.0	1.8	10.6	37.0

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TABLE 4. A Firm Hand, and Down with the Parties

There has been talk for some time about "major reforms" in our institutions through which we could make some changes in the Constitution, to make the country more governable. Which of these proposals do you agree or disagree with?

Broaden the powers of the President	Abolish the Senate, and keep only the Chamber of Deputies
Agree 51.9	Agree 30.5
Disagree 20.6	Disagree 30.8
Don't know 27.4	Don't know 38.7
Broaden the prime minister's power	Hold direct election of mayors by the voters, not by the communal council
Agree..... 35.0	Agree 61.9
Disagree..... 33.1	Disagree..... 13.7
Don't know 31.9	Don't know 24.4
Keep minor parties which fail to get more than a given share (3 to 5%) of the vote out of Parliament	Grant a majority bonus of a certain number of seats more than those won in the elections to the party getting most votes
Agree..... 50.9	Agree 19.6
Disagree..... 22.6	Disagree..... 43.4
Don't know..... 26.5	Don't know..... 37.0

TABLE 6. Masons, yes, but some of the DC, too...

Aside from the individuals involved what party do you think was, on the whole, most deeply involved in the P2 scandal?

DC 36.8
PCI..... 1.9
PSI..... 6.8
PRI (Republicans)..... 0.4
PR (Radicals)..... 0.2
PSDI (Soc. Democrats) 2.6
PLI (Liberals) 0.6
MSI/DN 0.7
PDUP (Proletarian Unity) 0.1
DP/New Left..... 0.1
Don't know..... 49.9

TABLE 5. At Last a Plus!

Could you rate the government now in office as good or bad? (opinion expressed in pluses or minuses on the approval index).

October 79 (Cossiga)	- 10
February 80 (Cossiga)	- 22
July 1980 (Cossiga)	- 23
February 81 (Forlani)	- 21
October 81 (Spadolini)	+ 15

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POLITICAL

NETHERLANDS

DISSIDENT GROUP ARISES WITHIN D'66 PARTY

Amsterdam VRIJ NEDERLAND in Dutch 16 Jan 82 pp 1, 2

[Article by Max Van Weezel: "The Timid Rebels of D'66, The 'Rappel' Group Feels That 'the Base' Is No Good]

[Text] It seems as though D'66 (the Democrats of 1966) are becoming a real political party. A real Chamber delegation, three ministers in the government, three secretaries of state and members. Not so many, true but the members the party has are sorely ambitious, all the same. So sorely, in fact, that a group of dissatisfied D'66 members has arisen.

Unfortunately, we could not follow what was happening on the other end of the line. From the conversation, we could make out that the person who had just called was named Laurens-Jan.

Cees Spigt: "We have had a first nonbinding contact (. . .). We did not agree on that (. . .) I do understand the significance you attach to that name, but we found him quite nice (. . .) Yes, outstanding, thanks, Laurens-Jan."

Let it be clear: Political leaders other than Laurens-Jan Brinkhorst have certainly attacked subversives with a firmer hand. And even those who are fueling the discontent are doing their very best to radiate reasonability. Cees Spigt, until this past November still the deputy chairman of D'66: "We do not want to be a recalcitrant group. We are not a WESP [(Labor Party) Work Group for Socialist Policy].

Ernst Van Altena, noted composer and ghostwriter of D'66 printed material for as long as anyone can remember: "We are certainly not a group which is out to set itself up as dissident."

Spigt: "We would rather form something like a think tank. It must not become a wild movement.

And once again, bordering on the superfluous, he adds: "I would feel it to be unjust if this were to be explained as a motion of lack of confidence in this cabinet. I have no doubt of our ministers' progressiving thinking."

Let this be clear, too: many party leaders have certainly faced fiercer opponents. Still, it is something else. Naturally, viewed superficially D'66 has already

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shown some similarities to a real political party (a Chamber delegation! three ministers!). But now that process seems to have received the definitive seal: Now a group of dissatisfied D'66 members has even arisen.

