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Chapter 7

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(1) Do you not know, brethren -- for I am speaking to those who know the law -- that the law is binding on a person only during his life? (2) Thus a married woman is bound by law to her husband as long as he lives; but if her husband dies she is discharged from the law concerning the husband. (3) Accordingly, she will be called an adulteress if she lives with another man while her husband is alive. But if her husband dies she is free from that law, and if she marries another man she is not an adulteress. (4) Likewise, my brethren, you have died to the law through the body of Christ, so that you may belong to another, to him who has been raised from the dead in order that we may bear fruit for God. (5) While we were living in the flesh, our sinful passions, aroused by the law, were at work in our members to bear fruit for death. (6) But now we are discharged from the law of death wherein we were detained, so that we serve in newness of spirit, and not in the oldness of the letter. _________________________________________________________________________________ After showing that we are set free from sin through the grace of Christ, the Apostle now shows that through the same grace we are freed from slavery to the Law. In regard to this he does two things: first, he states his proposition; secondly, he excludes an objection [v. 7; n. 532]. In regard to the first he does two things: 263 first, he shows that through the grace of Christ we are freed from the slavery of the Law; secondly, that this liberation is useful [v. 4c; n. 529]. In regard to the first he does three things: first, he makes a statement from which he argues to his proposition; secondly, he clarifies it [v. 2; n. 521]; thirdly, he concludes [v. 4; n. 527]. 519. The statement he makes is presented as something known to them. Hence he says: Do you not know, brethren? As if to say: You should not be ignorant of this. The reason they should not be ignorant of it is shown when he says: I am speaking to those who know the law. 520. But since the Romans were Gentiles and ignorant of the Law of Moses, it seems that what is said here does not apply to them. Therefore, some explained this as referring to the natural law, of which the Gentiles were not ignorant, as he said earlier: "When the Gentiles who have not the law do by nature what the law requires, they are a law to themselves" (Rom 2:14). Hence it is added: that the law is binding on a person, i.e., the natural law, as long as it lives, i.e., the law in man. And it lives as long as natural reason functions efficaciously in a person; but it dies, as long as natural reason succumbs to the passions: "They have broken the everlasting covenant" (Is 24:5), i.e., of the natural law. 264 But this interpretation does not seem to agree with the intention of the Apostle who always has in mind the Law of Moses, when he speaks of the Law with no modifying qualifications. Therefore, it is better to say that the Roman believers were not only Gentiles; there were many Jews among them. Hence it says in Acts 18 that Paul found at Corinth a certain Jew named Aquila, who bad recently arrived from Italy, and Priscilla his wife, because Claudius had expelled all the Jews from Rome. Therefore, the Law is binding on a person as long as he lives. For the Law was given to direct man in the way of this life, as it says in Ps 25 (v.12): "He will instruct him in the way that he should choose." Therefore, the obligation of the Law is dissolved by death. 521. Then (v.2) he clarifies what he had said with an example from the law of marriage: first, he gives the example; secondly, he clarifies it by a sign [v. 3; n. 525]. 522. In regard to the first he does two things [n. 523]. First, in the example he states how the obligation endures during life, saying: Thus a married woman is by divine law bound to her husband as long as he lives: "Your husband shall rule over you" (Gen 3:16); "What God has joined together, let no man put asunder" (Mt 19:6). And this indissolubility of marriage is especially considered, inasmuch as it is the sacrament of the indissoluble union of Christ and the Church, or of the Word and human 265 nature in the person of Christ: "This is a great mystery, and I take it to mean Christ and the Church" (Eph 5:32). 523. Secondly, he shows in the example how the obligation of the law is dissolved by death, saying: But if her husband dies, the woman, after the death of the husband, is discharged from the law concerning the husband, i.e., from the law of marriage by which she is obliged to the husband. For since, as Augustine says in his book On Marriage and Concupiscence, marriage is a good of mortal man, its obligation does not extend beyond mortal life. For this reason "in the resurrection," when life will be immortal, "they neither marry nor are given in marriage" (Mt 22:30). From this it is plain that if a person were to die and be restored to life, as Lazarus was, the one who had been his wife is no longer so, unless he marries her again. 524. But against this one might bring what is stated in Heb (11:35): "Women received their dead by resurrection!" But one should realize that the women received not their husbands but their sons, as the woman in 1 Kg 17 through Elijah, and another in 2 Kg 4 through Elisha. The case is different with sacraments which imprint a character, which is a consecration of an immortal soul. Now every consecration endures as long as the consecrated thing lasts, as is plain in the consecration of a church or altar. Therefore, if a baptized or confirmed or ordained person were to die and rise again, he would not have to repeat these sacraments. 