While the article is ostensibly about the UKs use of drones in Afghanistan, Alston and Shamsi anchor their comments on British drone use in the activities of the CIAs secret drone killing programme in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in the previously mentioned, PlayStation mentality that they say surrounds drone killings (Alston 2010).In the newspaper article, Alston and Shamsi (2010a) explicitly link video game-playing military personnel, physical remoteness, joysticks, and the killing of real people.In addition, such killing is referred to as antiseptic, as though there are no impacts on the person pulling the trigger to fire a missile on a distant enemy.Alston and Shamsi also refer to a surge in CIA drone killings, questioning their legitimacy and positing that they might just be retaliatory on the part of the CIA by their operators.The next discursive device deployed in the article brings the focus back to the UK and calls for the British Ministry of Defence to establish accountability mechanisms to ensure that British drone operators function in accordance with international law. -------------------------------------------------- In the former Alston (2010: 7) introduces a secret targeted killing programmereportedly conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Pakistan.Civilian operators are also reported to strike targets approved by senior government personnel (2010: 8).In addition, in the recognised NATO battlefield of Afghanistan, the US military operators conduct unrestricted attacks on the Taliban and the drug lords that fund them (2010: 8).In terms of the codified morality to which the CIA, the US military and their respective operators conform, the US Department of State specifies both the right to self-defence and International Humanitarian Law.However, apart from identifying these elements of a moral code that provides the framework within which US drone operators civilian and military conduct operations, no further detail about how the code is operationalized is offered.Ultimately, Alstons report (2010: 8) suggests ways of enhancing such a code: specifying who can legitimately be targeted and killed; introducing procedural safeguards; create accountability mechanisms. -------------------------------------------------- (2010).The CIAs covert predator drone war in Pakistan, 2004-2010: The history of an assassination campaign.Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33: 871-892.Williams, J.(2015).Distant intimacy : space, drones, and just war.Ethics and International Affairs 29(1): 93-110.Wilson, G.I.(2011).The psychology of killer drones action against our foes; reaction affecting us.Fabiusmaximus.com.[online].Available: http://fabiusmaximus.com/2011/ 09/28/29263/.Last accessed 17 March 2015.Woods, C. (2015).Sudden Justice: America's Secret Drone Wars.London: C Hurst & Co. -------------------------------------------------- London: Remote Control project, 2016, (January), 21 [cit.2016-05-23].Available from:: http://remotecontrolproject.org/press- release-civilian-drones-at-risk-of-being-used-by-terrorist-and-other- hostile-groups-stricter-regulation-and-countermeasures-needed-new- report-finds/ [4] Rosen, Armin.Here's Hezbollah's game-changing secret drone base.Business insider [online].2015 [cited 2016-05-23].Available from: http://www.businessinsider.com/hezbollahs-secret-drone-base-2015-4 [5] Hoenig, Milton.Hezbollah and the Use of Drones as a Weapon of Terror- ism.Public Interest Report [online].2014, 67(2), 5 [cited 2016-05-23].Available from: https://fas.org/wp-content/../Hezbollah-Drones-Spring- 2014.pdf 202 M. Hutter, R. S(cid:6)urek [6] Hubbard Ben.Syrian Fighting Gives Hezbollah New but Diffuse Purpose.The New York Times, May 20, 2014.[7] Newman Marissa.Jets scrambled after Hamas launches drone over Ga- za.The times of Israel [online].2014 [cited 2016-05-23]. -------------------------------------------------- These names, both famous and little-known, join the dramatis personae of defense secretaries, chiefs of staff, officials, and leading members of Congress who grappled with the promise and problems of UAVs for some 40 years.Then there were the operators.Strategic Air Command used the popular Lightning Bug for years to probe Chinese air defenses and to gather reconnais- sance.The drones flew thousands of missions over Southeast Asia."It is tempting to speculate about the number of pilot's lives saved by flying drones, and there arguably were some," writes Ehrhard.However, the re- ality was that "manned reconnaissance aircraft simply would not have been sent into the areas (like Hanoi dur- 2 2 Air Force UAVs: The Secret History ing Linebacker II) covered by the drones and certainly would not have conducted decoy or missile electronics intelligence missions described earlier," he concludes.Of course, unmanned vehicles had technical and operational challenges, as Ehrhard documents. -------------------------------------------------- The seminal 1946 RAND Corporation report titled Preliminary Design of an Ex- perimental World Circling Spaceship long before had spurred interest in possible satellites, and each of the armed services (save the Marine Corps) pursued satel- lite technology throughout the 1950s.The Soviet Sput- nik, the first earth-orbiting satellite, shocked the US on Oct. 4, 1957, causing the first significant increase in the pace of satellite development.Eisenhowers prom- ise to never again overfly the Soviet Union led to an acceleration of satellite work.The first working Corona surveillance satellite, Discoverer 14, flew just more than three months after the U-2 incident.19 Competition between the three modes of strate- gic reconnaissancedrones, satellites, and manned aircraftcontinues to this day.Drones lost all the early battles.Red Wagon en- joyed Air Force support.However, the aircraft, while small, was not cheap.The members of the Air Staff, led by the Chief of Staff, Gen. Curtis LeMay, approved a $70 million ($417 million in FY10 dollars) contract for Red Wagon and sent it with their full support to Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatrick. -------------------------------------------------- He approved the project, as did the CIA.20 Despite this lineup of sup- port, Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, used his veto power to hold up funds for Red Wagon.Brown wanted to keep all airborne recon- naissance money focused on the Oxcart project, which had received a $96 million contract in early 1960.21 Over the Air Forces objection, Brown prevailed.Red Wagon was soon cancelled, winning the dubious honor of being the first of many UAV projects that could not compete with a manned aircraft or satellites.22 n Fire Fly Like many innovations, the drone had formidable, seasoned competitors.There was a way to skirt com- 6 6 Air Force UAVs: The Secret History Above: AQM-34M remotely piloted aircraft in flight.Below: Closeup of a veteran AQM-34 RPA showing symbols of past missions.commander of Tactical Air Command (TAC) stated that he wanted no part of unmanned aircraft, according to the lead briefer.26 The team was turned down by sev- eral SAC agencies before they tried an 11th-hour pitch to the SAC director of operations, Maj. Gen. William H. Butch Blanchard. -------------------------------------------------- The SA-2 threat over Cuba was serious, and the tiny, two-air vehicle Fire Fly force at Holloman AFB, N.M., now on 72-hour opera- tional alert, got the call to deploy to Tyndall AFB, Fla. for a short-notice mission.Lloyd Ryan, then an Air Force colonel and drone proponent, recalls that NRO chief Dr. Joseph V. Charyk (also an undersecretary of the Air Force) pushed hard to use Fire Fly for photo recon- naissance over Cuba.28 On Charyks orders, the drones were loaded, programmed, and the GC-130 mother- ship was taxiing to the end of the Tyndall runway when the mission was aborted.The mission was stopped because, ironically, the Air Force did not want to tip the Soviet Union to the presence of this super-secret capability.Ryan remem- bers that he went looking for Air Force Chief of Staff Dr. Joseph V. Charyk, National Reconnaissance Office director (September 1961-March 1963).Gen. Curtis E. LeMay to kill the flight.The Air Force side did not want to use drones in Cuba, Ryan said and added, We only had two, and we had great visions of greater potential elsewhere [over the Soviet Union].29 This was a highly classified project and the exposure of the drone program over Cuba could have given the Soviets advanced warning of its capability. -------------------------------------------------- When Ryan found LeMay, they marched over to Charyks office.LeMay unceremoniously threw out the Commander- in-Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), Gen. Thomas S. Power, who was conducting a briefing at the time, and the three of them had an impromptu meeting.Ryan remembers, LeMay flat out told the un- dersecretary, not only, No, but Hell, no.30 The flight was scrubbed, and the first real chance for reconnais- sance drones to prove themselves went by the boards.Although drone proponents killed the flight over Cuba with help from the cigar-champing LeMay, An- dersons U-2 shootdown led directly to another ex- pansion of the drone reconnaissance program.31 The NRO inked a contract for seven new high altitude re- connaissance vehicles, designated model 147B.The B model was still a derivation from the hardy Firebee target drone, but had a 62,500-foot operating altitude, 10,000 feet higher than the A model due to a larger wing. -------------------------------------------------- This not only included picking up the radar tracking fre- quencies, but also characterizing the terminal track- ing and warhead arming and fuzing signals.Here was a mission manned aviation simply could not dothe drone offered up its life to get the electronic informa- tion, which was beamed in real time radio waves to a ship or plane out of harms way.By December 1962, the model 147D was declared operational for picking up SA-2 guidance and fuzing information from missiles stationed in Cuba.33 The contractor and the Air Forces Big Safari proved that they could react quickly to these special requests, but once again diplomatic events overcame their engineering and management dexterity.The Sovi- ets stopped firing SA-2s from Cuba just as the system became operational, and the 147D models ended up reconfigured as reconnaissance drones.34 n lightning Bug In March 1963, the still top secret program name, Fire Fly, was compromised and renamed Lightning Bug. -------------------------------------------------- Lightning Bug drones were still a secret Cold War capability, however, and went on 72-hour deployment alert out of Davis-Monthan AFB, Ariz. in July 1963 as part of the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing (SAC).35 This innocuous though highly-secret program seemed to have just missed its chance in the Cu- ban Missile Crisis.Several independent variables still 8 8 Air Force UAVs: The Secret History worked in the drones favor, however.The technologi- cal immaturity and cost of US reconnaissance satel- lites, the political sensitivity to manned reconnaissance due to the lingering effects of the Powers shootdown, and the rise of China as a nuclear power stimulated another resurgence of interest in unmanned recon- naissance aircraft.Fire Fly was an immature but pio- neering system that led to four interesting Air Force- operated UAVs from the black world of the Cold War intelligence community.Although Lightning Bug missed out in Cuba, the Tonkin Gulf incident of 1964 sparked a major opera- tional deployment for the NRO drone program. -------------------------------------------------- Beck kept the operation alive with an infusion of new air vehicles, and brought in the 4080th SRW commander, Col. John A.Des Portes, to personally oversee the program.Urgency was injected into the mission when China detonated its first nuclear device in the middle of October.40 After some well-need- ed oversight, Blue Springs moved to Vietnam in Octo- ber 1964 to concentrate on the emerging problems in that country and to get a better operational vector to sites in China.SACs attention and the natural learning curve helped resurrect Blue Springs as a viable reconnais- sance capability, despite the growing air defense threat.41 China had minor success shooting down this robot intruder but, unlike the Powers incident, it did not seem to matter politically.The first US drone shot down over China on Nov. 15, 1964 made the front page of the New York Times, but created little controversy.The slim article did little more than parrot Chinese pronouncements, while US officials said they were baf- fled by the charge of aerial intrusion.42 This particular sortie was later revealed as a deliberate attempt to exercise Chinese air defenses to collect intelligence on intercept methods, demonstrating the confidence US officials had in the benign political impact of drones compared to their manned counterparts.43 When the top secret US drone operation was unmasked two days later by an intrepid journalist, the response was again muted, lacking even the usual Soviet objections.44 Within a year, with its operations now becoming old news, the drone unit flew 160 Lightning Bug sor- ties in 1965-66.45 The Blue Springs operation proved to be an invaluable shakedown for drone operations that benefited from SACs stiff operational standards, expert contractor maintenance, and the strong man- date to monitor Chinese military operations without creating an international incident. -------------------------------------------------- The ex- otic D-21 drone looked like a mini-SR-71 with a single ramjet dominating its central axis.Forty feet long and more stealthy than the SR-71, the D-21 was designed to cruise at Mach 4 and 100,000 feet, guided by a stellar-inertial navigation system and fully autonomous flight controls.49 Upon return from a mission, the D-21 would slow from its Mach 4 operating speed to Mach A Mitchell Institute Study 9 9 1.6, drop its guidance package, avionics, camera, and film in a capsule and the airframe would self-destruct on command from a special JC-130 Hercules in the recovery area.50 The then-Secretary of the Air Force was Harold Brown, the person who blocked Red Wagon as a DOD executive in 1961.However, Brown enthusiastically sup- ported the D-21.51 The CIA jumped onboard in 1963 de- spite Congressional pressure questioning its expand- ing air and space forces and agreed to share funding and operational tasking with the Air Force through the NRO. -------------------------------------------------- Thus the top-secret projectdubbed Tagboard began with a $31 million cost ($189 million in FY10 dollars) for 50 airframes.Industry insiders pegged the program as escalating to almost 10 times that figure over the intervening years even though production dipped to only 33 air vehicles, bringing the program to nearly $1.7 billion in constant FY10 dollars.52 Like the other national reconnaissance drones, Tagboard was not just classified, it was a compartmentalized NRO program so secret that even Skunk Works engineers working in the Fort Knox-like SR-71 assembly building were restricted from viewing the D-21 by a hangar bulkhead dubbed Berlin Wall West.53 Launch and recovery loomed as daunting engi- neering obstacles.The D-21s ramjet required speeds over Mach 2 just to gain enough air compression to achieve engine start, so the plan called for launch from a specially configured A-12 (the CIA version of the Air Forces SR-71) mothership called the M-12.54 John- son called supersonic launch of the D-21 the most dangerous maneuver in any airplane that Ive ever worked on.55 Autonomous navigation over its phe- nomenal 3,000 nautical mile range only added to the engineering challenge. -------------------------------------------------- The first D-21 test launch was scheduled for Kelly Johnsons birthday, Feb. 27, 1965, but developmental problems delayed the launch more than one year.The first three tests went well, but the fourth, held on July 30, 1966, ended in a catastrophe.At launch the drone rolled into the M-12, causing a col- lision at 80,000 feet and Mach 3 that took out most of the M-12s right wing, rudder, and engine nacelle.It plunged earthward, the fuselage broke apart, and the crew ejected.Both pilot and drone operator survived ejection and landed in the ocean off California, but the backseater drowned before rescue helicopters ar- rived.A distraught Kelly Johnson unilaterally canceled the program and returned all developmental money to the NRO.56 High government officials wanted the drone, how- ever, and persuaded Lockheed to try a new approach.China had already conducted its first nuclear test, a 22-kiloton explosion at Lop Nor on Oct. 16, 1964.The first weaponized nuclear test came quickly with a 40-ki- loton bomb dropped from an H-6 (Chinese version of the Soviet Tu-16) bomber on May 14, 1965.57 In De- cember 1966, Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance authorized a redesign of the drone (now called the D-21B), which would be launched from a specially configured B-52H. -------------------------------------------------- Exacerbating that fact was an even more ominous, unmanned competitor the satellite.During this period, the NRO was rapidly improv- ing its satellite reconnaissance capabilities.Like the drone, reconnaissance satellites lacked the political sensitivities associated with manned reconnaissance overflights.Furthermore, unlike the drone, satellites violated no international norm or law.With the new US promise to desist from all aircraft overflight of China, the low-profile nature of US drone operations turned into a political disadvantage.n compass arrow Another outlandish UAV system designed for re- connaissance operations over China was the project called Lone Eagle, later renamed Compass Arrow.10 10 Air Force UAVs: The Secret History Perhaps the key point about Compass Arrow is that it represents the only true follow-on UAV ever produced by the US.SAC wanted the completely new Compass Arrow to take over for the high altitude modified Light- ning Bug drone that had proved vulnerable to enemy missiles.68 The new design incorporated such highly sophisticated technologies that a SAC reconnaissance historian said it represented a revolutionary develop- ment in the evolution of the special purpose aircraft.69 Officials at Air Force Systems Command, which represented the normal or white world of the Air Force acquisition system, had become so enthusiastic about the growth potential for drone reconnaissance that they attempted to wrest drone development from the NRO and the special acquisition arrangement with Air Force Logistics Commands Big Safari office. -------------------------------------------------- It was built to do the job right, but the price was too high even for the NRO.Although the silver bullet nature of the Lightning Bug drone program had resulted in high unit costs, standard acquisition practices proved even less effi- D-21 drone carried aloft by its mothership, a specially configured A-12, redesignated M-12 (also referred to as M-21).cient.Like the D-21, Compass Arrow was built for the trip to Lop Nor, and its capability goals were high.The challenges of autonomous flight at the required alti- tudes (80,000 feet) and distances pushed the state- of-the-art and the program quickly exceeded its budget and projected operational date.The original develop- ment program was bid at $35 million, but contractors later admitted they knew actual costs would be much higher.A company publication explained the huge cost escalation experienced by the program by saying, The 154 [the company designation for Compass Arrow] was a victim of too much optimism in the heat of a very tough competition to get the business.72 Only one year after the contract was awarded, the NRO cut the pro- duction number from 100 to a lean 20 airframes.73 Ryan deliberately under-bid to get the job, counting on the support of the highly secretive NRO community to bail them out when the inevitable escalation occurred. -------------------------------------------------- With the rise of the satellite, the NRO, which had played the rich uncle for drones through- out the Vietnam War, now handed to the Air Force the responsibility for development of future long range re- connaissance drones.The Soviet threat still loomed large, however.New and more deadly Soviet weapons posed major dangers that episodic satellite coverage could not adequately address.Furthermore, the rise of stealth technology and the increasing sophistication of communications and sensor electronics (all based on the meteoric rise 12 12 Air Force UAVs: The Secret History in microprocessor-based computing power) combined to give the national reconnaissance UAV new life in the 1980s.Ultimately, it took a change in presidential ad- ministrations to turn these trends into an actual UAV programa program that lasted for more than 15 years and remained secret for a long time afterward.n advanced airborne reconnaissance sys- tem The stealthy, very high-altitude, intercontinental range UAV, known as the Advanced Airborne Recon- naissance System (AARS), was one of the grandest UAV conceptions ever. -------------------------------------------------- The catalyst for a persistent, survivable airborne surveillance capability came from a new presidential administration.100 Ronald Reagan was swept into of- fice in the 1980 election by promising to restore US military strength.Reagans intelligence transition team perceived a number of shortfalls in US technical in- telligence collection, airborne surveillance being one of them.101 Author John Ranelagh got access to the teams top secret report for his book The Agency, and noted that the extra $1.5 billion per year they recom- mended be added to the NRO budget included develop- ment of a long-endurance (up to two days), high alti- tude reconnaissance aircraft. The report added, re- motely piloted vehicles (RPVs), possibly using stealth technology, should be reviewed for ... strategic intelli- gence collection.102 The extra cash infusion into black portions of the Air Force budget provided developmental elbow room, or slack fundsvirtually the same environment in which the Lightning Bug drones flourished during the Vietnam War. -------------------------------------------------- 24 24 Air Force UAVs: The Secret History As the United States involvement in Vietnam grew, the Lightning Bugs mission composition changed from exclusively national intelligence to incorporate tactical missions requested by combatant commands.In these roles, Air Force drone operators reached the third stage of weapon system innovation, achieving combat effectiveness by using the drones unique capabilities.This was the first such operational breakthrough for UAVs in combat.The following narrative highlights this important UAV story, picking up Lightning Bug opera- tions as they moved to Vietnam from Okinawa in 1964. n lightning Bugs as Bait Drone operations in the Vietnam War proved to be a valuable complement to Air Force manned tactical reconnaissance assets, providing information imprac- tical to get using manned platforms.Although the vast majority of combat drone flights involved photographic reconnaissance in denied areas, SAC also used the drones for various novel missions suited to the drones unique capabilities, as demonstrated by the next ex- ample. -------------------------------------------------- The answer: send in the drone.In response to this need, the CIA developed an electronics package that could record the SA-2s transmissions as it fuzed and exploded.The Big Safari office had the contractor squeeze this special payload into a large-model Lightning Bug ELINT drone.The em- ployment concept was the same as that developed for the SA-2 threat over Cuba in 1963the drone would take a direct hit from a missile while its data link trans- mitted the terminal firing data to a manned aircraft loitering a safe distance away.On Feb. 13, 1966, the specially configured drone picked up good SA-2 fuzing, guidance, and overpres- sure data that allowed US electronics experts to build jammers that would throw off the missile.As the mis- sile blasted it from the sky, the drone transmitted the SA-2s terminal emissions to a standoff aircraft (an EB- 66 Destroyer).The electronic take was so important that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Dr. Eugene G. Fubini, called this mis- sion the most significant contribution to electronic re- connaissance in the last 20 years.212 Later that year, another specially converted drone flew over North Viet- nam with a new Navy electronic defensive pod to test its utility against the actual threat, and the drone drew more than 10 missiles before it was brought down, confirming the pods ability to spoof the missile.213 As the electronic battle of countermeasures and counter- countermeasures continued to escalate, airmen could always sacrifice a drone to help keep their jamming equipment up to date.214 Another sacrificial drone mission deserves men- tion because of its historical significance. -------------------------------------------------- Cloud ceilings kept manned recon- naissance aircraft such as the RF-101 Voodoo and the RF-4 Phantom grounded due to the greater exposure A Mitchell Institute Study 25 25 to enemy ground fire at low altitude.217 Consequently, American forces got very little reconnaissance imag- ery during the lengthy monsoon season in Southeast Asia.To solve that problem, Ryan turned to Lightning Bug.The technical problems confronting the Lightning Bug team were not trivial.Big Safaris contractor had to figure out how to reliably fly the drone at altitudes less than 2,000 feet over varying terrain and attain much greater navigational accuracy.Because they had a basically sound airframe and worked with little oversight due to the secret nature of the program, the modification crew went from concept to combat in just over six months.Having solved most of the problems with low altitude control by incorporating a barometric altimeter into the flight control system (navigation improvements came later), the low altitude 147J model flew its first operational mission in the spring of 1966.218 This flight was the first foray into what would become its dominant mission profile as the high altitude regime became too lethal. -------------------------------------------------- TAC absorbed the brunt of wartime operations, which caused fighter commanders to push for various SAC resources which were dedicated to the thermo-nuclear de- terrence mission.The combat experience gained by fighter pilots in the war provided them elevated warrior status, which in turn led to increasing as- sertiveness and ultimately, their successful bid for Boeings high-altitude, long-endurance Condor UAV did not enter operational service but was important as a technology testbed.26 26 Air Force UAVs: The Secret History service hegemony.225 The struggle for control over drone operations played out within this larger ser- vice context.The tension between SAC, which operated the drones, and TAC, which assumed most of the risk against North Vietnamese air defenses, was evident as early as 1966.The commander of Pacific Air Forc- es (a TAC position) demanded organic reconnaissance drone capability and received permission to stand up a drone unit in April 1967 to gain elbow room in the upcoming turf battle.226 The Air Staff in the Pentagon changed the drone units mission to chaff delivery and radar jamming, essentially an electronic countermea- sures (ECM) mission. -------------------------------------------------- Furthermore, because drone operations were so heavily supported and electroni- Air Force UAVs: The Secret History 28 28 cally limited, very few sorties could be generated, re- sulting in manned aircraft assuming the bulk of the re- connaissance load.The payback was reconnaissance effectiveness, not lives saved.At the zenith of drone operations in December 1972, the Air Force depended almost entirely on them for bomb damage assessment due to bad weather.If a drone failed to return, SAC just launched another one on the target.In the new age of sophisticated, radar- guided air defenses, the low altitude Buffalo Hunter was a remarkably effective response that helped maintain battlefield awareness over lethal areas in the worst weather.Drones occupied a small but very important niche in reconnaissance operations in Vietnam, and as that conflict wore down, the Air Force turned its atten- tion to resolving the smoldering SAC-TAC battle over control of drone operations and the larger problem of transitioning drones to exclusive Air Force-control. -------------------------------------------------- n The rise and Fall of air Force uaVs This section covers a pivotal time in Air Force UAV history.In the first few years of the 1970s, Lightning Bug drones worked the skies over Vietnam and Ko- rea, having evolved into a fairly reliable, highly secret element of the US tactical airborne reconnaissance system.Air Force leaders supported, expanded, and even fought over the drones, but their gaze soon shift- ed to the Soviet threat in Europe.That shift changed operational requirements for remotely piloted vehicle systems in a monumental way.250 The fact that the Air Force considered making RPVs a substantial part of its core combat capability speaks to the relative tech- nological aggressiveness of Air Force leadership and its feudal arrangement during this decade.As we see, however, that aggressiveness did not translate into op- erational systems.RPVs failed to make the transfer from Vietnam to the much more demanding European theater and simply cost too much for the limited capability they pro- vided in that environment. -------------------------------------------------- The first was Chief of Staff Ryan, who had been extremely skeptical of drones when he first took over as CINCSAC in December 1964.262 LeMay, the cigar- champing bomber pilot who had built SAC into a pow- erful institution, ordered Ryan, his new vice CINC, to become familiar with highly secret drones, to see them up-close, to touch them.To comply, Ryan flew his jet to Eglin AFB, Fla., marched off the plane, touched a Light- ning Bug drone sitting in its cloistered hangar and said, There, I touched that little son-of-a-bitch, now I can go home. He marched back on his plane and flew back to Omaha.263 Over Ryans time at SAC, however, Lightning Bug operations became more reliable and important to Air Force operations in the Vietnam War.His interest in drones undoubtedly increased when he left SAC to become the commander in chief of Pacific Air Forces in 1967, right during the transition to low-level operations.Ryan became a believer during those two assign- ments, for as Air Force Chief of Staff from August 1969 through July 1973, he directed an amazing expansion of RPV activity. -------------------------------------------------- From 1966 to 1968, he served as assistant to 30 30 Air Force UAVs: The Secret History the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; JCS exercised con- trol over national drone reconnaissance assets being operated by SAC.After that, he went to Vietnam as the commander of 7th Air Force, where he managed the transition of the highly secret drone mission to a low-altitude, tactical reconnaissance mode.In 1970, only months after the release of the RAND/Systems Command report, Brown assumed the leadership of Air Force Systems Command, where he presided over an impressive expansion in Air Force drone develop- ment before taking over the Air Forces top position from Ryan in August 1973.By 1974, the Air Force RPV research and development request was almost $40 million, 97 percent of the total armed services and DARPA submission for that year.268 Although both Chiefs of Staff exerted top-down influence in the process, the main engine of UAV devel- opment came from the internal tension between SAC and TAC. -------------------------------------------------- Within two years, during a period of severe post-Vietnam War budget cutbacks, the program suffered several untimely test losses related to parachute recovery, a method never favored by TAC planners due to the difficult air environ- ment they forecast for a major war in Europe.322 Af- ter TAC became the Air Forces single RPV manager in 1976, they immediately pursued a ground launch and airbag recovery system (instead of being hooked in mid-air by helicopters, the drone parachuted to the ground and the impact was attenuated by inflatable bags).323 The concepts of operations for this system seemed even more unlikely for an air-centric organi- zation, for it involved the formation of ground launch crews and some sort of ground recovery vehicle to re- turn the RPV to a launch site.Through various exercises and tests, the opera- tional challenges of operating drones in Europe be- came clear.In particular, TAC drone operators flew as part of the Coronet Thor exercise in Germany to test 34 34 Air Force UAVs: The Secret History the viability of various data-linked sensors. -------------------------------------------------- The consistent cost overruns experienced by ev- ery single drone program seem odd, since affordability was supposed to be their key advantage.One reason for the failure of Air Force RPVs was the normaliza- tion of RPV acquisition after Big Safari.Although the piecework and heavy contractor manning used in the black, quick reaction Big Safari program had its ineffi- ciencies, these began to appear small after RPV acqui- sition joined the real Air Force in 1970.344 Whereas the NRO traded money (of which they had a seemingly endless supply) for time, the Air Force tried to save money.Whereas the TAC chaff-dispensing drone (de- veloped by Big Safari) was developed in 12 months and the reliable Combat Dawn SIGINT drones were tested and deployed in four months (at great expense), improved Buffalo Hunter drones developed through 36 36 Air Force UAVs: The Secret History normal acquisition channels took about five years to reach Vietnam, too late to make an impact. -------------------------------------------------- The outcome was even more radi- cal than the latter vision suggests.42 42 Air Force UAVs: The Secret History in summary This study began by quoting the 1956 statement of an Air Force officer, Maj. Gen. David H. Baker, fore- casting the demise of manned combat aircraft.Yet, some 35 years later, the Air Force had operated only one UAV system in combat.The general did go on to say, We cannot predict the time at which this [the re- placement of manned with unmanned] will happen.In the interim we must continue to advance as rapidly as possible in the quality of our manned aircraft.405 With regard to UAVs (the Air Force was pursuing ballistic and cruise missiles), that statementmore than the one which preceded itcharacterized the Air Force of the intervening years.In 1970, a major Air Force study with the charter of looking 15 years into the future concluded that drones would supplement and, in some cases, supplant manned aircraft in all the traditional missions of the tactical Air Forces.406 Yet, by the 1985 target date of the study, the Air Force possessed no operational UAVs and had only recently been cajoled into joining a Navy-initiated effort to mod- ernize a UAV system SAC proved in combat some 20 years prior. -------------------------------------------------- 44 44 Air Force UAVs: The Secret History to develop a system lacking any principled standard of efficiency.The cost of the Lightning Bug program far outweighed its military effectiveness, and in the open, competitive environment in which the services develop and procure weapon systems, the drones could not hope to survive.The NRO acted, for all practical pur- poses, as a risk-taking surrogate for the Air Force, but technology simply failed to support its experiment.Their operational shortcomings were too apparent in the strategic shift to the European theater that oc- curred after the Vietnam War, and all the Air Forces efforts to find remedies fell short.Furthermore, knowl- edge and understanding of UAV operations was con- fined to a few very high-level officials and specialized SAC crews, contributing to the weak internal constitu- ency within TAC that withered with test flight crashes and the overwhelming evidence of the UAVs operation- al problems. -------------------------------------------------- Their aggressive advocacy of high-altitude UAV projects at the expense of legacy systems gained them the ire of the other services, Lockheed (maker of the U-2), and eventually Congress.483 Both Lynn and Israel were merely echoing the sentiments of forward- looking Secretary of Defense Perry.Perry stated as far back as 1994 that between unmanned satellites and unmanned drones, piloted reconnaissance airplanes will be squeezed out within the next five to 10 years.484 The Secretary of Defense, key OSD executives, the lead service Chief of Staff, and the director of DARO all agreed that high-altitude UAVs like Global Hawk were the immediate future of reconnaissance and surveil- lance, but Congress did not.There ensued furious lobbying, pitting Global Hawk against the U-2 for the small, hotly contested aerial reconnaissance budget.Lt. Gen. Buster C. Glos- son, USAF (Ret.), a key figure in Gulf War air opera- tions, said in 1996 that a major stumbling block to success for both high-altitude UAV projects was too much help ... from Congressional U-2 mafias.485 The aggressive campaign by Perry, Fogleman, and Israel to replace the U-2 was reportedly one of the reasons Congress killed DARO in 1998.486 Even though the Air Force had stepped forward to stimulate a tran- sition from manned to unmanned reconnaissance, the resistance by powerful defense contractors and Congress demonstrated the way in which entrenched manned aircraft advocates could obstruct UAV devel- opment. -------------------------------------------------- The meteoric rise and fall of centralized UAV management provided strong evi- dence that pluralism and untidiness indeed may be the only way for the US military to achieve weapon system innovation with the UAV.A Mitchell Institute Study 57 57 air Force uaVs: The secret history notes 1.Maj. Gen. David Hodge Baker, quoted in the News and Comments section of Army, Navy, Air Force Register, Nov. 3, 1956: 6.2.The evolution of target drones started with the British Queen Bee in the mid-1930s, from which the term drone evolved.8.Program D, which acquired all the airborne reconnaissance programs such as the SR-71 and drones, was established in July 1962.Gerald Haines, The National Reconnaissance Office: Its Origins, Creation, and Early Years, Eye in the Sky: The Story of the Corona Spy Satellites, eds.Dwayne A.Day, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998) 151.3.Recall that UAVs possess characteristics so similar to manned aviation that they will inexorably improve as part of the aviation meta-system. -------------------------------------------------- Jeffrey T. Richelson, Americas Secret Eyes in Space: The US Keyhole Spy Satellite Program (New York: Harper & Row, 1990) 146 (photo).51.Brown saw it as a good way to deliver nuclear weapons as well, apparently upon suggestion by Kelly Johnson, who had proposed the drone for this role upon its design.Rich, 265, 23.52.The flight test phase of the Tagboard development program cost much more than production.Production slipped from 50 air vehicles to only 33 to stay inside the budget.53.Rich, 265.54.The D in D-21 stood for daughter while the M in M-12 stood for mother. The basic launch design for Tagboard probably evolved from the Convair proposal for Oxcart dubbed Fish that called for launch of a small, manned, ramjet-driven (Mach 4.2) vehicle by a supersonic B-58 Hustler.For references to that equally exotic program and Convairs Kingfish, the primary competitor to Lockheeds entry in the Oxcart program, see Johnson, 135 and Pedlow and Welzenbach, 264, 267-270, 291. -------------------------------------------------- Don Latham, assistant secretary of Defense for command, control, communications, and intelligence from 1981-88, wrote a fictitious scenario in which mobile SS-27 ICBMs are engaged by a US stealth bomber with onboard target recognition systems.He also described a high-altitude surveillance drone. Donald C. Latham, The Photon War, Armed Forces Journal International, February 1988: 48.135.A likely candidate for a program fitting Kiers description was a moderately stealthy (all-composite) high altitude German airframe called Egrett that was built in cooperation with a major American electronics firm.Egrett was an optionally piloted 55,000-foot loitering aircraft and went by the codename Senior Guardian.The aircraft was very successful in flight testing (the German program went by the name of LAPAS, for Luftgestutztes Abstandsfahiges Primar Aufklarungssystem) but was canceled by the German government in 1993 after they had promised an $800 million production contract. -------------------------------------------------- 153.Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century (1961; Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977) 371.154.William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, in the foreword to Goodwin, et al, Technology Transition.155.H. H. Bailey, Report of the Reconnaissance Panel Symposium on Remotely Piloted Vehicles (U), Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., WN-7054-PR, September 1970.163.The Army requirements were for an unattended aerial surveillance system and an elevated target acquisition system (ELTAS).AMCA Concept F6002, Elevated Target Acquisition System (ELTAS) (U), Alexandria, VA: US Army Advanced Materiel Concepts Agency (AMCA), April 29, 1971.164.Klass, Mini-RPVs Tested for Battlefield Use, 76.165.RPAODS competitors were Melpars E-35 (the RPV version of Melpars Axillary radar-homing drone) and the Philco-Ford Praeire II.US Army RPV Briefing to Maj. Gen. McAuliff (U), May 1974 (Sherwin Arculis personal files) 5. -------------------------------------------------- In 1970, the recovery success goal was raised to 98 percent after technical improvements, and recovery operations from 1972 to 1974 achieved 98.1 percent success.Briefing, Remotely Piloted Vehicles, Recovery History, Air Force Systems Command System Program Office (SPO), October 1974 (AFMC archives).68 68 Air Force UAVs: The Secret History 205.In a document declassified for this study, SAC historians explained the reliability improvements by noting the increase in learning by SAC planners with regard to route planning and MARS.They tended to fly the drones over populated areas when they noted the reluctance of North Vietnamese missile crews to shoot the large SA-2s due to collateral damage caused by expended rocket motors and warhead shrapnel.Also, drone programmers changed the flight path of the drone every 30 seconds because enemy Fan Song radars took that long to acquire target lock.SAC Reconnaissance History, January 1968-June 1971 (U), Offutt AFB, NE: History Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, Nov. 7, 1973: 37, 40-41. -------------------------------------------------- 206.Barry Miller, RPVs Provide US New Weapon Options, Aviation Week & Space Technology, Jan. 22, 1973: 39. less received the electronics 207.SAC countermeasures support they requested of TACs EB-66 unit, the 42nd Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron.Elder, 24. than half 208.Elder, 7.209.In addition, the in-theater intelligence analysis section forwarded the film to the US for analysis by other members of the intelligence community.Elder, 11.210.Robert F. Whitney, Hanoi is Building Sites for Missiles, New York Times, April 16, 1965: A1; Lon O. Nordeen Jr., Air Warfare in the Missile Age (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1985) 15.A very good study of the massive Soviet effort to develop the SA-2 can be found in Steven J. Zaloga, Soviet Air Defence Missiles: Design, Development, and Tactics (Surrey, England: Janes Information Group, 1989).211.Two days later an SA-2 shot down a drone as well.Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara did not allow US airmen to attack the SA-2 sites for fear of escalating the war. -------------------------------------------------- Wagner, 213.245.The treaty, signed on Jan. 13, 1973, stated, The United States shall cease immediately, completely, and indefinitely aerial reconnaissance over the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Nan Robertson, New Accord on Vietnam Calls for Halt Tomorrow on All Cease- Fire Violations, New York Times, Jan. 14, 1973: A18.However, when a complete bombing halt was enacted Jan. 15, 1973, a Pentagon spokesman also announced that drones would continue to conduct reconnaissance flights, as had become the custom in the bombing surges of previous years.The last drone sortie flying out of U-Tapao, Thailand flew over Saigon on April 30, 1975.Wagner, 198, 200.70 70 Air Force UAVs: The Secret History 246.As a historical note, the Air Force also operated an optionally piloted aircraft called Pave Eagle.When the North Vietnamese accelerated their use of the Ho Chi Minh trail, the Air Force developed the Igloo White remote sensor program to monitor trail activity. -------------------------------------------------- Ronald H. Huisken, The Origin of the Strategic Cruise Missile (New York: Praeger, 1981) 34-36.255.Secretary of the Air Force John L. McLucas added, however, that drones do not offer an escape from the demanding requirement for high reliability. McLucas, The Role of RPVs in the Air Force, Commanders Digest, Jan. 16, 1975: 12, 14, Air Force Plans Steady Growth in RPV Effort, Aerospace Daily, May 6, 1974: 1.256.Integrated circuits were developed in 1958, but expanded in complexity and shrunk in size until the first true microprocessor, which could function as the central processing unit for a computer, the Intel 4004 hit the market in 1971.Prior to that, the first standardized microprocessor, the PDP-10, produced in 1969 and used in many military systems, is considered by many to be a bellwether.257.Integrated circuits (microchips) allowed so-called full duplex data links, which maintained simultaneous communication between the ground station and the craft on the same frequency. -------------------------------------------------- Dougherty interview, Sept. 20, 1998.277.The 11th TDS continued in the Combat Angel ECM role, while the 22nd TDS took on the SAC reconnaissance drones from Vietnam.They both fell under the 432nd Tactical Drone Group at Davis-Monthan AFB, Ariz. Wagner, 104.278.The first two high-altitude, loitering UAV programs included the Combat Dawn ELINT drones, Compass Arrow, the ill-fated perfect drone, described earlier.271.PAVE STRIKE symbolized a rejuvenation of the tactical air forces after Vietnam and was stimulated by the 1973 Yom 279.SAC took operational responsibility for the program in 1970.SAC Reconnaissance History, January 1968-June 72 72 Air Force UAVs: The Secret History 1971 (U), Offutt AFB, Neb.: History Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, Nov. 7, 1973: 37, 116.280.New Drone Program, Aviation Week & Space Technology, Jan. 5, 1970: 22.281.High-altitude flight requires an increasingly complex engine configuration to achieve meaningful thrust. -------------------------------------------------- The Air Force persisted along this line, producing 74 74 Air Force UAVs: The Secret History strike drone prototypes used in major exercises and tests in 1974.In pristine desert conditions, the drones demonstrated acceptable performance, but exercises in Germany showed drone sensors to be inadequate and wing icing to be a major problem.Although many of these modifications were simply testbeds, an improved electronic countermeasures drone achieved operational status just prior to the Davis-Monthan Air Force Base drone group being disbanded in 1979.Lumpkin, 100-110; Wagner and Sloan, 98-104; Wagner, 180; Improved RPV Ready After 3 Years, Aviation Week & Space Technology, Feb. 6, 1978: 175-176.317.Lumpkin, 110.318.Lumpkin, 161-162; Remotely Piloted Vehicle Effort Pressed, Aviation Week & Space Technology, Feb. 6, 1978: 173 (the three advanced drones, from Northrop, Rockwell, and Boeing were pictured in this issue on pages 170, 175, and 176, respectively). -------------------------------------------------- The Air Force planned to buy 1,000 Boeing Pave Tiger mini-drones in 1983, but that program also failed to perform and stay within cost goals, so USAF attempted to cut the program several times.Congress continued to override the Air Forces wishes, funding the harassment drone through 1987, including an $80 million Boeing factory for Pave Tiger production.The program was finally cut in 1988.Benjamin F. Schemmer, US RPVs Back in Production as USAF Buys 1,000 Boeing Pave Tigers, Armed Forces Journal International, July 1983: 10; Congress Cuts Seek Spinner Drone Funding in Favor of Tacit Rainbow, AW&ST, Aug. 8, 1988: 19.366.Another very sophisticated, RPV-like program that failed in the 1980s was the Tacit Rainbow air-launched, battlefield loiter, radar-homing killer drone.Tacit Rainbow was a very secret, tri-service program that the Air Force planned to launch from B-52 rotary launchers, the Navy would drop from under-wing hardpoints on the A-6E Intruder, while the Army would employ its multiple launcher rocket system (MLRS). -------------------------------------------------- DATE q May 1988 COUNTRY USSR DATE OF- INFO.1985 , ...- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SUBJECT USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSOR: Aerial Reconnaissance in a Front Offensive Operation SOURCE Documentary Summary: The following report is a translation from Russian or the text of a lecture given at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy on the subject of aerial reconnaissance in a front offensive operation.After enumerating the tasks of reconnaissance, the paper describes in some detail the numbers of aircraft and drones available and the numer of reconnaissance sorties they can make.The remaining sections, one on organization and planning, and the other on actual conduct of reconnaissance are somewhat more general.End of Summary TS #8888-12 Copy # TOP SECRET TOF SECRET {.:011:97691 TOP SECRET lOP 5EIET WARNING NOTICI-INTBUGENCI SOUIQS 01 MITHODS INVOLVID r~T !ILWAI&I TO FOUION ~TIOHALSd \ Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 403g) Page 4 of 14 Pages Aerial Reconnaissance in a Front Offensive Operation Principles of preparation and conduct of front offensive operations and their support. -------------------------------------------------- TS #888412 Copy 1 __ .......,.... TOP SECRET .C011:97 691 TOP SECRET lGP SEEift WAIHINO NOTICI-IN'I'IWOIHCI SOUICIS 01 MltHODS JNVolym NOT RBIASAIU TO fOI80H NAnotw.Sj I \ Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 403g) Page 7 of 14 Pages The VR-2 provides aerial reconnais~ance in the face of strong opposition from enemy air defense and possible RBC contamination of the air and terrain.The c011plex includes the STRIZH reusable reconnaissance drone, the technical means of preparation of the drone for use, the means of preliminary preparation, recovery, and evacuation, the means of preflight preparation and launch, means of collecting, processing, and interpreting the aerial reconnaissance materials, and 111eans of processi~g navigational information and controlling the fight of the drone [illegible .].The drone flies at a speed of 1000-1100 km/hr. -------------------------------------------------- Correction of flight within visual contact is effected by signals or the (POLlE-N?]radio beacon, beyond visual contact bJ signals of the radiotechnical long-range .navigation system PROFIL'-2P.The third regime, manual control, is implemented in the event the onboard digital computer fails or the drone exceeds the acceptable departure from the desired flight profile [line illegible] recovery site.TS #888412 Copy 16,._ YeP SEERS TOP SECRET .C01197691 TOP SECRET WAINIHG NOTICI-INlaUGENCI souaas 01 MITHOOS !Nli'OLYEQ NOf llli.UAU 70 P01E10H NA 710tWSd \ Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 403g) Page 8 of 14 Pages The combat instruction, besides (2 words illegible] of the enemy and the combat task of the unit, can indicate the procedure for negotiating the enemy air defense, for cooperation with friendly air defense, the sortie rate, and the time and ethod for presenting reconnaissance data. -------------------------------------------------- NEWS GLENN GREENWALD VOICES DOCUMENTS STAFF ABOUT ARCHIVES NEWS The NSAs Secret Role in the U.S.Assassination Program By Jeremy Scahill and Glenn Greenwald 10 Feb 2014, 12:03 AM EST SHARE Facebook Google Twitter LinkedIn Email 590 ABOUT THE AUTHORS Jeremy Scahill Editor: Read more Glenn Greenwald Editor: Read more Credit: Kirsty Wigglesworth/Associated Press.T he National Security Agency is using complex analysis of electronic surveillance, rather than human intelligence, as the primary method to locate targets for lethal drone strikes an unreliable tactic that results in the deaths of innocent or unidentified people.According to a former drone operator for the militarys Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) who also worked with the NSA, the agency often identifies targets based on controversial metadata analysis and cell-phone tracking technologies.Rather than confirming a targets identity with operatives or informants on the ground, the CIA or the U.S. military then orders a strike based on the activity and location of the mobile phone a person is believed to be using. -------------------------------------------------- The drone operator, who agreed to discuss the top-secret programs on the condition of anonymity, was a member of JSOCs High Value Targeting task force, which is charged with identifying, capturing or killing terrorist suspects in Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan and elsewhere.His account is bolstered by top-secret NSA documents previously provided by whistleblower Edward Snowden.It is also supported by a former drone sensor operator with the U.S. Air Force, Brandon Bryant, who has become an outspoken critic of the lethal operations in which he was directly involved in Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen.In one tactic, the NSA geolocates the SIM card or handset of a suspected terrorists mobile phone, enabling the CIA and U.S. military to conduct night raids and drone strikes to kill or capture the individual in possession of the device.The former JSOC drone operator is adamant that the technology has been responsible for taking out terrorists and networks of people facilitating improvised explosive device attacks against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. -------------------------------------------------- It was always set to the most high-priority missions. I n addition to the GILGAMESH system used by JSOC, the CIA uses a similar NSA platform known as SHENANIGANS.The operation previously undisclosed utilizes a pod on aircraft that vacuums up massive amounts of data from any wireless routers, computers, smart phones or other electronic devices that are within range.One top-secret NSA document provided by Snowden is written by a SHENANIGANS operator who documents his March 2012 deployment to Oman, where the CIA has established a drone base.The operator describes how, from almost four miles in the air, he searched for communications devices believed to be used by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in neighboring Yemen.The mission was code named VICTORYDANCE.The VICTORYDANCE mission was a great experience, the operator writes.It was truly a joint interagency effort between CIA and NSA.Flights and targets were coordinated with both CIAers and NSAers.The mission lasted 6 months, during which 43 flights were flown. VICTORYDANCE, he adds, mapped the Wi-Fi fingerprint of nearly every major town in Yemen. The NSA has played an increasingly central role in drone killings over the past five years. -------------------------------------------------- In one top-secret NSA document from 2010, the head of the agencys Strategic Planning and Policy Division of the Counterterrorism Mission Management Center recounts the history of the NSAs involvement in Yemen.Shortly before President Obama took office, the document reveals, the agency began to shift analytic resources to focus on Yemen. In 2008, the NSA had only three analysts dedicated to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen.By the fall of 2009, it had 45 analysts, and the agency was producing high quality signal intelligence for the CIA and JSOC.In December 2009, utilizing the NSAs metadata collection programs, the Obama administration dramatically escalated U.S. drone and cruise missile strikes in Yemen.The first strike in the country known to be authorized by Obama targeted an alleged Al Qaeda camp in the southern village of al-Majala.The strike, which included the use of cluster bombs, resulted in the deaths of 14 women and 21 children.It is not clear whether the strike was based on metadata collection; the White House has never publicly explained the strike or the source of the faulty intelligence that led to the civilian fatalities. -------------------------------------------------- Another top-secret NSA document confirms that the agency played a key supporting role in the drone strike in September 2011 that killed U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaki, as well as another American, Samir Khan.According to the 2013 Congressional Budget Justification, The CIA tracked [Awlaki] for three weeks before a joint operation with the U.S. military killed the two Americans in Yemen, along with two other people.When Brandon Bryant left his Air Force squadron in April 2011, the unit was aiding JSOC in its hunt for the American- born cleric.The CIA took the lead in the hunt for Awlaki after JSOC tried and failed to kill him in the spring of 2011.According to Bryant, the NSAs expanded role in Yemen has only added to what he sees as the risk of fatal errors already evident in CIA operations.Theyre very non-discriminate with how they do things, as far as you can see their actions over in Pakistan and the devastation that theyve had there, Bryant says about the CIA.It feels like they tried to bring those same tactics they used over in Pakistan down to Yemen. -------------------------------------------------- Its a repeat of tactical thinking, instead of intelligent thinking. T hose within the system understand that the governments targeting tactics are fundamentally flawed.According to the former JSOC drone operator, instructors who oversee GILGAMESH training emphasize: This isnt a science.This is an art. Its kind of a way of saying that its not perfect. Yet the tracking pods mounted on the bottom of drones have facilitated thousands of capture or kill operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan since September 11.One top-secret NSA document provided by Snowden notes that by 2009, for the first time in the history of the U.S. Air Force, more pilots were trained to fly drones than conventional fighter aircraft, leading to a tipping point in U.S. military combat behavior in resorting to air strikes in areas of undeclared wars, such as Yemen and Pakistan.The document continues: Did you ever think you would see the day when the U.S. would be conducting combat operations in a country equipped with nuclear weapons without a boot on the ground or a pilot in the air? Even NSA operatives seem to recognize how profoundly the agencys tracking technology deviates from standard operating methods of war. -------------------------------------------------- The assassination complex: inside the governments secret drone warfare programme by Jeremy Scahill and the Staff of The Intercept Simon and Schuster: London; 2016; 256 pp.; ISBN 9781781257722 (paperback); RRP $22.99 Jeremy Scahill is a founding editor of the online news publication The Intercept and author of Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army and Dirty Wars: The World Is a Battlefield as a well as a docu - mentary movie of the same name.The Assas sination Complex is not so much a book as a collection of articles from several journalists at The Intercept and follows on from a recent expose titled The Drone Papers.As such, the narrative does not necessarily build from chapter to chapter and there is some degree of repetition.Edward Snowden has provided a foreword, and, to top and tail the book, Betsy Reed a preface and Glenn Greenwald an afterword.In all, it is a relatively easy to read book on a fascinating and topical subject. -------------------------------------------------- In addition, only an operator registration number can be associated to a drone/pilot position.No other data Is it considered that all public could capture the DRI unique number, but only security forces could link this number with specific personal data through databases?Yes that's correct.Our company is operating in Specific category.Article 40 - Requirements for UAS operated in the certified and specific categories except when conducted under a declaration, point 5 requires us to be equipped with Remote Identification.In slides you