Wave of Success

The founders are Spigt, Van Altena, and one of the men who has even occupied the post of publicity coordinator, so strategic in D'66, Ad Van Thiel. Last Monday, an appeal proposal was sent out to a select company of Chamber members, municipal council members and local D'66 leaders. A first meeting is to take place Saturday 30 January at the Evert Kupersoord in Amersfoort, the union hall not far from Jan Terlouw's residence, a closed meeting: "It is to exchange ideas, so it cannot get too big." (Spigt)

The name has already been decided, too: the Rappel group. That is a play on words which refers to the Appel [appeal, call from the French] with which Hans Van Mierlo, Hans Gruijters and roughly thirty other dissatisfied Dutchmen sought in 1966 to incite the people to arise against the musty party system of those days. The similarity is no accident: the Rappel group is calling for the fight to be resumed once again. With one difference: now the fight is directed against their own fellow party members. In other parties it sometimes happens that the young guard takes up arms against the calcified elders, in D'66 it is just the other way around. Spigt, Van Altena and all the others are worried about that disastrous phenomenon: the new D'66 member.

Spigt recalls: "In 1966, D'66 was established as a reform movement. Our present concern is that elan still be maintained. We must not sacrifice our profile to gray compromises."

"I think that it is always the case," Van Altena laments, "that people who see that a party is growing simply do not keep trying so hard."

The firmly-principled Democrat's manifesto warns against "rudderlessness" and "course deviations." And unusual consequences are attached to that for D'66: "If clarity produces a smaller electorate, that is the price that ought to be paid for it."

It is still not entirely clear--for they remain D'66 members--just what principles must be preserved. "The outward image of the party," says Spigt, "the image formation, that is one of things with which we must concern ourselves."

Van Altena does not see enough of the urge for constitutional reform reflected in the D'66 now: "D'66 must make it clear that we will not just go along with the current course of events. The elected mayor, direct input from the people--it did not reach the agenda in the cabinet formation."

Upwards

D'66 should become an environmental party once again. Spigt: "We have a very good secretary of state in Ineke Lambers. We must bring that profile to light. Even if that should conflict with economic interests." And: "We must leave no

doubt that D'66 is a progressive party. We are progressive and leftist, and we must have that made clear. We must not let there be any further misunderstanding about that."

This message is intended primarily for those who have recently joined D'66, among whom--according to the members of the Rappel group--careerism and irresponsible opportunism run rampant. Certainly, D'66 is an open party (anyone who wants to go to the party congress can go, and then he just votes along with everyone else). But that openness is seen to have its disadvantages, too. Spigt: "In a local chapter with 20 members, it can happen that someone comes forward who says: I want to be the standard bearer. For that he needs the support of 11 party members. If that person quickly recruits 20 new members, for example by paying their dues, he can just buy his way in as standard bearer. That is a worry which we recognize."

Van Altena: "Only three requirements are made of someone who puts himself forward as a candidate for municipal council member: Has he paid his dues? Was he not at fault from 1940-1945? And has he been a member of the party for at least 6 months? You can have yourself put on the list very handily. If you are in a small chapter --and D'66 has only a very few big chapters--it is quite easy to work your way up."

Therefore the Rappel group--once again quite unlike the average rebels in political parties--wants more "discipline" and more "control." Van Altena: "If structures which were called into being in the enthusiasm of the 1960s prove to work badly, you must dare to revise them. You must not maintain any dogmas until they kill you."

Van Altena stresses once more that it is not Jan Terlouw or Laurens-Jan Brinkhorst he is concerned with; it is the base of D'66 which is not any good. Spigt and Van Altena are also careful not to let drop any juicy words about the new party leadership of party chairman Jan Van Berkomp (who just won at the party congress of November 1981 against his opponent, Cees Spigt).