525. Then (v. 3) he clarifies what he had said by a sign. 266 And first, in regard to the obligation of marriage, which continues for the wife as long as the husband is alive. The sign of this is that she will be called an adulteress, if she lives with another man, i.e., as wife and husband, while her husband is alive: "If a man divorces his wife and she goes from him and becomes another man’s wife, would not she be polluted and contaminated?" (Jer 3:1). Secondly, he adduces a sign of the fact that the obligation of the law of marriage is dissolved by death, saying: But if her husband dies, she is free from that law by which she is bound to the husband, so that she is not an adulteress, if she is carnally united to another man, particularly if she has married him: "If the husband dies," namely, the woman’s, "she is free to be married to whom she wishes only in the Lord" (1 Cor 7:39). 526. This shows that second, third or fourth marriages are lawful of themselves, and not only by dispensation as Chrysostom seems to say, when he says that just as Moses permitted a bill of divorce, so the Apostle permitted second marriages. For there is no reason, if the marriage law is dissolved by death, why the survivor may not marry again. It is not because second marriages are illicit that the Apostle says: "A bishop should be married only once" (1 Tim 3:2), but on account of the sacramental sign: for he would not be one of one, as Christ is the spouse of one Church. 527. Then (v. 4) he concludes to his main proposition, saying: Likewise, my brethren, you have died to the law through the body of Christ, i.e., in becoming members of the body of Christ, dying and being buried with him, as stated above; you have died to the law in the sense that the obligation of the Law ceases in you, so that you may belong to another, namely, Christ, in whom through rising with him you have received a new 267 life. Hence you are held obliged not by the law of the former life but by the law of the new life. But this application seems awkward, because in the preceding example the man, died and the woman remarried without obligation of the law. But here the one released from obligation is said to die. However, if we consider it another way, there is a parallel, because since marriage is between two, it makes no difference which one dies. In either case the law is taken away by death. Hence the obligation of the Old Law ceases in virtue of the death by which we die with Christ. 529. Then (v. 4b) he shows the utility of this liberation. In regard to this he does three things: first, he mentions the utility, saying: that we may bear fruit to God. For if we have been made members of Christ and abide in Christ, we can bear fruit, i.e., good works, for the honor of God: "As the branch cannot bear fruit by itself, unless it abides in the vine" (Jn 15:4). 530. The second is there at While we were living. He shows that this fruit was impeded when we were under the slavery of the Law, saying: while we were living in the flesh, i.e., subject to the concupiscence of the flesh, our sinful passions, aroused by the law, were at work in our members, i.e., moved our members: "What causes wars and what causes fightings among you? Is it not your passions?" (Jas 4:1). And this to bear fruit for death: "Sin when it is full-grown brings forth death (Jas 1:15). The third is there at But now we are discharged. 268 He shows that this usefulness is acquired by those freed from the slavery of the Law, saying: But we are now discharged by the grace of Christ from the law of death, i.e., from the slavery of the Law of Moses, which is called the law of death, because it killed violators without mercy: "A man who has violated the law of Moses dies without mercy" (Heb 10:28). Or better, it is called the law of death because if offered the occasion for spiritual death, as it says in 2 Cor (3:6): "For the written code kills, but the Spirit gives life." Dead to that which held us captive as slaves under the law: "Before faith came we were confined under the law" (Gal 3:23). We have been freed in such a way that we serve not under the old written code but in the new life of the Spirit, i.e., renewed in the spirit through the grace of Christ: "A new heart I will give you, and a new spirit I will put within you" Ez (36:26); not in the old written code, i.e., not according to the old law. Or not in the old written code of sin which the letter of the law could not remove: "I have grown weak in the midst of all my foes (Ps 6:7).
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(7) What shall we say, then? Is the law sin? Let it not be! But I had not known sin, except through the law. For I would not have known concupiscence, if the law had not said: You shall not covet. (8) But taking the occasion, sin through the commandment wrought in me every concupiscence. For without the law sin was dead. (9) And I lived some time without the law. But when the commandment came, sin revived,
(10) And I died. And for me the commandment that was unto life was found to be unto death. (11) For sin, taking occasion by the commandment, seduced me and by it killed me. (12) Wherefore the law indeed is holy, and the commandment holy and just and good. (13) Was that then which is good made death for me? Let it not be! But sin, that it may appear sin, through what is good wrought death in me, that sin might become sinful above measure through the commandment.
