



were to await, on Moscow instructions, the French Forces. Moscow had in the meantime made arrangements for the Soviet liaison officer with the French Forces to support the previously agreed-upon story that the four were German underground members working for the Soviets and have the French provide transportation to the Soviet mission in Paris.

4. CARETINA took with him, as documentary evidence to support his story to the Soviets, the "Phoenix" case. This involves a report from a French CP member concerning the United States' unwillingness to have a Communist Govt. in France after WW II. The "Phoenix" case is being reported separately. The report was a part of CARETINA's and MUELLER's plan to split the Soviet Union and her Western Allies. Following are some of the more pertinent points in CARETINA's account of his years in the Soviet Union:

a. CARETINA was interrogated immediately upon his arrival in the Soviet Union by Polkgeneral (Lieut. General) Viktor Semenovich ABAKUMOV. ABAKUMOV, according to our information, was chief of the Armed Forces Counterintelligence Directorate as of June 1945 when he talked to CARETINA. The latter Directorate enjoyed an independent status during WW II, roughly 1943 to 1946, and, according to most KUBARK sources, reported directly to STALIN. The Armed Forces CI Directorate would, therefore, appear to have been responsible for the investigation of the GRU Western European nets. This supports other reports regarding the fate of the leading members of the GRU nets such as Alexander RADO, Rachel DUEBENDORFER, etc. It also leads to speculation as to how much use was made of the investigation by the Armed Forces CI Directorate (a component of the Soviet State Security Service after 1946) of the GRU nets to weaken the GRU position in the Soviet intelligence community and how much CARETINA contributed to this constant struggle for power between the GRU and State Security Service by his revelation of the German control of the two GRU principle agents - TREPPER and KENT.

b. The first and most intensive operational interrogation of CARETINA by the Soviets was on the Swiss net, the Rote Drei, although he knew relatively little of the Swiss net. In the course of this period of the interrogation, the Soviets revealed to CARETINA (as he explained because of their childlike pride in their espionage feats) that Alexander RADO had been working for the Soviets since about 1922 or 1923. The Soviets were particularly delighted by the fact that RADO had been a member of the British Royal Geographic Society.

c. CARETINA was interrogated continuously by the Soviets from July 1950 to December 1951 on the French Communist Party. He states that they wanted the identification of the German penetrations of the Central Committee of the French CP and the names of the French CP members who betrayed the Party's underground organizations to the Germans. CARETINA is convinced that the Soviets were seeking evidence to prove that the French CP was a traitor to the cause of Communism during World War II.

d. CARETINA is still puzzling over the resistance organization which the imprisoned Soviet officer Inu PAVLOV was heading in Inta. As far as CARETINA could ascertain the MGB extermination of the revolutionary elements in the camps extended far beyond Inta which would indicate that the resistance organization had spread or had units in many of the labor camps. CARETINA is still speculating as to whether this was a gigantic Soviet provocation operation designed to eliminate all potential enemies of the Communist regime within the camps. As he states, the Soviets are masters in provocation and capable of using any means, no matter how ruthless, in executing a provocation operation.

e. It is fairly safe to state that CARETINA came out of his ten and a half years of Soviet imprisonment with an intense dislike of the Soviet Communist government and with a definite feeling of sympathy and appreciation for the individual Russian.

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5. In order to check on CARETINA's account of his period in the Soviet Union, we would appreciate receiving from Headquarters the following:

a. Any reports or evidence concerning the MGB purge of alleged anti-Communist or anti-Soviet government elements in the labor camps during 1950.

b. Confirmation of Maurice THOREZ visit to Moscow during the time between July 1950 and December 1951 and whether he was there for medical reasons.

c. Traces on the following:

#BACH, Otto Friedrich, No. 3 of Attachment B

#BAHR, Albert, No. 4 of Attachment B

#BJOERKLUND, Boris Waldomarowitsch, No. 5 of Attachment B

#BRANDENBURGSKI, fnu, No. 7 of Attachment B

#HEIM or CHAIM, fnu, No. 10 of Attachment B

#JOHN, Richard (or Alfred), No. 11 of Attachment B

#KALINSKI, Abraham, No. 12 of Attachment B

#MENZEN, Karl Heinz, No. 17 of Attachment B

#PUSEP, Guenther, No. 22 of Attachment B

#SCHAEFER/SCHAEFFER, Egon or Eugen, No. 26 of Attachment B

#SCHLEVOIGT, Anneliese nee NASSEL, No. 27 of Attachment B

#SCHMIDT, Walter Max, No. 28 of Attachment B

#STEINBERG, Arkadi, No. 30 of Attachment B

#STLUKA, Hermann, No. 31 of Attachment B

#SOEHLERT, Helmut, No. 37 of Attachment B

6. Concerning the Attachments, Attachment A is a translation of CARETINA's own report. We have attempted to keep the flavor of his report but have done some reorganizing for purposes of clarity. CARETINA's story of his imprisonment, whether written or orally, pours out in an almost unbroken torrent of words and exactly as he recalls it. He was asked to prepare his report on a chronological basis but he is often carried away by his memories. To be certain his account was understandable, however we were forced to do some editing which we tried to limit to parenthetical comments. Attachment B was prepared as a guide for indexing the names. It will be noted that not all of the names are listed in Attachment B. Such names as fnu PAVLOV were omitted because we do not as yet have sufficient identifying data. The reference EGFA-19090 listed under the majority of the names in Attachment B indicates that these persons appear in the material photographed from CARETINA's briefcase in November 1957 and that UPSWING has undoubtedly received the information. The briefcase material was forwarded to Headquarters with EGFA-19090 of 26 November 1957.

APPROVED: [Signature]

Attachments: - A & B herewith

Distribution:

3 - EE w/atts A & B; 2 - SR w/atts A & B; 2 - COS/G w/atts A & B; 2 - FROB w/atts A & B;  
2 - BOB w/atts A & B

QB

FORM 53c  
10-57  
(40)

USE PREVIOUS EDITION.  
REPLACES FORMS  
51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29  
WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

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
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ATTACHMENT A TO EGMA-43172

DATE OF INFORMATION: June 1945 to January 1955  
DATE REPORT WRITTEN: April/May 1959  
SOURCE : CARETINA



The Road to Moscow

1. On 1 May 1945 we (Comment: CARETINA, KENT, STLUKA and KEMPA) moved to a previously prepared hut in the mountains near Bludenz (Vorarlberg, Austria). We installed our transmitting and receiving equipment in the hut. The necessity of maintaining direct radio contact with Moscow as long as possible induced KENT to talk to STLUKA, the radio operator, in an effort to persuade the latter to remain with us and thus gain freedom more quickly, according to our plan at that time, through the Russians in Berlin. I did not dare to ask the radio operator to do this because with all the confidence I had in him, it was too dangerous for me. The radio operator's only question to KENT was whether I was going along on this. KENT answered, "very probably", and the radio operator agreed under those conditions. KENT had a similar discussion with the secretary. There were two reasons for asking her to accompany us: a) We needed someone to make the first contact in the meeting previously arranged via radio with Moscow and a woman was much better suited to this errand since all men were being interned; b) KENT felt strongly that it would be very valuable to have someone from our Kommando present when the Russians were questioning us (CARETINA and KENT). Through a third person the Russians would have a check and it would alleviate the suspicion that KENT and I were collaborating on a previously arranged story. The secretary had done most of the clerical work in the Kommando and was well informed so that she could act as a neutral witness for our reporting. KENT was very insistent, for these two reasons, that KEMPA was the only person who could serve our purposes. I did not agree completely because the secretary had already been instructed to find my family and help take care of them. In the long run the Moscow plan was more important. KENT talked to the secretary who agreed to accompany us, believing as we did, that all could be settled in Berlin. The subsequent long internment in the Soviet Union was very difficult for the two, radio operator and secretary, because they did not know all the background and believed that all which followed was stupid coincidence. KENT's foresight regarding the MGB was proven to be correct by subsequent events. The neutral testimony of the secretary eliminated much that could have been incriminating. For example, OTTO (Leopold TREPPER) when questioned about us accused me of torturing people, etc. in an attempt to have me executed. Three German witnesses and KENT could disprove his statements.

2. On 3 May 1945, we were denounced by local Germans and Austrians to the French Army as an SS resistance nest. Our hut was surrounded by a French

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military force and we were taken in custody. KENT protested and presented himself as a Major of the Red Army working with his German colleagues in an underground movement. We showed the French our radio equipment and our weapons, seven pistols, thus proving that we had collected intelligence for the Soviet Army which the Allies should respect. They took us at our word and did not touch the smallest piece of equipment or material. We were taken, naturally, to the unit staff headquarters where we all waited together in one room. Until this time we had received no final confirmation of the protection promised us by Moscow. The radio operator had his small, English, 90-volt receiver and KENT had the code book, a French novel, with him. The French paid no attention when we said that we wanted to listen to the news on the radio. Moscow had already been asked to transmit "blind" in case the situation prevented our answering. Our receiving time from Moscow came while we were waiting at the unit staff headquarters. Moscow came on the air "blind", we received the message and decoded it under the eyes of the French who apparently noticed nothing unusual. Moscow's reply came through very positively to the effect that the Soviet liaison officer with the French Army was completely informed and would take care of everything. KENT then became very self-confident and demanding toward the French who took us back to our hut with many apologies. New French troop units arrived in the area and we were again taken into custody but the situation was soon clarified and we were taken to Lindau on Lake Constance where the French Army Staff Headquarters were located. During the three days we spent there, KENT and I talked with a French Colonel who, we were told by others, not by the Colonel, was a member of the Deuxieme Bureau. The Colonel asked us about minor details of the German underground in the course of which he asked about the chief of the "Sonderkommando Rote Kapelle" who, according to a radio transmission from the American Army in Milan, had the mission of assassinating General PATTON. Sitting at the table with false identity documents, I could scarcely tell him what the true nature of the "Sonderkommando Rote Kapelle" was or what nonsense this alleged assassination mission was.

Source Comment: If, at the end of the war, a French intelligence officer of that rank had no concept of the Rote Kapelle complex, then probably the Americans and English also had no idea. The present day knowledge is the result of the post-war years and post-war Soviet espionage against the Americans and English. Intelligence officers of the American and English services would have to imagine themselves at the end of the war possessed of the knowledge they now have, in order to understand the measures taken by Germans which were based on the years of experience with the Rote Kapelle.

3. The Soviet liaison officer was informed of our presence in Lindau and he asked that the French deliver us to the Russians in Paris. We traveled to Paris by car, accompanied by a French Captain. The trip was broken for a few hours in Strasbourg in an office of the French counterintelligence service where we saw two former German security policemen in the uniform of French Lieutenants. They recognized us but did not betray us. They were both Germans from Alsace. We arrived in Paris on 20 May 1945, the day

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MONTGOMERY was reviewing a parade. We, still carrying our weapons, passed MONTGOMERY at a distance of about three meters. The French delivered us to the Soviet Repatriation Mission which was in a building formerly occupied by the German Security Police. We were warmly welcomed and taken immediately to a Soviet General who arranged for all of our personal needs to be taken care of. The Russians are masters of this technique. I am convinced that HIMMLER, for example, would not have poisoned himself if he had been in Russian hands because of their unusually hospitable attitude. One learns in the Soviet Union and in prison that the friendlier and more polite the treatment, the more certain is the death sentence. When the Soviet General in Paris, who, by the way, was one of the cleverest I met during my eleven years in Russia, had been rather hastily briefed by us, he sent a radio message to Moscow which began with the words: "The Homeland is in danger".

Station Comment: CARETINA was asked to explain the significance of this radio message, whether the Soviet General in Paris was informed of the German play-back of Soviet agents, or what. CARETINA states that the General was never informed of the play-back but that CARETINA was introduced as a member of German counterintelligence who possessed valuable documentary evidence of the Western Allies', specifically United States', efforts to undermine Soviet strength in Western Europe. This documentary evidence was the "Phoenix Operation" which will be reported separately. The effort to split the Soviet Union from the war-time Western Allies was part of the German plan which CARETINA was attempting to carry out by going to Moscow as explained in the covering dispatch forwarding this report. CARETINA maintains that KENT's double-agent role was certainly not discussed, obviously KENT was anxious to have this information kept as closely as possible.

Moscow replied to the General's message that we would be picked up by the plane of Generaloberst (Polkgeneral or Lt. General) ABAKUMOV.

Station Comment: When queried as to whether the name ABAKUMOV was actually used and how CARETINA knew of ABAKUMOV and his position as chief of "SMERSH", CARETINA said that he could not recall exactly but knew that ABAKUMOV's name had entered into conversations with KENT and that KENT and the Soviet General in Paris had discussed ABAKUMOV. CARETINA did not learn of ABAKUMOV's position as chief of "SMERSH", Armed Forces Counterintelligence Directorate, until his interrogation in Moscow. Both he and KENT, however, knew that it was ABAKUMOV's alleged private plane which brought them from Paris to Moscow.

For a period of about eighteen days while we waited to leave, which took place on 7 June 1945, we were put in private rooms with bath, provided with radios and all other comforts. Even our weapons were not taken from us. The Soviet General, whose name I do not recall if I knew it at the time, strongly resembled General Major der Polizei Heinrich MUELLER, former

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chief of Amt IV of the RSHA. The Soviet was about 165 cm. tall, slender, wiry build with a narrow, thoughtful but quiet face, and dark hair. He spoke excellent French and no German. He was invited at one time during our Paris stay to a party with all of the Allies. He summoned me, showed me the list of Allied officers attending the dinner party, and asked me whether I had any background information on any of the Western officers. He did this very nicely, explaining that it was always necessary to know something of the people one was meeting. On the whole he showed no curiosity about the German aspects of our story and evidenced interest only in his Western "allies". He used his aide, a Colonel, as interpreter along with KENT occasionally interpreting. The Colonel was a stout, well-fed man who suffered from a bad case of asthma.

4. While we were in Paris "SOLJA", true name Vladimir OZOLS, was brought to see the General. OZOLS had remained in Paris and was still in complete ignorance of KENT's true role (as a double agent). OZOLS described KENT to the General as a man of great courage, clever and daring. OZOLS wanted the General to arrange a reunion between KENT and OZOLS. When the General suggested this, KENT declined. For reasons of his own safety he had no desire to meet former members of the Soviet net. Various other people in the process of "repatriating" were housed in rooms of the same building where we were. We did not know whether they were there voluntarily or being kept in custody. We made no effort to contact these people because among them was a Moscow-trained agent who had been in the custody of the RSHA for a long time and had cooperated in a radio play-back. When the Germans withdrew I had been ordered to mount an operation in the Saarbruecken area using this man and his radio equipment. The man was to continue the radio contact and reporting to Moscow and let the Western Allies pass him by. This occurred. After the advancing Allied troops moved farther east and the war ended, he made contact with the Soviets and was then awaiting, as we were, transport to Moscow. His fate is unknown to me.

5. It now became evident to us that we were not going to Berlin but all the way to Moscow. This was somewhat depressing but the path chosen had to be followed to the end. The plane arrived about the end of May 1945. The pilot introduced himself to us and asked whether we were in a great hurry to leave. He explained that he would very much like to get acquainted with Paris. We had no objections to this. An additional delay occurred when the pilot caught the flu so we did not depart until 7 June 1945. Only at the time of the departure did I turn over our weapons which I did to avoid having any suspicion aroused by the possession of weapons. The Soviet planes were not checked at the Le Bourget airfield -- the "Alliance" was still in full bloom. We flew non-stop to Minsk, landed there for refueling, about 1800 hours, on an airfield in the middle of the city, apparently controlled by the MVD. When it was time to take off, the General asked whether we had any objections to having some women and children in the plane with us. We naturally said we had no objections and the women and children accompanied us. The plane had five large upholstered seats which we wished to put at the disposal of the women and children. The pilot, however, refused, saying that he had strict instructions to make us as comfortable as possible. We were received by the airfield commandant, a General,

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in Moscow. Four large cars, SIS<sup>1</sup>, were waiting us. We were placed, each in a separate car, and each accompanied by seven men. This was the last time the four of us saw each other. At the gate to the airfield we stopped and each of us was searched. Everything, even the smallest piece of paper, was examined. We were told politely that this was merely a routine procedure. We drove toward the city in the open cars along the highway which was apparently the highway to Leningrad, passing the Dynamo Stadium and the White Russian Railway Station. Enroute we also passed the American or English Embassy. The men accompanying us pointed out everything in a very friendly manner. The people I saw impressed me as very down-cast, sad, pitiful and even morose. No one smiled. It was impossible to believe this was a nation which, only four weeks previously, had won a great war. It was a depressing sight.