In the meantime, the party leadership and the Chamber delegation have been informed of the existence of the Rappel group, but there are no returns as yet. It may safely be assumed that they will not be overenthusiastic. Van Berkomp, himself a former activist from the Brabant KVP [former Catholic People's Party, now a part of the Christian Democratic Appeal], and further a member of the board of Samivoz and the directorate of 800 Years s'Hertogenbosch [Bois le Duc], has thus far stressed above all that D'66 is certainly progressive, but above all quite differently leftist than the PvdA [Labor Party].

And the delegation?

Ha, Laurens-Jan himself on the telephone. What does he think about the Rappel? Brinkhorst: "I do not feel it is any frightfully serious matter. Sorry, I mean no serious problem. They are not setting themselves up as an organized party-within-the-party. They do not want to play the conscience of the party. Everything is being done quite openly. Fine. We have enough democratic organs in D'66. I have no need of a group like that."

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POLITICAL

TURKEY

ARTICLE SCORES POLICIES OF MILITARY REGIME

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 252, 9-22 Nov 81 pp 35-37

[Article by Sam Corbin: "A Year of 'Normalization'"]

[Text] The junta is not hiding its desire to place itself totally at the service of the Western alliance, at the price of a "guided democracy" which has eliminated any union, political or cultural expression.

The Turkish military junta has just celebrated the first anniversary of the 12 September 1980 coup d'etat. General Evren--head of state and chairman of the National Security Council, composed of five generals who exercise almost absolute power--prided himself on this occasion, in a televised speech, on the "public order" which reigns in the country as well as the "improvement of the economic situation."

But, the relative "social calm" that Turkey is experiencing has been obtained only at the price of wiping out any trace of democratic life, and the partial economic recovery is only benefiting the local middle class and the multinational companies, whose investments are more and more profitable. As for the celebrated "return to civil government" promised by the generals, it remains a distant goal, with the junta not hiding its intention to keep the reins of power for a long while still--for the good of the country, naturally!

International financial circles are loudly expressing their satisfaction with the "rehabilitation" of the Turkish economy under the direction of Deputy Prime Minister Turgut Ozal. The latter could not be cooperating more closely, in fact, with specialists from the International Monetary Fund, whose prescriptions and philosophy he fully approves. In the manner of the economist Milton Friedman, adviser to President Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, Ozal wagers on the "free play of market forces"--manipulated in their way, obviously, by the most powerful capitalist groups--to pull the country out of its present slump.

The representatives of 260 international private banks, meeting in London, have just given concrete evidence of their confidence in Ozal's "good intentions" by agreeing to reschedule \$3.2 billion of Turkish debt, with maturity postponed from 7 to 10 years. At the same time, international authorities such as the OECD and the IMF are on the verge of substantially increasing their economic assistance.

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The Turkish papers recently made much of the choice of Ozal as "economist of the year" by EUROMONEY, the great financial monthly in London. This prestigious review spoke highly of the "stabilization program" established by Ozal in January 1980, under the previous Demirel regime, and continued under the military regime. This program--which has basically meant austerity for most and a fuller freedom of action for trusts--makes things easy for foreign bankers and IMF specialists.

Ozal's first measure as Demirel's economic adviser had been the elimination of the system of price controls previously in force, which caused immediate and spectacular increases in the prices of products of the state's major enterprises--sugar, textiles, cement, fertilizer, tobacco, etc. Under the military regime the rate of inflation has fallen from 100 percent to 40 percent, but this decrease on which the junta prides itself, is not satisfying most consumers who are incapable of purchasing basic necessities whose prices were already excessively high in relation to their salaries.

The keystone of Ozal's economic policy was an extreme devaluation of the Turkish pound which enabled a 54 percent increase in exports. But this pronounced orientation of the Turkish economy towards the outside--including the countries of the Middle East--has been accompanied by a continued deterioration of the domestic market due to the extremely weak purchasing power of the working class and peasant population.

The difficulties of daily life are enormous for the average family. In this regard, an economist furnished us some estimates in figures: Even after the recent increase in the minimum wage from 4,500 to 10,000 Turkish pounds per month--which could at first sight appear to be a real improvement--a wage earner drawing the Interoccupational Minimum Growth Wage [SMIC] only earns the equivalent of three pairs of shoes and a kilo of tea per month. A family of 4 would actually need 50,000 Turkish pounds to live modestly but decently. However, when the conservative Turk-Is union--the only one tolerated in Turkey at present--proposed that the SMIC be increased to 19,500 pounds, it ran up against the categorical refusal of the authorities who termed this figure exorbitant.