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After showing that through Christ’s grace we are freed from the slavery of the Law [n. 518], and that this liberation is useful, the Apostle now answers an objection which arises from the foregoing, namely, that the Old Law seems not to be good. In regard to this he does two things. First, he solves the objection through which it seems that the Old Law is not good; secondly, he shows that the Law is good, there [v.14; n. 556] at For we know. In regard to the first he does two things. First, he sets out the objection with regard to the Law; secondly, he solves it, there [v.12; n. 551] at Wherefore the Law indeed. 533. First, therefore, he says: I have said that sinful passions existed by means of the Law and that it is a Law of death. What then shall we say follows from such statements? Shall we say that the law is sin? 270 This can be taken in two ways. In one way, that the Law teaches sin, as is said in Jer 10(:3), "The laws of the people are vain," namely because they teach vanity. In another way, that the Law is called sin, because the one who gave the Law sinned by decreeing such a law. These two follow one from the other, because if the Law teaches sin, the lawgiver sins by decreeing the law: "Woe to them that make wicked laws" (Is 10:1). Now it seems that the Law does teach sin, if the sinful passions come through the Law, and if the Law leads to death. 534. Then when he says Let it not be, he solves the aforesaid objection. Concerning this it should be noted that if the Law per se and directly caused sinful passions or death, it would follow that the Law is sin in either of the two ways mentioned; but not if the Law were the occasion of sinful passions and death. In regard to this he does two things. First, he shows what the Law does per se; secondly, what follows from it as from an occasion, there [v. 8; n. 540] at But taking the occasion. 535. Concerning the first he does three things. First, he answers the question, saying: Let it not be, namely that the Law be sin. For it does not teach sin: "The law of the Lord is perfect" (Ps 19:7). Nor has the lawgiver sinned as though decreeing an unjust law: "By me kings reign and lawgivers decree just things" (Pr 8:15). 536. Secondly, there at But I would not have known, he indicates what pertains per se to the Law, namely, to make sin known and not to remove it. 271 And that is what he says: But I would not have known sin except through the law: "Through the law comes knowledge of sin" (Rom 3:20). This is clear if it is understood of the natural law, because man distinguishes between good and evil through the natural law: "He filled their heart with wisdom and showed them both good and evil" (Sir 17:6). But here the Apostle seems to be speaking of the Old Law, which he signified above when he said the oldness of the letter. One should say therefore that without the Law sin could be known insofar as it has the character of ignobility, i.e., as something contrary to reason, but not inasmuch as it is an offense against God, because through the Laws divinely decreed, man learns that human sins displease God, since he forbids them and commands that they be punished. 537. Thirdly, there at For I would not have known concupiscence, he proves what he had said, saying: For I would not have known concupiscence, if the law had not said: You shall not covet [non concupisces]. In regard to this it should be noted that his statement, I would not have known sin except through the law, could be interpreted as referring to the sinful act which the Law brings to man’s attention, when it forbids it. This, of course, is true in some cases, for it says in Leviticus 18(:23), "A woman shall not lie down with a beast." But that this is not the Apostle’s meaning is clear from what he says here. For no one is unaware of the act of concupiscence, since all experiences it. Therefore, it must be interpreted as saying that, as was stated above, it is only through the Law that sin is recognized as something subject to punishment and an offense against God. He uses concupiscence to prove this, because corrupt concupiscence is common to all sins. Hence a gloss says, with Augustine, "Here the Apostle chose a 272 general sin, i.e., concupiscence." Therefore the law is good, because when it forbids concupiscence, it forbids all evils. 538. It might be supposed that concupiscence is a general sin according as it is taken for the desire for something illicit, which is of the essence of any sin. This is not the way Augustine called concupiscence a general sin, but because the root and cause of every sin is some special concupiscence. Hence a Gloss says that concupiscence is a general sin from which all sins come. For the Apostle quotes a precept from Ex 20(:17), "You shall not covet [non concupisces] your neighbor’s property." This is the concupiscence involved in avarice, about which it says in 1 Tim (6:10): "The love of money is the root of all evils," because "all things obey money (Ecc 10:19). Therefore, the concupiscence about which he is now speaking is a general evil, not with the commonness of a genus or species but with the commonness of causality. Nor is this contrary to what is stated in Sir (l0:15) that "pride is the beginning of all sin." For pride is the beginning of sin on the side of turning away [from God]; but covetousness is the beginning of sins on the side of turning toward a changeable good. 539. But it can be said that the Apostle takes covetousness to clarify his proposition, because he wants to show that without the Law sin was not known, i.e., its aspect as offense against God. This is particularly clear from the fact that the Law forbids covetousness, which is not forbidden by man. For God alone considers man guilty for coveting with the heart, as it says in 1 Sam (16:7): "Man sees those things that appear, but the Lord beholds the heart." But the reason God’s law forbade coveting another’s property, which is taken by stealing, and another’s wife, who is violated by 273 adultery, and not the coveting involved in other sins is that the former sins involve a p1easure in the very coveting, which does not happen in other sins. 540. Then (v.8) he shows what follows from the Law by way of opportunity. First, he states his intention; secondly, he clarifies it [v. 8b; n. 544]. 541. First, therefore, he says that sin, finding opportunity in the commandment of the Law forbidding sin, wrought in me all kinds of covetousness. By sin can be understood the devil, because he is the beginning of sin; and according to this he works all kinds of covetousness in man: "He who commits sin is of the devil, for the devil has sinned from the beginning" (1 Jn 3:8). But because the Apostle had not mentioned the devil here, it can be said that each actual sin, as apprehended in thought, works in man a desire for it, as it says in Jas (1:14): "Each one is tempted by his own desire. Then desire when it has conceived gives birth to sin." 542. But it is better to say that this refers to the sin he described above (c.5) as entering this world through one man, namely, original sin, which before the grace of Christ is in men according to guilt and punishment. But with the coming of grace its liability to punishment passes, although it abides with respect to inclination or habitual covetousness, which works in man every act of covetousness, whether it be the kinds of covetousness involved in various sins (for the covetousness involved in stealing is not the same as that in adultery) or the various degrees of covetousness as found in thought, pleasure, consent and deed. 274 But to work this effect in man sin finds opportunity in the Law. And that is what he says: finding opportunity. Or because with the coming of the precept the aspect of transgression is added, for "where there is no law there is no transgression" (Rom 4:15); or because desire for the forbidden sin increases, for the reasons given above. 