6. A short distance before the Red Square we turned left and arrived at the Derzhinsky Square, finally coming into the Lubyanda street. The enormous GPU, later MGB, building which contains the best known prison in the world, the Lubyanka, was guarded by a series of guards posted about 10 meters apart and marching slowly back and forth. We stopped at a small, almost invisible, side entrance. Soldiers came to carry our luggage and I went with two men through several narrow corridors and rooms to the official entrance where, although inside of the building, I still had to pass through two large iron-grill doors. We crossed a large, square court in the middle of which was a four-story, smaller building, the windows of which were covered with metal gratings. The buildings around the court were of different heights, some having eleven floors. The smaller building in the middle of the court was the notorious Lubyanka. The history of this building is well known. During the time of the Czars it served as temporary housing for the representatives of insurance companies visiting Moscow from the country. The Lubyanka was connected with the large, square block of ministerial building surrounding the court by an enclosed passage from the first or second floor. I was led to the reception room of the prison administrative offices which are located in the ministry building next to the connecting passage of the Lubyanka and are not in the Lubyanka itself. On the ground floor are two, rather small cells. I was requested, very politely, to wait there. My basic biographic data was taken down, also very politely, which I still gave under my false documentation - I also called the official's attention to this fact to which he said, "Bitte Schoen". I had the feeling that these officials are accustomed to dealing with men who in the past, or in the present or in the future, had or have or will have an unbelievable career. After the biographic data was taken, the actual clothing and body search was performed with a woman doctor present. Nothing went unexamined, all seams in the clothing, every orifice of the body including the skin of the genitalia, fillings and cavities in the teeth -- As a criminologist I was not ignorant of such methods but I was astonished at the pedantry of this search. Suspenders, metal buckles, shoe laces, in brief everything which could be used to commit suicide was removed and retained --- every item had to be receipted several times. All of this was done in a friendly manner and it was said with every belonging taken away, "This will be returned to you". Although what is taken away in

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this office is never returned, the most painful bureaucratic procedure is followed. The investigating officers are also completely imbued with this bureaucratic correctness and because of this they are convinced that everything they do is right because they are following to the letter some law or directive --- that the law or directive may possibly be unjust or wrong, is a thought which never occurs to 100 percent of the officials. With all of this they constantly preach their ideology which is that injustice is to be found only in the bourgeois and capitalist countries and that the Soviets are fighting only for the rights of man, etc., etc.

7. I waited in my individual reception room of the Lubyanka for what would happen next. I was given food which was much better than the food I later received in prison --- they know how to make the fine differentiations. One was accompanied to the toilet. The toilets were a square meter, or larger, walled space with raised stands on which one performed and a constant flow of water ran through the opening in the floor -- no chance of committing suicide there and even this was worked out with bureaucratic procedure. Sometime between two and three o'clock in the morning after our arrival, I was fetched by four officers with no explanation of where I was going and only a "Bitte schoen". Without suspenders or shoe laces, holding my trousers up with my hand because all buttons and fasteners had been removed, I went through endless corridors and up in an elevator to what I believe was the seventh floor. There I entered a large, typical anti-room in which ten generals were standing with briefcases under their arms whispering to each other in small groups. I was the only one offered a chair to the astonishment of several of the generals. In about five minutes I was asked to enter the next room. The generals were obviously dumbfounded but regarded me with respect, probably, because they had to wait longer than I did. I was still ignorant of whom I was visiting. I entered a very large room with a long conference table in the middle, wainscoting of dark oak on the walls, a long cushioned bench along the wall under the windows, and cushioned chairs around the table. At the end of the room, which was at least 15 x 18 meters in size, there was a huge desk with an enormous globe on it and a map of the world on the wall behind the desk. Red was the dominant color in the room. A man, about 50 years old with the impressive and self-assured bearing of a Generaldirektor of a large industry, was half sitting on the corner of the large desk with one hand in his trouser pocket. He appeared neither unfriendly or unsympathetic. Two other generals were seated on the cushioned bench under the windows. They appeared quite self-effacing and modest and had the usual files in their hands. I guessed immediately that the confident-appearing civilian was the chief, perhaps ABAKUMOV himself. The correctness of my guess was soon confirmed.

## Conversations with ABAKUMOV, 7/8 June 1945

8. In addition to the two generals sitting on the bench and ABAKUMOV, there were Lt. Col. SOKOLOV who was my first guardian and the interpreter, one Capt. K. whose full name I never learned. The interpreter was a Jew

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and had worked in the Soviet Embassy in Berlin during 1933. He spoke native German with a slight Baltic accent. The interpreter asked me the questions:

Question: "The Generaloberst would like to know who you are."

I guessed from the rank of Generaloberst (Lt. General) that this man was ABAKUMOV. They were still in the dark after I gave my true name, grade, and service affiliation.

Question: "The Generaloberst asks whether you are the chief of the Gestapo in France or have we misunderstood you?"

I explained in detail the nature of the Sonderkommando Rote Kapelle, what its functions were and how the play-backs of Soviet agents against Moscow were performed.

Very tense question: "How long?" (referring to the playbacks)

I said, "more than two and a half years." ABAKUMOV looked at the two generals with an air of astonishment. The two generals became quite pale and stared blankly in front of themselves. Then ABAKUMOV asked a number of minor questions such as: "Is KENT a traitor?"; "How did TREPPER escape?"; "Why had I come to Moscow?" At the latter question I told my "legend" (described briefly in covering dispatch). The interpreter interpreted with obvious hate and an expression of cynicism on his face. For example, he asked me several questions and with a cynical smile gave the answers to ABAKUMOV in three or four words. Repeatedly ABAKUMOV asked his own questions and then allowed the interpreter to translate the answers word for word. His greatest interest was in the political questions: How much knowledge did the German IS have of the secret plans of the Western powers; would the situation in France develop into a revolution; was a Communist government possible in France, etc. I told him that the French in spite of a history of revolution were much too practical a nation and would doubtless join the side which could offer the biggest beefsteak which, at the time, was the Western Powers. He then asked whether the Western Powers would support and recognize FRANCO or whether a movement toward a Republic would be supported. I said that the military strategists would probably make the decision and not the politicians. In our (German) opinion Spain would become a military base for the Western Powers in a very short time. Furthermore, the Spanish people and their pride should not be forgotten and this pride would not permit Spanish interests to be handled in the same way as could be done in France.

9. He then asked me to describe the French, American and English situation at the end of the war -- how we (Germans) viewed it from the intelligence reports we received. I tried to keep my replies along the Lenin line. The USA, for example, I said, had built up a gigantic war industry which would have to be converted to peacetime production and, in turn, a commercial outlet would have to be found for the peacetime production. I was personally familiar with German plans for new factories which could be con-

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verted at the end of the war into peacetime production with a minimum of effort. All industrial countries, along with the United States, had the same problem. The interests of these nations would clash in the commercial vacuum represented by the Soviet Union and China. Also the Soviet Union would never gain control of the Ruhr and its industrial potential; the Western Powers were agreed on that long hence, in spite of Yalta. In my opinion the deciding factor lay in the question of which nation would take over the manpower potential of the conquered peoples of Europe. During this explanation ABAKUMOV interposed some questions but generally listened attentively. I gave him examples and mentioned the documentary material I had brought with me (Comment: Source is referring to PHOENIX Operation, etc.) In my opinion there was not much to say regarding England. CHURCHILL, an enemy of Communism, would shortly add a new book against Communism to his previous works. With this I hit a sensitive spot and caused a reaction, certainly unexpected by me. ABAKUMOV interrupted passionately and said with obvious emotion: "That is provocation. We are good friends with England, so good that we will not have a war with that nation for fifty years." This erupted so impulsively and emotionally from the man that I was somewhat at a loss. I felt forced to give a definitive answer and said that the "Generaloberst" could have me shot if after a year had passed, he held the same opinion. ABAKUMOV said nothing further on the matter but asked me in conclusion whether the group backing me were agreed that Germany should become a Soviet Republic. I replied that at present this was impossible; this could only occur if Germany were independent; the West would not permit Germany to have independence and would make Germany a defeated colony.

10. The conversation with ABAKUMOV lasted about two hours. How much interest Moscow had in political matters can be seen from the fact that during my subsequent interrogation covering many years and innumerable detail, officers, for the most part of the rank of General, always returned to the political problems, regardless of what special aspect of the interrogation they had been summoned to cover and how many years later they interrogated me.

11. General LEONOV, Chief of the "Department for Especially Important Matters", often summoned me for brief interrogation on 10 points which he had listed and which he covered thoroughly.

Station Comment: Major General fnu LEONOV is listed as the Chief of Investigating Unit for Especially Important Affairs of the MGB during the summer of 1951, in CS-43980, 19 August 1954, Attach. to EGQW-19523, Source is <      >

LEONOV weighed 300 lbs. or more. His neck was so fat it would not fit into his uniform collar. He could scarcely bring out more than one sentence at a time for lack of breath. He was reportedly shot during the BERIA/ABAKUMOV trial.

12. I gained the impression from my own interrogation that the MGB exercised a strong advisory function on political activity in the Soviet

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government. Whether the information originated with prisoners or from their own sources, is difficult, naturally, for me to state. I imagine the situation was somewhat similar to Germany because the laws of dictators are similar. The intelligence would have been selected to fit the needs of the MGB officers or unit, also it would be selected to present a biased picture in order to increase the power of the organization, in this case, of the MGB. Officers and directors in a dictatorship are, after all, basically part of a bureaucracy. The basic rule of bureaucracy applies to all, i.e. grow, expand, exaggerate one's own importance and finally the individual exists only to keep the bureaucracy alive!

Into the Lubyanka on 8 June 1945

13. Following my two hour conversation with ABAKUMOV, I was taken to Cell No. 77 of the Lubyanka. This was a small two-bed cell. My cell mate was Egon or Eugen SCHAEFFER or SCHAEFER. He was a Silesian, born about 1909. He had attended school in Breslau and had allegedly been a chemist or chemical merchant. He claimed having formerly had a business in Berlin-Rudow. He spoke perfect Russian which he said he learned in the Eastern Institute of the University of Breslau long before the war. He claimed to have been a member of the NSDAP before 1933, to have left the Party in 1935, and to have belonged to the SS. He was probably actually from the Breslau area because he had an accurate knowledge of the area and persons living there. I was able to judge that part of his story having studied there several years myself. His story was that after 1935 he had drawn away from the Party and the German Government leadership until he was finally an enemy of the German Government. During the war he said that he worked in an office of the German Foreign Office which was monitoring enemy broadcasts and compiling the results in a report, called the "Brown Report", which was distributed to other offices. Next step in his career, in his own account, was interpreter for a Heeresgruppe on the Eastern Front where, he claimed, he had a disagreement with his superiors and was sent to the front line to serve with an intelligence unit. While in the front line he was taken prisoner. Judged by the prison food he received, he was being treated as a PW but all of this could have been cover. I immediately suspected him of being an ANTIFA man who was working for repatriation through good behavior. Typical of his remarks to me was, "Who swings from the gallows these days, can only blame himself." He learned nothing about me, not even my true name. He tried to make me drop my guard by provoking me in every possible way. In doing this he revealed sufficient about himself that I was able to detect a well-schooled Marxist. He may perhaps have had some concern regarding his NSDAP guilt. In any case the following occurred: We were extremely thorough in cleaning our cell because of the invasion of vermin. I had noticed in the very beginning that there were two ventilation openings high on the wall next to the windows. As soon as I noticed this the possibility of microphones occurred to me but I naturally said nothing to SCHAEFFER. During our thorough cleaning he wanted to clean all the cracks in the floor because the vermin were coming from there. In so doing he found a wire behind the floor board which I had already seen.

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He pulled the wire until it refused to give which brought about 20 centimeters out and then he tucked it back behind the floor board. I don't know whether he was actually angry about the wire or was putting on a show for my benefit. The whole performance lasted about 10 minutes at which time a duty officer came into the cell with a workman. The two pretended to be examining the window. The officer asked the workman softly in Russian: "Are there two or only one?", and the workman replied: "Two". Apparently the microphone had been disturbed. One the same day both SCHAEFER and I were summoned for interrogation at the same time which was not customary. This obviously enabled them to make the repairs.

14. Cell 77 was located at that time on the lower floor in the two-story structure right of the entrance to the second cell. Doubtless they were trying through SCHAEFER to monitor me. I was warned about him as a "knocker" (literally someone who taps out messages on the walls but in prison slang a provocation-agent). Other prisoners must have had unfortunate experiences with him. Later in 1947 I was sitting in the Lubyanka in one of the waiting cells which are all next to each other and where one sometimes waited an entire night. While I was there someone sang the "Horst Wessel" song and tapped or knocked out an unknown name. I answered with my true name. The unknown asked me immediately where Kriminalrat GIERING (Karl GIERING) was. I answered as though I had understood GOERING. This was obviously an act for my benefit. Months later I was questioned about this knocking by my interrogator. JOHN, another fellow-prisoner, asked me about this incident of the knocking and said that he had learned through SCHAEFFER's knocking that I was in the Lubyanka. Although JOHN was in Amt VI, (of the RSHA) I had not known him. Only SCHAEFFER or JOHN could have been responsible for this incident of the knocking. I am telling of this incident in such detail because both individuals are very doubtful people in my opinion and it would be worthwhile to keep an eye on them.

15. SCHAEFER in conversation was very enthusiastic about owning a boat when he was free so that he could make long trips along the coast at little cost. Naturally the boat would have to have a motor and a radio so that it could be safely used for trips!

## Interrogation in the Lubyanka

16. My interrogation started on the first day of my arrival. It took place in the morning between 10:00 and 13:00 hours; in the afternoon between 14:00 and 18:00 hours; and during the night from 22:00 to 02:00 or 05:00 hours in the morning. We were awakened at 06:00 hours in the morning and no one was permitted to remain in bed with<sup>out</sup> the permission of the interrogator and during the day we were not allowed to sleep or even lie down. I went for weeks with only one hour of sleep out of twenty-four hours. Everyone had to be asleep by 22:00 hours. The prisoners were so exhausted by the interrogation schedule that they fell asleep within 30 seconds. Ten minutes later in the depths of a sleep of complete exhaustion, the key rattled in the lock, everyone was awakened and off to the interrogators in a state of collapse. Light burned in the cells throughout the night. While I shared a cell with SCHAEFER, we had an agreeable blue

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bulb but that never happened afterwards. The only fresh air was obtained during a 20 minute walk which took place in the court behind a board fence or on the roof, I think it was the 10th floor, behind a board fence. On the roof was a small Vyshki (watch tower) on which stood an armed woman guard about whom the prisoners said, "She too once had a mother". There were some other more agreeable types. We could hear the bells from the Kremlin and that was all.

17. The first Sledovatel (Station Comment: source uses the Russian term, "Sledovatel" for interrogator throughout the report), Lt. Col. SOKOLOV, was present when ABAKUMOV questioned me. I do not know whether this was his true name but this was the name he signed. SOKOLOV began immediately with the Rote Kapelle complex. Then he returned to my personal history and kept up a very fast tempo in the interrogation. He was a brutal appearing man but intelligent, the type which one pictures from the general descriptions of GPU people. There were many things which he did not understand. In the specific fields on which he was working, he had very definite preconceptions based primarily on his ideological training. Anything which did not fit the framework and pattern of his ideology was a lie and deception propagated by the fascists and bourgeoisie. He did not limit himself (in his reporting) to what I said. The regulations determined what he put in the report of my interrogation. In the beginning I was still strong enough to refuse to sign the interrogation and that was probably one of the contributing causes to the bad relationship between us. He did not like me at all. This situation would not have changed regardless of who or what I was, because I represented the stubborn enemy and the bourgeois in his world and according to his rigidly schooled thinking processes. What a quarrel we had about "origin"! Only later did I learn that the information on my so-called origin always had an influence whether I received a sentence or not. My father was an employee, an agricultural inspector -- at which point the question was always asked, "How much land did he own?" In his mind the picture immediately arose of "Karl Karlovich", estate inspector and supporter of the former Russian estate-owners. It was inevitable that "bourgeois" was written instead of proletarian origin.

18. Later I developed another tactic. I learned that what is written into the file is not important, even if signed, as long as it does not fit into a Russian legal code, generally into Paragraph 58. Although one was not released, one could enjoy a more quiet life and would be sent to a camp in any case -- but without a court sentence which turned out, in reality, to be worse than if one received a court sentence. Foreigners who were sentenced received permission to write home sooner and were given the letters and packages sent from home. OCO prisoners (see Para. 42 for explanation of OCO) were concealed from the outside world as long as possible. I should add that even during the worst period of the MGB terror, i.e. before STALIN's death, only those prisoners were sentenced who had acknowledged their guilt according to Soviet law and had put their signature to the acknowledgement. In the case of a prisoner who did not sign, the state attorney could not formulate a charge against him quite as fast. There were exceptions which were of a political nature. Ranking Berman officers who

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had been on Russian territory during the war were confronted with witnesses who testified that the officer had committed such and such a crime. I became acquainted with officers who had experienced this. The officers stated that they had never even been in the area where the witnesses claimed to have seen the "crime". This type of sentence had a psychological and internal political reason. The simple people of the territories once occupied by the Germans had to have proven that no enemy can escape Soviet power. If no witness from the appropriate district could be found, witnesses from other areas were called.