Since the military takeover, the working class finds itself completely deprived of its means of defense. Strikes are strictly prohibited and the large leftist group of affiliated trade unions, DISK [Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Unions], was dissolved by decree as were all the professional, cultural or political organizations in the country. Hundreds of DISK union members have been imprisoned and the military regime's prosecutor in Istanbul has called for the death penalty for 52 leaders of this organization, so active before the coup d'etat.

What are the "crimes" of these union members, who never indulged in "terrorist acts"? Here are some of the "subversive" acts of which they are accused:

6 September 1976 - Attempt to start a general strike against the institution of emergency courts.

20 March 1978 - Attempt at a general strike against the rise of fascism after the assassination of seven young leftists from the University of Istanbul by members of the Nationalist Action Party.

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30 April 1980 - Work slow down and strike, on the national level, as a sign of protest against the regime's prohibition of 1 May celebrations.

"Attitude" adopted during the signing of collective bargaining agreements "which aggravates the country's economic situation."

It is useless to recall that strikes and collective bargaining were perfectly legal before the junta's rise to power.

Political Clean-Up

In the name of the "fight against terrorism"--the military regime's true theme and *raison d'etre*--tens of thousands of citizens find themselves under lock and key and numerous cases of torture have been pointed out by Amnesty International. According to the official figures announced by General Evren himself on 12 September--anniversary of the coup d'etat--some 24,300 political activists are in prison awaiting trial, while 3,735 "suspects" are under surveillance or closely watched. So far, 1,898 people have been condemned to long prison terms or to death, and 20 executions have already taken place. These figures cannot be verified and experienced observers think that the political prisoners--the overwhelming majority of whom are found to be leftist activists--are much more numerous than the junta's spokesmen are saying.

This "political clean-up" operation is being accompanied by a carefully orchestrated whitewashing. Every day pictures of groups of "terrorists" just arrested or being tried and of impressive stocks of weapons of all kinds found in their possession are spread across television screens and newspaper front pages. These prisoners are most often youths belonging to groups termed "communist" or "leftist" and, much less often, fascists from the Nationalist Action Party whose leader, Colonel Turkes and several other activists also risk the death penalty. In the present context, in fact, trials of neofascists--responsible in a large part for crimes perpetrated before the coup d'etat--correspond to a specific political need in the sense that they permit the regime to present itself in the eyes of the world as "impartial" and involved in a purely "antiterrorist" action.

Let us render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's. In the area of repression, the military regime has proved effective. Although the acts of terrorism have not completely ceased since the coup d'etat, it is true--as General Evren has stressed--that they are much less frequent than before 12 September 1980. According to official figures, crimes have decreased by 90 percent during the past 12 months.

But the restoration of public order and the fight against terrorism have served as perfect justification for the suppression of any political activity or expression. No public demonstration is tolerated, many publications felt to be "extremist" have been prohibited, and the papers which continue to appear are subject to strict censorship.

In all his speeches, General Evren stresses his intention to "reestablish democratic life" in the not too distant future, but most experienced observers feel that the military regime--a true dictatorship benefiting from a total monopoly of power--will remain in place for 2 to 4 more years. This is the minimum period which will no doubt prove necessary for establishing new institutions.

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The first step on the long road toward reestablishment of a restricted form of parliamentary democracy should be, according to decrees issued at the end of June by the National Security Council, the establishment of a constituent assembly responsible for defining the general framework of future political life as well as laws on political parties and unions.

The junta will have the upper hand in this process from beginning to end. The constituent assembly will be composed of an advisory assembly of 160 members and the 5 generals from the National Security Council. Forty of the members of the advisory assembly will be appointed by the junta which will choose the 120 others from among the candidates presented by the authorities from the various provinces. No member of the political parties which existed before the coup d'etat can be a candidate. The work of the assembly will also be dominated and controlled by the junta which will have the power and the responsibility for amending the draft constitution and issuing it.