543. It should be noted that he does not say that the Law gave the opportunity for sin, but that sin itself found opportunity by reason of the Law. For one who gives an opportunity scandalizes and, as a consequence, sins. This happens when someone commits an unrighteous act by which his neighbor is offended or takes scandal; for example, if someone frequents places of evil even with no evil intention. Hence he says below (14:13): "But decide never to put a stumbling block or hindrance in the way of a brother." But if someone does a righteous act, for example, if he gives alms, by which someone else is scandalized, he is not giving an opportunity for scandal; hence he neither gives scandal nor sins, but the one scandalized finds the act an opportunity for taking scandal and sins. Thus, therefore, the Law did what is right, because it forbade sin; hence it gave no opportunity for sinning, but man takes opportunity from the Law. For this reason it follows that the Law is not sin, but rather that sin is on the part of man. Consequently, sinful passions, which pertain to the covetousness involved in sin, do not exist in virtue of the Law as though the Law wrought them, but sin causes them, taking occasion from the law. And for the same reason it is called a law of death, not because the Law begets death, but because sin begets death by finding opportunity in the Law. 275 Now in the same sense the words can be arranged another way to say that sin worked all concupiscence through the command of the law, and this by taking occasion from the command; but the first exposition is simpler and better. 544. Then (v.8b) he clarifies what he had said; and this through experience of the effect: first, he mentions the effect; secondly, he repeats the cause [v. 11; n. 550]. In regard to the first he does three things: first, he describes conditions before the Law; secondly, under the Law [v. 9b; n. 547]; thirdly, from a comparison of the two conditions he concludes to the outcome of the Law [v. 10b; n. 549]. 545. First, therefore, he says: But sin, finding opportunity in the commandment, wrought in me all kinds of covetousness. This is obvious from the fact that apart from the law sin lay dead, not as though sin did not exist, because through one man sin entered this world before the Law (Rom 5:12), but in the sense that it was dead either with respect to man’s knowledge, which did not know that certain things forbidden by the Law were sins, for example, covetousness; or because it was dead as compared to what it was later. For it did not have as much power to lead men to death as it had later, when it took opportunity from the Law. For that is considered dead whose strength is weakened: "Mortify your members which are on earth" (Col 3:5). This, therefore, was the condition before the Law as far as sin was concerned. 276 546. But the condition so far as man was concerned is indicated when he says: I was once alive apart from the law. This can also be understood in two ways; in one way with respect to the fact that it seemed to man that he was alive, so long as he did not know that sin was that by reason of which he was dead: "You have the name of being alive, but you are dead" (Rev 3:1). Or this is said in comparison to the death which followed by occasion of the Law. For those who sin less are said to be alive in comparison to those who sin more. 547. Then (v. 9b) he describes conditions under the Law. First in regard to sin when he says: But when the commandment came, i.e., after the law was decreed, sin revived. This can be understood in two ways: in one way with respect to the knowledge of man, who began to know that sin existed in him, which he did not know before: "After I was instructed, I smote upon my thigh; I was ashamed and I was confounded" (Jer 31:19). He says, revived, because in paradise man had full knowledge of sin, although he did not have it through experience. Or sin revived as to its power, because after the Law was given, the opportunity was given for the power of sin to increase: "The power of sin is the law" (1 Cor 15:56). 548. Secondly, with respect to man himself; hence he says: and I died. This can also be understood in two ways: in one way as referring to man’s knowledge, so that "I died" means that I knew myself dead. In another way in comparison to the previous state, so that the sense is: I died, i.e., I was more bound to death than before. Hence what was said to Moses and Aaron is somewhat true: "You have killed the Lord’s people" (Num 16:13). 277 549. Then (v.10) he concludes from the comparison between the two states the outcome of the Law, saying that the very commandment which promised life according to the intention of the lawgiver: "I gave them my statutes and showed them my ordinances by whose observance man shall live" (Ez 20:11) proved to be an occasion of death for me, i.e., through sin which existed in man: "His food is turned in his stomach, it is the gall of asps within him" (Jb 20:14). 550. Then (v.11) he repeats the cause as though intending to clarify it by the outcome of the Law, saying: This happened, namely, that the commandment which promised life proved to be death, because sin, finding opportunity in the commandment deceived me through the covetousness it wrought in me. "Beauty hath deceived thee and lust hath perverted thy heart" (Dan 13:56) and by it, namely, the commandment, sin took occasion to kill me: "The written code kills" (2 Cor 3:6). 551. Then (v.12) he reaches the main conclusion, namely, that the Law is not only not sin but furthermore is good, making sin to be known and forbidding it. First he concludes with respect to the whole law, saying: As is clear from the foregoing, the law is holy: "The law of the Lord is without blemish" (Ps 19:7); "We know that the law is good" (2 Tim 1:8). Secondly, with respect to the particular commandments of the Law, saying: and the commandment is holy in regard to the ceremonial precepts by which men are directed in the worship of God: "Be holy because I am holy" (Lev 20:7) and just, in regard to the judicial precepts by which man is ordained to his neighbor in the proper way: "The ordinances of the Lord are true and righteous altogether" (Ps 19:9); and good, in regard to the moral precepts: "The law of thy mouth is better to me than thousands of gold and 278 silver pieces" (Ps 119:72). Yet, because all the commandments ordain us to God, he called the whole law holy. 552. Then (v.13b) he raises a question in regard to the effect of the Law. First the question, saying: Did that which is good, namely, in itself, bring death to me, i.e., act as a per se cause of death? For someone could falsely gather this from what he stated above, namely, that the commandment which promised life proved to be death to me. 553. Secondly, he answers negatively, saying: Let it not be. For that which in itself is good and life-giving cannot be the cause of evil and death, because "a good tree cannot bear evil fruit" (Mt 7:18). 554. Thirdly, he shows that what he is now saying is in agreement with what he had said above. For the commandment itself does not bring death; but sin, finding opportunity in the commandment, brings death. And that is what he says: But sin, in order that sin might be shown to be sin, worked death in me through what is good, because the Law is good by the very fact that it brings knowledge of sin. 555. This does not mean that sin worked death through the law, as though there was no death without the Law. For it was stated above that death reigned from Adam to Moses, i.e., before the Law was given. What it means is that sin worked death through the Law, because the damnation of death was increased when the Law came. And this is what he says: that sin might become sinful beyond the previous measure, either because the liability for transgression grew or because the inclination to sin increased with the coming of the Law’s prohibitions. 279 As stated above [n. 541ff.] "sin" here means the devil, or rather the inclination to sin.