19. I found during my interrogation that the Soviet interrogators really worked under considerable difficulty because they did not have the necessary background knowledge. They often knew nothing of the enemy organizational structure because the interrogation was so divided, so decentralized, that one interrogator would have only three questions to ask and did not dare to overstep the boundaries into a field that had been covered the previous night. Sometimes the interrogation would jump around to completely different aspects of the complex because the interrogator was totally unfamiliar with the previous material and had to switch to a different subject. I do not know whether this system was designed to work to the prisoner's disadvantage, to prevent the prisoner planning or thinking ahead; there would have been little purpose if this was the reason. The rank of a Major or Lieut. Col. was about the equivalent of a German Kriminalsekret-aer, as far as I could determine. Very often the interpreters knew more than the officers about the topic under discussion because they obtained a broader picture as interpreters than did the specialists.

20. The methods of the various interrogation officers were basically the same. The individual personality of the Sledovatels was important, however, in determining whether the situation was bearable or unbearable. If the Sledovatel had received instructions from his superiors that he was to obtain a specific statement from a prisoner, every Sledovatel would work equally hard to make the prisoner sign the statement which the Sledovatel, himself, had more or less written. Every one of them had embedded in the very marrow of their bones the drive to obey commands. My interpreter, one of the many I had, was a twenty-year old Lieut. who had just fallen in love and because of this was somewhat more approachable. I exploited his "softness" by talking to him in a more personal tone when we were alone. He told me, "Look, the Major has to do this on orders from above - there is no question of whether he believes you or not. Just let him speak his piece - he will have to go through this routine ten times if so ordered. When they have had too much, they will leave you alone."

21. For a prisoner, even an old professional criminal officer such as myself, it was consoling advice to remind oneself that people are the same everywhere regardless of the nervous, spiritual, and finally physical suffering to be endured. The interrogation methods seemed to all prisoners senseless and hopeless, even to me who, as a professional criminal officer, could understand the methods better. The prisoners could not withstand the continual pressure forever and signed all sorts of nonsense. One was accused

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of acts which were, quite simply, impossible on the basis of elementary logic -- the prisoner denied it and refused to sign the statement - then this stupid system starts: prove you are innocent. The normal human being attempts, when so challenged, to show the interrogator how impossible the accusation is and through his own efforts he gives the interrogator the material with which the interrogator can involve and trap him on an entirely different point. It was also sufficient for the interrogator if the prisoner agreed that he "might have" done such and such in some imaginary situation which in reality had never occurred and the prisoner had never done. This would prove the criminal intent of the prisoner which was the same as an acknowledgement of guilt and put the prisoner into the category of "support of the world bourgeois".

22. During a period of intensive interrogation the entire machinery of the prison administration supports the interrogator. They can determine in fiendish detail how to work on the prisoner psychologically for his own destruction. A heavy smoker is placed with prison companions who have nothing to smoke; a hungry man receives from the officer portioning out the food the worse and almost inedible portions; for the timid prisoner the guard knocks on the iron door at irregular and unexpected moments or when the guard fetches the prisoner in the evening, he takes him through a long detour of dark basement halls instead of the normal route. In many cases I witnessed, the methods were the result of increased severity in Government directives. A Jewish, Soviet government official of fairly high rank was not allowed to sleep for 14 days and had to be carried to his interrogation because he, naturally, could not walk after this treatment. Cells were changed frequently. Prisoners were provoked in order to justify punitive measures; for example, alleged "lying" was sufficient grounds. Solitary confinement, withdrawal of all reading material, and numberless other methodical annoyances were methods used to destroy the prisoners' resistance. I was threatened every day with intensive interrogation during the four week period before I was interrogated. During the pre-interrogation softening process the interpreter would translate the outline of my proposed interrogation for my benefit. I was even shown different types of weapons used in beating people, accompanied by a remark that this was very disagreeable but that I could prevent the use of such weapons.

Arrival at Lefortovskaya

18 July 1945

23. Whereas the Lubyanka made an impression, on the whole of some civilization with some degree of quiet and elegance in the way things were handled, Lefortovskaya was a typical military prison in which everything is impersonal, everything can be heard, everything is open from the third floor to the ground floor with no separation. Between the floors are large nets to prevent suicides. Hysterical women prisoners and prisoners gone berserk made horrible scenes, screaming in complete madness - all of which drove everyone to desperation. The screams of those being interrogated could be heard and even the blows of the beatings were audible. The interrogation rooms were along a long corridor, one after the other. When

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a beating was taking place, other interrogators would often bring their prisoners to the adjoining cells as a softening process. I was forced many times to listen from 01:00 to 05:00 hours to the beatings taking place in the next room and always warned that this could happen to me.

24. On 7 Oct. 1945 matters had developed to the point that violence was being used. I was accused of two things which I shall name Abwehrschwerpunkte (counterintelligence center of gravity). When a prisoner is involved in a complex such as I was, he can expect anything to happen. I was told, "We (Russians) did not put a foot in Europe for two and a half years during the first part of the war. You, however, are trying to convince us that you accomplished everything through DF<sup>1</sup>ing. Tell us the name of the traitor in our Ministry who was your agent"; and again, "You know the German agents in Moscow. In order that agents placed among us could deliver the required intelligence to you, you used your agent apparatus in Moscow. Who are these people?" These two questions represented a possible death sentence for me. I know that the Soviets, who can tie themselves up hopelessly, had no way out of this matter. If I had only known the name of a General working in SMERSH or the MVD during the war and I had been able to pass on this name as though MUELLER of Amt IV had told me the name in Berlin -- the man would have been ruined but --- in spite of the fact that I had no proof, the man would have had his career ruined, lost his friends and been under a suspended sentence for 25 years.

25. They resorted to beating because they had obtained nothing from me by other methods. The beating was performed personally by Lt. Col. SOKOLOV. Four soldiers held me on the floor. I was beaten on the arms, thighs, hips, but not on the head, stomach, chest or back. The beating was performed with a type of rubber black-jack and SOKOLOV counted the blows aloud as he administered them. After eighty blows I lost consciousness and came to again when a pail of water was dumped on my head. The physician was on hand to test my heart and decide whether the beating could continue. The second time I lost consciousness the physician halted the beating. I was completely black and for a long time could neither sit down or lie on my back. A Tatar female doctor treated me afterwards. She had a motherly, bedside manner. The medical care was good, open wounds were treated, prevention of blood-clots, etc. Since only the interrogator could give me permission to lie down and he refused this permission, the healing period was another, horrible torture. The intensity and pressure of the interrogation was increased and threats of more violent punishment added but they got nothing from me.

26. I had an opportunity to analyze my own opinion regarding the value of intensive interrogation, which I had always avoided, on the basis of my own physical reaction. The fact is that during such an experience a man thinks: I will never see the light of day again; everything is over. This results in a stiffening of the mental and spiritual power of resistance and only makes the interrogator's problem more difficult. The theory that a weak man will be further weakened by this method is nonsense because a weak man can be made to talk by other methods. It is vital that the interrogator

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maintain the mastery in the intellectual duel, thus insuring the psychological superiority --- violet or technical methods cannot replace the human task.

27. In the Lubyanka before coming to Lefortovskaya a second interrogator, the Ukrainian Major LEONTEV, later Lt. Col., had also entered into the case. The interrogation continued at a frantic pace night and day. Whereas SOKOLOV was the violent interrogator, LEONTEV played the obliging, affable, and friendly interrogator. He acted as if he knew nothing of my being beaten. I decided to cut SOKOLOV out of my case entirely. My first act was to maintain a depressed silence with LEONTEV stating that I would probably be shot soon. He, of course, saw an opportunity to exploit his prisoner's depression. He said that he would gladly help me but that for once I should tell him some of the interesting facts which I must know from my past experience and which were of interest. I replied that there had been no time because they continuously asked three questions and gave me little opportunity to talk. I was summoned again on the same day at an unusual hour. LEONTEV and his interpreter were telling jokes, passing out cigarettes and, generally, trying to create a friendly atmosphere. With this setting, I told them that SCHELLENBERG, Chief of Amt VI, had said that all German agents in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia had received, several weeks before the end of the war, a message thanking them for their cooperation and instructing them to turn themselves over with equipment, intelligence reports, and co-workers to the English or Americans who were in the area, and further that the English and Americans had already been advised of their presence. This is a condensation of a much broader fabrication which I told them. The effect was that of a bomb. LEONTEV disappeared hurriedly with only his notes and not a full statement. I was questioned in detail later but first they wanted to know why I had not told them this before because I had been in custody for seven months during which I was always treated with good will. My answer to the latter question was concerned primarily with the incompetent, thick-headed, and impossible Lt. Col. SOKOLOV --- I never saw him again. The interrogation in detail on my information came subsequently.

28. Covering all of my interrogations would be too long -- the tempo changed greatly during 1946 when there were long periods with no interrogation. The entire complex was plowed up again. I was transferred from the Lubyanka to the Lefortovskaya and back to the Lubyanka but most of my time was spent in Lefortovskaya. Lt. Col. LEONTEV remained the chief interrogator for my case. Other MGB officers, however, appeared continuously for special interrogation -- this was after SMERSH ceased to exist and there was only the MGB. The latter officers had either a single target to cover from the entire complex, such as for example the details on Otto BACH who is the current administrative director of the Berlin radio, or single sections of the Rote Kapelle complex. It was impossible to determine whether all of the interrogation was aiming at one definite goal.

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"Operativnik"

29. I had been designated as an Operative (operational) worker. Officers in this branch of work, from Major to General, in civilian clothes or uniforms, appeared with special questions at the interrogation -- always in the presence of my Sledovatel -- and asked special questions from which it was immediately obvious that the questions had nothing to do with the course of the interrogation. Current questions on espionage were asked me during this period, presumably, to increase their own knowledge. An interesting side-light on this portion of my interrogation was that I was asked the involved question, "Why in my opinion was to blame for the fact that Moscow did not spot the playbacks"? This topic was discussed with me long after the executive branch of the MGB had covered this subject thoroughly. If I remember correctly the operational officers entered into the interrogation only about the middle of 1946 - no - the complete interrogation on operational subjects took place at that approximate date but the operational officers were present during the interrogation on the Rote Drei which occurred during the first months. RADO and LUCIE were of the most interest. I recall that the English radio operator of the Rote Drei (Comment: Alexander FOOTE) stated in his memoirs that he was in Moscow and thoroughly questioned. His time in Moscow would have fit the period (when source was questioned about the Rote Drei). The agents played back by the Germans in Switzerland were also covered very carefully in the interrogation. After such an interrogation during which each officer was making his own notes, Major LEONTEV burst out enthusiastically with, "Now there is really something, we had our agents bei HITLER direkt unterm Arsch". They also told me that RADO had worked for them for 22 years, i.e. since 1923, as their "Aufklaerer" (spotter, reconnaissance man) and that in addition he was a member of the Royal British Geographical Society. In the expression of their child-like, easily aroused and, actually, charming pride, much could be learned. One day I saw the Russian translation of the "PHOENIX" case and the cover sheet indicated that the original and a translation had been forwarded to Comrade MOLOTOV.

30. One final comment on the pedantic exactness of the interrogation. The interrogation started not with me but with my grandparents. The residences of my grandparents, of my parents, and my own had to be described - my grandparents had three rooms, Aha, bourgeois! so the grandparents were bourgeois! employment, schools, university, military service, vacations, member of trade unions, were there Communists and who were they? Did you know THAEIMANN, PIECK, or the traitor TORGLER? Why did you not become a Communist? and so on and on. Thick volumes were written. If everything the Soviets obtained from their prisoners were collated and evaluated, complete histories on almost every specialized subject could be written. If they are capable of this, they could select the basic facts and all of the personal histories of individuals to be used in their espionage activity but I doubt their ability to organize and evaluate their own files correctly.

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## Cell Mates - As Many as I can Remember

31. From about 18 to 26 July 1945, I was in a noisy, damp, dark cell which even in summer had no light. It was a depressing cell. I protested by refusing to talk any more and was finally put in another cell. During the short period, 18 to 26 July 1945, I shared the cell with a VIASSOV General, a commander of the VIASSOV Artillery School in Berlin, who at the outbreak of war had defended Brest-Litovsk. He told me that when the first two Soviet Generals were taken prisoner by the Germans, the other Soviet Generals in his area had made bets as to which of the two captured Soviet generals HITLER would set up as head of the Russian Provisional Government. Nothing happened and this dampened, if not completely crushed, the unspoken, unexpressed hopes of the highest Soviet military leaders. The second man in the cell was a VIASSOV sergeant-major.

32. On 26 July 1945 in Cell No. 45 I met two emigrants who had both fought with the Whites against the Reds. They were both from Prague. One had been an architect in Prague and was the head of a Russian emigre organization in that city. I don't know which organization and unfortunately have forgotten the man's name. He told me that he had been brought by plane from Prague to Moscow. On the same plane were: Kriminalkommissar Willi LEIMER of the Prague Gestapo, who had been the Communist specialist there and had also run some radio play-backs against Moscow; the former Police President of Prague, WEIDERMANN, who lives today somewhere on the Rhine and whom I haven't visited although I knew him slightly in Prague; the Luftwaffe General WEISS from Prague. As is usual in prison, the architect told me his life history and begged me, if I were released, to look up his mistress in Prague and give her information about him. He had lived with her for years in an apartment. She was a former opera singer and her deceased husband had been a professor for throat surgery. The second man in the cell was the idiot son of a large estate owner. The idiot son had been a Russian emigrant in Prague where he worked as a house painter.

33. Ca. October 1945 in the same prison, in a cell on third floor the number of which I have forgotten, there was an alleged VIASSOV NCO who was actually one of the heads of the VIASSOV counterintelligence. He had had the rank of Captain and was almost certainly awaiting a death sentence. A Soviet Captain from Moscow was also in the cell undergoing "technical discipline".

34. End of January 1946 in the same prison and in a cell on the second floor, number forgotten, I had as cell-mates a sixty-year old Ukrainian who was in prison because of collaboration with the Germans; a forty-five year old Georgian who had emigrated to Paris in 1923 and had been in a German Kampfgruppe during the withdrawal from France. He may possibly have been turned over to the French at a later date.

35. June 1946, in the same prison, Cell No. 19, one cell mate was Walter Max SCHMIDT, former Attache of the German Embassy in Moscow. He had been taken out of the PW camp and placed in prison in Moscow because he

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answered the questions about his past, professional career truthfully. When I arrived in the cell during the night, he had been terribly beaten during an interrogation. The reason was that he was asked to name German agents in Moscow. They also had begun on me regarding German agents in Moscow and I was to eventually share SCHMIDT's suffering. The other cell-mate was a VIASSOV Capt. "Yuri" INU. He spoke good German and had been one of VIASSOV's Adjutants. He acted very friendly toward us and hostile toward the Jews. He was certainly informing on us. He was an intelligent, sympathetic, young man who claimed to be engaged to a German girl. The father of his fiancée, according to him, had been the head of a construction department of Siemens in Berlin until the end of the war and the family lived on Badstrasse. If the Soviets could have brought themselves to trust "Yuri", they would have had a natural, activist type of spy in him.

36. At the end of July or beginning of August 1946 I was again transferred to the Lubyanka. In the latter prison I had as cell mates the following:

- a. Fnu SEJA or CEJA, Latvian Foreign Minister in ca. 1924 and afterward ambassador in Washington, London and Kaunas. He had been a professor in Riga before being imprisoned. He has relatives living in Ludwigsburg (source's present residence) and his wife is living in Los Angeles, USA. I do not know whether he has been released.
- b. Fnu BRANDENBURGSKI, born ca. 1905, Soviet Russian, Jew, in civilian life had been an employee of the former Comintern in Moscow. He claimed that he was the personal guide for Max HOELZ in the Soviet Union until the latter met his mysterious death in the Volga. He was in the USA as a member of a Soviet Trade Delegation before the war which was purchasing Ford automobiles. He was accused, allegedly, of having hidden assets in the USA and of having cooperated with the bourgeoisie. He had not been permitted to sleep for fourteen days (mentioned above in para. 22).
- c. Fnu LAPIN, reportedly a Soviet Russian Sergeant-Major, Jew, teacher on the Chinese border in civilian life and spoke Chinese. He had certainly been a VIASSOV-man during the war. He had worked in Paris on a Russian newspaper published for Russians serving in the German Army. LAPIN became an agent provocateur about the end of 1949 or early 1950 in Camp No. 1 of Inta. He joined the leaders of a resistance group and then betrayed the whole group to the MGB. The results of his betrayal were several death sentences, solitary confinement including both officers and soldiers (see para. 52).