"Atlantic Solidarity"

General Evren's statements--and particularly his repeated denunciations of the "excesses" of the democracy instituted by the 1960 constitution, felt to be too "liberal"--hardly leave any doubt as to the orientation and the probable content of the future constitution as he envisages it. Thus, all observers agree that they foresee a basically presidential system with an all-powerful head of state and a parliament with reduced powers. In such a context, only purged and conservative political parties will be tolerated and the freedom of the unions will be strictly limited, with any "ideologically inspired" action prohibited. Such are the major lines of the "guided democracy" which the generals intend to establish before giving the troops the order to return to their barracks.

A Turkey dominated and run by a junta more concerned with maintaining order at any price than with social justice or freedom of expression will not displease the NATO strategists, who are concerned with the situation in the Middle East, more explosive than ever, and preoccupied with the Iraqi/Iranian war, the fighting in Lebanon, the death of Sadat, the Polish crisis, etc. General Evren's government--sheltered from any public pressure in its own country--does not hide its desire to place itself totally at the service of the Western alliance. This is why it presents itself as more disposed than its predecessors to come to terms with Greece, which has recently, with Turkish approval, rejoined the NATO military system. For the first time since the Cypriot crisis in 1974, Turkish and Greek units therefore participated together in NATO military maneuvers which just took place in the area. Under the auspices of "Atlantic solidarity," moreover, Greek-Turkish cooperation seems to be improving all down the line, as the reciprocal measures recently taken to eliminate restrictions on air traffic over the Aegean Sea indicate.

But on the thorny question of Cyprus--where Turkish forces still occupy almost 40 percent of the territory--the positions of the 2 parties remain distant, despite the recent resumption of a long-interrupted dialogue between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island. The Turks recommend a federal, two-zone solution, with each of the two communities having a separate territory with its own institutions under a central Greek-Turkish authority. The Greek Cypriots see this as a de

facto partition which they refuse and recommend, on their part, a combined central government with more extensive powers. At the beginning of September, the Turkish Cypriot authorities proposed to their Greek counterparts a compromise including, among other things, the restoration to the Greeks of 9 percent of the territory currently occupied by Turkish forces, which would enable some 40,000 Greek refugees to return and reestablish themselves there. This proposal was judged clearly insufficient by the spokesmen for the Greek community who in turn presented an arrangement leaving the Turks only 20 percent of the island's territory. The Cyprus question therefore remains a formidable area of discord between these allies, but the negotiations are continuing.

An Unhoped-For Theme

In all areas of daily life as well as political life--from foreign relations to relationships between governors and governed in the country's cities and towns--Turkey, under the military boot, is undergoing an extreme process of "normalization," indeed of "standardization." Everything has returned to order, and an inhabitual calm seems to have installed itself.

In the streets, troops walk, submachine guns in hand, under the distracted and indifferent gaze of citizens who often express their satisfaction with the absence--or at least the rarity--of crimes whose frequency was becoming terrifying before the coup d'etat. The media have been mobilized in order to reassure and lull the public whom the military regime has succeeded, to a large extent, in persuading that the country, formerly seriously disturbed, is currently in good hands.

Nor do the authorities refrain from using a good dose of demagoguery to give themselves a somewhat "populist" image. Television, for example, shows soldiers going through the markets to make sure the vendors are not allowing prices to rise too much, and the junta is shown to be particularly anxious to assure inexpensive leisure activities for its good people. Thus, many cafes and restaurants located on the banks of the Bosphorus or the Marmora have been demolished by order of the authorities to give everyone free access to the sea. It is now possible, therefore, to swim or picnic at the edge of the water inexpensively in Istanbul, as in other seacoast towns.

