t what the the the concept of god provides as an affordance for one trying to make contact with an external mind yeah so i mean i i talk about the imaginal as opposed to the imaginary the imaginary's the mental image the imaginal is like when you're pretending and you're acting and then we we can we can we can we can think about the idea of like virtual augmentation like a heads-up display and then we can put the two together we can get you know imaginally augmented reality and so you know we can use these imagina we can do the serious play because we're trying to develop and transform with imaginable augmentation that gets us into the right functionality to get into the right relationship which doesn't mean that that particular pretense right is sort of the accurate picturing of the right of the the the pull of the you know that the the thing that we are in relationship with uh very much yeah right right it's it it's interesting that that's the path towards the real you you made the case before that the path towards the rational must itself be rational but over here there's an implication that the path towards the real can also uh employ things which which are not the real yeah so right and so i i want to say that again um that um i i think in the way i've done it very carefully at least according to you uh i guess also according to me uh you know a argument for the proleptic rationality of higher states of consciousness that precisely lack any content and therefore in some sense are the most impoverished um i think i could make a similar case for the proleptic rationality of the imaginal i think in many ways that's what corban was trying to do in his work i think and that's why his work is really pivotally important right now as he was trying to say no no there is a way there like because he unlike jung corbin was much more willing and and repeatedly uh i i self-identified as a neoplatonist and there's a way in which no no like i can ultimately justify uh the the the i can give you a pro-proleptic justification