37. In October 1946 I was transferred back to Lefortovskaya, Cell No. 7, where the following shared the cell with me:

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- a. Fnu VASSILIEV, born about 1910, who had been a General-Major in command of a division of the Soviet Army during the war.
  - b. A Soviet Russian Major, NU, born ca. 1920.
38. In Dec. 1946, Cell No. 36, same prison, my cell mates were:
- a. VASSILIEV (see above).
  - b. Arkadi STEINBERG, a Soviet Russian Jew, Major in the Soviet Army. He joined VASSILIEV and me on 24 Dec. 1946. He had been with a front line reconnaissance unit. He was born in 1909 in Moscow and lived at Karl Marx U. 10 or 31, Quarters No. 10 or 31, where his parents were still living. His entire personality was that of a Western bourgeois. By profession he was a poet and author. He had been sentenced previously in 1937 to ten years and was again, in 1946, being "rehabilitated". His father had been a Colonel in the medical corps of the Soviet Army and was now retired. His mother was a German Jewess and he, himself, spoke fluent German. He talked about his experiences during the Russian retreat from Kuban during which he was in the Asov Sea area. The Russians had lost their heavy weapons and were awaiting every hour the final German push which would have given the Germans the entire Caucasus. At this very critical time, KAGANOVICH visited the front and made a personal appeal for last-ditch resistance. In response to KAGANOVICH's appeal, the officers yelled furiously, "Where is the Second Front?" KAGANOVICH answered, "Children, you want a Second Front? We are only grateful that they are not shooting at us".
39. End of January 1947, there were two German women in the cell next to mine. One was fnu von TECKLENBURG who was formerly with the German Embassy in Moscow and reportedly is now with the German Embassy in Lisbon. The other, NU, was a dental technician who had assisted the dentist who took care of HITLER's teeth. She had been forced by the Russians to identify HITLER's teeth. I had taught the two women the morse code through tapping on the wall in order that I could learn all information which they could give. The Soviets had insisted publically that HITLER emigrated to some unknown country at the same time that they had taken evidence from more than twenty of their prisoners who had witnessed his death.
40. In approximately February 1947, same prison and Cell No. 19, I was again sharing a cell with the above mentioned Walter SCHMIDT and a Soviet Jew who had been an English translator and interpreter for a publishing firm. He reportedly had been involved in the espionage affair concerning the Soviet Air Marshal NOVIKOV ? who was also in prison at the same time. We remained completely aloof from this man because he was totally unfathomable.

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41. I was moved together with SCHMIDT about March 1947 to the Lubyanka. We were in a cell with three or four Soviet Russians for about three hours and then were transferred to another cell. This continuous shifting to different cells was a science practiced by the Sledovatel. It always had to be assumed that one of the three or four inhabitants of the cell was a stool pigeon. I even learned that after a short period during which confidence would be developed, the stool pigeon would say that because of his situation he could not keep quiet about everything which was said and this should be taken in account. On the other hand, I purposefully talked freely in the cell about matters which had come up in the interrogation in order to avoid awakening the Sledovatel's suspicion by maintaining complete silence in the cell. My fellow prisoners could not get a complete and accurate picture from what I said. If the prisoner, however, reported it back to the Sledovatel, the latter would have evidence that I was not a "terrified, silent man". I emphasized to German fellow prisoners whom I trusted, the need to talk only about those aspects of their case which they had given in the interrogation. I did this to avoid provocation and to avoid being involved constantly in "secrets" which might ultimately cost me my head. I did very well using this system and never did fall into a trap. The Sledovatel always held a friendly discussion with every prisoner concerning the latter's fellow prisoners, although he certainly did not need to ask for the information. I have seen the Sledovatel consult a plan which he always had with him indicating who was in the cells on the left, right, above and below. The plan was part of his standard equipment and must have been brought up to date every day to cover the constant moving. In the Sledovatel's discussion about other prisoners, he tried to determine the attitude of the prisoner before him, whether the latter would defend his cell mates, whether he kept completely silent, etc. Such probing combined with the regular reporting of the cell spy were really dangerous for the man being questioned. The entire line of the interrogation might suddenly be changed as a result, much to the disadvantage of the prisoner. One learned from all of these experiences to remain constantly on guard and practice rigorous self-discipline to avoid any slips in the cell. Although I had been a criminal officer, this system was entirely new and unknown to me. We of the German counterintelligence organs had not used this system at all or very rarely. Although that was during the war when it was extremely important, we had so much work that we simply could not take on the additional burden of this type of control. The use of stool pigeons in the cell had been used before the war by the German criminal police but only in the case of the worst criminals, such as murderers.

42. After three hours in the first cell in the Lubyanka, I was moved to another cell where the following prisoners were:

- a. A Polish journalist, NU, who had been in prison in Poland at the time of Pilsudski; then imprisoned by the Germans; and now imprisoned by the Russians. He could under no circumstances be considered a HITLER follower but he thought that HITLER had destroyed the elementary strength of Judaism by destroying Galicia, the very source of life for Orthodox

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Judaism. The Poles had always been at odds with Judaism and had lived on the fringe of the great Jewish program in the Ukraine. He stated that the Polish intelligentsia considered that Judaism, whose strength was evident throughout the world, had its living core in Galicia. If a new and similar source of strength did not develop, Judaism would be assimilated.

- b. JOHN, Richard or Alfred (first name not certain), apparently was a SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer in Amt VI under SHELLENBERG and claimed to have worked on Operation ZEPPELIN. He was a Riga-German, spoke perfect Russian.

(Comment: A separate report has been prepared by source on JOHN which will be forwarded as soon as possible.)

- c. BOEKENKAMP, Manfred, representative of the German Information office in Hsinking, Manchuria, during the war. He was a Journalist, world traveller, participant in the Sven-Hedin expedition to Tibet in 1930 to 1934. He was an extremely interesting man who unfortunately died of blood poisoning in Kotlas, Siberia. I learned the latter news from the Red Cross. BOEKENKAMP was put in prison when the Russians occupied Hsinking after the German surrender. He had already worked for two years at forced labor in the forests without benefit of interrogation or trial before he came into my cell. When we saw him in the Lubyanka, he was starved and looked like a beggar. He was so badly clothed that every time he was taken to the interrogation, he was lent a pair of trousers from the prison supplies which he had to return each time when he returned. He received a sentence of 15 years. He was the only man who came back to the cell after his OCO conversation which lasted only two minutes.

(Source comment: OCO or Troika is a committee of three men who act as a tribunal. The OCO is composed of the Minister for State Security or his Deputy; the Minister of Interior; and one ranking Communist Party official. The three men meet once a month for 8 hours and decide on the sentence and fate of those prisoners who are not to be brought before a court. The OCO or Troika trials are kept completely secret.)

43. I shall attempt to list my fellow prisoners although I shall probably forget some of them. Every single, unimpressive prisoner has not stuck in my memory. I, also, cannot give the exact dates of the innumerable changes of cells and may make mistakes. I can recall the various prisons more accurately. Following are fellow prisoners whom I recall:

- a. PUSEP, Guenther, was in the Lubyanka. He was born ca. 1923 and was the first East Zone spy I encountered in prison. He

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reportedly had been trained by the French in the Coblenz area of West Germany, dispatched into the East Zone where he was arrested along with several of his colleagues. The mistake which caused his colleagues to be spotted by the Soviets concerned a wrist watch. He wore a good Western watch, unobtainable in the East, which the Soviets spotted. The watch rolled up his entire net. Many priests and members of the Caritas were trained with him for intelligence missions by the French and the Soviets, upon learning this, immediately suspected the entire Catholic Church. A few days after PUSEP's interrogation, I was questioned about the Catholic, Protestant Churches, and the Caritas. The Soviets were indoctrinated against the Catholic Church in all of their training and regarded the Church as the most ambitious and active potential power next to Communism (Russian Communism). LENIN had once said that there would be a death struggle between the Catholic Church and Communism which had made an indelible impression on the Soviet mind. When interrogated on this subject, I could only say that it had been known for years that the Vatican was one of the best informed centers in the entire world, thanks to the intelligence sources at its disposal. I pointed out that the Church had all the secrets of the confession at its disposal which the MGB and the "secret Service" did not have. The Catholic Church covers the earth. This simple, obvious statement of fact, presented perhaps somewhat diabolically on my part, was fuel for their counterintelligence fire. As far as we prisoners were concerned, the Soviets could make the Catholic Church a target. The power of the MGB's reports and the MGB's influence on higher policy -- even when the MGB reports originated in the narrow cells of "enemies of the State" -- could have far-reaching and serious consequences such as the measures taken in Hungary against Cardinal MINDS ZENTY. I often thought about this when I later read about events and wondered whether our interrogations and our replies could have had any effect.

- b. NU, Soviet Russian, born ca. 1912, in the Lubyanka. He had been taken prisoner by the Germans and put in a labor corps. Toward the end of the war he was taken prisoner by the English and agreed to fight against the Germans. When hostilities ceased, he was in an English camp established to house Russians who had fought with the English. The camp was visited by a Russian general who was working on repatriation of Russians to the Soviet Union. The Western Allies really had a strange picture of their faithful ally Joseph STALIN! The General took the man out of the camp to work as his interpreter. He served the General for two years during which he was a free man and had been promised by the General that nothing would happen to him if he repatriated. He sailed for Leningrad

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and was arrested immediately on the ship. He received a sentence of 25 years.

- c. MENZEN, Karl Heinz, in the same cell with me in the Lubyanka, born 1925/1927, former SS member. He pretended to be an American 1st Lieut. which was an insane thing to do but he did not carry it off too badly. The interrogator appeared honestly to be in some doubt as to whether he was or was not an American. I later heard from fellow prisoners that he had had a hard time. He was later in Vorkuta. West German police officials recently (Comment: since 1956) questioned me about him. I had already warned them against him. He is reported to have travelled to the East Zone (Comment: after his return to West Germany from the USSR) and to have started working against the West. His address since his return is: MENZEN-SOIKA, Karl Heinz, Essen, Manteuffelstr. 21, in care of Anneliese SCHLEVOIGT. The latter was his mistress, also imprisoned in Vorkuta in the Soviet Union. She returned via Potma. She is said to have several illegitimate children but not by MENZEN.

44. Following are fellow prisoners known by me in Lefortovskaya from December 1947 on:

- a. Professor Fnu RYBINSK, or a similar name, was one of the leading brain specialists in the Soviet Union and head of a scientific institute. He was a Jew, had a serious case of angina pectoris, was well over 60 years of age. He was picked up for having one of BUHKARIN's books in his library which he had completely forgotten was there.
- b. Hans DEHMEL, born 1896, Colonel in the Abwehr, former German youth movement leader, member of the German Freischar, volunteer worker in Schlesian and was not a Nazi. He was the last head of the Abwehr Headquarters in Prague. At the end of the war he was placed in Dachau by the Americans where his history of non-Nazi party membership was never brought to light. There, according to his account, an American investigator, a Jew filled with resentment, promised that he would turn him over to the Czechs as soon as possible which he did. In Prague the Czech court cleared him. Since no returnee from Czechoslovakia was being accepted by the American occupation unless the returnee had seventy kilos of baggage, DEHMEL had to earn the money to buy 70 kilos of baggage which he did by working in the Polidhuette in Kladno. In the meantime the Russians took an interest in him, picked him up and flew him to Moscow where he received 25 years for no reason at all.
- c. Fnu STEINART, German industrialist from Riga who died in Sukobezvednoye near Gorki shortly before being repatriated.

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His wife who now lives in Germany, was a cleaning woman in the office of the Soviet General in Potsdam. Since she spoke perfect Russian, she was used for other minor jobs such as obtaining flowers for MOLOTOV's reception in Berlin. This was her undoing because she also landed in a Russian labor camp. I was told the General for whom she worked had a direct telephone connection from his office to STALIN. This is a small indication of how important a position the MGB had in STALIN's time.

- d. NU, Greek Tobacco Merchant, came from Reval/Talin, more than 60 years old.
- e. BJOERKELUND, Boris Waldemarovich, born about 1893 and presently living in Helsinki. He is probably a Swedish Finn although he was born in Petersburg and, therefore, should probably be called a Russian Finn. I was with him for a fairly long period in Lefortovskaya and Inta. He had been a Colonel in the Finnish Army if I recall correctly. In civilian life he was an advertising specialist. He was a very decent man and his behavior was the best possible under the circumstances. Although he suffered from very poor health, he was a good man in the camp. His knowledge of Russian was very useful to him in the camp. I know that he has now returned home. As soon as I arrived in the returnee camp of Friedland, I gave the Red Cross all the information I could concerning him.
- f. PAWELSKI, Hans Paul (see EGMA-42331, 13 May 1959 which contains information source provided in this report).

45. In the Lefortovskaya was a very interesting man, my last cell companion before I was moved to the camp. I have forgotten his name but he was a Lieut. Col. in the Red Army who had worked in the Red Army's laboratory. He was born about 1895, came from an old, aristocratic, Russian family, and had been a White Russian officer. At the time of the revolution he fled from the Crimea via the Mediterranean countries to Germany and then on to France. In Munich he reportedly founded a bank with some other man ca. 1925. They tried to exploit the inflation of that period but finally had to give up the bank. He worked as a chemist in Paris and sold his patents in England. At this time he was doing extremely well. He claimed that because of homesickness he made contact with the official Soviet Russians in Paris. The Soviets told him that he could return home but that he had to earn the privilege. He would not discuss what services he performed to earn his right to return home but one of his tasks was apparently fighting in the Spanish Civil War. He earned a decoration in Spain, returned to the Soviet Union where he was taken into the Red Army to work as a chemist. He reached the rank of Lieut. Col. He had some type of eye trouble and went to Odessa to be operated on by a famous professor who has subsequently died. The operation was successful and he entrained for Moscow. About 100 kilometers from Moscow he was taken off the train as a prisoner and landed "fresh"

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in my cell. During the time he was in prison he received treatment for his eyes. Beside Russian, he spoke fluently German, French, Spanish and Italian. He had made translations of Greek and Latin poetry into Russian which had been published. He was a widely educated and cultured man with a slight tendency toward homosexuality. He had arranged for the care of Spanish children brought to the Soviet Union and on behalf of the MGB organized an exchange of letters between the children and their parents in Spain. The letters were exchanged at that time via a cover address in the United States. Apparently the Soviets used this job, done actually for the MGB, as a pretext for charging him with espionage. His extensive contacts which included not only Russian aristocrats but German and French aristocratic groups, must undoubtedly have been put at the disposal of his Red masters over the course of years. He had some type of personal acquaintanceship with BERIA whom he claimed to have met occasionally at the home of two elderly English women living in Moscow. He insisted that he was not a spy but that he would have to give in on some points because he must arrange to get to a camp for his eye trouble. He hoped to obtain his freedom once he was in a camp and pinned much of his hope on his contact with BERIA. To accomplish the transfer to a camp he decided to think up a legend as a spy. He asked me to help him. I advised against this but he insisted. We finally worked out his life story from the time he left the Crimea until he arrived in Paris and contacted the Soviet Russians as a life of an espionage agent. In the legend the Americans were to appear as his espionage masters. He selected American YMCA representatives whom he had known in various parts of the world and among whom he had friends as the heads of the espionage net. He claimed that most of the people he wove into his legend were deceased. I do not know how the deception worked because he had only started telling his story when I was again moved.

46. Another one of my cell mates was the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy in Moscow. I have forgotten his name but he was born about 1895. He came from a wealthy Japanese family. About 1920 he had been with the Japanese diplomatic mission in Warsaw and had participated in the settlement of the border between Germany and Poland according to the Versailles Treaty. He allegedly was regarded as a specialist in this area. During the war he was in Moscow and had cosigned the Non-Agression Pact between Japan and the Soviet Union. He described the feast provided by STALIN to celebrate the signing of the pact which was attended only by the Japanese special emissary, himself, STALIN and MOLOTOV. In spite of his many personal contacts with STALIN, all his efforts to obtain his freedom from the Lubyanka were in vain.

47. I obtained my first impression of the horrible conditions in the camps from various prisoners who were brought from the camps to Moscow for interrogation and who briefly shared my cell. In spite of the known horror of the camps, every Soviet Russian, all familiar with the workings of the penal system of their country, attempted in every possible way to acknowledge his "guilt" in order to expedite the transfer from prison to a camp. There was a firm conviction among the Soviet prisoners that the path to freedom was not from a prison but from a camp. Only the Jewish prisoners and a few foreigners fought to the end, obstinately maintaining their original position of "innocent" although they knew they could not win.