mentioned that specific category requires NRI.Where to find additional info for NRI and are you going to make workshop for NRI?The proposed secret content of the Operator ID does NOT protect from spoofing information by bad parties.Is there concern about theft of Operator ID by parties that have 'evil' intent?Drones operating under U-Space will be required to connect to a U-Space service provider using the NRI function.As the U- Space regulation is still under preparation the NRI function is not fully defined yet. -------------------------------------------------- Article 40(5) of regulation (EU) 2020/1058 introduces the requirement for the drone operating under the specific category to be equipped with at least one remote identification system.This might however be subject to revision.The purpose is not to protect against spoofing, but only to protect from the steel of the OPRN (as this number is openly broadcasted) Without the three secret characters, it is not possible to load the OPRN in the DRI (so you cannot load your neighbours OPRN instead of yours).Will there be a uniformity/norm of operator registration numbers (length)?Currently appears to be of varying lengths dependent on country.The unique UAS operator registration number issued by the Member States should consist of 16 alphanumeric characters, (see the presentation) Is this 2019/945 & 2019/975 applicable in Switzerland?The last information known was You are right.The addition of regulations 2019/945 and 2019/947 to the Annex of the 3 that FOCA (Swiss NAA) has not yet made their arrangement for the EU acceptance?, do you have any update? -------------------------------------------------- EU-CH air transport agreement will not take place before June.18 Question for Antonio: What is the purpose of the secret characters?Cant someone just guess them until the checksum matches and observed DRI if trying to spoof someone else?19 Where can we get prEN 4709-002 and how do we submit comments?The upload system in the drone will fail if the secret characters do not match.Draft standards are not freely available, for commenting, please contact your national standardization organization.You can find these here: https://standards.cen.eu/dyn/www/f?p=CEN WEB:5" .This link gives you more information on prEN 4709-002 already: https://standards.cen.eu/dyn/www/f?p=204:1 10:0::::FSP_PROJECT,FSP_ORG_ID:72429,6378 &cs=1CE12293FC0503061603281BB9AF6E697 20 21 22 23 24 Will this standard be using worldwide?Or is prepared just for EASA states?The standards being developed are European Harmonized standards.Will notified bodies use also 4709 to control the conformity? -------------------------------------------------- Alternatively, if they belong to Aviation Authorities, they may have access to registration database.This will depend on Member States decision.Each UA broadcasts both their own unique ID and their location.As the requirement from regulation EU 2019/945 has been established that DRI needs to be able to be received by commonly available smartphones there is only Wi-Fi or Bluetooth left as options The operator ID uses 3 'secret chars' that are used to calculate the checksum.Upon entry of the OperatorID, the checksum needs to correct, else the drone/add-on will not save the operator ID.30 Shall all drone support both WIFI (2.4 & 5.4) and Bluetooth?Why not only one type of broadcast instead of 3?You can use one of the types.Not all.5 31 WIFI/Bluetooth (2.4GHz) are compulsory?are there any current plans in order to designate a no ISM band for this purpose?32 Today in France we already have the digital signalling imposed by civil aviation.This system will have to be in addition?" -------------------------------------------------- 28 Jo Becker and Scott Shane, Secret Kill List Proves a Test of Obamas Principles and Will, The New York Times, May 29, 2012.29 Steven Ratner, Predator and Prey: Seizing and Killing Suspected Terrorists Abroad, Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 15, Number 3, 2007, pp.251-275.64 S. Krishnan so as well, resulting in a sort of international lawlessness that harms the interests of everyone.The use of drones may make everyone worse off.We have seen this dynamics before in the development of nuclear weapons technology during the Cold War.To put it briefly, the use of drones creates blowback that does more harm than good to US security.These objections do have some moral import because, if the use of drones is counterproductive, it will be a great waste of lives and resources.Were the GWOT a war in the morally relevant sense, the moral objections to this waste would be represented by its failure to satisfy the jus ad bellum principle that a war is just only if it has a reasonable chance of success.30 Supporters claim that drones are a morally valuable military technology, and three virtues of drones are often cited. -------------------------------------------------- For this a small, slow rotary winged aircraft is needed.For these tools a new name will appear in the near future - "Camcopters" [28][29].FIG.11.The Russian made S-100 UAV 5.SECURITY OR THREAT?Since the price of UAVs is dropping from month to month, and the home use of radio- controlled models are increasing, the illegal use of these "flying toys" is starting to be a real threat.There is no better proof than (1) the protected witness Gaspare Spatutstsa claimed that 25 years ago the mafia was researching methods about carrying explosives in the airspace.The leaders of the "Cosa Nostra" Sicilian criminal organization the Graviano clan (brothers Filippo and Giuseppe) [16] personally ordered to Spatutstsa to make radio- controlled models, which can carry a small amount of explosives to a "destination"; (2) the German secret service identified a terrorist network, who were planning attacks using drones, which would carry explosives in the air.Imagine, what effects can a special mini- missile, classified as a "surface-drone", cause. -------------------------------------------------- Priya Satia Drones: A History from the British Middle East During the presidency of George W. Bush, Defense Secretary Robert Gates launched a secret program that put hundreds of unmanned surveillance and attack aircraft into the skies over Iraq, Afghanistan, and later Pakistan.After Barack Obama came into ofce, drone use increased dramatically.He and Gates grew convinced that constant, ubiquitous drone surveillance coupled with airstrikes triggered remotely would solve U.S. tactical problems in these regions.The U.S. government has refused to share even the most basic information about drone use and attacks, but estimated gures for CIA-run strikes in Pakistan alone are about three hundred since Obama came into ofce, killing roughly three thousand individuals, including several hundred civilians.1 The fascination with technology that dominates most historical accounts of drones does not leave us any wiser about the uses to which they are being put or their likelihood of success in achieving their goals, for political and cultural factors have had a critical inuence on the invention of and response to policing by drones.2 I offer here a history of the tactical imagination behind drone surveillance, which at once illuminates the politics of their reception in the places in which they have been most heavily and controversially employed: Iraq and the region familiarly known as AfPak. Many critics of unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, focus on remote piloting as their most controversial quality, but as others, too, have pointed out, distancing tech- nologies have long been central to the history of warfare, invariably prompting fears of the ways in which they casualize violence.3 Certainly, drones remove aggressors entirely out of harms way, to an unprecedented distance, raising all kinds of questions about the place of martial values in American warfare. -------------------------------------------------- Hence Iraqi airspace has provided a corridor between Iran and Syria and Israel.53 The American public knows little of the debacle of negotiations surrounding these endgame details, just as it was told little about the hundreds of thousands of Iraqis killed during the eight-year war there.If discreet postimperial aerial control proved impossible in Iraq, it remains the American modus operandi elsewhere in the war on terrorism.Besides discretion, todays drone policing depends on active secrecy, to stie whatever trickle of critical opinion continues to emanate from the press at home, as much as abroad.Hence the CIAs dominance over so much of the activity.As in the British case, the program is the central piece of a more general expansion of state secrecy (including the NSAs secret surveillance of Americans, a crackdown on whistle- blowers, and the classication of unprecedented numbers of government documents) intended to keep questions about foreign policy in the hands of cloistered experts. -------------------------------------------------- Certainly, historians are not the only ones complaining about the mistaken faith in drone warfare.The UN Human Rights Council has condemned the U.S. failure to count and disclose, much less prevent, civilian casualties from drones.The ACLU has led a lawsuit over the CIAs refusal to conrm or deny the existence of the targeted killing program in Pakistan.Rights groups in general are incensed by civilian killings and the secrecy that precludes compilation of even remotely accurate casualty gures.108 Critics demand full disclosure and normalization of the program, but Satia: Drones: A History from the British Middle East 15 ................. 18514$ $CH1 01-10-14 07:30:33 PS PAGE 15 fulllment of such demands would be totally incompatible with the program; the whole purpose of air control is to provide a means of accomplishing unpopular tasks abroad in a time of mass democracy and anti-imperialism.Meanwhile, the American state has done exactly what the British state did when it found itself pressured to disclose details about aerial control: it has launched a public-relations campaign (including tours for scholars) that does not satisfy critics but that has successfully popularized the drone program as, on the whole, a very good thing, despite the damage it may do to democracy, relations with the Middle East, or the souls of the president and those who sit on the secret panel that devises the kill list.109 There is clear bipartisan consensus on the program, despite the countless legal objections to targeted assassinations and to the extension of the AUMF as the legal basis for todays drone strikes.110 History vs. -------------------------------------------------- Myth Here is where the history that I have related matters: drone warfare wont work, no matter how secret the American state succeeds in making it and no matter how distinct its missions might seem compared to British air control.The scheme will fail for all the same political reasons that British aerial control never stied insurgency and ended with a revolution that overthrew the Iraqi government that had tolerated the British presence.But history also works through memory: this chapter of aerial control stands even less chance of success because its victims recall too well lessons from the past, and they are working with a much more accurate version of history than our myth- consuming institutions have been.Societies, like Pakistan and Iraq, that experienced covert empire from the sky only a generation or two ago are wise enough to recognize the spuriousness of talk about their sovereignty and will continue to push back against even the subtlest hint of foreign intervention, thus making the security that is the alleged objective of the drone program a pipe dream. -------------------------------------------------- This is how state secrecy about aerial operations works and has worked historically: the secret is out, as it was to the British public in the 1920s, but without conrmation of details, the public is and was left to let its imagination run wild.Moreover, enduring belief in the unreliability of tribal informants and the incon- sistent quality of drone video feeds together cripple the claim that drone strikes are always precise; how can they be if they rely on inaccurate intelligence?118 If the American left has become ever more mistrustful of its government, as British liberals of the 1920s were of theirs, for Iraqis the wages of fear are even greater.Loss of Iraqi trust in in the United States may seem a small price to pay for the prots of surveillance, but Iraqis mistrust of their own government would seem to bankrupt the entire enterprise, if a stable Iraq is the genuine American goal.Iraqi politicians will accept [drone use in any form the United States wants], an Iraqi teacher reckons, because they are weak. After all, the eets presence was supposed to have been sanctioned by Iraqi ofcials, but all deny ever having been consulted.119 Simply put, the Iraqi government looks feeble, corrupt, and ineffectual, and the countrys claims to sovereignty laughable, when the sky is full of American drones and no sign of an Iraqi air force. -------------------------------------------------- Drones have undermined our grasp of this wisdom, engaging the United States in the futile task of beheading a hydra.Drones have replaced Guan- tanamo as the primary goad for recruitment to militant organizations and have made Guantanamo unnecessary with their take-no-prisoners approach.125 They make an exit strategy irrelevant.Indeed, if the thinness of the intruding presence stokes Iraqi and Pakistani suspicions of more substantive American control, it also leaves American ofcials and drone operators more susceptible to paranoid groupthink about move- ments and politics on the ground, making real and total withdrawal a permanent impossibility.That drones enable prolongation of the conict formerly known as the Global War on Terrorism is not lost on some elements of the public, much in the way that the radical back-benchers in the 1920s British Parliament and the editors of the Guardian knew that their government used airpower to engage in secret military activity in the Middle East whenever it liked.126 Drones today, like conventional aircraft then, make the decision to go to war easier. -------------------------------------------------- The USAF does not presume that in future conicts it will have the clear air superi- ority that has made drone warfare possible in the war on terror; rather, it is preparing for war in contested, degraded, and operationally limited combat zones.While we have yet to even begin our conversation about drone warfare, the USAF is moving on.We can have laws and rules, and we will want them in short order when China and Iran and the rest of the world turn drones loose, upsetting the simplistic norm of white-on-Middle Eastern use of drones.The administrations acknowledgment of the secret program in 2012 and the CIAs efforts to lower casualties, or at least count them in creative ways, show that even a secret agency can be responsive to public pressure.(As this essay goes to press, ofcials have announced the likely transfer of the CIA drone program to the Pentagonalthough, as I noted earlier, CIA involvement is only part of a more deeply historical problem.)Only intense public pressure can force lawmakers to have a conversation about what drones should be used for, as has been true of the limits we want to impose on other technologies, from computers to land mines. -------------------------------------------------- 3.See, for instance, David Bell, In Defense of Drones: A Historical Argument, New Republic, January 27, 2012.On distance and the dehumanization of victims, see Randall Collins, Violence: A Micro-Sociological Theory (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009).4.The global market for UAVs, some $6 billion a year, has also made for a bright spot in the American economy.See, e.g., Michael Hastings, The Rise of the Killer Drones: How America Goes to War in Secret, Rolling Stone, April 16, 2012; Future Is Assured for Death-Dealing, Life- Saving Drones, Guardian, August 3, 2012.See also Medea Benjamin, Drone Warfare: Killing by Remote Control (New York: OR Books, 2012), chap.2.5.In 1919, airpower was used to put down unrest in Egypt, Punjab, Somaliland, Afghanistan, and the North West Frontier.It was also used against the Red Army in South Russia.These were spasmodic, almost casual affairs. John Lafn, Swifter than Eagles: The Biography of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Maitland Salmond (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1964), 192. -------------------------------------------------- On Lawrences confusing views of violence and blood in Arabia, see Satia, Spies in Arabia, 163.75.PRO, AIR 8/94, F. H. Humphreys to Sir John Simon, December 15, 1932.76.Cited in Dexter Filkins, Tough New Tactics by U.S.Tighten Grip on Iraq Towns, New York Times, December 7, 2003.77.Secret Kill List Proves a Test of Obamas Principles and Will, New York Times, May 29, 2012.78.Glenn Greenwald, Militants: Media Propaganda, Salon, May 28, 2012, http://www .salon.com/2012/05/29/militants_media_propaganda/singleton (accessed August 3, 2013).79.Secret Kill List. See also Cora Currier, How the U.S.Decides [to] Drone-kill People When It Doesnt Know Who They Are, Informed Comment, March 2, 2013, http://www.juan cole.com/2013/03/decides-doesnt-currier.html (accessed August 3, 2013).80.See Deri, Costless War. 81.The Bureau of Investigative Journalism was so concerned about this excision of arguably the most important information about strikes that it refused permission for the Post to use its data in such reporting. -------------------------------------------------- 3: 7076; Wall and Monahan, Surveillance and Violence from Afar; Michael Boyle, Obamas Drone Wars and the Normalisation of Extra- judicial Murder, Guardian, June 11, 2012; Jane Mayer, The Predator War, New Yorker, October 26, 2009.125.Secret Kill List. 126.Satia, Spies in Arabia, 29495, 3013.127.Sam Biddle, Drones Mean the Iraq War Is Never Over, Gizmodo, October 21, 2011, http://gizmodo.com/5852228/drones-mean-the-iraq-war-is-never-over (accessed August 4, 2013).128.See also Deri, Costless War; Peter Singer, Do Drones Undermine Democracy? New York Times, January 21, 2012.129.Senator Ron Wyden, cited in CIA Controversies Scrutinized at Brennan Conrmation Hearing, Los Angeles Times, February 7, 2013; Steven Aftergood, Leak of White Paper Boosts Intelligence Oversight, FAS.org, February 11, 2013, https://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2013/02/ leak_boosts.html (accessed August 4, 2013).130.Juan Cole, Obama & Brennan Brought GOP Filibuster on Themselves by Extreme Secrecy on Drones, Informed Comment, March 8, 2013, http://www.juancole.com/2013/03/ brennan-libuster-themselves.html (accessed August 4, 2013). -------------------------------------------------- 131.Lev Grossman, Rise of the Drones: They Are Americas Global Fighting Machines.What Happens When They Are Unleashed at Home? Time, February 11, 2013, cover and 30.132.See my forthcoming book, Guns: The British Imperial State and the Industrial Revolution.133.Chris Woods, Drones: Barack Obamas Secret War, New Statesman, June 13, 2012.134.Emily Swanson, Opinion on Drones Depends on Whos Being Killed: Poll, Hufngton Post, February 15, 2013, http://www.hufngtonpost.com/2013/02/15/drones- opinion_n_2689813.html (accessed August 4, 2013).135.For Pakistan in 2012, see Obama 2012 Pakistan Strikes, Bureau of Investigative Jour- nalism, http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/01/11/obama-2012strikes (accessed August 4, 2013); U.S.Claims of No Civilian Deaths Are Untrue, Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 18, 2011, http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2011/07/18/washingtons-untru e-claims-no -civilian-deaths-in-pakistan-drone-strikes (accessed August 4, 2013). -------------------------------------------------- Drone Crash in Iran Reveals Secret U.S. Surveillance Bid - NYTimes.com Page 1 of 3 Reprints This copy is for your personal, noncommercial use only.You can order presentation-ready copies for distribution to your colleagues, clients or customers here or use the "Reprints" tool that appears next to any article.Visit www.nytreprints.com for samples and additional information.Order a reprint of this article now.December 7, 2011 Drone Crash in Iran Reveals Secret U.S. Surveillance Effort By SCOTT SHANE and DAVID E. SANGER WASHINGTON The stealth C.I.A.drone that crashed deep inside Iranian territory last week was part of a stepped-up surveillance program that has frequently sent the United States most hard-to-detect drone into the country to map suspected nuclear sites, according to foreign officials and American experts who have been briefed on the effort.Until this week, the high-altitude flights from bases in Afghanistan were among the most secret of many intelligence-collection efforts against Iran, and American officials refuse to discuss it. -------------------------------------------------- But the crash of the vehicle, which Iranian officials said occurred more than 140 miles from the border with Afghanistan, blew the programs cover.The overflights by the bat-winged RQ-170 Sentinel, built by Lockheed Martin and first glimpsed on an airfield in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in 2009, are part of an increasingly aggressive intelligence collection program aimed at Iran, current and former officials say.The urgency of the effort has been underscored by a recent public debate in Israel about whether time is running out for a military strike to slow Irans progress toward a nuclear weapon.In a recent speech, President Obamas national security adviser, Tom Donilon, hinted at secret efforts by the United States to keep watch on Irans nuclear program.We will continue to be vigilant, Mr. Donilon said last month at the Brookings Institution.We will work aggressively to detect any new nuclear-related efforts by Iran.We will expose them and force Iran to place them under international inspections. Iran said over the weekend that it had recovered the RQ-170, the same drone deployed over Osama bin Ladens compound before he was killed in May. -------------------------------------------------- Senior intelligence officials were disturbed that the drone was publicly discussed in the coverage of the Bin Laden raid, in part because of the fear of exposing its use over Iran.http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/08/world/middleeast/drone-crash-in-iran-reveals-secret-... 12/8/2011 Drone Crash in Iran Reveals Secret U.S. Surveillance Bid - NYTimes.com Page 2 of 3 A statement Sunday from the American-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan said Iran might have recovered an unarmed reconnaissance aircraft lost while flying a mission over western Afghanistan. But several experts noted that the stealth technology of the RQ-170 which greatly reduces the chances that the drone can be detected by radar had little use in western Afghanistan, because the Taliban have no radar to detect flights.Iranian officials have said that the aircraft was detected near the town of Kashmar, 140 miles from the Afghan border, and that it was shot down or crashed because its control systems were hacked by the Iranian military. -------------------------------------------------- Mr. Singer said that the most sought-after technology on the craft is probably its array of sensors, which may include sophisticated radar that is more advanced than anything Russia or China use currently.Dennis M. Gormley, a missile and drone expert at the University of Pittsburgh, said reverse- engineering the aircraft itself would be difficult even for a sophisticated military.Unless somebody put the engineering drawings in the U.A.V., he said, using the abbreviation for unmanned aerial vehicle, it wont be easy.In any complex piece of aviation equipment, you have to replicate the tolerances precisely. In Abbottabad, Pakistan, the RQ-170 was used to model the Bin Laden compound.In Iran, among other missions, it is looking for tunnels, underground facilities or other places where Iran could be building centrifuge parts or enrichment facilities.http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/08/world/middleeast/drone-crash-in-iran-reveals-secret-... 12/8/2011 Drone Crash in Iran Reveals Secret U.S. Surveillance Bid - NYTimes.com Page 3 of 3 One such site, outside Qum, was revealed by President Obama and the leaders of France and Britain in 2009, though it appears that Israel played a major role in detecting that site. -------------------------------------------------- News reports in South Korea in 2009 said the United States planned to base the RQ-170 drone there to fly surveillance missions over North Korea, whose nuclear and missile programs are a top American intelligence target.Scott Shane reported from Washington, and David E. Sanger from Boston.http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/08/world/middleeast/drone-crash-in-iran-reveals-secret-... 12/8/2011 -------------------------------------------------- DOUHET, G. 1921.Il dominio dellaria.Saggio sull'arte della guerra aerea.Roma, Stabilimento Poligrafico per lAmministrazione della Guerra; engl.trans.1942.The Command of the Air.New York, Coward-McCann.DUDZIAK, M. 2015, Targeted Killings and Secret Law: Drones and the Atrophy of Political Restraints on the War Power, In: D. Cortright, K. Wall, R. Fairhurst (eds), Drones and the Future of Armed Conflict: Ethical, Legal, and Strategic Implications, Chicago, Chicago University Press.ENEMARK, C. 2013.Armed Drones and the Ethics of War: Military Virtue in a Post-Heroic Age.London, Routledge.EVANGELISTA, M.; SHUE H. 2014.The American Way of Bombing: Changing Ethical and Legal Norms, from Flying Fortresses to Drones.Ithaca, Cornell University Press.GALLI, C. 2010.Genealogia della politica.Carl Schmitt e la crisi del pensiero politico.Bologna, il Mulino.GALLI, C. 2010.Political Spaces and Global War.Minneapolis, Minnesota University Press.GENTILIS, Alberici. -------------------------------------------------- Elyse: Well, thats quite a haul.Joe: A few months ago I started cleaning it and I noticed, a US navy anchor marking, contract number, part number, serial number.I found an antique propeller site on the internet, and the gentleman that ran the site said it could be from a World War II assault drone program.So, thats kind of what piqued my interest.Elyse: A drone program?Joe: Yeah, evidently a very secret program toward the end of World War II, that was run for a short time.Elyse: Today, unmanned drones such as the predator are cutting edge weapons in the US military arsenal.Well, wow.I mean, Ive heard of drones being used today, but nothing from World War II.Joe: I hadnt either.Elyse: What specifically do you want me to find out?Joe: Specifically, Id like to find out if this really was from a navy drone plane program at the end of World War II.Elyse: Okay.Well, definitely not my area.And I cant take it with me because its so heavy.So I think what Im going to do, Ill take some pictures of it, take some notes, and well leave it in your garage and Ill go do my research. -------------------------------------------------- Joe: That would be great.Elyse: The great thing about this, and the fascinating thing for me, is that theres a lot of information on this metal piece.It says, Koppers Company, Bartlett- Hayward, Baltimore, Maryland. Theres a serial number.Theres a part number.It says, Contract: NX-16-819. Lets see what I can find.This is fascinating.The navy started a pilot-less drone program called Project Option in the 1940s.The idea was to save pilots lives: create a remote-controlled plane, strapped with thousands of pounds of explosives, to perform bombing raids over Europe and Japan.The Navy had used pilotless planes for artillery practice, but now they wanted to use the technology for attack.They developed a top-secret partnership with David Sarnoff at RCA who was working on a revolutionary new invention, television.With a camera mounted in the nose of the drone, a pilot in a control plane following miles away could watch the target on a TV screen, turn a dial, and release the drones bombs. -------------------------------------------------- Elyse: Hi, Hill.Hill Goodspeed: Hi Elyse, how are you doing?Nice to see you.Elyse: Nice to see you again.Alright, so heres my question to you.I have this photograph.Im trying to figure out if this propeller was used on the TDR-1.Are these the original propellers that are on this plane?Hill: These are not.These are ones that are just really put on for display purposes.Elyse: Do these serial numbers or models mean anything to you?Hill: Really, they dont.You do see the US and the anchor.Thats a symbol that this was produced for the US Navy.Elyse: Hill says the alphabet soup of markings reflects the many manufacturers who contributed to making the propeller.But he suspects one number may prove an especially good lead.Hill: Well, the contract number the Navy had a contract number for any contract it let.The Navys Bureau of Aeronautics Records are in the National Archives.Elyse: Tell me a little bit about the history of the drone program.And was it a secretive thing?Hill: The TDR-1 program was very secretive because it was incorporating all this new technology, and that was mainly television. -------------------------------------------------- Bob, tell me about your involvement with the drone program.Bob Bothfeld: I was assigned to this outfit in 1943 right from Caltech.I didnt know a thing about it until I got there.Elyse: Bob explains that he was sent to Clinton, Oklahoma as part of Stag-1, commanded by Commodore Oscar Smith, and it was top secret.Bob: For two years, I wasnt allowed to tell anyone where I was, or what I was doing.I could write my family and tell them that I was alive, but thats all.Elyse: Bobs unit worked for a year testing the drones before Stag-1 shipped out to the Russell Islands, near Guadalcanal, in May, 1944.No one knew if the drones would work in combat, so on July 30, four TDRs were sent on a test run to bomb the grounded Japanese freighter, Yamazuki Maru, near Cape Esperance.Eventually, the drones served in battle, hitting their targets 21 out of 46 times, with no loss of American life.Bob says his unit knew they were doing something important.Bob: In the islands, I had the privilege of assembling all of the ones that they used. -------------------------------------------------- THE ASSASSINATION COMPLEX INSIDE THE GOVERNMENTS SECRET DRONE WARFARE PROGRAM JEREMY SCAHILL AND THE STAFF OF THE INTERCEPT First published in the USA in 2016 by Simon & Schuster Inc., New York First published in Great Britain in 2016 by Serpents Tail, an imprint of Prole Books Ltd 3 Holford Yard Bevin Way London WC1X 9HD www.serpentstail.com Copyright 2016 by First Look Media Works, Inc. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Interior design: Philipp Hubert Typeface: TI Actu by Stephane Elbaz and Swift Neue by Gerard Unger Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon CR0 4YY The moral right of the author has been asserted.All rights reserved.Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and the publisher of this book. -------------------------------------------------- A CIP record for this book can be obtained from the British Library ISBN 978 1 78125 772 2 eISBN 978 1 78283 322 2 CONTENTS PREFACE BETSY REED FOREWORD: ELECTED BY CIRCUMSTANCE EDWARD SNOWDEN THE DRONE LEGACY JEREMY SCAHILL DEATH AND THE WATCHLIST JEREMY SCAHILL AND RYAN DEVEREAUX WHY I LEAKED THE WATCHLIST DOCUMENTS ANONYMOUS FIND, FIX, FINISH JEREMY SCAHILL THE KILL CHAIN CORA CURRIER THE HEART OF THE DRONE MAZE JEREMY SCAHILL TARGET AFRICA NICK TURSE IX XI 1 14 36 40 54 68 84 DEATH BY METADATA JEREMY SCAHILL AND GLENN GREENWALD FIRING BLIND CORA CURRIER AND PETER MAASS STINGRAYS AT HOME JEREMY SCAHILL AND MARGOT WILLIAMS THE LIFE AND DEATH OF OBJECTIVE PECKHAM RYAN GALLAGHER MANHUNTING IN THE HINDU KUSH RYAN DEVEREAUX AFTERWORD: WAR WITHOUT END GLENN GREENWALD ACKNOWLEDGMENTS THE DOCUMENTS NOTES GLOSSARY CONTRIBUTORS ABOUT THE INTERCEPT AND FIRST LOOK MEDIA IMAGE CREDITS INDEX 94 108 122 134 152 179 189 191 193 213 219 221 223 225 THE ASSASSINATION COMPLEX 2 From his rst days as commander in chief, the drone has been President Barack Obamas weapon of choice, used by the military and the CIA to hunt down and kill the people his administration has deemedthrough secretive processes, without indictment or trialdeserving of execution. -------------------------------------------------- There has been intense focus on the technology of remote killing, but that often serves as a surrogate for what should be a broader examination of the states power over life and death.Drones are a tool, not a policy.The policy is assassination.While every president since Gerald Ford has upheld an executive order banning assassinations by U.S. personnel, Congress has avoided leg- islating the issue or even dening the word assassination.1 This has allowed proponents of the drone wars to rebrand assassinations with more palatable characterizations, such as the term du jour, targeted killings. When the Obama administration has discussed drone strikes publicly, it has offered assurances that such operations are a more precise alternative to boots on the ground and are authorized only when an imminent threat is present and there is near certainty that the intended target will be eliminated.Those terms, however, appear to have been bluntly redened to bear almost no resem- blance to their commonly understood meanings.2 The rst drone strike outside of a declared war zone was con- ducted in 2002, yet it was not until May 2013 that the White House THE DRONE LEGACY 3 released a set of standards and procedures for conducting such strikes.3 Those guidelines offered little specicity, asserting that the United States would conduct a lethal strike outside an area of active hostilities only if a target represents a continuing, imminent threat to U.S. persons, without providing any sense of the internal process used to determine whether a suspect should be killed without being indicted or tried.4 The implicit message on drone strikes from the Obama administration has been Trust, but dont verify.5 On October 15, 2015, The Intercept published a cache of secret slides that provide a window into the inner workings of the U.S. militarys kill/capture operations during a key period in the evolution of the drone wars: between 2011 and 2013. -------------------------------------------------- Were allowing this to happen.And by we, I mean every Amer- ican citizen who has access to this information now, but continues to do nothing about it. The Pentagon, White House, and Special Operations Command de- clined to comment on the documents.A Defense Department spokes- person said, We dont comment on the details of classied reports. THE ASSASSINATION COMPLEX 4 The CIA and the U.S. militarys Joint Special Operations Com- mand (JSOC) operate parallel drone-based assassination programs, and the secret documents should be viewed in the context of an intense turf war over which entity should have supremacy in those operations.Two sets of slides focus on the militarys high-value tar- geting campaign in Somalia and Yemen as it existed between 2011 and 2013, specically the operations of a secretive unit, Task Force 48-4.6 Additional documents on high-value kill/capture operations in Afghanistan buttress previous accounts of how the Obama adminis- tration masks the true number of civilians killed in drone strikes by categorizing unidentied people killed in a strike as enemies, even if they were not the intended targets.7 The slides also paint a pic- ture of a campaign in Afghanistan aimed at eliminating not only al Qaeda and Taliban operatives but also members of other local armed groups. -------------------------------------------------- One slide, marked Top Secret, shows how the terror watch- list appears on the terminals of personnel conducting drone opera- tions, linking unique codes associated with cell phone SIM cards and handsets to specic individuals in order to geolocate them.8 The costs to intelligence gathering when suspected terrorists are killed rather than captured are outlined in the slides pertaining to Yemen and Somalia, which are part of a 2013 study conducted by a Pentagon entity, the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnais- sance Task Force.The ISR study lamented the limitations of the drone program, arguing for more advanced drones and other sur- veillance aircraft and the expanded use of naval vessels to extend the reach of surveillance operations necessary for targeted strikes.It also contemplated the establishment of new politically challeng- ing airelds and recommended capturing and interrogating more suspected terrorists rather than killing them in drone strikes. -------------------------------------------------- The ISR Task Force at the time was under the control of Michael Vickers, the undersecretary of defense for intelligence.A erce proponent of drone strikes and a legendary paramilitary gure, Vick- ers had long pushed for a signicant increase in the militarys use of special operations forces.Key lawmakers viewed the ISR Task Force as an advocate for more surveillance platforms, like drones.9 The ISR study also reveals new details about the case of a Brit- ish citizen, Bilal el-Berjawi, who was stripped of his citizenship be- fore being killed in a U.S. drone strike in 2012.British and American intelligence had Berjawi under surveillance for several years as he THE DRONE LEGACY 5 A top-secret document shows how the watchlist looks on internal systems used by drone operators.traveled back and forth between the U.K. and East Africa yet did not capture him.Instead the United States hunted him down and killed him in Somalia.Taken together, the secret documents lead to the conclusion that Washingtons fourteen-year-long high-value targeting cam- paign suffers from an overreliance on signals intelligence, an apparently incalculable civilian toll, and, due to a preference for assassination rather than capture, an inability to extract poten- tially valuable intelligence from terror suspects. -------------------------------------------------- The documents also highlight the futility of the war in Afghanistan by showing that the United States has poured vast resources into killing local insurgents, in the process exacerbating the very threat the United States is seeking to confront.These secret slides help provide a historical context to Wash- ingtons ongoing wars and are especially relevant today, as the U.S. military intensies its drone strikes and covert actions against ISIS in Syria and Iraq.10 Those campaigns, like the ones detailed in these documents, are unconventional wars that employ special operations forces at the tip of the spear.The nd, x, nish doctrine that has fueled a post-9/11 borderless war is being rened and institutional- ized.These documents lay bare the normalization of assassination, THE ASSASSINATION COMPLEX 6 whether through the use of drones, night raids, or new platforms yet to be unleashed, as a central component of U.S. counterterror- ism policy.The military is easily capable of adapting to change, the source told me, but they dont like to stop anything they feel is making their lives easier or is to their benefit. -------------------------------------------------- And this certainly is, in their eyes, a very quick, clean way of doing things.Its a very slick, efficient way to conduct the war, without having to have the massive ground invasion mistakes of Iraq and Afghanistan.But at this point they have become so addicted to this machine, to this way of doing business, that it seems like its going to become harder and harder to pull them away from it the longer theyre allowed to continue operating in this way. This book, most of which was originally published by The Inter- cept as The Drone Papers,11 was produced by a team of report- ers and researchers that spent months analyzing the documents and is intended to serve as a long-overdue public examination of the methods and outcomes of Americas assassination program.That campaign, carried out by two presidents through four pres- THE DRONE LEGACY 7 idential terms, has been conducted secretly.The public has a right to see these documents not only to en- gage in an informed debate about the future of U.S. wars, both overt and covert, but also to understand the circumstances under which the U.S. government arrogates to itself the right to sentence individuals to death without the established checks and balances of arrest, trial, and appeal. -------------------------------------------------- According to one secret slide, as of June 2012, there were sixteen people in Yemen whom President Obama had authorized U.S. spe- cial operations forces to assassinate.In Somalia there were four.The statistics contained in the documents appear to refer only to targets approved under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, not CIA operations.In 2012 alone, according to data compiled by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, there were more than two hundred people killed in operations in Yemen and between four and eight in Somalia.HOW GEOGRAPHY SHAPES THE ASSASSINATION CAMPAIGN.In Afghanistan and Iraq the pace of U.S. drone strikes was much quicker than in Yemen and Somalia.This appears due, in large part, to the fact that Afghanistan and Iraq were declared war zones, and in THE DRONE LEGACY 11 Iraq the United States was able to launch attacks from bases closer to the targeted people.By contrast, in Somalia and Yemen, undeclared war zones where strikes were justied under tighter restrictions, U.S. attack planners described a serpentine bureaucracy for obtain- ing approval for assassination. -------------------------------------------------- The secret ISR study states that the number of high-value targeting operations in these countries was signicantly lower than previously seen in Iraq and Afghanistan because of these constraining factors. Even after the president approved a target in Yemen or Somalia, the great distance between drone bases and targets created signi- cant challenges for U.S. forces, a problem referred to in the docu- ments as the tyranny of distance. In Iraq more than 80 percent of nishing operations were conducted within 150 kilometers of an air base.In Yemen the average distance was about 450 kilometers, and in Somalia it was more than 1,000 kilometers.On average, one doc- ument states, it took the United States six years to develop a target in Somalia, but just 8.3 months to kill the target once the president had approved his addition to the kill list.INCONSISTENCIES WITH WHITE HOUSE STATEMENTS ABOUT TARGETED KILLING.The White Houses publicly available policy standards state that lethal force will be launched only against targets who pose a con- tinuing, imminent threat to U.S. persons. In the documents, how- ever, there is only one explicit mention of a specic criterion: that a person presents a threat to U.S. interest or personnel. While such a criterion may make sense in the context of a declared war in which U.S. personnel are on the ground in large numbers, such as in Afghanistan, that standard is so vague as to be virtually mean- ingless in countries like Yemen and Somalia, where very few U.S. personnel operate. -------------------------------------------------- City Research Online City, University of London Institutional Repository Citation: Kalpouzos, I.(2017).The assination complex: Inside the US government's secret drone warfare programme (Book review).The British Journal of Criminology, 57(6), pp.1530-1532. doi: 10.1093/bjc/azx025 This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version.Permanent repository link: https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/18678/ Link to published version: https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azx025 Copyright: City Research Online aims to make research outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience.Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders.URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to.Reuse: Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge.Provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. -------------------------------------------------- City Research Online: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/ publications@city.ac.uk Jeremy Scahill and the Staff of the Intercept, The Assassination Complex: Inside the US Governments Secret Drone Warfare Programme (Serpents Tail, 2016, 234pp.)Literature on armed drones has spread almost as fast as the drones themselves.They seem to embody an irresistible combination of violence and progress, promising war both total and limited, and precisely administered.Dumbfounded by the bluntness of the recent political transition, we dont have a full picture of how the new US administration will use this weapon of choice.We may wonder if drones will persist as the central new paradigm.One of the arguments advanced in Scahills book is that drone policy ensured some continuity between the Bush and Obama administrations, despite protestations to the contrary.As Glenn Greenwald puts it in the books afterword, the policy of assassination by drone represents a continuation, and in many cases an aggressive expansion, of the core principles of the Bush-Cheney mentality that Obama repeatedly vowed to overturn. (p. 182) Indeed, thats how drones should be seen: as ensuring continuity; as accentuating a particular moment in the 20th century ambition of air power to kill from afar and ensure asymmetry and invulnerability. -------------------------------------------------- These programs must remain secret and in the hands of the CIA.The president should continue to have the sole authority to order these attacks.What should the United States do?Arguments for Option 1 1.Keep the drone program secret and in 1.This secret program has been effective the hands of the CIA.2.Continue to use drones to target and kill terrorist suspects.3.Allow the president the discretion to decide who is a target.Public debate over the drone program will only help those who seek to harm us.at devastating al Qaeda and weakening our enemies without putting our soldiers or intelligence officers in harms way.2.The program is only possible because it is a secret.Putting it in military hands would make these killings impossible for foreign governments, who only allow them on their territory because they are secret.3.The program has eliminated many dangerous terrorists whom we had little or no hope of ever capturing.www.choices.edu watson institute for international studies, Brown university choices for the 21st century education Program Name:______________________________________________ Teaching with the News Online Resource 2 Debating U.S. Drone Policy Option 2: Use Drones Under Strict Limitations Drones have been used to kill terrorist suspects for more than ten years. -------------------------------------------------- The killing of U.S. citizens by secret drone programs should be stopped until there are standards that are debated and clear to all.What should the United States do?Arguments for Option 2 1.Put the drone program in the hands of 1.The program is effective and should be the military.continued in some form.2.Reduce the secrecy of the program and 2.There needs to be greater transparency force public officials to be accountable for their decisions.so that it is understood by the public and officials can be held accountable.3.Explain to the public the limits of the program and under what conditions the drone program might expand or end.3.The decision to kill enemy combatants including U.S citizens needs to be subject to the checks on power provided by the U.S. Constitution.www.choices.edu watson institute for international studies, Brown university choices for the 21st century education Program Name:______________________________________________ Teaching with the News Online Resource 3 Debating U.S. Drone Policy Option 3: End Targeted Killings The use of drones to kill suspected terrorists should be stopped. -------------------------------------------------- These killings should be called what they are: assassinations.It is illegal for the CIA to assassinate anyone, anywhere.It is illegal for the president of the United States to order the killings, most especially of U.S. citizens.The drones kill innocent bystanders and build resentment and hatred against the United States.Many of the CIAs strikes, called signature strikes, kill people who fit a pattern of extremist behavior, rather than killing specific, known terrorists.The secrecy of the program means that no one can be held accountable for these decisions.U.S. citizens have been targeted and killed by drones.This is a dangerous precedent made more dangerous because of its secrecy.U.S. citizens assumed to have committed a crime have a Constitutional right to a trial.In this secret environment, the govern- ments power can grow and grow.We have devastated al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan.Osama bin Laden is dead.We can safely end the drone program now and return to adhering to the Consti- tutional limits of power. -------------------------------------------------- html.6.It should be noted that this taxonomy is being used for organizational purposes within the discussion.Actual drone capabilities represent a continuum of sophistication, in which the lines both between military and commercial technologies and between the stated categories of systems are increasingly blurred.7.For more on the history of military drones, see Thomas P. Ehrhard, Air Force UAVs: The Secret History (Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies, July 2010).8.Jack Nicas and Colum Murphy, Who Builds the Worlds Most Popular Drones?, The Wall Street Journal, November 10, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/ articles/who-builds-the-worlds-most-popular-drones-1415645659.9.Ben Popper, DJI is about to become the first billion dollar consumer drone company, TheVerge.com, March 12, 2015, http://www.theverge.com/2015/3/12/8196413/dji-drone-funding-billion-dollar-sales.10.Catherine Shu, EHANG, Maker Of Ghost Drone, Raises $10M Series A Led By GGV Capital, Techcrunch.com, December 30, 2014, http://techcrunch. -------------------------------------------------- 19.Nicas, Criminals, Terrorists Find Uses for Drones, Raising Concerns. 20.Ibid.21.Alicia A. Caldwell and Josh Lederman, Secret Service testing drones, how to disrupt their flying, The Associated Press, March 10, 2015, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/b201597fe2dc4f5e9fe8241516e35e07/ secret-service-testing-drones-how-disrupt-their-flying.22.Rachel Feltman, The Future of Sports Photography: Drones, The Atlantic (February 18, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/ archive/2014/02/the-future-of-sports-photography-drones/283896/.| 33 CNAS.ORG 23.Rakesh Sharma, Growing The Use Of Drones In Agriculture, Forbes.com, November 26, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/ rakeshsharma/2013/11/26/growing-the-use-of-drones-in-agriculture/; Nick Leiber, Using Drones to Make Peace, Not War, Bloomberg.com, October 23, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-10-23/ aid-groups-are-using-drones-to-save-lives; James Norman, Drones striking a high-tech blow for conservation and the environment, The Guardian, May 7, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/07/ drones-striking-a-high-tech-blow-for-conservation-and-the-environment; and Jack Nicas, FAA Gives Approval to BP to Use Commercial Drones, The Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/ bp-launches-landmark-drone-program-in-alaska-1402404549. -------------------------------------------------- This assumes that the communications relay UAV is operating 200 to 300 kilometers from the ground control station and that both UAVs are operating at 20,000 to 25,000 feet.In this case, the distance between the two UAVs could be greater than 300 kilometers, since they would both be at high altitudes, thus allowing greater visibility over the horizon.56.While the U.S. Air Force has released limited information about the RQ-170, it has said little about the RQ-180, confirming only that the system will give the United States better access to contested airspace. David Axe, The Air Force Just Copped to Its Secret Stealth Drone, War Is Boring, June 10, 2014, https://medium.com/war-is-boring/ the-air-force-just-copped-to-its-secret-stealth-drone-342453e109ff.57.Amy Butler and Bill Sweetman, Secret New UAS Shows Stealth, Efficiency Advances, Aviation Week (December 6, 2013), http://aviationweek.com/ defense/secret-new-uas-shows-stealth-efficiency-advances.58.Bill Sweetman, Broadband Stealth May Drive Taranis Design, Aviation Week (February 17, 2014), http://aviationweek.com/awin/broadband- stealth-may-drive-taranis-design; UCAV: A world first for Dassault Aviation, Dassault Aviation, April 12, 2014, http://www.dassault-aviation. -------------------------------------------------- com/en/dassault-aviation/press/press-kits/ucav-world-first-dassault- aviation/; and Zach Rosenberg, Israel working on low-observable UAV, Flightglobal.com, November 28, 2012, http://www.flightglobal.com/news/ articles/israel-working-on-low-observable-uav-379564/.47.Horowitz and Fuhrmann, Droning on: Explaining the Proliferation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. 59.Butler and Sweetman, Secret New UAS Shows Stealth, Efficiency Advances. 48.Andrew Tarantola, The Terrifying Reaper That Shoots Hellfire from 50,000 Feet, Gizmodo.com, September 7, 2012, http://gizmodo.com/5941047/the-terrifying-reaper-that-shoots-hellfire-from-50000-feet.60.Taranis, BAE Systems, http://www.baesystems.com/enhancedarticle/ BAES_157659/; and nEUROn, Dassault Aviation, http://www.dassault- aviation.com/en/defense/neuron/introduction/.49.Andrea Shalal and Emily Stephenson, U.S.establishes policy for exports of armed drones, Reuters, February 18, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/ article/2015/02/18/us-usa-drones-exports-idUSKBN0LL21720150218; and Tarantola, The Terrifying Reaper That Shoots Hellfire from 50,000 Feet. 50. -------------------------------------------------- In 2016 Azerbai- jan reportedly used an Israeli-made Harop loitering munition to target a bus carrying a group of Arme- 59 EURASIA nian volunteer fighters, according to Armenias Defense Ministry.13 In 2018 Israeli law enforcement officials indicted Aeronautics for allegedly targeting Armenian separatists with a loitering munition at the request of Azeri military officials during a live product demonstration.14 In June 2018 the press secretary for the Artsakh Defense Army (Armenian-backed separatists) claimed that the Artsakh forces had downed 22 UAVs belonging to Azerbaijan since 2011 and had lost 3 UAVs over the same period.15 The Azeri Ministry of Defense has claimed to have downed 25 Armenian drones, most of which were consumer drones made by DJI.16 INFRASTRUCTURE Name Country Latitude Longitude Affiliation Activity Notes Baku Lokbatan Airport Sangachal Air Base Salyany Air Base Azerbaijan 402053N 0494029E Air Force HQ, Train- ing Azerbaijan 4007'47" N 4927'18" E Air Force Deployment Heron 1 site Azerbaijan 3938'45"N 4859'45"E Army Training NOTES 1. -------------------------------------------------- It was redesignat- ed the 89th Attack Sqn in 2016.38,39 489th Attack Squadron, 432nd Operations Group, 432nd Wing, Air Combat Command Creech AFB D MQ-9 Reaper 2016 Formed as the 77th Aero Squadron in 1917, the 489th began operating drones in 2016, when it was tasked with remotely operating the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper.40 Personnel from the 489th oper- ated the final Air Force MQ-1 Predator flight in 2018 before the aircraft was decommissioned.41 17th Attack Squadron, 732nd Operations Group, 432nd Wing, Air Combat Command Creech AFB D MQ-9 Reaper 2002 Formed as the 17th Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron in 1942, the 17th began operating drones in 2002, when it was equipped with the MQ-1 Predator and redesignated the 17th Reconnaissance Sqn.42 It transitioned to the Reaper in 2007, becoming the 17th Attack Sqn.22nd Attack Squadron, 732nd Operations Group, 432nd Wing, Air Combat Command Creech AFB D MQ-9 Reaper 2012 Formed as the 46th Bombardment Squadron in 1940, the 22nd began operating drones in 2012, when it was equipped with the MQ-9 Reaper.43 30th Reconnaissance Squadron, 732nd Operations Group, 432nd Wing, Air Combat Command Creech AFB D RQ-170 Sentinel The 30th Reconnaissance Squadron has operated the secretive RQ-170 reconnaissance drone since at least 2011.44,45 223 NORTH AMERICA 44th Reconnaissance Squadron, 732nd Opera- tions Group, 432nd Wing, Air Combat Com- mand Creech AFB D 2015 Formed as the 44th Aero Squadron in 1917, the 44th began operating drones in 2015 when it was reac- tivated to operate a classified unmanned aircraft.46 The exact type of aircraft and mission of this unit is not known.47 867th Attack Squadron, 732nd Operations Group, 432nd Wing, Air Combat Command Creech AFB D MQ-9 Reaper 2012 Formed as the 92nd Aero Squadron in 1917, the 867th began operating drones in 2012. -------------------------------------------------- 250 NORTH AMERICA 39.89 Attack Squadron (ACC), Air Force Historical Research Agency, 8 August 2017, https://www.afhra.af.mil/ About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/432130/89-attack-squadron-acc/ 40.Kristan Campbell, Centennial Squadron reactivates at Creech, Creech Air Force Base, 9 December 2016, https://www.creech.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1025692/centennial-squadron-reactivates-at-creech/.41.David Donald, U.S.Air Force Ends Predator Operations, Aviation International Online, 13 March 2018, https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2018-03-13/us-air-force-ends-predator-operations.42.17th Attack Squadron (ACC), Air Force Historical Research Agency, 8 August 2017, https://www.afhra.af.mil/ About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/862031/17-attack-squadron-acc/.43.22 Attack Squadron (ACC), Air Force Historical Research Agency, 24 June 2016, https://www.afhra.af.mil/ About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/862028/22-attack-squadron-acc/ .44.David Axe, Stealth Drones Secret Pacific Missions, War is Boring, 7 December 2013, https://medium.com/ war-is-boring/stealth-drones-secret-pacific-missions-3f12eee5c0d1. -------------------------------------------------- 136.Joseph Trevithick, Armys Elite Night Stalkers Quietly Stood Up A New Unit Ahead Of Getting New Drones, The Drive, 8 February 2019, http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26407/armys-elite-night-stalkers-quietly- stood-up-a-new-unit-ahead-of-getting-new-drones.137.Sean D. Naylor, The Armys killer drones: How a secretive special ops unit decimated ISIS, Yahoo News, 7 March 2019, https://news.yahoo.com/how-a-secretive-special-ops-unit-of-killer-drones-decimated- isis-100000657.html.138.Joseph Trevithick, Armys Elite Night Stalkers Quietly Stood Up A New Unit Ahead Of Getting New Drones, The Drive, 8 February 2019, http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26407/armys-elite-night-stalkers-quietly- stood-up-a-new-unit-ahead-of-getting-new-drones.139.Dan Gettinger, Training Drone Pilots, Center for the Study of the Drone, 29 June 2015, https://dronecenter.bard.edu/training-drone-pilots/.140.Tara L. Terry, Chaitra M. Hardison, David Schulker, Alexander C. Hou, and Leslie Adrienne Payne, Building a Healthy MQ-1/9 RPA Pilot Community, RAND Corporation, 2018, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/ pubs/research_reports/RR2000/RR2018/RAND_RR2018.pdf. -------------------------------------------------- 147.Richard Major, RQ-2 Pioneer: The Flawed System that Redefined US Unmanned Aviation, research report, Air Command and Staff College Air University, 2012, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1022933.pdf.148.VMU-1 History, Marines, accessed 16 January 2019, https://www.3rdmaw.marines.mil/Units/MAG-13/VMU- 1/History/.149.Ruth Quinn, Intelligence Center Provides Support to Desert Shield/Desert Storm, U.S. Army, 13 January 2014, https://www.army.mil/article/118182/intelligence_center_provides_support_to_desert_shielddesert_storm.150.Pioneer Short Range (SR) UAV, Federation of American Scientists, https://fas.org/irp/program/collect/pioneer.htm.151.Richard Major, RQ-2 Pioneer: The Flawed System that Redefined US Unmanned Aviation, research report, Air Command and Staff College Air University, 2012, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1022933.pdf.152.Richard Whittle, Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution (Henry Holt and Co, 2014), 81,100-102.254 NORTH AMERICA 153. -------------------------------------------------- Ibid, 110.154.Thomas P. Ehrhard, Air Force UAVs: The Secret History, The Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies, July 2010, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a525674.pdf.155.Dr. Daniel L. Haulman, U.S.Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Combat, 1991-2003, Air Force Historical Research Agency, 9 June 2003, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a434033.pdf.156.Daniel L. Haulinan, The U.S. Air Force in the Air War Over Serbia, 1999, Air Power History, 2015, https:// media.defense.gov/2016/Mar/17/2001481638/-1/-1/0/PAGES%20FROM%20AIR_POWER_HISTORY_SUM- MER-2015.PDF.157.U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, (Wash- ington, D.C.: 2000), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/kosovoaa/kaar02072000.pdf.158.Richard Whittle, Predators Big Safari, Mitchell Institute for Airport Studies, https://secure.afa.org/Mitchell/ reports/MP7_Predator_0811.pdf.159.Richard Whittle, Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution (Henry Holt and Co, 2014), 242-244. -------------------------------------------------- Under Secretary of Defense Dr. Michael Vickers 11 Afghanistan Iraq Libya Syria Beginning in 2000, the CIA flew unarmed surveillance drones over Afghani- stan.After 9/11, armed drones replaced them.67 The first U.S. targeted drone strike occurred on October 7, 2001 in Afghanistan.68 Though the CIA and the Air Force previously engaged in armed drone strikes, 2002 was the first time the CIA undertook a strike that was not directly in support of a military mission.69 The intended target was Osama Bin Laden; however, faulty intel- ligence resulted in the death of several civilians who were collecting scrap metal.70 Despite the mistake, U.S. drone strikes subsequently became an in- creasingly common phenomenon in the fight against terrorism in the Middle East.71 Drones were used for reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeted strikes by the U.S. Air Force in Iraq during the Second Gulf War (2003-2011) but have since ceased.As the war wound down, U.S. drone strikes in Iraq decreased substantially, with 43 strikes occurring in 2008, 4 in 2009, 0 in 2010, 1 in 2011, and 0 between 2012 and 2014.72 However, due to the present conflict with the Islamic State terrorist group, (ISIS) drone strikes by U.S. allied forces are once again taking place in Iraq.73 The government of Iraq now has its own armed drones, purchased from China.74 The United States launched its first drone strike in 2011 to aid NATO in the fight against the forces of Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi.75 The use of drones during the conflict that led to Qaddafis overthrow was essential as government troops often intentionally mingled with civilians and traveled in unmarked vehicles, making it difficult for high-flying bombers to hit their targets.76 Even after NATO officially ended the conflict, the U.S. used drones over Libya.77 Since 2015, the U.S. has resumed the drone program to fight ISIS in Libya.78 In February 2016, Italy and the United States signed an agree- ment allowing the U.S. to fly out of an airbase in Sicily to launch drone attacks on ISIS fighters in Libya. -------------------------------------------------- Arjun Sethi, Obama Misled the Public on Drones, Al Jazeera America, October 20, 2015, http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/10/obama-misled-the-public-on-drones.html Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Somalia: Reported US Covert Actions 2001-2011, February 22, 2012, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/02/22/get-the-data-somalias-hidden-war/ Ty McCormick, Exclusive: US Operates Drones from Secret Bases in Somalia, Foreign Policy, July 2, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/02/exclusive-u-s-operates-drones-from-secret-bases-in-somalia-special- operations-jsoc-black-hawk-down/ Ibid.Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Somalia: Reported US Covert Actions 2001-2011. McCormick, Exclusive: US Operates Drones from Secret Bases in Somalia. Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Somalia: Reported US Covert Actions 2001-2011. Mark Mazzetti, A Secret Deal on Drones, Sealed in Blood, New York Times, April 6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/world/asia/origins-of-cias-not-so-secret-drone-war-in-pakistan.html?_r=0 Salman Masood, C.I.A. -------------------------------------------------- Ibidem.Ibidem.Greg Miller, U.S.Launches Secret Drone Campaign to Hunt Islamic State Leaders in Syria, Washington Post, September 1, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-launches-secret-drone-cam- paign-to-hunt-islamic-state-leaders-in-syria/2015/09/01/723b3e04-5033-11e5-933e-7d06c647a395_story.html Ibid.Faseeh Mangi and Natalie Pearson, Pakistan Joins Exclusive Drone-Warfare Club, With Nod to China, NDTV, September 11, 2015, http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/pakistan-joins-exclusive-drone-warfare-club-with- nod-to-china-1216431; Arthur Michel, Irans Many Drones, Bard University Center for the Study of the Drone, November 25, 2013, http://dronecenter.bard.edu/irans-drones/; Kamran Yousuf, Pakistans First Indigenous Armed Drone Kills 3 Militants in Shawal: ISPR, Express Tribune (Islamabad), September 7, 2015, http://tribune.com.pk/story/952121/pakistans-first-indigenous-armed-drone-kills-3-militants-in-shawal-ispr/ Andrea Shalal and Emily Stephenson, U.S. -------------------------------------------------- Secrets, China Pushes for Drones, New York Times, September 20, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/21/world/asia/hacking-us-secrets-china-pushes-for-drones.html?_r=0 Iran Helping Hamas, Hezbollah Build Fleet of Suicide Drones, Jerusalem Post, April 9, 2015, http://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Iran-helping-Hamas-Hezbollah-build-fleet-of-suicide-drones-396672; Rowan Scarbor- ough, Iran Creating Suicide Drones that Threaten Israel, Washington Times, April 8, 2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/8/iran-creating-suicide-drones-us-army-report-warns/?page=all Dan Gettinger and Arthur Michel, A Brief History of Hamas and Hezbollahs Drones, Bard University Center for the Study of the Drone, July 14, 2014 http://dronecenter.bard.edu/hezbollah-hamas-drones/ Hoenig, Hezbollah and the Use of Drones as a Weapon of Terrorism; Gettinger and Michel, A Brief History of Hamas and Hezbollahs Drones. Ibid.Alessandria Masi, Hezbollah Allegedly Using Drones Against Al Qaeda In Battle For Qalamoun, International Business Times, May 12, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/hezbollah-allegedly-using-drones-against-al-qae- da-battle-qalamoun-1918696 Northrop Grumman Corporation, X-47B UCAS Makes Aviation HistoryAgain!, n.d., http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/x47bucas/Pages/default.aspx Geoff Dyer, U.S. -------------------------------------------------- In April the MoD announced that it had reached a significant landmark in its operation of Reaper drones - 20,000 operational flying hours over Afghanistan.31 In September another milestone was passed the 200th British drone strike.As always details about the circumstances of the strike remain secret.While there is a growing amount of information about the use of armed drones in Pakistan due to local media reports and information leaks by intelligence personnel in the US, there is very little information about the way in which UK drones are being used and the circumstances of UK drone strikes in Afghanistan.The UK MoD says that information about the UK drone strikes must remain secret as there is a risk that it could be used by enemy forces to adapt their tactics to reduce the operational effectiveness of Reaper.This would increase the security threat to our own forces and those of our allies.32 However the RAF seems to have no security fears when it releases selected information about UK drones strikes via its weekly RAF operational reports.33 Given there have now been over two hundred drone strikes by UK forces in Afghanistan, we believe that information and analysis of these strikes could safely be released without putting UK forces at risk. -------------------------------------------------- On 30th September Anwar Al-Awlaki was killed in a US drone strike on a convoy 90 miles east of the Yemeni capital Sanaa.98 Three other men also died in the attack including another US citizen, Samir Khan.99 Two weeks later al-Awlakis 16 year- old son, Abdul Rahman al-Awlaki was one of nine people killed in a US drone 17 strike near the town of Azzan in southern Yemen.100 According to the boys family Abdul Rahmann was on his way to dinner and was not at all involved in terrorism.Elsewhere In June, an unnamed US military official confirmed to the Washington Post that that the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) had carried out a a drone strike in Somalia, aimed at two senior members of al-Shabab.101 Although Predator drones have previously been used for surveillance in Somalia, this was seemingly the first time that an armed drone had been used in the country.In September Reuters reported that a US drone had crashed near Somalia's southern port city of Kismayu.102 From September 2011 there were numerous reports by the Tehran-based Press TV service of US drone strikes in Somalia resulting in hundreds of civilian casualties, however none were confirmed or reported by other news networks.103 In December an investigation by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism found that the Press TV reports were fabricated.104 In April Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced that armed Predator drones had been approved for use in Libya.105 Although the military refused to say from where the drones were flying, it was believed they based in Italy. -------------------------------------------------- In 2011 it continued to invest heavily in their development, opened new drone facilities in Africa, extended their use to new conflicts and admitted to secretly operating drones over Iran.While the US is currently at the forefront of using unmanned technology, both for surveillance and armed attack, it appears to feel that it can use drones whenever and wherever it likes.Although there have been some attempts through the courts, there is currently little sign that the US can be held accountable for its increasing use of drones.114 However this must come.The US cannot continue to use drones at will in violation of international law and global public opinion.Inevitably too, other nations will look to the example being set by the US and begin to use drones for cross border surveillance and to assassinate people they simply designate as terrorists.Both within the US and globally, civil society must work to hold the US accountable for its actions.19 Legal Issues Target Killing Background There are a number of legal issues associated with the use of armed drones, not least whether they are in a category so cruel as to be beyond human tolerance in a similar way to cluster bombs and anti-personnel landmines.115 However the space available here means that we will concentrate on the single issue of targeted killing. -------------------------------------------------- "135 In October 2011, the existence of secret, 50-page memo written by the Justice Departments Office of Legal Counsel in June 2010, which justified the assassination of al-Awlaki was revealed to the New York Times.136 While the contents of the memo itself remains secret, the New York Times was given (selective) reports of its contents by officials on condition of anonymity.According to the paper the memo provided the justification for acting despite an executive order banning assassinations, a federal law against murder, protections in the Bill of Rights and various strictures of the international laws of war.137 The ACLU amongst others is now calling for the memo to be made public.138 In October, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extra Judicial Killing, Christof Heyns, again criticised the growing use of drones for targeted killing: "The use of such methods by some states to eliminate opponents in countries around the world raises the question why other states should not engage in the same practices... -------------------------------------------------- The danger is one of a global war without borders, in which no one is safe."139 In December 2011, Reprieve wrote to the US Ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron Munter, seeking information about his role in the drone killing of two Pakistani youths.Reprieve say they plan to bring legal action against Mr Munter and others in order to hold them accountable for their actions in relation to drone strikes.140 At the same time, lawyers acting for Noor Khan, another victim of US drones strikes, are challenging the UK Foreign Secretary to clarify whether British intelligence has aided US drone strikes in Pakistan.141 23 Other Issues In Brief Autonomy While current armed drones are remotely controlled from the ground, the next generation will be much more autonomous.Drones now in development can take off by themselves, fly their pre-programmed mission, return and land, all without the intervention of a human pilot.Some argue that this is merely an extension of the auto-pilot currently in use on most aircraft, while others see the growing autonomy of armed drones as a dangerous step towards autonomous weaponry. -------------------------------------------------- All of these questions, and many more, need to be debated openly and honesty and require careful analysis and clear-headed judgement based on evidence.Unfortunately that evidence is being kept strictly under wraps.While it may be necessary to keep some information secret, we do not believe it is appropriate, or legitimate to refuse to disclose any and all information about the circumstances of the use of Reapers over the past three years.There is, at the very least, the sense that public discussion is being manipulated.With the use of armed drones only set to increase, we need a serious, public and fully informed debate on all these issues and to ensure there is full public accountability for their use.28 References 1.The test took place on 21st February 2001.See www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/armed-predator.htm 2.Mary Ellen O'Connell, Seductive Drones: Learning from a Decade of Lethal Operations, Journal of Law, Information & Science, Notre Dame Law School, August 2011, p4-5. -------------------------------------------------- Karen De Young, CIA idles drone flights from base in Pakistan, The Washington Post, 02/07/11 http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-idles-drone-flights-from-base-in- pakistan/2011/07/01/AGpOiKuH_print.html 92.Salman Masood, C.I.A.Leaves Base in Pakistan Used for Drone Strikes, New York Times, 11/12/11.http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/12/world/asia/cia-leaves-pakistan-base-used-for-drone-strikes.html 93.Suspected US spy drone 'crashes in Yemen, AFP, 08/02/11, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5h95MtnhYnXUe- umPi0xey05sqDVQ?docId=CNG.c0c63e4646495230d8449227753b8d56.151 94.Yemen al-Qaeda head Anwar al-Awlaki 'targeted by drone', BBC News, 07/05/11, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- middle-east-13319862 95.Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Is Intensifying a Secret Campaign of Yemen Airstrikes, New York Times, 08/06/11 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/world/middleeast/09intel.html?_r=2 96.Karen DeYoung, U.S. increases Yemen drone strikes, The Washington Post, 17/09/11, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-increases-yemen-drone- strikes/2011/09/16/gIQAB2SXYK_story.html 97. -------------------------------------------------- Craig Whitlock and Greg Miller, U.S. assembling secret drone bases in Africa, Arabian Peninsula, The Washington Post, 21/09/11, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-building-secret-drone-bases-in-africa-arabian- peninsula-officials-say/2011/09/20/gIQAJ8rOjK_story.html 98.Anwar al-Awlaki killed in Yemen - as it happened, The Guardian, 30/09/11, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/blog/2011/sep/30/anwar-al-awlaki-yemen-live 99.Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Samir Khan named as second US citizen to die in drone strike, The Guardian, 30/09/11, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/30/samir-khan-anwar-al-awlaki 32 100.Grieving Awlaki family protests Yemen drone strikes, Los Angeles Times, 19/10/11, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2011/10/yemen-drone-awlaki-son-family.html 101. -------------------------------------------------- 135.Matthew Rothschild, Obama Wrong to Rub Out Al-Awlaki, The Progressive, 30/09/11.http://www.progressive.org/al_awlaki.html 136.Peter Finn, Secret U.S. memo sanctioned killing of Aulaqi, The Washington Post, 30/09/11 http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/aulaqi-killing-reignites-debate-on-limits-of-executive- power/2011/09/30/gIQAx1bUAL_story.html 137.Charlie Savage, Secret U.S.Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, New York Times, 08/10/11 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/middleeast/secret-us-memo-made-legal-case-to-kill-a-citizen.html 138.U.S. Must Explain Targeted Killings of Its Own Citizens, ACLU, 19/10/11, http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/us- must-explain-targeted-killings-its-own-citizens 139.U.N. warns against extrajudicial killings, UPI.com, 21/10/11, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2011/10/21/UN- warns-against-extrajudicial-killings/UPI-77851319219217/?spt=hs&or=tn 140.Adam Entous, Drone Program Attacked by Human-Rights Groups, Wall Street Journal, 9/12/11. -------------------------------------------------- While weaponization or significant disruption will often be reported publicly, non-state actors often have an interest in keeping their surveillance and logistics operations secret.Furthermore, mere observations of drones not engaged 17 Chapter 1: Introduction Categories Surveillance: Descriptions Military UAVs were largely developed and produced for both spying and reconnaissance purposes;69 as such it is unsurprising that commercial drones provide can provide non-state actors with an excellent infrastructure to conduct surveillance operations without being detected.Drones can be also be used to carry conventional spying devices.Reconnaissance Drones can be used by violent non-state actors to capture live footage.There is some compelling evidence that IS used hobbyist drones to gain situation awareness on the battlefield as early as 2014.In August of that year, the group released a 14-minute video showing aerial views of the Tabqa air base prior to its campaign to capture the military installation.70 Several studies have demonstrated that a drone equipped with a radio transceiver can be used to extract unencrypted information from Wi-Fi and Bluetooth devices.71 This can include the setup of a fake mobile Wi-Fi network or a rogue access point, enabling the interception of smartphone traffic by luring users to connect to a nearby free Wi-Fi point, which in turn captures the users sensitive information such as passwords or credit card credentials.72 Drones can be used for command-and-control purposes, allowing groups to direct attacks, monitor progress, and supervise operations. -------------------------------------------------- 3 (2006): 4349, https://doi.org/10.1109/MTAS.2006.1700021 ; Michael J. Boyle, The Drone Age: How Drone Technology Will Change War and Peace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020); Richard Whittle, Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution.(New York: Picador, 2015).70 Peter Bergen and Emily Schneider, Now ISIS Has Drones?, CNN, 25 August 2014, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/24/opinion/bergen-schneider-drones-isis/.71 Da-Zhi Sun, Li Sun, and Ying Yang, On Secure Simple Pairing in Bluetooth Standard v5.0-Part II: Privacy Analysis and Enhancement for Low Energy, Sensors 19, no.15 (24 July 2019): 126, https://doi.org/10.3390/s19153259.72 Stephen Gergo Vemi and Christo Panchev, Vulnerability Testing of Wireless Access Points Using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)[C], in 14th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, ECCWS 2015, 2015, 42528, https://pureportal.coventry.ac.uk/files/4028853/panchevcomb.pdf.73 Susannah George and Lori Hinnant, Islamic State Turns to Drones to Direct Suicide Car Bombers, Associated Press, 2 February 2017, https://apnews.com/article/technology-protocols-ap-top-news-islamic-state-group-middle- east-4b36e6f9ed814880ab56a1763060759d. -------------------------------------------------- com/sites/davidaxe/2022/04/13/ukraines-10000-drones-are-dropping-tiny-cheap-bombs-on-russian-troops/.93 See the previous section.21 Chapter 1: Introduction This typology allows us to categorize the different ways that non-state groups can use drones.As mentioned above, several of these categories remain speculative rather than empirically established; this report aims to establish which types of drone usage commonly feature in violent non-state actors drone programs.Figure 4: Typology of drone uses by violent non-state actors.94 94 Modified from Rassler, Remotely Piloted Innovation, 1011.22 Chapter 2: Hezbollah Chapter 2: Hezbollah Past Developments Hezbollah first encountered armed drones by being on the receiving end: in 1992, its general secretary was assassinated by Israel in an air strike guided by a drone.95 Shortly thereafter, Hezbollah reportedly found ways to exploit the Israeli drone flights to their own advantage: in 1997, hacking into unsecured video feeds, Hezbollah detected and ambushed a Shayetet 13 commando, causing twelve deaths.96 By November 2004, Hezbollah had acquired its own drones Iranian Mersad-1 and flown one into Israeli airspace, escaping unscathed.97 The war with Israel in 2006 saw a flurry of activity, notably with explosive-laden Ababil drones being flown into Israel (and shot down).98 Reports at the time incorrectly attributed an attack on Israeli corvette INS Hanit to an explosive drone; this was later corrected to a missile attack.99 Following a six-year hiatus in drone activity after 2006, Hezbollah resumed reconnaissance flights over Israeli territory, most of which were intercepted.100 In 2016, a drone alternately attributed to Hezbollah or to Russia overflew Israel Defense Forces (IDF) manoeuvres and successfully evaded repeated interception attempts.101 Meanwhile, other Hezbollah flights got dangerously close to the Dimona nuclear reactor, on one occasion (in 2012) capturing footage which was reportedly later shared with Iranian officials.102 In parallel, Hezbollah employed drones to attack enemy militias in Syria, first in 2014 to attack Jabhat al-Nusra positions, and later (from 2016 onwards) to strike IS forces.103 In these latter strikes against IS, Hezbollah employed small, commercially bought quadcopters to drop Chinese-made submunitions,104 demonstrating a transition from the mostly Iranian-made military drones it had employed until then. -------------------------------------------------- Current Advances In its current state, the Hezbollah drone program seems mostly low-activity, though regular interceptions of drones take place in Israel.The groups rumoured drone capabilities, however, continue to be a source of significant concern in Israel.In 2021, for instance, the Israeli research institute ALMA estimated that Hezbollah possessed approximately 2,000 drones, sparking fears that Hezbollah could overwhelm Israels air defences and cause extensive casualties in the case 95 Ronen Bergman, Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israels Targeted Assassinations (New York: Random House, 2018), 39197.96 Roee Nahmias, Nasrallah Describes 1997 Ambush, Ynetnews, 9 August 2010, https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3932886,00.html.97 Hezbollah Flies Unmanned Plane over Israel, CNN, 7 November 2004, http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/11/07/hezbollah/.98 Milton Hoenig, Hezbollahs Drones, Federation of American Scientists - Public Interest Report 67, no. -------------------------------------------------- 114 , Al Jarida, 11 January 2021, https://www.aljarida.com/articles/1610301482744419700/.115 Reda, .116 Asswak Al arab, .25 Chapter 2: Hezbollah observation.117 It is in this latter respect observation and reconnaissance that Hezbollah appears to have had most success.On several occasions, observation drones have managed to enter deep into Israeli territory, gathering imagery of Israeli military bases or the Dimona nuclear reactor.118 In the case of the nuclear reactor, these flights followed declarations by Hassan Nasrallah Hezbollahs general secretary that Hezbollah possessed the capability to specifically target this power plant, despite its great distance.119 These flights, therefore, serve a dual purpose of both demonstrating capability and gathering information.As mentioned previously, the importance of Hezbollahs drone program comes from the perception that the group possesses significant drone capabilities which it could unleash in the case of a major conflict with Israel;120 in launching regular long-range reconnaissance flights, Hezbollah seeks to demonstrate this capability and assert its ability to threaten Israel, despite an otherwise rather muted pattern of attacks. -------------------------------------------------- Furthermore, Hezbollah has been accused of collaborating with militias in Iraq, notably Kataib Hezbollah (an Iraqi group), in launching drone attacks in Kurdistan in June 2022.135 127 Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah: We Have Been Manufacturing Our Own Drones And Transforming Missiles Into Precision Missiles For Years; We Do Not Need Missile And Drone Shipments From Iran, Middle East Media Research Institute, 16 February 2022, https://www.memri.org/tv/hizbullah-sec-gen-nasrallah-tech- know-how-missiles-precision-manufacture-drones.128 In 2021, Hezbollah claimed to have launched a Hassan drone over Israel, whose provenance or technical details are not known.IAF Flies over Beirut after Drone Enters Israel; Hezbollah Claims Responsibility, The Times of Israel, 18 February 2022, https://www.timesofisrael.com/iaf-flies-over-lebanon-after-drone-enters-israel-hezbollah- takes-responsibility/.129 Ostovar, The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients, 164; Thomas Juneau, How War in Yemen Transformed the Iran- Houthi Partnership, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism Online First (30 July 2021): 2, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1954353. -------------------------------------------------- 130 Judah Ari Gross, Iranian UAV That Entered Israeli Airspace Seems to Be American Stealth Knock-Off, Times of Israel, 10 February 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/iranian-uav-that-entered-israeli-airspace-seems-to-be- american-stealth-knock-off/ ; Wim Zwijnenburg, Sentinels, Saeqehs and Simorghs: An Open Source Survey of Irans New Drone in Syria, Bellingcat, 13 February 2018, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/02/13/sentinels- saeqehs-simorghs-open-source-information-irans-new-drone-syria/.131 Farnaz Fassihi, Ronen Bergman, and Eric Schmitt, Irans Attack Was Response to Secret Israeli Attack on Drone Site, The New York Times, 16 March 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/16/world/middleeast/iran-israel- attack-drone-site.html ; Emanuel Fabian, IDF Airs Footage of Drone Interceptions, Accuses Iran of Escalating UAV Terror, The Times of Israel, 7 March 2022, https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-airs-footage-of-drone-interceptions- accuses-iran-of-escalating-uav-terror/. -------------------------------------------------- 210 One explanation for this disparity may lie in IS extensive exploitation of drone attacks for media value: an exploding drone is much more limited in its ability to produce compelling video footage, compared to a drone that launches munitions.211 Chris Woods, Sudden Justice: Americas Secret Drone Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).212 Don Rassler, The Islamic State and Drones: Supply, Scale, and Future Threats (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center, 11 July 2018), 3, https://ctc.usma.edu/islamic-state-drones-supply-scale-future-threats/ ; George and Hinnant, Islamic State Turns to Drones to Direct Suicide Car Bombers.213 Erik Lin-Greenberg, Remote Controlled Restraint: The Effect of Remote Warfighting Technology on Crisis Escalation (Ph.D., New York, Columbia University, 2019), 13, https://doi.org/10.7916/d8-3nse-x110.214 | , Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 19 April 2018, https:// www.alquds.co.uk/%EF%BB%BF---- 215 Previous research by the authors has collected 160 images of such attacks, representing 47 separate incidents. -------------------------------------------------- Iran) or whether they developed their programs on their own without state patronage.That being said, even groups receiving aid from Iran rely on their own processes of development and maintain supply chains outside of their patron.In the case of the two major groups Hezbollah and the Houthi Movement achieving self-sufficiency in drone production appears to be a significant concern.275 274 Rassler, The Islamic State and Drones, 1.275 Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah: We Have Been Manufacturing our own Drones.53 Chapter 7: Comparative Analysis The Houthi Movement, owing in part to the presence of a state patron willing to share technological knowledge and support supply chains, transitioned rapidly from improvised quadcopters to externally supplied technology.In a further evolution of their program, they switched from foreign-supplied technology to assembling their own drones with smuggled parts and homemade airframes. -------------------------------------------------- In this respect, efforts to counter a drone program may present similarities with other campaigns of targeted killing and academic debates on their effectiveness.298 295 Arthur Holland Michel, Eyes in the Sky: The Secret Rise of Gorgon Stare and How It Will Watch Us All (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2019), 8.296 .297 Gadi Eisenkot and Gabi Siboni, Guidelines for Israels National Security Strategy, Policy Focus, trans.Susann Codish (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2 October 2019), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/guidelines-israels-national-security-strategy ; Itamar Lifshitz and Erez Seri-Levy, Israels Inter-War Campaigns Doctrine: From Opportunism to Principle, Journal of Strategic Studies Online First (10 August 2022): 126, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2022.2104254 ; See also Amelie Ferey, Assassinats Cibles: Critique Du Liberalisme Arme (Paris: CNRS editions, 2020).Ronen Bergman quotes Meir Dagan, former Mossad chief, as comparing this approach to kill[ing] the driver in order to stop a car. -------------------------------------------------- This Is the Worlds First Energy-Based Weapons System That Uses a Laser to Shoot down Incoming UAVs, Rockets & Mortars at a Cost of $3.50 per Shot.It May Sound like Science Fiction, but Its Real.Https://T.Co/NRXFoYTjIU.Tweet.Twitter, 14 April 2022. https://twitter.com/naftalibennett/status/1514661060011245571.Bergen, Peter, and Emily Schneider.Now ISIS Has Drones? CNN, 25 August 2014. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/24/opinion/bergen-schneider-drones-isis/.66 Bibliography Bergman, Ronen.Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israels Targeted Assassinations.New York: Random House, 2018.Bidgood, Jess.Massachusetts Man Gets 17 Years in Terrorist Plot.The New York Times, 2 November 2012. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/02/us/rezwan-ferdaus-of-massachusetts- gets-17-years-in-terrorist-plot.html.Binnie, Jeremy.Houthis Claim Long-Range Cruise Missile Attack on UAE.Janes.com, 18 January https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/houthis-claim-long-range-cruise- 2022. missile-attack-on-uae. -------------------------------------------------- Washington Post, 14 September 2019. https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/drone-attacks-on-saudi-oil-facilities-spark-explosions-and- fires/2019/09/14/b6fab6d0-d6b9-11e9-ab26-e6dbebac45d3_story.html.Fang, Jian, Anthony Finn, Ron Wyber, and Russell S. A. Brinkworth.Acoustic Detection of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Using Biologically Inspired Vision Processing.The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 151, no.2 (February 2022): 96881.https://doi.org/10.1121/10.0009350.Fassihi, Farnaz, Ronen Bergman, and Eric Schmitt.Irans Attack Was Response to Secret Israeli Attack on Drone Site.The New York Times, 16 March 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/16/world/middleeast/iran-israel-attack-drone-site.html.Ferey, Amelie.Assassinats Cibles: Critique Du Liberalisme Arme.Paris: CNRS editions, 2020.Fishman, Alex.The New Explosive Drone Threat from Gaza.Ynetnews, 29 July 2018. https:// www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5318598,00.html.Frantzman, Seth J.Hezbollahs Drone Threat Is Now on Display. -------------------------------------------------- 11 (November 2017): 96685.https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1258863.Mamdouh, Moutaz. : ., 13 March 2017. https://www.ida2at.com/air-defence-systems-and-unmanned-planes-isis- enhances-its-weapons-arsenal/.74 Bibliography Maney, George, and Pamela Oliver.Finding Collective Events: Sources, Searches, Timing.Sociological Methods & Research 30, no.2 (November 2001): 13169.https://doi.org/10.1177/0 049124101030002001.McKenzie, Sheena, and Gianluca Mezzofiore.Londons Gatwick Airport Shut for over 17 Hours in Unprecedented Drone Attack.CNN, 21 December 2018. https://edition.cnn.com/2018/12/20/ uk/gatwick-airport-drones-gbr-intl/index.html.Michel, Arthur Holland.Eyes in the Sky: The Secret Rise of Gorgon Stare and How It Will Watch Us All.New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2019..The Age of Drone Vandalism Begins with an Epic NYC Tag.Wired, 30 April 2015. https:// www.wired.com/2015/04/age-drone-vandalism-begins-epic-nyc-tag/. -------------------------------------------------- Middle East Media Research Institute.Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah: We Have Been Manufacturing Our Own Drones and Transforming Missiles Into Precision Missiles For Years; We Do Not Need Missile And Drone Shipments From Iran, 16 February 2022. https://www.memri.org/tv/hizbullah-sec-gen-nasrallah-tech-know-how-missiles-precision-manufacture- drones.Middle East Media Research Institute.Houthi Military Spokesman Brig.-Gen. Yahya Saree Claims Houthi Responsibility For Monday Abu Dhabi Drone Strike: The UAE Is Unsafe So Long As Escalation Against Yemen Continues, 17 January 2022. https://www.memri.org/tv/houthi- military-spokesman-general-saree-claim-responsibility-abu-dhabi-airport-drone-attack.Middle East Media Research Institute.Iran Is Acting Against the UAE By Means Of The Yemeni Houthi Militia And Threatening More Attacks On It, 8 February 2022. https://www.memri.org/ reports/iran-acting-against-uae-means-yemeni-houthi-militia--and-threatening-more-attacks- it. -------------------------------------------------- Bellingcat, 24 May 2017. https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2017/05/24/types-islamic-state-drone-bombs-find/.Weimann, Gabriel, and Conrad Winn.The Theater of Terror: Mass Media and International Terrorism.White Plains: Longman, 1994.Whittle, Richard.Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution.New York: Picador, 2015.Williams, Alison J.Hakumat al Tayarrat: The Role of Air Power in the Enforcement of Iraqs Boundaries.Geopolitics 12, no.3 (July 2007): 50528.https://doi.org/10.1080/14650040701305690..Reconceptualising Spaces of the Air: Performing the Multiple Spatialities of UK Military Airspaces: Reconceptualising Spaces of the Air.Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 36, no.2 (April 2011): 25367.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2010.00416.x.Winter, Charlie.Apocalypse, Later: A Longitudinal Study of the Islamic State Brand.Critical Studies in Media Communication 35, no.1 (January 2018): 10321.https://doi.org/10.1080/152 95036.2017.1393094. -------------------------------------------------- .Framing War: Visual Propaganda, the Islamic State, and the Battle for East Mosul.Cambridge Review of International Affairs 33, no.5 (September 2020): 66789.https://doi.or g/10.1080/09557571.2019.1706074..The Terrorist Image: Decoding the Islamic States Photo-Propaganda.London: Hurst, 2022.Wintour, Patrick.Yemen Peace Talks at Risk after Several Killed in Houthi Drone Attack.The Guardian, 10 January 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/10/houthi-drone- attack-on-yemeni-base-kills-several-people-reports.Woods, Chris.Sudden Justice: Americas Secret Drone Wars.New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015.Woolley, John T. Using Media-Based Data in Studies of Politics.American Journal of Political Science 44, no.1 (2000): 15673.https://doi.org/10.2307/2669301.81 Bibliography X-UAV MINI Talon 240KM LONG RANGE - RC Groups.Accessed 26 September 2022. https:// www.rcgroups.com/forums/showthread.php?3493103-X-UAV-MINI-Talon-240KM-LONG- RANGE. -------------------------------------------------- Following his election, he called for a new approach [to countering terrorism] one that reject[s] torture and one that recognize[s] the imperative of closing the prison at Guantanamo Bay.39 While phasing out torture, available data elucidates that this new approach was in part just an embrace of the 34 Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agencys Detention and Interrogation Program (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, December 9, 2014), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf 35 The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Requests Judicial Authorization to Commence an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, November 20, 2017) https://www.icc-cpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?name=171120-otp- stat-afgh.The investigation includes review of war crimes by members of the United States ("US") armed forces on the territory of Afghanistan, and by members of the US Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") in secret detention facilities in Afghanistan and on the territory of other States Parties to the Rome Statute, principally in the period of 2003-2004. 36 Counterterrorism, Detention and Interrogation Activities from September 2001 to October 2003, 2003-7123-IG (Central Intelligence Agency, May 7, 2004), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5856717 37 Micah Zenko, Why Did the CIA Stop Torturing and Start Killing, Council on Foreign Relations (blog), April 7, 2013, https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-did-cia-stop-torturing-and-start-killing 38 Mark Mazzetti, Rise of the Predators: A Secret Deal on Drones, Sealed in Blood, The New York Times, April 6, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/world/asia/origins-of-cias-not-so-secret-drone-war-in-pakistan.html?pagewanted=print 39 Barrack Obama, Speech on National Security (speech, May 21, 2009), The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/21/us/politics/21obama.text.html 7 CIAs kill-in-lieu-of-capture preference dating back to the Helgerson Memo of President Bushs first term. -------------------------------------------------- In summer 2014, airstrikes in Syria were commenced against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) operatives, which led to a reported 13,501 strikes in Syria and Iraq from August 2014 through the end of Obamas presidency (the number of drone strikes is not available).44 The administrations embrace of targeted drone strikes as a centerpiece of its counterterrorism operations was not undertaken, however, without some consideration of legal constraints.President Obama himself noted a reservation that drones might become a cure-all for terrorism, particularly in non-active war zone regions.45 In May 2013, the White House released the Presidential Policy Guidance on Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities (PPG) fact sheet.It stated a preference for capture and set forth criteria for the use of lethal force, namely, a legal basis for the use of force, a continuing, imminent threat posed by prospective targets, a checkbox list, including near certainty of any targets presence and minimal risk to non-combatants, and compliance with international laws of armed conflict and state 40 Jessica Purkiss and Jack Serle, Obamas Covert Drone War in Numbers: Ten Times More Strikes Than Bush, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, January 17, 2017, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2017-01-17/obamas-covert-drone- war-in-numbers-ten-times-more-strikes-than-bush 41 Drone Strikes in Pakistan, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, accessed January 2, 2019, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war/pakistan 42 Drone Strikes in Yemen, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, accessed January 2, 2019, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war/yemen 43 Drone Strikes in Somalia, Bureau of Investigative Journalism, accessed January 2, 2019, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war/somalia 44 Purkiss and Serle, Obamas Covert Drone War in Numbers: Ten Times More Strikes Than Bush. 45 Daniel J. Rosenthal and Loren Dejonge Schulman, Trumps Secret War on Terror, The Atlantic, August 10, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/trump-war-terror-drones/567218/ 8 sovereignty.46 The administration also issued Executive Order 13732 in July 2016 which affirmed the United States commitment to respect the laws of armed conflict and called for the release of an annual report on the number of strikes undertaken by the U.S. Government against terrorist targets outside areas of active hostilities and assessments of combatant and non-combatant deaths resulting from those strikes.47 Trump Administration At the time of this writing, President Trump seems to have embraced his predecessors operational expansion of the drone program but rejected his key bureaucratic constraints and protections. -------------------------------------------------- Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities, Office of the Press Secretary, May 23, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press- office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-us-policy-standards-and-procedures-use-force-counterterrorism 47 United States Policy on Pre- and Post-Strike Measures to Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the Use of Force, Executive Order 13732, 81 FR 44485, July 7, 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press- office/2016/07/01/executive-order-united-states-policy-pre-and-post-strike-measures 48 Katie Bo Williams, How Many Civilians Die in Covert US Drone Strikes?It Just Got Harder to Say, Defense One, March 6, 2019, https://www.defenseone.com/news/2019/03/how-many-civilians-die-covert-drone-strikes-it-just-got-harder-to- say/155355/?oref=d_brief_nl 49 Matthew Kahn, Document: Trump Revokes Obama Executive Order on Counterterrorism Strike Casualty Reporting, Lawfare, March 6, 2019, https://www.lawfareblog.com/document-trump-revokes-obama-executive-order-counterterrorism- strike-casualty-reporting 50 Drone Strikes in Yemen. 51 Drone Strikes in Somalia. 52 Jessica Purkiss, Jack Serle and Abigail Fielding-Smith, US Counter Terror Air Strikes Double in Trumps First Year, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, December 19, 2017, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2017-12-19/counterrorism- strikes-double-trump-first-year 9 in 2016 to 2,609 in 2017.53 In early 2018, the president made overtures about Pakistan, suggesting in a Tweet that they give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. -------------------------------------------------- As of the time of this writing, the parameters of the Trump Administrations drone policy remain largely unknown and susceptible to serious legal critique.Drone Program Details Relevant Actors Both the United States military and the CIA carry out drone strikes around the world.Cooperation between the CIA and the militarys Joint Special Operations Command55 (JSOC) has been extensive, though in the case of drone strike operations, frequency, scope and applicable protocols and engagement directives are largely unclear.56 Still, there is reason to believe that military-CIA synergy in the drone sphere has been considerable.In September 2011, the Washington Post reported that co-mingling [of the organizations] at remote bases is so complete that US officials ranging from congressional staffers to high-ranking CIA officers said they often find it difficult to distinguish agency from military personnel.57 It has also noted that the two organizations may have carried out operations pursuant to one anothers legal authority, alleging CIA Director, General Mike Hayden, communicated with Central Command commander, General Martin Dempsey, to sort out which activities should be done by the military under Title 10 and which should be CIA Title 50 covert activities.58 In testifying before a 2011 hearing of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, Michael Lumpkin, stated [w]hichever organization [CIA or JSOC] has primary authority to conduct the operations leads; whichever organization has the superior 55 The JSOC was established by a classified charter in 1980 to carry out special operations and reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to permit more expeditious decision-making. -------------------------------------------------- It was later moved under the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), which, in 2003, then-Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, converted into a supported command to allow it to plan and execute its own missions.Under President Bush, the Administration bypassed SOCOM altogether, issuing orders directly to JSOC.More recently, while CIA drone strikes have attracted more generally attention due to governmental leaks and concern over the Agencys involvement in combat-like operations, JSOC drone activities have, according to some, been far more expansive.See The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions, Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic and Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2012, 11, https://www.law.columbia.edu/human-rights- institute/counterterrorism/drone-strikes/civilian-impact-drone-strikes-unexamined-costs-unanswered-questions; News Briefing, Department of Defense, January 7, 2003, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?trascriptid=1226; Gretchen Gavett, What is the Secretive US Kill/Capture Campaign, PBS, June 17, 2011. -------------------------------------------------- The Obama Administration described the CIA and JSOC missions in Yemen as closely coordinated,64 though some accounts suggest that drone strike operations there are primarily under JSOC control with CIA assistance.65 Marc Ambinder and D.B.Grady suggest CIA and JSOC cooperation in Yemen as almost seamless with JSOC and the CIA alternating Predator missions and borrowing each others resources, such as satellite bandwidth.66 Drones appear to have begun being used to track individuals in Somalia in 2007 under President Bush.Thereafter, they carried out reconnaissance missions until June 2011, when strikes against alleged members of al-Shabaab were ordered under President Obama.67 According to CNN, the strikes were part of a new secret joint Pentagon and CIA war against Somali al- Shabaab militants.68 Though drone strikes in Somalia appear to have been escalating, conventional air and helicopter raids carried out by JSOC from CIA, Air Force and security 59 The Future of US Special Operations Force: Ten Years After 9/11 and Twenty-Five Years After Goldwater-Nichols, statement of Michael Lumpkin, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, before Hearing of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, 112th Congress, First Session, September 22, 2011, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg70785/html/CHRG- 112hhrg70785.htm 60 Jeremy Scahill, The Secret US War in Pakistan, The Nation, November 23, 2009, https://www.thenation.com/article/secret- us-war-pakistan/ 61 Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, Top Secret America (New York: Little, Brown & Company, 2011) 62 The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions, 15. -------------------------------------------------- 63 News Brief with Geoff Morrell From the Pentagon, Department of Defense, November 24, 2009.64 Adam Entous, Siobhan Gorman and Julian E. Barnes, U.S.Relaxes Drone Rules: Obama Gives CIA, Military Greater Leeway in Use Against Militants in Yemen, The Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2012, https://www.wsj.com/artiles/SB10001424052702304577366251852418174 65 Mark Mazzetti, C.I.A.Building Base for Strikes in Yemen, The New York Times, June 14, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/world/middleeast/15yemen.html 66 The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions, 13, citing Marc Ambinder and D.G.Grady, The Command: Deep Inside the Presidents Secret Army (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2012).67 Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, U.S.Expands Its Drone War into Somalia, The New York Times, July 1, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/02/world/africa/02somalia.html 68 Barbara Starr, U.S.Strikes al Qaeda Affiliate in Somalia, CNN, June 28, 2011, security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/06/28/u-s- strikes-al-qaeda-affiliate-in-somalia/ 12 contractor bases have complicated precise estimates as to drone strike figures. -------------------------------------------------- This is the practice of conducting second strikes in relatively close temporal proximity to initial strikes to ensure that all individuals present in a kill box, or designated area, are killed.73 These strikes have reportedly killed rescuers on the scene, which, in the context of an armed conflict, would raise questions under the Geneva Conventions.74 Regardless of whether or not an armed conflict exits, any killing of rescuers likely amounts to a violation of principles of international human rights law.The aforementioned strike types may be carried out to effectuate the elimination of persons on designated kill lists. Both the military and CIA, as well as the National Security Council, compile and maintain lists of targetable persons, though the processes of inclusion and 69 David Axe, Hidden History: Americas Secret Drone War in Africa, Wired, August 13, 2012, https://www.wired.com/2012/08/somalia-drones/ 70 The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions, 9; Adam Entous, Siobhan Gorman and Julian E. Barns, U.S. -------------------------------------------------- 88 The White House.National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington D.C.: The White House, 2017), 7, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf 89 International Bar Association.The Legality of Armed Drone Strikes under International Law: Background Paper by the International Bar Associations Human Rights Institute (London: International Bar Association, 2017), 14, https://www.ibanet.org/Human_Rights_Institute/HRI_Publications/Legality-of-armed-drone-strikes.aspx 90 Daniel Webster.Letter to Henry Stephen Fox in The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers, Vol.1 1941-1843, edited by K.E.Shewmaker.New England: Dartmouth College Press, 1983.Daniel Webster, the United States Secretary of State from 17 It is far from clear that current targets of United States drone strikes pose a threat that is instant and overwhelming and leaving no moment of deliberation. Furthermore, it is also far from clear that no alternative choice of means, such as capture and trial in accordance with dictates of due process, is available. -------------------------------------------------- In Al-Saadoon v. Secretary of State for Defense, Lord Justice George Leggatt of the High Court of Justice in the United Kingdom captured this transition in stating that the [use of] force to kill is indeed the ultimate exercise of physical control over another human being.159 This sentiment gravitates toward the view that the appropriate legal test in jurisdictional determinations should be the exercise of authority or control over the individual in such a way that the individuals rights are in the hands of the state.160 With respect to drone operations, the International Bar Association also submits that a finding that IHRL is inapplicable to the victims of extraterritorial drone strikes by virtue of jurisdiction when such law would be applicable in situations of detention is unconscionable and runs counter to the object and purpose of numerous human rights treaties.161 Finally, in Bankovic, the ECtHR noted that IHRL principles apply to the actions of a state carried out in another state through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the government of the other state.162 This would provide a jurisdictional basis for United States drone strike operations in states pursuant to the consent of those states governments. -------------------------------------------------- 216 An Action Plan on U.S. Drone Policy: Recommendations for the Trump Administration, Stimson Center, June 2018, 11-12, https://www.stimson.org/file/26208 41 Trump Administration Relaxations All the while revitalizing and expanding drone strike operations, the Trump Administration appears to have relaxed Obama-era guidelines and policy directives, obscuring the governments present legal position.According to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Administration replaced the PPG with its own secret set of rules governing lethal drone strike procedures in October 2017.217 These new rules, the PSP, appear to loosen three key PPG constraints: 1.PSP eliminates the PPG Section 3.A and 4.A requirement that potential targets pose an imminent threat 2.PSP reduces the near certainty requirement of PPG Section 3.B(a) and 4.B(a) for the presence of targeted persons to reasonable certainty 3.PSP revises PPG strike determination procedures, reducing senior policymaker involvement and oversight and delegating more authority to lower-level operational commanders The elimination of an imminent threat requirement removes a fundamental prerequisite upon which PPG Sections 3 and 4 are premised and indefinitely widens the scope of possible subjects for targeting. -------------------------------------------------- Summary of Present United States Legal Position The DOJ white paper and PPG, products of the relative transparency of the Obama Administration, provide an outline of the United States legal position with respect to its drone 217 ACLU v. DOD FOIA Case Seeking Trump Administrations Secret Rules for Lethal Strikes Abroad, American Civil Liberties Union, Release, January 16, 2018, https://www.aclu.org/cases/aclu-v-dod-foia-case-seeking-trump-administrations-secret- rules-lethal-strikes-abroad.On October 30, 2017, the ACLU filed a Freedom of Information Act request seeking public disclosure of the new rules.In response to the Administrations refusal to acquiesce, the ACLU filed a lawsuit on December 21, 2017 to compel disclosure.At the time of this writing, the suit is still pending.218 An Action Plan on U.S. Drone Policy: Recommendations for the Trump Administration, 16.42 strike operations under international law.The Trump Administrations apparent relaxations and return to a policy of Bush-era secrecy have made amorphous the governments stance on pivotal legal issues such that its present position is largely opaque, frustrating scrutiny and accountability efforts. -------------------------------------------------- Emerging Issuess Exploring Drones How Unmanned Aircraft Could Change the Way We Live, Work, and Think about Risk INTRODUCTION During World War II, in a top-secret mission called Operation Aphrodite, the U.S. mili- tary endeavored to create an unmanned aerial vehicle.Early reports indicate this military operation largely involved a B-17 bomber equipped with TV cameras, parachutes, and explosives.The plan was for the bomber pilot to take off, reach a designated altitude, and bail out, while a pilot in a second plane used remote controls to guide the highly explosive plane to its target.This mission met with little success, including claiming the life of for- mer President John F. Kennedys older brother, Joseph, a U.S. Navy lieutenant whose bomber exploded over the English Channel.1 While unmanned aerial vehicles were only in their infancy during World War II, the efforts of the greatest generation helped lay the groundwork for today.Drones, or unmanned aircraft,2 have become an integral part of the U.S. military. -------------------------------------------------- Outside of IHL situations, lnternational Human Rights Law (IHRL) applies and lethal force may only be used when absolutely necessary to save human life that is in imminent danger.This does not appear to be the case for many of the US drone strikes that have been carried out in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia for examPle.32.Despite repeated denials that the UK would follow the US down the path of drone targeted killing, on 21 August 2015 British drones targeted and killed UK citizen Reyaad Khan near Raqqa in Syria.Alongside Khan, his cousin from Aberdeen, Ruhul Amin, and a Belgian man known only as Abu Ayman al-Belgiki, were also killed.ln Parliament, David Cameron admitted that the strike was "the first time in modern times that a British asset has been used to conduct a strike in a country where we are not involved in a war."26 Senior military officers acknowledged that the strike represented the 'crossing of a Rubicon',27 while Defence Secretary Michael Fallon made it clear that the uK was prepared to carry out further such targeted killings.2s 33. ln his letter to the United Nations reporting the strike, the UK Ambassador argued the strike against Reyaad Khan was undertaken as part of the collective self-defence of lraq aswellas self-defence of the UK. -------------------------------------------------- Atthe end of April2017, a heavily redacted copy of the lntelligence and Security Committee's (lSC) report into the intelligence basis of the strike was published.32 36.Even before the redactions, however, the Committee were refused access to what they describe as "central", "key" and "clearly relevant" documents on the strike against Reyaad Khan.33 ln addition they were refused all access to information on the US drones strikes conducted in conjunction with the UK on Junaid Hussain and Mohammed Emwazi around the same time.3a 37.While the Committee appears to have done its best to scrutinise the intelligence basis of the UK's first drone targeted killing outside the battlefield, they faced clear resistance from the National Security Secretariat (NSS) and the Government.While it may be understandable that some information is deemed too sensitive to be publicly released, the very point of the ISC is that it is allowed to see such information in order for there to be proper and appropriate parliament scrutiny of government activities. -------------------------------------------------- C: lnformation on use of armed drones more restricted than for other aircraft 39.While it is accepted that some information about military operations needs to be kept secret, it appears that routine information about the use of armed drones is more 31 Government has ducked central question about lethal drone strike, Joint Human Rights Committee, 1 9 October 2016, https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joinlselect/human- rights-committee/news-parliament-201 5/drone-report-published-16-1,71 3tlntelligence and Security Committee, IJK Lethal Drone Strikes in Syria, April 2017, https://b1 cba9b3-a-5e663 1 fd-s- sitas.