At the same time, the regime incessantly sings the praises of the "particularly Turkish" ideology of Kemalism, the doctrine of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, hero of the war of independence and founder in 1923 of the Turkish Republic. This year just happens to be the 100th anniversary of the birth of Kemal Ataturk and the regime is bending over backwards to exploit this unhoped-for theme.

But, if the propaganda in all its forms, the continuous ceremonies and the booming speeches have contributed for a time to deceiving the public, they are ending up by exasperating it. In any case, they are hardly succeeding in distracting the people's attention from the serious economic and social problems which, in the long term, risk creating an explosive situation, all the more so since the absence of freedom and democratic institutions prevents the discontent from being expressed through legal channels.

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Additional Turn of the Screw

The junta has just taken one more step in forced "standardization." Political parties, which were officially only "suspended" as of 12 September, have just been permanently dissolved by decree on the eve of the meeting of the advisory assembly responsible for preparing the new constitution. This measure includes the confiscation by the state of all their property which was already sequestered anyway.

Bulent Ecevit, former prime minister and leader of the Republican People's Party (social democratic), has communicated to the press a protest against this measure, thus daring to infringe the prohibition of all leaders of former parties from expressing themselves publicly. "If everyone remains silent in the face of such a measure, we will no longer have the right to consider ourselves as worthy of democracy," he declared.

Legal action was immediately taken against him and the military prosecutor has demanded a penalty of 3 months to 1 year in prison.

Addressing the advisory assembly during its inaugural session, 23 October, the head of state, General Evren, justified the dissolving of political parties by invoking the "necessity" of preventing them from "exercising pressure" on the assembly's work.

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MILITARY

FRANCE

SUBMARINES TO BE ARMED WITH NEW EXOCET SM 39 MISSILE

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 14 Nov 81 pp 50-51

[Article by Pierre Langereux: "New Exocet SM 39 Missile for Submarines: The SNA, SNLE, and 'Agosta' [class] Will Soon Be Armed With SM 39 Antiship Missiles"]

[Text] The new SM 39 subsurface version of the antiship Exocet missile of AEROSPATIALE [National Aerospace Manufacturing Company] will in a few years equip the French Navy's conventional attack submarines of the "Agosta" class as well as the nuclear propelled attack submarines (SNA) and nuclear propelled missile launching submarines (SNLE) of the Oceanic Strategic Force [FOST). The first submarines armed with the SM 39 will supposedly be the SNA, beginning with the second unit, the "Saphir," which was launched on 1 September 1981 and will be placed into service in the middle of 1984 (see AIR & COSMOS No 870). The first nuclear attack submarine, the "Rubis," will also receive the new missile, as well as the other three French SNA which will be placed into service between now and 1988. Each SNA will thus be equipped with 14 torpedos of 533 millimeters or a like number of SM 39 missiles capable of being launched by any one of the submarine's four torpedo launching tubes. Testing of the installation of the SM 39 aboard an "Agosta" class attack submarine have already taken place this year.

Constructed under the auspices of the Technical Directorate for Missiles (DTEn), the SM 39, for the time being, is reserved exclusively for the French Navy. There is no plan to export it even though the missile can be launched "by all submarines" (equipped with Standard 533-millimeter torpedo launching tubes), as stated in a DTEn document. Therefore, it is not out of the question that in the future the SM 39 may be sold to "some friendly countries," which have attack submarines, especially of the "Agosta" class.

Development of the SM 39, started in 1979, has just completed a phase with the commencement of full-scale submarine firings. The first submarine firing of the SM 39 took place in the Mediterranean last July. The trial made it possible to test the underwater trajectory and emergence of the Missile up to ejection of the aerial missile, which constitutes the principal innovation of this particular version of the Exocet intended for submarines.

Milieu Changing Missile

Differing from all other Exocet missiles, the SM 39 is a composite missile since, in fact, it consists of an "aerial missile" encapsulated within an "underwater vehicle" (VSM) which, incidentally, gives it the appearance of a torpedo.

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The complete SM 39 missile, encapsulated within the underwater vehicle is 5.8 meters long and weighs 1,345 kilograms. The aerial missile is only 4.6 meters long and weighs 666 kilograms (see AIR & COSMOS, No 645).