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## CAMP Life in Russia

48. I was transferred again at the beginning of December 1948. This time I was shoved into an already full, prison automobile standing in front of the Lefortovskaya. Those who could peek out of a small, grilled window in the rear of the car described the trip through Moscow. The soldiers accompanying us paid no attention to this. It was noticeable to us foreigners that from this point on the controls were somewhat less rigid. Behind us lay the strictness and enforced silence. The soldiers even talked to the prisoners. We travelled in a "Stolipin" train car (Comment: type of prison car) via Gorki to Kirov in the Perecilka. Our car was attached to normal trains and we arrived on the second day. Four or five Stolipin cars were assembled in the Kirov station loaded with fellow sufferers. It was impossible to stand or walk between the tracks because it looked as if an entire army had taken care of the human body's needs there. It was clearly evident that this was the customary unloading station for this type of transport. Here I encountered for the first time the Soviet criminal prisoners. Blatnois (Comment: corrupt, professional criminals used as a type of trusty in the criminal camps) and Bezprishorny (Comment: orphan children who became roving mobs of gangsters), both male and female, were so much in evidence that we who were unfamiliar with this element had the cold shudders when we met them. Every change which occurred in the convoy, handed from one guard to another, change of trains or of temporary camps, etc. was accompanied by the continuous counting of heads, writing down again and again of personal data, receipted, etc. We stood around and froze for an eternity until the doors of the Perecilka finally opened.

49. We were surrounded as soon as we entered by the old prisoners, Blatnois and Bezprishorny. The Bezprishorny were twelve to sixteen years old and were like a pack of jackals from the Steppes. At a nod from the Blatnois chief, they threw themselves on the possessions of the new arrivals, forcing the latter to take off any article of clothing which appeared to be useful. In a matter of seconds the new arrivals were in rags and almost unrecognizable. The individual was helpless and only organized gangs could survive. As a group of PWs we gathered in a corner to protect ourselves. Next we were ordered to bathe. In order to keep any of our possessions we had to organize those we trusted into a series of guards. We were marched, naked and carrying a small piece of black, smelly soap in our hands, along the path to the washrooms. Along the way we had to visit the Parimacher (Comment: literally hairdresser and here indicating delousing and head shaving) who were all women and yelled at us, "Get in here. We know what you look like, you are not the first ones". After bathing there was a long wait in a large collection cell where the criminals were already waiting - but the Germans were well represented. A short and bloody battle developed when the jackals tried forcibly to take away the packages, suitcases and our few possessions. The candles were extinguished during this and when the guards came in to relight the candles, the bandits had been beaten. The soldiers still knew how to fight. The lesson we taught them lasted for that day and we had peace. The guards were completely indifferent to all of this.

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50. Sixty-five of us waited for four weeks in a cell about 5 x 6 meters in size. The group included: sixty Germans, mostly PW's; one Rumanian General; one Korean; three Japanese. The Germans had been sentenced to seven or eight years in the labor camps for stealing a head of cabbage or a few potatoes. If the theft was committed by one person the sentence was seven to eight years but if the theft was organized by three men, the three were handled as a group and sentenced to 15 to 25 years in the labor camps. Of the Germans in the group, only a few were sent to Inta, many went to the Urals, and some to Vorkuta and Sverdlovsk. I recall only two whom I met later. They were:

- a. WOHLERT, Hellmut, living in Hamburg today. At the time he made the impression of being a well educated and decent man. The camp won a moral victory over him. He degenerated until he was stealing and once attempted to commit suicide. He finally was an MGB collaborator and was avoided by everyone. I do not know whether any proof exists of his work for the MGB. There is so much gossip in a camp that a rumor of this type spreads easily. I do know, however, that he disintegrated and must be regarded today as an unstable element.
- b. BAHR, Albert, physics student. He was arrested and sentenced for espionage activity against the East. He had previously been a PW in Canada. He was one of the most honest and reliable men I met during my imprisonment. He could be as silent as a grave and was always ready to help others. Today he is studying mining because he worked in the mines of Russia for so long. He felt he was too old after his long imprisonment to continue studying physics.

Inta, New Year 1949

51. I was dispatched with an echelon of about 1000 prisoners at New Year 1949. The majority of the other prisoners went on to Vorkuta, whereas I was destined for Inta. We marched from the camp (Pereoilka) to the station in a long, sad column with guards and yapping dogs at our heels. The population attempted visibly to avoid looking at us. The majority of our column were Russian prisoners and the elder people greeted us. A few old women stopped and watched us, weeping as they did so. Officers, dressed like fops with waves of perfume surrounding them, ignored us, as if we simply did not exist, while they carried on an animated conversation. Now and then some Machorka (very bad tobacco) or Papirossi (cheap cigarettes) were thrown into our midst. At the station ninety-six men were put in a sixty-ton car and forty-five men in a smaller car. All this progressed according to long lists of names - the bureaucracy had not economized on time and effort in making the preparations. Wood and coal was distributed for fuel to heat the cars. When the fuel was gone, the Russians began to burn the cars they were riding in. With this, the convoy guards stole wood

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and coal for us and allowed us to steal it, for fear we would escape if we burned our transportation. The railroad guards protested violently but the guards disregarded the protest on the grounds that they were preventing fires. During this period the care we received was the best of the entire period of imprisonment. It took six days to reach Inta when it should take only one and a half days from Kirov. The freight trains carrying coal from the North had the right of way over even the express trains which accounted for the long travel time. We were unloaded on an open field in Inta and struggling through deep snow we reached Camp No. 5, the Quarantine Camp. In 1955 Camp No. 5 became the medical camp. I met many of my former cell mates from the Lubyanka here. They had all arrived a few weeks previously and were BJOERKLUND, PAWELSKI, DEHMEL, STEINART, LAPIN, PUSEP, etc.

52. During the transfer from Kirov to Inta, I met an alleged Lieut. Col. of the Red Army, fnu PAVLOV. PAVLOV protected us, the Germans, from the bandits. He only needed to say one word to the Russian or the bandits and they obeyed him. He had an unbelievable power of authority. He told me that after the war he had been in Schwerin, East Zone of Germany, where he lived with a German woman. He implied, although he never stated such a thing, that he had worked in the Kontrrazvedka (counterintelligence) of the MGB. He was an amazingly strong personality who exercised an incredible influence over his fellow Russians. This quality made him a logical man to organize a resistance movement. The heads of the individual coal combines and repair works, all subordinate to the coal combine Intaugol, and the heads of the municipal construction works visited Quarantine Camp No. 5, Inta. PAVLOV, who in civilian life had been an engineer in an automobile factory in Gorki, negotiated with the chief of the repair works and arranged to be made a supervisor. A group of our people went along on the basis of his advice. We arrived in the first camp. It was immediately evident that the living conditions in the work shops were so bad that we, inexperienced foreigners, would probably starve. We, some Germans and some other nationals, applied for jobs in the slaughter house because the rations were much better there. The contact with PAVLOV remained and as long as we were in the camp he helped us. He improved his knowledge of German with my help in return for which he supplied extra bread and tobacco. At my request he arranged for those Germans, just released from solitary confinement and forced to return to work immediately in their weakened condition, to be given extra rations. He accomplished this by going, quite directly, to the head of the kitchen or bakery, who was also a prisoner, and telling him to give the man just out of solitary extra food. If he could not do this he gave the weakened man his own rations and scrounged food elsewhere. His orders were followed by everyone without argument. In the repair shop where he was a supervisor there was a great deal of coming and going, including officers and directors of the repair works. I felt that there was something afoot. PAVLOV also gave us the news from the Voice of America every day. VOA was a Russian broadcast and reception was good in the camp. Groups of men who could be trusted gathered for discussion of the political situation. Both the free men and prisoners expected war to break out between the West and the Soviet Union

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during the years of 1949 to 1952. One day during the summer of 1949, PAVLOV approached me openly about organizing a resistance movement and asked whether the Germans would cooperate. This discussion was held strictly between the two of us. In his opinion preparations should be made now for the target day sometime in the unknown future. The higher ranking Russian officers belonging to the organization thought the entire Komi ASSR could and must be taken over by the prisoners when the hostilities began. The supply of food would probably be to our disadvantage at first because the future war would be a matter of life and death for the present Soviet regime. The present regime would have no scruples regarding the prisoners. A gigantic Katyn (Comment: referring to the mass murder of Polish officers at Katyn) would be our fate if we did not take care of ourselves in advance. The bridge over the Petshora would have to be blown up to stop military reinforcements from coming. The Soviets would probably not use the air force against us because it would be needed much too urgently on the fronts. The large series of coal pits also offered us protection against the danger of air attack. The small transmitter belonging to the MGB in Inta could, according to the imprisoned electrical engineers, be made so strong with the available power that half the world would hear us. Support from the West in the form of supplies and weapons dropped from the air was as good as certain. Inta was not an isolated plan for resistance. There were such good connections with other prison areas that the revolt of the Soviet slaves would shorten the war this time. Another advantage lay in the fact that the majority of the prisoners in the camps were soldiers, most of whom had had experience in guerilla warfare.

Source Comment: What was this? Provocation or a flame up of the old Russian conspiratorial urge toward plotting?

53. During this period an interesting event occurred. Two soldiers while drunk beat up their officers, took away their weapons and even berated them along political lines. Only the comrades of the soldiers prevented a murder. The two soldiers were sentenced, in a lightning trial, to 25 years with a special recommendation that they be assigned to the camp where they had previously been guards and had manned the watch towers, Vyshki. The recommendation was made in the belief that the soldiers would be torn to bits in three days. The two soldiers came into our camp. They were treated by all camp inmates in the friendliest possible manner which also was done as conspicuously as possible. Nothing would satisfy them until they had sought out their former soldier comrades, still guarding, and yelled at the latter that they were getting along fine, better than before. Due to the rapid spread of gossip, this situation lasted only a short time before the two soldiers were taken out of the camp because of the bad effect on the discipline of the troops. The troops were given a political indoctrination lecture every Monday morning. In the lecture the troops were told that the prisoners were starving wolves without any human attributes, the same idea the court had when sentencing the two soldiers. Newly arrived soldiers were, therefore, terrified of the prisoners. We, however, did learn a great deal about the inner workings of the Army through some of

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the troops, primarily West Ukrainians, who were formerly Polish. The Western Ukrainians were filled with hate for their compulsory military service.

54. PAVLOV had obtained exact sketches and plans of the weapons and munitions depots in Inta. What was I to do when he approached me? I know that in the Russian mind the attitude during a dangerous situation was, "who is not with us, is against us". I agreed with the condition that I would be the only representative of the German and Austrian element in the camp and that I would select two deputies. I would show him the two deputies so that he knew them by sight but as long as I was there no one else was to have any direct contact. This I did as a safeguard against provocation. He told me that in case his organization did become known to the MGB, his people were ordered if confronted with evidence of conspiratorial conversation, to spit in the face and swear at the person used to confront them. This was typical behavior for the camp. I discussed the plan with the above mentioned Albert BAHR and a former Luftwaffe Captain Fritz MUELLER who was an Austrian from Linz. We three agreed that no other German or Austrian should learn anything of my conversation with PAVLOV and the three of us would make every effort to prevent Germans and Austrians from being drawn into the organization which could possibly be an attempt at provocation.

55. Approximately February 1950 the organization blew up. The MGB started to work. There was considerable proof that the above mentioned LAPIN had been working for the camp MGB and was involved. Many groups had distrusted him because he was a Jew. I myself had received an urgent warning concerning a Russian spy of the MGB and had stayed completely apart from LAPIN. The Lithuanians had remained as skeptical and cautious as we Germans. Consequently, only the Germans, Austrians and Lithuanians came out of the whole mess unharmed. The arrests took place in all of the camps of Inta and included free men and officers as well as prisoners. PAVLOV and others received the death sentence.

Source Comment: The question again comes to mind of whether this was provocation or not -- whether the sentence was carried out? No one knows.

The MGB Lieutenant who questioned me and tried to implicate me did not possess any concrete evidence against me. Almost five years later when I was in Camp No. 4 of Inta, the same MGB Lieutenant, by then a Captain, was transferred to the camp and asked me to tell him honestly whether I had participated, adding it was all in the past and I could talk freely. He told me that we could see from the events in Vorkuta in 1953 that the immediate action taken by the MGB in Inta had prevented a great deal of blood shed. I only smiled and said, "Whom are you asking, da!"

56. The uncertainty as to whether I would be seized in connection with the PAVLOV affair - I was certainly threatened - lasted well into 1950.

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Suddenly and mysteriously I was transferred again. I was ordered to leave the camp within an hour and was accompanied on leaving by two soldiers with machine pistols which caused my friends to write me off as dead. We went on foot to the Quarantine Camp No. 5 and then back to Perecilka. There German PW's were being assembled. All believed that we were being sent home and I hoped that some new agreement regarding PW's had been reached. This occurred at the end of July 1950. A few days later I was sent in a small transport back to Moscow, still worried that the move was connected with the PAVLOV organization. I arrived in the Lubyanka in the late evening. In less than twenty minutes the guard came to get me. I met again ABAKUMOV's interpreter, the same one who had interpreted for me the first night of my arrival in Moscow, with him were two Generals.

Interrogation on the French Communist Party  
1950/51

57. The two Generals with the interpreter talked to me very courteously, asking about unimportant matters, ordering food for me because I had not eaten, offering me tobacco, etc. It was evident that they had plenty of time and wanted to create a pleasant atmosphere. When things had quieted down except for my inner tension which was increasing, I was asked: "You knew BOEMELBURG?" I had to tell them everything I knew about him, his importance in the Counterintelligence Section working against Communism. Finally came the question: "Do you know whether BOEMELBURG had a penetration agent in the Central Committee of the French CP?" I answered immediately: "Yes, TORGLER" "No", they said, "We do not mean TORGLER. We know enough about the traitors. We want to know whether he had penetrations of the French CP Central Committee". They wanted to know everything; how often I and BOEMELBURG had met; where he held meetings with his agents, etc. I told them that I knew from conversations that BOEMELBURG had three penetrations of the Central Committee in France. One of the latter I had met accidentally while I was visiting BOEMELBURG. When the agent took a hasty departure, BOEMELBURG remarked that the man is a member of the Central Committee. I was asked to give a description of the agent. It was true that I was aware that BOEMELBURG had a penetration of the French Central Committee but I had never known any details. I had to make as clear as possible to the Soviets that BOEMELBURG's training in conspiratorial operations was excellent due to his continuous experience with various Communist Parties, pointing out that he never let me see his files and all his agents were assigned numbers to protect the true names. Suddenly in the year 1950 Soviet interest in the French CP was alive and strong.

58. I later learned through other prisoners that Maurice THOREZ had come to Moscow for a cure - which probably lasted for years. With his visit, Soviet investigation of the security and reliability of French Communist Party reached a peak. On the basis of the nature of the questions asked me from August 1950 to December 1951 on the French Communist Party, the underlying purpose of the MGB could be seen. They were trying with all means at their disposal to establish proof, using my testimony, of the treachery of

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the French CP during the war years. I was not interrogated often during this period but I received a constant supply of cell stool pigeons as companions in place of interrogation. The stool pigeons repeatedly brought up the French resistance as represented by the Maquis and the French CP during the war which was obvious provocation. The Sledovatel did attempt to disguise his knowledge of the conversations in the cell when he talked to me. He would say, "You said in your cell ---". There was a consistent rumor among the prisoners that Maurice THOREZ was being kept in a special section of the Butirka. I often had to pass through this special section enroute to my interrogation. The section contained about eight to ten cells which were guarded by three men, one of them an officer. Each cell had a medieval padlock on the lock and nothing else to distinguish it. Once as I was passing through with my guard, about ten civilians were gathered in front of one of the cells. The ten men were wearing the best Russian suits and high fur caps; judging by their well fed appearance they were high government officials. As soon as I and my guard entered the outer room, the cell was closed and the men turned around to examine me. A colonel, director of Butirka whom I had met during some cell scandal, was standing at attention next to the civilians with a look of devotion on his face. My guard, an elderly, peasant type, was frightened by this gathering and whispered to himself, "What the devil, the entire Kremlin is visiting us!"