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/fi\esl20170426-UK-Lethal-Drone-Strikes-in-Syria _Report.pdf 33 lbid.p3, p23 3a lbid p2 35 lbd.p24 9 74 restricted than routine information about the use of other armed aircraft.I believe this is due to the controversial nature of these systems and a desire to control information flow in order to manage what is described as 'the public perception problem'.36 40 Sometimes the difference in the way information about the use of armed Reaper is released, in comparison to information about the use of other aircraft, is made very clear. -------------------------------------------------- See p19 3s See Nolan Peterson, 'Deep Targets': On the Ground With British, US Drone Forces Attacking lSlS, The Daily Signal, 02 May 2016, http://dailvsiqnal.com/2016/05/02ideep-tarqets-on{he-qround-with- ; Alistair Bunkall, lnside Top-Secret Drone Operation Agalnst british-u-s-drone-forces-targeting-isis/ lS, Sky News, 10 May 2016, http://news.sky.com/story/1690440/inside-top-secret-drone-operation- against-is; David Willetts, Meet Tina... the RAF Reaper drone pilot flying missions from secret base to take down lSlS, The Sun, 03 May 2016, https://www.thesun.co.uk/archives/news/'l 158578/meet- tina-the-raf-reaper-drone-pilot-flying-missions-from-secret-base-to-take-down-isis/ 10 75 very well-known nickname for the baseao while lhe Daily Signal reported that the British Reapers were attached to the US 386th Air Expeditionary Wing "and work alongside the U.S. Air Force's 46th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron".A simple Google search confirms that the 386th Air Expeditionary wing/46 Reconnaissance Squadron are based at Ali Al Salem air base.al [Appendix: Document 9, 10 & 1 1l 45. ln addition UK national news organisations, as well as specialist defence press regularly report that British Reapers are located at Ali Al Salem air base in Kuwait though some note this has not been officially confirmed. -------------------------------------------------- "a6 Janes Defence WeeklY, 7 APril20'17 "The tJnited Kingdom is understood to have 10 Reapers (its entire force) operating out of Ati Al Satem Air Base in Kuwait, though fhrs has never been confirmed by the MoD."a7 46. lt seems a policy of being more restrictive about the number of Reapers deployed and their location came into existence during 2014 when the UK committed to the use of armed drones beyond operations in Afghanistan.ln January 20151wrote to the Secretary of State for Defence asking him to set out clearly the reasons why the numbers deployed/location details, which were being released in relation to use in Afghanistan, could no longer being released.The reply (from Permanent Joint Headquarters) stated that "tn Afghanistan there were a large number of air assefs contributing to the overall /S,AF mrssio n. Given this we were able to release information on UK Reaper assefs as fhrs did not compromise capabilities by giving an indication of the level and area of coverage." -------------------------------------------------- Ministry of Defence Ref: FOI 2014107575 Chris Cole Drone Wars UK 19 Paradise Street Oxford OS1 1LD Email: chris@dronewars.net 19 December2014 Dear Mr Cole Thank you for your email of 26 November.You requested the following information: On Monday 24th November, Mr Mark Francois, Minister for the Armed Forces, told the House of Commons "On 26 October, our troops left Camp Bastion and, as confirmed by the Secretary of State, the finat UK personnetteft Kandahar ained yesterday.All of our maior equipment and materiel has now teft the country."(Hansard,24 Nov 2014 : Column 629) Piease can you telt me underthe Freedom of lnformation Actwhere the UK's 10 Reaper aircraft have been re-located to, either by country or by geographical region (i.e.Southern Europe, Middle-East, North Africa etc.)I am treating your correspondence as a request for lnformation under the Freedom of lnformation Act 2000 (fbln) I have now completed a search of our paper and electronic records and I can confirm naaper, the RAF's Remotely Piloted Aircraft System, has relocated to the United Kingdom and the Middle East. -------------------------------------------------- Please note that any request for an internal review must be made within 40 working days of the date on which the attempt to reach informal resolution has come to an end.B2 lf you remain dissatisfied following an internal review, you may take your complaint to the lnformation Commissioner under the provisions of Section 50 of the Freedom of lnformation Act.Please note that the lnformation Commissioner will not investigate your case until the MOD internal review process has been completed.Further details of the role and powers of the lnformation Commissioner can be found on the Commissioner's website, http://www.ico.orq.uk.Appendix: Document 2 Yours sincerely, PJHQ J9 FOI Secretariat 83 {-}r ffi Ministry of Defence Mr Chris Cole (Drone Wars UK) Email : chris@d ronewars.net Dear Mr Cole, Appendix: Document 3 Jg FOI Secretariat Permanent Joint Headquarters Northwood Headquarters Sandy Lane Northwood, Middlesex HA6 3HP United Kingdom E-mail: PJHQ-J9-FOl-Group@mod.uk Reference : FOl2O15l0851 I Date: 12 November 2015 Thank you for your email of 1 October which requested the following information: 1) for each month between Juty and Sept 2015, and broken down between lraq and Syria, a) The number of Reaper missions flown; b) The number of reaper sorfies with weapons released; c) The number and type of weapons released please can you let me have the number of IJK air strikes in lraq and Syria per month srnce Juty 2015 broken down between Tornado and Reaper aircraft? -------------------------------------------------- 30 Oct 20L2 : Column \il4116 Drones Question Asked by Lord Hylton To ask Her Majesty's Government how many drones are operated by the United Kingdom in or near Afghanistan; whetirer they are used for attack purposes; and, if so, how many deaths of non-combatant by United Kingdom drones since operations in Afghanistan began,lHL2566l civilians have been "urr"a The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Astor of Hever): The following table listi the UK Ministry of Defence's in-service remotely piloted air systems by number of aircraft and typ" cunently deployed in support of UK operations within Afghanistan.Remotely Piloted Air System Number of Remotely Piloted Aircrafi Hermes 450 5 9 Hawk III 9 lack Hornet la Hawk Total IB 335 Allplay avital role in military operations in support of our Armed Forces on the grouncl.Although their primary mission is intelligence collection, surveillance and Leconnaissance, the Reaperremotely pilotecl aircraft is armed with preision gLrided weapons. -------------------------------------------------- 93 Appendix: Document 7 f,l?ffi)\Y/ Ministry of Defence JB FOI Secretariat Permanent Joint Headquarters Northwood Headquarters Sandy Lane Northwood ,Middlesex HA6 3HP United Kingdom E-mail: PJH mod.u Ref : 1 9-02-2014-093528-00 1 17 March 2014 chris@dronewars.net Drone Wars UK 19 Paradise Street Peace House Oxford OX1 1LD Dear Mr Cole, Thank you for your email of the 19 February 2014 requesting the following information: "Please can you tetl me how many Reaper UAVs are currently in service with British forces in Afghanistan.tf more than five please can you tell me the date when fhese additional Reapers came into service."I am treating your correspondence as a request for information under the Freedom of lnformation Act 2000 (FOIA).A search for the information has now been completed within the Ministry of Defence, and I can confirm that all the information in scope of your request is held.The information you have requested can be found below; The UK currently has five Reaper Remotely Piloted Aircraft in service. -------------------------------------------------- Civilian contractors assembling a RAF Reaper Remotely Piloted Air System (RPAS) at Kandahar Airfield, in Afghanistan.RAF/MOD Crown Gopyright 2014 News articlos by date h ttps: //rvrnv.raf'.rrrod.uk/en,s/arch ive/nrorc-rallrcapcrslake-to-thc-ski es-03 0?20 I 4 [ I 6/0o120 I 7 I I :5o: I 8] 98 i\4orc R.\F Rearcrs l ake 1'o'l'hc Sktes https//rv$,rr,.rat-rIorl.uk/ncr\s/clivc/rDorc-rt:rcl)cs-rak0-(o{he-skics-0i072t)l4ll6/06/2017 Il:56:l8l 99 Appendix: Document 9 I Yiewsley ..I Now 20"C' 2pm23'C sion in O UK Edition ' Search Q i SPORT , W&SHOWBII : NEWS UVING MONEY filOTORS , TRAVET TE(H MOST POPUI.AR Meet Tina... the RAF Reaper drone pilot flying missions from secret base to take down ISIS I uxcl-USIVE:The Sun goes inside secret Reaper I air base known as The Rock By DAVID WILLETTS, Defence Editor 3rd |"{ay 2uiii, li:ili p:n I Updaiecl: l$th l'*iay 2f}16, 3:5'T ;un AT her secret Middle East base, RAF Warrant Officer Tina is taking the fight to lS - flying killer drones to attack the terror group who she likens to Nazis. -------------------------------------------------- There is a 16.1 percent chance the Reaper will return to this top secret base with fewer rockets and bombs, according to RAF data."We're looking for deep targets," RAF Group Capt.Jim Frampton totd The Daity Signal.Americans need an alternative to the mainstream media.But this can't be done alone.Find out niore >> "Leadership, foreign fighters, finances.This ptatform lets us understand how Daesh is functioning," Frampton added, using a disparaging Arabic acronym for lSlS.ln a trailer beside a hangar at the airfietd, two RAF pilots remotely control the drone through taxi, takeoff, and departure' They make radio calts with locaI air traffic control to avoid civitian aircraft.Once ctear of local airspace, they transfer control of the drone to British pilots at either Creech Air Force Base in Nevada or RAF Waddington in the United Kingdom.From thousands of miles away, pilots sitting in front of computer screens will remotety pitot the Reaper through its combat mission. -------------------------------------------------- Since the acquisition of Reapers under Urgent Operational Requirement procedures in 2008 the MoD has previously given the number and location of UK Reapers in response to both written parliamentary questions and Freedom of information requests without any apparent operational security issues (see attached examples).As you will be aware there are continuing questions about the use of armed unmanned aerial vehicles and transparency about their use is a key issue as the UN Special Rapporteur, Ben Emmerson, has spelt out a number of times.You will appreciate that it is difficult for members of the public to understand why there is a difference in terms of operational security between Operational Herrick and Operation Shader and therefore I would be grateful if you could set out the reasons as clearly as possible.Yours sincerely Chris Cole Co-ordinator 110 111 Appendix: Document l3 Fermanent Joint Headquarters (United Kingdom) Middle East Team Secretariat J9 Policy and Operations Permanent Joint Headquarters, Sandy Lane NORTHWOOD, HA6 3HP Mr Chris Cole Drone Wars UK Peace House 19 Paradise Street Oxford OXl lDL Ref: D/PJHQlJgnO2a15l15B0F Date: 2ltlarch 2015 THEAT OFFICIAL CORRESPONENGE . -------------------------------------------------- He decided to initiate an alternative way of carrying out Elint missions, a way which eliminated risking human life.Corra flew ck tO Washington and approached Qeneral Steakley of the I lof the JCS about his drone idea.Steakley said that he would pursue the mat~r with Cyrus R. Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense.Within a month after the EC-121 shootdown, the Defense Department approved the program using the Ryan model TE drone aircraft.The first test flight tookiplace in I Novemfr 1969 andth.e first operational flight occurred on 15 Februaryl970 D / / . .This unmanned drone operation was given the nickname I pnd was part of an Air Force program initially referred to as the I I The Air Force soon adopted the use of drones and "minimanned" aircraft (flight I crews only) with palletized intercept receivers remotely tuned by operators at ground stations to reduce manned aerial reconnaissance in high risk areas.Through a complex system of uplink/downlink communications, intercept activities could be carried out without exposing a large number of operator personnel to hostile reactions. -------------------------------------------------- These drone and minimanned platforms supplemented the ACRP fleet.However, because of cost considerations and a high attrition rate due to the drones over North Vietnam, the Air lclrone operation in 1975.Nevertheless, a downlink Force phased out thel t l8P SECRET UMBRA 44 DOCID: 4047116 QG.l\.'felt SEEREl' tJMlltA programfl lin the late 1970s, using minimanned U-2R aircraft.Two U-2R aircraft performed a totaf of 24 missions per ,~I lcontinuedl I A FINAL LOOK AT THE CRIBIS 'Eo 1.4.(c) P.L.86-36 .Despite minima] officia] involvement in BEGGAR SHADOW missibns, NSA pJayed a major role in evaluating the shoot.down of EC-121.It provided accul".ateinforniation on the ~adar renections of the flight pattern of the missionj flight; and command and contro] responsibilities.In the investigation which followed the crisis, NSA officials provided key intelligence information justifying the aerial reconnaissance program and the need for this special intelligence and made important recommendations for improving the U.S. response to crisis situations. -------------------------------------------------- 10 Mark Brown, Lockheed Uses Ground-Based Laser to Recharge Drone Mid-Flight (July 12, 2012), available at http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2012-07/12/lockheed-lasers.11 Steven Aftergood, Secret Drone Technology Barred by Political Conditions (Mar.22, 2012), available at http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2012/03/sandia_drone.html.12 Jennifer Lynch, Are Drones Watching You?, Electronic Frontier Foundation (Jan. 10, 2012), available at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/01/drones-are-watching-you.EPIC Testimony Aerial Surveillance and Privacy 3 October 25, 2012 Field Forum of biometric data in the world, exacerbates the privacy risks.13 Drones can be deployed to monitor individuals in a way that was not previously possible. -------------------------------------------------- In this decision, the Court found that statements from Leon Panetta, the director of the CIA at the time, and from the US President clearly demonstrate that the CIA uses drones in lethal strikes and these strikes have taken place at the very least in Pakistan and Yemen.83 Since 2002, there have been reports of a secret, more comprehensive CIA drone program.84 It is in part assumed that there is a clear delineation between the competencies of the military and the CIA in relation to, on the one hand, the official military drone strikes in Afghanistan and Iraq i.e.zones in which a recognized armed conflict is taking place and, on the other hand, the CIAs secret drone program in Afghanistan and beyond as a counter terrorism measure.85 In Pakistan the CIA station chief is said to have complete control and the power to take all local decisions.86 A in Blood, 6 April 2013, 80 Federal Prosecutor Generals decree from 20 June 2013, p. 14 and 15. -------------------------------------------------- 81 Federal Prosecutor Generals decree from 20 June 2013, p. 33.82 See e.g.New York Times, A Secret Deal on Drones, Sealed http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/world/asia/origins-of-cias-not-so-secret-drone-war-in- pakistan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.83 See United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in the cases Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745 (D.C. Cir.2010) and Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1105 (D.C. Cir.2010): the statements make clear that the CIA uses drones to conduct lethal strikes, that those strikes have occurred in (at least) Pakistan and Yemen, that the government believes the strikes have killed particular targeted individuals.When considered together, the statements of Mr. Panetta and the President plainly acknowledge the CIA drone program.84 P. Alston, Study on Targeted Killings, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 28 May 2010, A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, par.18; A. Burt/A. -------------------------------------------------- Wagner, Blurred Lines, Yale Journal of International Law Online, Vol.38, autumn 2012, p. 3-4.85 at: http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer; New York Times, A Secret Deal on Drones, 6.Apr.2013, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/world/asia/origins-of-cias-not-so-secret- drone-war-in-pakistan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.86 See for http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/world/asia/origins-of-cias-not-so-secret-drone-war-in- pakistan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.instance New York Times, A Secret Deal on Drones, 6 Apr.2013, available at: Predator War, available Yorker, 2009, New Oct.The The See 26 Page 19 criminal complaint has previously been lodged against the CIA representative acting at the time of the strike, Jonathan Banks, which prompted him to return to the US.87 Aside from the claim, disputed in this text, that a non-international armed conflict existed, the CIA are prevented from relying on the so-called combatant privilege since CIA employees are not members of the US armed forces.88 In accordance with Article 43 (2) AP I, in an armed conflict only combatants are entitled to directly participate in hostilities and thus to benefit from immunity from prosecution, assuming they adhere to the rules of international humanitarian law.89 To enjoy this status the individual in question must be clearly identifiable as a member of a party to the conflict by wearing a uniform or holding a weapon.90 These rules also apply to non-international armed conflict since the rules of international armed conflict are as much as possible applicable, particularly in a case in which a state is engaged in conflict with non-state actors on another states territory.91 The principle of reciprocity means that state and non-state actors who fail to identify themselves as parties to the conflict may be punished in an identical manner.92 One of the aims of this rule is to ensure that it is clear who is responsible for individual hostile acts so that illegal maneuvers may be appropriately punished. -------------------------------------------------- This would present problems in a scenario in which secret service agents take part in hostilities; for this reason such agents may not benefit from combatant privilege.93 In such cases national criminal law applies.In the present case it is possible to apply US criminal law (on account of the nationality of the perpetrator) and Pakistani criminal law (scene of the crime) as well as the German Criminal Code (nationality of the victim).94 It is not possible to refer to the rules of international humanitarian law in order to provide justification for the actions of the persons responsible for the strike.In this sense the Federal Prosecutor General is mistaken in his finding that civilians who, during their participation in hostilities, adhere to international humanitarian law commit no breaches of this law and thus may rely on this as a justification to avoid criminal liability.95 Yet even if this assumption on 87 The criminal complaint is available at: http://www.reprieve.org.uk/static/downloads/2010_12_13_PUB_FIR_application_drones_Kareem_Khan.pdf; Spiegel online, CIA unter Druck: US-Spitzenagent muss aus Pakistan fliehen, 17 Dec. 2010, available at: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/cia-unter-druck-us-spitzenagent-muss-aus-pakistan-fliehen-a-735370.html. -------------------------------------------------- However, this would in practice render the requirement to display clear identification symbols useless, since the persons operating the drone would be located far from the field of battle.98 By equating the CIA and the military in relation to the use of combat drones in Pakistan, the Federal Prosecutor General fails to recognize the fundamental differences between military operations and the activities of secret services.Referring to the fact that both entities share the same ultimate commanding authority does not support a conclusion that the CIA is part of the military.While the US President may have ultimate authority over both the military forces and the secret service, this does not automatically mean that the CIA and the military are embedded in the same command structure.The two entities are fundamentally different; the CIA has an independent hierarchy and organization that is not incorporated into any military command structure.99 In addition, there are doubts as to the intensity of the cooperation between the military and the CIA in Pakistan, since the CIA has its own informants in Pakistan and the tribal areas to provide guidance on targeting of drone strikes.100 Training in the application of international humanitarian law is a further important distinction between the two entities. -------------------------------------------------- The MOD had, in a limited way, put part of the withheld information in the public domain in light of the comments of the Defence Secretary on 4 June 2015 to reporters in which he confirmed that all ten British Reapers were deployed.7 The Commissioners position 12.With regard to the first criterion of the test set out at paragraph 8, the Commissioner accepts that the type of harm that the MOD believes would be likely to occur if the information was disclosed is applicable to interests protected by section 26(1)(b) of FOIA.13.Having considered the detailed submissions provided to her by the MOD, the Commissioner is satisfied that disclosure of the withheld information clearly has the potential to harm the capability and effectiveness of UK forces in operations against Daesh.The Commissioner is therefore satisfied that there is a causal link between the potential disclosure of the withheld information and the interests which section 26(1)(b) is 5 Update: air strikes against Daesh: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/update-air- strikes-against-daesh 6 See Nolan Peterson, Deep Targets: On the Ground With British, US Drone Forces Attacking ISIS, The Daily Signal, 02 May 2016, http://dailysignal.com/2016/05/02/deep- targets-on-the-ground-with-british-u-s-drone-forces-targeting-isis/ Alistair Bunkall, Inside Top-Secret Drone Operation Against IS, Sky News, 10 May 2016, http://news.sky.com/story/1690440/inside-top-secret-drone-operation-against-is David Willetts, Meet Tina the RAF Reaper drone pilot flying missions from secret base to take down ISIS, The Sun, 03 May 2016, https://www.thesun.co.uk/archives/news/1158578/meet-tina-the-raf-reaper-drone-pilot- flying-missions-from-secret-base-to-take-down-isis/ 7 http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/strike/2015/06/03/uk-dicusses- joint-reaper-pilot-training-with-france/28408303/ 5 Reference: FS50634580 designed to protect. -------------------------------------------------- 20.The complainant argued that it was important to note that the MOD has made clear that the targeted killing of Reyaad Khan by British forces utilizing a Reaper was not part of Operation Shader, the name given to UK military operations against Daesh.The complainant also noted that in evidence to the parliamentary Joint Human Rights Committee about the use of armed drones, the Defence Secretary Michael Fallon reiterated that the government wouldnt hesitate to take similar action again.9 The complainant emphasised that over the past decade it has become accepted as a constitutional convention that the House of Commons should have an opportunity to debate any proposed use of military force, except when there is an emergency and it would not be appropriate to consult MPs in advance.Thus the complainant argued that the government has accepted that there should be proper public accountability and oversight over use of British military force.21.Consequently, the complainant argued that a blanket policy of refusing details of the number of Reaper drones on operations or their location enables covert use of such systems, and prevents rightful public oversight of the deployment of UK military force, and thus there was a compelling public interest in the disclosure of the withheld information. -------------------------------------------------- In most of those cases, the CIA conducted the attacks under Title 50 authority, which outlines the authorities for covert action. Thus, the United States could not acknowledge the strikes, and any rules of engagement would also be kept secret.Obama, in a candid discussion with law students at the University of Chicago in April 2016, conceded that this did a dis- service to the creation of legal and ethical standards for the strikes, something he said he was trying to repair.3 In those same comments, Obama acknowledged that in his rst years in of ce he was concerned that the drone program had a weak legal basis.He had never suggested it at the time as the administration alternated between ducking ques- tions about the program and simply defending its use.I think its fair to say that in the rst couple of years of my presidency, the architecturelegal architecture, administrative architecture, command struc- turesaround how these [strikes] were utilized was underdeveloped relative to how fast the technology was moving, he said. -------------------------------------------------- And Americas monopoly on the technologyand thus its ability to set some norms about their usefaded as other countries raced to match the US drone capability.Israel and China both have advanced programs; most others are still catching up.Cyber attacks, because they are so stealthy and their effects often so hard to see, were treated more as a state secretand were less politically charged.But the barrier to entry for other countries was low, and as Obama entered the twi- light of his presidency, many sophisticated players existed.Olympic Games proved to be the start of a new era of state- sponsored cyber attacks.Seven years after Obamas meeting with President Bush, Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran had all launched state- sponsored attacks and had become far more skilled at cyber exploits and espionage.The policy of secrecy surrounding the drone and cyber programs diverged as well.The administration wisely gave up its futile effort to avoid talking about drones; since each attack was reported in the media, the technology was not deniable. -------------------------------------------------- To understand the commonalities and the differences in American debates over how to use drones and cyber weapons, it is rst necessary to consider how the weapons differ.A Short History of Drones and the Myth of Perfect Aim It did not take long for Obama to embrace his predecessors advice to retain and accelerate the two secret programs.For a new president seeking a way out of Iraq and debating a brief surge in Afghanistan, drones were particularly attractive.The more Obama learned about the technology, the more he turned to it.The rst term of his administration saw 2017 Georgetown University Press.All Rights Reserved.This PDF is intended for non-commercial use by individuals.For all other types of re-use, please contact Georgetown University Press at gupress@georgetown.edu.19029-Perkovich_Understanding.indd 66 19029-Perkovich_Understanding.indd 66 8/16/17 8:02 PM 8/16/17 8:02 PM Cyber, Drones, and Secrecy 67 about three hundred drone strikes in Pakistan alone, roughly a sixfold increase from the number during the entire Bush administration. -------------------------------------------------- After a minor rebellion in the Obama war cabinet, led by Secretary of State Hil- lary Clinton and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Adm. Michael Mullen, the adminis- tration concluded that the signature strike standard was simply too loose.12 American ambassadors were given far more authority to sign off onor halta strike in their territory, an imposition of State Department control that quickly resulted in serious con icts with the CIA and the Pentagon.The latter agencies were not accustomed, or very happy, with the idea of career foreign service of - cers limiting their ability to pull the trigger. 2017 Georgetown University Press.All Rights Reserved.This PDF is intended for non-commercial use by individuals.For all other types of re-use, please contact Georgetown University Press at gupress@georgetown.edu.19029-Perkovich_Understanding.indd 68 19029-Perkovich_Understanding.indd 68 8/16/17 8:02 PM 8/16/17 8:02 PM Cyber, Drones, and Secrecy 69 Over time, Obama himself became deeply involved in debating what was a legitimate target and what was not, a subject that appealed to his legal training but also left him feeling deeply uneasy. -------------------------------------------------- But even at the time, one section appeared particularly fanciful.Bush raised the specter that the Iraqi leader would oat a ship off the coast of the United States and launch an attack with a secret eet of UAVs armed with chemical or biological weapons that could be dropped on American cities.The idea never quite garnered the ridicule it deserved, for the ship would have been a sitting duck for the US Coast Guard or the navy, and biological and chemical weapons are hard to disperse effectively.But the imagery of a otilla of drones illustrates the rst signi cant difference between drones and cyber: with drones, geography still matters, as it limits the weapons effectiveness.Fourteen years after that speech was delivered, it is still hard to imagine how a foreign power could launch such an attack.A base near the United States would be necessary, and, of course, hiding such an air base would be dif cult.Thus, the Bush administration needed to conjure up a ship- based solution to the problem. -------------------------------------------------- (In fact, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld ordered Paci c Command to be ready to do just that when the North Koreans were threatening a launch in 2006.16) If Mexico sent an armed drone over the border, undoubtedly the United States would again try to shoot it down.But what if the National Security Agency saw a Sony- like attack massing in a North Korean server or in the computers of a Mexican drug lord?It is far from clear what the US response would be.The Defense Department doctrine on 2017 Georgetown University Press.All Rights Reserved.This PDF is intended for non-commercial use by individuals.For all other types of re-use, please contact Georgetown University Press at gupress@georgetown.edu.19029-Perkovich_Understanding.indd 73 19029-Perkovich_Understanding.indd 73 8/16/17 8:02 PM 8/16/17 8:02 PM 74 Sanger cyber activity states that in certain cases an attack would merit a national response, but the threshold is understandably vague. -------------------------------------------------- But cyberspace is different.Former defense secretary Ashton Carter said he could imagine a federal response in only about 2 percent of all cyber attacks; given the huge number of cyber attacks that take place daily on government and civilian targets, that percentage seems high.So far, only a handful of publicly known cases have merited any signi cant federal response.Sparking the Debate There is no reason these questions cannot be debated by the American people.From 1945 through the Cold War, almost everything about nuclear weapons was classi ed top secret or above.Yet the country managed to debate nuclear doctrine in the open, determining a set of rules over when the United States would use them.That debate ended in a very different place than it began.The world gained con dence in the US governments ability to control nuclear weapons because of that debate.And the United States set standards that others now follow.The public is now having a similar debate about drones, though a vigorous press had to help drag the government to that point. -------------------------------------------------- 10.Jo Becker and Scott Shane, Secret Kill List Proves a Test of Obamas Principles and Will, New York Times, May 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world /obamas- leadership- in- war- on- al- qaeda.html?pagewanted=9&_r=1&hp&adxnnlx =1338289213- gFazCDrgzwY2RtQCER9fGQ&pagewanted=all.11.See Steve Coll, The Unblinking Stare, New Yorker, November 24, 2014, http:// www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/11/24/unblinking- stare.12.Adam Entous, Siobhan Gorman, and Julian Barnes, U.S.Tightens Drone Rules, Wall Street Journal, November 4, 2011.13.Ibid.14.Of ce of Press Secretary, Remarks by the President. 15.David E. Sanger, Bush Sees Urgent Duty to Pre- empt Attack by Iraq, New York Times, October 8, 2002.16.For further discussion of the US consideration of shooting down a Taepodong missile over the Paci c, see my account in The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2010), 32223. 2017 Georgetown University Press. -------------------------------------------------- TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .................................................I.A BACKGROUND ON DRONE STRIKES AND AL-AULAQI .............................................A.Use of Drones as Weapons Against Terrorism ......B.The Case of Anwar Al-Aulaqi ......................II.THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR DRONE STRIKES ........A.Defining Enemy Combatant ......................B.The Presidents Authority in Times of War ..........C. Due Process Rights of American Citizens in Times of War ..............................................D. Application of the Framework to the Strike Against Al-Aulaqi ...........................................2 4 4 8 17 17 19 28 33 * Former Counsel to the President and United States Attorney General under the George W. Bush Administration.Before joining the Bush Administration in Washington, the author served as then-Governor George W. Bushs General Counsel, the Texas Secretary of State, and was later appointed to the Texas Supreme Court.The author is currently the Doyle Rogers Distinguished Chair of Law at Belmont University College of Law, and Counsel of the Nashville law firm of Waller Lansden. -------------------------------------------------- L. No.107-40, 115 Stat.224 (2001); see also Donna Miles, Deputy Secretary: 9/11 Changed America Forever, U.S. DEPT OF DEF.(Sept. 7, 2006), http://www.defense.gov/news/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=726.2 Mary Ellen OConnell, Seductive Drones: Learning from a Decade of Lethal Operations, 21 J.L.INFO.& SCI.116, 122 (2012) (In sum, during the last decade, we know from media reports that the US has used [unmanned combat vehicles] in lethal operations in the following countries: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen.).3 See David Rohde, The Obama Doctrine, FOREIGN POLICY, Mar.Apr.2012, at 65.4 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at National Defense University (May 23, 2013) [hereinafter Obama Speech on Drone Policy], available at http://www.whitehouse .gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university; President Ba- rack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Change of Office Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Ceremony (Sept. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Obama Change of Office Speech], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/30/remarks-president-change-office-chair man-joint-chiefs-staff-ceremony. -------------------------------------------------- 29 Gogarty & Hagger, supra note 21, at 8586.The use of drones is expanding in other countries.See id.at 8889, 13537; Dion Nissenbaum, Pakistan Moves to Build Its Own Drones, Push Aside U.S., WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2012, at A13; see also Simon Rogers, Drones by Country: Who Has All the UAVs?, GUARDIAN DATABLOG (Aug. 3, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.guard ian.co.uk/news/datablog/2012/aug/03/drone-stocks-by-country.Drones are used in the United States for domestic purposes as well.See Greg McNeal, DOJ Report Reveals Details of Domestic Drone Usage, FORBES (Sep. 28, 2013, 9:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/2013/ 09/28/doj-report-reveals-details-of-domestic-drone-usage/.6 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol.82:1 targets.30 Before President Obama gives such an order, the target must be on the kill list.31 The details of precisely how a persons name is placed on the kill list are classified.32 One can speculate, how- ever, that this process begins with the Intelligence Community33 com- piling a comprehensive master list of persons of interest.34 30 See Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret Kill List Proves a Test of Obamas Principles and Will, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A1. -------------------------------------------------- Second, the facts and circumstances pertaining to the nomi- nation must meet the reasonable suspicion standard of review established by ter- rorist screening Presidential Directives.Id.The TSC is the final authority in deciding whether a person makes it onto the TWL.Id.2013] DRONES: THE POWER TO KILL 7 The Obama Administration reported that it initiates top secret nominations to place potential targets on the kill list.35 A committee of over 100 national security members reportedly videoconferences once a week to discuss suspected enemy combatants and analyze their biographies.36 The committee deliberates on each of the potential targets for a month or two, then recommends which names should ultimately be placed on the kill list and which names should not be- cause they no longer appear[ ] to pose an imminent threat.37 One can speculate that the Terrorist Watch List (TWL) or a similar master list constitutes a foundation or first stage of the Obama Administrations process to select targets on the kill list.38 It has been reported that, because of his citizenship, Al-Aulaqis case was re- viewed by the Presidents National Security Council (NSC) before his name was finally placed on the kill list.39 Little is known, however, about the investigative methods or evidentiary standards by which in- formation is obtained and analyzed.40 The New York Times has tried to obtain more information about this process in court, but the re- quests have been opposed by the Obama Administration and denied by the courts.41 Even with the review process discussed above, based on my participation in numerous National Security Council meetings, I would find it hard to imagine that the name of an American citizen would be presented to the President prior to a final review and recom- mendation by the NSC principals, including the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Af- fairs.42 The President is entitled to know, and should receive, the During this lengthy process, the potential target has no notice that he may be placed on the list, nor is he aware of the reasons why. -------------------------------------------------- 136 Yemen-Based al Qaeda Group Claims Responsibility for Parcel Bomb Plot, CNN.com, Nov. 6, 2010, http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/11/05/yemen.security.concern/ ?hpt=T2.137 Holder Letter, supra note 5, at 3.138 Yemen Sentences Frenchmans Killer to Death, Two AQAP Inciters Get Jail, SABANEWS .NET, Jan. 17, 2011, http://www.sabanews.net/en/news233457.htm.139 Understanding the Homeland Threat LandscapeConsiderations for the 112th Congress: 2013] DRONES: THE POWER TO KILL 17 Al-Aulaqi under surveillance for at least two weeks, set up a secret airstrip in the Arabian Peninsula so it [could] deploy armed drones over Yemen,140 and on the morning of September 30, 2011, launched a missile from an unmanned aerial drone, killing Al-Aulaqi.141 There is nothing reported about the views, assessments, or attempts by the United States government to capture Al-Aulaqi even though he was under surveillance for two weeks.Based on the public record summarized above, it appears Al-Au- laqi was a legitimate national security threat.142 His actions, if re- ported accuratelyparticularly his operational involvement in the 2010 plan to blow up United States cargo planes and in the failed at- tempt to blow up a plane on Christmas Day in 2009go well beyond freedom of speech and association rights protected under our Consti- tution.143 Nevertheless, the question this Article attempts to answer is whether the President has the authority, acting alone, to designate an American citizen overseas as an enemy combatant for purposes of placing that citizen on a kill list, without providing that citizen the procedural due process of notice and an opportunity to contest the governments findings before a neutral decisionmaker.144 Concluding that the circumstances surrounding future American targets may pose a more difficult question, especially when there appears to be ample time to provide some form of due process, this Article suggests steps the United States government should consider to supplement the Presidents existing constitutional and statutory authority. -------------------------------------------------- II.THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR DRONE STRIKES A.Defining Enemy Combatant Before addressing the Presidents authority to place a person on the kill list, it is important to understand first who is considered an enemy combatant.Unfortunately, there are multiple statutory and Hearing Before the H. Comm.on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong.21 (2011) (statement of Michael E. Leiter, Dir., National Counterterrorism Center).140 Craig Whitlock & Greg Miller, U.S.Creating a Ring of Secret Drone Bases, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2011, at A1.141 Hettena, Awlaki Timeline, supra note 8; see also U.S. Officials Warn of Possible Retalia- tion After al Qaeda Cleric Is Killed, CNN.COM, Sept. 30, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/09/30/ world/africa/yemen-radical-cleric/index.html.142 See Obama Change of Office Speech, supra note 4.143 See id.144 Cf.Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (plurality opinion) (concluding that a citizen detainee has a right to challenge his designation as an enemy combatant before a neutral decisionmaker). -------------------------------------------------- 218 Id.at 509, 517.219 Id.at 515 (internal quotation marks omitted).220 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub.L. No.112-81, 1021(b)(2), 125 Stat.1298, 1562 (2011); see also Hedges v. Obama, No.12 Civ.331(KBF), 2012 WL 1721124, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.May 16, 2012).221 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519.222 Id.at 518.223 Id.at 519.224 Id.at 521.26 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol.82:1 drones.225 Few would disagree with this proposition.Agreeing that is true, however, we must still answer whether the AUMF authorizes the President to unilaterally designate an American citizen an enemy combatant for purposes of the kill list, particularly when circum- stances may provide ample time to have some formal review process.226 When questions arise over the scope of the powers of the Presi- dent and Congress, many scholars turn to the Supreme Courts deci- sion in Youngstown as the framework to find the answer.227 During the Korean War, President Harry Truman issued an executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize most of the nations steel mills to avert an anticipated strike by the United Steel Workers of America.228 The Court held that the President did not have the authority to issue such an order.229 In a concurring opinion, Justice Jackson articulated the following three-prong framework to analyze the scope of presidential power.230 According to Justice Jackson, the Presidents authority to take ac- tion should be evaluated in a framework that includes three levels or zones of authority.231 In Zone One, the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, which elevates his au- thority to its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.232 In Zone Two, the Presi- dent acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of au- thority, and therefore he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may 225 See Holder Speech at Northwestern, supra note 5. -------------------------------------------------- What is the difference between killing an American by drone strike and a targeted killing by a missile fired by an Air Force pilot flying 50,000 feet above or a targeted killing by an artillery shell fired by a Marine sergeant fifty miles away?Perhaps the difference is simply an acceptance of a historical practice that commenced at a time the U.S. government had neither the same capability to discern among American and foreign targets as we do today, nor the ability to target and kill with the accuracy we can today.Debat- ing the difference in treatment among long distance killings is beyond the scope of this Article; however, members of Congress may be forced to confront these questions if they decide to move forward with legislation on drone killings.Furthermore, there has been some concern expressed recently by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International that the use of drones constitutes a war crime.See Greg Miller & Bob Woodward, Secret Deal with Pakistan on Drones, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2013, at A1; Kimberley Dozier, 2 Human Rights Groups Criticize US Drone Program, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 22, 2013, http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2013/10/22/2-human-rights-groups-criti cize-us-drone-program. -------------------------------------------------- The poisoned political climate in Congress has, until now, stymied progress on such important issues as immigra- tion and the deficit.459 If the partisanship that deadlocks todays Con- gress prevents legislation on drones, then an alternative would be for the President to rely on his own authority to ease fears of an un- checked Executive.For example, he could issue a military order or presidential memorandum formally establishing objective criteria that must be satisfied before the Executive designates an American as an enemy combatant and places him on the drone kill list.The President could also impose on his Administration reporting requirements to Congress of all actions relating to drones and American citizens.Of course, because designations of Americans as enemy combatants re- late to national security and are often classified, the President may have already secretly exercised his independent authority to minimize an abuse of power.460 Unfortunately, presidential action in isolation of congressional legislation can be rolled back by the next administra- 457 See supra notes 24345 and accompanying text. -------------------------------------------------- 90/Number 872, December 2008.23 Eric Holder, Attorney General, Remarks at Northwestern University School of Law on March 5, 2012.24 Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret Kill List Proves a Test of Obamas Principles and Will, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012.HOW TO ENSURE THAT THE U.S. DRONE PROGRAM DOES NOT UNDERMINE HUMAN RIGHTSA HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST BLUEPRINT 5 A SECRET DRONE COURT IS NOT THE ANSWER Former Pentagon General Counsel Jeh Johnson and others have expressed deep skepticism about recent proposals25 to create a secret FISA26-like court to sanction targeted killings in advance.As Johnson noted, courts exist to resolve cases and controversies between parties, not to issue death warrants based on classified, ex parte submissions.27 Such a court would likely be unconstitutional because it would violate the separation of powers and would be asked to render advisory opinions rather than rule on actual cases and controversies. -------------------------------------------------- Those wrongfully targeted, or their survivors, are entitled to remedy, and the Administration should refrain from claiming that state secrets or the political question doctrine should foreclose such claims.RECOMMENDATIONS To ensure that the U.S. targeted killing/drone program is not undermining human rights, the president should prioritize transparency, legality, and oversight.TRANSPARENCY AND OVERSIGHT Order the Justice Department to release all Office of Legal Counsel memoranda setting forth its legal analysis of and justification for the targeted killing program, including the memorandum on the lethal targeting of Anwar al-Awlakian account of which has appeared in The New York Times.28 Such memoranda should be released with as few redactions as possible. Cooperate with all congressional oversight efforts and make transparency a high priority in the conduct of ongoing targeted killing operations. Identify the measures in place for agencies engaged in targeted killing to protect civilians. -------------------------------------------------- 2 For example, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates declared in an interview with CNN in 2013 that this capability meant that you can far more easily limit collateral damage with a drone than you can with a bomb, even a precision-guided munition, off an airplane. See Interview with Robert Gates, State of the Union with Candy Crowley, 10 February 2013, http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1302/10/sotu.01.html.While there has been scattered academic, activist, legal, policy, and media contestation of the conventional wisdom on drones, this has been fragmented and has not resulted in substantive international policy change.Indeed, those seeking to limit the impact of armed 3 Andrew Lichterman, Automated warfare, weapons modernization, and nuclear war risk, Presentation to the 2015 NPT Review Conference, New York, 28 April 2015, http://www.wslfweb.org/docs/Automated-warfare-and-nuclear- weapons-4-28-15.pdf.7 I N T R O D U C T I O N drones often end up caught in two discursive Given that the over whelming majority of air traps. -------------------------------------------------- Due to the optimistic that greater transparency could follow.difficulty in gaining access to the precise location of drone strikes, along with the lack of However, these small steps towards greater official accounts of individual strikes, it is hard to transparency may be short-lived, which determine whether we are capturing the full extent of the civilian death toll.Regardless, the strikes we do capture and the details we are able to record are important pieces of a puzzle, even if not a complete picture.The transparency environment today Positively, American counter terrorism operations have become somewhat less secretive over time, although that trend may be changing.In Yemen and Somalia, the US Central Command and US Africa Command are the bodies responsible for militar y operations in the two countries.Both began to regularly release information on drone strikes, sometimes with estimates of how many people were killed.At the end of 2016, US Central Command said it was implementing a monthly roll-up of strikes in Yemen, releasing figures normally on the first Friday after the 15th of each month.9 9 Major Josh Jacques, Personal communication with Jessica Purkiss, 4 April 2017. -------------------------------------------------- 21 Major Audricia Harris, Office of the Secretary of Defence Public Affairs department, Personal communication with Jack Serle, 31 March 2017.22 Jessica Purkiss and Jack Serle, Unprecedented number of US air and drone strikes hit Yemen, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2 March, 2017. https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2017-03-02/unprecedented-number-of-us-drone-and- air-strikes-hit-yemen.23 Christopher Sherwood, Department of Defense spokesman, Personal communication with Jack Serle, April 2017.24 Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt, Trump Eases Combat Rules in Somalia Intended to Protect Civilians, New York Times, 30 March 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/world/africa/ trump-is-said-to-ease-combat-rules-in-somalia-designed-to-protect- civilians.html.19 International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary IHL: Rule 14.Proportionality in Attack, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter4_rule14.25 Colonel Mark R. Cheadle, Director, Public Affairs and Communications Synchronization and Sr. Leader Engagement, US Africa Command, Discussion with author, 30 March 2017. -------------------------------------------------- The family went to Washington, D.C. in 2013 to As President and as Commander-in-Chief, provide evidence at a congressional briefing.I take full responsibility for all our counter Nobody has ever told me why my mother was terrorism operations,including the one that targeted that day, Rafiq ur Rehman, another of inadvertently took the lives of Warren and Mamanas sons, testified.27 While only a handful Giovanni, he stated.30 of congress members attended the session, possibly due to other pressing hearings taking place that same day, all reportedly apologised and expressed their condolences.28 The briefing was the first time the US Congress had come face to face with drone strike victims.President Obama explained that the existence of the operation was declassified and disclosed to the public because the Weinstein and Lo Porto families deser ve to know the truth.31 As the operation had been carried out under the authority of the highly secretive CIA, such an While this response seems positive, the familys admission marked a rare moment of lawyer, Reprieves Jen Gibson, stressed that the transparency. -------------------------------------------------- Where use is intense destruction of buildings and damage to or sustained, evidence suggests that these can infrastructure, such as power, water, and reach sufficient levels to pose a threat to sanitation facilities.Whilst potential toxic civilian health.8 impacts will be greatest where the use of explosive weapons in populated areas has been widespread and sustained,7 even limited use (such as individual air strikes) can bring risks to health in communities.As such, the There may also be specific concerns from novel materials that are being used in munitions deployed from drone platforms.For example, Dense Inert Metal Explosive (DIME) munitions, environmental impacts of explosive force are a the long-term health impacts of which are 4 The humanitarian harm caused by the use of explosive weapons in populated areasfrom deaths and injuries to infrastructure damage and displacementhas been recognised by a number of states, civil society, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the UN Secretary-General among others. -------------------------------------------------- In September 2014, following a request for regardless of the objectives being pursued.help from the Iraqi government, British MPs They were also more willing to initiate conflicts debated a government motion to authorise the using drones than piloted aircraft7 use of armed force against ISIS strictly within The US use of armed drones to attack al-Qaeda in Pakistan in recent years is often cited as an example of how this is happening in practice.According to The Bureau of Investigative the borders of Iraq.MPs approved the motion and strikes in Iraq began almost immediately.Within six weeks, however, British drones were crossing the border into Syria, with intelligence gathered by the British drones used by the US- Journalism (TBIJ) there have been over 420 US led oalition forces to undertake strikes in Syria.10 airstrikes in Pakistan (up to the end of 2016), all carried out by armed drones.Pakistan has publicly condemned the strikes on numerous occasions but does not attempt to shoot down the drones for fear of causing all-out war with the US (although there are reports that indicate some officials within the Pakistan administration secretly supported the strikes, at least for some time.8) When questioned by the media about legal authorisation for such missions, the Prime Ministers official spokesman said it was because the flights did not amount to militar y action. -------------------------------------------------- p. 25.8 Greg Miller and Bob Woodward, Secret memos reveal explicit nature of US, Pakistan agreement on drones, The Washington Post, 26 April 2010, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ national-security/top-pakistani-leaders-secretly-backed-cia-drone- campaign-secret-documents-show/2013/10/23/15e6b0d8-3beb- 11e3-b6a9-da62c264f40e_story.html?utm_term=.f6d2a9409e35.9 Recommendations and Report of The Task Force on US Drone Policy, The Stimson Center, April 2015, https://www.stimson.org/ sites/default/files/file-attachments/recommendations_and_report_ of_the_task_force_on_us_drone_policy_second_edition.pdf.10 Rowena Mason, UK to fly military drones over Syria, The Guardian, 21 October 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/uk- news/2014/oct/21/uk-to-fly-military-drones-over-syria.See also FCO response to PQ from Andrew Rosindell MP, 23 February 2015, http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written- questions-answers-statements/written-question/ Commons/2015-02-11/224326.11 Ibid. -------------------------------------------------- 4, 9.4 Katrina Manson, Jostling for Djibouti, FT Magazine, 1 April 2016, http://www.ft.com/ cms/s/2/8c33eefc-f6c1-11e5-803c-d27c7117d132.html.C O U N T RY C A S E S T U DY: D J I B O U T I A crashed US drone in Djibouti.Photo from a declassified Accident Investigation Board when it comes to power projection.5 It has personnel and US Department of Defense become an instrumental location in the US-led contractors.The base also employs about global war on terror.1,100 local and third-countr y workers.7 The US Navy operates a base at Camp The operations of Camp Lemonnier are Lemonnier, near the Djibouti-Ambouli shrouded in secrecy.Some is known from International Airport.It is a former French unclassified and also leaked classified Foreign Legion outpost and was previously documents and investigative reporting.used as a CIA black site where terrorism Virtually the entire 500-acre camp is suspects were detained without charges and dedicated to counterterrorism, reported allegedly tortured.6 It is currently home to Craig Whitlock of The Washington Post in about 4,000 US and allied militar y and civilian 2012, making it the only installation of its 5 Craig Murphy, Remote U.S. base at core of secret operations, The Washington Post, 25 October 2012, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-us- base-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392- 197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html. -------------------------------------------------- 6 Secret prisons: Obamas order to close black sites, The Guardian, 22 January 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2009/jan/23/secret-prisons-closure-obama-cia; Jason Leopold, Senate report set to reveal Djibouti as CIA black site, Al Jazeera America, 2 May 2014, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/5/2/djibouti-senate-cia.html.kind in the Pentagons global network of bases. 