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(14) For we know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal, sold under sin. (15) I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate. (16) Now if I do what I do not want, I agree that the law is good. (17) So then it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me. (18) For I know that nothing good dwells within me, that is, in my flesh. I can will what is right, but I cannot do it. (19) For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do. (20) Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me.
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After showing that the Law is neither evil nor productive of an evil effect [n. 532], the Apostle now proves that the Law is good. In regard to this he does two things: first, he proves its goodness from the very repugnance to good found in man, a repugnance the Law cannot take away; secondly, he shows what can take away this repugnance [v. 24; n. 589]. In regard to the first he does three things: first, he states his proposition; 280 secondly, he proves it [v. 15; n. 562]; thirdly, he draws the conclusion [v. 21; n. 583]. In regard to the first he does two things: first, he asserts the goodness of the Law; secondly, man’s condition [v. 14b; n. 558]. 557. First, therefore he says: We have stated that the Law is holy. We said this because we, who are wise in divine matters, know that the law, i.e., the old, is spiritual, i.e., in harmony with man’s spirit: "The law of the Lord is stainless Ps 19 (v.7). Or it is spiritual, i.e., given by the Holy Spirit who is called the finger of God: "If by the finger of God I cast out demons" (Lk 11:20). Hence it says in Ex (31:18): "He gave Moses two tables of stone, written with the finger of God." Yet the New Law is not only called spiritual but "the Law of the Spirit" (Rom 8:2), because it is not only given by the Holy Spirit but the Holy Spirit imprints it on the heart in which he dwells. 558. Then (v. 14b) he indicates man’s condition. This passage can be interpreted in two ways: in one way so that the Apostle is speaking in the person of a man existing in sin. This is the way Augustine explained it. But later in a book against Julian he explained it as though the Apostle is speaking in his own person, i.e., of a man in the state of grace. Let us continue, therefore, by showing how these words and those that follow can be explained under both interpretations, although the second explanation is better. 559. The first statement, therefore, but I am carnal, is so interpreted that the word "I" stands for man’s reason, which is the chief thing in man; hence each man seems to be 281 his own reason or intellect, as a city seems to be the ruler of the city, so that whatever he does the city seems to do. 560. But man is called carnal, because his reason is carnal. It is called carnal in two ways: in one way from the fact that it is submissive to the flesh and consents to things to which the flesh urges it: "For while there is jealousy and strife among you, are you not of the flesh?" (1 Cor 3:3). In this way it is understood of man not yet healed by grace. In another way reason is said to be carnal, because it is under attack from the flesh: "The desires of the flesh are against the Spirit" (Gal 5:17). In this way, even the reason of a man in the state of grace is said to be carnal. In both cases it is carnal on account of sin; hence he adds, sold under sin. 561. But it should be noted that the carnality, which implies rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, arises from the sin of the first parent, because this pertains to the inclination to sin derived from that sin. But the carnality which implies submission of reason to the flesh arises not only from original sin but actual, through which a man by obeying the desires of the flesh makes himself a slave of the flesh; hence he adds: sold under sin, namely, of the first parent or of the self. He says, sold, because the sinner sells himself into the slavery of sin as payment for fulfilling his own will: "For your iniquities you were sold" (Is 50:1). 562. Then (v.15) he clarifies what he had stated: first, that the Law is spiritual; secondly, that man is carnal, sold under sin [v. 17; n. 568]. In regard to the first he does two things: first, he presents a proof; 282 secondly, he draws the conclusion [v. 16; n. 567]. The proof is based on man’s infirmity, which he first asserts; secondly, he gives the proof [v. 15b; n. 564]. 563. The proof is based on man’s infirmity, revealed by the fact that he does what he knows should not be done; hence he says: For what I do, I do not understand, i.e., do not know that it should be done. This can be taken in two ways: in one way of a person subject to sin, who understands in general that sin should not be committed, but overcome by the suggestion of the devil or by passion or by the inclination of a perverse habit, he commits it. Therefore, he said to do what he understands is not to be done, acting against conscience, just as "the servant who knew his master’s will but did not act according to his will" (Lk 12:47). In another way it can be understood of one in the state of grace. He does evil not by performing the deed or consenting with the mind, but only by desiring through a passion in the sensitive appetite; and that desire escapes the reason or intellect, because it exists before the intellect’s judgment. When the judgment is made, the desire is impeded. Therefore, it is significant that he does not say: "I understand it is not to be done" but "I do not understand"; namely, because such a desire arises before the intellect has deliberated or has perceived it: "The desires of the flesh are against the Spirit, and the desires of the Spirit are against the flesh" (Gal 5:17). 564. Then (v.15b) he proves what he had said by division and by effect. 