59. I forgot to mention that on the evening of my arrival in Moscow and after being questioned by the two Generals in the Lubyanka, I was taken to the Butirka prison. I was imprisoned in Butirka in a three-man cell for the entire period. Since this was the interrogation section, my cell mates changed constantly. Of special interest were:

- a. Two Jewish Physicians: They had been in trouble with the MGB before and had been previously imprisoned. The two doctors were the first who brought news of the growing wave of anti-Semitism. The anti-Semitism increased and reached its high point with the arrest of the doctors in Moscow shortly before STALIN's death.
- b. Soviet Russian Jew, Chemical Technician: He was born about 1910.
  - 1) His special field was the technical equipment needed in a chemical factory. He had either worked in the Health Ministry or was a consultant for the Ministry. He was assigned to a scientific trade delegation headed by a Soviet professor which was visiting the United States and England. The delegation's mission was to buy the technical/mechanical equipment used in the production of penicillin. The trip took place after the war but I don't know the exact dates. My cell mate was abroad for more than three months. In the United States they had absolutely no success, no equipment was sold to them and they were told nothing about the production of penicillin. The only group which showed them any

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sympathy were the negroes and this they exploited for propaganda purposes. In England they were invited by all scientific and social groups. They had some very valuable discussions along lines of interest to the USSR but the English refused to sell them the equipment. The problem the Soviet scientists were facing was how to store penicillin to maintain the effectiveness of the medicine. As I recall they could not keep it for longer than 14 days. In England they met a colleague of Professor FLEMING. This man was HEIM, or possibly written CHAIM, who was a co-discoverer of penicillin. HEIM, formerly a young German chemist, had emigrated to England from Berlin in 1933 as a result of the anti-Semitic laws. HEIM gave the Russians, in the course of many conversations, the information they sought. My cell companion insisted that HEIM was bitter because he did not receive a larger reward for the discovery of penicillin which, he claimed, was because the English were unwilling to reward a Jew. Both HEIM and FLEMING had suffered some type of financial reversal. HEIM, according to my companion, was of the opinion that penicillin should be made available to all of the peoples of the world regardless of their politics. For the Soviets, he proved to be a real friend. He gave the Soviets, without the knowledge of the English, a sample which was from one stage in the production of penicillin. The sample was vital for the Russian experiments and problems.

- 2) The Soviet professor heading the delegation decided to remain in England. My cell companion was imprisoned after the delegation returned. I do not know whether this happened immediately or later. The reasons for his imprisonment were the professor's defection; suspicion of espionage; spreading hostile propaganda abroad; and charges of embezzlement. I do not know what happened to him but he was typical of the cases released after STALIN's death during the rehabilitation of the Jews.
- c. KALINSKI, Abraham, Polish Jew from East Poland where his father allegedly owned a soap factory. He claimed that he had lived in a camp for Polish officers in the Soviet Union and when the Polish officers were released at the outbreak of the Russo-German war, he did not join ANDERS in England but remained with the Peoples' Democratic Polish Army in the USSR. He also said that he had been a Military Attache'. He pretended for my benefit to be a violent enemy of the Soviets but I had proof that he reported my conversations to the Sledovatel with considerable embroidery and exaggeration. I regarded him as a spy who would have enjoyed using methods of the Inquisition. He begged me to pass on news of him to his sister

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who was married to an Englishman and lived in a city in Palestine, the name of which, translated from the Hebrew, is "Door of Hope". I have not done this because I would never use official channels. I saw an article in the press in 1956 or 1957 concerning a Polish Military Attache' or Assistant Attache', named KALINSKI, who was arrested by the French in West Berlin. I called the attention of the official organs (Comment: UPSWING) to this at the time but do not know what action was taken. KALINSKI is a born intelligence operator.

- d. Italian Communist: North Italian, born about 1905, ca 190 cm tall, very broad build. His father was one of the leading engineers or head of an electrical works near Venice, if my memory is correct, Padua. He himself was an electrical engineer in the Soviet Union. His father was a Social Democrat and he was a Communist. In Italy he had been sentenced to nine years for illegal Communist activity. He was connected with the publishing and distribution of a Communist newspaper. After serving three years he was released because of his youth. He went to France where he worked for the French CP and was again imprisoned. He was expelled from France and went to Belgium. In Belgium he landed in jail again, was expelled, and came to Moscow. In Moscow he worked for the Comintern and was eventually used by the Comintern as a courier. He travelled frequently to Germany as a courier. One of his contacts in Berlin was a woman doctor who had her office on the Friedrichstrasse not far from the Waidendammer bridge. He remarked that this woman's office was an excellent meeting place because her patients covered the coming and going of the Comintern agents. During HITLER's regime, sometime in 1933, he attended a German CP illegal Party assembly in Solingen as the Moscow courier. He received a ten year prison sentence during the trials of 1937 in the USSR. He described to me the men convicted at the same time he was in 1937. He said that all had become fat, bureaucratic office workers who whimpered and begged desperately for their lives. There were no traces of the former revolutionaries and it was probably high time that such men disappeared. Through the Politisolator (Comment: Political Officer?) VLADIMIR, he came eventually to Narilsk. His mother in Italy went to the Italian Foreign Minister CIANO to beg for help for her son but CIANO did not want to intervene for a Communist. The mother begged CIANO to help her son, not to consider that he was helping a Communist. CIANO gave in with this argument. A letter from the mother actually reached him in Narilsk via diplomatic channels. He was allowed to write an answer in which he stated that he was getting along very well. His sentence was completed shortly after the end of the war. Although he was allegedly a free man he was ordered to remain in Narilsk

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and head the electrical works there. He was not given a passport but when given his vacation in 1950 he was permitted to go to Krasnoyarsk. He took all of his savings, more than 25,000 rubles, and in Krasnoyarsk he managed to obtain a plane ticket to Moscow. His one desire was to visit his friends, see an opera and enjoy the type of life in Moscow which he had missed for so many years. He arrived in Moscow and his friends housed him illegally. While attending the opera he met a delegation of Italian workers who were sitting in the row in front of him. They were all old Communists. They arranged to meet him in the toilet where they could get away from their MGB "guide". The head of the delegation was a Communist delegate to the Italian Parliament with whom he had worked in the underground distributing the illegal newspaper. It was a happy reunion but had to be held with all the precautions of an illegal underground group although they were in Moscow. He told the Italian delegation his complete history in the USSR. During the third meeting the MGB caught them. He went back to prison and while in prison he was treated very well and allowed extra privileges because he could and did tell his Sledovatel that had he not come to Moscow, he would be today a member of the Communist representation in the Italian Parliament as was his friend. I do not know what happened to him. He broke intellectually and spiritually with Communism while he was still in Narilsk. Fifteen years in the Soviet Union had revealed too much to him. He may have long since returned to Italy and such a man could be very valuable.

60. I was returned to the camp in December 1951 but before leaving the prison in Moscow, the Sledovatel told me that I might be going home but it all depended on me. He was trying to elicit some sensational revelations about the French Communist Party from me. As of January 1952 I was again in Camp No. 3 of Inta, having spent the usual period in Camp No. 5, the Quarantine Camp. My comrades received me as one returned from the grave. For the first time I heard about the extent of the punishment resulting from the revolt. The active participants in the revolt had disappeared. I was told that several Russians had sworn to chop off the heads of PAWELSKI and WOHLERT who had apparently been uncovered as MGB informants. The Blatnois ruled the camp as before.

#### Life of a Blatnois

61. A true Blatnois is forbidden to do any work. The Blatnois who disregards this rule is a traitor, Sukas. (Comment: bitch). A feud exists between the Blatnois and the Sukas. The different gangs of Blatnois also fight each other, generally, attended by considerable blood shed. The reasons for the fights are various. One faction steals with no hesitation from the workers as well as systematically pilfering and controlling the camp supplies. Another faction maintains that the daily ration of the workers

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should not be touched. The latter group is the larger. The quarrel between the two factions caused five deaths in one month. I witnessed one of the Blatnois feuds in the barracks on one occasion. Two men from one faction challenged the leader of the opposing group to come to the barrack to discuss their differences. As the leader of the opposing group entered the barrack, the two men locked the door, pulled out their knives and went to work on the one man. Approximately fifty men who had just returned from the day's work were sitting around in the barracks. All whispered, watched this unfair struggle and did nothing. To have intervened would have meant death. The leader protected himself with his own knife against his two attackers but he had small chance of surviving because the first stab had been fatal. When he fell to the floor dead, he had forty-nine knife wounds. As the final gesture the two attackers pinioned the corpse to the wooden floor with an iron bar. They took off his boots, an almost symbolic action, washed themselves and one of the two went to the guard, threw his knife to the soldier, saying, "I killed the swine". He had perhaps already served one year of a twenty-five year sentence and he would now receive another twenty-five years because there was no capital punishment in the Soviet Union at that time. The camp director and the political officer walked into the barracks where nothing had been touched. The prisoners were still sitting around as if paralyzed. The camp director ordered all of the prisoners into one corner but no one moved. The terrifying smell of death caused a breathless silence. The camp director moved uncertainly and did not insist on obedience to his order. The political officer then pulled out a cigarette and they both lit Paprossi. Finally the political officer said, "This is one Hell of a mess", and they both left. The camp officials were obviously happy to have the Blatnois kill each other because they were afraid of the Blatnois and had no control over them. A bible which was forbidden in the camp and which belonged to us Germans was found and seized by a soldier. The Blatnois learned of this, went to the soldier and said, "The bible will be back in its old place at 1800 hours today". The Soldier returned the bible without saying a word.

62. Once the king of the Blatnois came into the camp. No one knew him. He was a small man with very lively eyes who looked like a scholar. When he entered the barrack, the most ferocious of the Blatnois jumped up and made room for him in the best place. This type of manners was absolutely unknown in the camp and was indicative of the importance of the old man. The old man did not need to say a word; one glance, one movement of his head and the Blatnois immediately obeyed. I had an opportunity to talk to the old man later. He spoke four foreign languages, had obviously studied and was educated. According to the rules of behavior in that society, I could not possibly talk to him about his position as king of the Blatnois. Discussing the Bolshevik Party, he stated that the only way to combat the terror of that Party was to use the same weapons of terror the Bolsheviks themselves used. He also stated that his Blatnois were ruled by the threat of death and must obey blindly. He indicated that the code of the Blatnois was absolutely rigid and only the strongest and most determined men could join. Today there are many complaints about these groups of Blatnois which are actually small but if there were more Blatnois, Bolshevism could not

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survive. Inasmuch as their motivation is purely negative and they have no positive goals, they have little chance of ridding themselves of the criminal element. The old man, naturally, did not discuss this aspect of the Blatnois.

63. The Sukas were the brigadiers for the labor brigades until 1952 and also served as the controllers to force more work. The prisoners soon became acquainted with their new masters and soon found methods to avoid work. The result was that the prisoners vegetated, the production decreased although the number of prisoners increased.

#### The New Era in the Camps

64- The new era in the camps should have begun in the Spring of 1952 when it was decided to pay the prisoners so that money appeared for the first time. It was delayed, however. The criminal element in the work brigades quickly organized the system whereby the money paid for work was pocketed by three or four trusted men. Two to ten rubles was paid for the heaviest work and this was not sufficient to buy Machorka. Production sank even lower than before. The Russians in charge reacted immediately because production was the magic word. The criminal element was removed from the camp and very soon the political prisoners joined us. Only a minimum of Blatnois remained so that the camp director could depend on the few Blatnois being destroyed if they interfered with the workers in any way. The brigades were composed of political prisoners who did not cheat their comrades. Various rewards were offered for good work. Finally the system was introduced whereby high production was rewarded by shortening the sentence of a prisoner, i.e:

100% production during one work day shortened the prisoner's sentence by one day.

105% production during one work day shortened the prisoner's sentence by one and a half days.

110% production during one work day shortened the prisoner's sentence by two days.

120% production for one work day shortened the prisoner's sentence by three days.

If a prisoner could make 120% production for every work day of one year, he could cut off three years of his sentence. This was truly successful system because the Russian prisoners for once started to work hard. Production climbed and the number of workers needed to do a job decreased. In certain types of work two-thirds of the former man-power was out and the production was greater than before. The necessary 120% could not be attained, however, on certain jobs primarily because the State norm had been determined in areas where favorable conditions existed and in the North conditions did not permit the same production. The problem lay primarily in the organization and flow of supplies and, in addition, the headquarters

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responsible for planning did not supply the brigades with the necessary supervision and administrative personnel, or supplied too little. The nonproductive workers had to be carried in the percentage of the entire brigade. This is not difficult to arrange in the Soviet Union where years of experience has taught the worker how to use a pencil. In the cases where the norm was not attained, the workers quickly learned how to cheat. In the usual case 80% of the norm was attained and 120 to 140% was written down. The system worked, however. A quotation attributed to Churchill is applicable to the situation, "We cannot afford Socialism, we are not rich enough".

65. The pencil was used quite openly in correcting the alleged, earned percentages. Everyone knew about it and everyone turned his eyes away. In spite of the known attitude the prisoners were terrified of being caught because this would constitute a crime against the Socialist Society which is one of the worst. They also knew that all the credit gained through hard work could be sacrificed by days spent in confinement. I was asked by my Brigade about the end of 1953 when the brigadier left to take over the brigade. The reasoning behind the request was that, in the case of a German, another twenty-five years added to his sentence would be meaningless because the Germans would eventually be freed through their Government's negotiations. A Russian, on the other hand, would have to serve his entire sentence if he could not shorten it through hard work. Although free men worked in the brigades, the camp rules were that a prisoner must be the brigadier. The reason for this was that 50 to 60% of the prisoners' monthly income was deducted for the cost of running the camp and the camp officials were well paid with a high percentage of prison labor. All salaries of the camp officials, including the guards, were paid out of the deductions from the prisoners' pay - in brief, we prisoners were supporting the man guarding us. From the remainder of our pay which we were given, we had to pay for housing, food and clothing. If anything was left over after paying all those expenses, we could use it as we wished. My brigade which was employed in the installation of plumbing equipment and water pipes received, per man, 250 to 350 rubles per month to use as each man wished. It should be remembered that butter cost 25 rubles for one kilo. Prisoners who became specialists and passed the necessary examinations were classified according to the same salary grades as the free workers. The camp officials were, for the above reasons, very concerned that their prisoners earn high salaries because of the proportionate deductions. Extra money went toward improving the camp which, in turn, brought the camp officials recognition and promotions from the various "Commissions" who paid periodic visits to the camps. There were, therefore, no free brigadiers who would have been strongly tempted to arrange for the 15 to 20% of the free workers in the brigade to earn the most money. It was a very clever, well thought-out system. The perfection I have just described above was not attained for one and half years and in the meantime STALIN died.

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STALIN's Death

66. The free men working on our construction site brought us the first news of STALIN's sins. The news of his death had been rumored about eighteen hours before he died and there was scarcely a man working. The free workers brought vodka and toasts were drunk to the new era; everywhere unconcealed joy was evident. Not a sad man was to be seen during this time.

67. By the time of STALIN's death, work had been rewarded by pay for almost a year. There had been, also, some easing in minor regulations. In the four or five months after STALIN's death, one improvement followed another so rapidly that hope of freedom quickly spread. Rumors of amnesty were continuous. A group of Germans was assembled on 15 June 1953, comprising about a third of the Germans in the camp. Then came 17 June 1953 and the revolt in the East Zone. The situation was frozen and remained so, especially for foreigners, for years. I had the general impression, in spite of the chronology, that all of the alleviating measures had been planned long before STALIN's death. We generally thought that the same trend would have occurred if STALIN had been alive. The repentance of the government toward the masses of prisoners was primarily a political necessity based on the fact that whatever government was in power would pay for any mistakes made by previous leaders. The increasing unhappiness among the population over the millions of prisoners, a sorrow shared by almost every family, could not be disregarded forever. The actual mass rehabilitation occurred only in 1954 and first the Jewish cases were given wide publicity. The whole enormous mass of prisoners was seized by a restlessness which continued throughout the year of 1954. Decrees ordering improvements and amnesties were issued so fast that the camp administration could not put one into effect before a new one, replacing the old one, was issued. The bureaucratic machinery could not keep pace. It was easily seen that the Government wanted to settle the disagreeable problem of prisoners and camps but lacked the courage to abolish the system once and for all. They obviously were trying to accomplish their goal by degrees, thus achieving two things: Not increase the unrest and dissatisfaction and at the same time maintain the production level. The concern over production was not based on facts because the majority of the Russian prisoners would remain in the camp voluntarily due to the fact that they had been much worse off when they were in Central Russia and in the Kolkhoz! The North was considered a preferred area because of the working conditions, i.e. double pay after five years; longer vacations; double amount of sick leave, etc. The Government in Moscow hesitated to put an end to the system -- we had the impression that they were afraid to release such an enormous and dangerous element. The prisoners, in reality, were not dangerous but the Government's attitude was typical of the Soviet system -- for tactical reasons all sorts of nonsense is brought into discussions and in the end those, who know it was nonsense originally, believed it to be true.

