ntially rational there has to be a non-inferential way in which they go through that acquisition of rationality right and so i think saying that because like because because the the mystic cannot give us any inferential content of any significant degree it's ineffable right in terms of you know in profound ways that instead of making that a worrying thing that makes us say oh it's probably not rational because that there's a way of saying no no if we've got all this other independent argument that it's really affording transformation in a way that's rationally justifiable then we should say no no that's a good thing because it points to the kind of proleptic rationality that is actually needed to undergo transformation yeah the kind of rationality you use to justify transformation is not inferential argumentative rationality it's proleptic aspirational rationality yeah yeah i i hear what he's saying i i get that and i appreciate that i i wonder if i mean i think i think you may yourself have employed this this sort of the ancient analogy of gnosis yes knowing which is which is which is more than propositional um and and i appreciate i appreciate the desire to to to distance from the propositional in a day and age where we've become overly propositioned yeah a little bit of a tongue-in-cheek expression um so i i i you have me with that well and the reason is is because i wanna i wanna sort of i wanna have a response to a kind of knee-jerk reaction to well there's no you know they don't offer any arguments they just point to their experience and therefore it's not rational it's like no no no you've misunderstood i've given you how this is all taking place outside of the propositional and then you know if you work if you look at the very tight arguments of l.a paul and agnes callard jerry fodor even who came out of computational cognitive science right right you can't or think about again the neural networks throwing in the noise to overcome the overfitting that's a non-inferential non-proposition we have to use the