283 First, he distinguishes under the division between "not doing the good" and "doing evil," because even a person who does not do the good is said to commit sin, i.e., the sin of omission. 565. In regard to he omission of the good therefore, he says: For I do not do the good I want [will]. In one way this can be understood of a man in the state of sin; then I do refers to a complete action performed outwardly with the consent of reason, whereas I will refers not to a complete act of will commanding the deed, but to an incomplete willing by which men want the good in general, just as they have a correct judgment about the good in general; yet this judgment is perverted by a bad habit or a perverse passion with the result that the will goes wrong, when it gets down to the particular case, and does not do what it knows in a general way should be done and would want to do. In another way it is understood of a man healed by grace; then, conversely, I will refers to a complete act of willing which lasts through the act of choosing a particular deed, whereas I do refers to an incomplete action which has gone no further than the sense appetite and has not reached the stage of consent. For a man in the state of grace wants to preserve his mind from wicked desires, but he fails to accomplish this good on account of disorderly movements of desire that arise in the sensitive appetite. This is similar to what he says in Gal (5:17): "So that you do not do all that you will." 566. Secondly, in regard to perpetrating evil he says: But the evil I hate, I do. If this is understood of the sinner, I hate means an imperfect hatred in virtue of which every man naturally hates evil; I do means an action completely performed in keeping with 284 reason’s consent. For that general hatred of evil is frustrated in a particular choice by the inclination of a habit or passion. But if it is understood of a person in the state of grace, I do means an incomplete action which has gone no further than existing as a desire in the sensitive appetite; I hate refers to complete hatred, by which one continues hating evil until its final reprobation: "I hate them with a perfect hatred" (Ps 139:22), namely, evil men, inasmuch as they are sinners: "While the laws were very well observed because of the piety of the high priest Onias and his hatred of wickedness" (2 Macc 3:1). 567. Then (v.16) he concludes from the aforementioned condition of man that the Law is good, saying: But if I do what I do not want. No matter which of the aforementioned ways is taken, by the very fact that I hate evil I agree that the law is good in forbidding evil which I naturally do not want. For it is clear that man’s inclination in keeping with reason to will the good and flee evil is in accord with nature or grace; and each is good. Hence, the Law also, which agrees with this inclination by commanding what is good and forbidding what is evil, is good for the same reason: "I give you good precepts; do not forsake my teaching" (Ps 4:2). 568. Then (v.17) he proves what he had said about man’s condition, namely, that he is carnal and sold under sin. In regard to this he does three things: first, he states his proposition; secondly, he proves it [v. 18; n. 572]; thirdly, he draws the conclusion [v. 20; n. 582]. 285 569. That man is carnal and sold under sin as though somehow a slave of sin, is clear from the fact that he does not act but is led by sin. For a free man acts of himself and is not led by another. Therefore, he says: I have said that I agree with the Law so far as my intellect and will are concerned, but when I act against the Law, it is no longer I that do it, i.e., do what is against the Law, but sin which dwells within me. So it is evident that I am a slave of sin, inasmuch as sin by exercising its dominion over me does it. 570. It is easy to understand this of a man in the state of grace; for the fact that he desires something evil, so far as the sensitive appetite pertaining to the flesh is concerned, does not proceed from the work of reason but from the inclination to sin. But a person is said to do what his reason does, because man is what he is according to reason; hence the movements of concupiscible desire, which are not from reason but from the inclination to sin, the man does not do but the inc1intion to sin, which is here called sin "Whence wars and fightings among you? Is it not your passions that are at war in your members?" (Jas 4:1). But this cannot properly be understood of a man in sin, because his reason consents to sin; therefore, he commits it. Hence Augustine and a Gloss say: Greatly deceived is the man who consents to the desires of the flesh and decides to do what they desire and then thinks he can say of himself: I am not doing this. 571. However, there is a way, although forced, to understand this even of a sinner. For an action is mainly attributed to the principal agent acting in virtue of its proper characteristic, not to the agent acting in virtue of a characteristic proper to some other thing by which it is moved. But it is clear that man’s reason, considered in the light 286 of what is proper to it, is not inclined to evil, but insofar as it is moved by concupiscible desire. Therefore, the doing of evil, which reason does, inasmuch as it has been overcome by desire, is not attributed principally to reason, which is understood here to be man, but rather to the desire or habit in virtue of which reason is inclined to evil. It should be noted that sin is said to dwell in man, not as though sin were some reality, since it is a privation of good, but to indicate the permanence of this kind of defect in man. 572. Then (v.18) he proves that sin dwelling in man does the evil which man commits: first, he presents the medium proving the proposition; secondly, he explains the medium [v. 18b; n. 577]. 