8 7 Camp Lemmonier, Djibouti, Commander, Navy Installations Command, http://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/ cnreurafswa/installations/camp_lemonnier_djibouti.html.8 Craig Whitlock, Remote U.S. base at core of secret operations, The Washington Post, 25 October 2012, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-us- base-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392- 197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html.59 T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Among other things, the US Joint Special thermal imaging devices, radar, cameras, and Operations Command (JSOC) is responsible communications.12 for the operation of US drone strikes in the region. -------------------------------------------------- The Washington Post reported in 2012 orders to find, track, or kill people that the US government has designated terrorists were increasingly delivered to Camp Lemonnier.Originally, the Pentagon described Lemonnier as temporar y, but it has hardened into the U.S. militar ys first permanent drone war base. 9 Camp Lemonnier was known as the busiest Predator drone base outside the Afghan war zone.13 Documents leaked to The Intercept in 2015 indicated that at the time, the base operated ten MQ-1 Predators and four MQ-9 Reapers.14 However, the Predator drones have reportedly since been removed from Djibouti, after more than 100 missions in Yemen and Somalia.15 After six drones armed with Hellfire missiles crashed, one only 1.5 kilometres from Djibouti From Chabelley, investigative journalist Nick City, the US moved its drones to Chabelley airfield in 2013, about 10 kilometres away from the main base.10 While this was thought to be temporar y, in June 2015 the US made a long-term implementing arrangement with Djibouti to establish Chabelley as an enduring base, allocating $7.6 million to construct a new perimeter fence around the base.11 The US Air Force also reportedly installed a tactical automated security system, a suite of integrated sensors, 9 Craig Whitlock, Remote U.S. base at core of secret operations, The Washington Post, 25 October 2012, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-us- base-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392- 197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html. -------------------------------------------------- 10 Nick Turse, The stealth expansion of a secret U.S. drone base in Africa, The Intercept, 21 October 2015, https:// theintercept.com/2015/10/21/stealth-expansion-of-secret-us- drone-base-in-africa; Craig Whitlock, Chaos in tower, danger in skies at base in Africa, The Washington Post, 30 April 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national- security/miscues-at-us-counterterrorism-base-put-aircraft-in- danger-documents-show/2015/04/30/39038d5a-e9bb-11e4- 9a6a-c1ab95a0600b_story.html; Craig Whitlock, Remote U.S. base at core of secret operations, The Washington Post, 25 October 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ national-security/remote-us-base-at-core-of-secret- operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392-197a-11e2-bd10- 5ff056538b7c_story.html.11 Letter to Committee of Appropriations from the Undersecretary of Defense, 25 June 2015, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/execution/reprogramming/ fy2015/milcon/15-10_MC_May_2015_Request.pdf.Turse found, US drone missions cover Yemen, southwest Saudi Arabia, a large swath of Somalia, and parts of Ethiopia and southern Egypt.16 The drones are flown via satellite link by pilots at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada and Cannon Air Force Base in New Mexico.17 They are maintained and launched in Djibouti by an Air Force squadron. -------------------------------------------------- 12 USAF boosts security of AFRICOMs AOR with TASS installation, airforce-technology.com, 1 May 2014, http:// www.airforce-technology.com/news/newsusaf-boosts-security- of-africoms-aor-with-tass-installation-4256028.13 Craig Murphy, Remote U.S. base at core of secret operations, The Washington Post, 25 October 2012, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-us- base-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392- 197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html.14 Nick Turse, The stealth expansion of a secret U.S. drone base in Africa, The Intercept, 21 October 2015, https:// theintercept.com/2015/10/21/stealth-expansion-of-secret-us- drone-base-in-africa 15 Joseph Trevithick, Why the US Air Force Pulled Its Predator Drones from a Secret Base in Africa, Motherboard, 4 December 2015, http://motherboard.vice.com/read/why-the- us-air-force-pulled-its-predator-drones-from-a-secret-base-in- africa.16 Nick Turse, The stealth expansion of a secret U.S. drone base in Africa, The Intercept, 21 October 2015, https:// theintercept.com/2015/10/21/stealth-expansion-of-secret-us- drone-base-in-africa 17 Craig Murphy, Remote U.S. base at core of secret operations, The Washington Post, 25 October 2012, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-us- base-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392- 197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html. -------------------------------------------------- The government recently turned away Russia, worried it would 20 China negotiates military base in Djibouti, AlJazeera, 9 May 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/ africa/2015/05/150509084913175.html.upset relations with the numerous western countries that are already tenantsthough it 21 Katrina Manson, Jostling for Djibouti, FT Magazine, 1 April 2016, http://www.ft.com/ cms/s/2/8c33eefc-f6c1-11e5-803c-d27c7117d132.html.18 Craig Murphy, Remote U.S. base at core of secret operations, The Washington Post, 25 October 2012, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-us- base-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392- 197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html.19 Nick Turse, Target Africa: The U.S. militarys expanding footprint in East Africa and the Arabian peninsula, The Intercept, 15 October 2015, https://theintercept.com/drone- papers/target-africa.22 Country comparison: GDP (purchasing power parity), The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, accessed 22 July 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html#dj. -------------------------------------------------- 1 See, e.g., The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions, Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic & Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2012, pp.24-25, 46, http://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights- institute/files/The%20Civilian%20Impact%20of%20Drones.pdf.68 T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S This lack of transparency prevents the victims and their families from obtaining any semblance The stakes: why the fight for transparency matters of accountability, and foments anger and fear among communities in targeted regions.It also For years, the US condemned other countries undermines democratic legitimacy and the rule of that carried out lethal strikes outside recognised law, because still-secret legal justifications for armed conflict.But beginning in the mid-2000s, and consequences of this lethal force mean that both Republican and Democratic administrations the public is unable to independently assess the nevertheless embraced a programme of just merits and legality of this deeply controversial these kinds of strikes.3 The US government programme. -------------------------------------------------- For example, the US 28 Navi Pillay, Pillay Briefs Security Council on Protection of Civilians on Anniversary of Baghdad Bombing, United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 19 August 2013, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13642&LangID=E.73 H A R M TO G OV E R N M E N TA L T R A N S PA R E N CY governments drone programme in Pakistan has executive branch secrecyand, often, excessive for years been one of the governments worst judicial deference to those secrecy claims.keep secrets.Despite regular and detailed news reports of US strikes there, current and former Transparency litigation suffers from a US officials statements about the programme,29 and a district court ruling that apparently agreed that this information has indeed been officially acknowledged,30 the government still goes to extraordinar y lengths to maintain in court, to the public, and to the international community that this programme is secret. -------------------------------------------------- undermining the rule of law.The unique challenges of the legal fight for transparency Given the significant costs of the secrecy surrounding the targeted killing programme, non- profit organisations and media outlets have turned to the courts to tr y to gain access to this information.Litigants suing for information about the targeted killing programme under the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) have had critically important successes, but still face an uphill battle and hurdles imposed by excessive 29 Anna Diakun, The Drone Program in Pakistan Is One of the Governments Worst-Kept Secrets, ACLU Speak Freely Blog, 18 July 2017, https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/drone-program- pakistan-one-governments-worst-kept-secrets.30 The ACLUs Second Circuit brief explaining why it appears that a federal district court held this fact to be acknowledged is available at https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/aclu-v-doj-brief- plaintiffs-appellees.31 The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions, Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic & Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2012, http://www.law.columbia. -------------------------------------------------- edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-institute/files/ The%20Civilian%20Impact%20of%20Drones.pdf.74 This problem is perpetuated when even the judicial opinions deciding these cases are redacted, such that the court may rule for or against the plaintiff without the plaintiff knowing why.Plaintiffs must decide whether to appeal without knowing why the court rejected their arguments or the ultimate basis for the courts reasoning.Even when the court rules against the government and holds that a particular fact or document may not remain secret, plaintiffs may still not get the information they seek.If the US government appeals, its briefs may be riddled with redacted section headings, redacted topic sentences, redacted lists, and entirely redacted pages.32 As an extreme example, in one of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)s recent targeted killing FOIA lawsuits, the ACLU prevailed on a certain issue before the district court.But because this ruling was redacted at 32 See, e.g., ACLU v. DOJ, 844 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. -------------------------------------------------- This exemplified the hypocrisy of the governments stance on the issue: when it ser ved the governments purposes, it would disclose information about the programme or coordinate unofficial leaks.All the while, it would claim in court that the programme was so secret that to even acknowledge its existence would put the national security of the United States at risk.34 The ACLUs 13 January 2009 FOIA request on predator drone strikes is available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/ field_document/2010-1-13-PredatorDroneFOIARequest.pdf.35 The CIAs memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment on the basis of its Glomar response is available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/15__ cia_s_motion_for_summary_judgment_10_01_10.pdf.75 H A R M TO G OV E R N M E N TA L T R A N S PA R E N CY The federal appeals court in Washington, DC, Khan in Yemen.41 Just weeks later, another US saw through the US governments attempt to drone strike killed Anwar al-Aulaqis son, have it both ways.36 In a victor y for transparency, sixteen-year-old US citizen Abdulrahman.42 Later the court held that given the many public that month, in October 2011, the ACLU statements by senior administration officials submitted a FOIA request seeking records concerning the nature of the targeted killing pertaining to the legal basis, factual basis, and programme, the CIAs refusal to confirm or deny actual process by which the US government even an intelligence interest was unreasonable targeted and killed these three Americans. -------------------------------------------------- Because the discussion of those facts is redacted, it is impossible for the public to evaluate whether the killing of al-Aulaqi meets the legal standards described in the memo.Moreover, key terms in the memo are undefined, so it is not even clear what exactly the legal standards are and how they operate in practice.45 Ibid.at 516-17.46 New York Times v. DOJ, 756 F.3d 100 (2d Cir.2014).47 Ibid.at 124.PPG must be disclosed.The government refused, so the ACLU again sued.During the course of this lawsuit, the government abandoned extremely broad claims of executive privilege and released the PPG, along with four Defense Department 49 Scott Shane, Election Spurred a Move to Codify U.S. Drone Policy, New York Times, 24 November 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/world/white-house-presses-for-drone-rule-book.html.50 Brett Max Kaufman, Court Considers Releasing Key Documents Governing Secretive Targeted Killing Program, ACLU Speak Freely Blog, 26 February 2016, https://www.aclu.org/blog/ speak-freely/court-considers-releasing-key-documents-governing- secretive-targeted-killing. -------------------------------------------------- In a contrasting view, the New America Foundation proposes civilian casualties to be much less than those 20 Ibid.21 D. Byman, Do targeted killings work? Brookings Institute, 14 July 2009, http://www.brookings.edu/research/ opinions/2009/07/14-targeted-killings-byman; and US Drone strikes in Pakistan claiming many civilian victims, says campaigner, The Guardian, 17 July 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2011/jul/17/us-drone-strikes-pakistan-waziristan.[...] Government records showed that there had been at least 2,200 deaths caused by such strikes and that, in addition, at least 600 people had suffered serious injuries.Officials pointed out that efforts to identify the exact number of deceased (and therefore to establish the exact number of civilian deaths) were hampered by security concerns and by topographical and institutional obstacles to effective and prompt investigation on the ground by officials working on behalf of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas secretariat, as well as by the cultural tradition of Pashtun tribes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of burying their dead as soon as possible. -------------------------------------------------- To the United States, a drone strike seems to have ver y little risk and ver y little pain.At the receiving end, it feels like war.Americans have got to understand that.If we were to use our technological capabilities carelesslyI dont think we do, but theres always the danger that you willthen we should not be upset when someone responds with their equivalent, which is a suicide bomb in Central Park, because thats what they can respond with. 41 41 Chris Woods, Sudden Justice: Americas Secret Drone Wars, p. 285.96 T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Country case study: Yemen Missile strikes from remotely piloted unmanned aircraft, or drones, have become a defining symbol of the United States for most Yemenis.If the United States has built a school in Yemen, most Yemenis Waleed Alhariri heads the US office of the Sanaa dont know about it; if the United States has Center for Strategic Studies (SCSS) in New York City and is a fellow-in-residence at Columbia Law Schools Human Rights Institute.The Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies (SCSS) is an independent policy and research think tank that provides new built a hospital in Yemen, most Yemenis dont know this either; but what almost ever y Yemeni has heard about are the children, families, and homes of their countr yfolk blown approaches to understanding Yemen and the apart in drone strikes. -------------------------------------------------- Today come to signify, for many Yemenis, US AQAP has become arguably more powerful, ruthlessness and has resulted in general fear resource-rich, entrenched, and operating with and public anger, which facilitates the more institutional flexibility and adaptive propaganda used as a recruiting tool for capacity than ever before, according a recent AQAP in many affected communities.Sanaa Center report.3 The report further 1 Jo Becker and Scott Shane, Secret Kill List Proves a Test of Obamas Principles and Will, New York Times, 29 May 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas- leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html.says that, The use of militar y force alone will almost certainly fail to defeat AQAP. This is because both the drone programme and similarly blunt and violent counter-terrorism tactics not only overlook the complex and 2 Out of the Shadows: Recommendations to Advance Transparency in the Use of Lethal Force, Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic and Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, June 2017, https://www.outoftheshadowsreport.com. -------------------------------------------------- Those terms denote, as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties sets out, a rule of international law which is accepted and Weapons advisor y opinion.41 Further, as the ILC has obser ved, that list may not be exhaustive and does not prevent the emergence of new rules of international law generally accepted by states as having a jus cogens character.42 At present, the rules relevant to drone strikes are the prohibition on the use of force and the recognized by the international community of basic rules of IHL.states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.36 A number of features of this rule of state responsibility need to be considered.The first is the range of jus cogens or preemptor y norms potentially relevant to the actions of the states in conducting drone strikes.The foremost example of such a norm, as the International Court of Justice recognized in the Nicaragua case, is the 33 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2) [2006] 2 AC 221 (HL), 263 (Lord Bingham). -------------------------------------------------- In drone programmes to bring strategic litigation, 1986, the United Kingdom (in marked contrast to which targets not the states actually launching France and Spain) permitted the United States unlawful strikes, but any of the states, which to fly airstrikes against Libya from United unlawfully facilitate the same.This approach, of Kingdom onshore airbases.The United Nations targeting the concerning actions of a particular General Assembly condemned the airstrikes, state indirectly, by focusing on the actions of although the relevant resolution did not explicitly those that enable that state, has had some mention the United Kingdoms role in them.57 support previously.In R (Zagorski) v Secretary In the same way, any states providing approval of State for Business, Innovation and Skills,58 and access for their territor y to be placed at the the UKs export of an ingredient used in lethal disposal of a drone programme which breaches injections overseas was challenged as a means 54 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 8th edition, ed. -------------------------------------------------- James Crawford, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 105.55 See: ASR, article 6; and ILC Commentary to article 6, [1]-[9].of disrupting capital punishment in the United States; and, in early 2017, Rights Watch (UK), together with Amnesty International and Human 56 Jackson, State Complicity, p. 141.57 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 41/38 (20 November 1986), UN Doc.A/RES/41/38.58 [2011] HRLR 6; Case of Zagorski and Baze v Secretary of State for Innovation, Business and Skills, [2010] EWHC 3110 (Admin).113 I N T E R N AT I O N A L L AW P E R S P EC T I V E S Rights Watch, challenged the UKs complicity, by means of the rules of state responsibility at international law, in the unlawful conduct of Saudi Arabia in the Yemen conflict on the basis of the UKs export of militar y materiel.59 States throughout the world that are not operating armed drone programmes are becoming increasingly drawn into this highly problematic innovation in modern warfare, which raises considerable legal and humanitarian concerns. -------------------------------------------------- At the same time that a greater worldwide involvement increases shared expertise and facilitates operations with global reach, it also exposes many more states to potential legal liability for their complicity in the international drone framework.For, it is clear that complicit states may be challenged within their domestic courts for their own breaches of international law as assistants to wrongdoing (subject to domestic legal rules as to the justiciability of international law).Those seeking new means by which to slow the spread of armed drone programmes would be well advised to consider this strategy of targeting complicity as a means of cutting off the effectiveness of current and future drone programmes.59 R (Campaign Against Arms Trade) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation, and Skills.114 T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Regional case study: Latin America Hector Guerra is an international relations Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.3 Latin American militar y and police institutions are using unarmed drones, especially for sur veillance missions in border areas, territorial waters, for crowd control and particularly, in anti-narcotics operations.4 Israel and United States remain the main suppliers, although there are locally analyst, and policy and advocacy practitioner in the developed militar y and police drones, like fields of humanitarian disarmament and human rights multilateralism. -------------------------------------------------- lemonde.fr/societe/article/2017/01/04/comment-hollande- autorise-l-execution-ciblee-de-terroristes_5057421_3224.html.12 Adam Entous and Missy Ryan, U.S.has secretly expanded its secret global network of drone bases to North Africa, The Washington Post, 26 October 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-has-secretly- expanded-its-global-network-of-drone-bases-to-north- africa/2016/10/26/ff19633c-9b7d-11e6-9980-50913d68eacb_ story.html?utm_term=.e52535705f75.13 Srdjan Cvijic and Lisa Klingenberg, Armed drones policy in the EU: the growing need for clarity, in European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, Litigating Drone Strikes: Challenging the Global Network of Remote Killing, May 2017, https://www.ecchr.eu/en/documents/publications/articles/ litigating-drone-strikes-eng-neu.html, footnote 52, cf Die bewaffneten Drohnen kommen, Spiegel Online, 31 March 2015, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundeswehr- ursula--von-der-leyen-laesst-kampfdrohnen- entwickeln-a-1026373.html. -------------------------------------------------- Not only are operators suggesting that it is appropriate to use rape as a weapon against individuals in a time of war, they are also making light of sexual violence more 22 Lauren Wilcox, Embodying algorithmic war: Gender, race, and the posthuman in drone warfare. Security Dialogue, 48, no.1, p. 13, describing Donna Haraway, Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective, Feminist Studies 14(3): 575599.23 Lauren Wilcox, op.cit.p. 13.24 For details of these processes, see Cora Currier, The kill chain: the lethal bureaucracy behind Obamas drone war, The Intercept, 15 October 2015, https://theintercept.com/drone- papers/the-kill-chain.25 Kyle Grayson, Six These on Targeted Killings, Politics 32(2): 120128.26 Ian Shaw, Intervention From Baseworld to Droneworld, AntipodeFoundation.org, 14 August 2012, https:// antipodefoundation.org/2012/08/14/intervention-from-baseworld- to-droneworld.27 Jeremy Scahill and Glenn Greenwald, The NSAs secret role in the U.S. assassination program, The Intercept, 10 February 2014, https://theintercept.com/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/. -------------------------------------------------- The statement highlights the way that remote killings lower the threshold for resorting to violent force to resolve complex conflicts and emphasises that killing by remote control is deeply offensive to Pax Christis belief Drone warfare embodies the fundamental problems that covert warfare entails.The process for determining who is targeted by drones, and why, is decided by a small group of government officials who are not accountable to Congress or the American people for their actions Concealment of covert activities generates confusion, results in the deaths of countless targeted people and bystanders, and in active nonviolence that is committed to taking undermines international law and on violence rather than inflicting it on others. cooperation.19 Pax Christi International also expresses concerns about the invasion of privacy using drone technology for human sur veillance, including civilian purposes such as law enforcement or border control.18 In addition to calling for more careful study of the issue and continual prayers for peace, the Brethren statement asks that members call upon both the US President and Congress to immediately cease all use of armed drones both domestically and abroad as well as commit to greater transparency and accountability about secret kill lists and the decision-making processes around drone deployment. -------------------------------------------------- The Debate over Drone Proliferation Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate over Drone Proliferation Michael C. Horowitz, Sarah E. Kreps, and Matthew Fuhrmann In the last decade and a half, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), drones, has become commonplace.1 In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States launched its rst armed drone strike in Afghanistan in that year.The strike missed its intended targetMullah November of Akhund, the Talibans number three in commandbut killed several others.A year later, the United States used an armed drone to strike suspected al-Qaida members in Yemen, including Qaid Salim Sinan al Harithi, who was thought to have plotted the attack against the USS Cole in 2000, which had killed seven- teen U.S. sailors.Since then, U.S. drone strikes have grown in both geographic scope and number, extending to Pakistan in 2004 and Somalia in 2007, and in- creasing from about 50 total counterterrorism strikes from 2001 to 2008 to about 450 from 2009 to 2014.2 U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta once understandably referred to drones as the only game in town in terms of stopping al-Qaida.3 Although the United States has been the most prolic user of combat drones, several other countries have employed them as well, including Iraq, Israel, Nigeria, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. -------------------------------------------------- See Hastings, The Rise of the Killer Drones: How America Goes to War in Secret, Rolling Stone, April 16, 2012, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-rise-of-the-killer-drones-how-america- goes-to-war-in-secret-20120416.11.Jimmy Stamp, Unmanned Drones Have Been around since World War I, Smithsonian.com, February 12, 2013, http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/unmanned-drones-have-been- around-since-world-war-i-16055939/?no-ist.12.Sarah E. Kreps, Drones: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).13.Thomas P. Ehrhard, Air Force UAVs: The Secret History (Arlington, Va.: Mitchell Institute Press, 2011).14.Mary Dobbing and Chris Cole, Israel and the Drone Wars: Examining Israels Production, Use, and Proliferation of UAVs (Oxford: Drone Wars UK, January 2014), p. 8, https://dronewarsuk.les .wordpress.com/2014/01/israel-and-the-drone-wars.pdf.15.Ehrhard, Air Force UAVs.The Debate over Drone Proliferation 11 Although the Predator and its successor, the Reaper, are armed and can travel long distances at medium altitude to strike targets, most drones elded by militaries around the world are tactical and unarmed; they can y for only a few hours at a time and are designed exclusively to provide local surveillance data.16 Of the nearly ninety countries that now have military drones of some kind, the majority do not yet possess armed and advanced drones. -------------------------------------------------- Charli Carpenter, for example, argues that, to the extent that one is concerned about drone strikes violating international law, the problem is U.S. policy.37 Drones are merely the delivery system, which could just as easily be a soldier or manned aircraft.Some current and former policymakers have expressed a sim- ilar view.In his memoirs, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Panetta states: [T]o call our campaign against Al Qaeda a drone program is a little like calling ter, 2014), http://www.stimson.org/sites/default/les/le-attachments/recommendations_and _report_of_the_task_force_on_us_drone_policy_second_edition.pdf.33.Michael C. Horowitz, The Looming Robotics Gap: Why Americas Global Dominance in Mili- tary Technology Is Starting to Crumble, Foreign Policy, May 5, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/ 2014/2005/2005/the-looming-robotics-gap/.34.Moyar, DronesAn Evolution, Not a Revolution, in Warfare, p. 13.35.Plaw, Fricker, and Colon, The Drone Debate, p. 305.36.Quoted in Micah Zenko and Sarah Kreps, Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2014), p. 8, http://www.cfr.org/drones/limiting-armed-drone- proliferation/p33127. -------------------------------------------------- 38.Leon Panetta with Jim Newton, Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace (New York: Penguin, 2014), p. 388 39.Quoted in Zenko and Kreps, Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation, p. 8.40.Davis et al., Armed and Dangerous? p. 15.41.We do not engage in depth the debate about the relative cost of current-generation drones be- cause of the lack of signicant apples-to-apples comparisons on relative costs across multiple countries.As time progresses, researchers will be better able to resolve this debate.42.Ty McCormick, U.S.Operates Drones from Secret Bases in Somalia, Foreign Policy, July 2, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/2007/2002/exclusive-u-s-operates-drones-from-secret- bases-in-somalia-special-operations-jsoc-black-hawk-down/.43.Gilli and Gilli, The Diffusion of Drone Warfare? The Debate over Drone Proliferation 17 The Advantages and Limitations of Drones Neither of the above perspectives is complete.Those who argue that drones are transformative overlook important operational limits. -------------------------------------------------- As discussed earlier, one obvious benet is that drones operate without a pilot in the cockpit.States with armed drones can conduct strikes without risking the lives of their forces, thus minimiz- ing casualties.At the same time, current-generation dronesmanned and unmannedoperate most effectively in permissive airspace, where there is a relatively low risk of being shot down.53.Deborah Lee James and Mark A. Welsh III, State of the Air Force Press Brieng by Secretary James and General Welsh in the Pentagon Brieng Room (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, January 15, 2015), http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/ Article/606995.54.James Dao, Drone Pilots Are Found to Get Stress Disorders Much as Those in Combat Do, New York Times, February 22, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/23/us/drone-pilots- found-to-get-stress-disorders-much-as-those-in-combat-do.html.55.United States Government Accountability Ofce, Actions Needed to Strengthen Manage- ment of Unmanned Aerial System Pilots (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Account- ability Ofce, 2014), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-316, p. 17. -------------------------------------------------- 72.Greg Miller and Bob Woodward, Secret Memos Reveal Explicit Nature of U.S., Pakistan Agreement on Drones, Washington Post, October 24, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/national-security/top-pakistani-leaders-secretly-backed-cia-drone-campaign-secret- documents-show/2013/10/23/15e6b0d8-3beb-11e3-b6a9-da62c264f40e_story.html.The Debate over Drone Proliferation 23 The Strategic Consequences of Drone Proliferation Given the preceding discussion, what are the strategic consequences of drone proliferation?It depends.Drones may be transformative in some con- texts but not others.In this section, we assess the impact of drone prolif- eration in six contexts: (1) counterterrorism; (2) interstate conict; (3) crisis onset and deterrence; (4) coercive diplomacy; (5) civil war and domestic con- ict; and (6) operations by nonstate actors.Research on the strategic effects of military technology identies these particular contexts as potentially salient.73 We therefore focus our attention on them here, recognizing that they are by no means the only areas in which drones might matter.74 As the following analysis shows, the effects of drone proliferation are hetero- geneous. -------------------------------------------------- Current-generation drones are likely to be consequential for counter- terrorism and domestic conict, but less transformative in most other settings.counterterrorism: helping to kill terrorists in uncontested airspace The U.S. experience suggests that drones shape the way policymakers think about counterterrorism operations.Echoing the argument developed earlier, some members of the U.S. foreign policy establishment have indicated that the availability of drones has affected how they view the use of force.For example, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted that drones cause leaders to view war as bloodless, painless, and odorless, allowing them to take actions that would not be permissible were American casualties part of the calcula- tion.As the Washington Post put it, Gates had come to see new technologies such as drones as providing an antiseptic form of warfare: Remarkable ad- vances in precision munitions, sensors, information and satellite technology and more can make us overly enamored with the ability of technology to transform the traditional laws and limits of war. -------------------------------------------------- Al- though some of the domestic political opposition is simply political theater, there are unresolved questions of safety and security concerning the logistics of transporting suspected terrorists.Against this backdrop, killing rather than capturing suspects has become a critical element of the United States counter- terrorism strategy.80 75.Greg Jaffe, Former Defense Secretary Gates Warns against Lure of Drone Warfare, Washing- ton Post, October 23, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/former-defense-secretary- gates-warns-against-lure-of-drone-warfare/2013/10/23/c5bdc734-3c2d-11e3-a94f-b58017bfee6c _story.html.76.Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense University (Washington, D.C.: White House, May 23, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofce/2013/05/23/ remarks-president-national-defense-university.77.U.S. Department of Justice, Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed against a U.S. Citi- zen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qaida or an Associated Force, http:// msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf. -------------------------------------------------- 78.Zenko and Kreps, Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation, p. 9.79.Robert Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014).80.Daniel Klaidman, Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency (New York: Houghton Mifin Harcourt, 2012).The Debate over Drone Proliferation 25 The United States experience is not necessarily unique.For example, the Israel Defense Forces use armed drones to target suspected militants in Syria,81 Gaza,82 and Sinai.83 As with the United States, however, Israel is not forthcom- ing with details of its operations because of the military sensitivity of the strikes and the political sensitivity of diplomatic relationships that facilitate those strikes, such as with the Egyptian government with respect to strikes in the Sinai.84 The above evidence suggests that, particularly for democratic regimes, and perhaps for others as well, armed drones may lower the barriers for using force in a counterterrorism context where capture is unpalatable and adversar- ies are armed and dangerous but do not have sophisticated air defenses that can shoot down the low and slow-ying drones. -------------------------------------------------- Michael Boyle argues, for instance, The risks of a conict spiral arising from the shoot-down of the drone or an accident of some kind in the East China Sea are real and potentially dangerous.96 Despite the technical limitations of armed drones, it is possible that a state might attempt to carry out drone strikes on an adversarys territory, potentially triggering a crisis if the UAV is shot down.It is more likely, however, that countries would use drones for persistent surveillance in a contested area.Indeed, this is a case where unarmed drones could carry signicant, possibly salutary, implications for international security.92.David Axe, Drones Take Over Americas War on ISIS, Daily Beast, June 17, 2015, http:// www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/06/17/the-war-on-isis-is-a-drone-war.html.93.Greg Miller, U.S.Launches Secret Drone Campaign to Hunt Islamic State Leaders in Syria, Washington Post, September 1, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/ us-launches-secret-drone-campaign-to-hunt-islamic-state-leaders-in-syria/2015/09/01/723b3e04- 5033-11e5-933e-7d06c647a395_story.html. -------------------------------------------------- The risk of autocrats using armed drones for domestic control reects grow- ing concerns held by some senior U.S. defense ofcials about their potential use.For instance, in a discussion about the future of military robotics in December 2015, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work argued that authoritarian regimes who believe people are weaknesses in the machine, that they are the weak link in the cog, that they cannot be trusted ...they will naturally gravitate towards totally automated solutions.122 There are signs that this is already happening.Consider, for example, that when facing pro- tests in Xinjiang in 2014, the Chinese government reportedly ordered the de- ployment of surveillance drones to monitor the situation.123 operations by violent nonstate actors: a legitimate concern Drones may also be a useful military tool for nonstate actors.But why would militant groups need them?They already have a variety of potential means to attack targets, including nail bombs and explosives that may be less expensive and more deadly.124 Small drones could generate military benets for militant groups as a preci- 119. -------------------------------------------------- Tucker, Every Country Will Have Armed Drones within 10 Years. 120.Autocratic countries monitoring their soldiers to ensure that they comply with orders are nothing new, of course.The Soviet Union, in World War II, famously employed blocking battal- ions designed to shoot anyone retreating from the front.See Richard J. Overy, The Dictators: Hit- lers Germany and Stalins Russia (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004).What drones enable is the use of these techniques without the mass mobilization necessary in the Soviet case.121.Talmadge, The Puzzle of Personalist Performance. 122.Robert O.Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense Speech at CNAS Defense Forum, JW Marriott, Washington, D.C., December 14, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/ Speech-View/Article/634214/cnas-defense-forum.123.Didi Kirsten Tatlow, China Said to Deploy Drones after Unrest in Xinjiang, New York Times, August 19, 2014, http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/2008/2019/china-said-to-deploy- drones-after-unrest-in-xinjiang. -------------------------------------------------- 126.Bruce Hoffman, The Logic of Suicide Terrorism, Atlantic Monthly, June 2003, pp.4047.127.Sarah Krepss interview with U.S. Air Force colonel stationed in South Korea, March 2014.For an example of the use of small drones to evade surveillance by a nation-state, see North Ko- reas use of surveillance drones in South Korea.The drones crashed but evaded detection by air defense systems.As Van Jackson writes, [I]ts the low-performance qualities of North Koreas drones that enable them to evade South Korean defenses, which are optimized for more traditional threats from bigger, faster, higher-altitude aircraft. See Jackson, Kim Jong Uns Tin Can Air Force, Foreign Policy, November 12, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/2011/2012/kim-jong- uns-tin-can-air-force/.128.Michael S. Schmidt, Secret Service Arrests Man after Drone Flies near White House, New York Times, May 14, 2015.129.Ibid.130.Alex Brandon, FBI: Man Plotted to Fly Drone-Like Toy Planes with Bombs into School, Associated Press/CBS News, April 8, 2014, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fbi-man-in- connecticut-plotted-to-y-drone-like-toy-planes-with-bombs-into-school/. -------------------------------------------------- 131.Carlo Munoz, Iran Claims Drones Gained Access to Secret Israeli Facilities, The Hill, October 29, 2012, http://thehill.com/policy/defense/264691-iran-claims-drones-gained-access-to- secret-israeli-facilities.132.Hamas Flexes Muscles with Gaza Drone Flight, Agence France-Presse, December 14, 2014, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/12/14/Hamas-ies-drone-over-Gaza- during-anniversary-parade-.html.The Debate over Drone Proliferation 37 Table 1.Overall Consequences of Current-Generation Drone Proliferation Context Counterterrorism operations Interstate war Crisis onset and deterrence Coercive diplomacy Domestic control and repression Use by nonstate actors Consequences of Current-Generation Drone Proliferation high low moderate low high moderate In light of these trends, this article shows the potential effects of drone pro- liferation in six different contexts, making our study one of the most compre- hensive assessments of this topic carried out to date.Table 1 summarizes the main results from our analysis. -------------------------------------------------- However, the radiation monitoring task needs radiation-hardened chips.reconnaIssance of nuclear InstallatIons The spy drones are known for collecting an adversarys vital data, including that of nuclear or other sensitive installations.This system of collection and transmission of data, which otherwise is considered a negative phenomenon, may at times produce positive results.It can be a good tool for building confidence and allaying misgivings by giving a clear-cut picture of the perceived enemys preparedness and intention.Historically, most of the reconnaissance drones have been used for the purpose of defence preparedness.Earlier, during the Cuban missile crisis, the US planned to collect the data on Soviet nuclear weapons preparedness through drones.However, because of resistance by the armed forces that such a venture may reveal the top-secret military drone programme, the US government was forced to abandon the idea; but the development of the project continued. -------------------------------------------------- 3.Tom OConnor and Naveed Jamali, Could the Next 9/11 be Caused by Drones?, Newsweek, 11 September 2021, available at https://www.newsweek.com/could-next-9-11-caused-drones-1647249.4.Adam Rawnsley, America Almost had a Nuclear-armed Drone Bomber, War is Boring, 16 December 2014, available at https://medium.com/ war-is-boring/america-almost-had-a-nuclear-armed-drone-bomber- e494e2e9a286#.5bfd7rdw5.Nuclear Mission of Drones 155 5.Drones and Atomic Bombs, Geographical Imaginations, 19 October 2017, available at https://geographicalimaginations.com/2017/10/19/drones- and-atomic-bombs/.Ibid.6.7.Richard Whittle, Predators: Secret History of Drones, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2014.8.Vincent Boulanin, AI & Global Governance: AI and Nuclear Weapons Promise and Perils of AI for Nuclear Stability, Center for Policy Research, United Nations University, 7 December 2017, available at https://cpr.unu.edu/publications/articles/ai-global-governance-ai-and-nuclear-weapons- promise-and-perils-of-ai-for-nuclear-stability.html. -------------------------------------------------- 16.Bill Gertz, Russia Reveals Secret Nuclear-armed Drone Sub: High-speed Harbor Buster shown on TV, Washington Free Beacon, 11 November 2015, available at https://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-reveals-secret- nuclear-armed-drone-sub/.17.Bill Gertz, Russia building Nuclear-armed Drone Submarine, Washington Free Beacon, 8 September 2015, available at https://freebeacon.com/ national-security/russia-building-nuclear-armed-drone-submarine/.18.Ibid.19.Bill Gertz, Russia Reveals Secret Nuclear-armed Drone Sub, n. 16.20.Ibid.156 Journal of Defence Studies 21.Russian Navy to put Over 30 Poseidon Strategic Underwater Drones on Combat Duty, TASS, 12 January 2019, available at https://tass.com/ defense/1039603.22.Mark Episkopos, Russian Navy will Soon Deploy 32 Poseidon Nuclear Drones across 4 Submarines: How Worried should the U.S. Navy be?, The National Interest, 15 January 2019, available at https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russian-navy-will-soon-deploy-32-poseidon-nuclear-drones- across-4-submarines-41617. -------------------------------------------------- In fact, the FAA just announced an interim policy that would streamline the Section 333 approval process.30 Communication Community involvement, up-front communication, and transparency about the decision to purchase and utilize drones are keys to success.The San Jose Police Department learned this the hard way when it had to apologize publicly for its secretive purchase of a drone.31 After heavy criticism from civil liberties groups, the department promised it would not use or even test the drone.Civil Rights Issues To minimize any civil rights or privacy concerns related to local drone regulations, states or municipalities may want to consult advocacy groups such as a local chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).For example, in applying for a COA, the Michigan State Police had the ACLUs Michigan chapter review its policies for operating the drone a good-faith expression of cooperation that went a long way.Drone Task Force Although its functions may be limited because no federal regulations are currently in place, a drone task force at the state level can be beneficial to share resources, to recommend regulations or guidelines on the use of drones, to spearhead all drone-related matters or to streamline implementation of state and federal drone regulations once they are enacted. -------------------------------------------------- One such example is the Alabama Drone Task Force, established by Gov.Robert Bentley, which includes members like the states law enforcement secretary, agriculture commissioner, conservation commissioner, transportation director and lieutenant governor.32 This advisory council recently recommended the Alabama Department of Transportation to be the lead state agency on drones.33 Education An increasing number of alarming situations such as the frequency of drone sightings near airports, in one case coming within 5 to 10 feet of a Delta Airlines flight34 highlights the need for better education of the public.Instead of waiting for a tragic accident to happen, state and local governments should develop an education program that teaches the public about the basic FAA rules of flying a drone for recreational use.35 A Web site can be an important component of such a program; in addition to serving as a central drone information hub, it can promptly update the public about the local no-fly zones that are constantly being changed by the FAA.36 Conclusion According to the ACLUs recent recommendation, a UAV law should have safeguards that address the See: Regulations on Page 13 TALK OF THE TOWNS | 11 From Page 11: Lawmakers Aim to Pass Drone Usage Regulations; Municipalities should Understand Possible Effects following areas: usage limits, decision-making entity, data retention, abuse and weaponization.37 Thus far, New Yorks bills 0411 and 3597 collectively provide some safeguards against these concerns. -------------------------------------------------- 04537, 237th Leg., Reg.Sess.(N.Y. 2014), http://assembly.state.ny.us/ leg/?default_fld=%0D%0A&bn=S04537&term=2013&Summary=Y&Actions= 31 Robert Salonga, San Jose: Police Apologize for Drone Secrecy, Promise Transparency, san Jose mercurY news (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.mercurynews.com/crime-courts/ci_26279254/san-jose-police-apologize- secret-drone-purchase-promise.Y&Text=Y.4 H.B.3597, 238th Leg., Reg.Sess.(N.Y. 2015), http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=%0D%0A&bn=A03597&term=2015&Summary=Y&Tex t=Y.5 H.B.6713, 238th Leg., Reg.Sess.(N.Y. 2015), http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=%0D%0A&bn=A06713&term=2015&Summary=Y&Tex t=Y.6 S.B.1249, 238th Leg., Reg.Sess.(N.Y. 2015), http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=S01249&term=2015&Summary=Y&Text=Y.7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 See supra note 3.Id.at 2.Id.at 1.Id.Id.at 2.Id.Id.Id.32 Alabama Governor Assigns Drone Responsibility, fox6news, http://www.myfoxal.com/story/27959106/alabama-governor-assigns-drone- responsibility (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). -------------------------------------------------- In 2015, the Federation of German Scientists [Vereinigung Deutscher Wissenschaftler VDW] and the German Section of the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA) present the Whistleblower Award to (among others) the former US drone pilot Brandon Bryant (Missoula/USA) 1 Personal Information and Biography of Brandon Bryant Brandon Bryant is 29 years old.After attending high school in the US state of Montana, he began a journalism course which he then had to abandon after one semester for financial reasons.At the age of 19, in July 2005 he joined the US Air Force because this promised him a free vocational training.In April 2006 he began to study and train as a remotely-piloted-aircraft sensor operator (referred to below as drone pilot) for Predator drones.He flew his first mission on December 3, 2006.In January 2007 he was deployed to Iraq.Starting in 2009, he worked for a secret special unit for targeted killing, operating out of an air-conditioned container at Cannon Air Force Base in New Mexico.1 He found the work increasingly unpleasant, preferring to do something that saves lives instead of taking them. -------------------------------------------------- Additionally, this type of warfare puts the drone pilots under severe psychological stress.Brandon Bryant says: The truth is: Nothing is clean.It can never be clean. 8.(b) At the end of 2013 and beginning of 2014 he spoke with investigative journalists.Based on his knowledge of the secret drone programme, he revealed the vital role played by the technical facilities and the Air and Space Operation Command (AOC) at the US airbase in Ramstein, Germany, as well as the worldwide data connections for drone control and analysis of the images they provide.9 (c) In 2014, based on his knowledge of the secret GILGAMESH geolocation system and his specific mission experience, he revealed the inaccuracy of the German governments claim that the mobile telephone numbers of terrorist suspects passed on by German intelligence agencies to US authorities could not be used to define targets.a.Public criticism of the myth of precise and clean killing (targeted killing) In the certificate handed to him when he left the Army in 2011, it is documented that Brandon Bryant and his unit were involved in the killing of 1626 people. -------------------------------------------------- Brandon Bryant revealed that the image carefully cultivated by official sources could not be maintained: in Ramstein there was much more than a purely technical procedure which merely forwarded data.The Federal German government's claim that although German intelligence agencies had passed on mobile communications data this could not be used to locate a target was also debunked with Brandon Bryant's information on the GILGAMESH components in the drone's technical equipment which allows a mobile phone to be located within metres 27.In mid-April 2015, the whistleblower portal The Intercept and the current affairs magazine Der Spiegel published a top-secret PowerPoint presentation on the drone programme28 from 2012.The information in this file on the technical details confirmed the previous revelations from Brandon Bryant.Additionally, Der Spiegel quoted from documents it had received which prove that the US government knew of the legal implications for Germany associated with a drone programme including extrajudicial killings and that there was correspondence with the German government on this. -------------------------------------------------- Phones are lent or given innocently to friends and relatives, including children, to use and targets who know they are likely to be the subject of surveillance even deliberately pass around SIM cards to confuse their trackers.So it is almost certain that the wrong person will be killed at some time or another.41 3.Significance of Brandon Bryants Revelations By personally vouching for the reliability of his information on the secret drone warfare with its extrajudicial killings, Brandon Bryant did more than just raise ethical issues.He also forced a public debate, which is still raging, on the issue of whether the German government is making itself jointly responsible for the killings because it is tolerating the activity taking place on German territory in Ramstein.37 ARD-Tagesschau from 3.4.14 38 initially in The Intercept from 10.2.14 - https://theintercept.com/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/ and then in 39 40 the episode of NDR-Panorama on 3.4.14 DER SPIEGEL from 17.4.15 http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ramstein-air-base-us- drohneneinsaetze-aus-deutschland-gesteuert-a-1029264-2.html. -------------------------------------------------- Brandon Bryant in NDR Panorama broadcast on 3.4.14 and in an interview with the SZ on 4.4.2014, http:// www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/us-drohnenkrieg-immer-fliessen-die-daten-uber-ramstein 41 a detailed description of these problems of false identification can be found in The Intercept on 10.2.14 - https://theintercept.com/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/ 6 a.Fighting wars with armed drones One the one hand we have a worldwide discussion on the permissibility of these new methods of warfare, but on the other hand there are states such as Israel and the USA which have already been deploying armed unmanned aerial vehicles in armed conflicts for years.Some voices speak out against any sort of drone deployment, although they may have different reasons for this opinion, whereas others might consider it safe or inoffensive to use these unmanned drones for reconnaissance flights but reject any armed deployment. -------------------------------------------------- According to the information published in Der Spiegel on 17.4.2015, the editors were in possession of documents which show that in June 2013, the then State Secretary at the German Federal Foreign Office, Emily Haber, requested assurance from Washington that the US bases were not involved in targeted killing missions.An internal annotation notes the rejection of this request: The Federal Chancellery and Ministry of Defence therefore advocate sitting out the pressure from parliament and the public. 55 Following this approach, the German government has for years refused to exert any pressure on the responsible US authorities to provide detailed information on the Ramstein facilities.This behaviour is very similar to that of the monkeys in the old story: Hear nothing, see nothing, say nothing. Even the Attorney General of Germany, responsible for the prosecution of crimes as defined in the Code of Crimes against International Law, is of the opinion that drone attacks are only justifiable in areas of actual warfare. -------------------------------------------------- In this way, Brandon Bryant lent a recognisable face to the issue of the US extrajudicial drone war.In Spring 2015 there was another case of whistleblowing from an unknown person on the issue of Ramstein, including top secret documents from 2012.None of these contradict anything Brandon Bryant disclosed.In fact, the two whistleblowers complement each other well.In the meantime, Brandon Bryant has come to see himself as a whistleblower and part of the same lineage as Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning, although he still tends to underestimate his own role and is obviously still affected by feelings of guilt.He has set up his own website with the name redhand where other soldiers and critics of the drone programme can speak out.He also volunteered to be a witness for detailed first-hand information for the parliamentary committee investigating the NSA affair61.On 25.10.2013 in New York he took part in a UN panel on the US drone programme, together with human rights lawyers, university professors and UN Rapporteurs. -------------------------------------------------- "The Obama Doctrine How the President's Drone War Is Backfiring."Foreign Policy.Mar.2012.Web.28 Jan. 2013.(p. 4) 13 Abbas, Hassan, Are Drone Strikes Killing Terrorists or Creating Them? http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/are-drone- strikes-killing-terrorists-or-creating-them/274499/ 14 Pew Research Center, Global Attitude Project, July, 2010.10 Critique: A Worldwide Student Journal of Politics Refusal to publicly acknowledge the use of drones by the United States government played a significant role in shaping negative public opinion in Pakistan.What is truly sinister in the minds of many Pakistanis, however, is the outright denial on the part of the Obama administration of the very existence of drone strikes in Pakistan.The former White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs said the following: "When I went through the process of becoming press secretary, one of the first things they told me was, 'You're not even to acknowledge the drone program. -------------------------------------------------- "Drone Warfare: Blowback from the New American Way of War."Middle East Policy 18.3 (2011): 122-32.21 Critique: A Worldwide Student Journal of Politics American civilians can be killed by their own government without any sort of judicial process.Rohdess article quotes Jameel Jaffer, deputy legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union: The administration has claimed the power to carry out extrajudicial executions of Americans on the basis of evidence that is secret and never seen by anyone.Its hard to see how that is consistent with the Constitution.25 The article closes by pointing out the problematic way these strikes have been justified by the Obama administration.The administration has outright refused to release details of its strikes, and in doing so has made it impossible to allow the courts to review the strikes constitutionality, and if this were to be a tactic used by a Republican presidential administration, the outcry on the left would be deafening,26 says Jaffer. -------------------------------------------------- 29 Wall, Tyler, and Torin Monahan."Surveillance and Violence from Afar: The Politics of Drones and Liminal Security-scapes."Theoretical Criminology 15.3 (2011): 239-54.Print.23 Critique: A Worldwide Student Journal of Politics in Washington have a lot of work to do in bridging the gap between governmental and media-related portrayals of and perceptions toward drone strikes to the public.This will help to moderate the potential for the de-humanization of targets, a radical shift not just in the War on Terror but in war fighting as a whole.According to The Origins of C.I.A.s Not-So-Secret Drone War in Pakistan, by Mark Mazzetti for the New York Times, The ground had shifted, and counterterrorism officials began to rethink the strategy for the secret war.Armed drones, and targeted killings in general, offered a new direction.Killing by remote control was the antithesis of the dirty, intimate work of interrogation. -------------------------------------------------- Targeted killings were cheered by Republicans and Democrats alike, and using drones flown by pilots who were stationed thousands of miles away made the whole strategy seem risk-free.30 The drone program has fundamentally changed the role of the C.I.A.in American foreign policy.As a former Deputy Director of the C.I.A., John E. McLaughlin stated in his testimony to the 9/11 commission, You cant underestimate the cultural change that comes with gaining lethal authority.When people say to me, Its not a big deal, he said, I say to them, Have you ever killed anyone? It is a big deal.You start thinking about things differently, 30 Mazzetti, Mark."RISE OF THE PREDATORS; Origins of C.I.A.s Not-So- Secret Drone War in Pakistan."The New York Times.The New York Times, 07 Apr.2013.Web.08 Apr.2013.24 Critique: A Worldwide Student Journal of Politics he added.31 As stated earlier however, drones have crept upon the American political landscape in a way that will hopefully facilitate the necessary discussion on when, how, how often, and where to use these lethal weapons. -------------------------------------------------- "US Drone Strikes in Pakistan 'carried out without Government's Consent'" The Guardian.Guardian News and Media, 15 Mar.2013.Web.04 Apr.2013.Bergen, Peter and Katherine Tiedeman, The Drone War.Are Predators Our Best Weapon or Worst Enemy? New Republic, 3 June 2009.Fricker, Matthew and Avery Plaw."Sudden Justice?Evaluating the US Predator Drone Campaign in Pakistan" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Theory vs. Policy?Connecting Scholars and Practitioners, New Orleans Hilton Riverside Hotel, The Loews New Orleans Hotel, New Orleans, LA, Feb 17, 2010 .2012-12- 04 http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p415840_index.html Friedorsdorf, Connor, Former White House Press Secretary: Treating Drones Like a Secret Is 'Inherently Crazy', The Atlantic.Com, February, 2013. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/02/former- white-house-press-secretary-treating-drones-like-a-secret-is- inherently-crazy/273458/ Gamage, Daya."UN Says: US Drone Strikes Violate International Laws & Pak Sovereignty." -------------------------------------------------- Asian Tribune.Asian Tribune, 18 Mar.2013.Web.23 Mar.2013.27 Critique: A Worldwide Student Journal of Politics Haider, Murtaza, Pilots dinner trumps the regard for civilian lives, Dawn.Com http://dawn.com/2013/01/02/pilots-dinner-trumps-regard-for- civilian-lives/print/ Haroon, Sana, Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland, (London: Hurst & Company)2007 Hudson, Leila, Colin S. Owens, and Matt Flannes."Drone Warfare: Blowback from the New American Way of War."Middle East Policy 18.3 (2011): 122-32.Iqbal, Anwar, US Official says Drones Using Pakistan Base. Dawn, 14 February 2009. http://archives.dawn.com/archives/33491 Mazzetti, Mark."RISE OF THE PREDATORS; Origins of C.I.A.s Not-So-Secret Drone War in Pakistan."The New York Times.The New York Times, 07 Apr.2013.Web.08 Apr.2013.Pew Research Center, Global Attitude Project, July, 2010. http://www.pewglobal.org/files/pdf/Pew-Global-Attitudes-2010- Pakistan-Report.pdf Rohde, David. -------------------------------------------------- Accessed at https://medium.com/war-is-boring/ffa1be165291 19 Wikileaks Cable (2007) Dutch Firm Selling UAV Engines To Iranian Dealer (s) http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09STATE20624&q=demarche%20iran%20netherlands%20uav 20 Easton, I.M.