68. At the end of 1954 the situation was so confused and the regulations in the camps so relaxed that I had the experience of seeing the prisoners who were brigadiers, make proposals regarding amnesties based on good work performance and proposals for transfers to another camp where there were

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better living conditions, more freedom, etc. I, a foreign prisoner, made twenty such detailed proposals and had about 50% success. We decided then that it would be a good tactic to raise our percentage as high as possible and in one month we won the so-called "Red Performance Flag". Armed with such factual evidence as the "Flag", it was possible to push and achieve success in particularly desirable amnesty measures we had proposed.

The MGB Political Officers' Activity  
Among the Prisoners

69. I would like to touch on the subject of the MGB Political Officers because it played a big role in camp life. When a new arrival came to the camp, he could expect a summons from the political officer within the first month. There were several political officers in every camp. Each took care of a "Workers' Column", such as the mine workers, and each "Workers' Column" had 500 to 800 prisoners in it. Therefore, 3,500 prisoners would have three to four political officers and their helpers assigned to them. The summons to the political officer was dreaded by all. New interrogation, new accusation, and new worries could come out of the interview and if a prisoner quarreled with the political officer, the latter could destroy, from one day to the next, the carefully sought-for job and working conditions. The political officer was the most powerful man in the camp and he was the real head of the camp government. A man would be ordered not to report to work the next day but to go to the Kum, the nickname of the political officer. This order made the prisoner apprehensive immediately. He worried about what would happen to him, had someone denounced him, would he receive solitary confinement or some other type of punishment, etc. I have had Russian prisoners whom I knew return from a visit to the political officer, completely dejected, and tell me that they had no choice but to work for the Kum. This was told me by a friend -- I had to remain distrustful of such confidences, although told me by a friend, because I knew the Russian had been sent by the Kum to report on me.

70. I will describe briefly my visit to the Kum. I was summoned to the Kum one day in 1949. He let me cool my heels in the anti-room from 0600 hours of the early morning until late afternoon. This was done to develop the necessary tension and uneasiness in me. I had never laid eyes on him before but when I entered his office, he acted as if I were an old acquaintance. He was a Lieutenant and an educated, intelligent man who also had some manners. His name could probably be dug up somewhere. He asked the most ordinary questions: How are you getting along? Where are you working? Are you satisfied with the conditions, etc.? This took up a great deal of time and from this he gradually worked into questions on my fellow German prisoners, asking the same questions about them. I answered questions on only two or three Germans who were working in my Brigade, explaining that due to lack of time I had no contact with the others. He then continued with such questions as: Did we Germans get along well together? Did we sing songs together? did we discuss current events together? etc.

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All of the latter was forbidden. The questions became more precise and personal as he continued trying to build a feeling of confidence and sympathy between himself and me. Thus in a slow, very sly, and clever way, he created a good conversational atmosphere and was certainly not stingy with tobacco. He even asked me whether we were hungry. In brief, he appeared to be a human being and a friend, a striking contrast to the brutal atmosphere of the camp. Prisoners should not be blamed for being taken in by this type of treatment. The ordinary prisoner could not possibly see through the maneuver and most have felt that the conversations with the Kum were innocent. Due to my training as a professional criminal officer, he had more difficulty getting the conversation rolling along as he wished while talking to me. After about an hour I told him quite clearly that we were professional colleagues of a sort and that he did not need to keep up the pretense with me, asking bluntly what he wanted of me. He acted as if he knew nothing of my former career and profession; he even asked me to give him my biography. When he asked me this, I said that we should really talk more freely with each other, if for no other reason than out of respect for my former profession. He smiled at that and stated that his only purpose was to have an interesting discussion with me. He let slip with this, without noticing it, that he was perfectly aware of my history. I explained to him that I could satisfy his professional interest in the activities of my fellow nationals when they were not working. If he would accompany me on a tour of the camp, he would find Germans in all of those installations where a prisoner could earn a piece of bread or a spoonful of soup by doing extra work. I continued that in spite of the muchly vaunted justice in the Soviet Union, foreigners, who theoretically received the same punishment as Russian prisoners, were in reality punished more severely because a foreigner had no contact with his native land and received no moral or material support from his own family. I commented that if he did not allow me to talk freely with him, he would have a very dull conversation. Taking advantage of the relaxed mood, he asked jokingly about politics and what my opinion was of recent events. I claimed to be completely uninformed, pointing out that at that time, 1949, although there was a "newspaper" and a radio, which we did not understand, I had received no news. I added that as a prisoner behind barbed wire, I had no political opinions. He tried to provoke me by accusing me of being a coward; to which I replied that I was not a coward and was not stupid. After further exchanges of this type, I challenged him to give me a description of the current political situation so that I would have some idea of what was happening. With that he jumped up and went to a large map on the wall. This was a map of the world with a great deal of red on it. He proceeded to explain the political situation of that period (Comment: 1949) and did it quite accurately which I could judge because, regardless of being in prison, I was well informed. He spent considerable time pointing out all the American bases which were well marked on the map and he said, "You can see for yourself that the American bases have been built to encircle us, our allies and friends. We are completely surrounded." "What could we do if there is another war?" He appeared to be honestly worried so I asked him what he thought the reasons were for the "encirclement". His answer came directly from Marx ideology and indoctrination, repeating the words "Capitalism" and "Imperialism" constantly. When he had concluded this

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tirade, he said, "Perhaps we have made some mistakes. Do you think the Russian occupation of East Prussia is good? or will only thoughts of revenge and another war come from it?" Once again I said that as a prisoner I had no political opinions. After considerable back and forth, I said that I might be able to estimate the feelings of the German people because I knew the German mind but in doing this it should be understood that I was not passing judgement, merely trying to describe. He jumped at this naturally.

71. I started out by asking his permission to ask him some questions to which he agreed. First I asked him if he knew the book "Hero of Our Time" which he said he knew. Then I asked who the author of the book was and he answered, "LERMONTOV". I asked him what the setting was for the action of the book and he said, "The Caucasus". I then asked when was LERMONTOV in the Caucasus and what was he doing there. His reply was, "An officer there, about one hundred to one hundred and twenty years ago". I pursued this with, "Why was he there?" He answered, "To make peace with the restless Caucasian peoples". I said, "More clearly stated, to conquer them, isn't that so?" He replied, "Yes". Then I said, "What would you say if Turkey, today, presented a case demanding that the Caucasus belong to Turkey?" He answered that there was no question of what would be done because it would simply not be allowed. I said, "You see East Prussia has belonged to Germany, not 120 years, but 700 years! Families have worked and lived there for generations. Do you think the Germans would give an answer different from yours to my question about the Caucasus?" He replied, "No, I understand you;" and that was the political officer's answer to my question. I added that I thought it was stupid for Russia to keep this area for local strategic reasons, Russia certainly was not land-hungry, when by this action the leading industrialists in the Eastern Zone would be driven into the arms of the Western Powers and probably were eager for revenge against Russia.

72. The open discussion, described above, was possible in the camp but not everyone was capable of carrying on such a discussion. Hunger and a craving for tobacco caused many weak-willed men to serve the political officer. In some cases the prisoners had lost all strength to resist and served out of fear. My discussion with the political officer resulted in a relationship, almost friendly, between him and me and he always greeted me first whenever he met me in the camp. He never again attempted to recruit me although twice he asked me for my opinion regarding such and such Germans. I had a vague, intuitive feeling that he was trying to indicate to me that the individuals about whom he was asking should be somewhat more cautious because they had been denounced. There were, of course, Germans among the prisoners who had a close contact with the Kum and thereby received personal favors in working conditions, etc. As far as I could determine such Germans were relatively few. If desired, I could probably recall some of the names and list the German co-workers of the Kum.

Transfer of Germans and Other Foreigners From the North

73. I talked daily with the free laborers working with my brigade on the construction site. The free laborers had close contact with the

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Upravleniye, Directorate (Comment: Presumably MVD), either through personal contacts or through their work, which administered the prisoners and camps. Much could and was learned through this channel. A Norwegian prisoner, released in 1952, worked in the electrical works of Inta where he was employed on the Dampfverteilung (Comment: steam distributor?) in the city. He visited our construction site every day and always brought me, as an old friend in camp, the most recent news from the milieu of the free laborers. We conceived a plan whereby we could obtain more information and from better placed sources. Our plan was successful. It should be remembered that the Russian man is not very attentive or chivalrous toward the Russian woman. Most Russian women are impressed and very approachable if a man is polite and considerate toward them. We decided that we could learn more of the inner plans and workings of the Upravleniye through the women. Our plan was quickly activated by means of the young wife of a 1st. Lieut. Both she and her husband worked in the Upravleniye. The 1st Lieut. took his two-month vacation, leaving his wife alone. Once the young woman was alone, she gave free expression to her violent affection for the Norwegian. She became so demanding that my friend was coming and going, night and day, from her quarters. He kept us informed almost to the moment of everything which was happening in the Upravleniye. Correctly stated, he kept me informed, not us, because I had to be extremely careful in order to protect him. One day this woman was ordered to leave her work in her usual department. She and many other employees of the Upravleniye were put to work, as the result of an urgent directive from Moscow, on "completing" the dossiers on foreigners. This occurred about the end of November 1954. Another directive from Moscow urging the most expeditious completion of the job caused all employees on leave to be recalled, including her husband which did not please her. The work on the dossiers was an enormous task because all West Ukrainians, formerly Poles, were included and there were a great many of the latter. It was evident at this stage that Moscow had not decided whether prisoners from the areas which Russia had annexed should be treated as foreigners or Soviet citizens. The problem was not solved while I was in the USSR. Prisoners with this background, who were given their freedom, were permitted to apply at the Gendarmerie for passports. I had such a case in my brigade. The man applied for a passport but sat around a year without receiving an answer. I have never learned what happened to him. I realized that the directive ordering the "completion of the foreigners' dossiers" would very shortly affect a change in our situation if no big political upset occurred in the outside world which would stop the action underway.

74. We were in Camp No. 4 in Inta in mid-December 1954. Camp No. 4 had formerly been a womens camp and had, in November 1954, been turned into a camp for construction workers only so that the construction brigades from all camps were collected in Camp No. 4. About five hundred Germans from Vorkuta joined us there during December 1954. They were assigned to the barracks for the free laborers and theoretically were separated from us but in practice it was impossible to maintain the separation. Our German camp society in Inta was a small group. We all knew each other extremely well, especially how far each one could be trusted. Now we were joined by five hundred Germans of all types: Many from the East Zone who had been "Volks-polizei"; some who were criminals; quite a number of former soldiers; some

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openly displaying intense nationalism, including fanatic Russian-haters and "agent provocateurs". In short no one knew whom to trust. Soon the stew began to boil -- a request was made for a common, all-German, internment camp and that all prisoners be treated as PW's. Immediate transportation to the next staging area was requested; contact with a representative of the Red Cross in Geneva was requested, etc. When the quarantine period was past, the majority of the Germans were ordered to go to work. Actually the work consisted of small jobs such as shoveling snow and was provided merely to keep the prisoners busy. When ordered to work, the Germans went on a hunger strike and sent a delegate to me, demanding that I join the hunger strike. I refused, as far as I personally was concerned, and gave them my reasons. I told my German comrades in the brigade that they were free to do what they wished. Two of them joined the strike. The Germans who had come from Vorkuta imagined that they had been brought to Inta for forced labor with the work brigades and they wanted to go home. As brigadier for my brigade, I knew the supply of material in Inta. I had prepared estimates of supplies needed for the next year. As a result I knew that there was absolutely no doubt that the labor strength for the coming year was planned at 350 laborers and not at 850 laborers. There had been no allowance in the estimates to cover 850 laborers and the principle of profit applied even in the prison camp production. We construction workers paid for our support in the camp from our own earnings and the support of the Germans from Vorkuta was carried by the Upravleniye. For this reason alone it was obvious that the Vorkuta group were there only awaiting transport to the next staging area. I simply could not make the Germans, whom I did not know and who were an unknown quantity to me, understand the situation. I also refused to participate in the request for a German camp because I preferred to live in a camp of various nationalities as a prisoner in a dictator state. In a crucial situation a camp of one nationality could become a Katyn much more quickly and easily than a mixed camp. In addition to the above reasons, I knew my German too well -- every man became an intense individualist in an enemy camp which, as was proven, was a purely destructive form of behavior in practical terms. The Russian prisoners and free laborers who were at all intelligent agreed with me in my fear of another Katyn. The opinion of my Russian co-workers was that in a new, world-wide war the official Party leadership would stop at nothing because the present, ruling clique knew that a new war would mean complete destruction if they did not use every possible means to assure their survival. If they were defeated, they would destroy everything along with themselves. The Nazis had said the same thing exactly when they said, "If we withdraw, we will close the door after us with a mighty crash". In spite of the Nazi threat, the door was not completely closed. I, however, believe the Soviet rulers to be a much more determined group of men. This matter is discussed in the USSR today, not publically but in small trusted groups. The Soviet people are very vulnerable to this argument. If, for example, the people are told, as convincingly and emphatically as possible, through propaganda channels that the people of the Soviet Union have nothing to fear; that all the Party leaders make their hysterical threats against the West because they know that a war means the end for them personally. From what I

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know of the Russians, they are as vulnerable today to this argument as they were in 1954/55.

75. The German hunger strike was stopped after three days. The camp administration had an easy game in breaking up the strike. There were unnecessary mass meetings which resulted in the usual beatings. At the beginning of February 1955, everyone including all the Germans from Inta were loaded on a transport which took us to Sukobezvednoye near Gorki. Everything occurred as we of Inta had predicted. All the excitement and anger was purposeless. Our case was being handled by the government in Moscow. There was no purpose in striking or acting defiantly as far as the local Upravleniye was concerned unless it was a small local matter which was controlled by the Upravleniye. We were political bartering material for Moscow and had to accept the fact that we would be treated as slaves in our position had been treated throughout history. Moscow had drawn up their plan and made the preparations long before we became involved. The first indication we had that we were concerned was received from Moscow in November 1954. The invitation to ADENAUER was in June 1955 and the actual negotiations occurred only in September 1955. When ADENAUER was invited to Moscow during June 1955, we had been in Gorki already for five months, as well as in other camps in the Moscow area.

76. About 1100 Germans from Vorkuta and other smaller camps were assembled in the Sukobezvednoye collection camp. There was every imaginable type of German from various parts of the world as well as from East and West Germany. As far as their political coloring was concerned, they were from extreme left to extreme right although old Nazis of the original pattern were few and those required careful examination to determine whether they were honestly Nazis. Much of the criminal element had suddenly developed into fanatic Russian-haters and German nationalists. This transformation was a means of obtaining a "clean" return ticket to their native land. All the events in the collection camp, including sacrifice of lives, were frequently worse than the prison. I had never encountered in prison as much stupidity, stubbornness, and general meanness as I did in the collection camp. They had not learned their lesson from the purposeless hunger strike in Inta but continued this type of behavior, constantly becoming excited and making themselves ridiculous. There were many men in the camp who lacked all political acumen and intuition and who today are certainly involved in some type of political movement because they are such egoists. Books undoubtedly will or have been written about the heroic resistance which, from my experience, was absolute stupidity, and which give a completely false picture of the Russian reaction to their stupid behavior. The Russians were primarily interested in keeping peace, in trying to instill some sense in the men, and in preventing the entire morale of the surrounding camps from being infected by this stupidity. Occasionally, hard, cynical, or insulting words were exchanged on both sides but the Russians did not use force at any time. It was easy for them with the help of their co-workers and the former Volkspolizei members to remain completely and currently informed on everything happening in the camp. An experienced counterintelligence man

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(Abwehrmann) could easily see that the restless masses did not represent a real danger. The stupid behavior went so far that a crowd of 200 prisoners locked up the Russian staff and the political officer in a barrack. The Russians took this quite calmly but there were cries among the prisoners to set the building on fire. Fortunately nothing happened but how easily something could have happened which was absolutely senseless and would have sacrificed lives at the very period when the prisoners were awaiting the final transport home. The only possible grounds for violence would have been if the Russians had told us that we were not going home in spite of the amnesty and ADENAUER's negotiations. The first group left following ADENAUER's visit. Then the departures were stopped. The Soviets were obviously annoyed by the official reception in Freidland which was enthusiastic and accompanied by sharp speeches against the Soviet Union. This cost us four more months of waiting. The Soviets like to retaliate with such petty irritations.

77. Everyone's nerves were taut during the additional four months we had to wait which caused trouble and horrible scenes. It was the height of stupidity to expose ourselves during the final waiting period. There was a good possibility that the Soviets would provoke the prisoners in order to obtain new material for publicity against the German prisoners. During my imprisonment I had admired many times the Soviet mastery of the art of provocation. The Soviets used any and all means. For example, through their informants and helpers they provoked the various nationals to quarrelling. Most frequently they aroused the Latvians against the Ukrainians or vice versa. The Latvians and Ukrainians, each, represented 25% of the total number of prisoners and consequently were the strongest numerically. When these two national elements quarrelled, the ensuing battles were gigantic. After the battles the antagonists were dispersed among other camps "for the sake of peace".