573. First, therefore, he proves that sin dwelling in man does the evil which man commits. This proof is clear when the words are referred to a man in the state of grace, who has been freed from sin by the grace of Christ. Therefore, as to a person in whom Christ’s grace does not dwell, he has not yet been freed from sin. But the grace of Christ does not dwell in the flesh but in the mind; hence it is stated below (8:10) that "if Christ is in us, the body is indeed dead because of sin, but the spirit lives because of righteousness.’’ Therefore, sin, which the desire of the flesh works, still rules in the flesh. For he takes "flesh" here to include the sensitive powers. For the flesh is thus distinguished against the spirit and fights it, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite tends to the contrary of what reason seeks, as it says in Gal (5:17): "The desires of the flesh are against the spirit." 287 574. He says, therefore: We have said that in me, even though healed by grace, sin acts; but this must be understood of me according to the flesh along with the sensitive appetite. For I know through reason and experience that the good, namely, of grace by which I have been reformed, does not dwell in me. But lest this be understood to include reason according to the manner explained above, he adds: that is, in my flesh. For in me, i.e., in my heart, this good does dwell, for it says in Eph (3:17): "That Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith." 575. This makes it clear that this passage does not favor the Manicheans who want the flesh not to be good according to its nature and, consequently, not a good creature of God, whereas it is written: "Everything created by God is good" (1 Tim 4:4). For the Apostle is not discussing a good of nature but the good of grace, by which we are freed from sin. 576. If this passage referred to man existing under sin, it would be superfluous to add, "that is, in my flesh," because in a sinner the good of grace does not dwell either in regard to the flesh or the mind. A forced interpretation would explain this passage by saying that sin, which is the privation of grace, is somehow derived from the flesh to the mind. 577. Then (v.18b) he clarifies what he had said: first, from man’s capabilities; secondly, from his action which proves his capability [v. 19; n. 581]. 578. Man’s capability is described first in regard to willing, which seems to be in man’s power; hence he says, I can will. For nothing is so much within man’s power as his will. 288 Secondly, he describes man’s capability, or rather his difficulty in achieving an effect, when he says: But I cannot do the good, i.e., I do not find it within my power, as it says in Pr (1:9); "The heart of a man disposes his way, but the Lord directs his steps." 579. This passage of Paul seems to favor the Pelagians who said that the start of a good work is from us, inasmuch as we will the good. And this is what the Apostle seems to say: But I cannot do the good. However, he rejects this interpretation in Phil (2:13): "But God is at work in you both to will and to do." 580. Therefore, the fact that I can will, once I have been healed by grace, is due to the work of divine grace, through which I not only will the good but also do some good, because I resist concupiscence and, led by the Spirit, act against it; but I do not find it within my power to accomplish that good so as to exclude concupiscence entirely. This indicates that the good of grace does not reside in the flesh, because if it did, then just as I have the faculty of willing the good because of grace dwelling in the mind, so I would have the faculty of accomplishing the good in virtue of grace residing in the flesh. 581. But if be referred to man existing under sin, then it could be explained so that to will is taken for an incomplete act of willing, which from the impulse of nature is good in some who sin. Then when he says, I do not do the good I want, he manifests what he had said by citing man’s action, which is a sign and effect of human capability. For man does not have the strength to accomplish good, because he does not do the good he wants but does the evil he does not want. This has been explained earlier [n. 564ff]. 582. Then (v.20) he concludes to what he had previously proposed, saying: Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it but sin which dwells within me. This, too, has been explained earlier. 289 But it should be noted that in virtue of the same medium the Apostle concludes to the two things he had proposed above, namely, the goodness of the law, when he said: "If I do what I do not want, I agree that the law is good" (v.16), and the dominion of sin in man, when he says here: "If I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells in me." The first of these conclusions pertains to his statement that the Law is spiritual; the second to the statement: "But I am carnal, sold under sin." But he draws the first conclusion, which is about the goodness of the law, from that medium by reason of "I do not want," because his mind does not want what the law forbids, which shows that the Law is good. But in virtue of the phrase, "I do" he conc1udes that sin, which functions against reason’s will, holds sway over man.
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(21) So I find it to be a law that when I want to do right, evil lies close at hand. (22) For I delight in the law of God, according to the inward man, (23) but I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind and making me captive to the law of sin which dwells in my members. (24) Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from this body of death? (25) The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord! So then, I of myself serve the law of God with my mind, but with my flesh I serve the law of sin.