& Hsiao, L.C.R.(2013) The Chinese Peoples Liberation armys Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Project: Organizational Capacities and Operational Capabilities.Project 2049 Institute.21 Hsu, K. (2013) Chinas Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Industry.U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.Accessed at http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Chinas%20Military%20UAV%20Industry_14%20June%202013.pdf 22 The Aviationist (2013) New photo shows that China has really copied the U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel stealth drone.Accessed at http://theaviationist.com/2013/06/02/china-rq170-copy/ 23 Wong, E. (2013) Hacking U.S.Secrets, China Pushes for Drones.September 20, 2103, New York Times.40 PAX !Policy Paper: Unmanned and Uncontrolled?Accessed at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/21/world/asia/hacking-us-secrets-china-pushes-for-drones.html?_r=0 24 Want China Times (2014) Saudi Arabia signs deal for Chinas Pterodactyl drone. -------------------------------------------------- Accessed at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc_150459.pdf 100 United States Munitions List, category VIII.Accessed at http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/regulations_laws/documents/official_itar/2013/ITAR_Part_121.pdf 101 Laird, Robin (2013) US Needs 21st Century Arms Export System; Embrace Allies.Accessed at http://breakingdefense.com/2013/09/09/us-needs-21st-century-arms-export-system-embrace-allies/ 102 US State Department (2015) The DDTC announces new requirements for the permanent export of unmanned aerial systems.Accessed at https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/documents/UAS_NoticeRevised.pdf 103 Open Society Foundations (2015) The Human Cost of Secret US Drone Strikes in Yemen.Accessed at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/human-cost-secret-us-drone-strikes-yemen 104 Wassenaar Agreement (2013), Article 8.A.1.(c) and (d).105 See for example: BBC (2015) Paris drones: New wave of alerts.Accessed at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31725302; Washington Post (2015) Drone incident at White House highlights long-studied, still-unsolved security gap. -------------------------------------------------- Drone Flight and Failure: the United States Secret Trials, Experiments and Operations in Unmanning, 1936-1973 By Katherine Fehr Chandler A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Rhetoric and the Designated Emphasis in New Media in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in Charge: Professor David Bates, Co-Chair Professor Charis Thompson, Co-Chair Professor Samera Esmeir Professor Jake Kosek Spring 2014 Drone Flight and Failure: the United States Secret Trials, Experiments and Operations in Unmanning, 1936-1973 2014 by Katherine Fehr Chandler Abstract Drone Flight and Failure: the United States Secret Trials, Experiments and Operations in Unmanning, 1936-1973 by Katherine Fehr Chandler Doctor of Philosophy in Rhetoric and the Designated Emphasis in New Media University of California, Berkeley Professor David Bates, Co-Chair Professor Charis Thompson, Co-Chair I examine the precursors to contemporary unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs) to ask what is at stake in the designation unmanned? The apparent misnomer dissociates technologies and humans, occluding how international interventions, including surveillance, military support, signals intelligence, and targeted killing, are carried out through actions networked between humans and nonhumans. -------------------------------------------------- Pointing to the time lapse between capturing surveillance imagery and ordering a missile strike, military officials explained, The idea of arming the Predator seemed to provide the answer: Mr. bin Laden and his lieutenants could be attacked by the same surveillance drone that spotted them.4 The uncertainty of who was attacked by the unmanned aircraft, now apparent after the arrival of ground troops, did not unsettle the potency of the connection between targeting and surveillance.Testifying to Congress, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld used this logic to support new spending for the aircraft.If you have an unarmed Predator that's out there gathering intelligence information and you replace it with an armed Predator, that not only can gather intelligence information, but then can actually fire a Hellfire you've got different lethality.5 The 2003 defense budget, submitted to Congress on the same day as the missile strike, provided over one billion dollars for unmanned aircraft. -------------------------------------------------- The article explained: Villagers here in the remote mountains of eastern Afghanistan said Ahmad and two other local men, Daraz and Jahan Gir, were peasants gathering scrap metal from the war....They were killed last Monday when a U.S. Hellfire missile, fired from a CIA-run Predator drone, shrieked down in what was supposed to be an attack on terrorists.9 Questions were also raised as to why the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), not the Air Force, made the decision to fire the missiles.Reports in the subsequent days indicated an Al Qaeda finance official had been killed.This claim was never confirmed.Victoria Clarke, Rumsfelds 1 press secretary, speaking on February 12, reiterated, We're convinced it was an appropriate target, based on the observation, based on the information that it was an appropriate target.10 When journalists asked why villagers would say three innocent civilians were killed, government officials suggested locals, aware of the United States practice of paying compensation to survivors mistakenly killed by American missile strikes, were seeking to take advantage of this policy.11 In the February 4, 2002 attack in Afghanistan the interconnection between authority, power and evidence mobilized through unmanned aircraft was not yet secret.12 Today, questions about CIA drone strikes produce no official response. -------------------------------------------------- The Navy effort in 1936, which first made use of the name drone, also noted ambivalence between the target plane and its possible use as a weapon.Four years later, the same core group of engineers that led efforts to build the target drone would develop a television guided assaulted drone, used in September and October of 1944 in Europe and the South Pacific.Funding for these weapons was cancelled before the end of the war, although drone persisted as a designation for target aircraft and remotely piloted air vehicles.The second part of my research explores how unmanned becomes associated with remotely flown aircraft, even as the term drone continues to be used to name the unmanned training systems that simulated jet planes for training air-to-air and surface-to-air defense.This part of my research focuses on the Firebee, a jet powered drone produced by Ryan Aeronautical, still used today as a target aircraft.The term unmanned gains currency as early efforts to build drone reconnaissance are positioned against manned U-2 flights, which became an international flashpoint following the capture of Francis Gary Powers as a prisoner while flying a secret reconnaissance mission over the Soviet Union in 1960. -------------------------------------------------- While most remotely piloted aircraft used during World War II were targets to train anti- aircraft gunners, the U.S. Navy researchers who engineered the drone also proposed the system 8 could be modified for use as a weapon.Chapter 2, American Kamikaze, examines these projects, emphasizing the significance of television.Reversing the perspective of the target drone in the previous chapter, I ask how targets were sighted by incorporating image transmission into assault drone aircraft.Forty-six television guided weapons were used in the Solomon Islands in the South Pacific and a modified version of the television guided aircraft flew thirteen flights over Europe.Technical discussions and military reports indicate how the assault drone was likened to suicide bombings, as does the title of James Halls memoir about the top-secret assault drone unit, American Kamikaze.While television guided drones were correlated with enemy tactics, they were also promoted as exemplary of American ingenuity, using technology to replace human risk, though the program was ended in 1944. -------------------------------------------------- Disconnecting the human pilot and the remote aircraft, there is nobody that can be taken prisoner through unmanned reconnaissance.I complicate these displacements of the human through Nobodys Perfect.A humorous film about Ryan Aeronauticals failed attempts to build manned and unmanned aircraft alike, the film counters the opposition between human and nonhuman setting up instead a series of alliances and disparities between technologies and operators.Chapter 4, Drones from Above and Below, examines reconnaissance drones developed between 1960 and 1973, which were tested in the United States and flew top secret missions in Southeast Asia.It concludes with sale of a Ryan Aeronautical drone system to Israel in 1971, used during the Arab-Israeli War in 1973.The chapter explores how national security is tied to 9 reconnaissance, both as a response to nuclear threats to the United States and the basis for international interventions in Vietnam.Even as these distinctions divide between domestic and international territory, they are reformulated by aerial views, which reconfigure territory from above. -------------------------------------------------- Drone crashes, unexpected landings and tensions between what is known and unknown intervene in these separations.Examining the practices that produce what is seen and what is not, I explore how ambiguity is interlayered with the geopolitical uses of these drone, arguing contradictions are the systems secret.10 Part One Targets and Targeting 11 Chapter 1 The Queen Bee and the Drone: Remote Controlled Aerial Targets in the Interwar An urgent need in the fleet exists for radio-controlled aircraft for use as aerial targets,1 wrote the United States Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) William Standley in a memorandum from March 23, 1936, circulated to the Navy Bureaus of Aeronautics, Ordinance, and Engineering.This call came after Standley returned from the Second Naval Conference in London, where the worlds five major naval powers negotiated armament limits, beginning in December 1935.There, he witnessed anti-aircraft practices held by British Royal Navy with a remote controlled aircraft, known as the Queen Bee.2 The urgent need Standley expressed tied to changing strategies of attack and defense in the interwar: airpower would change what was a target and how militaries targeted. -------------------------------------------------- The answers to this question drones are experiments, simulations, and ordinance; they are targets and targeting systems; and they are framed both as defensive measures and top-secret weaponry point to the ways programs of action and the network of humans and nonhumans incorporated by drones are contradictory, as much as they are associative.Latours definition of program suggests these complications, noting that each device anticipates what other actors, humans or nonhumans, may do (programs of action), but these anticipated actions may not occur because other actors have other programs anti-programs.21 However, drone targets take shape as a network of elements that not only come together in a chain of action, but also come apart and fail what is unanticipated leading to tensions and rupture, not just connections, between humans and nonhumans.By December 1936, the Navy Research Laboratory had produced a complete set of radio equipment, which modeled how the aircraft would be controlled in flight. -------------------------------------------------- The military applications for television proposed by 36 Zworykin drew on these connections and resulted in military contracts for the company in 1939.During World War II, RCA would produce five thousand television cameras and receivers for the military.The refinements to the television tube that was used to guide the drone aircraft relied on the image orthicon, which would be used in the production of television sets until 1965.Image transmissions used by American forces in assault drones during World War II predated widespread commercial broadcast television.In American Kamikaze, Halls memoir of being a television drone operator for the Navy between 1942 and 1944, he recalls being told about the top-secret mission for which they had been selected.The Lieutenant told the men, We are going to mount radio-controlled pilotless drones against the enemy,11 and explained how the pilotless planes would be operated by four different divisions.He was interrupted when mentioning the television unit. -------------------------------------------------- Meanwhile, the Navy officially began its assault drone program on March 22, 1940, when the then Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, Ernest King approved the conversion of a TG-2 aircraft to radio control.The television controlled weapon relied on the personnel and technologies that had developed drone targets for anti- aircraft defenses.Fahrney was given command of the assault drone program and subsequently recruited key personnel involved in the target drone program to produce the new weapon, which reconfigured drone.The TG-2, for example, which became the first television guided aircraft, was previously a drone target control plane.Using technologies that had already been developed for target drones, the Navy engineers transformed radio controlled system to simulate enemy aircraft into a prototype of an offensive weapon.Television was the feature that distinguished the top-secret attack weapon from the drone target.Writing to the Naval Aircraft Factory on January 17, 1941, King noted he was particularly desirous that the technique of operating offensive torpedo carrying radio controlled aircraft in quantity be pushed to a conclusion, and that sufficient flight tests of aircraft television be carried out to permit recommendation of useful application for Naval work.32 In 1941, a number of tests were made guiding the converted TG-2 plane and using an RCA television set. -------------------------------------------------- Two additional TG-2 planes were assigned to the project in September 1941 for conversion to assault drones.By November, the Bureau of Aeronautics began to explore production possibilities on a larger scale, looking to obsolete airplanes as possible frames for the remotely guided weapons, as well as cheaply produced plywood airplanes.34 The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 shifted responses to the experimental program though.With a large part of its fleet and aircraft destroyed, many within the Navy emphasized the importance of rebuilding and mobilizing already tried methods of warfare, as the United States formally entered World War II.Positioned against Japan in the Pacific, the Navy was challenged by the unexpected defeat.Internal discussions within the Navy characterized the threat of the Japanese as inhuman.To counter this, experimental weapons were promoted as providing a technological advantage.Captain Oscar Smith, of the Naval Bureau of Ordinance, unaware of the top-secret developments with radio and television control already underway, wrote to the Chief of Naval Operations on December 15, 1941. -------------------------------------------------- The CNO laid plans for a top-secret Fleet Special Air Task Force, which began training in 1942 in Clinton, Oklahoma.Smith was given the new rank of Commodore and charged with overseeing the program.Plans called for over three thousand personnel, 99 control planes and 891 drones divided into three Special Task Air Groups (STAG).Despite this, in early 1943 only twelve TDN assault drones had been built and although the pilotless aircraft incorporated television and radio control, they were low performance air vehicles, built of plywood.This meant that they were slow and could only be maneuvered simply.Further, the cost far exceeded the available budget.40 American Interstate Company was contracted to build the next model, the TDR, which was ready to be flown in late 1943.Towers, now Commander of the Pacific Fleet, resisted efforts to include the television guided drone in his battle plans.The TDR were declared untried, and the current efforts of United States Navys in the South Pacific effective. -------------------------------------------------- The choreographies between television, remote controlled aircraft, Navy engineers, RCA inventors, military decision-makers and the politics of war transform drone target planes into television controlled assault weapons.At the same time, these dynamic relations are imbricated in the almost immediate failure of the system.And though the television guided assault drones come apart in 1944, they also speak to contemporary unmanned combat air vehicles, as the choreographies indicate how operator, onscreen image and enemy are linked through immersion and distance.Navy RCA television technologies transferred by Admiral King to the Army during the summer of 1944 guided War Weary B-17 bombers, Army Air Corp planes that were no longer usable by pilots and were converted into remotely piloted weapons.Two top-secret missions, Project Aphrodite and Project Castor, were trialed in the fall of 1944 in Europe.The War 49 Weary B-17s differed from the TDR drones developed by the Navy. -------------------------------------------------- Nobodys Perfect, a humorous promotional film about the breakdowns experienced in experimental test flights by manned and unmanned aircraft built by Ryan Aeronautical troubles the practices of containment that marked this period.Through irony, the film highlighted how separations between human and machine, as well as technology, industry and politics, come undone through ambiguity, failure and disconnection.The Bee with an Electronic Brain Training missions with Firebee target drones were declassified in 1953, although technical details related to the system remained secret.The Firebee became public through articles, photographs and captions that first appeared in 1953.I supplement these materials with technical reports that were released later, detailing the systems operation.While efforts to build the pilotless targets discussed earlier were documented by Delmar Fahrneys monthly reports to the Navys Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, the Firebee relied on a new model of military- industrial relations. -------------------------------------------------- Within the United States, the incident did not lead to a reappraisal of the strategy, although Eisenhower did discontinue U-2 flights over the Soviet Union.Rather, the captured pilot was highlighted as a weakness and the pursuit of wholly technological reconnaissance methods gained traction.In the next decade, photographs from satellites and drone aircraft would become operational and while it was likely these methods were also detected as they flew over enemy territory, the systems remained largely secret and brought about minimal public discussion in part because there was no human body.60 Exemplary of the ways unmanned reconnaissance was opposed to piloted flights was Schwanhaussers briefing for the Air Force Reconnaissance Panel at the Pentagon on April 21, 1960.He explained the Firebee could be modified to fly up to 1100 nautical miles at an altitude of 50,000 feet for reconnaissance and told the Air Force, The use of U-2 manned vehicles for overflights of the territory of nations unfriendly to the United States creates, we believe, risks which are unnecessary to take. -------------------------------------------------- We feel there is a solution to this in the logical evolution of the unmanned Firebee drone system.61 After Powers was shot down, Schwanhausser recalls that things started to happen very rapidly.62 71 Ryan Aeronautical was given its first exploratory contract during the summer of 1960 for a project known as, Red Wagon. Central to the early experiments were efforts to make the drone invisible to electronic detection by using non-conductive paint and radar absorbing blankets.63 A letter from August 19, 1960, to Dr. Joseph Charyk, the Under Secretary of the Air Force, from T. Claude Ryan, the President of the company, outlined how Ryan Aeronautical would manage the program, as well as the facilities and working capital available for the project.While it appeared that everything had fallen into place, the contract that would have continued the project was not approved by the Secretary of Defense, who returned the proposal with a note: I thought we werent going in this direction.64 William Wagner, former Vice-President of Ryan Aeronautical, explained, More often than not the industry representative works the new project up through the military organizations, often with a green light at every stage, only to find at the top level that the project really belongs to another agency which is more apt to fund the program.65 The logical evolution of drone reconnaissance that Schwanhausser foregrounded in his presentation to the Air Force was not as straightforward as the claim may seem. -------------------------------------------------- 80 Chapter 4 Drones Above and Below: Reconfiguring Territory Through Unmanned Reconnaissance A Time magazine article, Reconnaissance: Cameras Aloft: No Secrets Below, from December 28, 1962 included a brief remark by President John F. Kennedy: The camera, I think, is going to be our best inspector.1 The article came in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, which brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war.On October 14, 1962, U-2 reconnaissance flights captured photographs of medium-range ballistic missile installations in San Cristobal, Cuba, precipitating the stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union.2 The incident foregrounded the significance of strategic reconnaissance in the Cold War and extended how the United States pictured national security.Tracking enemy activity from the sky came to be seen as protecting the United States from nuclear threats and Americans were invited to view reconnaissance as part of the nations defense. -------------------------------------------------- Positioning viewers as looking from above, the aerial view was both opposed to what was below, tied to a way of seeing territory that presumed technical mastery.This viewpoint was presented as given, the fact of the land below.Countering the assumptions of this view, I show how reconnaissance was produced through a constellation of practices, which tie aerial images to social, technical and political practices.Through the Cuban missile crisis, I explore how Americans were positioned as viewers of strategic reconnaissance and I trace the global politics implied by this relation.The production of aerial reconnaissance operated not just through the camera, but by layering together networked human and nonhuman parts, variously exposed and concealed.As reconnaissance imagery becomes part of how national security was pictured, the first top-secret drone missions surveyed for targets in experimental missions in the American Southwest, suggesting a different framework for watching from above: one that is concealed and framed offensively. -------------------------------------------------- Top-down visibility and secret reconnaissance missions are in tension with each other and these contradictions are operative in the use of drones in Southeast Asia and the Middle East.Aerial imagery operates through layers and fragmentation to reveal and conceal territory, reconfiguring how national protection and international interventions are enacted.Learning to See from Above The photographic imagery of medium-range missile installations in San Cristobal, Cuba, captured on October 14, 1962 led to an intense campaign to collect visual and electronic intelligence over Cuba during the next days, while the National Security Council deliberated on the United States response.Speaking for the first time on October 22, 1962 about the discovery of the missile sites on national television, Kennedy began by observing: This Government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military buildup on the island of Cuba.Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. -------------------------------------------------- The day before, an American U-2 pilot, Major Rudolph Anderson, was shot down by surface-to-air-missiles and died in the resulting crash, leading to another push for unmanned reconnaissance.Based at the time at the Atlantic Missile Range in Cape Canaveral, Florida, Robert Schwanhausser, head project engineer for the top-secret reconnaissance drone, remembered how the Ryan people were trying to figure out how their [reconnaissance] drone work might be continued. Without a doubt they could do a job in Cuba.7 Working in the Air Force Reconnaissance Division in 1962, Lloyd Ryan explained there was a great reluctance to deploy the system,8 though, and recalled how General LeMay, the Air Force Chief of Staff personally cancelled a mission to Cuba with the system in November.Ryan says, It was due to the unknown nature of just how good it would be, and whether we were giving away a capability that we might want to save for bigger game.9 Based in a restricted hanger, the engineers could not discuss their project with the military personnel on high alert on the base in the midst of crisis. -------------------------------------------------- The reconnaissance drone was known only to the project engineers and a select group of military commanders.While the drone was not deployed to Cuba, the death of Anderson, as well as the limitations of satellite reconnaissance, did lead to more funding for the project and after the Cuban missile crisis, Ryan Aeronautical was given the go-ahead to build thirty-eight new drones over the next two years.10 Funds provided for the experimental project pointed to the ongoing significance of surveillance, as indicated in the article by Time.Reconnaissance: Cameras Aloft: No Secrets Below explained how reconnaissance continued to watch Cuba after the missile crisis, elaborated through the role of the camera.The uses for surveillance articulated in the article are suggestive of what underwrote the development of drones, even though no mention was made of these emerging capacities, guarded by secrecy.The article referenced the quotation by Kennedy, The camera, I think, is going to be our best inspector,11 to explain: The Presidents brief, blunt remark was deliberate understatement. -------------------------------------------------- At the same time, there was a corresponding attempt to make this same knowledge secret.It was not just that the surveyor knew the enemy, but also that the enemy did not know that the surveyor knew.Big encompasses the aspects of the program that make it exceptional funding was expedited and the programs were highly secretive.As indicated by the Big Safari mandate, projects were of sufficient importance and priority to warrant preferential treatment, quick reaction and extraordinary procurement procedures.18 Working with the Big Safari time constraint, Ryan Aeronautical engineers relied on the design of the Firebee to guide the development of the reconnaissance drone.The most significant modification was to the navigation system.The Firebee flew using dead reckoning, relying on pre-set course of the altitude, distance and direction to be travelled.The first navigation unit was built using a timer-programmer from a telephone stepping-switch and a gyro compass, which would guide the direction of the aircraft based on time intervals. -------------------------------------------------- In this story, it is the film captured through the drone that is big. In this mission, the camera took pictures of resolution targets on the ground below.This tested the navigation system onboard the modified Firebee, as well as the camera.After recovering the drone following its parachute descent into Holloman Air Force Base, Schwanhausser remembered the big excitement was to get the take, the film, and to go process it and see what we had. We flew straight to Los Angeles and were met in Los Angeles by Ray Bellweg and we went straight to this very secret facility they had for processing which I couldnt get into.26 After processing the film, Schwanhausser recalls combing through the footage for the targets.About 6 oclock in the morning we found the resolution targets on the film and they were damn good. We immediately flew the film, as youd expect, to Washington for presentation purposes and carried on with the flight test program.27 The story highlights what it took to find the targets after the photographs had been taken. -------------------------------------------------- Surveillance incorporated not just the drones flight, but processing the film in Los Angeles and having human observers identify the targets.When they were found, the film was then flown to Washington, D.C. and presented, tying the images to the cross- country trips that produced the pictures and situated the project as big. On May 3, 1962, the same drone was flown for another flight.On the return leg of the flight from Wendover, Utah, a momentary loss of connection between the drone and the altimeter tracking system caused the automatic parachute recovery system on the drone to be activated.The drone landed at 8,000 feet altitude between two peaks in the Magdalena Mountains 120 miles from Holloman Air Force Base.A military helicopter was sent to pick up the drone, but with the wind and high altitude, the helicopter didnt have enough lift and also crashed.Schwanhausser remembered, Now weve got both an Army helicopter and a classified drone with all its secret gear splashed on the mountain side.28 The Air Force recommended the drone be burned to keep the security of the project from being compromised. -------------------------------------------------- The Ryan project engineers set aside the recommendations of the Air Force to destroy the aircraft and instead disassembled the drone at the crash site and re-constructed its body.A failed flight became a success when the aircraft was flown again a few days later.The two previous test flights indicated the extraordinary qualities used to promote unmanned reconnaissance: In the first, drone reconnaissance defied expected protocols.The second shows the big excitement of finding the resolution targets, which pictured the drones success.This final example, which could have spelled the end of the project as it crash landed in the mountains, adds to this analysis by suggesting how failure was incorporated into the extraordinary qualities of the Big Safari funded program.In the last crash, the drone being flown was produced by reconnaissance a given view of the world.A similar logic was at play in how the missions remained secret, obscured within the New Mexico landscape.Previously, I examined a series of images and captions of the Firebee target used in press releases that introduced the drone in aeronautical and airspace magazines. -------------------------------------------------- Flying above White Sand Desert in 1953, the jet-powered drone was described as a spectacle as eerie as an uninhabited missile from another planet.31 Undulating mountains below the drone are flattened by the aerial perspective and the Firebee is seemingly caught between the skies and rippling desert sand, suggesting an almost ethereal plane.Yet, the otherworldly qualities of the desert also locate the drone above White Sands Missile Range and Holloman Air Force Base, centers for experimental flight, missile tests and other secret experiments during the Cold War.The white sand dunes in the desert moreover, are iconic markers of the area, captured for example in black and white photographs taken by Edward Weston and Ansel Adams of the region.32 At once, the photograph was of a desert landscape and a military test range, although the latter remains invisible.Before, I used these images to analyze how human operators became a spectral presence in the drones flight.The same might be said for the way the landscape operated in the photograph, which naturalized the drone against the backdrop of the desert, obfuscating the military, political and industrial relations that shape the scene below. -------------------------------------------------- The scene of the drone in the desert overwrites the political and military contexts that shape land through the mediation of landscape.Yet, these obfuscations are incomplete, which 88 suggest limitations to erasures I describe above, both in the case of landscape and drone reconnaissance.Although the drone crash in the Magdalena Mountains did not compromise the project in 1962, drone aircraft did become public knowledge several years later, after an unexpected landing of a reconnaissance drone occurred over Los Alamos.This event is instructive because it shows how secrecy and erasure enacted through the drone only partially obscure its operations.On August 6, 1969 a headline in the Albuquerque Journal read Secret Something Falls to the Earth. The article described the emergency descent by parachute of a super secret unmanned aircraft in full view of Los Alamos residents,42 bringing a classified unmanned reconnaissance system built by Ryan Aeronautical into the view of the public. -------------------------------------------------- The article remarked, Reverberations from the thud of the graceful birds landing on the northern New Mexico plateau, 150 miles away from White Sands, was felt all the way to Washington.46 Attempts to keep the reconnaissance drone secret splashed into headlines, as an Associated Press wire article Sudden Landing Unveils New Drone put together the inadvertent release of information from White Sands the previous year with the drone landing at Los Alamos.After the incident, the Air Force acknowledged the existence of the Firefly for reconnaissance, though it gave few details about the program.Fireflies and other UAVs described how the Ryan engineers and military personnel addressed the incident.At the Holloman Air Force Base ground control unit, panel lights signaling a control failure came on after the drone had been flying for three hours.The only option for the controllers on the ground was to hit the panic button, which released the parachute permitting it to descend with minimum damage so that it might be recovered.47 Art Rutherford, who was aboard the DC-130 launch plane that tracked the flight, later recalled everyone was looking out the windows to see if they could spot the bird. -------------------------------------------------- He writes, The arrival of the Manhattan Project on the Pajarito Plateau thus not only brought together multiple secret societies those supporting U.S. military nuclear science and Pueblo theocracies but also rival systems of knowledge and knowing.52 Masco argues these different modes of knowing continue to operate in Los Alamos, complicating the blanket of secrecy that protects the area, which both claims to serve national security, while complicating what is at stake in these interests.The unexpected intersection of top-secret nuclear weapons development and the reconnaissance drone points to the multiple forms of secrecy operative in the name of security.In the flights and failures examined above the efforts taken to produce the exceptional qualities of the drone, the big photographs captured by the system and its crashes, indicate how the drone is intertwined with relations connected to the ground below.Tuning to the still partially classified drone reconnaissance mission from the Vietnam War era, I shift from the layered images of aerial reconnaissance captured over New Mexico to tensions between who knows and sees what through drone missions in Southeast Asia. -------------------------------------------------- The reconnaissance drone system would be remodeled according to at least two dozen configurations, with contracts ranging from a few aircraft to hundreds.Thousands of images would have been captured by drone aircraft, although only a few 90 have been released to the public.Beyond what was seen and what was not, I ask how these classified missions reconfigure relations to the territory below, extending the protections provided by aerial photography, as well as the drones Big Safari. How did the secret ways of knowing proposed by reconnaissance photography operate?How was tracking and monitoring tied to new divisions, which distinguished not just between the East and the West but also above and below?On August 4, engineers from Ryan Aeronautical received word that the high-altitude reconnaissance drones built by the company would be deployed.As an industry contractor, the Ryan Aeronautical engineers were central to the operation of the drone aircraft, reflecting the role played by Ryan Aeronautical not just selling the systems but training the Air Force in their use. -------------------------------------------------- The system was launched from Japan, flown over Southeast Asia, recovered in Taiwan and the film was transported via courier jet to be developed in the United States.The images captured by the drone remained classified, 91 although, another Ryan Aeronautical employee, Ed Sly explains while we didnt see the results we understand the camera brought back significant information.60 At the same time, the top- secret mission was seen by individuals in Taiwan when the drone landed in a rice paddy.While there would have been no public acknowledgement of the program in the United States, people in Taiwan watched the drones recovery by military helicopter.Moreover, the offhand remark about the strangers who appeared out of the bushes and woodwork, suggest that even while alliances between nations like the United States, Japan and Taiwan made the missions possible, there was simultaneously a stranger who was presented as outside these operations the person on the ground.The systems built by Ryan Aeronautical were, as far as I can tell, never used in the Soviet Union, even though divisions between East and West motivated their development. -------------------------------------------------- Rather, the thousands of missions flown by drone aircraft were primarily staged in Vietnam, other parts of Southeast Asia, China and later, in the Middle East, where the Israeli government used drones for its own reconnaissance missions.Drones operated both on the ground and in the sky, producing a global patchwork that was multivalent and transformable, even as their use as a surveillance system positioned the networked actions in opposition to enemy territory.Partitions and separations are suggested not just by friendly and enemy territory, but also by what is secret, what is not, and for whom, which variously link and disjoin military and industry operators, as well as relations to the ground.The confluence of these multiple elements fragments the seamlessness of the aerial view and the land surveyed below.The views produced through the drone might instead be framed through its programmed navigation system and the inevitable errors that were part of its flights.The navigation system of the drone operated through a series of plotted points, preset prior to the reconnaissance missions. -------------------------------------------------- In 1969, Ryan Aeronautical was purchased by Teledyne, another defense industry firm.Between 1969 and 1973, after becoming Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical, the company received over fifty contracts for unmanned aircraft.One of the largest contracts was for a low flying reconnaissance drone, flown between 1970 and 1972 in top-secret missions known as Buffalo Hunter. In over 1,000 missions, the drones attempted to track over thirteen- thousand high priority targets and captured photographs of close to five-thousand sites, approximately a forty percent success rate.67 On July 24, 1973 a confidential report about Buffalo Hunter was submitted by Air Force Major Paul W. Elder, as part of Project CHECO Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations.The opening pages explain: The counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare environment of Southeast Asia has resulted in USAF [United States Air Force] airpower being employed to meet a multitude of requirements.These varied applications have involved the full spectrum of USAF aerospace vehicles, support equipment and manpower. -------------------------------------------------- Elder analyzes the systems effectiveness in gathering intelligence and how this information was used by commanders in a counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare environment. An echo of irony appears in the introduction of the report nonetheless.Elder explains, These reconnaissance operations functioned under tight security; and to maintain that security the reconnaissance directors changed the nickname of the operation several times. By the BUFFALO HUNTER era, however, the drones use was no longer a tightly-held secret.Howard Silber in an Omaha World-Herald editorial said that the Buffalo Hunter can spot a water buffalo standing belly-deep in the muck of a rice- paddy. Although water buffalos were hardly the reconnaissance target for the drones, Silbers wry assessment of the capability is an accurate one.69 While earlier names for the project were more innocuous, Buffalo Hunter like Big Safari, the program used to initially fund the development of the unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, evoked the perspective of a hunter as the operative model for reconnaissance. -------------------------------------------------- The photographs provided intelligence about air-defense and as evidence, this image of Soviet missiles circulated widely, partitioned from the drone aircraft that produced them.This account in the Buffalo Hunter report complicated what was secret and what was not.Images and the ability of drone reconnaissance to capture targets on the ground in high resolution circulated in the United States with no knowledge of the unmanned reconnaissance missions.At the same time, as Elder writes, The North Vietnamese were undoubtedly familiar with the dwarf aircraft that regularly buzzed their cities, airfields, rail lines, bridges, roads and waterways.71 Secrecy operated through layers, covering and exposing different aspects of the networked operations, be it the target, the imagery or the aircraft.94 The Air Force divisions that deployed the drones, based first in Bien Hoa Air Base in South Vietnam and later in Da Nang Air Base in Thailand, were separated from targeting and track planning, which was done by Strategic Air Command (SAC) in Omaha, Nebraska. -------------------------------------------------- Even though the video opposes the soldier and terrorist, the Hellfire missile strike establishes the technological advantage of the soldier, responding to the small-arms fire by obliterating the human targets.Once the scene has been set up to portray a defensive counter- attack, the scale of the missile strike overwhelms the chase scene that has come before.The inky black explosion insists the soldier, literally, is on top.Unlike the majority of the drone strikes carried out between 2009 and 2014 through a secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) program, the scene from 2008 video corresponds with the occupation of Iraq by American armed forces.The confusion between what the camera on the UAV sees and the action of the soldier is invited, in part, by this occupation.Yet, this immersive view is also embedded in the segment of images, which tracks, follows and responds to the actions of the figures onscreen.As mentioned previously, this video was likely uploaded on the DOD website because it enacts a familiar chase scene, positioning the viewer as pursued even though the Hellfire missile strike undoes this relationship, insisting instead on the mastery of technology. -------------------------------------------------- 109 5 Allan R. Millet, Patterns of Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, in eds.Williamson Murray and Allan Millet, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 333.6 See Zaloga, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Robotic Warfare 1917-2007.During World War I, efforts were made to test remotely flown and autonomously operated aircraft as aerial torpedoes by the Army Air Corps.They were led by Charles Kettering, Orville Wright and Elmer Sperry.Known as the Kettering Bug, the project was top-secret and remained experimental.No mention is made of this project by the Navy and it is possible that they were not aware of the earlier tests, which pre-date their project to the experiments from 1923-1924.7 A.B. Cook, from Chief of the BuAer to the CNO, April 15, 1936, Washington, D.C., Target Drones, Collected Records of D. S. Fahrney, RG 72, NARA II.8 Ibid.9 U.S.Naval Air Missile Test Center, The Father of the Guided Missile Retires. 30 October 1950, Delmar Fahrney Technical File, National Air and Space Museum Archive, Washington, D.C. 10 Fahrney, The History of Pilotless Aircraft and Guided Missiles, 201. -------------------------------------------------- 9.Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996).3 John F. Kennedy, Address on the Cuban Crisis October 22, 1962 (speech, Washington, D.C., Oct. 22, 1962), accessed April 18, 2014 http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1962kennedy- cuba.html.4 Ibid.5 Ibid.6 Ibid.7 Robert Schwanhausser, interview by William Wager, RRS#5, March 3, 1971 2.Ryan Aeronautical Collection, San Diego Air and Space Museum Archives, San Diego, CA.8 in Wagner, Lighting Bugs and other Reconnaissance Drones, 50.128 9 Ibid.10 Table 3.3.-1 History of TRA Government Contracts Related to Remotely Piloted Vehicles 1962-1987, Ryan Aeronautical Collection, San Diego Air and Space Museum Archives, San Diego, CA.11 Reconnaissance: Cameras Aloft: No Secrets Below, Time.12 Ibid.13 Tom Wicker, "M'Namara Insists Offensive Arms Are out of Cuba," New York Times (1923- Current File), Feb 07, 1963. accessed, April 28, 2014, http://search.proquest.com/docview/116515797?accountid=14496. -------------------------------------------------- 38 A classic account of the Trinity Test is: Lansing Lamont, The Day of Trinity, (New York, NY: Atheneaum, 1965); see also, Ferenc Szasz, The Day the Sun Rose Twice, (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1984).130 39 National Park Service, White Sands National Monument Home Page, White Sands National Monument, April 11, 2014, accessed April 17, 2014, http://www.nps.gov/whsa/index.htm.40 White Sands has served as the set for western and science fiction films alike, including My Name is Nobody and The Man who Fell to the Earth in the 1970s and Young Guns II and Transformers more recently.41 National Park Service, History of Commercial Filming at White Sands, White Sands National Monument, Nov. 18, 2011, accessed April 17, 2014, http://www.nps.gov/whsa/planyourvisit/upload/filming_history_11_18_11.pdf.42 Wagner and Sloan, Firefly, 29; see also Bill Stockton, Firefly is Shrouded in Secrecy, Alamagordo Daily News (Alamagordo, NM), Aug. 5, 1969.Charles D. La Fond, Air Force Learns its Tough to Keep a Secret, Washington Waveguide (Washington, D.C.), Sep. 1969; Drone Test Pattern Outlined, Aerospace Daily, Nov. 22, 1968. -------------------------------------------------- Accessed April , 014, http://www.livingunderdrones.org/download-report/.Ohnuky-Tierney, Emiko.Kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms, and Nationalisms: the Militarization of Aesthetics in Japanese History.Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002.Parks, Lisa.Cultures in Orbit: Satellite and the Televisual.Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005.Pedlow, Gregory and Donald Welzenbach.The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954-1974.Darby, PA: DIANE Publishing, 1998.Rand Corporation.Air Defense Analysis.Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1951.Reconnaissance: Cameras Aloft: No Secrets Below. Time, Dec. 28, 1962.Report by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee. (Washington, D.C., February 14, 1955), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955 1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX, Document 9.Accessed April 7, 2014. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d9.Reitz, Carl.UAV / RPV Compendium.Warminster, PA: Navy Air Development Center, 1988. -------------------------------------------------- Bombing Civilians: a Twentieth-Century History.New York, NY: New Press, 2009.Taubman, Philip.Secret Empire: Eisenhower, the CIA, and the Hidden Story of America's Space Espionage.New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2003.144 Thompson, Charis.Making Parents: the Ontological Choreography of Reproductive Technologies.Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005.Uricchio, William.Televisions First Seventy-Five Years: the Interpretative Flexibility of a Medium in Transition. In The Oxford Handbook of Film and Media Studies, edited by Robert Kolker, 286-305.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.Wagner, William.Lightning Bugs and Other Reconnaissance Drones: the Can-Do Story of Ryans Unmanned Spy Planes. Fallbrook, CA: Armed Forces Journal International, 1982.Wagner, William and William P. Sloan.Fireflies and Other UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles).Arlington, TX: Aerofax, 1992.Weber, Samuel.Targets of Opportunity: on the Militarization of Thinking.New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2005. -------------------------------------------------- 2 Our methodology: how does it work?3 Key findings and country comparisons 4 Recommendations forthe UK Appendix Glossary 2 3 5 9 13 16 42 44 46 1 Contents Race to the top Foreword There are few innovations that have the potential to be as transformative for the UK economy, communities and our daily lives as drones.They are helping organisations across industries from logistics, manufacturing and agriculture to do tasks faster, safer and cheaper.They are also beginning to improve public services, helping to save and protect lives, with emergency response teams, police forces and the NHS all deploying them across the UK.BT Group has made no secret of its vision and ambitions to contribute towards the UKs drone success.Our mobile network, as the largest and most reliable in the UK, could be critical.By improving flight control, assisting with authentication and authorisation, facilitating data transmission and enabling cellular communication, 4G and 5G technology can be the backbone that helps drive the future growth of the industry. -------------------------------------------------- UAV technologies are here to stay.Used foolishly, they can endanger our interests, diminish regional and global stability, and undermine our values.Used wisely, they can help advance our national security interests even as we foster a more robust inter- national commitment to the rule of law.We believe this report offers a useful framework for ensuring that we use these new technologies wisely, and we look forward to discussing our recommendations with the administration and the public.John Abizaid Rosa Brooks June 2014 4 Recommendations and Report of the Task Force on US Drone Policy TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP The task forceIII consists of 10 senior-level participants from stakeholder constituencies including the US military community, the intelligence community, the legal commu- nity, academia and the private sector.Task force co-chairs: Gen. John Abizaid (US Army, retired), JPA Partners, LLC; former Commander, US Central Command. Rosa Brooks, Professor of Law, Georgetown University; Senior Fellow, New America Foundation; Contributing Editor, Foreign Policy; former Counselor to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. -------------------------------------------------- The legal norms governing armed conflicts and the use of force look clear on paper, but the changing nature of modern conflicts and security threats has rendered them almost incoherent in practice.Basic categories such as battlefield, combatant and hostilities no longer have clear or stable meaning.When this happens, the rule of law is threatened.The United States was founded upon rule of law principles, and histori- cally has sought to ensure that its own actions, international law and the actions of for- eign states are consistent with these principles.Today, however, despite the undoubted good faith of US decision-makers, it would be difficult to conclude that US targeted strikes are consistent with core rule of law norms.12 Recommendations and Report of the Task Force on US Drone Policy Executive Summary International Precedents: From the perspective of many around the world, the United States currently appears to claim, in effect, the legal right to kill any person it determines is a member of al-Qaida or its associated forces, in any state on Earth, at any time, based on secret criteria and secret evidence, evaluated in a secret pro- cess by unknown and largely anonymous individuals with no public disclosure of which organizations are considered associated forces (or how combatant status is determined or how the United States defines participation in hostilities), no means for anyone outside that secret process to raise questions about the criteria or validity of the evidence, and no means for anyone outside that process to identify or remedy mistakes or abuses. -------------------------------------------------- Nonetheless, we must consider how 36 Recommendations and Report of the Task Force on US Drone Policy Task Force Conclusions US targeted strikes appear to those outside the US executive branch and particularly to those who live in other parts of the world.From the perspective of many around the world, the United States currently appears to claim, in effect, the legal right to kill any person it determines is a member of al-Qa- ida or its associated forces, in any state on Earth, at any time, based on secret criteria and secret evidence, evaluated in a secret process by unknown and largely anonymous individuals with no public disclosure of which organizations are considered asso- ciated forces (or how combatant status is determined, how the United States defines participation in hostilities), no means for anyone outside that secret process to raise questions about the criteria or validity of the evidence, and no means for anyone out- side that process to identify or remedy mistakes or abuses. -------------------------------------------------- And in an important practical respect it is: in both cases, the US government generally does not publicly acknowledge its responsibility.When it comes to oversight mechanisms, however, the difference between covert activ- ities and traditional military activities that are secret and unacknowledged is a crucial one.Whereas covert actions undertaken by the CIA require both a before-the-fact 38 Recommendations and Report of the Task Force on US Drone Policy Task Force Conclusions presidential finding and notification even if after the fact of the congressional in- telligence committees, secret, unacknowledged strikes carried out by the US military need not be reported to the intelligence committees as long as they can be character- ized as traditional military activities.(They also do not require an advance presidential finding under the law, though press reports suggest that all or most recent targeted strikes carried out by the military have in fact received prior presidential approval). -------------------------------------------------- Because the information involved is classified, members of Congress may have only limited ability to object in a meaningful way: they may be unable to share vital details with colleagues not on relevant committees, and they may lack the authority to share details or criticisms with constituents.But secret policies that have not been scruti- nized are more likely to be ill-conceived,115 and the congressional deference more or less forced by lack of information may become a habit that continues, even when more consequential uses of force are under consideration.116 40 Recommendations and Report of the Task Force on US Drone Policy RECOMMENDATIONS On May 23, 2013, President Obama delivered a major speech at the National Defense University in which he acknowledged many of the same concerns addressed in this report.In his speech, he pledged to continue the difficult task of ensuring that the use of lethal UAVs is both strategically sound and consistent with long-standing US com- mitments to democracy, accountability and the rule of law. -------------------------------------------------- Her areas of expertise include defense strategy and policy, military opera- tions, national security and civil-military relations.Before joining CFR, Davidson was an assistant professor in the School of Public Policy at George Mason University where she taught courses on national security, civil-military relations, counterinsurgency and public policy.From 2009 to 2012, she served in the Obama administration as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for plans, where she oversaw the development of guidance for military campaign and contingency plans.She also led policy efforts for US global defense posture, including the militarys rebalance to Asia, and internation- al agreements related to US forces stationed overseas.Previously, Dr. Davidson served as director for stability operations capabilities in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (20062008), where she founded and directed the Consortium for Complex 56 Recommendations and Report of the Task Force on US Drone Policy Task Force Members Operations (20072008), an innovative interagency project to enhance education, training, coordination and performance in complex emergencies and interventions. -------------------------------------------------- The Deaths of Innocents. The New York Times, October 23, 2013.Ac- cessed June 4, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/24/opinion/the-deaths-of-innocents.html; The Ed- itorial Board.The Lawyer Behind the Drone Policy. The New York Times, May 7, 2014.Accessed June 4, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/08/opinion/the-lawyer-behind-the-drone-policy.html; The Editorial Board.The Trouble With Drones. The New York Times, April 7, 2013.Accessed June 4, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/08/opinion/the-trouble-with-drones.html; see also Singer, Peter.Do Drones Undermine Democracy? The New York Times, January 21, 2012.Accessed June 4, 2014. http:// www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/opinion/sunday/do-drones-undermine-democracy.html?pagewanted=all; Mayer, Jane.The Predator War. The New Yorker, October 26, 2009.Accessed June 4, 2014. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer; McKelvey, Tara.Covering Obamas Secret War. Columbia Journalism Review, May 3, 2011.Accessed June 4, 2014. http://www.cjr.org/feature/cov- ering_obamas_secret_war.php?page=all. -------------------------------------------------- In addition, an Israeli UAV manufacturer, Elbit Systems, has received dozens of permits from the Israeli government to test and operate unmanned aircraft in Israeli airspace.Opall-Rome, Barbara.International ISR: Israel Tackles The Last Frontier of UAV Technology, Defense News, June 3, 2013.Accessed June 2, 2014. http:// www.defensenews.com/article/20130603/C4ISR01/306030015.49.China has been pursuing advanced military unmanned aircraft, allegedly even using hacking attacks against defense contractors to steal American UAV technology.China has reportedly even tested a stealth combat UAV.(See Wong, Edward.Hacking U.S.Secrets, China Pushes for Drones. New York Times, September 20, 2013.Accessed June 2, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/21/world/asia/hacking-us- secrets-china-pushes-for-drones.html.Iran has also claimed to have developed increasingly sophisticated UAVs, although the truth of these claims is unclear.In November 2013, Iran announced its development of an unmanned aircraft with a range of 1,200 miles and the ability to remain airborne for 30 hours. -------------------------------------------------- Accessed June 2, 2014. http://www.cfr.org/drones/ transferring-cia-drone-strikes-pentagon/p30434.109.This is part of a broader problem that is beyond the scope of this report: the recent blurring of the lines between the military and intelligence communities.See Chesney, Robert.Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate. Journal of National Security Law and Policy 14 (February 2012): 539-629.Accessed June 3, 2014. http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Mili- 76 Recommendations and Report of the Task Force on US Drone Policy Endnotes tary-Intelligence-Convergence-and-the-Law-of-the-Title-10Title-50-Debate.pdf; Brooks, Rosa.Shadow Wars. Foreign Policy, September 20, 2012.Accessed June 3, 2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/arti- cles/2012/09/20/shadow_wars; Mazzetti, Mark.The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth.New York: The Penguin Press, 2013.110.Dilanian, Ken.Sen.Levins bid to boost drone oversight falters in Congress. Los Angeles Times, February 12, 2014. -------------------------------------------------- Developed products of various calibres of UAV capabilities are freely available in the market.Time to come, some non-state actors may use UAVs to spread fear, possibly chemical or biological attacks, transport illicit cargo with limited exposure, or to cause any other desired reaction which will threaten national as well as regional security.The primary goal of this study is to test the research question of whether it is possible for the adversaries/ non state actors to use commercial drones to threaten the national/regional security.The hypothesis is that commercial drones do increase the risk to the national security.The research is primarily a qualitative analysis, as it requires analysis of possible capabilities of state, non-state actors and adversaries.In addition, threat from civil usage of UAVs.Finally to propose recommendations if any required countering such threats.ii SECRET SECRET CONTENTS Chapter I INTRODUCTION Non-state actors and asymmetric warfare Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) Commercial/ domestic drones Statement of the problem Hypothesis Aim and objectives of the study Significance of the study Scope and Limitations Organization of paper Chapter II LITERATURE REVIEW Capabilities of modern UAVs/ drones Past Incidents Policies and directives by the Sri Lankan authorities Policies and directives by the other countries Definition of Terms Chapter III METHODOLOGY Methodology Collection of data Data analysis and findings Hypothesis testing Chapter IV RECOMMENDATIONS Recommendations Conclusion Further researchable areas 1 - 2 2 3 3 3 3 - 4 4 4 - 5 5 6 - 7 7 - 10 10 - 11 11 - 13 13 - 14 15 15 16 - 17 18 - 19 20 - 21 21 22 iii SECRET SECRET CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION NON-STATE ACTORS AND ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 1. -------------------------------------------------- The flight of UAVs may operate with various degrees of autonomy: either under remote control by a human operator, or fully or intermittently autonomously, by on-board computers.8.Compared to manned aircraft, UAVs are often preferred for missions that are too "dull, dirty or dangerous" for humans.They originated mostly in military applications, although their use is expanding in commercial, scientific, recreational and other applications, such as policing and surveillance, aerial photography, agriculture and drone racing.Civilian drones now vastly outnumber military drones.(Washington, 2013) 9.The term drone, more widely used by the public, was coined in reference to the resemblance of dumb-looking navigation and loud-and-regular motor sounds of old military unmanned aircraft to the male bee.The term has encountered strong opposition from aviation professionals and government regulators.2 SECRET SECRET COMMERCIAL/ DOMESTIC DRONES 10. -------------------------------------------------- This study is focused to identify whether it is possible for the non-state actors/ adversaries to use commercial drones to threaten the national/regional security.HYPOTHESIS 13.The hypothesis of this study is commercial drones do increase the risk to the national security.AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 14.The aim of this study is to test the research question of whether it is possible for the adversaries/ non-state actors to use commercial drones to threaten the national/regional security.3 SECRET SECRET 15.The objectives of the study is to; a.Identify the capabilities of modern commercial drones and threats.b.Identify possible means for the adversaries/ non state actors to use commercial drones to threaten the national/regional security.c. To propose recommendations if any required countering such threats.SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 16.This study contributes to the growing literature on UAVs/ commercial drones by comparing the technology and possible usage. -------------------------------------------------- Further, data collection, specially the regional data was limited due to the time limitation.b.Words.Words limitation for this study paper is considered as 4,000 words.That limit found to be insufficient to do an in depth study.4 SECRET SECRET c. Validity.Since the technology develops rapidly, analysis and recommendations of this study may not be applicable in the future context of commercial drones.ORGANIZATION OF PAPER 18.This study consists of four chapters.Accordingly, the first chapter introduces the subject along with background of the study, objectives, and significance of the study, limitations and the organization of the chapters.19.Second chapter was dedicated for comprehensive literature review.This chapter mainly discusses the regulations and policies related to usage of commercial drones and previous studies in relation to asymmetric threat of UAVs.20.Third chapter is allocated to procedural matters resulting to methodology, under which data collection, analysis and findings and testing of hypothesis have also been discussed. -------------------------------------------------- 21.Forth chapter brings out the conclusion, recommendations and further researchable areas.5 SECRET SECRET CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW 22.This chapter present the literature review of this study is an attempt made by the author to organize relevant information, incidents, policies, regulations and relating similar studies under the scope.CAPABILITIES OF MODERN COMMERCIAL/ DOMESTIC DRONES 23.Present day drones are capable of lifting heavy cameras and other objects.Technology has developed to a point which drones no longer are fragile machines incapable of lifting heavier objects.There are capable of lifting camera, allowing user to take the best of the very best aerial footage.Such powerful drones are not just limited to cameras, they are also capable of carrying other heavy objects.Following are five of the heavy lifting drones in the market, up to 20kgs some of these are much more powerful than we could have thought possible. -------------------------------------------------- (INTENTIONALLY BLANK) 6 SECRET SECRET Name Image Max Control Payload Range Flight Time (with payload) Payload DJI MATRICE 100 FREEFLY ALTA 8 3.6kg 5km 40 min Camera/ other devices 18kg 2km 10 min Professional camera/ other devices/ heavy objects AZ 4K UHD 20kg 6km 20 min Professional camera/ other devices/ heavy objects 8kg 5km 15 min Camera/ other devices 8.2kg 3km 18 min Camera/ other devices DJI MATRICE 600 DJI S900 Table 2.1 Source : : Heavy Lifting Drones www.dronesglobe.com PAST INCIDENTS 24.There were many incidents/ disasters contributing to public wariness.Following are some of the examples for that; (Forrest, 2015) 7 SECRET SECRET a. Drone Crashes Near the White House.On Monday, 26th January 2015, a drone crash landed on the White House lawn.The White House does have its own specific flight restrictions, but the drone wasn't easy to detect. -------------------------------------------------- The drone operator, photographer Warren Abrams, claims that the drone crashed after someone in the audience stole control of it from him.e. Drone Injures Bystanders in Virginia Crowd.In the fall of 2013, spectators gathered at the Virginia Motorsports Park for the Great Bull Run, a festival with live music, drinking, a tomato fight, and a bull run similar to the Running of the Bulls in Spain.During the festival, a drone being used to record video crashed into the stands, injuring several people in attendance.f. Drone Flies Too Close to a News Helicopter.One major concern for consumer drone use is the potential for operators to pilot drones into occupied airspace.In Washington, a news helicopter was covering a fire when the pilot noticed a drone flying too close for comfort.Nothing happened in this particular incident, but the US 8 SECRET SECRET FAA said it receives 25 reports a month of drones flying too close to manned aircraft. -------------------------------------------------- The drone caused no harm or damage in its operation, but its operator was detained and questioned afterwards.This incident, along with similar situations, prompted the US FAA to criminalize drone flight in certain areas.k. Drone Flies Over Comerica Park.The Detroit Tigers were playing against the Baltimore Orioles in a Major League Baseball game in US when a drone went buzzing by overhead.Being that professional sporting events usually attract fans in the tens of thousands, a weaponized drone could cause serious injury.Drones are difficult to detect and make security harder to enforce at such events.m. Drone Crashes into Grand Prismatic Spring.A Dutch man crashed his drone in the Grand Prismatic Spring, a famous hot spring in Yellowstone National Park.At the time, park rangers were concerned that the downed drone, as well as attempts to remove it, could hurt the spring.9 SECRET SECRET n. Drone Attacked by Hawk. -------------------------------------------------- g. Dropping of items as well as displaying of banner from a pilotless aircraft in flight without approval is also illegal.Their operations will also have to be restricted to daytime unless the operation is indoors with adequate lighting or, is a shielded operation with adequate illumination.h. There is also a ban on operating pilotless aircraft in a race or competition of any form, without special approval from CAA DG.POLICIES AND DIRECTIVES BY THE OTHER COUNTRIES 27.Different policies and directives promulgated by different countries in order to regulate the usage of UAVs and commercial drones.Following are some of the regulation formulated by selected countries; 11 SECRET SECRET a. India.Drones in India have been banned since October 2014, regardless of their use.India is currently in the process of creating extensive regulations covering the use of drones in India.Until regulations are created, civil operation of drones will require approval from the Air navigation service provider, defence, ministry of home affairs, and other concerned security agencies within India. -------------------------------------------------- e. It further reads, Under the circumstances, for the safety and security of life and property of the people and for the national security, henceforth any person, company or organization intending to operate any flying object like Drone, UAV/UAS or remote controlled planes/toy planes etc.is to obtain prior written permission from the Civil Aviation Authority, Bangladesh (CAAB) in prescribed form. (CAAB, 2015) f. Israel.Israels Aviation Law regulates the operation and manufacturing of all aircraft, including unmanned aircraft (UA) in Israel.The Law imposes licensing 12 SECRET SECRET requirements on flight operators, aviation instructors, manufacturers, and all other persons engaged in aviation.Israels Civil Aviation Authority (CAAI) controls the licensing and supervision of civilian flight operations, and maintains a special unit for UA operations.The CAAI has issued a number of directives to regulate various aspects of UA activities, including flight altitude and authorized routes, required transmission devices, and procedures for the preapproval of flights. -------------------------------------------------- Australia, New Zealand and Spain have notified provisional norms for the civilian use of UAVs.Spain is especially liberal with drone usage, allowing UAVs weighing up to 150 kg for investigations, agriculture, surveillance, aerial advertising, search and rescue operations, radio and TV transmissions, and more.(Lute, 2016) DEFINITION OF TERMS 28.UAV.A UAV is defined as a "powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload".Therefore, missiles are not considered UAVs because the vehicle itself is a weapon that is not reused, though it is also unmanned and in some cases remotely guided.(Anon., n.d.) 13 SECRET SECRET 29.Adversary.A party acknowledge as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged (Anon., n.d.). -------------------------------------------------- This includes the regulations and directives issued by various countries and reviews over these regulations.The review of state and non-state actors includes data from contemporary security, scientific, and defence journals as well as published books on military.15 SECRET SECRET DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 36.With the analysis of literature and data collected during this research, following possible modes of operandi by the adversaries, with using commercial drones, have been identified.a. Drones Crash in to High Security Areas.Adversaries can cash commercial drones armed with explosive in to high security areas.These areas may include military headquarters, security forces headquarters, fuel refineries, storages, airport (including aircraft on ground), etc.b. Drones Crash into VIPs/ VVIPs.Adversaries can cash commercial drones armed with explosive in to VIPs.Possible targets may include politicians including the President, Prime Minister, other ministers, foreign dignitaries, diplomats etc. -------------------------------------------------- 16 SECRET SECRET g. Transportation of Drugs.Unregistered drones can be used to transport drugs between places of high security.Even if it get caught no one will be responsible.37.Only around 50 UAVs/ drones are registered with Sri Lanka Civil Aviation Authority to date, while many more are believed to be in operation.This is common for most of the regional countries.If these devices use by the adversaries, they can make use of these commercial drones to achieve desired objectives, which will always be a threat to national and regional security.38.Weaknesses in Present Regulations.Available regulations in most of the countries seems to be perfect as it covers most of the aspects.Even though regulations made by the Sri Lankan CAA cover almost all the aspects of this threat theoretically.During the study following points to be improved were identified.a.Anyone Can Bring Drones to Sri Lanka.Practically anyone can either disassemble or as a whole bring drones to Sri Lanka, either in their main luggage or as cargo. -------------------------------------------------- 17 SECRET SECRET 39.Capabilities to Counter.Regional governments/ military always equipped with the capabilities to counter symmetric adversaries/ non state actors, it will take reasonable time for them to counter threats from commercial drones as it is new to the world and even adversaries have not yet utilised these capabilities.HYPOTHESIS TESTING 40.This study is to test the research question of whether it is possible for the adversaries/ non state actors to use commercial drones to threaten the national/regional security, and the hypothesis that commercial drones do increase the risk to the national security.This section presented the methodology employed to test that hypothesis.It also examines conceptual uses for commercial drones as well as state and non-state actors/ adversaries current usage, present regulations, possible modes of operandi and things to be improved have been considered.41.To conduct the analysis it is important to answer or explore the following questions. -------------------------------------------------- a.Can present commercial drones capable of carrying devastating payloads?b.Are there in past incidents of misuse of commercial drones?c. Is there any threat to national security by using commercial drones?d. What are the possible modes of operandi by adversaries?e. What are threats to other regional countries and their counter measures?f. Is there any mechanism to regulate the usage of commercial drones?g. Are there any things to improve in present regulations?18 SECRET SECRET 42.With the analysis of available literature and with a special significance to above questions, the hypothesis: commercial drones do increase the risk to the national security, can clearly be established.Finally, the research concludes with the recommendations to minimize to damage which can be caused by the adversaries.19 SECRET SECRET CHAPTER IV RECOMMENDATIONS 43.This chapter brings out the conclusion, recommendations and further researchable areas. -------------------------------------------------- Since matter is very much sensitive to the national security, the proposed organization should be formed under the MOD in liaison with SLAF and CAA, in order to closely supervise, monitor and control the usage of commercial drones.Similar mechanism to be implemented in other countries.48.Ethical code of conduct should also be introduced in order to ensure the right for privacy and safeguarding of vital information.20 SECRET SECRET 49.Countries do not have regulations, need national commercial drones policy and its regulations must include the domestic use for flying and licensing of commercial drones.It must define the laws of their trade and import in the country, without posing any threat to public, military installations and national security.Public can also participate in feedback to design the privacy policy and civil liberties from aerial surveillance.50.It is recommended to carryout public awareness programmes on regulations and legal aspects of usage of drones. -------------------------------------------------- 21 SECRET SECRET FURTHER RESEARCHABLE AREAS 54.Are we permitted to shoot down illegal drones?It goes without saying that people whose rights are infringed by illegally filming or flying drones may defend themselves.Similar to the rules on self-defence against a person, damaging or destroying an object in order to prevent a legal infringement is permitted.(Solmecke, 2013) 55.Establishment of mechanism to apply the regulations to be considered in a separate research.22 SECRET SECRET REFERENCES Anon., 2016.Military Terms and Definitions.www.militaryterms.net[Accessed 23 Aug 2016] Anon., n.d. Google.www.google.lk[Accessed 23 Aug 2016] Anon., n.d. Military Terms and Definitions www.militaryterms.net[Accessed 23 Aug 2016] CAAB, 2015.No drone allowed in country's airspace, s.l.: s.n.CAAI, 2012.Regulation of Drones: Israel, s.l.: s.n.Dictionary, C., n.d. 2016. -------------------------------------------------- s.l.:s.n.Forrest, C., 2015.12 drone disasters that show why the FAA hates drones.Lute, S., 2016.What are the current regulations for flying drones in India?.Headlines today & India today.Kirinde, C., 2016.UAV, drone operators urged to register with Civil Aviation Authority.Sunday Times.Washington, U. o., 2013.Domestic Drones: Technical and Policy Issues, s.l.: University of Washington.Zahid, A.A., 2014.Pakistan needs a commercial drone policy.www.dronesglobe.com Solmecke, R. C., 2013.Are you allowed to shoot down illegal drones?.23 SECRET SECRET 24 SECRET Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka Civil Aviation Authority of Sri Lanka Implementing Standards (Issued under Sec.120, Civil Aviation Act No.14 of 2010) Title: Requirements for Operation of Pilotless Aircraft (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles/Remotely Piloted Aircraft) Reference No.: CA-IS-2016-GEN-001 SLCAIS : 053 Date: 25th February 2016 Pursuant to Sec.120 of the Civil Aviation Act No.14 of 2010 which is hereinafter referred to as the CA Act, Director General of Civil Aviation has the power to issue, whenever he considers it necessary or appropriate to do so, such Implementing Standards for the purpose of giving effect to any provision in the CA Act, Regulations or Rules made thereunder including the Articles of the Convention on International Civil Aviation specified in the Schedule to the CA Act. -------------------------------------------------- IS, ISIS) Joint Civilian Casualty Study JCOA Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Division/Joint Center JLLIS KIA LOAC MAM MEK MILGROUP MNF-I NAF NATO NCT NGO NIAC NSA OEF OGA for Operational Analysis Joint Lessons Learned Information System Killed in action Law of armed conflict Military-age male Mujahedin-e Khalq U.S. military group Multinational ForceIraq New America Foundation North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nation containing the target Nongovernmental organization Noninternational Armed Conflict National Security Agency Operation Enduring Freedom Other (i.e., nonmilitary) government agency Abbreviations | xvii Office of General Counsel (DOD) Operational military effectiveness Operational preparation of the environment Office of the Secretary of Defense Processing, exploitation, and dissemination Positive identification Prisoner of war Presidential Policy Guidance Quick reaction force Rules of engagement Situational awareness Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape training Strategic military effectiveness Special Operations Forces Tomahawk land attack missile Traditional military activity Tactical military effectiveness Tactics, techniques, and procedures Unmanned aerial system Unmanned aerial vehicle (drone) Uniformed Code of Military Justice OGC OME OPE OSD PED PID POW PPG QRF ROE SA SERE SME SOF TLAM TMA TME TTP UAS UAV UCMJ xviii | Abbreviations UN UNSCR USAID United Nations United Nations Security Council Resolution U.S. Agency for International Development Abbreviations | xix P A R T I D R O N E S T R I K E S I N P A K I S T A N ASSESSING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES BY LARRY LEWIS C H A P T E R 1 INTRODUCTION Drones (referred to as unmanned aerial vehicles or UAVs by the U.S. mili- tary) are a recent innovation in warfare, introducing new and important capabilities to the battlefield. -------------------------------------------------- That said, the United States could find ways to compensate for these additional chal- lenges, for example, by partnering with third-party organizations with a presence on the ground or through increased reliance on leveraging human intelligence (HUMINT) to cue other intelligence sources to enhance BDA.In both Afghanistan and the current drone campaign in Pakistan, the stated desire of the United States to minimize civilian harm was evidenced by such statements as: Weve done everything possible ...to reduce any risk to that civilian population. 16 However, the militarys ability to do ev- 14 Jo Becker and Scott Shane, Secret Kill List Proves a Test of Obamas Principles and Will, New York Times, 29 May 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership -in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?pagewanted=all.15 While the legal framework for counterterrorism (CT) strikes in Pakistan is in debate, the in- ternational norm of the default status of individuals to be civilians in case of uncertainty would appear to be valuable to preserve. -------------------------------------------------- A number of these best practices and lessons could be applied to the drone activities outside Afghanistan.U.S. government elements conducting this campaign, including leaders and those responsible for executing opera- tions, should seek out these lessons.The U.S. militarys J7 Joint Force De- 2 Besides the issue of civilian casualties becoming toxic in Afghanistan, civilian casualties also harmed CT operations in Iraq in 2009 and drove the development of restrictive policy guid- ance for those operations in Pakistan and Yemen, such as those in the Presidential Policy Guid- ance given on 23 May 2013.See White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: The Presidents May 23 Speech on Counterterrorism, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office /2013/05/23/fact-sheet-president-s-may-23-speech-counterterrorism.32 | Drone Strikes in Pakistan velopment, which recently led the Joint Staff Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) 3 Working Group, is a good source for these lessons. -------------------------------------------------- Moreover, with the problems surrounding Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba, no other readily apparent long-term detention options avail- able for dealing with captured terrorists, and the planned withdrawal of U.S. forces from large-scale combat operations, some proponents argue 3 Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, DOD News Briefing, 12 February 2002, https:// www.fas.org/irp/news/2002/02/dod021202.html, hereafter Rumsfeld Briefing.4 Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense University. 5 Despite these advantages, however, U.S. claims that drones are surgical in their ability to avoid civilian casualties seem not to be supported by operational data.The analysis of strikes in Afghanistan mentioned in part 1 showed that drone strikes were 10 times more likely to cause civilian casualties than strikes by manned aircraft.38 | The Future of Drone Strikes that drone strikes are becoming one of few remaining tools left to use in the 6 U.S. counterterrorism (CT) mission. -------------------------------------------------- 12 Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on the Presidents Speech on Coun- terterrorism (briefing, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 23 May 2013), www.whit ehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/background-briefing-senior-administration-officials -presidents-speech-co, hereafter Background Briefing; and Eric Schmitt, Congress Restricts Drones Program Shift, New York Times, 16 January 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/17 /us/politics/congress-restricts-drones-program-shift.html?_r=0; and John T. Bennett, McCain Vows New Fight over Control of U.S. Armed Drone Program, Defense News, 19 February 2014.40 | The Future of Drone Strikes perceptions, this framework addresses a gap in the current dialogue over drone strikes.The next section of this work briefly outlines the framework and pro- vides an overview of President Obamas guidance and several other policy options.After that, methods for evaluating the effects of proposed changes to drone strike policy on the framework are presented in three areas: mili- tary effectiveness, legitimacy issues, and how these topics contribute to the net effectiveness of a policy option on the broader goals of U.S. security and counterterrorism. -------------------------------------------------- The subtlety that is often missed here centers on covert actions, which, generally speaking, are actions taken by a government that, at the time the action is carried out, are not intended to be acknowl- edged by the government.Title 10 governs the authorities and mechanisms of the armed forces, while Title 50 covers the authorities of the intelligence agencies, intelli- gence collection, and other such secretive activities.There are important details to note with regard to the interplay between Title 10 and Title 50.Relevant to the discussion here is the fact that covert actions are covered in Title 50which gives a more nuanced definition than that given above (see Appendix B)and may only be executed if directed by a presidential finding, but their execution is not restricted to any particular agency.As a result, the military may carry out covert actionsincluding covert drone strikesunder Title 50. -------------------------------------------------- This option has received high-profile attention.Members of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, including Chairman Dianne Fein- stein and Senator Angus S. King, as well as Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick J. Leahy and Ranking Member Charles E. Grassley have 8 expressed interest in it.Former Secretary of Defense and CIA Director 7 A drone court could alternatively have oversight over targeting operations in general.This may include operations in support of more widely varied missions than if the purview of the court was strictly over remote targeting operations.8 Carlo Munoz, Sens.Feinstein, Leahy Push for Court Oversight of Armed Drone Strikes, The Hill, 10 February 2013, http://thehill.com/policy/defense/282033-feinstein-leahy-push-for -court-oversight-of-armed-drone-strikes-; John O. Brennan, Open Hearing: Nomination of John O. Brennan to be the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 7 February 2013 (transcript and video), United States Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC, http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-nomination-john-o-brennan-be -director-central-intelligence-agency, hereafter Brennan, Open Hearing; and Scott Shane, De- bating a Court to Vet Drone Strikes, New York Times, 8 February 2013, http://www.nytimes .com/2013/02/09/world/a-court-to-vet-kill-lists.html. -------------------------------------------------- 1 (Fall 2006).52 | The Future of Drone Strikes (FOIA) lawsuit to release portions of a classified memorandum that put forth its legal rationale for targeting U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaki, while members of the public and even of the Senate Select Committee on Intel- ligence pushed for the release of additional DOJ legal memos on drone strike practices.15 More widely, the UN, Congress, advocates, and pundits have called for the release of further details on U.S. drone strike activities and practices.In the 2014 Intelligence Authorization Act, Congress proposed a provi- sion that would have required the president to report the total number of combatants and noncombatant civilians killed or injured by drone strikes 16 in the past year, although it later stripped the provision from the bill.With respect to U.S. targeting processes and standards, Senators Ronald L. Wyden, Mark E. Udall, and Martin T. Heinrich of the Senate Select Com- mittee on Intelligence noted in a public letter to Attorney General Holder, The United States playbook for combating terrorism will sometimes include sections that are secret, but the rulebook that the United States follows should always be available to the American public. 17 While the primary focus of these members of Congress may be on the release of information to the American people, greater transparency to the local population in areas of drone strikes may also be desirable. -------------------------------------------------- On the other hand, whether or to what extent OGAs are in practice bound by IHL and other international laws in their 31 For example, see Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti, Secret Order Lets U.S.Raid Al Qaeda, New York Times, 9 November 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/washington/10military .html?pagewanted=all&_r=2&.32 See Joseph B. Berger III, Covert Action: Title 10, Title 50, and the Chain of Command, Joint Force Quarterly 67 (2012).33 Marshall Curtis Erwin, Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel /RL33715.pdf.Legitimacy | 75 actions remains unclear.34 A further difference between DOD and OGAs is the relatively high level of transparency in DODs chain of command.For these reasons, the military preference has the potential to provide more confidence in the legality of U.S. drone strike practices. -------------------------------------------------- Secrecy The extent to which the United States can engage in such operations as drone strikes clandestinely or covertly is to some extent an issue of military effectiveness, and has implications for the perception of U.S. legitimacy.If drone strikes were largely kept a secret from the international public or from those in the country in which the operations take place, this could support the perception that the U.S. government respects state sover- eignty, which might increase the perception of U.S. legitimacy.Moreover, these actions may effectively help the United States achieve its CT objec- tives without a large ground operation, thus avoiding what might be seen as a more illegitimate action than a drone strike operation.Hence, effec- 58 One report recommends going much further in this vein than the listed policy options, urging the United States to foster the development of appropriate international norms for the use of lethal force outside traditional battlefields. See Abizaid and Brooks, Recommendations and Report of the Task Force on U.S. Drone Policy. -------------------------------------------------- Legitimacy | 87 tively maintaining the secrecy of its operations can be a tool with which the United States increases or maintains the perception of its legitimacy.As noted in Appendix A, even if total secrecy is not attained but the strikes are not widely known, the host country may choose not to acknowl- edge them for diplomatic or practical reasons and, in essence, the secret is safe from the perspective of the broader international community.This practice carries some risk, however, because if the actions done in secret are discovered, the backlash and perception of legitimacy could be more negative than if the operation had been done in the open.More- over, with respect to drone strike operations specifically, strikes obviously leave evidence that they occurred (see Appendix A for further discussion).Given that very few nations in the world currently operate armed drones, the ability to attain true secrecy may be questionable.The military preference policy, especially if it includes a preference for Title 10 action, could decrease the flexibility the United States has to carry out secret drone strike operations. -------------------------------------------------- Furthermore, various media outlets have asserted that the CIA must perform these operations, with the implication that DOD does not carry out covert drone strikes, although Appendix A discusses 2 how DOD is not legally barred from conducting such activities.Noncommittal and conflicting statements have come out of high levels of the U.S. government on the subject of the U.S. military carrying out covert actions.In his 2007 confirmation hearing, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and current Director of National Intelligence Lieutenant General James R. Clapper Jr. testified that Title 50 covert activities are normally not conducted ...by uniformed military forces, tacitly acknowl- However, in his written edging that DOD forces conduct covert actions.3 testimony for the same hearing, Clapper said it was his understanding that military forces are not conducting covert action, but are limiting them- 4 selves to clandestine action. -------------------------------------------------- .., 20.32 Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedeman.Washingtons Phantom War, Foreign Affairs 90, no.4 (July/August 2011), 4-5.15 targeted killings proven by their hosting of UAV facilities, while requesting that America target common enemies. Beyond the public eye, Pakistani officials have supported drone attacks even though they have occasionally protested publically.Former Pakistan Prime Minister, Yousaf Raza Gillani, was a supporter of UAV killings and stated I do not care if they [the Americans] do it as long as they get the right people.33 Furthermore, it was reported by The Washington Post that CIA documents containing proof that top officials in Pakistans government had for years secretly endorsed the program had been uncovered.34 These same documents include evidence that these same officials were privy to routine classified briefings on strikes and casualty counts.35 Despite civilian casualty allegations, the US has been able to justify their use of remote piloted weapons by indicating that the use of drones has allowed for more precision than other conventional tactics, like putting boots on the ground that would fight in large scale type warfare exposing more civilians to the risks associated with more conventional means.36 President Obama has further attempted to maintain public support for his decisions associated with using UAVs, as he has re-enforced the concept that the US applies jus in bello principles of necessity and proportionality when conducting strikes. -------------------------------------------------- This was demonstrated in his National Defence University speech; the use of drones is heavily constrained ...before any strike is taken, there must be near-certainty 33 Washingtons Phantom War, ..., 5.34 Greg Miller and Bob Woodward.Secret Memos Reveal Explicit Nature of US, Pakistan Agreement on Drones, The Washington Post, 23 October 2013.Last accessed 3 May 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/top-pakistani-leaders-secretly-backed-cia-drone- campaign-secret-documents-show/2013/10/23/15e6b0d8-3beb-11e3-b6a9-da62c264f40e story.html.35 Ibid.36 Washingtons Phantom War, ..., 2-5.16 that no civilians will be killed or injured- the highest standard we can set.37 The decision to conduct targeted killings by drone strikes have been influenced by the recognition that American public support is a necessity and that the application of physical violence is a founded on social values such as the fear of friendly force, and non-combatant casualties.Closely linked with these socially constructed norms are the implicit preconceived notions like American exceptionalism that influence decisions like the employment of UAVs to conduct attacks in sovereign states. -------------------------------------------------- This has led to the effective conduct of these types of operation without diplomatic and political interference from outside sources.Exceptionalism has resulted in unilateralism, whereby the US has been able to develop its drone program with efficiency, as it has not been required to cooperate with any other coalition member.Although some countries and organizations such as the UN continue to publically criticize drone practices, opposition has been insignificant and inconsequential, as countries that are the most impacted by the attacks secretly support the US approach.A number of sources have reported this phenomenon, as countries like Pakistan also benefit from the killings of terrorist leaders, and continue to support drone strikes.45 The efficiency, or perception thereof, of targeted killings has resulted in the legitimacy of the 44 War, Casualties, and Public Opinion ..., 295.45 Washingtons Phantom War, ..., 5.Also, see Secret Memos Reveal Explicit Nature of US, Pakistan Agreement on Drones, which highlights some of the proof of this- Despite repeatedly denouncing the CIAs drone campaign, top officials in Pakistans government have for years secretly endorsed the program and routinely received classified briefings on strikes and casualty counts, according to top-secret CIA documents and Pakistani diplomatic memos. 20 employment of drones in the eyes of the American public, as their use supports the attainment of national objectives. -------------------------------------------------- 23.Alexey Nikolsky, Design of secret drone is disclosed during Shoigus photosession,Vedomosti, February 26 FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 8, 2013,https://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/2013/02/08/oblik_sekretnogo_bespilotnika_raskryt_izza_ fotosessii_shojgu.24.Transas and Sokol will standardize their drones after winning tender for UAV for the Russian army,VPK.name, December 2, 2011, https://vpk.name/news/61511_tranzas_i_sokol_pobedivshie_v_tendere_na_sozdanie_bla_dlya_ rossiiskoi_armii_maksimalno_unificiruyut_svoi_apparaty.html.25.Artem Kuznetsov,Timur Latypov,Victor Osmanov, Kazan drones: corporate raiding, breakthrough, or collapse of hopes? Biznes Online, May 24, 2018, https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/383267.26.Timur Latypov, Milking dry: Altair transferred from Kazan to Yekaterinburg,Biznes Online, October 9, 2018, https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/398202.27.State contract for preproduction batch of Kazan combat drones Altius signed,Biznes Online, February 20, 2021, https://www.business-gazeta.ru/news/500019. -------------------------------------------------- GORY S81 PEelASSI":V ON 111M' on CONTROL NO ___ _ Approved for Release: 2018/11/16 C05115217 TOP ti'P.RFf Approved for Release: 2018/11/16 C05115217 DRAFT BYEMAt~ CONTROL SYSTEM ..RECORD OF APPROVALS AND COORDINATION APPROVED .~,--" Director, National Reconnaissance Office Chief of Staff, USAF COORDINATION Comptroller, NRO AF/PR Director, NRO Staff AF/PRPL SAF/OI AF/LG AF/LGY AF/LGYJ HA'HH .. f. VIA BYEMAN 1).,'I'~.~'f POL ::'Y";'TEM TOP SECRET Ct."SSlflfOSV 8YMAlIf 1 E);EMPT Fi:i{)ll,l GNERJl.l OCtAS$IFIC.o\TlONSCHEO!JU 0' XECUflVE O~OlA 11~<;" [XfM"r,ONCATE GO~V !J82 OifCLA.$SlfY ON iM' Dii f - COpy CONTROL NO ________ _ PA.GE 3 OF == PAGES COPIES OF Approved for Release: 2018/11/16 C05115217 " I nn C'r'"or"', uv _iltkt",.~r~ Approved for Release: 2018/11/16 C05115217 D R AFT BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEf.1 1.0 PURPOSE This plan issues policy and guidance required to (a) trans- fer nine A-II aircraft and seventeen D-2l drones from the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) to the USAF, (b) declassify the physical assets, and (c) relocate assets to permanent storage areas during fiscal year 1977. -------------------------------------------------- .. - } 4.2 The D-21 drone was developed by the NRP for use in conjunc- tion with the A-11/A-12, as shown in Tab A.Subsequent to A-12 deactivation, the D-21 program was relocated to Beale AFB, California, and adapted 'to the B-52H launch platform.In June 1972, the program was terminated and seventeen D-2l drones were relocated to storage atl 4.3 During May 1975, the Director of Central Intelligence, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), Director, National Reconnaissance Office and the Vice Chief of Staff, .... - USAF determined that there was no current NRP or USAF TOP SECRET COpy OF CONTROL NO ___ _ PAGE 6 OF=====PAGES COPIES ClASSIFlf.O 8Y 'Yf~.A,fot 1 E XEMP,.""'()tIof CENERAl OECl.a.ssI'!CATIO~ ScwEOuU OF Ut:tCUTiVE ORO(A t1"l!il [x:;,...,.rIOfi CAH OORY ~8J DEC l .... SSIf Y ~ jM\l' on HAIH)l E VIA BYfMAN coWr~()L SYSTEM Approved for Release: 2018/11/16 C05115217 Approved for Release: 2018/11/16 CO! -------------------------------------------------- USAF.5.2 D-21 drone airframes will be shipped by and from~ lat an approximate rate of three per .... ... ~--------------------~ t"At-~nt (' VIA BYfMAN C:ONfnOl SYSTEM TOP SECRET ClAS$I,tfO B'V 8Yi:'-'AN 1 IE X[MlIT fROM CENf.Jt\Al :JE:L.it.ssl*,!C,ltn~ SCHEOULE Of 'XECU1IV OAO'EM 116!.1IHff;:tM'flON C.tIU COAY 562 OECl.a.s$I~Y O~ IMP' D Y CONTROL NO __ _ COpy PAGE - , - - OF ==== PAGES COPIES OF Approved for Release: 2018/11/16 C05115217 Approved for j~!seYc!i ~fit16 COS ~ 15217 D R AFT ' HANDLE VIII BYEMAN , CONTROL SYSTEM; month commencing July 1976. a.One drone wili be ,shipped to the USAF museum for mating with an A-II.b. Sixteen D-2ls will ,be shipped via C-5 to MASDC., 5.3 Engines not required by the SR-71 Program, USAF depots or museum display air vehicles will be shipped to MASDC.5.4 Effective with plan approval, "ownership" of A-U and D-21 assets will transfer from the NRP to the USAF. -------------------------------------------------- c. Transfer documentation will designate the aircraft as the "A-II"; the drone will retain the designation D-21.9.0 INFORMATION 9.1 Unclassified public information releases for museum use and/or response to press and public queries will be developed - - in consideration of President Johnson's official press TOP SECRET CONTROL NO __ _ COPY __ OF __ COPIES C1.6SS.FJf.O ev I!VfMJi,N 1 Ii: XJ.tPT FAOM CNflUol OI:CLAS!.IFICA liON SCI-fC>UU OF l{lCVlf'r(f OROE F'< i 1(,51 E);!.tM'liON CA Til GOIFn '!t01 oeC\..AssrF't' ~.w OfT PAGE.lLOF __ PAGES 'lANOL E V I A BYEMAN C'HnnUL :,YS'FM Approved for Release: 2018/11/16 C05115217 TRP SfP.P.fT Approved for Release: 2018/11/16 C05115217 BYfMAN CONTROL SYSTEM D R AFT release and a feature article on the A~ll that appeared in Air Force and Space Digest, April 1964.(See Tabs C & D).Requests for information that is not contained in the following paragraph will be referred to theSecretary of the Air Force Office of Information (SAFOI) for response. -------------------------------------------------- HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM TOP SECRET ClASSIHf.O 8'" I!JVf""''-'N (XfMti'l FROM OEIttlUIAl OECtASS!FICATIOO SCHfOUlE 0' tX(,;VTIIJt OAO(R 116S':> ()(EMP110"~ C.& TI!CORY san OECLA,sSIF" ON I"_if' on 1 CONTROL NO ____ _ COpy OF COPI ES PAGE 14 OF __ PAGES Approved for Release: 2018/11/16 C05115217 .Oi OLOCAC' Approved for Release: 2018/11/16 C05115217 U flU/fin CONTROL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE DATA SPEED ALTITUDE RANGE WING SPAN LENGTH GROSS WEIGHT ENGINE FIRST FLIGHT LAST FLIGHT EXPERIMENTAL PAYLOAD MACH 3.0 80,000 FT. 3,000 N.M. 57' FT. 102 FT. 64,000 LBS.J 58 APRIL 1962 MAY 1968 D-21 DRONE HANDLE VIA BYfMAN COIHROL SYSTEM TOP SECRET Cl A$.Stl It: 0 8" IIYIM,A,N (xE,..,r FADM GfNEIIIAl CELL "'~I' lCATlO"'I SCI-fEou'..E QI' tX(CI"t'flvl: onOf~ 1 t651 E 'U.MFTIOf'O c"n OOR,( 581 OClASS'fV 0fIl IMf' veT t .. CONTROL NO __ _ _ COpy OF COPI ES PAGE~OF~ PAGES Approved for Release: 2018/11/16 C05115217 Approved for Release: 2018/11/16 C05115217 ,.,'" " 1 I l ! -------------------------------------------------- AUDIO 3- DRONE TECHNOLOGY Is it a bird ?is it a plane ?no its a drone!What was once a dream for science fiction fans is now inching closer to reality.Gone are the days when messenger pigeons brought us a scroll of news tied to its foot.Powerful companies are pouring money into what they hope will be the birth of a new delivery market, as the Atlantic reports: The commercial drone industry has a new best friend, and that friend is powerful and loaded.It's Google, which recently unveiled its secret drone delivery program, Project Wing, meaning another tech titan now has skin in the commercial UAV game.One that just might have enough clout to make delivery drones happen.Google, Amazon, and a handful of others have embarked on a project that may change the way consumers receive products, and the commercial drone industry is poised to take off with far-reaching applications.As the Smithsonian Magazine explains, drones have come along way from their original purpose, and today can be found in agriculture, security, and even Hollywood. -------------------------------------------------- It was not so long ago that the word "drones" would invoke images of a top-secret unmanned military aircraft carrying out black- ops missions or some other controversial operations in the minds of ordinary citizens.Only in the past few years have these unmanned aircraft been able to break away from the stigma associated with their use and adapt a friendlier, non-militaristic public perception.Un- manned Aerial Vehicles, more popularly known as drones, have un- doubtedly become a vital instrument on the battlefield of today's wars.4 The explosion of drone technology is not only permanently changing military tactics and the landscape of war but is also currently influencing and shaping drone regulations regarding both commercial and individual applications across many countries.'With advance- ments in drone technology, countries are scrambling to gain posses- sion of a drone platform, either for military or non-military applications.' -------------------------------------------------- journal of war & culture studies, 2018, 118 Towards an Understanding of Drone Fiction Tobi Smethurst and Stef Craps Ghent University, Belgium Since the end of the twentieth century, strike-capable military drones have rapidly evolved from an ominous near-future technology, seldom discussed outside of science fiction or top-secret military contexts, to a burgeoning multi-billion dollar international industry at the centre of public scrutiny and interest.Meanwhile, the figure of the drone has saturated Western public con- sciousness to the point that it can be described as a trope.Sparking the interest of artists, writers, and filmmakers, drone warfare has begun to feature in a wide range of films, books, and art installations, and this flood of drone-related media seems unlikely to peter out.To date, however, little academic work has looked in depth at cultural interpretations of drones and the role they serve in fictional (ized) narratives.What is urgently needed to better our understanding of the drone, we argue, is a cultural studies perspective that is able to assess the drone as a fictional, narrative construct, while still taking account of its very real, material consequences for both pilots and victims. -------------------------------------------------- This article aims to introduce readers to the nascent field of drone fiction, providing a jumping- off point for future research into the figure of the drone.Here, we explore how drone warfare is mediated through three different drone-fictional works: the semi-autobiographical book The Drone Eats with Me by Atef Abu Saif, the experimental video game Unmanned by Molleindustria, and the short film 5,000 Feet Is the Best by Omer Fast.Through close readings of these varied works, we draw attention to what each particular mode of mediation reveals about the effects of drones on those who work with or live around them.keywords drone fiction, drone warfare, game studies, popular culture trauma studies, We know what a drone is.But at the same time, we dont.Adam Rothstein, Object Lessons: Drone (2015) 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group DOI 10.1080/17526272.2018.1514759 2 TOBI SMETHURST AND STEF CRAPS Since the end of the twentieth century, strike-capable military drones have rapidly evolved from an ominous near-future technology, seldom discussed outside of science fiction or top-secret military contexts, to a burgeoning multi-billion dollar international industry at the centre of public scrutiny and interest. -------------------------------------------------- From 2025, federal funds cannot be used to purchase drones made in China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, or drones using certain components made in those coun- tries.For the European market to develop, the EU should implement similar regula- tions.This is protectionism for our securi- ty.It also boosts the activities of local man- ufacturers.Technology has a nationality.Therefore, drones used in public adminis- tration should come from our country or from allied countries if we do not produce them ourselves.BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING CHINESE MANUFACTURERS PRODUCE HIGH-QUALITY DRONES, BUT THEIR BUSINESS IS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE CHINESE SECRET SERVICE.THEY RESTRICT THE AVAILABILITY OF THEIR PRODUCTS IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES AND LOCATIONS, CREATING NO FLY ZONES (NFZS) AT THE REQUEST OF THE GUARDIANS.IN THE EVENT OF AN ESCALATING OR NEW CONFLICT, DRONE OPERATORS CAN CHOOSE TO EXCLUDE THEIR DRONES FROM FLYING IN CERTAIN AREAS, SUCH AS POLAND. -------------------------------------------------- However, kill lists are not unique to the drone context; they are used in many different conflicts and by many nations.We include the use of kill lists in this report because of the potential for diminished account- ability for civilian harm where they are used secretly.Media reports suggest that the National Security Council (NSC) and the CIA have a list of targetable individuals, as does the military.How many individuals are on these kill lists, and the extent to which they contain the same individuals, is not known.Furthermore, the pro- cess of adding an individual to a kill list reportedly differs for CIA and military targets, and continues to evolve over time.13 What we detail here may have changed since our publica- tion date.In October 2011, Congressman Dutch Ruppersberger, the ranking minority member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, told reporters that in deciding to strike US citizens, the National Security Council investigates potential targets in coordination with the military, and proposes its selected targets to President Obama.14 The White Houses role in targeting decisions, and that of the Presidents counterterror- ism adviser John Brennan, has expanded, according to news reports citing named and unnamed Obama Administration officials.15 A May 2012 New York Times report based on interviews with three dozen current and former Obama advisers describes a weekly Pentagon-run videoconferencedubbed Terror Tuesdayin which over 100 national security officials review PowerPoint slides bearing the names and biographies of suspected members of al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in Yemen and Somalia to decide whether to recom- mend that the President add an individual to the militarys kill list.16 It is unclear who creates and selects the slides reviewed at the meetings. -------------------------------------------------- This process reportedly results in a list of two-dozen individuals whose threat potential must be reviewed again if they are not killed within 30 days.17 8 See Adam Entous, Siobhan Gorman and Julian E. Barnes, US Tightens Drone Rules, The Wall Street Journal, November 4, 2011. ibid.See Greg Miller, C.I.A.Seeks New Authority to Expand Yemen Drone Campaign, The Washington Post, April 18, 2012.See Greg Miller, White House Approves Broader Yemen Drone Campaign, The Washington Post, April 25, 2012.9 10 11 12 See David Ignatius, US, Pakistan Take a Breather, The Washington Post, March 7, 2012; David Rohde, Obamas Secret War, Foreign Policy, (March/April 2012).See e.g.Jo Becker and Scott Shane, Secret Kill List Proves a Test of Obamas Principles and Will, The New York Times, May 29, 2012; Kimberly Dozier, Who will drones target?Who in the US will decide? Associated Press, May 21, 2012.See Mark Hosenball, Secret panel can put Americans on kill list, Reuters, October 5, 2011. -------------------------------------------------- See Kimberly Dozier, Who will drones target?Who in the US will decide? Associated Press, May 21, 2012; Becker and Scott Shane, Secret Kill List Proves a Test of Obamas Principles and Will, The New York Times, May 29, 2012; Daniel Klaidman, Drones: How Obama Learned to Kill, The Daily Beast, May 28, 2012.See Jo Becker and Scott Shane, Secret Kill List Proves a Test of Obamas Principles and Will, The New York Times, May 29, 2012; Klaidman, Daniel.Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2012), 209-223.See Kimberly Dozier, Who will drones target?Who in the US will decide? Associated Press, May 21, 2012.13 14 15 16 17 w w w .c i v i l i a n s i n c o n f l i c t .o r g 9 Brennans staff, consulting with the Pentagon, State Department, and other agencies, takes the lead in selecting targets, according to a May 2012 Associated Press report citing un- named officials.18 White House officials reportedly believe that Brennans involvement is simply an additional level of scrutiny in target selection, while officials outside the White House are concerned that his office will turn into a pseudo military headquarters, entrust- ing the fate of al-Qaeda targets to a small number of senior officials.19 The President reportedly personally approves every military target in Yemen and Somalia, but reviews only about a third of the CIAs targets in Pakistanthose that seem particularly controversial.20 Little has been reported on the CIAs target selection procedures, which have been described as insular.21 Former CIA General Counsel John Rizzo described the process as housed within the CIAs Counterterrorism Center, with targets approved by the CIA General Counsels office.22 A more recent account states that targets are added to the kill list by a Covert Action Review Group, made up of high-ranking CIA staff, and then sent on to the CIAs Counterterrorism Center, which directs the strikes.23 Media accounts of particular operations suggest that some targeting decisionsor at least decisions not to targetmay be made outside institutionalized decision-making processes. -------------------------------------------------- One account depicts Brennan and then-Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff James Cartwright, pulling the President out of events to make targeting decisions.24 It also de- scribes a phone call in which Pentagon lawyer Jeh Johnson and State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh were asked to sign off on a list of three individuals to be targeted in Somalia.25 These decisions may be part of the Terror Tuesday processfor example, selecting names to be included in the review or deciding the timing of a strike against an approved nameor they could be outside this process.The process may also be influenced by the political climate.Tensions between the United States and Pakistan in the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, for example, reportedly resulted in the implementation of a multi-level appeals process in which the US Ambassa- dor to Pakistan and the Secretary of State had the opportunity to object to targets, though the director of the CIA retained authority to order a strike.26 The kill list is not the only way the US targets individuals using drones. -------------------------------------------------- A significant proportion of the individuals killed in drone strikes are not, by even the US governments account, militant leaders and thus are unlikely to be on the kill list. According to one me- dia account, a White House evaluation of drone strikes in summer 2011 found that the CIA was primarily killing low-level militants.27 Similarly, a 2011 New America Foundation report found that just one out of every seven drone attacks in Pakistan kills a militant leader.28 A Reuters study found that more than 90 percent of the estimated 500 individuals killed in drone strikes in Pakistan were lower-level fighters, based on an analysis of data provided by unnamed US officials in May 2010.29 ibid.ibid.18 19 20 See Jo Becker and Scott Shane, Secret Kill List Proves a Test of Obamas Principles and Will, The New York Times, May 29, 2012.See Kimberly Dozier, Who will drones target?Who in the US will decide? Associated Press, May 21, 2012.21 22 See Tara McKelvey, Inside the Killing Machine, Newsweek, February 13, 2011. -------------------------------------------------- 33 See Greg Miller and Julie Tate, CIA Shifts Focus to Killing Targets, The Washington Post, September 1, 2011.34 For a study on the history of CIA and military cooperation and related legal questions, see Robert Chesney, Law of Title 10/ Title 50 Debate Journal of National Security Law and Policy, 539, (2012): 222. w w w .c i v i l i a n s i n c o n f l i c t .o r g 1 1 parallel operations, meaning separate campaigns of strikes in the same region.In these parallel operations, the CIA and JSOC may exchange information and provide each other operational support.Second, the CIA and JSOC conduct joint operations.Cooperation is significant but bifurcated, for example, with JSOC taking a lead on operations that are con- ducted under CIA legal authorities.JSOCs Emergence The CIAs involvement in drone strikes has a much higher public profile due to extensive government leaks to media, but some observers believe that JSOCs role in lethal targeting generally is far more extensive.35 JSOC has evolved into what a former counterinsurgency adviser to General David Petraeus described as an almost industrial-scale counterterrorism killing machine.36 One former military general described JSOC as a parallel universe.37 JSOC was established in 1980 by a classified charter.38 JSOC originally reported directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to allow for rapid decision-making.39 It was later moved under the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM), which provides forces to regional command- ers rather than directing operations.40 In 2003, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was frustrated at the CIAs better positioning in Afghanistan, in getting in on the ground and making contacts much more deftly than Special Operations Forces.41 He made SOCOM a supported command, allowing itand thus JSOCto plan and execute its own missions.42 Media reports suggest that JSOC has functioned as the Presidents Army, with Bush Administration officials able to bypass SOCOM and issue orders directly to JSOC.43 A September 2003 Execute Order known as the al-Qaeda or AQN EXOrd authorized JSOC operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and a dozen other countries, reportedly including Pakistan and Somalia. -------------------------------------------------- 1 2 w w w .c i v i l i a n s i n c o n f l i c t .o r g As we describe in the chapter CIA and JSOC, basic details about JSOC are unknown and the organization operates with a greater degree of secrecy than even the CIA.Military officials do not speak publicly about JSOCs structure, size, or budget.JSOC reportedly includes more than 4,000 soldiers and civilians,46 and has all of the pieces of a self-sus- taining secret army, including its own intelligence division and its own drones.47 The secrecy of both JSOC and CIA drone operations may have implications for preventing civilian harm and addressing it when it occurs.We describe the potential ramifications in the chapter CIA and JSOC.Blurring Lines, Unclear Roles The CIA and JSOC are organizations with divergent genealogies and traditions, but at pres- ent their roles are converging in drone strikes.CIA and JSOC cooperate extensively in counterterrorism operations generally.48 Scholars note the blurring of roles between the CIA and Special Forces reflects a shift from boots on the ground strategy to one of counterterrorism and discrete attacks.49 Admiral William McRaven, former commander of JSOC and current head of SOCOM, described the two agencies as having spent a decade in bed together.50 Robert Gates, then-Secretary of Defense, heralded CIA-JSOC cooperation after the joint raid that killed Osama bin Laden, calling it an extraordinary coming together that is unique in anybodys history.51 According to journalists Marc Ambinder and D.B. -------------------------------------------------- Informants in Bin Laden Raid, The New York Times, June 14, 2011, quoting an unnamed official as stating that drone operations are consistent with the US-Pakistan agreements that have been in place for some time. 64 See Indira A.R.Lakshmanan, Obama Increases Pakistan Drone Strikes As Relations Sour, Bloomberg News, June 8, 2012.65 See Pakistan: US drones kill 18 suspected militants, Associated Press, August 24, 2012; Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti, Pakistan Arrests C.I.A.Informants in Bin Laden Raid, The New York Times, June 14, 2011.66 See Jeremy Scahill, The Secret US War in Pakistan, The Nation, December 7, 2009.67 See US Embassy Cable, Pakistan Army GHQ Again Approves Embedding, EO 12958 Decl.10/05/2034 (October 9, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/229065.68 Jeremy Scahill, The CIAs Secret Sites in Somalia, The Nation, July 12, 2011.69 See Dana Priest and William Arkin, Top Secret America The Washington Post (2011) 227. -------------------------------------------------- 70 See Department of Defense, News Brief with Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon, November 24 2009, stating that Special Op- erations Forces have been for months, if not years now, training Pakistani forces so that they can in turn train other Pakistani military on how to -- on certain skills and operational techniques and emphasizing thats the extent of our -- our, you know, military boots on the ground in Pakistan. 