The SM 39 missile has an acceleration motor (76.5 kilograms) equipped with a single-component "Condor" block of Isolane composite solid fuel: the cruising "Helios" block (156 Kg) is also a single component of smokeless Nitramite solid fuel. The underwater vehicle is equipped with an ejection motor (100 kilograms) with a single-component "Narval" block of semi-smokeless Butalite solid fuel as well as a gas generator with a single-component block (1 kilogram) of Isolite composite solid fuel. These solid fuels are supplied by the SNPE [National Powder and Explosives Company].

The SM 39 aerial missile is practically the same as the AM 39 missile, the air-sea version of the Exocet which equips airplanes and helicopters, with this exception: the SM 39 is equipped with a new digital computer (that of the MM 40) and slightly modified retractable wings in order to be enclosed within the launching capsule fabricated in part by the ECAN [expansion unknown] of Ruelle.

The underwater vehicle is a strong, watertight capsule which completely isolates the aerial missile from the water for the entire underwater trajectory after it leaves the submarine's torpedo-launching tube. In addition, this underwater capsule has a hydrodynamic shape whereas the missile is adapted to aerodynamic flight in the upper subsonic regime. The VSM is propelled and guided in its entire underwater trajectory, which is one of the main advantages of the SM 39 over all its competitors, including the American Sub-Harpoon which is launched in an unpropelled and unguided capsule. This original characteristic of the French missile permits considerable reduction in the peak altitude of the SM 39, to about 50 meters, whereas the Sub-Harpoon ascends to 600 meters, which exposes it to the risk of detection by enemy radar. In addition, it assures emergence from the water under favorable conditions, even in very heavy seas, something the other missiles cannot do.

The VSM is in fact propelled and guided up to emergence, that is, up to the very beginning of the aerial phase. At that moment, after jettisoning of the underwater capsule's forward nose the SM 39 aerial missile is ejected from the underwater vehicle by a solid-fuel gas generator. The VSM, now no longer of any use, falls back into the sea and sinks, as do the other elements (the missile's nose and chock pads) in order to avoid localizing of the point of the missile's launching and hence of the submarine.

During this time the SM 39 missile rapidly enters upon the cruising trajectory and from then on behaves like the AM 39 missile. It follows, in particular, a trajectory near the water's level (sea skimmer) whose altitude-controlled in accordance with sea conditions by a radio-altimeter--is lowered in successive steps as the missile approaches its objective.


From its launching by the submarine the SM 39 missile is completely autonomous, like all the Exocet versions, by virtue of an inertial preguidance which directs the missile both during the underwater phase and the cruising phase of the atmospheric flight. At the end of its flight, about 15 km from the objective, the

SM 39 missile, like the AM 39, is guided in proportional navigation by its ADAC active electromagnetic self-guidance, perfected by EMD [Marcel Dassault Electronics].

The large explosive charge, initiated by an impact or proximity fuse is "capable of neutralizing any surface objective," states a DTEn document.

The range of the SM 39--officially classified--is on the order of 50 km, since it is the same missile as the AM 39, whose range is variable, depending upon the altitude and speed of the launching airship, from 50 km (fired at low initial speed) to 70 km (fired from high speed, high altitude airplanes), the range of the SM 39 is therefore shorter than that of other tactical subsurface missiles like the Harpoon (about 90 km). But it is considered sufficient by the French Navy, considering the detection and objective designation capabilities of the SNA and SNLE, whose mission requires, above all else, the greatest discretion.

[Photo caption--p 51] Detail of the separation of the SM 39 missile from the USM after emergence: the nose of the capsule is jettisoned; the missile is ejected by a gas generator; the capsule falls back into the water and sinks. The missile's solid fuel motor is ignited shortly after ejection. This technique of a propelled and guided capsule permits firing even in heavy seas. On the right; ignition of the SM 39 motor after ejection from the capsule (the chock pads for the missile are also ejected).