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After showing that the Law is good because it concords with reason [n. 556], the Apostle now draws two conclusions based on the two things he had posited; 290 the second conclusion is there [v. 23; n. 586] at But I see. In regard to the first he does two things: first, he draws a conclusion from what he had said; secondly, he offers a sign to clarify it [v. 22; n. 585]. 584. Now he had posited two things: the first was that the Law is spiritual, from which he concludes: So I find, namely, by experience, it to be a law consistent with that of Moses, when I will to do the good, i.e., there is agreement between the Law of Moses and my reason, by which I approve the good and detest evil, just as that Law commands the good and forbids evil: "The word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart, that you mayst do it" (Dt 30:14). And in this way it was necessary that evil, i.e., sin or the inclination of sin, lie at hand, i.e., lie next to my reason, as though dwelling in my flesh: "Guard the doors of your mouth from her who lies in your bosom," i.e., from the flesh (Mic 7:5). 585. Then (v.22) he presents a sign to show that the Law agrees with reason. For no one delights except in that which agrees with him. But man according to his reason delights in the Law of God; therefore, the Law of God agrees with reason. And that is what he says: I delight in the law of God in my inner man, i.e., according to reason or mind, which is called the inner man, not that the soul is fashioned according to man’s figure, as Tertullian supposed, or that it alone is man, as Plato said that man is a soul using a body; but because that which is more important in man is called man, as was explained above [n. 570]. But in man that which is more important, so far as appearance is concerned, is outward, namely, the body so fashioned that it is called the outward man. But so far as 291 the truth is concerned, the more important is within, namely, the mind or reason, which is here called the inner man: "How sweet to my taste are your words" (Ps 119:103). 586. Then (v.23) he presents the other conclusion which corresponds to his previous statement that "I am carnal." The conclusion is this: But I see another law in my members, which is the inclination to sin and can be called a law for two reasons: first, by reason of the effect. For just as the Law induces to do good, so the inclination induces to sin. Secondly, by reason of their cause. 587. But since the inclination to sin is a punishment for sin, it has a twofold cause: one cause is sin, which has taken mastery over the sinner and imposed its law on him, i.e., the inclination to sin, just as a master imposes his law on a vanquished slave. The other cause of the inclination is God, who imposed this punishment on sinful man, i.e., that his lower powers do not obey reason. And in this sense the very disobedience of the lower powers constitutes the inclination to sin and is called a law, inasmuch it was introduced by the law of divine justice, just as the sentence of a just judge has the force of law: "And this has been done from that day forward, and was since made a statute, and an ordinance, and as a law in Israel" (1 Sam 30:25). 588. This law is found in the sensitive appetite as in its source, but it is found spread over all the members which play a role for concupiscent desire in sinning: "Just as you once yielded your members to serve impurity and every iniquity, so now yield your members to serve righteousness" (Rom 6:19). Hence he says "in my members." Now this law has two effects in man: first, it resists reason; hence he says: at war with the law of my mind, i.e., with the Law of Moses, which is called the law of the mind, 292 inasmuch as it agrees with the mind or with the natural law, which is called the law of the mind, because it is present by nature in the mind: "They show that what the law requires is written in their hearts" (Rom 2:15). Concerning this resistance it says in Gal (5:17): "The desires of the flesh are against the spirit." The second effect is that it makes man a slave; hence he says: and making me captive, or leading me captive, according to another text, to the law of sin which is in my members, i.e., in myself, following the Hebrew custom of speech whereby a noun is used in place of a pronoun. But the law of sin makes man captive in two ways: the sinner it makes captive through consent and action; the man in grace through the movement of concupiscent desire. Psalm 126 says of this captivity: "When the Lord led back the captives of Zion." 589. Then (v.24) he deals with liberation from the law of sin and does three things: first, he poses a question; secondly, he answers [v. 25; n. 592]; thirdly, he draws a conclusion [v. 25b; n. 594]. In regard to the first he does two things. 590. First, he declares his misery when he says: Wretched man that I am. This wretchedness is the result of sin which dwells in man: either in the flesh only, as in the just man, or also in the mind, as in the sinner: "Sin makes nations miserable" (Pr 14:34). 591. Secondly he asks: Who will deliver me from this body of death? This question seems to express the desire voiced in Ps 142 (v.7): "Bring my soul out of prison." 293 Yet it should be remembered that in man’s body one can consider the very nature of the body which agrees with the soul. It is not from this that he desires to be separated: "We do not wish to be unclothed, but to be clothed over" (2 Cor 5:4). One can also consider the corruptible body which is a load upon the soul, as it says in Wis (9:15). Hence it is significant that he says: from this body of death. 592. Then (v.25) he responds to the question. For man by his own power cannot be freed from the corruption of the body, nor even of the soul, although he agrees with reason against sin, but only by the grace of Christ, as it says in Jn (8:36): "So if the Son makes you free, you are free indeed." Therefore, he says: the grace of God will free me and it is given through Jesus Christ: "Grace and truth came through Jesus Christ" (Jn 1:17). 593. This grace liberates from the body of this death in two ways: in one way so that the corruption of the body does not dominate the soul and draw it to sinning; in another way so that the corruption of the body is taken away entirely. In regard to the first, it is fitting for the sinner to say: Grace has freed me from the body of this death, i.e., from sin into which the soul is led by the corruption of the body. But the just man has already been freed to that point; hence, it befits him to say in regard to the second: The grace of God has freed me from the body of this death, so that in my body is neither the corruption of sin nor of death: which will happen at the resurrection. 594. Then (v.25b) he draws the conclusion which follows in different ways from the foregoing words, depending on how they are explained. For if they are explained in the person of a sinner, the conclusion is inferred in the following manner: It has been said that the grace of God has freed me from the body of 294 this death, so that I am not led into sin by it; therefore, when I have been freed, I serve the law of God with my mind, but with my flesh I serve the law of sin, which law remains in my flesh in regard to the inclination to sin, in virtue of which the desires of the flesh are against the spirit. But if the words are understood as spoken in the person of a just man, the conclusion is inferred in this manner: The grace of God through Jesus Christ has freed me from the body of this death, so that the corruption of sin and death is not in me. So then I, one and the same before being freed, serve the law of God with my mind by consenting to it; but with my flesh I serve the law of sin, inasmuch as my flesh is moved to concupiscent desire according to the law of the flesh. 295







 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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