78. The Germans who cooperated with the Soviet political officer in Sukobezvednoye are generally known, for example PAWELSKI. Any German who was suspected of cooperating or any German who was discovered to be a homosexual was driven from the camp and had to live in a small house just outside the front gates of the camp. About twenty-five men lived there. The names of the twenty-five could easily be pulled together and they should be noted. The alleged Volkspolizei officer, Lt. Col. BACH, occupied himself in trying to organize the camp along the lines of the "East Germans", allegedly in order to facilitate his return home. Whether that was the reason for his efforts or more significance lay behind them, I do not know. He told me that he came from Saarbruecken and that his father had been a Communist who was in a concentration camp during HITLER's regime. The camp hated BACH primarily because he caused the death of a German 1st Lt. NUESSE by his cooperation with the political officer. NUESSE died of a heart attack brought on by anger and excitement over BACH's behavior. As stated elsewhere, PAWELSKI is a good source of information on the men who lived in the house outside the gates because he was one of them. There were many suspect men among the returnees, the names of whom probably could be listed from official records.

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Return Home, Early January 1955

79. Because of the long delaying tactics on the part of the Russians, the order to break camp was not taken seriously when first issued. The trip went off well and without delays, the sick travelling in a new express sleeper car and the healthy in freight cars. We were permitted to get out at every stop and visit the villages where we stopped. Everyone got out and talked to the people of the villages as much as possible. The Russians, especially the old women, were very frank. The women did not attempt to conceal their dissatisfaction. They had been told that war criminals were being returned to Germany. When they saw eighteen and nineteen year old boys in our midst, they immediately asked what the boys had done during the war. We told them the boys were our Generals. This broke the ice and they began to talk, apparently, from their hearts. They said, "Yes, we have known for a long time how those on top lie to us. Tell your people in your homeland what you have seen here." We often gave the Russian people small presents. We had been receiving packages regularly from Germany since early 1955 although not before that date. With the packages we prisoners in the camp had more than the free people living in the Gorki area. A few packages had arrived during 1954 in Inta which was the sensation of the camp at the time. The Russians (Comment: Prisoners) came again and again to look at the fabulous gifts in the German packages. Their own packages generally contained Machorka, dry bread, a few onions, garlic and sometimes potatoes. Our packages had an unbelievable propaganda effect. Frequently the discussion among the Russians would be, "Just look, our robbers in Moscow have won the war and what have we to eat?" and "Look at the wonderful things the Germans who lost the war have to eat. The Capitalists certainly understand how to get along better than we do". It was even worse in Suko-bezvednoye where there were only Germans and where all of the packages were collected over a period of one or two months and delivered at one time which meant several thousand packages. The Russians living around the camp were wood cutters and machine workers. Although free and not wearing prison clothes, they received only 450 grams of sugar per month. If grain and other food supplies were available in Gorki, a trip of over 200 kilometers by train, friends would write to the population around the camp and the free Russians would travel to Gorki with their sacks to buy food. It should be remembered that this was 1955. We gave the sickly, undernourished children of the local population sugar, sweets and other food because we had more than enough when the packages arrived. The Communists soon issued an order forbidding our gift-giving because it hurt the Party pride. They disregarded, however, the obvious fact that we continued to do this by less obvious methods. It sufficed that an official Party order had been issued which relieved Party members of responsibility. Officers up to the rank of Major were not embarrassed to ask us whether we had any of the pretty, colorful cans left over for them to take to their apartments. They would carry off all they received, 15 to 20 cans, dressed in uniform and hugging the cans to their bellies. We invited them to taste the food we received but they were very cautious in their comments. The living conditions and food of the population in the North was much better than in the Gorki area.

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80. We were "accompanied" by officers, not guarded, during our trip home and the officers talked freely. One Colonel who accompanied us to the border complained that he was not allowed to go as far as Freidland, stating that he would not return to the Soviet Union if he did reach Freidland. Although such frank statements were rare, he appeared to be sincere. Travelling through Poland we saw the same poverty. The Poles offered to exchange Schnaps for our new, padded clothing and were often taken up on the offer. They, the Poles, told us about the low level of their earnings as compared to the high prices. They stated that a specialized railway worker who worked forty-eight hours per week could not survive and, therefore, they all had to work fifty to sixty hours per week in order to exist. They predicted the growing dissatisfaction which was proven true in Posen in 1956. Often they yelled at us, "Come back soon so that this will end." In spite of their poverty, the Poles were very friendly. They gave us cigarettes, invited us for beer and Schnaps and would not take "no" for an answer. The remark we heard repeatedly in Poland was, "We know the Bolsheviks and know what you have suffered." If a Pole in uniform walked through the station, there was immediate silence but our Polish companions would wink at us.

81. The most horrifying sight for us was East Germany where very young Volkspolizei with children's faces with their guns in readiness stood around our cars and would not allow a civilian to approach us. Old soldiers, faced with this after enduring a hard war and long, difficult imprisonment, did not spare words of appropriate descriptiveness directed against the Volkspolizei infants. A clash almost occurred at the Oder bridge in Frankfurt. The Russian Colonel accompanying us was summoned and in a typically Russian manner pointed out the ridiculousness of the situation whereby we were freer in Russia than in Germany. Order was re-established in a few minutes and we saw nothing more of the Volkspolizei. The Russian Colonel had, without mincing words, ordered the Volkspolizei to stop this nonsense about guarding. We learned, thus, with our arrival in East Germany who the real masters were. Our transport was always shunted onto the sidetracks to avoid taking us through the larger cities and our train travelled as fast as possible to get us through East Germany. It required only eight hours for our freight train to cover the distance from the east border to Friedland. If our train had to pass through a large station, the tracks were cleared and the Volkspolizei stood guard as we went through. The transport before ours had described the "Soviet paradise" to the population which taught the East Germans a lesson as far as permitting the local populace to talk to the transport. We were handed over to the German authorities at the border of Friedland, all formalities were friendly and the transfer accomplished without hitches. Almost eleven years in the Soviet Union lay behind us.

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ATTACHMENT B TO EGMA-43172

NAMES FROM ATTACHMENT A FOR INDEXING

MICROFILMED  
JUL 23 1962  
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. ~~2R (201-7111)~~  
ABAKUMOV, Viktor Semenovich  
DOB: ca 1900  
Polkgeneral (Lt. Gen.); Head of Soviet State Security Service  
1946 to 1951.  
Para: 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 17
2. ~~A~~ BACH, ~~fnu~~ (Lt. Col.)  
POB: Saarbruecken, Germany  
Volkspolizei Lt. Col., German PW in the USSR until early 1955.  
Para: 78.
3. ~~A~~ BACH, Otto Friedrich  
DOB: 2 Dec 1899  
POB: Stuttgart, Germany  
Add: A 56 Marinesteig, Berlin-Schlachtensee, West Germany  
Current administrative director of the Berlin radio (as of April 59).  
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. D, E, F.  
Para: 28
4. ~~A~~ BAHR, Albert  
DOB: 31 Aug 1921  
Add: A Ganderkesee/Oldenburg, Bergedorferstr, West Germany  
Presently at: Berg Academy, Clausthal-Zellerfeld, Burgstaedterstr. 1  
(as of April 1959)  
German PW in USSR until early 1955.  
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. E, G.  
Para: 50, 54.
5. ~~A~~ BJOERKLUND, Boris Waldomarowitsch  
POB: Petersburg; probably Russian Finn  
Add: A Helsinki - April 1959  
Finnish PW in the USSR (as of 1955), Col. in Finnish Army WW II.  
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. D.  
Para: 44, 51
6. ~~A~~ BOEMELEBURG, Karl  
BOIS, MOLLENBURG, (Col), BERMELEBURGER  
DOB: 28 Oct 1885  
POB: Berlin, Germany  
Kriminaldirektor, Amt IV, RSHA, during WW II.  
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. A, E, F.  
Para: 57
7. ~~A~~ BRANDENBURSKI, fnu  
DOB: ca 1905  
POB: Russia  
Soviet PW in USSR as of 1946; suspect Soviet agent.  
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. E  
Para: 36

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8. ~~cit. Germany~~ DEHMEL, Hans  
DOB: 1896  
Add: Munich-Grosshardern, An der Rehwiess 15, ~~cit. Germany~~  
German PW in the USSR; Chief of Abwehr Headquarters in Prague  
during WW II; now in Austria (as of 1959).  
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. C, E, G.  
Para: 44, 51
9. ~~cit. Germany~~ GIERING, Karl  
DOB: ca 1890  
POB: Berlin, ~~Germany~~  
Kriminalrat; Chief of the Communist Counter-Intelligence Department  
of Amt IV, RSHA. Started the Paris Rote Kapelle Sonderkommando.  
Para: 14
10. ~~cit. Germany~~ HEIM or CHAIM  
POB: Germany  
Add: A England  
Chemist, co-discoverer of penicillin.  
Para: 59  
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. E
11. ~~cit. Germany~~ JOHN, Richard (or Alfred)  
DOB: ca 1906  
POB: Probably Riga  
German PW in the USSR as of 1947; Amt VI, RSHA, during WWII.  
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Atts. C, E, F.  
Para: 14, 42.
12. ~~cit. Germany~~ KALINSKI, Abraham  
Polish PW in the USSR as of 1945; Suspect Soviet Agent.  
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. E  
Para: 59
13. ~~cit. Germany~~ KEMPA, Hilda or Hella  
DOB: 4 Feb 1919  
POB: Berlin, ~~Germany~~  
Add: Munich 15, Hermann Linz Str. 4, ~~cit. Germany~~  
Secretary to CARETINA; German PW in USSR as of 1945.  
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Atts. A, C, E, F, G.  
Para: 1 Heinz PANNOWITZ (241-123497)
14. ~~cit. U.S.S.R.~~ LAPIN, fnu  
DOB: ca 1905  
POB: Russia  
Soviet PW in the USSR as of 1949/50; suspect Soviet agent.  
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. D, E.  
Para: 36, 51, 55.

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15. ~~W. G. G.~~  
LEIMER, Willi  
Kriminalkommissar of the Prague Gestapo, Amt IV, RSHA, during WW II  
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov, Att. E.  
Para: 32
16. ~~W. G. G.~~  
LEONOV (General)  
General; Chief of the "Department for Especially Important Matters",  
Soviet State Security Service, during 1951. Reportedly still  
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. E during the BERLIN  
Para: 11 ABAKHOV trial
17. ~~W. G. G.~~  
MENZEN, Karl Heinz [ ]  
DOB: ca 1922  
Add: A Essen, Manteuffestr. 21 bei SCHLEVOIGT, Anneliese (after 1956)  
German PW in the USSR as of 1947; suspect Soviet agent.  
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. E  
Para: 43
18. ~~W. G. G.~~  
MUELLER, Heinrich  
DOB: 28 April 1900  
POB: Germany  
Generalmajor der Polizei; Chief of Amt IV, of RSHA  
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Atts. A, F.  
EGQA-81010, 14 Aug 1956, Att. A.  
Para: 3, 24
19. ~~W. G. G.~~  
MUELLER, Fritz  
POB: Linz, Austria  
Austrian PW in the USSR as of 1949; Luftwaffe Captain during WW II.  
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. E  
Para: 54
20. ~~W. G. G.~~  
OZOLS, Vladimir [ ]  
(SOLJA, SOKOL, The General, "Z", A. MARIANNE (W/T)  
Soviet agent  
Ref: EGQA-81010, 14 Aug 1956, Att. A.  
EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. C.  
See Basic British EQUAL study.  
Para: 4.
21. ~~W. G. G.~~  
PAWELSKI, Hans Paul [ ]  
DOB: 27 June 1921  
POB: Meseritz, East Prussia  
German PW in the USSR from Dec 1947 to early 1955; suspect  
Soviet agent.  
Ref: EGMA-42331, 13 May 1959  
EGMA-41794, 30 Apr 1959  
EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Atts. C, E, D, G.  
EGQA-81010, 14 Aug 1956  
Para: 44, 51, 60 78.

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22. ~~TH~~ ~~de Germany~~ PUSEP, Guenther  
 DOB: ca 1923  
 German PW in the USSR 1947-1955; former French agent in East Germany.  
 Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. E.  
 Para: 43, 51

23. ~~Z~~ RADO, Alexander [ ]  
 @ ALBERT, @ DORA (W/T), @ WEBER, @ KOULICHER, Ignaci  
 Soviet principle agent  
 DOB: 5 Nov 1899  
 POB: Upjest, Hungary  
 Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. E.  
 See Basic British EQUAL study  
 Para: 29

24. ROESSLER, Rudolf [ ]  
 @ LUCIE (W/T), @ TEDDY  
 Soviet agent  
 DOB: 1897  
 POB: Czechoslovakia; died 1957  
 Ref: See Basic British EQUAL study  
 Para: 29

25. ~~U.S.S.R.~~ RYBINSK, fnu, (Professor)  
 Soviet brain specialist; in prison in Moscow in 1947.  
 Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. E.  
 Para: 44

26. ~~TH~~ ~~de Germany~~ SCHAEFFER or SCHAEFFER, Egon or Eugen  
 DOB: ca 1909  
 POB: Silesia, probably Breslau, ~~Germany~~  
 Chemist  
 German PW in the USSR in 1945; suspect Soviet agent.  
 Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. E.  
 Para: 13, 14, 15, 16

27. ~~TH~~ ~~de Germany~~ SCHLEVOIGT, Anneliese nee NASSSEL  
 DOB: 7 Feb 1919  
 POB: Essen, ~~Germany~~  
 Add: A Essen Manteuffelstr. 21 (as of Apr 1959), ~~Germany~~  
 In prison in USSR as of 1947; fiancée of MENZEN, Karl Heinz  
 Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. E, G.  
 Para: 43

28. ~~TH~~ ~~de Germany~~ SCHMIDT, Walter Max  
 German PW in the USSR as of June 1946; former Attaché German Embassy,  
 Moscow, WW II.  
 Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. E  
 Para: 35, 40, 41.

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29. ~~SEJA~~ or ~~CEJA~~, fnu  
Former Latvian Foreign Minister, 1924; later Ambassador in Washington,  
London and Kaunas; Latvian PW in the USSR, 1946.  
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. E  
Para: 36
30. ~~STEINBERG~~, Arkadi  
DOB: 1909  
POB: Moscow, USSR  
Add: ~~Moscow, Karl Marx Strasse 10~~ (family home as of 1946)  
Prisoner in Moscow in 1946; major in Soviet Army.  
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Atts. E, G.  
Para: 38
31. ~~STLUKA~~, Hermann  
DOB: ca 1900  
POB: Austria  
Add: ~~Oberalm 12, Austria~~  
CARETINA's radio operator; Austrian PW in the USSR as of 1945.  
Ref: EGMA-41397, 1 Apr 1959  
EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Atts. A, E, F, G.  
Para: 1, 2
32. ~~SUKOLOV~~, Viktor (1906-1971)  
@ KENT, @ SIERRA, Vincente; @ ARTHUR, @ FRITZ, @ BARCZA, Arthur  
@ URWITH, Simon; @ MANOLO, @ CLEMENT, @ DUPUIS, @ LEBRUN  
Soviet agent  
(Comment: True name reported by CARETINA is GUREVICH)  
DOB: ca 1912  
POB: Russia  
Ref: See Basic British EQUAL study  
Para: 1, 2, 3, 4, 8.
33. ~~TECKLENBURG~~, fnu (female)  
German PW in the USSR as of Jan 1947; employee German Embassy, Lisbon  
as of 1958.  
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. E  
Para: 39.
34. ~~TREPPER~~, Leopold  
@ "LE GRAND CHEF", @ OTTO, @ GILBERT, Jean; @ DE WINTER, @ UNCLE  
@ IVANOWSKI, Bladimir Ivanovich; @ UNCLE OTTO, @ LE GENERAL,  
@ TREPER, Liebe ben Zaharya  
Soviet principle agent  
DOB: ca 1902  
POB: Galicia  
Ref: See basic British EQUAL Study.  
Para: 1, 8

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~~cc Germany~~  
35. WEIDERMANN

German Police President of Prague during WW II.  
Living West Germany as of April 1959  
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. 3  
Para: 32.

~~cc Germany~~  
36. WEISS (General)

Luftwaffe General in Prague during WW II.  
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. E.  
Para: 32

~~cc Germany~~  
37. #WOEHLERT, Helmut

Add: Hamburg, as of April 1959  
German PW in the USSR as of 1948; suspect Soviet agent  
Ref: EGFA-19090, 26 Nov 1957, Att. E  
Para: 50, 60.

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