71 CIA drone strike in 2002 killed a US citizen suspected of ties to Al Qaeda, but the US reportedly did not begin strikes against until May 2011.See Jeb Boone and Greg Miller, US drone strike in Yemen is first since 2002, The Washington Post, May 5, 2011.72 See Hakim Almasmari, Officials: Drone strike kills 13 suspected militants in Yemen, CNN, May 3, 2012, reporting an unnamed Yemeni presidential aide as stating that at least two US drone strikes are conducted daily since mid-April in southern regions controlled by al Qaeda fighters.73 See Peter Finn, Secret US Memo Sanctioned Killing of Aulaqi, The Washington Post, September 30, 2011. w w w . -------------------------------------------------- US officials believed that if Salehs regime failed and they lost the consent of the Yemeni government, the CIA could still carry out the strikes as covert actions.83 The CIA reportedly suspended strikes for several months in 2011 and 2012during the political transition from Saleh to current president Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi.Drone strikes resumed by spring 2012, but whether they are currently conducted under CIA or military authority is unclear.84 Covert Strikes in Somalia Drones have reportedly tracked individuals in Somalia since 2007.85 For the next four years, drones were used strictly for surveillance, and it was not until June 2011 that the first widely 74 See Micah Zenko, Escalating Americas Third War in Yemen, Council on Foreign Relations Blog, May 14, 2012, The likelihood that US air power will target only those (anonymous) individuals who aspire to attack the United States, while sparing Yemeni rebels, is low.Perhaps more importantly, drone strikes could ultimately unite these disparate groups behind a common banner that opposes both the Hadi regime and its partner in crime, the United States.; see also Mark Mazzetti, US Is Intensifying a Secret Campaign of Yemen Airstrikes, The New York Times, June 8, 2011, noting using force against militants in Yemen was further complicated by the fact that Qaeda operatives have mingled with other rebels and antigovernment militants, making it harder for the United States to attack without the appearance of picking sides. 75 See Greg Miller and Karen DeYoung, US Launches Airstrike in Yemen as New Details Surface About Bomb Plot, The Washington Post, May 10, 2012; Minimum total confirmed and possible strike events, Yemen January to July 2012, Bureau of Investigative Journalism, estimating between 20 and 62 strike events from March to May 2012. -------------------------------------------------- 76 See Kimberly Dozier, Officials: Expanded Drone Strikes Approved, Associated Press April 26, 2012.77 See Dana Priest and William Arkin, Top Secret America (2011) 209.78 See, e.g., Greg Miller and Karen DeYoung, US Launches Airstrike in Yemen as New Details Surface About Bomb Plot, The Washington Post, May 10, 2012, US officials said it was too early to determine whether any high-value targets had been killed in the Thursday attack and declined to say whether it had been carried out by the CIA or the US Joint Special Operations Command, which also patrols Yemen with armed drones and conventional aircraft. 79 See Adam Entous, Siobhan Gorman and Julian E. Barnes, US Relaxes Drone Rules, The Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2012, Both the CIA and US militarys Joint Special Operations Command, or JSOC, conduct parallel drone campaigns in Yemen.; Greg Miller, CIA to Operate Drones Over Yemen, The Washington Post, June 14, 2011; Mark Mazzetti, US Is Intensifying a Secret Campaign of Yemen Airstrikes, The New York Times, June 8, 2011 11. -------------------------------------------------- 80 See Mark Mazzetti, C.I.A.Building Base for Strikes in Yemen, The New York Times, June 14, 2011.81 Marc Ambinder and D. B. Grady, The Command: Deep Inside the Presidents Secret Army, New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, 2012. ibid.82 83 See Mark Mazzetti, C.I.A.Building Base for Strikes in Yemen, The New York Times, June 14, 2011; Greg Miller, CIA to oper- ate drones over Yemen, The Washington Post, June 14, 2011; Siobhan Gorman and Adam Entous, CIA Plans Yemen Drone Strikes, The Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2011.84 See e.g., Yemen: Deadly airstrikes against Qaeda militants days after drone strike kills Fahd al-Quso, Associated Press, May 10, 2012; Kimberly Dozier, Officials: Expanded Drone Strikes Approved, Associated Press, April 26, 2012.85 See David Axe, Hidden History: Americas Secret Drone War in Africa, Wired Magazine, August 13, 2012.1 6 w w w .c i v i l i a n s i n c o n f l i c t .o r g reported US drone strike in Somalia took place.86 While most reports attributed the strike to JSOC or SOCOM, 87 CNN described the strike as part of a new secret joint Pentagon and CIA war against the Somali-based al-Shabaab, a claim based on a statement by Panetta then downplayed by the Pentagon.88 The scale of drone strikes in Somalia is still unknown, but appears to be increasing. -------------------------------------------------- 88 Barbara Starr, US strikes al Qaeda affiliate in Somalia, CNN, June 28, 2011; Leon Panetta, (statement, Hearing to Consider the Nomination of Hon.Leon E. Panetta to be Secretary of Defense, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 112th Congress, 2011), 43, So that we are doing that in Yemen.It is obviously a dangerous and uncertain situation, but we continue to work with elements there to try to develop counterterrorism.We are working with JSOC as well in their operations.Same thing is true for Somalia and with regards to AQIM in North Africa, we are working with both the Spanish and the French to develop approaches there that will contain them as well.; Z. Byron Wolf, Panetta Says Yemen Still Cooperating in Counterterror, ABC News Political Punch, June 9, 2011, Panetta] appeared to indicate that the CIA was also working with JSOC in operations in Somalia targeting the terror group al Shabab.Pentagon officials later said that Panetta was speaking about counterterrorism cooperation in broad terms and not specifically about JSOC operations in Somalia. 89 Chris Woods, Militants and civilians killed in multiple US Somalia strikes, Bureau of Investigative Journalism, first published Feb. 22, 2012; continuously updated, last visited August 21, 2012, The Iranian TV station Press TV has reported on a much large number of drone strikes in Somalia83, as of May 2012however, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, finding no other news reports corroborating these strikes, has suggested these reports were fabricated by Press TV. -------------------------------------------------- See Press TVs Somalia Claims 2011-2012, Bureau of Investigative Journalism, December 2, 2011; Emma Slater and Chris Woods, Iranian TV Station faked Somali deaths by US drones, Bureau of Investigative Journalism, December 2, 2011.. 90 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011), Letter to UN Security Council, UN Doc.No.S/2012/544 (July 13, 2012) http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/376/40/PDF/ N1237640.pdf?OpenElement 91 See e.g., Michael R. Gordon and Mark Mazzetti,US Used Base in Ethiopia to Hunt Al Qaeda, The New York Times, February 23, 2007; Sean D. Naylor, Years of detective work led to al-Qaida target, Air Force Times, November 21, 2011; Jeremy Scahill, Blowback in Somalia, The Nation, September 26, 2011; US troops raid Somali town controlled by fighters, The Guardian, September 14, 2009.. 92 See David Axe, Hidden History: Americas Secret Drone War in Africa, Wired, August 13, 2012. -------------------------------------------------- 93 See Craig Whitlock and Greg Miller, US assembling secret drone bases in Africa, Arabian Peninsula, officials say, The Washington Post, September 20, 2011; Julian E. Barnes, US Expands Drone Flights to Take Aim at East Africa, The Wall Street Journal, September 21, 2011.94 See David Axe, Hidden History: Americas Secret Drone War in Africa, Wired, August 13, 2012.95 See e.g., Aweys Cadde, Suspected US Drone Down In Kismayo, Somalia Report, September 25, 2011; Ian Cobain, British al-Qaida member killed in US drone attack in Somalia, The Guardian, January 22, 2012; Mohammed Ibrahim, US Drone Strike Kills Foreign Commander Fighting for Militants in Somalia, The New York Times, January 23, 2012; Somali militants in key port attacked by US drones, BBC News, September 25, 2011; but see Abdi Guled and Malkhdir M. Muhumed, Partner Airstrike Hits Somali Militants Convoy, Associated Press, June 24, 2011, referring to strike by military aircraft from a partner country; Deaths in US drone strike in Somalia, Al Jazeera, February 25, 2012, referring to a US military strike. -------------------------------------------------- 96 See Jeremy Scahill, The CIAs Secret Sites in Somalia, The Nation, July 12, 2011. w w w .c i v i l i a n s i n c o n f l i c t .o r g 1 7 tember 2011 the Wall Street Journal reported that the drone program in Somalia was con- ducted by the military, but it also reported that operations in Yemen are conducted by the militaryless than two weeks before the CIA-led strike there that killed Anwar al-Awlaki.97 Somalias Transitional Federal Government has voiced support for US airstrikes.In a Sep- tember 2011 interview with the Wall Street Journal, prime minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali said that he did not object to US drone strikes so long as his government was consulted.98 More recently, Omar Jamal, charge daffaire of the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations, said that the Somali government coordinates with NATO, the US, and the U.K., is notified in advance of drone strikes, and approves of them on the condition that civilian casualties are avoided.99 ibid. -------------------------------------------------- 148 See Jo Becker and Scott Shane, Secret Kill List Proves a Test of Obamas Principles and Will, The New York Times, May 29, 2012.149 Daniel Klaidman, Drones: How Obama Learned to Kill, DailyBeast, May 28, 2012.(Excerpt from Daniel Klaidman, Kill or Cap- ture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012).150 John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, The Ethics and Efficacy of the Presi- dents Counterterrorism Strategy (speech, Wilson Center for International Scholars, Washington, DC, April 30, 2012),http:// www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy.w w w .c i v i l i a n s i n c o n f l i c t .o r g 2 7 Brennan emphasized that there have indeed been occasions when we have decided against conducting a strike in order to avoid the injury or death of innocent civilians. According to Brennan, these standardsfor identifying a target and avoiding the loss of innocent civiliansexceed what is required as a matter of international law on a typical battlefield.151 CIA officials say they have declined to conduct strikes out of concern for civilian life. -------------------------------------------------- An unnamed official told The Washington Post: [Obama and Brennan] demanded that they keep tightening the procedures, so that if there were any doubt, they wouldnt take the shotThere were flaws, and they fixed them.155 US Government Civilian Casualty Claims According to US officials, covert drone strikes have caused relatively few civilian deaths, and in some periods of time have caused none at all.In numerous leaks to the press, un- named Obama Administration officials have claimed between just 20 and 50 civilian deaths ibid.151 152 Leon Panetta, interview by Charlie Rose, Charlie Rose: Leon Panetta, Secretary of Defense, PBS, September 6, 2011, http:// www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4872.153 Greg Jaffe and Greg Miller, Secret US Cable Warned About Pakistani Havens, The Washington Post, February 24, 2012; see also Mark Mazzetti, Scott Shane and Alissa J. Rubin, Brutal Haqqani Crime Clan Bedevils US in Afghanistan, The New York Times, September 24, 2011, stating that the CIA is hesitant to carry out drone strikes in populated towns like Miram Shah.. -------------------------------------------------- For the most part they have been precise, precision strikes against al-Qaeda and their affiliates and we are very careful in terms of how its been ap- plied.159 In 2009, Leon Panetta, then-director of the CIA and current Secretary of Defense, said that airstrikes in Pakistan were very limited in terms of collateral damage.160 (For more exam- ple, see chapter Civilian Protection Limitations.)Events following one particular drone strike illustrate the complexities of deciphering an accurate story of civilian harm.On August 23, 2010, a CIA strike reportedly killed at least seven civilians in Pakistan.Unnamed US officials repeatedly told media for a year after this incident that there were no civilian deaths from drone strikes: 156 Between 2009 and 2011 government officials repeatedly leaked estimates of civilian deaths, dating them to 2008.In these press accounts, the officials are never named: December 2009: In the previous two years about 80 drone strikes killed just over 20 civilian casualties and more than 400 enemy fighters. -------------------------------------------------- 158 See Jo Becker and Scott Shane, Secret Kill List Proves a Test of Obamas Principles and Will, The New York Times, May 29, 2012.159 Your Interview with the President 2012, YouTube video, 26:37, posted by whitehouse, January 30, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eeTj5qMGTAI/.160 US Airstrikes in Pakistan Called Very Effective, CNN, May 18, 2009. quoting Leon Panetta.w w w .c i v i l i a n s i n c o n f l i c t .o r g 2 9 January 2011: According to an unnamed official, since the drone program accelerated in mid-August [we] have killed several hundred militants with- out causing any deaths among civilian non-combatants.161 February 2011: According to an unnamed official, no civilian had been killed in more than 75 strikes in Pakistans tribal areas since August 22, 2010.162 June 2011: US counterterrorism adviser John Brennan said that nearly for the past year there hasnt been a single collateral death because of the exceptional proficiency, precision of the capabilities weve been able to develop.163 August 2011: Brennan stated: Fortunately, for more than a year, due to our discretion and precision, the US government has not found credible evi- dence of collateral deaths resulting from US counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan or Iraq, and we will continue to do our best to keep it that way.164 Brennans remarks prompted an investigation by the London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism, which found that media had credibly reported civilian deaths in more than one in five of the 116 reported drone strikes during the year in question.165 Brennan later clari- fied his previous statements, saying, what I said was that over a period of time before my public remarks, that we had no information about a single civilian, a noncombatant being killed.166 In a public address, Brennan admitted that drone strikes had resulted in civilian deaths, but said it was exceedingly rare.167 US officials have, over time, provided contradictory data on the number of civilian casual- ties. -------------------------------------------------- 178 See Jo Becker and Scott Shane, Secret Kill List Proves a Test of Obamas Principles and Will, The New York Times, May 29, 2012.179 James Rosen, Obama Aides Defend Claim of Low Civilian Casualties After Drone Kill List Report, FoxNews, May 30, 2012.180 Justin Elliott, Dissecting Obamas Standard on Drone Strike Deaths, ProPublica, June 5, 2012.181 James Rosen, Obama Aides Defend Claim of Low Civilian Casualties After Drone Kill List Report, FoxNews, May 30, 2012.182 See Letter from Elisa Massimino, President, Human Rights First, to Barack Obama, President of the United States, May 29, 2012, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/Letter-to-President-Obama-on-Targeted-Killing.pdf, arguing that [s}uch a policy permits both the targeting of innocent civilians in violation of international law, and allows the administration to undercount the number of civilian casualties resulting from such strikes..183 Greg Miller, CIA Seeks New Authority To Expand Yemen Drone Campaign, The Washington Post, April 18, 2012. -------------------------------------------------- 200 See President Obamas Difficult, Deadly Decisions on Counter-terrorism in Spotlight, ABC News, May 29, 2012.201 See e.g., Scott Shane, C.I.A.Is Disputed on Civilian Toll in Drone Strikes, The New York Times, August 11, 2011.202 Predators and Civilians: An Intelligence Report Shows How Effective Drone Attacks Are, The Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2009, arguing that an intelligence report the Journal saw corrects media reports of the level of civilian casualties from drone attacks; The US Is Right to Strike Hard at Terrorists in Yemen, The Washington Post, May 8, 2012, commending authorization of signature strikes in Yemen; The C.I.A.and Drone Strikes, The New York Times, August 13, 2011, questioning claims of no civilian casualties and calling for greater transparency, but also stating It is true that the precision technology and American efforts have kept noncombatant deaths to a minimum. 203 Matthew M. Aid, Intel Wars: The Secret History of the Fight Against Terror (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2012), 53. w w w . -------------------------------------------------- Martin describes his horror as he could do nothing but wait and watch as the missile killed the two boys together with the occupants of the truck.213 With a wider field of view (and accompanying authorization to call off a strike in the presence of civilians, which the CIA and JSOC may maintain), the two boys may have been noted in time to save them.206 See Eric Schmitt, Threats and Responses: The Battlefield, The New York Times, November 6, 2002.207 Matthew M. Aid, Intel Wars: The Secret History of the Fight Against Terror (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2012), 53; See Adam Entous, Special Report: How the White House Learned to Love the Drone, Reuters, May 18, 2010; Matt J. Martin and Charles W. Sasser, Predator: The Remote-Control Air War over Iraq and Afghanistan: A Pilots Story, Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2010.208 See R. Geiss and M. Siegrist, Has the Armed Conflict in Afghanistan Affected the Rules on the Conduct of Hostilities, Inter- national Review of the Red Cross, (March 2011); 11, 19; C. Christine Fair, Nicholas Howenstein, and J. Alexander Thier, Troubles on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border, US Institute of Peace, December 2006, noting that Taliban and al Qaeda militants have taken refuge in the remote villages of the tribal areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and that the commingling with so-called foreigners has upended the traditional tribal identification in these areas. -------------------------------------------------- Human Intelligence Drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen are also based on human intelligenceinformation gathered from human sources such as covert agents, informants, and foreign government 214 INTelligence: Human Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, August 26, 2010.215 Columbia Human Rights Clinic interview with Marc Garlasco, former senior intelligence analyst at the Pentagon, New York City, NY, April 11, 2012.216 See Joseph Fitsanakis and Ian Allen, Cell Wars: The Changing Landscape of Communications Intelligence, Research Insti- tute for European and American Studies, May 2009, http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Cells_War.pdf; Rowan Scarborough, Taliban Taunts US Eavesdroppers, Human Events, February 11, 2009, http://www.humanevents.com/2009/02/11/taliban- taunts-us-eavesdroppers/.217 See ibid; Columbia Human Rights Clinic interview with Marc Garlasco, former senior intelligence analyst at the Pentagon, New York City, NY, April 11, 2012. ibid.218 219 Michael Hastings, The Rise of the Killer Drones: How America Goes to War in Secret, Rolling Stone, April 16, 2012. -------------------------------------------------- The CIA and JSOCs presence in Pakistan dates back to at least 2005, when an earthquake in Kashmir lead to a loosening of travel restrictions and US operatives and contractors entered posing as construction and aid workers.Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, Counterstrike: The Untold Story of Americas Secret Campaign Against Al Quaeda, (New York: Times Books, 2011), 257-58; Karin Brulliard, CIA Vaccine Program Used in bin Laden Hunt in Pakistan Sparks Criti- cism, The Washington Post, July 21, 2011; Marc Ambinder and D.B.Grady, The Command: Deep Inside the Presidents Secret Army, (Amazon Digital Services, 2012).Kindle edition.224 See Ellen Nakashima and Craig Whitlock, With Air Forces Gorgon Drone We Can See Everything, The Washington Post, January 2, 2011, Officials also acknowledge that Gorgon Stare is of limited value unless they can match it with improved hu- man intelligence - eyewitness reports of who is doing what on the ground. 225 Nicholas Mumm, Crowdsourcing: A New Perspective on Human Intelligence Collection in a Counterinsurgency, Small Wars Journal, January 3, 2012. -------------------------------------------------- Human intelligence may also be sourced and gathered by private security companies and passed on to US forces, or gathered by Pakistani contractors and directly delivered to US agents.See Scott Horton, The Trouble with Drones, Harpers, May 3, 2010; Jeremy Scahill, The Secret US War in Pakistan, The Nation, December 7, 2009.226 See Civilians in Armed Conflict: Civilian Harm and Conflict in Northwest Pakistan, Center for Civilians in Conflict.2010, 22; see Alex Rodriguez, Pakistani Death Squads Go After Informants to US Drone Program, Los Angeles Times, December 28, 2011; Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What Are the Risks of the CIAs Covert Drone Program? The New Yorker, October 26, 2009; Shuja Nawaz, Drone Attacks Inside Pakistan: Wayang or Willing Suspension of Disbelief? Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, (Summer/Fall 2011): 79, 83.227 Alex Rodriguez, Pakistani death squads go after informants to US drone program, Los Angeles Times, December 28, 2011.228 See Civilians in Armed Conflict: Civilian Harm and Conflict in Northwest Pakistan, Center for Civilians in Conflict, (2010), 61. -------------------------------------------------- In April 2012, Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley said that it would be years before Air Force personnel would be able to sift through the unsustainable amounts of video and still imagery collected by its drones.234 Likewise, the US Army has acknowledged taking more surveillance and storing more data than it has the capacity to properly analyze.235 The military is pursuing solutions that would speed up data analysis 231 See Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, US Doubts Intelligence that Led to Yemen Strike, The Wall Street Journal, December 29, 2011. ibid.232 233 Matthew M. Aid, Intel Wars: The Secret History of the Fight Against Terror (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2012), 55.234 Spencer Ackerman, Air Force Chief: Itll Be Years Before We Catch Up on Drone Data, Wired, April 5, 2012; Matthew M. Aid, Intel Wars: The Secret History of the Fight Against Terror (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2012), 55.235 See US Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Changing Modern Warfare, Torchbearer National Security Report, July 2010,17, http://www.ausa.org/publications/ilw/Documents/TB-US%20Army%20Unmanned.pdf. -------------------------------------------------- Grady, The Command: Deep Inside the Presidents Secret Army, (Amazon Digital Services, 2012).Kindle edition; Oliver North and Chuck Holton, American Heroes in Special Operations, (New York: Fidelis Books, 2010), 9, noting that JSOC includes the Air Forces 24th Special Tactics Squadron.247 See Mark Mazzetti, The Drone Zone, The New York Times, July 6, 2012; United States Air Force Class A Aerospace Mishaps Fiscal Year 2011, United States Air Force Judge Advocate Generals Corps, accessed September 14, 2012, http:// usaf.aib.law.af.mil/indexFY11.html; The Drone Wars UK Drone Crash Database, The Drone Wars UK, accessed September 14, 2012, http://dronewarsuk.wordpress.com/drone-crash-database; United States Air Force Class A Aerospace Mishaps Fiscal Year 2010, United States Air Force Judge Advocate Generals Corps, accessed September 14, 2012, http://usaf.aib.law.af.mil/ indexFY10.html.248 Sharon D. Manning et al., The Role of Human Causal Factors in US Army Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Accidents, US Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory, 2004, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA421592. -------------------------------------------------- 6.264 See e.g., Directive 2311.01E, Department of Defense, May 9, 2006, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/231101e.pdf, applying to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense. (emphasis added) 265 In April 2012, the Columbia Human Rights Clinic requested information from the Department of Defense Office of General Counsel regarding post-strike investigation systems specifically for drone strikes, and had received no response as of publica- tion.4 6 w w w .c i v i l i a n s i n c o n f l i c t .o r g and emails discussing who was killed.266 In the case of high profile strikes, US officials have described near certainty about the identity of individuals killed.Congressman Adam Schiff, who was interviewed shortly after the reported killing of Anwar al-Awlaki in 2011, stated: We want to make sure that we can make positive identification. -------------------------------------------------- It suggests that rather than seeing itself as duty-bound to the law and culturally invest- ed in its rationales, the agency relates to the law as a constraint that may undermine the agencys goals if not carefully managed, and perhaps, in some cases, circumvented.Even in accounts favorable to the CIA, the CIAs relationship to the law is discussed only in terms of avoiding liability and political fall-out for actions that might, if revealed, be per- ceived as illegal even if technically legal.There is no allusion to a concern for whether ac- tions, though technically legal, might offend the purposes and values of the law, or brush up too closely to their limits to be appropriate.For example, Jack Goldsmith, former lawyer in the Bush administration, writes that the CIAs 150 or so lawyers help operators sort through the cognitive dissonance that arises from the twin injunctions to violate some laws and norms but not others. According to Gold- smith, these lawyers provide comfort that whatever other fallout might occur from their CIA activities, operators neednt worry about violating what to them often felt like bewildering US legal restrictions. In any event, everyone in the CIA knows that trouble follows from violating US law and people are watching for violations and can impose various types of legal or political punishment if they find one.304 Likewise, former CIA lawyer Afsheen John Radsan conjectures that the CIA has sought legal approval for its drone strikes because [t] he CIA, we know is accustomed to checking off the boxes in its paperwork and is [m]ind- ful of their potential legal exposure on targeted killing.305 To be sure, recent accounts of the CIAs torture and secret detention programs under the Bush administration reflect that CIA personnel are deeply concerned with liability and public perception. -------------------------------------------------- c i v i l i a n s i n c o n f l i c t .o r g 5 7 the best practices of militaries over time.Operationalizing the law is not merely a matter of following clear rules; this is especially true in the context of US operations aimed at al- Qaeda and its affiliates, which call for commanders to apply traditional legal concepts to complex and ever-changing circumstances.314 The covert drone strikes context compounds the complexity.The CIA is a relative novice in the field of the laws of war.According to former CIA law- yer Afsheen John Radsan: On 9/11, there were far more lawyers who knew the details of the Geneva conventions at the defence department (and at the state department) than at CIA.315 Whereas conventional military forces benefit from extensive Judge Advocate General training programs and established international law departments like the Naval War Colleges, the CIA General Counsels office does not appear to benefit from similar struc- turesunless such institutions exist secretly. -------------------------------------------------- 11-64, September 2011), 78-86, describing barrier to judicial review of drone strikes and the CIAs actions generally.. 321 See Declan Walsh, Eric Schmitt and Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud, Drones at Issue at US Rebuilds Ties to Pakistan, The New York Times, March 18, 2012, reporting an official who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the programs covert status as stating: These efforts have been extremely precise and effective. 322 In February 2012, unnamed officials responded to a report of CIA strikes targeting funeral-goers and other civilians by stat- ing: One must wonder why an effort that has so carefully gone after terrorists who plot to kill civilians has been subjected to so much misinformation.Lets be under no illusions there are a number of elements who would like nothing more than to malign these efforts and help Al Qaeda succeed. See Scott Shane, US Said to Target Rescuers at Drone Strikes Sites, The New York Times, February 5, 2012, More explicitly, in May 2012, the New York Times reported an unnamed senior official as stating that reports of civilian deaths unwittingly draw on false propaganda claims by militants.; Jo Becker and Scott Shane, Secret Kill List Proves a Test of Obamas Principles and Will, The New York Times, May 29, 2012. -------------------------------------------------- 332 See Senate Select Intelligence-Committee, Hearing: Worldwide Threats, Jan. 31, 2012, http://www.dia.mil/public-affairs/ testimonies/2012-01-31.html.6 0 w w w .c i v i l i a n s i n c o n f l i c t .o r g ered to be effective in fighting terrorism without sacrificing American service members lives that questioning the way drone strikes are conducted, or under what legal authority they continue, is unlikely to bestow electoral benefits.333 Moreover, as commentator Kathleen Clark notes: Gang of Eight notification inoculates the executive branch from later political backlash, because the executive branch canand doespoint to Congresss inaction as congressional endorsement of the covert action.334 The CIA is well-aware that providing information to congressional committees can stem hard congressional scrutiny.Jack Goldsmith notes: Contrary to conventional wisdom, CIA management loves to report to the committees because it wants buy-in for its politi- cally risky actions.335 Indeed, former CIA officials have lamented that their mistake with the torture and secret detention programs was notifying only the Gang of Eight members, rather than the full intelligence committees.336 According to former CIA General Counsel John Rizzo: [W]hat CIA needed above all from Congress was stalwart, bipartisan coverfor their understanding and acquiescence that the continuing al-Qaeda threat required un- precedented measures.337 Rizzo argues that the agency should have provided intelligence committees all the details all along the way to compel them, reallyto take a stand on the merits to either endorse the program or stop it in its tracks.338 As watchdogs in the form of journalists and human rights organizations struggle to garner factual information in the relatively inaccessible areas where covert drones strikes occur, the public is especially reliant on Congress to take the lead in scrutinizing the CIAs actions. -------------------------------------------------- Yet Congresss obligation extends further: to contribute to public debate.As former CIA lawyer and minority staff director for the House intelligence committee Suzanne Spauld- ing emphasizes, Congress has the responsibility to inform and lead public discussion and debate particularly about how best to address the long term threat of terrorism. 339 There are established procedures for Congress to declassify and publicize previously secret infor- mation, but these procedures have reportedly never been employed, and certainly not with regard to covert drone strikes.340 The Transparency Imperative In light of news reports that drone strikes are turning public opinion in Pakistan and Yemen against the United States, there may be internal pressure at the CIA to establish mecha- nisms related to civilian harm, notwithstanding the lack of hard external scrutiny we have described.CIA analysts have sometimes shown strategic concern for reducing civilian harm where it would undermine the mission or US security generally.341 In 2012, Counterterrorism Advisor John Brennan alluded to procedures that seem akin to a military battle damage assessment (see chapter The Civilian Toll). -------------------------------------------------- One account suggests that Department of Defense General Counsel Jeh Johnson has questioned the legality of some JSOC drone strikes in Somalia and Yemen, and effectively prevented them in the past.348 342 See Marc Ambinder and D. B. Grady, The Command: Deep Inside the Presidents Secret Army (Kindle Edition 2012); see also Klaidman, Kill or Capture, 205, noting JSOC operated in a culture of near-total secrecy. 343 For official description of JSOC, Factbook 2012, US Special Operations Command, 22, http://www.socom.mil/News/Docu- ments/USSOCOM_Fact_Book_2012.pdf.However, the Factbook does list the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper drones as Special Forces inventory. See ibid., 29.344 Kenneth S. McGraw, Deputy Public Affairs Officer, US Special Operations Command, email message to Columbia Human Rights Law Clinic, March 26, 2012, (on file with Columbia Human Rights Clinic).345 See Chapter 1: Background, (describing reports that the al-Qaeda ExOrd sets rules of engagement for JSOC). -------------------------------------------------- Even when the CIA reports to the intelligence committees and JSOC to the committees on armed services, no committee has a complete, unobstructed view of the full campaign, as one account notes.368 Hearing only part of the story does not allow for effective congressio- nal oversight and could deter committees from taking responsibility to regulate the drone program.Even as congressional oversight of JSOC has been frustrated, the organization enjoys wide political support.In congressional hearings, JSOC has been credited with several successes,369 including eradicating al-Qaeda Iraq in urban Baghdad,370 and the killing of Osama bin Laden.371 Congressional committees have praised JSOCs flexibility and unique interagency authorities as an example for other military forces.372 The Senate Armed Ser- vices Committee has praised and encouraged the spread of JSOC man-hunting tactics to other branches of the military.373 Congressional enthusi- asm can be traced to JSOCs 2006 killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, after which Senator Evan Bayh of Indiana re- portedly requested and received an unprecedented (and secret) billion-dollar earmark for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets on the basis of a battlefield conversation with JSOC personnel.374 Political support threatens to obscure the need for scrutiny of JSOCs record on legal compliance and steps to prevent or reduce civilian harm. -------------------------------------------------- 376 377 See Jeremy Scahill, The Secret US War in Pakistan, The Nation, November 23, 2009.ibid.; Jennifer D. Kibbe, Conducting Shadow Wars, Journal of National Security Law & Policy, 5 (2012): 373.6 6 w w w .c i v i l i a n s i n c o n f l i c t .o r g Ethical and Legal Implications Despite the precision capabilities of weaponized drone technology, targeting operations invariably put civilian lives at risk.As with any weapon or weapons platform, there are legal, moral, and strategic reasons to explore alternatives to lethal targeting, and if targeting does take place, to take precautionary measures and other actions to mitigate the risk of harm- ing civilians.With the proliferation of covert drone operations outside of traditional armed conflict theaters, however, we are concerned that policymakers are overlooking the need to take civilian-protection measures and consider alternative approaches to lethal drone strikes in counterterrorism strategy.Our objective in this chapter is not to document and prove legal violations, but to iden- tify concerns at the juncture of ethics and the law. -------------------------------------------------- o r g 6 9 Approaches to counterterrorism that yield less concrete and identifiable gainssuch as diplomacy, prevention of radicalization, intelligence-gathering, and detentionare losing salience among policymakers, although they are inherently less threatening to civilian life than drone strikes since they do not involve lethal targeting.(Some of these approaches also carry the risk of human rights abuses, but they are not inherently or directly life-threat- ening.)In May 2012, The New York Times reported that some Obama Administration officials worry drone strikes are crowding out consideration of a broader strategy against radicaliza- tion. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton reportedly complained of a drones-only approach at Situation Room meetings, in which discussion would focus exclusively on the pros, cons, and timing of particular strikes.388 The New York Times journalists Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker provide a candid account by former national counterterrorism center director, Michael Leiter, concerning the Administrations internal debate about its gravitation toward lethal targeting of members of the Somali group al-Shabaab: When we kill somebody, there is going to be someone else to take their place, said [National Counterterrorism Center official] Leiter. -------------------------------------------------- Policymakers may assume the precision capabilities of drone technology forestall civilian harm.However, even when drone strikes do not result in civilian death, they have a profound impact on local com- munities (see chapter The Civilian Toll).Non-lethal alternatives can also negatively impact civilian populations, but these are benefits and costs to any action that should be carefully assessed by US policymakers; we are concerned policymakers are not sufficiently weighing the options.388 Jo Becker and Eric Schmitt, Secret Kill List Proves a Test of Obamas Principles and Will, The New York Times, May 29, 2012.389 Schmitt and Shanker, Counterstrike, 235.390 Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President on Osama bin Laden, (remarks, White House, Washington, DC, May 2, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/02/remarks-president-osama-bin-laden.391 Geoffrey Robertson, Why its absurd to claim that justice has been done, The Independent, May 3, 2011. -------------------------------------------------- Over the past 16 months, the US has worked closely with its counterterrorism partners in South Asia and around the world to capture, detain, and interrogate hundreds of militants and terrorists..396 See John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec.& Counterterrorism, The Ethics and Efficacy of the Presi- dents Counterterrorism Strategy, (speech, Wilson Center, Washington, DC, April 30, 2012.397 See Eric Holder, Attorney General, (speech, Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, IL, March 5, 2012).398 Adam Entous, Special Report: How the White House learned to love the drone, Reuters, May 18, 2010, quoting an unnamed Administration official; Priest and Arkin, Top Secret America, 211, arguing that drone strikes became popular because there was really nowhether to put captives if the CIA didnt want to hand them over to the military and if the military didnt want to keep them in the politically unpopular prison on Guantanamo in Cuba. w w w .c i v i l i a n s i n c o n f l i c t . -------------------------------------------------- 417 See e.g., Hakim Almasmari, Two suspected US drone strikes reported in Yemen, CNN, May 15, 2012, reporting that Jaar district residents said civilians were killed after they rushed to the site of the first strike..418 Gregory S. McNeal, The US Practice of Collateral Damage Estimation and Mitigation, (unpublished dissertation, Pepperdine University, November 9, 2011), 1013 , noting also that target lists must be re-examined periodically to ensure those objects have retained the characteristics that rendered them lawful military objectives initially..ibid.419 420 Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting and International Humanitarian Law in Afghanistan, Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, 39 421 (2009): 321.ibid., 17, noting that the mitigation process involves 5 levels of tests based on a progressively refined analysis of avail- able analysis of available intelligence, weapon type and effect, the physical environment, target characteristics and delivery scenarios keyed to risk thresholds established by the Secretary of Defense and the President of the United States.; see Joint Targeting Cycle and Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology (CDM), General Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 10, 2009, 30-36. -------------------------------------------------- 422 Aaron M. Drake Aaron, Current US Air Force Drone Operations and Their Conduct in Compliance With International Hu- manitarian Law: An Overview, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 39 (2011): 629, 643, noting that RPA operations conducted by the US Air Force that the Air Force ROE take into account that operators at lower levels, including RPA opera- tors, might not be in a position to determine the excessiveness of collateral damage relative to the direct military advantage anticipated from a strike...; See also Gregory S. McNeal, The US Practice of Collateral Damage Estimation and Mitigation, discussing the Non-Combatant Casualty Cut-Off Value (NCV): operations involving estimates of civilian casualties below the NCV as contained in the ROE can be authorized by the senior commander; however, [i]f the estimate exceeds the NCV military commanders must analyze the target using the Sensitive Target Approval and Review Process (STAR) and must submit the target for approval by the President of the United States of Secretary of Defense.; See also Joint Targeting Cycle and Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology (CDM), General Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 10, 2009, 38. -------------------------------------------------- Atlantic, August 21.At http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/drones-actually-the- most-humane-form-of-warfare-ever/278746/.Madlena, Chavala, Hannah Patchett, and Adel Shamsan.2015.We Dream about Drones, Said 13-Year-Old Yemeni Before His Death in a CIA Strike.The Guardian, February 10.At https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/10/drones-dream-yemeni-teenager- mohammed-tuaiman-death-cia-strike.Martin, Matt J., and Charles W. Sasser.2010.Predator: The Remote-Control Air War over Iraq and Afghanistan: A Pilots Story.Minneapolis: Zenith Press.Mazzetti, Mark.2013.The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth.New York: Penguin Press.McVeigh, Karen.2013.Drone Strikes: Tears in Congress as Pakistani Family Tells of Mothers Death.The Guardian, October 29.At https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/ 29/pakistan-family-drone-victim-testimony-congress.New America Foundation (NAF).n.d.a.Drone Strikes: Pakistan.In Depth: Americas Counterterrorism Wars. -------------------------------------------------- New York Times, November 12.At http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/13/us/us-vows-to-stop- using-torture-against-terrorism-suspects.html?_r50.Scahill, Jeremy.2013.Dirty Wars: The World Is a Battleeld.New York: Nation Books..2016.The Assassination Complex: Inside the Governments Secret Drone Warfare Pro- gram.New York: Simon and Schuster.Serle, Jack.2015.Almost 2,500 Now Killed by Covert US Drone Strikes since Obama In- auguration Six Years Ago: The Bureaus Report for January 2015.Bureau of Investigative Journalism, February 2.At https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2015/02/02/almost- 2500-killed-covert-us-drone-strikes-obama-inauguration/.Shane, Scott.2011.C.I.A.Is Disputed on Civilian Toll in Drone Strikes.New York Times, August 12.At http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/world/asia/12drones.html?_r50.Singer, P. W. 2009.Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conict in the 21st Century.New York: Penguin Books.Singh, Ritika.2013.Drone Strikes Kill Innocent People: Why Is It so Hard to Know How Many? -------------------------------------------------- New Republic, October 25.At https://newrepublic.com/article/115353/civilian-casualties- drone-strikes-why-we-know-so-little.Taylor, Adam.2015.The U.S.Keeps Killing Americans in Drone Strikes, Mostly by Accident.Washington Post, April 23.At https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/ 2015/04/23/the-u-s-keeps-killing-americans-in-drone-strikes-mostly-by-accident/.THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW T H E D R O N E P A R A D O X F 67 Tromov, Yaroslav.2016.Do U.S. Killings of Militant Leaders Work?Wall Street Journal, May 26.At http://www.wsj.com/articles/do-u-s-killings-of-militant-leaders-work-1464255002.U.S. Ofce of the Director of National Intelligence.2016.Summary of Information Regarding U.S. Counterterrorism Strikes outside Areas of Active Hostilities.At https://www.dni.gov/ les/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/DNI1Release1on1CT1Strikes1Outside1 Areas1of1Active1Hostilities.PDF.Woods, Chris.2015.Sudden Justice: Americas Secret Drone War.New York: Oxford University Press.Zenko, Micah. -------------------------------------------------- In January 2015, an off-duty employee of the US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency lost control of a friends DJI Phantom quadcopter, which then crashed onto the White House lawn.The incident raised concerns about the extent to which the Secret Service is prepared for drone activity.Four months later, a man was arrested for trying to fly a Parrot Bebop drone over the White House fence.In France, unidentified drones have been flown over the US embassy, the Eiffel Tower, the Invalides military museum, the submarine communications base at Sainte-Assise, the Place de la Concorde, the Elysee Palace and multiple nuclear power stations.In June 2014, an unidentified drone was used to monitor the French national football team during a closed training session at the 2014 World Cup in Brazil.In July 2014, an unidentified drone came within six metres of an Airbus A320 as it landed at Londons Heathrow Airport, prompting the Civil Aviation Authority to issue new safety guidelines, known as the dronecode. -------------------------------------------------- EXCEPTIONS.This section does not prohibit the use of a drone: 2.1.To counter a high risk of a terrorist attack by a specific individual or organization if the United States Secretary of Homeland Security determines that credible intelligence indicates that there is such a risk.If the law enforcement agency first obtains a search warrant signed by a judge authorizing the use of a drone.If the law enforcement agency possesses reasonable suspicion that, under particular circumstances, swift action is needed to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or the destruction of evidence, or to achieve purposes including, but not limited to, facilitating the search for a missing person.3.4.By a person or an entity engaged in a business or profession licensed by the state, or by an agent, employee, or contractor thereof, if the drone is used only to perform reasonable tasks within the scope of practice or activities permitted under such persons or entitys license. -------------------------------------------------- Authority means the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority. Information drone. means any evidence, images, sounds, data, or other information gathered by a means any agency of this State or a political subdivision of this Law enforcement agency State which is vested by law with the duty to maintain public order and to enforce criminal laws.Statutes/Bills: 725 ILCS 167/ Freedom from Drone Surveillance Act - 19 Prohibited use of drones Sec.10. agency may not use a drone to gather information..Except as provided in Section 15, a law enforcement Exceptions .This Act does not prohibit the use of a drone by a law enforcement Sec.15. agency: 3.4.2.1.To counter a high risk of a terrorist attack by a specific individual or organization if the United States Secretary of Homeland Security determines that credible intelligence indicates that there is that risk.If a law enforcement agency first obtains a search warrant based on probable cause issued under Section 108-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. -------------------------------------------------- A chemical or rubber manufacturing facility; 5.A petroleum or chemical storage facility; 6.A water or wastewater treatment facility; 7.Any facility, equipment, or pipeline infrastructure utilized in the storage, transmission, or distribution of natural gas or propane; and 8.Railroad yards and facilities not open to the general public; 55 The statute generally prohibits drone use by a law enforcement agency to gather evidence or other information.Following the general prohibition, the statute prescribes exceptions by which drone use is permissible.The statute allows use of a drone in these circumstances: 1.2.3.4.5. to counter a high risk of a terrorist attack by a specific individual or organization if the United States secretary of homeland security determines that credible intelligence indicates that there is such a risk; if the law enforcement agency first obtains a search warrant signed by a judge authorizing its use; if the law enforcement agency possesses reasonable suspicion that, under particular circumstances, swift action is needed to prevent imminent danger to life; to provide continuous aerial coverage when law enforcement is searching for a fugitive or escapee or is monitoring a hostage situation; or to provide more expansive aerial coverage when deployed for the purpose of searching for a missing person. -------------------------------------------------- or B.It is unlawful for a respondent of a protective order issued pursuant to 19.2-152.10 to knowingly and intentionally use or operate an unmanned aircraft system to follow, contact, or capture images of the petitioner of the protective order or any other individual named in the protective order.C. A violation of this section is a Class 1 misdemeanor.16.1-279.1 2.That the second enactment of Chapter 451 of the Acts of Assembly of 2016 is repealed.3.That the Secretary of Commerce and Trade, in consultation with the Virginia Economic Development Partnership, shall study the impact of this act on unmanned aircraft research, innovation, and economic development in Virginia and report to the Governor and General Assembly no later than November 1, 2019. 72 Washington Definitions: Drones Sample definition: An unmanned aircraft that is operated without the possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the aircraft. should apply to unmanned aerial vehicles controlled by a remote operator. -------------------------------------------------- Unmanned Underwater Vehicle NAS Protects Terabytes of Top Secret Mission Data DEFENSE SOLUTIONS Challenge Solution Results Size constrained UUV SWaP-optimized DTS1 High-capacity removable storage Protection for critical data at rest 4TB Removable Memory Cartridge with path to 8TB NSA CSfC-approved 2-layer encryption Reduced SWaP enabling longer missions Large storage capacity with room for growth Top Secret data protected in transport Challenge Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) provide an efficient way for the armed forces to autonomously perform critical underwater missions.These underwater drones often travel thousands of miles, remain on station for long periods of time, and collect massive amounts of data.In search of a small form factor network attached storage (NAS) solution for a new UUV, an engineer at a defense contractor reached out to Curtiss-Wright.The UUV required a high storage capacity solution to store critical mission data on long-range missions. -------------------------------------------------- No- tably, the aircraft employing HARP would still have the ability to carry chaff and flare countermeasures, albeit in reduced amounts.46 According to an Orbital ATK press release in February 2015, the HAPS vehicle was able to launch, perform pitch 34 | Air & Space Power Journal maneuvers, and fly to a detonation point that simulated the location of an incoming rocket-propelled grenade (fig.3).47 Optimizing the amount of blast and frag to kill an RPG or a drone is important.Jay Rodgers, the USNs HARP principal investor, states that even blast alone is a tough kill mechanism for achieving effectiveness given kill vehicle warhead size constraints and how close to the aircraft the inter- cept is likely to occur. Thus, he continues, enhanced blast and frag have better RPG [and drone] defeat potential.The enhanced blast is particularly attractive as it has greater effect than unaugmented blast but doesnt have the same lethal radius as fragmentation, a fratricide issue.48 Another USN program, Standoff Weapon Defeat (SOWD), which has similar RPG de- feat concepts as the HARP program, touts being useful as a drone countermeasure.49 Users and investors in SOWD range from DARPA to the Secret Service, and over 10 Army agencies are involved in the program. -------------------------------------------------- 70 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, January 2014), 4344.52.Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request: Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System (Washington, DC: DOD, February 2015), 5-2, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/defbudget/fy2016/fy2016_Weapons.pdf.53.Douhet, Command of the Air, 30.Lt Col Leslie F. Hauck III, USAF Colonel Hauck (MA, Air University and Naval War College; MS, Embry Riddle Aeronau- tical University) is the chief of special technical operations at Headquarters, US Air Force.He authored his professional studies paper on drones while attending Air War College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama.Before attending Air University, he served as an F-16 deputy group commander at Luke AFB, Arizona.Colonel Hauck received his commis- sion from the US Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado, and is a career F-16 pilot who has served in multiple positions including 80th Fighter Squadron commander and 310th Fighter Squadron director of operations. -------------------------------------------------- Rather than confirming a targets identity with operatives or informants on the ground, the CIA or the US military then orders a strike based on the activity and location of the mobile phone a person is believed to be using (Scahill and Greenwald, 2014)8.Retired US general and former NSA and CIA 7 See for example the self-description of an intelligence analyst at IC Watch who has the following software- related skills: i2 Analyst Notebook, Microsoft Office, Internet, PowerPoint, Analyst Notebook, Microsoft Excel, Time Management, Facebook, , Microsoft Word, Social Networking, Research https://icwatch.wikileaks.org/nsadocs/andrea- javor55587789OhioHIDTACriminalIntelligenceAnalystIntern2013-05-01 8 [Th]is account is bolstered by top-secret NSA documents previously provided by whistleblower Edward Snowden.It is also supported by a former drone sensor operator with the US Air Force, Brandon Bryant, who has become an outspoken critic of the lethal operations in which he was directly involved in Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen. -------------------------------------------------- Secret military documents expose the inner workings of Obamas drone wars The Intercept 15 October, https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/the-assassination-complex/ Schmid A, 2011, The Definition of Terrorism in The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research Ed A Schmid (Routledge, Abingdon, Virginia), 39-99 21 Schneier B, 2006, Data Mining for Terrorists, Schneier Blog 3 March, https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/03/data_mining_for.html Shaw I, 2013, Bureaucratic AssassinationHow do US Targeted Killings Work?"Understanding Empire Blog 3 October, http://understandingempire.wordpress.com/2013/10/03/bureaucratic-assassination-how- do-u-s-targeted-killings-work Shaw I, Akhter M, 2014, "The dronification of state violence" Critical Asian Studies 46(2) 211234 Staheli U, 2012, "Listing the Global: Dis/Connectivity beyond Representation?"Distinktion: Scandinavion Journal of Social Theory 13(3) 233246 Star S L, Ruhleder K, 1996, Steps Toward an Ecology of Infrastructure. -------------------------------------------------- Design and Access for Large Information Spaces. Information Systems Research 7 111-134 Stohl C, Stohl M, 2007 Networks of Terror: Theoretical Assumptions and Pragmatic Consequences. Communication Theory 17 July: 93-124 Suchman, L, 1994, Do Categories Have Politics?The Language / Action Perspective Reconsidered.Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) 2 177-190 Thrift N, French S, 2002, The Automatic Production of Space.Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers NS 27 309-335 Weber J, 2003, Umkampfte Bedeutungen: Naturkonzepte im Zeitalter der Technoscience (Campus: Frankfurt, New York) Weber J, 2011, Blackboxing Organisms, Exploiting the Unpredictable: Control Paradigms in Human-Machine Translation, in Science in the Context of Application.Eds.M Carrier, A Nordmann (Springer: Dordrecht / Heidelberg / London / New York) 409-429 Wikileaks, 2015, IC Watch.https://icwatch.wikileaks.org/ Whitlock C, 2012, Remote US base at core of secret operations The Washington Post 25 October, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-us-base-at- core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392-197a-11e2-bd10- 5ff056538b7c_story.html Woods C, 2015, Covert drone strikes and the fiction of zero civilian casualties in Precision Strike Warfare and International Intervention. --------------------------------------------------