Caption: Details of the SM 39. A. ADAC self-guidance, water tight and resistant to low temperatures. B. Guidance order elaborator. C. TRT radioaltimeter. D. Inertial platform with vertical stabilization gyroscope equipped with three accelerometers and a yaw gyroscope (like the MM 38). E. Thermal pile. F. Warhead (MM 38). G. Cruise motor with steel shell and higher energy solid fuel. H. Acceleration motor, lighter and more powerful. I. Rear window, like the MM 38. J. Trapezoidal wings. K. Control surfaces modified for adaptation to the wings of the carrying aircraft. L. Nozzle of underwater motor. M. Underwater booster. N. Strong water-tight capsule (VSM).

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UNITED KINGDOM

UK'S NOTT REAFFIRMS DEFENSE SPENDING PLANS

PM271503 London THE TIMES in English 27 Jan 82 p 4

[Unattributed report of 26 January House of Commons session: "Some Adjustments to Defence Procurement Are Inevitable"]

[Text] Timetable changes in a large and diverse defence procurement programme, would be necessary, but the main features of the programme envisaged in the defence white paper stood, Mr John Nott, secretary of state for defence, said during commons questioning.

Mr Hilary Miller, (Bromsgrove and Redditch, C) had called upon the minister to re-state the position about Britain's defence procurement in order to reassure defence industries and those who served in the forces. He asked whether Mr Nott had prolonged any previous announced timetable for the purchase of equipment.

Service in the armed forces (he added) provides valuable jobs for those who wish to serve their country and the equipment they use provides valuable jobs in our industry. There is some uncertainty in our defence industries arising out of the stream of releases about cancellations and prolongations.

Mr Nott: The professionalism and dedication of our armed services are admired throughout the country. We should be proud of them.

On procurement generally we shall be spending more in real terms with British industry in the next financial year than this year, and this year we are spending more than we did last year.

There will have to be some adjustments, maybe changes of a few months, to some programmes, but there are bound to be these changes in such a large programme amounting to 6,000m pounds next year. The strategy set out in the white paper published in June remains. All the major programmes there are going to be maintained.

Mr Bruce George (Walsall, south, lab): How many aircraft are available for the air defence of the United Kingdom? How does his recent announcement on Tornado affect the air defence variant of Tornado?

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If this is likely to be delayed, how does he square this with the off-repeated charges made by Tories in opposition that British air defences were grossly inadequate?

Mr Nott: The air defence version of Tornado is hardly affected by the reduction in the peak deliveries we have made from just over 60 aircraft to 44. That will not affect the strike version and the air defence version may be affected by a month of two but little more as far as we can see.

On the air defence of the UK which with him I regard as of greatest importance, we have made considerable advancements. We have agreed to run on two phantom squadrons into the 1990s, a new decision. We intend to arm with the side-winder missile 72 of our Hawker aircraft.

The huge programme for the improvement of the country's environment--radar and other things--for defence of the UK continues. This is an area where we are applying greater concentration and more resources.

Mr Keith Speed (Ashford, C): In the 1980 white paper there was the intention to purchase more minesweepers for the Royal Navy reserve. In this year's there is no sign of that desperately needed replacement.

Mr Nott: He is right. These are urgently needed for the RN reserve. I hope to start placing these orders in the next financial year.

Mr Peter Snap, and opposition spokesman (West Bromwich, East, lab): How does he envisage paying not only the immense bill for the 385 Tornado aircraft on order but the ridiculous and nonsensically expensive Trident project, the bulk of which will also fall due at about the same time?

Mr Not: The bulk of the Tornado expenditure is happening at present. In the next financial year, the Tornado programme will cost the ministry of defence budget about 1,000m pounds. The same expenditure profile is in the next few years. The major expenditure will have been tapering off by the mid-1980s.

Generally speaking, the Tornado programme as a whole, when compared with the Trident programme as a whole, is infinitely more expensive. We are talking about a total programme cost for Tornado aircraft of somewhere in the region of 11,250m pounds. A huge programme which is going forward successfully.

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